1

G.R. No. 135204 April 14, 2004 Ambal saw one of their companions poking his armalite at
William. Then, they tied William to a santol tree. He was
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.NARCISO RAMOS
pleading to appellant, but she simply turned her back.
y MATIAS, RAMON SAN ROQUE y DELA CRUZ, EULALIA SAN
Ramon stabbed William twice at the stomach with a 29"
ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias LALING, WILLIAM
bladed knife. Then Narciso shot William five to seven times
RAMOS alias WILFREDO RAMOS, (provisionally dismissed),
with his .45 caliber pistol. When William was already dead,
and three (3) other John Does, accused.
Ramon and Wilfredo Ramos untied his body and brought
EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias it to a dumpsite (of used tires) twenty five meters away.
"LALING", appellant. There they placed William’s body atop a pile of rubber
tires. Ramon poured gasoline on his body and set it on fire.
DECISION Appellant and the others were closely watching. After
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: thirty minutes, appellant and the men left. Ambal
immediately reported the incident to Saturnino Rivera.
Appeal by Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela Cruz They proceeded to the dumpsite where they saw the
from the Decision1 dated April 24, 1998 of the Regional Trial charred body. According to Ambal, Ramon, appellant
Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C- and Narciso’s sister are brother and sisters.
46010, declaring her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and sentencing her to suffer the Saturnino Rivera declared on the witness stand that he
penalty of reclusion perpetua. She was also adjudged to considered William his best friend. William and appellant
pay the heirs of the victim, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. frequently quarreled and sometimes, he maltreated her.
Saturnino corroborated Ambal’s testimony that they went
The Information[2] dated December 14, 1993 filed against to the scene of the crime and saw the charred body of
appellant and her co-accused Narciso Ramos y Matias William; and that they reported the gruesome incident to
alias "Narcing", Ramon San Roque y dela Cruz, Wilfredo the NBI.
Ramos and three (3) other John Does is quoted as follows:
Mariano Lomida testified that on February 19, 1993, or
"That on or about the 11th day of February 1993 in eight days after the incident, appellant suddenly arrived in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of Atimonan, Quezon looking for William. She told Mariano
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with that William left their house on February 9, 1993 without her
deliberate intent to kill, conspiring together and mutually knowledge. She borrowed P3,000.00 from him (Mariano)
helping one another, with treachery, evident with a promise to pay on March 27, 1993. But since then,
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then he never saw her again. Mariano further testified that due
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie up on a to the death of his son, he suffered wounded feelings.
santol tree, stab, shoot and burn one WILLIAM LOMIDA,
resulting to the death of the latter." Special Investigator Laurence M. Nidera of the NBI Anti-
Organized Crime Division conducted the investigation. He
"CONTRARY TO LAW." took the statements of Bernie Ambal, Saturnino Rivera and
Upon arraignment on December 15, 1994, appellant, Mariano Lomida. Upon the arrest of appellant and Narciso
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime Ramos by the Capital Command (CAPCOM) of the
charged. Philippine National Police, they were turned over to the
NBI.
The case against Wilfredo Ramos was provisionally
dismissed. The other accused, Narciso Ramos and Ramon After the prosecution rested its case, appellant filed a
San Roque, have remained at large. demurrer to evidence but was denied. Meanwhile,
appellant jumped bail. On the basis of the evidence
During the trial, the prosecution presented the following presented by the prosecution, the case was submitted for
witnesses: Bernie Ambal, Saturnino Rivera, Mariano Lomida decision.
and NBI Special Investigator Laurence M. Nidera. Their
testimonies, woven together, established the following On April 24, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the
facts: dispositive portion of which reads:

On February 11, 1993 at around 7:00 o’clock in the "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the
evening, Bernie Ambal was standing outside his store at accused Eulalia San Roque de Francisco y dela Cruz alias
168 De Paro St., Caloocan City. Narciso Ramos, Ramon ‘Laling’ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
San Roque and three (3) others passed by. They murder as charged in the Information and hereby
proceeded to the house of William Lomida and appellant, sentences her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
who were then live-in partners. Narciso and Ramon stood perpetua with accessory penalties as provided by the law
by the door, while one of their companions, holding an and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of
armalite, positioned himself behind Narciso. Their other P50,000.00.
companion, armed with a pistol, stayed on the street, and " SO ORDERED."3
the third one, also armed with a pistol, went to the
backyard. At a distance of ten (10) meters away, Ambal Appellant appeared during the promulgation of the
saw Narciso pulling out his .45 caliber pistol and knocking Decision.
at the door. Appellant then opened the door and Ramon In her brief, appellant raised the following assignments of
went inside. error:
Soon thereafter, William and appellant, accompanied by "I
Narciso, Ramon, and three (3) others left the house. As
they were passing by the store, Ramon stopped and "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED
borrowed Ambal’s jacket. At that instance, William EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO Y DELA CRUZ alias
suddenly held his arm and whispered, "Samahan mo LALING CONSPIRED AND CONFEDERATED WITH HER CO-
naman ako, baka kung ano ang gawin sa akin ng mga ACCUSED IN PERPETRATING THE CRIME OF MURDER, WHEN
ito, tutal barkada mo naman si Ramon." But Ambal was THE FACT OF SUCH CONSPIRACY HAS NOT BEEN
scared and hesitant. William then requested him to look for SATISFACTORILY PROVEN TO EXIST BEYOND REASONABLE
Saturnino Rivera. DOUBT DURING THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.

The group headed to Narciso’s house, about ½ kilometer "II

away from Ambal’s store. Unknown to them, Ambal trailed
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST
behind. Hiding himself behind a tree fifteen meters away,
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE WEAK EVIDENCE OF
 2

THE PROSECUTION, CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION Q From where the accused picked up by these people?
HAS FAILED TO PROVE ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF
A Lomida was taken from the house where Eulalia San
THE CRIME AND THE CORPUS DELICTI.
Roque and William Lomida were living.
"III
Q William Lomida is the victim in this case. Now, how is he
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY related to Eulalia San Roque?
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER BY THE MERE FACT THAT SHE
A They are not married. They are live-in partners.
FAILED TO APPEAR AFTER THE CASE WAS REVIVED SUCH
FAILURE HAVING BEEN APPRECIATED BY THE TRIAL COURT Q Now, how far from the store where this house of William
AS A CLEAR INDICATION OF HER GUILT. Lomida and Eulalia San Roque is located?
"IV A More or less, ten meters away.
"THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN FINDING THE Q Is it located in front of the store, on the left side or at the
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE BASIS back of the store?
ALONE OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS IN THIS
CASE, WITHOUT BEING SUPPORTED THEREBY BY A The house of Eulalia is alongside of our house.
CONVINCING EVIDENCE." Q What part of your store where you were at the time you
We shall discuss the above assignments of error jointly. saw these people picked up Lomida?

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, A I was outside the store standing.
provides: Q After the accused picked up the victim, what
"ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the happened or where did they go?
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of A William Lomida, the victim, was brought to the house of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal,4 in its Narciso Ramos.
maximum period to death, if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances: xxx

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, Court:

with the aim of armed men, or employing means to xxx
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity. Q So the persons whom you saw got Lomida were Narciso
Ramos, Ramon San Roque, William Ramos alias Wilfredo
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise. Ramos and three men of Narciso Ramos and Eulalia San
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, Roque?
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault A Yes, your Honor.
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great xxx
waste and ruin. Pros. Mananquil:
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the Q Now, you said that the accused brought William Lomida
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a to the house of Narciso Ramos. How far is this house of
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public Narciso Ramos located in relation to the store, your store?
calamity.
A About half kilometer away.
5. With evident premeditation.
xxx
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting
the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his Q Now, when the victim was brought to the house of
person or corpse." Narciso Ramos, what happened next?

In convicting the appellant of murder, the trial court gave A The victim was tied to a santol tree.
full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution
Q Where is this santol tree where the victim Lomida was
lone eyewitness, Bernie Ambal. An extract from his
tied? How far is this from the house of Narciso Ramos?
testimony is quoted hereunder:
Court:
"DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROS. MANAQUIL:
Q Who tied the victim?
xxx
A Ramon San Roque, Wilfredo Ramos and the three others
Q And in the evening of that date, could you recall at
unidentified men.
about 7:00 in the evening of February 11, 1993, if there was
any unusual incident that happened? Pros. Mananquil:
A Yes, sir. Q After the accused tied William Lomida on a santol tree,
what happened next?
Q Will you please tell us what was that unusual incident all
about that you observed and noticed? A Ramon San Roque stabbed William Lomida.
A Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three men of Q And with what kind of weapon was used by Ramon San
Narciso Ramos got the victim and Eulalia San Roque was Roque?
also with the group.
A A bladed 29.
Court:
Q How long?
Q Who was taken?
A I cannot say how long, sir.
A The victim, your Honor.
Q How many times did you see Ramon San Roque
Q What is the name of the victim? stabbed the victim with the 29?
A William Lomida was taken by these people. A About two times, sir.
Pros. Mananquil:
 3

Q And did you see if Lomida was hit with that two stab A About 25 meters.
thrust?
Q Now, after the accused brought the victim to the piles
A He was stabbed on the stomach. of recycled tires, what happened next?
Pros. Mananquil: A Ramos San Roque got a can and poured something on
the body of the victim and then, lighted it up.
Q What happened after Ramon San Roque stabbed the
victim? Q What happened to the body of the victim, William
Lomida?
A The victim, William Lomida ‘nangisay’ and then Narciso
Ramos came near the victim and shot him. A The body was burned.
Q How many times? Q At the time when this Ramon San Roque poured
something on the body of the victim and then lighted the
A About 5 to 7 shots.
same, where were Wilfredo Ramos, Eulalia San Roque and
Q And did you see if the victim was hit? Narciso Ramos and the other unidentified persons?

A It seems that the shots were directed to his face because A There were – They were there in front of the burning
he was bloodied all over his face. body.

Q With what kind of firearm, if you remember? Q How long did the fire last?

A When the investigator showed me some guns, I noticed A It took a long time, about more than one hour.
that the one gun that Narciso Ramos used was a .45
Q After one hour, what happened next?
caliber.
A They left the place. The group left the place.
Q Was it magazine or revolver?
Court:
A Magazine type.
Q What happened to the tires?
Q After Narciso Ramos shot the victim 7 times on the head,
what happened next? A The tires also burned.
A When the group made sure that the victim was dead Q And where was the body of Lomida in relation to the
already, they untied him and brought the body where tires?
there was a pile of tires, piles of pieces of rubber tires.
A The body of the victim was almost burned and when we
Q By the way, at the time when the victim was shot by went back to the place, the shape of the charred was still
Narciso Ramos and stabbed by Ramon San Roque, where there. The same of human body."5
was Willy Ramos, Narciso Ramos and Eulalia San Roque?
The foregoing testimony clearly shows that Ambal, being
A They were just there standing and afterwards, turned then present at the locus of the crime, was able to identify
their back around. the appellant and the other accused as the persons who
killed William. Ambal narrated the incidents leading to the
xxx
victim's death with clarity and lucidity that they could not
Prosecutor: have been fabricated or concocted. The records show
that throughout the trial, he remained steadfast in his
Q How far was Eulalia San Roque from Lomida when testimony. There is thus no doubt in our minds that this lone
Lomida was shot by Narciso Ramos and stabbed by eyewitness is credible. While his testimony is
Ramon San Roque? uncorroborated, still it sustains the conviction of appellant.
A This place up to that wall. Distance of about 8 meters. In People vs. Toyco,6 we held:

Q And what was Eulalia doing at the time when the victim "It is axiomatic that truth is established not by the number
was stabbed and shot? of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies.
The testimony of a single witness if positive and credible is
A She turned her back and face the kitchen of the house sufficient to support a conviction even in charge of
of Narciso Ramos. murder."
Q Did she not try to intervene, this Eulalia, being the live-in We are not persuaded by appellant’s contention that the
partner of William Lomida or did not exert effort to pacify? prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
xxx establish the existence of conspiracy among the accused.
She vigorously contends that she did not participate in the
Prosecutor: killing of the victim.
Q Just turning her back, what else that she did, being live- In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not
in partner of William Lomida? necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and
A She did not do anything anymore. killed the victim.7 The presence of conspiracy among the
accused can be proven by their conduct before, during
Q After the victim was stabbed and shot, he was untied or after the commission of the crime showing that they
from the santol tree. Who untied him? acted in unison with each other, evincing a common
purpose or design. There must be a showing that appellant
A It was Ramon San Roque, Willy Ramos and the three
cooperated in the commission of the offense, either
others.
morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or
Q Willy refers to Wilfredo Ramos? materially through external acts indicating a manifest
intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in
A Yes, sir.
an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one becomes
Q Where was Eulalia at the time? the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be
deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.8
A She was still there standing.
The series of events in this case convincingly show that
Q Now, you said after the victim was untied from the santol appellant and her co-accused acted in unison and
tree, he was brought to where pieces of rubber tires were cooperated with each other in killing William Lomida.
piled, recycled, how far is this from the santol tree where Appellant was the one who opened the door and allowed
the victim was tied?
 4

the other accused to enter the house. She joined them in sufferings.15 Mariano Lomida, victim’s father, equivocally
bringing the victim to the residence of Narciso Ramos, her described how he suffered untold wounded feelings for
brother-in-law. While her co-accused dragged the the loss of his son.
helpless victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice
We also award the victim’s heirs ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant
damages. This is pursuant to our ruling in People vs.
merely watched intensely. She even "turned her back" as
Catubig16 that if a crime is committed with an aggravating
the lifeless body of the victim was being burned. And after
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of
attaining their purpose, she fled with the other accused.
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified.
The above circumstances clearly show the common
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated April 24, 1998 of
purpose and concerted efforts on the part of appellant
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, in
and her co-accused. We agree with the trial court in
Criminal Case No. C-46010, is hereby AFFIRMED with
concluding that their acts were indications of a criminal
MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant EULALIA SAN
conspiracy to commit the crime of murder.
ROQUE DE FRANCISCO is sentenced to suffer the penalty
The only remaining question is whether the crime was of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
attended by aggravating circumstances. reclusion perpetua, as maximum. She is ordered to pay the
victim’s heirs (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
The killing of the victim was attended by treachery.
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) ₱50,000.00 as
Treachery exists "when the offender commits a crime
moral damages and (d) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in
damages.
the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from Costs de oficio.
any defense or retaliatory act which the victim might
SO ORDERED.
make."9 Here, appellant and her co-accused tied William
to a santol tree before they stabbed and shot him to Vitug, Corona and Morales, JJ., concur.
death, thus, insuring the execution of the crime without risk
Footnotes
to themselves. Obviously, he could not retaliate. This
aggravating circumstance qualifies the crime to murder.
1 Penned by Judge Remigio E. Zari, Rollo at 12-15.
2 Rollo at 4.
However, we cannot sustain the trial court’s appreciation
of the aggravating circumstance of superior strength as 3 Decision, id. at 32.
this is absorbed in treachery.10 4Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 (enacted on January 1, 1994)
amended the prescribed penalty to "reclusion perpetua to death."
It bears stressing that this crime of murder was committed
on February 11, 1993.11 The law applicable is Article 248 of
5 TSN, February 13, 1996 at 3-17.
the Revised Penal Code then penalizing murder with 6G.R. No. 138609, January 17, 2001, 349 SCRA 385, 399, citing People vs.
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Benito, 303 SCRA 468 (1999).
Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, in cases in which 7People vs. Amazan, G.R. Nos. 136251, 138606 & 138607, January 16, 2001,
the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, 349 SCRA 218, 234, citing People vs. Alib, 322 SCRA 93 (2000).
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of 8People vs. Visaya, G.R. No. 136967, February 26, 2001, 352 SCRA 713, 720-
three different penalties, and there are neither 721.
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that attended 9People vs. Berdin, G.R. No. 137598, November 28, 2003 at 16-17, citing
the commission of the crime, the penalty prescribed by People vs. Bolivar, 352 SCRA 438 (2001); Article 14, par. 16, Revised Penal
law in its medium period shall be imposed. Code.

