KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 142396.] [February 11, 2003.]
VITUG, J NATURE: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
FACTS:
Petitioner Khosrow Minucher (Minucher), an Iranian national, was charged for violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972." The narcotic agents who
raided the house of Minucher were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo (Scalzo). Minucher was
acquitted by the trial court of the charges.
Minucher filed a civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for damages on account of what he
claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug traffcking made by Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration,
he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Court, asking that the complaint be ordered
dismissed. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its decision
sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him.
Minucher filed a petition for review with the Court, appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court. The
Manila RTC continued with its hearings on the case. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favour of
petitioner Minucher and adjudged private respondent Scalzo liable in actual and compensatory damages of
P520,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P10 million, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00,
attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defence of
Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune
from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, the present petition for review.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
Yes, Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity. Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity
is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. the Court has recognized that, in such matters, the
hands of the courts are virtually tied. The diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked
to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it
should be ascertained that Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts
alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State
Immunity from Suit, however, this immunity principle has limitations.
Nevertheless, as a foreign agent, operating within a territory, Scalzo can be cloaked with immunity from suit as
long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent or
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imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency,
however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case:
1. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries.
2. Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United
States Embassy.
3. Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo.
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough indication that the
Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of
agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law
enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the
criminal case against Minucher.
Therefore, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
NOTES:
Doctrine of Immunity of Suit
o “The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of
customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign
sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its
sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity,
the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The
proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he
is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.”
Limitation of Immunity of Suit
o “It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes
only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of
the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule
of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit
in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not
have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be
sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot
be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.”
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JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
[G.R. No. 125865.] [March 26, 2001]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J NATURE: IMMUNITY OF ORAL DEFAMATION
FACTS:
This case has its origin in two criminal Information’s for grave oral defamation filed against petitioner.
Petitioner Jeffrey Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City (MTC) with two counts of grave oral defamation. Petitioner was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal
charge, the MTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MTC judge
received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication
that petitioner is immune from suit, the MTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal
cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
The motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court via petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.
On January 28, 2000, the Supreme Court rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for
review. On the grounds that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute, it is limited to
acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, the Supreme Court argued that the immunity cannot cover
the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the crime of oral defamation enjoys immunity.
RULING:
No, the crime of oral defamation does not enjoy an immunity. The provisions of Section 45 (a) of the
Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development Bank only gives immunity to the
officers and staff from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity.
The Court held, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the
purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the Decision had
the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against him. The court wish to stress that it
did not. What the court merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act
performed in an official capacity, however, issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral
defamation is still for the trial court to determine.
Therefore, in view of the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner and intervenor Department of
Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
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NOTES:
PUNO, J., concurring:
The nature and degree of immunities vary depending on who the recipient is Under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State for all acts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be arrested, prosecuted and
punished for any offense he may commit, unless his diplomatic immunity is waived. On the other
hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities, that is, only those necessary
for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfilment of its purposes. officials and
employees of the ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts,
notwithstanding the absence of a waiver of immunity. If the immunity does not exist, there is nothing to
certify by the DFA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOL – LO and SARAW, defendants-
appellants.
[G.R. No. L-17958.] [February 27, 1922.]
MALCOLM, J NATURE: PIRACY
FACTS:
Around June 30, 1920. Two Dutch boats sailed leaving Matuta, to Peta, a part of Dutch East Indies
(present day Indonesia). In first boat was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the second boat eleven men,
women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. The second boat arrived around 7’o clock in the evening
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas
manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. Initially the armed men asked for food, however, once on the Dutch
boat, the armed men took all the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women. The
Moros put all the passenger back in the boat, except the two women, put holes in the Dutch boat with the idea of
submerging the boat, however, after eleven days, the passengers are saved. Taking the two women with them
and repeatedly raped them, the Moros arrived at Maruro and at Maruro the two women escaped.
Two of the armed man LOL - LO and SARAW returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the
crime of piracy.
A demurrer (Appeal) was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros. The defendant argued that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of any court of the Philippine, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine. The demurrer (Appeal) was overruled by
the trial judge, after the trial, a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty of the crime.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the accused committed Piracy.
2. Whether or not the case is within the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
3. Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
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RULING:
1. Yes. The accused are guilty of piracy. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without
lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. The court
ruled that all the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
2. Yes. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. The court ruled that piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed
within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not
neutral to crimes."
3. Yes, the Penal Code dealing with the crime piracy is in force. The court ruled that the provisions in
dealing with the crime Piracy originated in the Spanish Penal Code, are still in force in the Philippines
even when there is a change in the sovereign power from Spain to the United States by virtue of the
1898, Treaty of Paris. While The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The
municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As such, laws subsisting at the time
of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community and are strictly of a municipal
character will continue until by direct action of the new government which they are altered or repealed.
The Penal Code provisions on piracy are held not to be inconsistent with the laws of the U.S., A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be
that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."
Therefore, both the defendant and appellant were found guilty for the crimes of Piracy, however, the propriety
of the sentence of the crimes of both accused, do differ. Defendant and appellant LOL-LO (the one who raped)
was accused of death penalty with a unanimous vote of the bench and while the defendant and appellant
SARAW, the vote was not unanimous, since one of the members of the court Justice Romualdez, registered his
non-conformity. Thus, one of the accused who participated in the crime of piracy was sentenced to death and
another to life imprisonment.
NOTES:
PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154 PENAL CODE; WHETHER I FORCE. — The provisions of the Penal
Code relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in the United States.
Those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are
still in force in the Philippines.
Article 153 of the Penal Code now reads as follows: "The crime of piracy committed against citizens of
the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the
crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it
shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."
DEFINED. — Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
JURISDICTION. — Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crime has no territorial limits.
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INSTANT CASE. — One Moro who participated in the crime of piracy was sentenced to death and
another to life imprisonment.
humani generis: Latin word or Enemy of Mankind. The tradition of classing the pirate as one has
been expanded to one other particular class of seafaring criminal, that of the slaver, who, by trafficking
in human flesh upon the high seas, is similarly held to be in a state of war against all humanity.
o Reference:
https://www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/rechtsfilosofieentheorie/2018/2/NJLP_2213-
0713_2018_047_002_002
Animus furandi: Latin term which means the 'intention to steal.' In order to constitute a crime of
larceny, the thief must take the property.
o Reference: https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/animus-furandi/
