Doctrine of Frustration Under Contract Law
Doctrine of Frustration Under Contract Law
Doctrine of Frustration Under Contract Law
Submitted by
Rishabh Aggarwal
Batch- 2019-24
Division- A
PRN-19010224032
In August, 2019
Assistant Professor
SLS NOIDA
CERTIFICATE
Rishabh Aggarwal
In all the contracts, it is assumed that the parties involved will perform their
obligations in good faith. Sometimes it so happens that the performance of the
contract is possible when it is made, however, certain events which are beyond the
control of the parties may subsequently happen and render the performance
impossible or unlawful( e.g. flood, fire, earthquake, unavailability of materials due
to wars, natural disasters, strike ,riot, civil war etc). So, the contract becomes void.
When such event occurs, the contract is said to have been “frustrated” 1. Thus,
“frustration” is the sum total of all the events which serve to make performance of
contractual obligations impossible/ unlawful.
Over the years, the doctrine has become more and more complex and an analysis
of the same is required so, this research project will first consider the explanation
of the doctrine which includes the evolution of the doctrine, applicability in India,
and its features. Followed by a literature review (2 book reviews 5, one article
review6) and the research paper will at last discuss a conclusion with an assessment
of the theoretical basis of the doctrine of frustration.
1 The word “frustrated” appears to have been first used in a dissent by Sir Roland Vaughn Williams
in Nickoll & Knight v Ashton, Edridge & Co. (1901), 2 KB 126, an admirality case discussed in Krell v
Henry
(1903) 2 KB 740 (CA).
2Lord Sumner in Hirji Mulji v Cheong Yue Steamship & Co. (1926), AC 497,507.
3S.56, Indian Contract Act (1872)
4AIR 1954 SC 44.
5Peel,E. (2012). Treitel: The Law of Contracts. London. Sweet & Maxwell: Thomas Reuters UK
6Reddy,V.(1999). The Doctrine of Frustration of Contracts: Its Development, Features and
Anamolies. IIIrd year student NLIU
EXPLANATION
I. Evolution and development
In England, the law of contracts in based upon the principle of absolute liability 7.
This means that the contractual obligations were absolute and supervening events,
which were outside the scope of control of the parties involved, provided no excuse
for non-performance. In the case of Paradin v Jane8, a tenant was sued for rent and
pleaded that he was dispossessed of the property by the King’s enemy. This plea
was considered bad. Further, it was held that “when the party by his own contract
creates a duty, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any
accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his
contract; though the land be surrounded or gained by the seas, or made barren by
wildfire, yet the lessor will have his whole rent”.
The doctrine of absolute contracts works fine and continues to apply wherever it
would be reasonable, having taken into consideration the circumstances in which
the contract was made, to expect it to provide for the event. But in other
contractual relations where the contract called for personal performance by a party
who died or was permanently incapacitated 9; or in cases of supervening illegality 10,
the doctrine was not regarded as a satisfactory way to allocate the losses.
The modification of this theory/principle began in 1809 with the case of Atkinson v
Ritchie11 where the court recognised that the outbreak of war between UK and
foreign countries would frustrate the charter according which a British ship was to
load at a foreign port. In the subsequent case of Taylor v Caldwell12where the
defendants were absolved from the liability as the performance of the contract was
impossible.
In this case, the defendants had agreed to let the plaintiffs use their music hall
between specified dates for holding concert there. But before the date of the
concert, the hall caught fire and was destroyed without the fault of either of the
parties involved.
7Beastson and Freedman .(1995). Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law. UK:Claredon Press.
8King’s Bench, (1647) Aleyn 26: 82 ER 897.
9Taylor v Caldwell ,(1863) 3 B&S 826: 122 ER 309.
10Brewster v Kitchell,(1691) 1 Salk 198; Atkinson v Ritchie,(1809) 10 East 530
11 (1809) 10 East 530, supra n.3.
12(1863) 3 B&S 826: 122 ER 309
The defendants were sued by the plaintiffs for the loss. It was held that the
defendants were not liable to pay for the contract as the contract was not absolute
and its performance depended on the existence of the hall. The contract had been
discharged because,”the parties must from the beginning have known that it could
not be fulfilled unless...... some particular thing continued to exist”’ and in these
circumstances it was
In the well known coronation case of Krell v Henry14, the courts further widened the
scope of the doctrine by extending the cause of frustration to cover cases where
the commercial object of the contract was destroyed or failed to materialize. In this
case, the defendant hired a flat for the days of coronation of King Edward VII, but
the coronation was cancelled due to the ill health of the king. It was held that the
defendant is not liable to pay the rent as the coronation was the foundation of the
contract and it failed to happen15.