The range of the imposable penalty, i.e., reclusion

10People vs. Ampo-an, G.R. No. 75366, July 4, 1990, 187 SCRA 173, 189;
People vs. Manzanares, G.R. No. 82696, September 8, 1989, 177 SCRA 427.
temporal in its maximum period to death, is 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to death. Applying the Indeterminate 11The crime was committed before Republic Act No. 7659 which took
effect on January 1, 1994.
Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of 12People vs. Berdin, supra at 18, citing People vs. Joey Manlansing y
Ambrosio and Mario Manlansing y Ambrosio, G.R. Nos. 131736-37, March
the crime, the maximum period is the medium of the
11, 2002.
imposable penalty, which is reclusion perpetua. The
minimum period is one degree lower, or prision mayor in its 13 People vs. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003.
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium 14People vs. Solamillo, supra, citing People vs. Marquez, 380 SCRA 561
period, the range of which is 10 years and 1 day to 17 years (2002); People vs. Yatco, 379 SCRA 432 (2002); People vs. Matic, 377 SCRA
314 (2002).
and 4 months. The minimum period of the penalty
imposable is anywhere within this range, or 10 years and 1 15People vs. Berdin, supra at 19, citing People vs. Pacina, 338 SCRA 195,
day. Hence, appellant should be sentenced to 10 years 215-216 (2000).
and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion 16G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621, cited in People vs. Berdin,
perpetua, as maximum. supra at 19.

Regarding damages, the trial court correctly awarded

₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victim’s heirs. When
death occurs as a result of a crime, appellant should be
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, without need of any evidence or proof of
damages.12
We likewise award temperate damages, in lieu of actual
damages. Here, the prosecution failed to present any
proof of the expenses incurred by the victim’s heirs.
However, as they actually incurred funeral expenses, we
award ₱25,000.00 by way of temperate damages.13
Anent moral damages, we award the victim’s heirs the
amount of ₱50,000.00.14 For verily, moral damages are not
intended to enrich the victim’s heirs; rather they are
awarded to allow them to obtain means for diversion that
could serve to alleviate their moral and psychological
 5

G.R. No. 157221 March 30, 2007 After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27,
1995 with the following findings:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. CESAR
GALVEZ, Appellant. From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this
case, this Court finds the following facts to be
DECISION
undisputable, to wit:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio Enojarda,
For review before this Court is the Decision1 of the Court of while making copra in the coconut land of Danilo Perez at
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30, Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan, was shot to death by one of
2001, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial the four (4) men. How many gunshot wounds he suffered
Court (RTC) Isabela, Basilan finding the accused-appellant and what part of his body was hit by the gunfire, the
Cesar Galvez (Galvez), guilty of Murder, but modifying the evidence is found wanting.
penalty of the RTC from a sentence of "seventeen (17)
2) That a day before the incident and on the date of the
years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to
incident which was July 27, 1991, the accused Cesar
twenty (20) years as maximum" to reclusion perpetua.
Galvez has not fired any firearms.
The facts are as follows:
xxx
At around 11 o’clock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo
3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite rifle…allegedly
Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal, Ricardo Francisco
found by Barangay Captain Inocente Manicap from the
and Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from making copra to
scene of the crime and later turned over to PFC Samuel
eat leftover dinner inside the copra kiln in the farm of Perez
Omoso, the Police Investigator of this case, did not come
in Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up
from the M16 armalite rifle with Serial No. 117460, the gun
from the circle where they were eating to drink water,
issued to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations omitted).11
shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the ground shouting
"Dan ya tupa comigo" (Dan, I am hit). The rest of the group Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of the
took cover, crawling to different directions. After the prosecution witnesses, Rellios and Perez, were credible
attack, Rellios reported the incident to the barangay and trustworthy as there was no motive to perjure
captain and they brought Enojarda’s dead body to his themselves; that the testimony of defense witness SPO2
family.3 Ramillano was full of loopholes; and that the testimony of
the store owner was insufficient to disprove the presence
On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar
of the accused at the scene of the crime.12
Galvez (Galvez), a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) for Murder, which reads: The RTC concluded:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and within the xxx since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired his M16
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz. at Matarling, armalite rifle on that night of July 27, 1991, and those five
Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, (5) empty shells were not fired from his armalite, then xxx
the above named accused, armed with an M16 armalite the bullet that hit and instantly killed Rosalio Enojarda on
rifle, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with that night of July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo Perez
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and came from the gun fired by any of the three (3) unidentified
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rosalio Enojarda persons who were the companions of the accused, Cesar
with the said M16 armalite rifle, thereby inflicting gunshot Galvez at the night of the incident xxx.13 (emphasis
wound on the body of the latter which caused his death.4 supplied)
The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege
Enojarda fell, the rest of the group took cover and Rellios conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of
while in a crawling position, saw Galvez about 5 meters nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still convicted Galvez
away holding an armalite rifle and firing at their direction; of murder based on conspiracy since Galvez was seen by
Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not two witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm
recognize them as well as the firearms they carried together with his unidentified armed companions.14 The
because they were approximately nine meters trial court also held that the offer of Galvez to have the
away;5 Perez, also crawled and hid in the bushes about 5 case settled out of court is an indication of his guilt.15
meters away; when the firing stopped, one of the
The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:
attackers passed by about two meters from where Perez
was hiding and because the moon was bright, he WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial matters
recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was wearing a fatigue surrounding the commission of the crime, being carefully
uniform and armed with an armalite rifle; he also saw that and meticulously examined and studied, this Court finds
Galvez had three armed companions but did not the accused SPO2 Cesar Galvez, a member of the
recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying Philippine National Police GUILTY beyond reasonable
because they were about nine meters from Galvez.6 doubt as principal in committing the crime of Murder as
alleged in the Information and which crime is defined and
Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified
penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, but
that he was staying at his father-in-law’s house on July 27,
considering his good military records after the commission
1991 and drank tuba at around 10:30 p.m. at a nearby
of the crime, hereby sentences him to suffer an
store. He went home and slept with his wife soon after.7To
imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS
corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo
and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS as
Ramillano, a visitor at his father-in-law’s house and
maximum, which is the minimum period of Reclusion
Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store owner. 8 He also
Temporal in its maximum period to death. And to
presented Athena Elisa Anderson, Document Examiner
indemnify the heirs of the late Rosalio Enojarda, the
and Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime Laboratory of
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the
Region 9, Zamboanga City, who testified that the paraffin
Court the amount of P500.00 as judicial costs and other
test conducted on both his hands showed that there was
accessory penalties attached to the penalty of Reclusion
no nitrate present;9 and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser,
Temporal.
Ballistic Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the
scene of the crime were not fired from the firearm issued And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the
to Galvez.10 military ranks he now hold [sic] in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
 6

And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused OPEN COURT IN THE MANNER AND CIRCUMSTANCE
shall immediately be committed to the Provincial Jail NARRATED BY HIM.25
where the Provincial Warden is directed to immediately
In his Supplemental Appellant’s Brief, Galvez further claims
transfer him to the National Penitentiary at San Ramon
that it was seriously erroneous:
Penal Colony at Zamboanga City for commitment
thereat. I.
And the property bail bond he has posted for his …TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and its ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE OTHER MALEFACTORS NOT
pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
bondsman.16
II.
Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 18255, which rendered its Decision on March …TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING MATTERS NOT
30, 2001 affirming his guilt but modifying the penalty to be INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION, MORE SO THE THEORY OF
imposed, thus: CONSPIRACY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THERE BEING
NO OTHER PERSONS CHARGED IN THE PRESENT CASE.
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant
CESAR GALVEZ is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, III.
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other …TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER
respects.17 UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FAR DIFFERENT FROM THE
The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally INFORMATION, IN EFFECT DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
liable based on conspiracy when such fact was not [THE] RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE
alleged in the Information. However, it still found Galvez OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.
guilty of Murder.18 The CA reasoned that: the negative IV.
results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the
possibility that Galvez used another gun in shooting the …TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO
victim; the eyewitnesses of the prosecution identified ALLEGED EYE WITNESSES WHOSE DECLARATIONS WERE
Galvez as the perpetrator if not one of the perpetrators of CLEARLY BELIED DURING THEIR CROSS EXAMINATION.
the crime; alibi, which was offered by Galvez, is the V.
weakest of all defenses and cannot prevail over positive
identification; the offer of Galvez to the wife of the victim …NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED-
to have the case settled is also a strong indication of APPELLANT.
Galvez’s culpability; and treachery was adequately VI.
established as the attack was sudden, unexpected and
did not accord the victim an opportunity to defend …TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED, BASELESS PRESUMPTIONS
himself.19 The CA further held that since there was no AND CONCLUSIONS IN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty should INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS PRESUMED.26
be reclusion perpetua.20
Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental
Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 which the CA Appellant’s Brief adding that:
denied in its Resolution dated August 21, 2001, stating that
VII
it was a mere rehash of the arguments already addressed
in the decision.22 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN AND
The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court
BALLISTIC TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal
APPELLANT SHOT THE DECEASED USING AN M16 RIFLE
Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the Court issued a
OTHER THAN THE ONE ISSUED TO HIM.27
Resolution23 accepting the case; committing the accused
to the Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required in
accused and the Solicitor General that they may file criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt because
additional briefs with this Court.24 an accused is always presumed to be innocent unless
proven otherwise;28 when circumstances yield two or more
In his Appellant’s Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court
inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption
erred:
of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of
I guilt, the court must side with that which will acquit the
accused; in this case, the RTC found undisputed the fact
… IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS that he did not shoot the victim on the night of July 27, 1991
LIABLE FOR MURDER FOR THE DEATH OF ROSALIO and the firearm that was used in killing the victim was
ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991 DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDINGS owned and possessed by another man, as shown by the
THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT FIRE HIS RIFLE ON negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests; the
THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE BULLET THAT HIT AND statement of Danilo Perez that he saw the accused on the
KILLED ROSALIO ENOJARDA COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED night of July 27, 1991 is not credible since Perez was in a
FROM ANY OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES BELONGING TO ANY OF crawling position with his chest almost touching the
THE THREE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS WHO WERE NOT ground at the time he allegedly saw the accused; Judge
CHARGED NOR INDICTED TOGETHER WITH THE ACCUSED IN Memoracion, who penned the decision could not have
THE SAME CRIMINAL INFORMATION IN QUESTION. assessed the demeanor of the prosecution witnesses while
II testifying as it was another judge who heard and received
their testimonies;29 the two defense witnesses, who
… IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO corroborated his (Galvez’s) alibi are unbiased and
RELLIOS, WHILE IN CRAWLING POSITION WHOSE CHESTS unrelated to him; while alibi is the weakest defense, it is the
WERE ALMOST TOUCHING THE GROUND AND UNDER only defense if it is the truth and it assumes importance
CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD SEEN THE where the prosecution evidence is weak; the statement of
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH M16 ARMALITE RIFLE IN the trial court that the offer of the accused to have the
THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991 DESPITE DANILO PEREZ’ [sic] case extra-judicially settled is a tacit admission of guilt is
POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO also unsubstantiated as there is nothing in the records that
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN shows that the accused made an offer to settle the case
out of court.30
 7

For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General argued faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also
that: the paraffin test and the ballistic examination are not for the acts of his co-accused as well.36
conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a gun during the
Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this
incident; in this case, the paraffin test was conducted on
case, it is imperative that the prosecution prove Galvez’s
Galvez two days from the date of the incident; Galvez was
direct participation in the killing of the victim. This, the
also positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as
prosecution failed to do.
one of four armed men who attacked them during the
incident; Perez clarified that while he was in a crawling The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to
position, he was looking upward, thus, he was able to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Rellios and
identify Galvez; between Galvez’s alibi and the positive Perez that they saw Galvez fire an armalite rifle in their
declarations of witnesses whose testimonies have not direction on the night in question. The positive
been assailed nor discredited by improper motive, the identification of these witnesses, the CA ruled, has more
latter deserves greater credence; the trial court correctly weight than the negative results of the paraffin and
convicted Galvez of murder as there was treachery since ballistic tests.37
the victim was not in a position to defend himself from the
attack of the accused; the proper penalty should We disagree.
be reclusion perpetua under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot
Code as there was no mitigating circumstance;31 Galvez is the victim. While this Court does not ordinarily interfere with
also liable for temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 since the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness of
pecuniary loss has been suffered although its exact witnesses, when there appears on the records, however,
amount could not be determined, and exemplary facts and circumstances of real weight which might have
damages of ₱25,000.00 due to the presence of the been overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot
qualifying circumstance of treachery; the amount of shirk from its duty to render the law and apply justice.38
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be awarded to
the heirs of the victim together with the ₱50,000.00 During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows:
awarded by the trial court for moral damages.32 Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00
After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court o’clock in the evening on July 27, 1991 what happened?
resolves to acquit Galvez. A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine
Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order where it came from and one of our companion was hit.
that an accused may be held liable for the acts of his co- Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who
accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy was hit?
in the information, an accused can only be made liable
for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.
responsibility is individual and not collective.33 xxx
As explained in People v. Tampis,34 Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion
The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely Rosalio Enojarda, what did you do?
inferred, in the information. Absence of a particular A: I dropped and crawled, sir.
statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet
concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy xxx
renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused
Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself
liable for the individual acts of his co-accused. Thus, each
among the grasses?
of them would be held accountable only for their
respective participation in the commission of the offense.35 A: Yes sir.
The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you
v. Quitlong, the Court explained: were already hiding among the grasses?
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where
the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an I was hiding about two meters from me.
accused to bear and respond to all its grave legal
Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused
where you were hiding, who was that culprit?
has been apprised when the charge is made conformably
with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. A: Cesar Galvez, sir.
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular,
mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a xxx
criminal offense without due process of law and that in all COURT:
criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The After you heard the shots how long after you saw him
right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise passed by?
explicit in procedural rules. x x x xxx
xxx Q: Was it 30 minutes after?
x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact xxx
which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial,
may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.
allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused)
impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of passed by together with his companions around 20 to 25
another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such minutes after you heard the shots, is that what you want to
person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own impress this Court?
participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can A: Yes, Your Honor.
rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
xxx
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance,
the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an Q: Did you see him really shoot?
accused must know from the information whether he
 8

