This document discusses relief scenarios that should be considered when designing relief piping systems. It describes common scenario categories like maintenance, operational upsets, and fire conditions. Key points discussed include using a process hazards analysis to identify realistic scenarios, considering complications like components with different maximum pressure ratings, and estimating the number of devices likely to relieve simultaneously for a given scenario. The document provides an example machinery room fire scenario and compressor maintenance scenarios. It recommends ensuring all relief valves are included in at least one analyzed scenario.
This document discusses relief scenarios that should be considered when designing relief piping systems. It describes common scenario categories like maintenance, operational upsets, and fire conditions. Key points discussed include using a process hazards analysis to identify realistic scenarios, considering complications like components with different maximum pressure ratings, and estimating the number of devices likely to relieve simultaneously for a given scenario. The document provides an example machinery room fire scenario and compressor maintenance scenarios. It recommends ensuring all relief valves are included in at least one analyzed scenario.
This document discusses relief scenarios that should be considered when designing relief piping systems. It describes common scenario categories like maintenance, operational upsets, and fire conditions. Key points discussed include using a process hazards analysis to identify realistic scenarios, considering complications like components with different maximum pressure ratings, and estimating the number of devices likely to relieve simultaneously for a given scenario. The document provides an example machinery room fire scenario and compressor maintenance scenarios. It recommends ensuring all relief valves are included in at least one analyzed scenario.
This document discusses relief scenarios that should be considered when designing relief piping systems. It describes common scenario categories like maintenance, operational upsets, and fire conditions. Key points discussed include using a process hazards analysis to identify realistic scenarios, considering complications like components with different maximum pressure ratings, and estimating the number of devices likely to relieve simultaneously for a given scenario. The document provides an example machinery room fire scenario and compressor maintenance scenarios. It recommends ensuring all relief valves are included in at least one analyzed scenario.
Examples Scenarios Defined − conditions enabling one or more relief valves on a common header to simultaneously relieve pressure
Scenario categories include
Maintenance
Relief Scenarios
Operational Fire Condition
Upset ASHRAE 15 “Scenarios” Basis for sizing the relief valves − Vessels (§9.7.5) isolated & subject to a fire No insulation or jacket assumed − Compressors (§9.8 & Appendix F) “cold- start” with the discharge isolation valve closed Minimum regulated flow with suction assumed to be +50°F for high-stage duty and the saturated intermediate temperature for boosters
§9.7.8.4 discusses common headers and
relief valves “expected to operate simultaneously” IIAR 2 11.3.4 ... The size and maximum equivalent length of common discharge piping downstream from each of two or more relief devices shall be governed by the sum of the discharge capacities of all the relief devices that are expected to discharge simultaneously… Relief header scenarios The extremes, often unrealistic − Only ONE PRV relieving at a time − EVERY PRV simultaneously relieving
EVERY PRV lifting is not a SCENARIO
but it does provide a RESULT
What is the SCENARIO?
− Fire in the area surrounding the components − Maintenance related scenario − Internal heat addition − Other? The Extremes
Only “ONE PRV relieving at a time”
− Issues ASHRAE 15 “scenarios” are for sizing the relief valve (isolation) ASHRAE 15/IIAR 2 refers to multiple relief valves relieving simultaneously − Observations Every PRV needs to be present in at least one scenario Only one PRV relieving at a time is often not reasonable for external heat addition scenarios (i.e. fire) The Extremes
“All at once” simultaneous relief scenario
− Issues Doesn’t provide any additional insight into actual scenarios May (probably) not be a realistic scenario Causes us to ignore possible lessons learned by thinking through more realistic scenarios − Observations Provides for an apples-to-apples competitive bid No one can say you haven’t considered every possible overpressure scenario Scenario identification
Use the Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) to
identify/corroborate scenarios − Overpressure of system components or plant areas (e.g. machinery room)
Maintenance procedures should be
reviewed to identify potential overpressure scenarios
Previous incidents that have occurred in
the facility or the industry at-large should be used to identify overpressure scenarios Scenario complications Component on common pressure level with different MAWPs¹ − Examples Compressor oil separators (or oil coolers) with 300 psig MAWP discharging into an vessel with <300 psig MAWP Booster compressors w/higher MAWP discharging into an intercooler w/lower MAWP
Sizing basis for internal heat sources
− Examples Thermosiphon oil coolers − Recommend sizing relief valve for full-load oil cooling heat load Components undergoing Clean-In-Place (CIP) ¹ Maximum Allowable Working Pressure Machinery room scenarios Fire − What components are nearby? − What pressure levels are they on? − What are the component MAWPs?
Maintenance − Compressors are the most common maintenance scenario − ASHRAE sizing scenario How many compressors would realistically be undergoing this scenario simultaneously? Example: Machinery Room Scenario #1: Machinery room fire − All vessel relief valves in the room active − Heat gain to components with higher MAWP on the same pressure vessel is considered Thermosiphon oil coolers heat gain (fDL) added to pilot receiver relief valve Oil separators heat gain (fDL) added to high pressure receiver or intercooler Example: Machinery Room
Scenario #2-#n: Compressor maintenance
− Each compressor’s relief valve active for the largest number of compressors expected to undergo simultaneous maintenance − Include the oil cooler if the relief valves fitted on the oil cooler and oil separator share a common riser to the header − Note that each compressor may have it’s own scenario if the branch piping details and relief valve sizes are different Other non-simultaneous justifications
Fire-rated partition separating
components on a common header − For example, a high-pressure receiver located outside of machinery room
Components are normally in common
(i.e. not isolated relative to one another) with different MAWPs − For example, a 300 psig oil pot that is connected to a 250 psig recirculator package Mitigation example Take steps to reduce the scenario or the size of the required relief valve
Background − CIP of refrigerated silo − ASME Stamped at 150 psig MAWP − CIP has lifted relief valves in the past even when steps are skipped and heat exchanger is open to suction − Unknown how much the pressure exceeded the relief valve set pressure Mit. Example, continued An incident investigation should have been done in response to lifting relief valve − Possible investigation recommendations Revisit/re-do PHA on silo Train staff responsible for CIP Install a high-pressure cutout to stop CIP if pressure reaches a pre-determined limit % of MAWP Verify CIP process, controls, and equipment are being maintained as part of mechanical integrity Automate the CIP process − Wrong response Increase the size of the relief valve Recommendations If you use an “all at once” scenario for designing the header, consider describing and highlighting it as such and creating reasonable scenarios for showing compliance
Use the PHA process to identify
scenarios
EVERY relief valve on a header MUST
BE part of AT LEAST ONE scenario − Without calculating the back pressure you cannot show compliance For more information, See two part series in IRC Cold Front: Vol. 12 No. 1 and Vol. 12 No. 2