Over the years, various events and instances have been identified by the courts in
contractual cases which may render the contract impossible to perform and thus,
widening the scope and applicability of the doctrine of frustration under contract
law. These instances include-
The Supreme Court first mentioned the word “frustration” and explained the
doctrine of frustration of contract in the case of Ganga Saran v Firm Ram
Charan20wherein it observed that “the doctrine of frustration cannot avail a
defendant when the non-performance of a contract is attributable to his own
default”.
The case was followed in the landmark case of Satyabrata Ghose v Mugneerum
Bangur & Co.21 BK Mukherjea J of the Supreme Court observed as follows: “ this is
much clear that the word ‘impossible’ has not been used here in the sense of
physical or literal impossibility. The performance of an act may not be literally
impossible but it may be impracticable and useless from the point of view of the
object and purpose which the parties had in view; and if an untoward even or
change of circumstances totally upsets the very foundation upon which the parties
rested their bargain, it can very well be said that the promissory finds it impossible
to do the act which he promised to do”22.
Application of Section 56
Change in subsequent laws governing contracts might change rendering the whole
performance of contract illegal. The Supreme Court judgement in Boothalinga
Agencies v V.T.C Poriaswami Nadar23where the court ruled that subsequent illegality
to perform a contract, due to government legislations, renders the contract void
under Section 56 on the Indian Contract Act. The decision was followed in Rozan
Mian v Tahera Begum24 where the court decided that changes in legislations can
make the agreements between parties void.
20AIR 1952 SC 9.
21AIR 1954 SC 44: 1954 SCR 310.
22These principles have been affirmed by the Supreme Court in Dhruv Dev Chand v Harmobinder
Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1024, where SHAH J (afterwards CJ) held that the doctrine does not apply to
completed transfers. Indian Rare Earth Ltd v Southern Electric Supply Co of Orrisa, AIR 2010 Ori
115,no supply to factory because of uprooting of towers by super cyclone, no liability.
23AIR 1969 SC 110
24AIR 2007 SC 2883
In the case of Punj Sons v Union Of India25 where the court implied the conditions
of supply of Tin ingots from the terms of the contract which dealt with the supple of
hot dip tin ingot coated milk containers. As the tine ingots were not available the
contract was held frustrated.
These are the features of the doctrine of frustration of contract which help in
categorising an event as a frustrating event or not. These features help to
distinguish between which are frustrated and void and provide a basis of
classification for the same.
LITERATURE REVIEW
25AIR 1986 DEL 158
26Satyabarta Ghose v Mugneerum Bangur & Co. AIR 1954 SC 44.
27Khan R.(1982). Frustration: Legislative or administrative intervention. 6 C.U.L.R 96.
1. Peel, E.(2012). Treitel: The Law of Contracts. London. Sweet & Maxwell:
Thomson Reuters UK Limited pp 920 986.
The book published by Oxford Press Inc, New York and authored by Jill Poole
potrays all the case laws that helped in the introduction and development of
the doctrine of frustration of contract in the Common law system. The book
mainly focuses on cases and judgements and helps to understand the concept
of doctrine through the view point of the judges and the interpretation of the
law through the previous cases. The book is good for referencing cases
related to the doctrine and provides the reader with very detailed
judgements. The book however does not have any Indian Case Law reference
and the explanation of the topic is only through detailed cases. The book,
however, does not contain any view point of the lawyer and the general
explanation is very less. The scope of the doctrine has just been limited to the
previous cases and judgements in the book.
CONCLUSION
Scope of the doctrine should be enlarged bringing all the events that frustrate a
contract in the within the purview of Section 56, thereby removing unnecessary
categorisation of cases as governed under Section 32 and 56 when all the cases can
be decided under Section 56 alone. Provisions like that of imprevision under French
law, must be made so as to secure public interest and also prevent any injustice
caused to the promisor. Most importantly, the courts should work to preserve the
elasticity and flexibility of this doctrine of frustration ensuring that it keeps pace
with the dynamic business, social and economical environment where complex
transactions are continuously taking place making the contract more vulnerable to
supervening events. This would eliminate the injust demand of absolute liability
from the side of the promisor and help in the development of the doctrine and the
law of contracts in general.