A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied) which when put together reveals a convincing picture
pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author
During his cross-examination, Perez further testified:
of the crime.43
Q: So, when you said the explosions came from different
as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the
directions, was not true?
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt
A: We heard shots but we do not know where it came from, every circumstance essential to the guilt of the
what we did was to drop and crawl. accused;44 and that every circumstance or doubt
favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly
COURT: (To the witness) taken into account.45
You did not see the one firing? The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are
Yes, your Honor, because I crawled. mainly based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said testimonies reveals,
Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings you saw however, other circumstances that should be
this accused and companions pass by? appreciated in favor of Galvez, to wit:
A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time but I think (a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez
it has about 20 to 25 minutes.40 with three other armed companions minutes after
xxx Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that they saw
him in the vicinity before the shooting of Enojarda.46
Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at Mr.
Enojarda? (b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.47

A: No sir.41 (Emphasis supplied). (c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at
Enojarda and that he merely assumed that Galvez was the
Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination the one who shot the victim when the latter passed by
following: him.48 Rellios testified that he only presumed that Galvez
Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr. shot at Enojarda.49
Enojarda? (d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with
A: No sir. Galvez50 and that he does not know any motive why
Enojarda was killed.51
COURT: (To the witness)
In considering both favorable and "incriminating"
In other words you were only presuming that it was him. circumstances for or against Galvez, the following must
always be borne in mind: that the Information charged
A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.
Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime of Murder; that
ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing) the three other armed men were not included as John
Does; and that there was no allegation of conspiracy in
Did you understand the question when you were asked by
the Information.
the Court. Since you did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot
at the victim, and reportedly you saw him only five minutes Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
thereafter, you only presume Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. prove that Galvez was the sole author of the shot that
Enojarda? killed Enojarda. The "incriminating circumstances" do not
point to Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime. The
A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
presence of the three armed men raises the probability
Based on the above testimonies, the following that any one of those men inflicted the fatal shot. It must
circumstances appear to have been established: (1) at be stressed that the prosecution witnesses merely
around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their two presumed that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.
companions were eating merienda near the copra kiln
Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after
when they were sprayed with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was
Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently establish that
fatally hit and fell on the ground; (3) Rellios, Perez and their
Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no
two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover; (4)
evidence that Galvez was seen or was together with the
about five minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez,
three other armed men when Enojarda was hit. There is a
armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing at Rellios,
missing link that precludes the Court from concluding that
Perez and their two companions as well as in the direction
it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.52 It cannot be said
of the copra kiln; and (5) about 20 to 25 minutes after the
therefore that there was positive identification of Galvez
first burst of gunfire, Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue
through circumstantial evidence.
uniform and carrying an M16 armalite rifle along with three
armed companions, after which, their group left the scene In People v. Comendador,53 the Court held:
of the crime.
While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity
However, these circumstances are not sufficient to of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in a given
establish the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable doubt. case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
be observed in assaying the probative value of
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
circumstantial evidence:
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances
x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads
essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty
of guilt of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish person.54 (Emphasis supplied)
with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince
And in Dela Cruz v. People,55 the Court stressed, thus:
beyond reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of
the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is
that the series of events pointing to the commission of a reasonable doubt, which simply means that the
felony is appreciated not singly but collectively. The guilt prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain the
of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond the point of moral
one (1) particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle certainty – certainty that convinces and satisfies the
 9

reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of
it. It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in compromise by the accused may be received in
mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every evidence as an implied admission of guilt,66 such principle
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to is not applicable in this case.
support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will
The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made
prosper even though the accused’s innocence may be
on offer of compromise,67 is the March 3, 1993 Order of the
doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of
RTC which reads as follows:
the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness
of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty.
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in Court together with
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and manifested
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the that there is a possibility of understanding and settlement
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby
not sufficient to support a conviction, and, thus, that which reset for new assignment.68
is favorable to the accused should be
considered.56 (Emphasis supplied). Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally
offered and admitted as evidence during the trial. The
And when the evidence on the commission of the crime is victim’s widow or any prosecution witness did not testify on
purely circumstantial or inconclusive, motive is vital. As any offer of compromise made by Galvez. We have held
held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,57 that when the evidence on the alleged offer of
compromise is amorphous, the same shall not benefit the
Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not
prosecution in its case against the accused.69
an element of the crime. However, motive becomes
important when the evidence on the commission of the The Court also recognizes that there may be instances
crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. Motive is thus when an offer of compromise will not amount to an
vital in this case.58 admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,70 the Court
pronounced that:
In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that he did
not know of any motive on the part of Galvez to kill …In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally
Enojarda.59 This is a circumstance that should be taken in admissible as evidence against the party making it. It is a
favor of Galvez. legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases
of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes
In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v. People,60 to
which directly affect the public interest, no compromise
wit:
whatever may be entered into as regards the penal
Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases
given effect to the constitutional presumption of the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not
innocence which can only be overcome by contrary made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
proof beyond reasonable doubt – one which requires the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the
the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of guilt
it. As we have so stated in the past – or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.71(Emphasis supplied).
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must overthrow the As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed made such an
reasonable doubt. To meet this standard, there is need for offer under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was not
the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both given the opportunity to explain that it was given for some
oral and documentary, independently of whatever other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an
defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid its legal
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that consequences.
the crime had been committed precisely by the person on
In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez
trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be
prevails over the alleged implied admission of guilt.
one of conviction. It is thus required that every
In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the accused, explained
circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into
that:
account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more
sway judgment.61 (Emphasis supplied) presumptions are involved. Sometimes the presumptions
conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the
There could not be any doubt that the facts, as
accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is
established by the circumstantial evidence, failed to
necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and
exclude the possibility that another person shot Enojarda.
determine what logical or social basis exists for each
There were three other armed men, any one of whom
presumption, and then determine which should be
could be the culprit.
regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail
When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the
to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime existence of a presumption indicating his guilt does not in
beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless
even if the commission of the crime is the inculpating presumption, together with all the
established.62Indeed, the State, aside from showing the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is
existence of a crime, has the burden of correctly sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by
identifying the author of such crime.63 Both facts must be proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the Until the defendant’s guilt is shown in this manner, the
strength of its evidence and without solace from the presumption of innocence continues.72
weakness of the defense.64
xxx
Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental brief
The presumption of innocence, x x x is founded upon the
before this Court that it was erroneous for the CA to have
first principles of justice, and is not a mere form but a
affirmed the RTC ruling that Galvez’s offer to the victim’s
substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere
wife to settle the case is a tacit admission of guilt.65
suspicion or conjecture; a probability that the defendant
 10

committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified
opportunity to do so. Its purpose is to balance the scales in his presence at the scene of the crime with a lawful
what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is inherently weak;
lone individual pitted against the People and all the and that Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law
resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is as witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their
that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, house on the night in question, pertain to the weakness of
the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt Galvez’s alibi which may cast doubt on his innocence.
cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is However, these circumstances do not prove beyond
in consonance with the rule that conflicts in evidence must reasonable doubt Galvez’s guilt. Although an accused
be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than must satisfactorily prove his alibi, the burden in criminal
upon a theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.73 cases still rests on the prosecution to prove the accused’s
guilt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in favor of
own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness
Galvez, there could not be a moral certainty as to the guilt
of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the
of Galvez. The prosecution has not proven the guilt of
constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused
Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.
by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt
It may be pointed out that the following circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption
support the conviction of Galvez as charged: remains.78 Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the
accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures,
(a) the negative findings of the paraffin and ballistic tests presumptions, or suspicions.79
do not prove that Galvez did not fire a gun;
That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the
(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his investigating police officer is a prerogative given to the
presence at the scene of the crime with a lawful purpose, accused and should not be given evidentiary value to
yet he put up alibi which is inherently weak; establish his guilt. In People v. Saavedra,80 the Court held
(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as that an accused has the right to remain silent and his
witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their house silence should not be construed as an admission of guilt.
on the night in question; and Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the
(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
investigating police officer. prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his identity and
culpability.81 Conviction must be based on the strength of
These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
discharge of its duty to prove the guilt of Galvez beyond defense, i.e., the obligation is upon the shoulders of the
reasonable doubt. prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not the
It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a accused to prove his innocence.82 The prosecution’s job is
conclusive proof that one has not fired a gun, as held by to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
this Court in People v. Pagal74 and People v. doubt.83 Thus, when the evidence for the prosecution is
Teehankee which were cited by the CA in its Decision,
75 insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and
since it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear the accused absolved and released at once.84
no traces of nitrate or gunpowder as when the hands are Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great
bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards.76 Such goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send
principle, however, has no bearing in the present case. In people to jail but to render justice.85 Under our criminal
the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court concluded justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether
that a negative finding does not prove that the accused the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but
therein had not fired a gun because the accused were whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.86
positively identified by witnesses as having shot their
victims, unlike in the case at hand where Galvez is not It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the
positively identified by direct or circumstantial evidence Prosecution, justice could not be rendered in this case for
that he shot Enojarda. If the principle should be given any the untimely death of Enojarda. Justice, however, would
weight at all, it should be in favor of Galvez, that is, also not be served with the conviction of the herein
considering that he is not positively identified, then, the accused. It is well to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:
negative results of the paraffin test bolster his claim that he In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime
did not shoot Enojarda, and not the other way around. charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even
The argument that the negative result of the ballistic hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the
examination does not prove that Galvez did not fire a gun perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the
during the incident as it was possible that he used another victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of
gun, should also be struck down. It is the prosecution which Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception,
has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political
other than the one issued to him and that such firearm, persuasion – whether privileged or less privileged – to be
which Galvez used, was the one that killed the victim. It is invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused
not for Galvez to prove the opposite of the possibility deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called
adverted to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution upon to disprove what the prosecution has not
which must prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and proved.87 (Emphasis supplied)
not for him to prove his innocence. As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its
Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin burden of proving Galvez’s guilt beyond reasonable
and ballistic tests do not conclusively prove that Galvez doubt, the Court has no choice but to acquit him.
did not shoot the victim, the same negative results cannot WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
be used as circumstantial evidence against Galvez to Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case No. 1816 dated
prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate February 2, 1995 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
the basic precepts of criminal law which presumes the in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255 dated March 30, 2001
innocence of the accused. Every circumstance favoring are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant
an accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account, Cesar Galvez is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his
the proof against him must survive the test of reason, and guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause
judgment.77
 11

the immediate release of Cesar Galvez unless he is being 49 TSN, October 1, 1993, pp. 153-154.
lawfully held for another crime and to inform this Court 50 TSN, September 20, 1993, p. 21.
accordingly within ten (10) days from notice. 51 Id. at 22.
SO ORDERED. 52See Baleros, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 138033, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA
10.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
53 No. L-38000, September 19, 1980, 100 SCRA 155.
Associate Justice 54 Id. at 169-170.
Footnotes
55 G.R. No. 150439, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 190.
1Penned by then CA Associate Justice, now Supreme Court Associate
Justice, Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by CA Associate Justices
56 Id. at 215-216.
Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Elvi John S. Asuncion, CA rollo, pp. 179-194. 57 G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005, 456 SCRA 45.
2 Penned by Judge Salvador A. Memoracion, CA rollo, pp. 13-25. 58 Id. at 77.
3TSN, Danilo Perez, September 20, 1993, pp. 5,12-16; TSN, Wilfredo Rellios, 59 TSN, September 20, 1993, p. 22.
October 1, 1993, pp. 79,85-92, 95-97.
60 G.R. No. 153699, August 22, 2005, 467 SCRA 552.
4 Records, p. 1.
61Id. at 567, citing Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, supra note 14, at
5 TSN, Wilfredo Rellios, October 1, 1993, pp. 89-94. 215; People v. Dramayo, 149 Phil. 107, 114-115 (1971).
6 TSN, Danilo Perez, September 20, 1993, pp. 15-21. 62 People v. Sinco, G.R. No. 131836, March 30, 2001, 355 SCRA 713, 721.
7 TSN, Cesar Galvez, November 7, 1994, pp. 261-273. 63 People v. Limpangog, 444 Phil. 691, 709 (2003).
8TSN, Danilo Ramillano, October 10, 1994, pp. 225-240; TSN, Wilhelmina 64 Id. at 709.
Espinosa, September 28, 1994, pp. 2-12.
65 Rollo, Vol, II., pp. 21-23, 36-37; Vol. I, p. 192, (CA Decision, p. 14).
9 TSN, Athena Elisa Anderson, February 10, 1994, pp. 184-193.
66 See Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 27.
10 TSN, Lemuel Caser, May 12, 1994, pp. 202-224.
See RTC Decision, p. 12, Records, p. 166; see also CA Decision, p. 14, rollo,
67
11 CA Rollo, pp. 82-83. Vol. I, p. 192; Brief for the Appellee, pp. 21-22, rollo Vol. II, p. 109.
12 Id. at 83-85. 68 Records, p. 40.
13 Id. at 85-86. 69 See People v. Pido, G.R. No. 92427, August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 45, 66.
14 Id. at 88. 70 G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995, 250 SCRA 676.
15 Id. at 88-89. 71 People v. Godoy, supra note 70, at 723.
16 Id. at 24-25. 72 Id. at 726-272, citing Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1
17 Id. at 193. 73 People v. Godoy, supra note 70, at 726-728.
18 Id. at 189. 74 338 Phil. 946 (1997).
19 Id. at 189-193. 75 319 Phil. 128 (1995).
20 Id. 76 People v. Pagal, id. at 951 and People v. Teehankee, id. at 163.
21 Id. at 195-200. 77Dela Cruz v. People, supra note 14, at 215; People v. Dramayo, supra note
22 Id. at 206. 20, at 112.

23 The case is now docketed as G.R. No. 157221.

78People v. Calumpang, G.R. No. 158203, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 719,
736.
24 Rollo, p. 5.
79Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005, 456 SCRA
25 CA rollo, pp. 58-59. 45, 77.
26 Rollo, pp. 22-23. 80 No. L-48738, May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 610, 633.
27 Id. at 52. 81 People v. Sinco, supra note 62, at 721.
28 Rollo, pp. 52-54. 82People v. Mamalias, 385 Phil. 499, 514 (2000); People v. Limpangog, supra
note 63, at 710; People v. Sinco, supra at 728; People v. Enad, 402 Phil. 1, 25
29 CA rollo, pp. 60-63. (2001); People v. Garcia, 390 Phil. 519, 526 (2000).
30 Rollo, pp. 23-37. 83 People v. Mamalias, id. at 514.
31 CA rollo, pp. 160-173. 84 Id.
32 Rollo, pp. 95-120. 85 People v. Mamalias, supra note 82, at 513.
33 People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372, 390-391 (1998). 86 People v. Garcia, supra note 83, at 528.
34 455 Phil. 371 (2003). 87 People v. Monje, supra note 43, at 736.
35 Id. at 383-384. See also Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 420 Phil. 25 (2001).
36 People v. Quitlong, supra at 387-388.
37 CA rollo, pp. 190-191; CA Decision, pp. 12-13.
38 See People v. Lumilan, 380 Phil. 130, 153 (2000).
39 TSN, September 20, 1993, pp. 15-18.
40 TSN September 21, 1993, p. 69.
41 Id. at 74.
42 Id. October 1, 1993, pp. 153-154.
43 People v. Monje, 438 Phil. 716, 732-733 (2002).
44People v. Quidato, Jr., 357 Phil. 674, 683 (1998); People v. Mendigurin, 456
Phil. 328, 337 (2003).
45 People v. Mendigurin, id. at 344.
46 TSN, September 20, 1993, pp. 67-68; TSN, October 1, 1993, pp. 93 and 150.
47 Id. at 74.
48 TSN, September 20, 1993, p. 70.
 12

G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005 checks bounced upon presentment for the reason
"CLOSED ACCOUNT";11 when the Ladonga spouses failed
EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
a criminal complaint against them.12
DECISION
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the
account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the the checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation,
Decision,1 dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the
CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated checks when they mature;13 and, that petitioner is not a
August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 signatory of the checks and had no participation in the
of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 issuance thereof.14
convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known
as The Bouncing Checks Law. On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision
finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable
The factual background of the case is as follows: doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. which reads:
Blg. 22 were filed with the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment
Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case No. 7068 finding accused Adronico Ladonga, alias Ronie, and
alleges as follows: Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of the aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand
Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this charged before this Court, and accordingly, sentences
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
confederating, and mutually helping with one another, 1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of
knowing fully well that they did not have sufficient funds one (1) year for each of them, and a fine in the amount of
deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), ₱9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No.
Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, 284743;
and feloniously, draw and issue UCPB Check No. 284743
postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND 2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for
SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (₱9,075.55), each of them to one (1) year and a fine of ₱12, 730.00,
payable to Alfredo Oculam, and thereafter, without equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
informing the latter that they did not have sufficient funds
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of
deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the
one year for each of them and a fine of ₱8,496.55
check, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said
check to Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the 4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and
aforementioned checks; however, upon presentation of solidarily pay and reimburse the complainant, Mr. Alfredo
the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same Oculam, the sum of ₱15,000.00 representing actual
was dishonored for the reason that the account of the expenses incurred in prosecuting the instant cases;
accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank, ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and the amount of
Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the ₱30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject
damage and prejudice of the said Alfredo Oculam in the checks which bounced; but without subsidiary
aforestated amount. imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas With Costs against the accused.
Pambansa Bilang 22.2
SO ORDERED.15
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.16 On
Case Nos. 7069 and 7070 are similarly worded, except for
the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court
the allegations concerning the number, date and amount
of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
of each check, that is:
criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which
dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱12,730.00;3 is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.17
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 – UCPB Check No. 106136
dated July 22, 1990 in the amount of ₱8,496.55.4 On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of petitioner.18 It held that the provisions of the
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When
penal code were made applicable to special penal laws
arraigned on June 26, 1991, the two accused pleaded not
in the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, 19 U.S. vs.
guilty to the crimes charged.5
Ponte, 20 and U.S. vs. Bruhez.21 It noted that Article 10 of the
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall
Alfredo Oculam. He testified that: in 1989, spouses be supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide
Adronico6 and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular the contrary. The Court of Appeals stressed that since B.P.
customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory
Bohol;7 sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
obtained a ₱9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by (RPC), the principle of conspiracy may be applied to
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that
post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by the fact that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the
Adronico;8 sometime in the last week of April 1990 and checks did not exculpate her from criminal liability as it is
during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part
obtained an additional loan of ₱12,730.00, guaranteed by in every act and knows the part which everyone
UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 performed. The Court of Appeals underscored that in
issued by Adronico;9 between May and June 1990, the conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be
Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of the act of the other.
₱8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post
dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico;10 the three
 13

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article
Court of Appeals denied the same in a Resolution dated is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be
November 16, 1999.22 supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary.
Hence, the present petition.
The appellate court’s reliance on the cases of People vs.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for
Parel,25 U.S. vs. Ponte,26 and U.S. vs. Bruhez27 rests on a firm
resolution:
basis. These cases involved the suppletory application of
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE principles under the then Penal Code to special
DRAWER OR ISSUER OF THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED laws. People vs. Parel is concerned with the application of
BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE LATTER’S Article 2228 of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030, the
ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 AS CONSPIRATOR. penal laws if they favor the accused. U.S. vs.
Ponte involved the application of Article 17 29 of the same
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING Penal Code, with reference to the participation of
ISSUES: principals in the commission of the crime of
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized
VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs. Bruhez covered Article 4530 of the
INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the
REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES: instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium
Law.
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code.
– Offenses which are or in the future may be punished B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE recent case of Yu vs. People,31 the Court applied
COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING under Article 3932 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
TO SPECIAL LAWS LIKE B.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.23 The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in
this case is analogous to the application of the provision
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For once
criminally liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 because she conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal
had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
three checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
proven by the checks themselves. She contends that the participation of each of them becomes secondary, since
Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of all the conspirators are principals.33
conspiracy, as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. She posits that the application of the principle of All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner
conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and must be set aside.
include situations not provided for or intended by the Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when
lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like petitioner, two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To
checks. be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy,
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner the accused must be shown to have performed an overt
and echoes the declaration of the Court of Appeals that act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.34 The
some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active
the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or
applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.35
suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that
Code to it. petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution
witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the
– Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.36 With respect to
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, describe the details of petitioner’s participation. He did not
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. specify the nature of petitioner’s involvement in the
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides commission of the crime, either by a direct act of
that offenses which in the future are made punishable participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator,
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the or cooperating in the commission of the offense by
RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to another act without which it would not have been
such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt
contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was
can perfectly be reconciled. present when the first check was issued. However, this
inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the criminal design.
the special penal laws are controlling with regard to
offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but
restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that by positive and conclusive evidence.37 Conspiracy
special legal provisions prevail over general ones.24 Lex transcends mere companionship and mere presence at
specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
considered as a superfluity, and could have been conspiracy.38 Even knowledge, acquiescence in or
eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one
 14

as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation 3 Id., p. 3.

in the commission of the crime with a view to the 4 Id., p. 5.
furtherance of the common design and purpose.39 5 Id., pp. 29-31.
As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent 6 Also known as Ronie.
vintage, People vs. Mandao:40 7 TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 4-7.
To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be 8 Id., pp. 16-21.
taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal
9 TSN of December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 2-3.
concept that imputes culpability under specific
circumstances; as such, it must be established as clearly as 10 TSN of January 28, 1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 1-2.
any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be 11 TSN
of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 19; TSN of
positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 1 and 3; TSN of
and simplistic device by which the accused may be January 28, 1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 1; Original Records, p.
128.
ensnared and kept within the penal fold.
12 TSNof December 4, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, pp. 2 and 4; TSN
Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of January 28, 1992, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 2; Original Records, p.
of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must always 125.
be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. 13 TSN
of August 23, 1993, Testimony of Evangeline Ladonga, pp. 7-8, 11-12
The Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we and 15; TSN of December 20, 1993, Testimony of Adronico Ladonga, p. 18.
quote: 14 TSN
of August 23, 1993, Testimony of Evangeline Ladonga, p. 10; TSN of
December 20, 1993, Testimony of Adronico Ladonga, pp. 24-26.
At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its
evidence against accused-appellant Franco, merely 15 Original Records, p. 124.
relied and pegged the latter’s criminal liability on its 16 Id., p. 126.
sweeping theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not
17 Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo, p. 28.
attendant in the commission of the crime.
18 Rollo, p. 133.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction
19 No. 18260, January 27, 1923, 44 Phil. 437.
must be predicated on the strength of the evidence for
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence 20 No. 5952, October 24, 1911, 20 Phil. 379.
for the defense. The proof against him must survive the test 21 No. 9268, November 4, 1914, 28 Phil. 305.
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
22 Rollo, p. 39.
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on
the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense 23 Rollo, pp. 69-70.
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that 24 Bayan(Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570,
it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 483.
certainty. 25 Note No. 19, supra.
Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of 26 Note No. 20, supra.
the appellant beyond reasonable doubt in order to 27 Note No. 21, supra.
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
28 ART.22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a
In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of
29 ART. 17. Principals. – The following are considered principals:
the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is
weak, the accused must be acquitted when the 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
quantum of proof required in all criminal cases. (Citations
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
omitted)41
without which it would not have been accomplished.
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the 30 ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
petitioner with moral certainty. Its evidence falls short of crime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry
the quantum of proof required for conviction. with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or
tools with which it was committed.
Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the
petitioner’s innocence must be upheld and she must be Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person
acquitted.1a\^/phi1.net
not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in 31 G.R. No. 134172, September 20, 2004.
CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated 32 ART.39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to
August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he
Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for
each eight pesos, subject to the following rules:
convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline 1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto and
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in the
preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment shall not
B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be
costs. counted against the prisoner.

2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary

SO ORDERED.
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen
Puno, (Chairman), Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario,
days, if for a light felony.
JJ., concur.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision
correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
Footnotes
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in
1 Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (now retired) and concurred a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during
in by Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and Eloy R. Bello (now retired). the period of time established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer
2 Original the same deprivation as those of which the principal penalty consists.
Records, pp. 1-2.
 15

5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by [G. R. No. 132028. April 19, 2002]
reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his
financial circumstances should improve. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUSEBIO
33 People vs. Felipe, G.R. No. 142505, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 146, ENFECTANA, alias Toytoy, and ERWIN
176; People vs. Julianda, Jr., G.R. No. 128886, November 23, 2001, 370 SCRA ENFECTANA, accused-appellants.
448, 469; People vs. Quinicio, G.R. No. 142430, September 13, 2001, 365
SCRA 252, 266. DECISION
34 People vs. Pickrell, G.R. No. 120409, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 19, QUISUMBING, J.:
33; People vs. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454,
473; People vs. Pagalasan, G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991, June 18, 2003, 404 Before us on appeal is the decision[1] dated June 24, 1997
SCRA 275, 291.
of the Regional Trial Court, Borongan, Eastern Samar,
35 Peoplevs. Caballero, G.R. Nos. 149028-30, April 2, 2003, 400 SCRA 424, Branch 1, in Criminal Case No. 10582, finding appellants
437; People vs. Ponce, G.R. No. 126254, September 29, 2000, 341 SCRA 352,
359-360.
guilty of murder and sentencing them to suffer the
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
36 TSN of December 3, 1991, Testimony of Alfredo Oculam, p. 20.
37 People
Appellants herein were indicted in an Information [2] as
vs. Tamayo, G.R. No. 138608, September 24, 2002, SCRA 540,
553; People vs. Melencion, G.R. No. 121902, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 113, follows:
123.
That on November 2, 1994, at about 11:00 oclock in the
38 People
vs. Leaño, G.R. No. 138886, October 9, 2001, 366 SCRA 774; People morning, at the National Highway, Barangay Cabay,
vs. Compo, G.R. No. 112990, May 28, 2001, 358 SCRA 266, 272.
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the
39 People vs. Natividad, G.R. No. 151072, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 587, jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
595. accused conspiring, confederating and helping one
40 People vs. Mandao, G.R. No. 135048, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 292. another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation
41 Id., pp. 304-305.
and treachery and without justifiable cause, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously bumped Leo Boco
and the complainant Adelaida Boco with the trycicle (sic)
of the accused, when the victim has just alighted from a
passenger jeepney, then attacked, assaulted, hacked,
stabbed and wounded Leo Boco with the use of sharp
bladed weapons, which the accused provided
themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting injuries upon
Leo Boco, which injuries caused the instantaneous death
of Leo Boco, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the victim, in such amount as may be awarded to them
under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and other related laws and caused injuries on the
complainant, Adelaida Boco, when she was bumped by
the trycicle (sic) named Pepit owned and operated by the
herein accused and driven by co-accused Erwin
Enfectana.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the attendance of the
aggravating circumstances of: Evident premeditation,
Conspiracy, Treachery and advantage taken due to
superior strength or means employed to weaken the
defense of the victim.
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Thereafter trial ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was ADELAIDA BOCO,
widow of the victim, Leo Boco. She testified that on
November 2, 1994, at around 11:00 A.M., while she and her
husband were on their way home, they were sideswiped
by a tricycle driven by appellant Erwin Enfectana with
Efren Enfectana as passenger. As a result, her husband fell
in a crouching position. When he was about to get up,
appellant Eusebio Enfectana came from behind to stab
him. Then appellant Erwin Enfectana and accused Efren
Enfectana took turns stabbing Leo Boco, causing his
death.[3]
DOMINADOR DIALINO, a 52-year-old farmer, testified that
he saw appellants and co-accused kill the
victim. According to the witness, he was at the store of one
Olivo Contado, at around 11:00 A.M. of November 2,
1994. From there, he saw Leo and Adelaida Boco alight
from a jeepney. He also saw a fast running tricycle which
bumped the vehicle of the Boco spouses. The tricycle was
being driven by Erwin Enfectana who was with Efren
Enfectana. They missed the Boco spouses who jumped
away. Erwin and Efren Enfectana alighted from the
tricycle and walked towards Leo Boco, who had fallen
down. They were carrying short bladed weapons known
as depang.[4] Dominador Dialino tried to stop them by
going between them and the Boco spouses, to no
avail. He heard Efren Enfectana shout, bon-a na
Tatay (Father, stab him). He then saw Eusebio Enfectana
 16

stab Leo Boco. After Leo Boco fell, Erwin and Efren also bolo. In order to escape, he hid in the house of Osias
stabbed him.[5] Montes where he learned that his father, Eusebio
Enfectana, and Leo Boco had a quarrel.[12]
BARTOLOME BAHASAN, a 54-year-old resident of Bgy.
Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, testified that FE ANDALIZA GLINO testified that on the morning of
sometime in 1985, the family of Eusebio Enfectana tried to November 2, 1994, while she was ironing clothes in the
move into the residence of Leo and Adelaida Boco but house of Nestor Borja, she heard a tricycle crashing into a
they were prevented by Leo. He also alleged that wooden fence. When she looked out the window, she saw
sometime in 1985, Leo Boco was waylaid by the appellant Erwin Enfectana sprawled on the ground trying
Enfectanas (Eusebio, Erwin and Efren) but he was able to to get up. She also saw Leo Boco with
escape by swimming across the river.From then on, Leo a dipang approaching Erwin and trying to stab him. Erwin
Boco always tried to evade the Enfectanas.[6] got up and ran away. She returned to her chores but after
a while, she heard a woman shout, Leo, ayaw kamo pag-
Dr. MICHAEL TAN, the Municipal Health Officer of
igi, ayaw hito (Leo, do not quarrel, not here.) She looked
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, testified that he was the one
out the window and saw Leo Boco advancing, this time
who conducted the post-mortem examination on the
towards appellant Eusebio Enfectana. Leo was trying to
cadaver of Leo Boco. According to him, the deceased
stab Eusebio Enfectana while the latter parried the blows
suffered six stab wounds, and that the probable cause of
with a piece of wood. When Eusebio Enfectana was
death was the stab wound at the back that caused
cornered against a banana store, witness Fe Glino said,
hemorrhage. He opined that in all probability, based on
she looked away until she heard somebody
the sizes and nature of the wounds, not less than two
shouting, Patay na si Leo Boco (Leo Boco is already
weapons were used against the victim.[7]
dead).[13]
On June 15, 1995, ADELAIDA BOCO was recalled to the
Defense witness NENITA ALDE testified that she was the one
witness stand to testify on the damages she and her family
who took the pictures of the appellants house, which show
suffered and the expenses they incurred as a result of Leo
shattered windows and the stones allegedly used in
Bocos death. According to her, Leo Boco was a
breaking these windows.[14]
businessman who earns at least P20,000 a month by selling
automotive parts in Cebu. She said that she Another defense witness, EDDIE AMBAL, testified that on
incurred P50,000 in funeral expenses. She also spent for November 2, 1994, while he was on his way home from his
legal fees because she engaged a lawyer for the fee aunts house, he saw a tilted tricycle. He also saw appellant
of P500 per appearance in court. Aside from these, she Eusebio Enfectana being attacked by Leo Boco with
also alleged that since her husbands death, she became a dipang. According to him, Eusebio Enfectana managed
the sole breadwinner of her family and the main source of to parry these blows with a piece of wood until he reached
livelihood for her five children.[8] a banana store where he was able to get hold of a
bolo. This he used to stab and hack the victim, Leo
For its part, the defense presented DARIO D. ALDE,
Boco.[15]
municipal treasurer of Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, as its
first witness. He testified that there is no record of Leo Boco Witness MARCOS LADIAO testified that on November 2,
as businessman in the Municipality of Balangkayan.[9] 1994, at around 11:00 A.M., while he was on his way to the
house of a certain Romulo Elpedes, he noticed a tilted
Next witness for the defense was Mrs. MANUELA CONTADO
tricycle by the side of the road. He saw appellant Eusebio
DIALINO. She testified that on November 2, 1994, she went
Enfectana standing near the said tricycle. He also saw Leo
to the cemetery of Balangkayan where she stayed from
Boco with a small bolo approaching Eusebio Enfectana
8:30-9:30 A.M. She then proceeded to the waiting shed
from the direction of the seashore. He heard Leo Boco
where she waited for a ride home. She was able to ride a
shout, kay waray ko man kamatay an anak, it amay it ak
tricycle at around 11:00 A.M. She alleged that Dominador
papatayon (Because I failed to kill the son, I will kill the
Dialino was with her in the tricycle and that they arrived in
father). With these words, Leo Boco bumped Eusebio
Cabay at around 12:00 noon. Upon arriving home, they
Enfectana and tried to stab him with the dipang. But
were informed that Leo Boco had been killed.[10]
Eusebio Enfectana managed to evade the thrust of Leo
Appellant EUSEBIO ENFECTANA testified that on November Bocos weapon. Eusebio Enfectana was able to pick a
2, 1994, at around 11:00 A.M., while he was at home, piece of wood which he used to parry the blows of Leo
someone arrived and informed him that his tricycle was Boco, at the same time backpedalling across the street
involved in an accident. He went to the place and saw his where he (Eusebio Enfectana) was eventually cornered
tricycle turned upside down with its windshield broken. against the banana store of Contado. At said store,
Suddenly, he saw Leo Boco running towards him with Eusebio Enfectana managed to get hold of a long bolo
a dipang (a small bolo). He evaded the attacks of Leo which he used to stab Leo Boco. When the victim fell
Boco and managed to get hold of a piece of wood which down, appellant Eusebio Enfectana ran and jumped over
he used to defend himself. Still, Leo Boco persisted in the fence.[16]
attacking him until he was able to get hold of a bolo which
Later, the prosecution recalled ADELAIDA BOCO as its
he used in stabbing Leo. According to him, he was able to
rebuttal witness to disprove the allegations of Eddie Ambal
stab Leo in the right hand and chest. Aside from this he was
that he (Ambal) actually saw the killing of Leo Boco.[17]
also able to hack him in the neck. As Leo fell down from
these counter-attacks, according to appellant, he took On June 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision as
Leos bolo and used this to stab him. He was then chased follows:
by the sons and the cousin of Leo Boco up to his house
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and
which they pelted with stones. After they stopped, Eusebio
circumstances, EUSEBIO ENFECTANA and ERWIN
decided to call the authorities to surrender himself.[11]
ENFECTANA are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
Appellant ERWIN ENFECTANA testified that he is 24 years co-principals of the crime of Murder, defined and
old, married, and a resident of Cabay, Balangkayan, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
Eastern Samar. According to him, at around 11:00 A.M. of amended, and further amended by R.A. 7659, section 6,
November 2, 1994, while he was waiting for passengers in which provide the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to
Bgy. Cabay, Balangkayan, he saw Leo Boco running Death. Accordingly, Eusebio Enfectana and Erwin
toward him with a small bolo. In his effort to escape, he Enfectana are hereby sentenced to serve the indivisible
accidentally bumped his tricycle on a fence. He fell down penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the cost and to
because of the impact but he immediately stood up and indemnify the heirs of Leo Boco in the amount of Fifty
ran away because Leo Boco was still chasing him with a Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) pursuant to a recent ruling of
 17

the Supreme Court (citing People vs. Chica, GR No. better position to decide the issue, having heard the
117732, 1995. PP. vs. Sison, 159 SCRA 645). Records show, witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
Eusebio Enfecatana and Erwin Enfectana are out on bail, manner of testifying during trial. This rule admits of
the same is hereby ordered cancelled pursuant to exceptions, such as when the evaluation was reached
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-92. As far as accused Efren arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked,
Enfectana is concerned, he is still at large to date. misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which could affect the result of
SO ORDERED.[18]
the case.[20] Unfortunately for appellants, none of these
Aggrieved, appellants filed this appeal alleging that the exceptions is present in this case.
trial court erred:
The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Adelaida Boco
I and Dominador Dialino were both positive and
categorical. The assertion of appellants that they
IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT EUSEBIO contradicted each other has no support in the
ENFECTANA ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE. records.Moreover, even if we were to agree with
II appellants that there were inconsistencies in their
testimonies, they refer only to trivial and immaterial
[IN] FINDING BOTH APPELLANTS GUILTY OF MURDER. details. Thus, assuming these inconsistencies to be present,
III they tend to show that the witnesses were being
spontaneous and were not coached or rehearsed. Settled
IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS. is the rule that minor inconsistencies do not affect the
In essence, the issues here are (1) whether the trial court credibility of a witness. On the contrary, they may be
properly gave credence to the version of the prosecution considered badges of veracity or manifestations of
while disbelieving that of the defense; (2) whether there is truthfulness on material points and they may even
self defense on the part of Eusebio Enfectana; and, (3) heighten the credibility of the witness.[21]
whether the circumstance of treachery should be The records of this case show that the prosecution
appreciated to qualify the offense to murder. Likewise, we witnesses were consistent in their narration as
must further inquire into the propriety of the civil indemnity to WHO committed the crime, WHEN and HOW it was
and damages awarded by the trial court. committed. These are the material facts in this case which
Appellant Eusebio Enfectana admits that he killed Leo had been sufficiently and convincingly established by the
Boco. He, however, alleges that he acted in self- prosecution. Compared with the allegation of the
defense. According to him, he was attacked first and he appellants, the prosecutions version is more believable
had no option but to kill the aggressor. On the other hand, and in accord with reality, hence deserving full faith and
appellant Erwin denies any participation in the killing and credence.
alleges that he was nowhere near the place where the Appellants would want us to believe that it was the victim,
incident transpired. Both appellants assail the finding of Leo Boco, who initiated the attacks, first against Erwin
the trial court that they are liable for the death of Leo Enfectana and then against Eusebio Enfectana, and that
Boco. According to them, it was the victim, Leo Boco, who notwithstanding the fact that said Erwin and Eusebio were
had the motive to commence the assault upon Eusebio both caught unaware and unarmed by the sudden
Enfectana because of Bocos conviction resulting from a attacks of Leo Boco, they managed to evade him and
complaint lodged against him by the Enfectanas. They escape unscathed. This is highly suspect and in our view,
add that Boco also lost in a civil case involving his house. quite incredible. Evidence to be believed must not only
Appellants also assail the inconsistencies in the testimonies come from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself
of the prosecution witnesses, particularly those of Adelaida be credible.[22] It is very unlikely that Leo Boco, if the version
Boco and Dominador Dialino. Lastly, appellants contend of the appellants were true, would fail to land even a single
that even if self-defense could not be appreciated, the hit upon the body of either appellants. Yet neither Erwin
crime committed was merely homicide and that only nor Eusebio Enfectana showed such injury. The version of
Eusebio should be held liable therefor.[19] the appellants would not explain why co-accused Efren
Enfectana suddenly disappeared after the incident. If it
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the appellee, was true that they were innocent, then there is no reason
avers that the trial court committed no error in convicting for Efren Enfectana to flee and hide. Flight is an indication
appellants Eusebio and Erwin Enfectana for murder. The of guilt[23] and lends credence to the version of the
OSG contends that the failure of appellants to submit any prosecution in this case.
counter-affidavit immediately after the complaint was
filed against them is an indication that their version was no As for the issue of self -defense, it is an established principle
longer spontaneous nor truthful. According to the OSG, that once this justifying circumstance is raised, the burden
the claim that it was the victim who had the motive to of proving the elements of the claim shifts to him who
commence the assault against the Enfectanas is invokes it.[24] The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the
unrealistic, since it is also true that the Enfectanas victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to
harbored ill feelings towards Leo Boco. The OSG stresses actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person
that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, as a claiming self-defense; (2) that there be reasonable
whole, show no real discrepancy and that the necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the
inconsistencies pointed out by appellants refer only to unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient
minor and trivial matters. provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the
Considering the evidence presented and the arguments person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and
adduced by appellants and appellee, we are unable to immediate cause of the victims aggression.[25] The
find merit in the present appeal. condition of unlawful aggression is a sine qua non;
otherwise stated, there can be no self-defense, complete
The conviction of the Enfectanas was primarily based on
or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful
the testimonial accounts of Adelaida Boco and
aggression against the person defending himself.[26]
Dominador Dialino which was found by the trial court to
be more credible than the version of the appellants. It is Given the fact that the relationship between the parties
doctrinally settled that when the issue is one of credibility had been marred by ill will and animosities, and pursuant
of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the to the rule on the burden of evidence imposed by law on
findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a the party invoking self-defense, the admission of appellant
 18

Eusebio Enfectana that he killed Leo Boco made it G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006
incumbent upon appellant to convincingly prove that
RAMONITO MANABAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
which necessitated the use of deadly force by appellant.
Unfortunately, appellant miserably failed to prove the DECISION
existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
As found by the trial court: CARPIO, J.:

The version of the accused [appellant] that it was Leo The Case
Boco who was the unlawful aggressor and that Leo Boco This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 21 May
attacked and stabbed him while he was inspecting his 2001 and the Resolution3 dated 8 November 2001 of the
tilted tricycle on the highway cannot be given faith and Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23790. In its 21 May
credit it being an afterthought, self-serving and expert 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision
invention and/or imagination sans truth.[27] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 ("trial
Weighing the conflicting versions of the prosecution and court"), finding Ramonito Manaban ("Manaban") guilty of
the defense, we agree with the trial courts conclusion that the crime of homicide. In its 8 November 2001 Resolution,
the prosecutions version is more in accord with the natural the Court of Appeals modified its Decision by reducing the
course of things, hence more credible. award for loss of earning capacity.

Anent the third issue, we also agree with the trial court that The Facts
treachery is present in this case. The victim and his wife The facts as narrated by the trial court are as follows:
were suddenly attacked as they were coming down from
a jeepney. They had no idea that they were going to be On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o’clock in the
assaulted. The manner by which the appellants morning, Joselito Bautista, a father and a member of the
commenced and perpetrated their assault, (1) by trying to UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained
bump Leo and Adelaida Boco, making the former lose his of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. There,
balance and more susceptible to an attack, and (2) by the doctors prescribed certain medicines to be
simultaneously attacking Leo Boco, hence preventing him purchased. Needing money therefore, Joselito Bautista,
from putting up any semblance of defense, shows beyond who had taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the
any doubt that there was alevosia in this case. Settled is BPI Kalayaan Branch to withdraw some money from its
the rule that an unexpected and sudden attack under Automated Teller Machine (ATM).
circumstances that render the victim unable and Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM
unprepared to defend himself constitutes alevosia.[28] booth but because he could not effectively withdraw
As to damages, there is no dispute as to the propriety of money, he started kicking and pounding on the machine.
P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of Leo Boco. There For said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito
being uncontradicted testimony regarding the funeral Manaban, approached and asked him what the problem
expenses and legal fees paid by the widow, Adelaida was. Bautista complained that his ATM was retrieved by
Boco, at least P50,500 should be awarded to her as actual the machine and that no money came out of it. After
damages. Manaban had checked the receipt, he informed Bautista
that the Personal Identification Number (PIN) entered was
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of Branch 1 of the wrong and advised him to just return the next morning. This
Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, in angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on
Criminal Case No. 10582, finding the appellants Eusebio the machine. Manaban then urged him to calm down
Enfectana and Erwin Enfectana guilty of murder, is and referred him to their customer service over the phone.
AFFIRMED. Each of them is sentenced to the penalty Still not mollified, Bautista continued raging and striking the
of reclusion perpetua as well as to pay the heirs of the machine. When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he
victim Leo Boco P50,000 as civil indemnity. In addition, fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of
appellants are hereby ordered jointly and severally to Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against the machine, he
pay P50,500 as actual damages to the widow, Adelaida confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a
Boco. Lastly, let a copy of this decision be furnished to the shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista.4
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine
National Police so that co-accused Efren Enfectana be On 24 October 1996, Manaban was charged with the
apprehended promptly and brought to the bar of justice. crime of murder. The Information states:

Costs against appellants. That on or about the 11th day of October 1996, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with
SO ORDERED. a gun, and with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, did
Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
Jr., JJ., concur. assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one JOSELITO BAUTISTA, by then and there, shooting him at
Corona, J., no part in the deliberations. the back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said
JOSELITO BAUTISTA mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO
BAUTISTA.5
When arraigned on 4 December 1996,6 Manaban
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial then
followed.
The Trial
The Prosecution’s Version
The prosecution presented six witnesses: (1) Faustino
Delariarte ("Delariarte"); (2) SPO1 Dominador Salvador
("SPO1 Salvador"); (3) Rodolfo Bilgera ("Bilgera"); (4)
Celedonia H. Tan ("Tan"); (5) Dr. Eduardo T. Vargas ("Dr.
Vargas"); and (6) Editha Bautista ("Editha").
 19

Delariarte was a security guard who was employed by the 4. Two (2) Caliber .38 empty shells marked "RM-1" and "RM-
same security agency as Manaban. Delariarte testified 2";
that in the early morning of 11 October 1996, their duty
5. One (1) Caliber .38 misfired ammunition marked "RM-3";
officer, Diosdado Morga, called him and informed him
that one of the guards stationed at the BPI Kalayaan 6. Nine (9) Caliber .38 ammunition marked "RM-4", "RM-5",
Branch ("BPI Kalayaan") was involved in a shooting "RM-6" and "JB-1" to "JB-6"; and
incident. When he arrived at the bank, Delariarte saw
Manaban inside the bank using the phone. He also saw 7. One (1) Caliber .38 deformed copper coated lead
Joselito Bautista ("Bautista") lying on the ground but still bullet marked "JB". (Re-FID No. 606-14-1096 [N-96-2047]).13
alive. He then told their company driver, Virgilio Cancisio Based on the examination, Bilgera concluded that the
("Cancisio"), to take Bautista to the hospital but to be bullet which was extracted from Bautista’s body by the
careful since there was a gun tucked in Bautista’s waist. medico-legal officer was fired from the ARMSCOR 2015 .38
Bautista allegedly reeked of alcohol. Delariarte further Caliber revolver with Serial No. 2890914 and that the empty
testified that when Manaban came out of the bank, shells also came from the same gun. Bilgera submitted a
Manaban admitted to Delariarte that he shot Bautista.7 written report15 on the result of his examination.
SPO1 Salvador was a police investigator assigned at Editha, the widow of Joselito Bautista, testified that she was
Station 10, Philippine National Police-Central Police District married to Bautista on 22 December 1993 in civil rites and
Command (PNP-CPDC) of Quezon City. SPO1 Salvador that they have four children, the eldest of whom was 13
testified that on 11 October 1996, about 2:05 a.m., the duty years old. Editha stated that her husband, who was a
desk officer SPO2 Redemption Negre sent him, SPO1 Jerry member of the University of the Philippines Police Force
Abad and SPO1 Ruben Reyes to BPI Kalayaan to ("UP Police Force") since 1985, was receiving a monthly
investigate an alleged shooting incident. SPO1 Salvador salary of P5,050 at the time of his death. She narrated that
testified that when they arrived at BPI Kalayaan, they were on 11 October 1996, about 1:25 a.m., her husband brought
met by Delariarte and Cancisio. Manaban then their daughter Frinzi who had an asthma attack to the UP
approached them and surrendered his service firearm, a Health Center where she was confined for three days.
.38 caliber revolver, to SPO1 Salvador. Manaban allegedly According to Editha, her husband then left to withdraw
admitted shooting Bautista. SPO1 Salvador and his team money at BPI Kalayaan for the purchase of medicines.
investigated the crime scene. According to SPO1 Later, she was fetched by members of the UP Police Force
Salvador, he saw Bautista lying on his back near the who informed her that her husband had been shot. Editha
Automated Teller Machine ("ATM"). A .38 caliber revolver claimed that as a consequence of her husband’s death,
inside a locked holster was tucked in Bautista’s right waist. she spent more than P111,00016 for the nine-day wake,
SPO1 Salvador noticed that Bautista, who was still embalmment and funeral services.17
breathing, had been shot in the back. They brought
Bautista to the East Avenue Medical Center where The prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with
Bautista later died. Thereafter, they proceeded to the the testimony of Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI
police station and turned over Manaban to their desk Kalayaan. Instead, they just agreed to stipulate that on 11
officer for proper disposition and investigation.8 October 1996, about 7:45 a.m., Tan and BPI Custodian
Elma R. Piñano retrieved BPI Express Teller Card No. 3085-
Dr. Vargas, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico- 2616-21 issued to Bautista which was captured by the ATM
Legal Officer, conducted an autopsy on Bautista’s because a wrong Personal Identification Number (PIN)
cadaver. Dr. Vargas testified that Bautista died of a was entered.18
gunshot wound. According to him, the point of entry of the
bullet was at the back, on the right side of the body and The Defense’s Version
there was no exit point. He stated that he was able to The defense presented four witnesses: (1) Manaban; (2)
recover the slug from the left anterior portion of the victim’s Renz Javelona ("Javelona"); (3) Tan; and (4) Patrick Peralta
body and that he later submitted the slug to the NBI ("Peralta").
Ballistics Division. Dr. Vargas further stated that the bullet
wound was fatal because the bullet hit the right lung and Manaban, the accused, testified that he was employed
lacerated parts of the liver, stomach and the pancreas. by Eagle Star Security Agency as a security guard and was
Based on the location of the gunshot wound, Dr. Vargas assigned at BPI Kalayaan. On 10 October 1996, he was on
deduced that the assailant must have been behind the duty from 7:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day.
victim, on the right side, when he shot the victim.9 Dr. Manaban narrated that on 11 October 1996, about 1:40
Vargas also testified that the absence of signs of near-fire a.m., Bautista tried to withdraw money from the ATM.
indicates that the distance between the muzzle of the gun Manaban then saw Bautista pounding and kicking the
and the point of entry was more than 24 inches. During ATM. When Manaban asked Bautista what was the
cross-examination, Dr. Vargas testified that he was able to problem, Bautista replied that no money came out from
take blood samples from the victim which, based on the the machine. According to Manaban, Bautista appeared
NBI Chemistry Division analysis, tested positive for to be intoxicated.
alcohol.10 Dr. Vargas issued a certificate of post-mortem
examination11 and an autopsy report.12 Manaban looked at the receipt issued to Bautista and saw
that the receipt indicated that a wrong PIN was entered.
Bilgera was a ballistician at the Firearms Investigation Manaban informed Bautista that the ATM captured
Division (FID) of the NBI. Bilgera testified that upon Bautista’s ATM card because he entered the wrong PIN.
receiving a letter-request dated 11 October 1996 from PNP He then advised Bautista to return the following day when
Police Inspector Percival Fontanilla, he conducted a the staff in charge of servicing the ATM would be around.
ballistic examination on the following specimens
submitted to him: Bautista replied that he needed the money very badly
and then resumed pounding on the ATM. Manaban tried
1. One (1) ARMSCOR 2015, Caliber .38 Revolver, SN-28909 to stop Bautista and called by telephone the ATM service
marked "DBS"; personnel to pacify Bautista. Bautista talked to the ATM
2. One (1) ARMSCOR 200, Caliber .38 Revolver, SN-P03471 service personnel and Manaban heard him shouting
marked "DBS"; invectives and saw him pounding and kicking the ATM
again.
3. One (1) Caliber .38 one badly deformed copper coated
lead bullet marked "RM"; When Manaban failed to pacify Bautista, Manaban fired
a warning shot in the air. Bautista then faced him and told
him not to block his way because he needed the money
 20

very badly. Bautista allegedly raised his shirt and showed Peralta opened the ATM, they found Bautista’s ATM card
his gun which was tucked in his waist. Manaban stepped which was captured by the machine.22
back and told Bautista not to draw his gun, otherwise he
Peralta, a Customer Engineer Specialist, testified that on 11
would shoot.
October 1996, BPI Kalayaan sought his assistance
However, Bautista allegedly kept on moving toward regarding their ATM. When Peralta arrived at BPI Kalayaan,
Manaban, who again warned Bautista not to come near he talked to Tan and then proceeded to the ATM to assess
him or he would be forced to shoot him. Bautista suddenly the damage. According to Peralta, the ATM keyboard
turned his back and was allegedly about to draw his gun. was damaged and mis-aligned.23
Fearing that he would be shot first, Manaban pulled the
The Trial Court’s Ruling
trigger and shot Bautista.
On 14 April 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the
Manaban recounted that he then went inside the bank
dispositive portion of which reads:
and called the police and his agency to report the
incident. While he was inside the bank, a fellow security WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
guard arrived and asked what happened. Manaban reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, the Court
answered, "wala yan, lasing." hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2)
Later, a mobile patrol car arrived. Manaban related the
MONTHS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8)
incident to the police officer and informed him that
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Pris[i]on Mayor, as maximum; to
Bautista was still alive and had a gun. Manaban then
pay indemnity to the heirs of Joselito Bautista for his death
surrendered his service firearm to the police officer.
in the amount of P75,000.00; and actual damages in the
According to Manaban, he fired his gun twice – once in
amount of P111,324.00 for the nine-day wake,
the air as a warning shot and the second time at Bautista
embalm[ing] and funeral services, and P1,418,040.00 for
who was about four meters from him.19
the loss of Bautista’s earning capacity, the last to be paid
On cross-examination, Manaban further explained that by installment at least P3,030.00 a month until fully paid
after he fired the warning shot, Bautista kept coming with the balance earning interest at the rate of six percent
toward him. Manaban pointed his gun at Bautista and (6%) per annum; and to pay the costs.
warned him not to come closer. When Bautista turned his
SO ORDERED.24
back, Manaban thought Bautista was about to draw his
gun when he placed his right hand on his waist. Fearing for The trial court held that the defense failed to establish self-
his life, he pulled the trigger and shot Manaban. defense as a justifying circumstance. According to the trial
According to Manaban, "[n]oong makita ko siya na court, unlawful aggression, which is the most essential
pabalikwas siya, na sadya bubunot ng baril, sa takot ko na element to support the theory of self-defense, was lacking
baka maunahan niya ako at mapatay, doon ko na rin in this case. The trial court found that, contrary to
nakalabit yung gatilyo ng baril." Manaban declared that Manaban’s claim, Bautista was not about to draw his gun
it did not occur to him to simply disable the victim for fear to shoot Manaban. Evidence show that Bautista’s gun was
that Bautista would shoot him first.20 still tucked in his waist inside a locked holster. Furthermore,
the trial court held that Bautista could not have surprised
Javelona was an ATM Service Assistant of BPI. Javelona
Manaban with a preemptive attack because Manaban
testified that on 11 October 1996, between 1:30 a.m. and
himself testified that he already had his gun pointed at
2:00 a.m., she received a call from a client at BPI Kalayaan.
Bautista when they were facing each other. The trial court
The client, who was later identified as Bautista,
likewise rejected Manaban’s claim of exemption from
complained: "Nagwi-withdraw ako dito sa ATM Kalayaan.
criminal liability because he acted under the impulse of an
Mali daw yung PIN ko, alam ko tama yung PIN ko. Ilang
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. The trial
beses ko nang ginamit, mali pa rin. Kailangan kong mag-
court held that the requisites for the exempting
withdraw."
circumstance of uncontrollable fear under paragraph 6,
Javelona tried to placate Bautista and advised him not to Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are not present in this
insert his card anymore because it might be captured by case. However, the trial court credited Manaban with two
the machine and to try again later in the morning. Bautista mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and
allegedly answered angrily: "Na capture na nga, eh! Tama obfuscation.
na nga yung PIN number [sic]. Hindi ako pwedeng hindi
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
makakuha ng pera. Kailangan kong bumili ng gamot para
sa anak ko. Hindi ko naman kasalanan ito." Javelona On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
replied: "Sir, hindi ho natin makukuha ang card ninyo decision. The Court of Appeals later reconsidered and
ngayon kasi ang makaka-open lang ho ng ATM machine modified its decision with respect only to the award of loss
ay ang officer ng Kalayaan Branch. Even if makuha natin of earning capacity. Using the formula 2/3 [80 – age at the
ang card ninyo ngayon, hindi pa ninyo magagamit time of death] x [gross annual income – 80% gross annual
ngayon. Magagamit lang ninyo as soon as mag-pa- income], the Court of Appeals recomputed the award for
encode kayo ng PIN number [sic]." loss of earning capacity. In its Resolution dated 8
November 2001, the Court of Appeals reduced the award
Bautista then reiterated angrily his dire need to withdraw
for the loss of the victim’s earning capacity from P1,418,040
money for the medicine of his daughter. Javelona
to P436,320.
apologized to Bautista and informed him that there was
really nothing she could do at that time. She also advised The Issues
Bautista to go back to the bank at 9:00 a.m. to get his ATM
card and also to withdraw money over the counter. In his petition for review, Manaban submits that:
Bautista refused to be pacified and started cursing so 1. The Respondent Court gravely erred in affirming the
Javelona decided to hang up the phone.21 erroneous factual appreciation and interpretation by the
Tan, the Assistant Manager of BPI Kalayaan, testified that trial court a quo in practically affirming the decision of the
when she reported for work in the morning of 11 October latter court which are based on a clear misappreciation of
1996, she discovered that the ATM was out of order. facts and findings grounded entirely on speculations,
According to Tan, the ATM keyboard was not properly surmises or conjectures "in a way probably not in accord
mounted and the keys were damaged. Also, the with law or with the applicable jurisprudence of the
telephone beside the ATM was hung up. Tan then called Supreme Court."
Peralta, the technician, to have the ATM repaired. When
 21

2. The Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring Q: And when you told the victim not to come close, he did
petitioner’s self-defense on the sole fact that the entrance not come closer anymore?
of the deceased victim’s wound was from the back.
A: He walked towards me, sir.
3. The Respondent Court gravely erred in concluding that
Q: For how many steps?
petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression just
because the holster of the victim was still in a lock position. A: I cannot remember how many steps.
4. Granting arguendo that petitioner made a mistake in his Q: And according to you, while he was facing you and
appreciation that there was an attempt on the part of the walking towards you he suddenly turned his back to you,
deceased victim to draw his gun who executed is that correct?
"bumalikwas," such mistake of fact is deemed justified.
A: Bumalikwas po at parang bubunot ng baril.
5. Finally, the Respondent Court gravely erred in awarding
exorbitant and baseless award of damages to the heirs of Q: Let us get the meaning of "bumalikwas", tumalikod sa
deceased victim.25 iyo?

The Court’s Ruling A: Bumalikwas po (witness demonstrating).

The petition is partly meritorious. Q: Will you please demonstrate to us how the victim
"bumalikwas"?
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review. The reviewing tribunal can correct errors though A: When he was facing me and I told him, "Sir, you just be
unassigned in the appeal, or reverse the lower court’s there otherwise I am going to take the gun" and at that
decision on grounds other than those the parties raised as moment, he, the victim turned his back and simultaneously
errors.26 drew the gun.

Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of Self- Q: When he was facing you, the victim never drew his gun,
Defense is that correct?

When the accused invokes self-defense, he in effect A: Not yet, sir.

admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to him to Q: And according to you, it was at that point when he
prove that he killed the victim to save his life.27 The turned his back on you that he tried to draw his gun?
accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that all the requisites of self-defense are present.28 A: Yes, sir.

Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, Q: You said that he tried to draw, but the fact is he merely
the three requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying placed his hand on his waist?
circumstance which may exempt an accused from A: No, sir, when I saw him, when he was hit, I saw him, the
criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of hand was already on the gun but still tucked on his waist
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means (witness places his hand on his right waist with fingers
employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack open).
of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the
person defending himself.29 Unlawful aggression is an Q: And it was at that precise moment while the victim’s
indispensable requisite of self-defense.30 Self-defense is back was turned on you that you fired your shot?
founded on the necessity on the part of the person being A: When he was about to turn his back and it seems about
attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful to take his gun, that is the time I shot him because of my
aggression.31 Thus, without prior unlawful and unprovoked fear that he would be ahead in pulling his gun and he
attack by the victim, there can be no complete or might kill me.
incomplete self-defense.32
Q: When you said, when you fired your shot, the victim’s
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least gun was still tucked in his right waist, is that correct?
a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a
person.33 A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not A: Yes, sir, his hand was on his waist.
considered unlawful aggression,34 unless the threat is
Q: You just answer the question. Was the victim’s gun still
offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful
tucked on his waistline?
intent to cause injury.35 There must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which A: Yes, sir.
puts the defendant’s life in real peril.36
Q: And his hand was merely placed on his hips. The victim’s
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part right hand was merely placed on his right hip?
of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as
ATTY. CARAANG
evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second,
when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked I object. The witness testified that he was about to draw his
holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista gun.
turned his back at Manaban, Manaban was already
pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These COURT
circumstances clearly belie Manaban’s claim of unlawful He is asking the question so he has to answer.
aggression on Bautista's part. Manaban testified:
A: No, sir, the gun was on his waist.
ATTY. ANCANAN
ATTY. ANCANAN
Q: You said the victim showed his gun by raising his shirt?
Q: At the precise time that you fired your second shot, you
A: Yes, sir. could have aimed your gun at the extremities of the victim,
Q: The victim never drew his gun? meaning legs or arms, is that correct?

A: He was about to draw the gun when he turned around. A: When I saw him that he was about to draw his gun
because of my fear that he would get ahead of me and he
Q: My question is when the victim was facing you, the would kill me, I did not mind anymore, I just inunahan ko
victim never drew his gun? siya.
A: Not yet, sir. ATTY. CARAANG
 22

May I request that the answer of the witness be quoted as The witness already admitted that when he fired his gun,
is? the victim’s back was towards the witness, so my last
question is just a follow-up.
A: Noong makita ko siya na pabalikwas siya, na sabay
bubunot ng baril, sa takot ko na baka maunahan niya ako ATTY. CARAANG
at mapatay, doon ko na rin nakalabit yung gatilyo ng baril
But the witness testified that he was not given the
ko.
opportunity to have a second thought, that is why right
ATTY. ANCANAN then and there, he pulled the trigger of his gun.
Q: Mr. Witness, how long have you been a security guard COURT
before this incident?
Objection noted, witness may answer.
A: Around 7 months, sir.
A: What I was thinking at that time, was just to disarm him
Q: Now, before you were employed as security guard by but when he turned, bumalikwas, and I saw that he was
the Eagle Star Security Agency, did you undergo any going to draw a firearm and that was when I decided to
training as a security guard? "makipagsabayan."
A: Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where? RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION
A: Camp Crame, sir. ATTY. CARAANG
Q: For how long? Q: Mr. Witness, when you and the victim were facing each
other, the gun was already pointed to him, is it not? Your
A: Three (3) days, sir.
gun?
Q: And what did you learn from those 3 days training as
A: Yes, sir, I pointed my gun at him.37
security guard?
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to
A: Our duties as security guard were lectured to us, sir.
draw his gun when he turned his back at Manaban is mere
Q: Now, were you not taught during the training that in any speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his
given situation, your first duty is to disable first an loaded firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back.
aggressor? In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger
considering that Manaban, who had already fired a
ATTY. CARAANG warning shot, was pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista,
Objection, your Honor, I think that is no longer material who was a policeman, would have realized this danger to
besides, that is not part of my direct examination. his life and would not have attempted to draw his gun
which was still inside a locked holster tucked in his waist.
COURT Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista was
Witness may answer. about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have
easily disabled Bautista by shooting his arm or leg
A: It was taught to us, sir, but it depends on my situation. If considering that Manaban’s firearm was already aimed at
the person kept on doing what I told him not to do and it Bautista.
would reach a point that it would endanger my life, of
course even if you were in my place, you would do the Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must
same thing, so nakipagsabayan na ako, sir. face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be
avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary.38 Absent
Q: But in this particular case when you fired your second such actual or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is
shot, the victim’s back was towards you, is that not nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the
correct? life or inflicting injuries on another.39
ATTY. CARAANG Voluntary Surrender and Obfuscation
Objection, already answered, your Honor. The trial court credited Manaban with two mitigating
COURT circumstances: voluntary surrender and obfuscation.

Witness may answer. It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report
the shooting incident. When the police arrived, Manaban
A: No, sir, I shot him only once, not twice. surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily went with
the police to the police station for investigation. Thus,
Q: Please answer the question. When you fired your
Manaban is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating
second shot . . .
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
A: Bumalikwas ho ’yon eh.
On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not
Q: Please answer the question. entitle Manaban to such mitigating circumstance. Under
paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the
A: Yes, sir.
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is
Q: And because his back was towards you, you could appreciated where the accused acted upon an impulse
have easily disabled him by firing at his leg or at his arms, so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
is that not correct? obfuscation. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance
of passion or obfuscation are: (1) that there should be an
ATTY. CARAANG act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition
I object, your Honor, it was already answered. He said he of mind; and (2) that the act which produced the
was not given the opportunity to have a second thought obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
and at that moment he was able to pull the trigger of his the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
gun. the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.40

ATTY. ANCANAN In his testimony, Manaban admitted shooting Bautista

because Bautista turned around and was allegedly about
to draw his gun to shoot Manaban. The act of Bautista in
turning around is not unlawful and sufficient cause for
 23

Manaban to lose his reason and shoot Bautista. That is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
Manaban interpreted such act of Bautista as preparatory ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor as
to drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as
Bautista’s act unlawful. The threat was only in the mind of maximum. Ramonito Manaban is ordered to pay the heirs
Manaban and is mere speculation which is not sufficient of Joselito Bautista: P892,570.56 as indemnity for loss of
to produce obfuscation which is mitigating.41 Besides, the earning capacity; P69,500 as actual damages;
threat or danger was not grave or serious considering that and P50,000 as indemnity for death.
Manaban had the advantage over Bautista because
SO ORDERED.
Manaban was already pointing his firearm at Bautista
when the latter turned his back. The defense failed to Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco,
establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause Jr., J.J., concur.
that allegedly produced obfuscation.
Footnotes
Award of Damages 1 Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The records42 reveal that Bautista was 36 years old at the 2Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate
time of his death and not 26 years old as stated by the trial Justices Fermin A. Martin, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
court and the Court of Appeals.43 Moreover, the annual 3Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate
salary of Bautista at the time of his death was Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, concurring.
already P60,864 and not P60,600.44 We likewise modify the 4 Rollo, p. 47.
formula applied by the Court of Appeals in the 5 CA rollo, p. 12; Records, p. 1.
computation of the award for loss of earning capacity. In
accordance with current jurisprudence,45 the formula for 6The trial court Decision erroneously stated that the arraignment was on 5
December 1996. However, the Certificate of Arraignment, Minutes, and
the indemnification for loss of earning capacity is: Order of the trial court show that Manaban was arraigned on 4 December
1996. Records, pp. 28-30.
Net Earning = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual – Living
Expenses]
7 TSN, 27 January 1998.

Capacity Income (GAI) 8 Rollo, pp. 48-49; TSN, 5 and 19 May 1997.
9 TSN, 7 August 1997.
= 2/3(80 – age of deceased) x (GAI – 50%
10 TSN, 13 November 1997.
of GAI)
11 Exh. "X," records, p. 173.
Using this formula, the indemnification for loss of earning 12 Exh. "Y," records, p. 174.
capacity should be:
13 Records, p. 167.
Net Earning = 2/3 (80 – 36) x [P60,864 – (50% 14 This was the service firearm confiscated from Manaban.
Capacity x P60,864)]
15 FID Report No. 603-11-1096, dated 15 October 1996. Records, pp. 167-168.

= 29.33 x P30,432 16Editha submitted a list of expenses incurred with a total of P111,324. Exh.
"LL," records, p. 187.

= P892,570.56 17 See Exhs. "II," "JJ," "KK," and "LL," records, pp. 184-187.
18TSN, 10 June 1997, pp. 44-46. See certification letter of Tan and Piñano,
With regard to actual damages, the records show that not dated 14 October 1996, addressed to the State Investigation and
all the expenses that the Bautista family allegedly incurred Intelligence Division of the Philippine National Police in Quezon City,
were supported by competent evidence. Editha failed to records, p. 164.
present receipts or any other competent proof for food 19 TSN, 29 July 1998, pp. 5-24.
expenses and rental fee for jeeps for the funeral. Editha 20 Id. at 25-42.
merely submitted a typewritten "Summary of Food
Expenses & Others."46 A mere list of expenses, without any 21 TSN, 14 October 1998.
official receipts or any other evidence obtainable, does 22 TSN, 18 November 1998.
not to prove actual expenses incurred.47 Competent proof 23 TSN, 21 October 1998.
of the actual expenses must be presented to justify an
award for actual damages.48 In this case, only the 24 Rollo, p. 56. Records, p. 319.
following expenses were duly supported by official 25 Rollo, pp. 11-12.
receipts and other proof : 26 People v. Jubail, G.R. No. 143718, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 478.

1. Embalming fee49 P11,000 27Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, 19 October 2004, 440 SCRA
695; People v. Gadia, 418 Phil. 30 (2001).

2. Bronze Casket50 25,000 28 People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825 (2003).

29Catalina Security Agency v. Gonzales-Decano, G.R. No. 149039, 27 May
3. Cadillac Hearse fee51 3,500 2004, 429 SCRA 628; People v. Pansensoy, 437 Phil. 499 (2002).
30 People v. Gallego, supra note 28.
4. Funeral Services52 30,000
31 People v. Gadia, 418 Phil. 30 (2001).

Total P69,500 32 People v. Gallego, supra.

33People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA
Thus, we reduce the actual damages granted 535.
from P111,324 to P69,500.
34 Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, 24 September 2004, 439 SCRA 94.
We likewise reduce the indemnity for death from P75,000 35 People v. Catbagan, supra.
to P50,000 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.53
36Cabuslay v. People, G.R. No. 129875, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision 241; People v. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, 10 September 2003, 410 SCRA
of the Court of Appeals dated 21 May 2001 and its 463; Roca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114917, 29 January 2001, 350 SCRA
414.
Resolution dated 8 November 2001. We find petitioner
Ramonito Manaban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 37 TSN, 29 July 1998, pp. 28-41, 46 (Emphasis supplied).
the crime of Homicide. Applying the Indeterminate 38 People v. Damitan, 423 Phil. 113 (2001).
Sentence Law and taking into account the mitigating 39 Senoja v. People, supra note 27.
circumstance of voluntary surrender, Ramonito Manaban
 24

40 People v. Pansensoy, supra note 29. G.R. No. 156786 June 3, 2004
41 People v. Malejana, G.R. No. 145002, 24 January 2006.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
42See Certificate of Identification of Dead Body (Exh. "U"), records, p. 196; SUSANO PATEO y GARCIA alias "Sanok" and VICENTE
Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination (Exh. "X"), records, p. 199; Autopsy BATUTO y JAPAY, appellants.
Report No. N-96-2047 (Exh. "Y"), records, p. 200.
43 It was the accused, Ramonito Manaban, who was 26 years old at the DECISION
time of the shooting incident.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
See Service Record of Bautista (Exh. "HH"), records, p. 183. The mistake
44

may be due to the testimony of Editha that Bautista was receiving a Appellants Susano Pateo y Garcia alias "Sanok" and
monthly salary of P5,050 (or an annual salary of P60,600) at the time of his Vicente Batuto y Japay were charged with the crime of
death.
murder in an information1 which reads:
Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, 16 June 2004, 432 SCRA 329; People v.
45

Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 692; Tugade, Sr. v. That on or about the 01st day of October 2000, at Sitio
Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 258 (2003). Picas, Brgy. Caraycaray, Naval, Biliran Province,
46 Exh. "LL," records, p. 187. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused, with malice aforethought, and with
47 See People v. Agudez, supra.
deliberate intent to take the life of ANTONIO SILVANO,
48 Pleyto v. Lomboy, supra. conspiring with, confederating and mutually helping one
49 Exh. "II," records, p. 184. another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and treacherously attack the former, first, from
50 Exh. "JJ," records, p. 185.
behind by co-accused Vicente Batuto who hid behind the
51 Id. flowering plants in front of the store of Susano Pateo alias
52 Exh. "KK," records, p. 186. Sanok, and thereafter, by Susano Pateo who went out of
his store and strike (sic) the head of Antonio Silvano with
53 People v. Quirol, G.R. No. 149259, 20 October 2005, 473 SCRA 509; People
v. Catbagan, supra note 33; People v. Daniela, 449 Phil. 547 (2003); People the use of a lead pipe, and later, to (sic) the other parts of
v. Escote, Jr., 448 Phil. 749 (2003); People v. Dungca, 428 Phil. 682 (2002). the victim’s body, and while accused Vicente Batuto and
victim Antonio Silvano grappled for the possession of the
short knife, co-accused Susano Pateo continuously hack
(sic) said Antonio Silvano hitting him to (sic) the different
parts of his body which caused his direct and immediate
death thereafter.
Appellants pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
At around 6:30 in the evening of October 1, 2000,
appellants Susano Pateo and Vicente Batuto were having
a drinking binge together with Olimpio Narrido and Zosimo
Paculan at the yard near Susano’s store located at Sitio
Picas, Brgy. Caraycaray, Naval, Biliran. When they were
inebriated, they began to talk loudly and became unruly.
Their neighbor, Antonio Silvano, could not sleep due to the
noise. He and his wife sent their daughter, Ana Marie, to
ask the group twice to tone down their voices, but the
request was ignored.
A short while later, Antonio went out of his house to buy
candies from Susano’s store with Ana Marie in tow. He
brought with him a knife hidden behind his waist. When he
saw Antonio approaching, Susano handed a bolo to
Vicente, who then hid behind some shrubs near the store.
After Antonio got his candies, Vicente suddenly emerged
from his hiding place and hacked the former at the back
of his head. Immediately thereafter, Vicente successively
hacked Antonio on different parts of his body. Antonio
fought for possession of the bolo from Vicente. He was
able to draw his knife and stab Vicente on the abdomen,
chest and left arm.
Seeing the tide shifting in Antonio’s favor, Susano ran out
of his store and repeatedly struck Antonio on different
parts of his body with a blunt instrument, forcing the latter
to release his hold on Vicente and drop his knife. Antonio
ran towards his mother’s house while Vicente pursued him.
Vicente caught up with him and repeatedly hacked him
on different parts of his body with the bolo.
After Antonio fell to the ground, Susano went back to his
house. Vicente, however, who had a grudge against
Antonio, tauntingly asked, "Are you still alive?" He then
delivered the coup de grace and thrust his bolo into
Antonio’s body, which caused his death.
Dr. Salvacion Salas, Municipal Health Officer of Naval,
Biliran, examined Antonio’s cadaver and came up with
the following findings:
 25

1. Hacking wound at the occipital region of the head Hence, this appeal based on the following assignment of
which measures to 7 cm. width respectively, involving only errors:
the skin.
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
2. Hacking wound at the frontal area of the head involving TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ANA MARIE
the skin exposing the bone. The wound measures L-9 cm. SILVANO, ERIC SILVANO, AND TERESA MALLEN INSPITE OF
& w-2 cm. respectively. No brain tissues noted. THEIR GROSSLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS.
3. Hacking wound at the left portion of the face involving
at the upper left eyebrow passing thru the left ear involving 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED
the left portion of the neck. It involved the skin up to the SUSANO PATEO OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
bone of the skull but no brain tissues noted. The wound
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
measures L-19 cm. & W-3 cm.
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE IN FAVOR OF VICENTE BATUTO.4
4. Hacking wound at the right portion of the right ear
In particular, appellants point out that Ana Marie failed to
through the right side of the forehead. It measures L-6.5
expressly mention that Susano struck her father with a lead
cm. & W-2 cm. Involving only the skin and Muscle.
pipe. Also, she could not have witnessed the incident as
5. Lacerated wound at the back of the right ear measuring she testified that she went to sleep after she returned from
3 cm. in length; and 1 cm. in width. the store. These are all contrary to Eric Silvano’s and Teresa
Mallen’s testimonies. In addition, Ana Marie candidly
6. Wound at the back portion of the head; just adjacent
admitted that she was coached by her lawyer as to what
to the 1st wound, involving only the skin. It measures L-6
she will do during the trial.
cm.; W-1 cm.
Witnesses cannot be expected to give a flawless testimony
7. Lacerated wound at the left cheek bone area with a
all the time. Although there may be inconsistencies in
Measurement L-2.5 cm; W-0.5 cm.
minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the
8. Lacerated wound at the right face – measuring L-11 cm. witnesses, where, as in this case, there is no inconsistency
& W-6.5 cm. respectively. in relating the principal occurrence and the positive
identification of the assailant. Minor discrepancies do not
9. Lacerated wound at the chain just below the lower lip damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its
Measuring 4 cm. in length; and 2 cm. wide. material whole nor reflect adversely on the witnesses’
10. Lacerated wound at the left arm just below the right credibility. We have previously held in fact that minor
axilla measuring 2 cm. long; and 1 cm. wide. inconsistencies, far from detracting from the veracity of
the testimony, even enhance the credibility of the
11. Stab wound at the left chest – 5 cm. from the left nipple. witnesses, for they remove any suspicion that the testimony
The wound measures 3 cm. long; 0.7 cm. wide; and 24 cm. was contrived or rehearsed.5 In this case, all three
deep directing downward penetrating the chest cavity. prosecution witnesses identified appellants as the
12. Stab wound at the abdomen just 3.5 cm. from perpetrators of the crime. Not only were they identified,
umbilicus. The wound measures 2 cm. length; 0.5 cm. wide the witnesses also testified as to their roles and their specific
& 3.5 cm. deep involving the skin up to muscle. deeds in the killing.

13. Lacerated wound at the back of the right thigh It has been held that a witness testifying about the same
measuring to 3 cm. long; 2 cm. wide & 6 cm. deep. nerve-wracking event can hardly be expected to be
correct in every detail and consistent with other witnesses
14. Lacerated wound at the back of the right leg just in every respect, considering the inevitability of differences
below the knee joint measuring to 5 cm. long; 1 cm. wide in perception, recollection, viewpoint or impressions, as
& 5 cm. deep involving the skin up to the muscle. well as in their physical, mental, emotional and
15. Lacerated wound at the right hand measuring 1 cm. psychological states at the time of the reception and
long & 4 cm. wide. recall of such impressions. After all, no two persons are alike
in powers of observation and recall. Total recall or perfect
Cause of Death: Cardiac Respiratory Arrest due to Severe symmetry is not required as long as witnesses concur on
Internal & External hemorrhage secondary to Multiple material points.6
Hacking and Stab wounds.2
As to allegations that Ana Marie’s lawyer coached her to
Appellant Vicente interposed self-defense. He alleged cry, it should be noted that she was only nine years old
that a drunk and armed Antonio went to Susano’s store when she testified. Even without the lawyer coaching her,
looking for him. When Antonio found him outside the store, she was the daughter of the victim and she personally
he stabbed the latter with the knife. Vicente fought back witnessed how her father was killed. She would naturally
with his bolo. In the ensuing struggle, Antonio fell and died cry if forced to remember how her father died. In any case,
of his wounds. we deem this episode too immaterial to affect her
credibility.
For his part, Susano denied striking Antonio with a lead
pipe. He claimed that he just stayed in his store during the It is well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the
fight and took no part in the fighting. credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect.
Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the
The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s
trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the
evidence and rendered a decision,3 the dispositive
issue of credibility; thus, his findings will not be disturbed on
portion of which reads:
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
Court finds the accused SUSANO PATEO Y GARCIA alias circumstances of weight and substance that could have
"Sanok" and VICENTE BATUTO Y JAPAY GUILTY beyond altered the conviction of appellants.7 The circumstances
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, hereby imposing pointed out by appellants are too trivial to affect the
upon them the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and with all assessment and the eventual findings of the trial court that
the necessary penalties provided by law. appellant committed the crime.
Both accused shall solidarily pay the legal heirs an Moreover, when the accused invokes self-defense, it
indemnity on the life of the deceased Antonio Silvano in becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and
the amount of P50,000.00. With costs. convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of
himself. Self-defense as a justifying circumstance is present
SO ORDERED.
 26

when the following concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) observed by the trial court, "consciously, Vicente Batuto
reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or hid in the ‘San Francisco’ plants and shrubs near the store
prevent it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the to create an ambush on the presence of Antonio
part of the person defending himself.8 Unlawful aggression Silvano."18The fact that he hid behind the plants showed
is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance his intention to surprise Antonio and ensure that he would
of self-defense. It contemplates an actual, sudden and be able to successfully deliver the first blow. We, therefore,
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not affirm appellants’ conviction for the crime of murder.
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
defending himself must have been attacked with actual
for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The two
physical force or with actual use of weapon. Of all the
penalties being both indivisible, and there being no
elements, unlawful aggression, i.e., the sudden
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in this case, the
unprovoked attack on the person defending himself, is
lesser of the two penalties, which is reclusion perpetua,
indispensable.9 A threat, even if made with a weapon, or
should be imposed pursuant to the second paragraph of
the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.19
sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly
revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts The trial court correctly awarded civil indemnity in the
showing the commencement of actual and material amount of P50,000.0020 which is awarded without need of
aggression.10 proof.
In the case at bar, the trial court found that Vicente came WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of
out of his hiding place and hacked the unsuspecting the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, in
Antonio on the head. Antonio could not have been the Criminal Case No. N-2093, finding appellants, Susano
aggressor. Pateo y Garcia @ "Sanok" and Vicente Batuto y Japay,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
Moreover, the nature, number and location of the wounds
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
sustained by the victim belie the assertion of self-defense
perpetua and ordering them, jointly and severally, to pay
since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a
the heirs of the deceased Antonio Silvano, civil indemnity,
determined effort to kill and not just to defend.11 The
in the amount of P50,000.00, is AFFIRMED in toto.
number of wounds was established by the physical
evidence, which is a mute manifestation of truth and ranks Costs de oficio.
high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.12 In this case,
Antonio sustained fifteen hack and stab wounds. These SO ORDERED.
wounds more than belie Vicente’s assertion that he was Davide, Jr., Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
defending himself.
Besides, the trial court also found that when Antonio was Footnotes
already down, Vicente asked, "Are you still alive?" After 1 Records, p. 27.
taunting him, Vicente delivered the coup de grace by 2 Exhibit "A", Records, pp. 7-8.
thrusting his bolo into his sprawled body. A person making
a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when
3 Penned by Judge Enrique C. Asis, Records, pp. 110-132.
the unlawful aggression has ceased.13 4 Rollo, p. 63.

As to Susano’s denial that he participated in the killing, the 5 People v. Bustamante, G.R. Nos. 140724-26, 12 February 2003.
trial court observed that "plainly, if Susano Pateo was not a 6 People v. Aliben, G.R. No. 140404, 27 February 2003.
participant, no witness would point to him."14 In fact, their 7 Id.
other two drinking companions were not pointed to as
perpetrators and impleaded as accused. Moreover, the 8 Id.
trial court found that the fifteen wounds sustained by 9 People v. Rubiso, G.R. No. 128871, 18 March 2003.
Antonio were apparently caused by two instruments: a 10 Id.
sharp and a blunt instrument.15 The defense of denial, like
alibi, is considered with suspicion and is always received
11 People v. Aliben, supra.
with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and 12 People v. Astudillo, G.R. No. 141518, 29 April 2003.
unreliable, but also because it can be fabricated easily. 13 People v. Carriaga, G.R. No. 135029, 12 September 2003.
Furthermore, all three of the prosecution witnesses pointed
to him as one of the perpetrators and in fact narrated in
14 Decision, Records, p. 128.

detail his participation in the killing of Antonio. 15 Id., p. 130.

The trial court correctly found that there was conspiracy. 16 People v. Aliben, supra.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an 17 People v. Bustamante, supra.
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and 18 Decision, Records, p. 131.
decide to commit it. In the absence of direct proof of
conspiracy, it may be deduced from the mode, method 19 People v. Hormina, G.R. No. 144383, 16 January 2004.
and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or 20 People v. Berdin, G.R. No. 137598, 28 November 2003.
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.16 In this case, Vicente
admitted the killing. Susano’s participation in the killing was
proven by his acts of handing the bolo to Vicente and
beating Antonio up with a blunt instrument.
The trial court also correctly held that treachery attended
the killing of Antonio. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means and method or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution,
without risk to the offender, arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. The essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked.17 As
 27

G.R. No. 148724 October 15, 2002 Domingo Arnante admitted having shot his own father
twice but sought to justify his misdeed. He said that during
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
the celebration of his brother’s birthday, his father, without
DOMINGO ARNANTE y DACPANO, appellant.
any apparent reason, got mad at him and started
DECISION scolding him. He told his father to stop humiliating him in
front of all the guests but the victim persisted. He left the
VITUG, J.: group and went to his room to get his gun. He fired the gun
On 16 July 2000, Valentin Arnante, his son Domingo downwards to make his father stop censuring him. He then
Arnante, and other relatives were celebrating the birth went out of the house through the kitchen door but his
anniversary of Christopher Arnante, another son of father still followed and threatened to hack him with a
Valentin and brother of Domingo, at their residence in Sto. bolo. He was so embarrassed that he lost control of himself
Domingo, Iriga City. Shortly after lunch, the group started and shot his father twice. He promptly left the scene but
having drinks in the living room of the Arnante residence. soon thereafter surrendered to the police authorities.
At around six o’clock in the evening, Valentin and his son The Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, which had
Domingo, by then already both drunk, came to a heated tried the case, rendered a decision, on 09 February 2001,
argument. Domingo told his father to stop embarrassing rejecting the plea of self-defense and convicting Domingo
him in front of guests but the latter still went on berating his Arnante; it held:
son. Feeling ignored, Domingo stood up, proceeded to his
room, followed by his brother Christopher, and took hold "WHEREFORE, finding the accused DOMINGO ARNANTE
of a handgun. Domingo fired the gun towards the ground guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
scaring the people in the house and prompting them to defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised
rush out through the front door. Domingo went out of the Penal Code, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion
house through the kitchen door. His father Valentin perpetua, pay the indemnity of P50,000.00 and to pay the
followed until he was fired at and shot twice by Domingo. costs."2
The victim was not able to make it to the hospital.
In its brief for appellant, the defense raised a lone
Domingo Arnante y Dacpano was indicted for parricide in assignment of error to the effect that the "the trial court
an information that read – erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the fact
that he (had) acted in legitimate self-defense."3
"That at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening of July 16, 2000
at their residence at Zone 5, Mabunga St., Sto. Domingo, The claim of self-defense is untenable. When an accused
Iriga City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then criminal liability, he assumes the burden to establish his
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence.4 In
kill, shoot his own father, Valentin Arnante y Tabayag twice order that the plea of self-defense can prevail, three basic
with a handgun hitting his stomach and left arm which conditions must concur, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the
directly caused his instantaneous death"1 - part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient
to which charge he pleaded "not guilty" when arraigned. provocation on the part of the person defending
Elena Arnante, the wife of the victim and mother of himself.5 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
Domingo, testified that she was in the living room when she sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on
heard two gunshots. She dashed out from the room and the life and limb of a person defending himself 6 and not
she saw near the kitchen her husband down on the floor merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The
with gunshot wounds and her son Domingo standing by aggression must be real and not just imaginary.7
the kitchen door still holding the handgun. She The testimony of appellant himself easily negates any
immediately called for help and brought Valentin to the showing of unlawful aggression on the part of his father.
Our Lady of Mediatrix Hospital where her husband was Observe his testimony -
declared "dead on arrival."
"Q. On July 16, 2000 at or about 6:00 o’clock in the evening
Christopher Arnante stated that he tried to caution his at Sto. Domingo, Iriga City while you were at your house
brother Domingo when the latter got hold of the handgun together with your father what happened if any?
but his brother would not hear of it. Domingo went out of
the house through the kitchen door. Valentin followed. "A. Now, there was a birthday celebration in connection
Christopher then heard two gunshots. He did not see of the birthday of my brother and a drinking spree was
where the first shot was directed at but he saw the second held.
shot being aimed at his father. Entering the house, he saw
"Q. What is the name of your brother?
his father bleeding and about to fall to the ground. When
he tried to assist his father, Domingo also fired at him but "A. Christopher.
missed. Christopher hurriedly went to the house of a
"Q. What happened between you and your father at
neighbor to call for help. Failing to contact any police
around 6:00 o’clock in the evening on said date and time
officer, he personally went to the police station where, not
and year and place?
long after, he was informed that his father was dead on
arrival at the hospital. "A. We had an altercation.
Dr. Pablo Filio, Jr., the Assistant City Health Officer of Iriga "Q. And what is that altercation about between you and
City, conducted a postmortem examination on the your father?
cadaver of Valentin Arnante about six hours after the
latter’s death. The physician’s postmortem report "A. I cannot understand sir. He suddenly got mad at me.
indicated that the victim suffered two (2) gunshot wounds "Q. And what happened when your father suddenly got
– one on the left arm which penetrated 2 inches below the mad at you?
armpit and another gunshot wound on the umbilical
region, 3 inches below the umbilicus – the second wound "A. I told my father not to scold me anymore as there were
being fatal and the immediate cause of death of the very many people there it was shameful on my part.
victim. He also testified that from the entry and direction of "Q. Then what happened when you told that to your
the wound, it would appear that the assailant was in front father?
of the victim.
"A. He continued scolding me.
 28

"Q. By the way you mentioned ‘papa,’ is that the way you "Q. Why two (2) shots?
call your father?
"A. I was not able to control myself."8
"A. Yes, sir.
Nothing in the testimony would suggest the attendance of
"Q. So, what happened when your papa continued to a kind of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim that
scold you? can justify appellant’s claim of self-defense. A mere
perception of an impending attack is not sufficient to
"A. I left.
constitute unlawful aggression, and neither is an
"Q. Where did you proceed? intimidating or threatening attitude.9

"A. I entered my room to put a stop to his scolding. The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Verily, appellant
"Q. And after you entered your room what happened voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities shortly
next? after the shooting incident.
"A. He continued scolding me so what I did was I took my Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
gun and then fired downward. Republic Act No. 7659, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
"Q. Why did you fire your gun downward? perpetua to death for the crime of parricide. The
attendance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
"A. In order for my father to stop scolding me as there were surrender justifies the imposition of the lesser penalty.10
so many people I was getting embarrassed.
In addition to the civil liability of P50,000.00, appellant must
"Q. After firing your gun downward what happened next? also be made to account for P50,000.00 moral damages
"A. I went out of the house through the kitchen. for wounded feelings and moral shock suffered by the heirs
of the victim and P25,000.00 exemplary damages on
"Q. Why did you went out the house through the kitchen account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which
Mr. Witness? was alleged and proved, to the crime of parricide.
"A. So I could leave the place. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga
"Q. Were you able to leave the house through the kitchen? City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. IR-5300, finding
DOMINGO ARNANTE y DACPANO guilty of the crime of
"A. Yes, sir. parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, as well as to pay P50,000.00 civil
"Q. And what happened when you were able to go out
indemnity, is AFFIRMED with modification in that appellant
the house?
is likewise hereby ordered to pay P50,000.00 moral
"A. Now I went out of the house so I could leave the place damages and P25,000.00 exemplary damages to the heirs
but after I went out of the house I saw my father followed of the victim. Costs against appellant.
me closely.
SO ORDERED.
"Q. And what happened when your father followed you
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
closely?
(Special Member, Per Special Order No. 269), JJ., concur.
"A. He was still scolding me and he was carrying a bolo. Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., on official leave.
"Q. What happened when you noticed that your father
followed you closely and he had a bolo? Footnotes

"A. He was about to hack me I told him not to do it

1 Rollo, p. 6.

because I was going to leave. 2 Rollo, p. 50.

"PROS. TAGUM: 3 Rollo, p. 35.

4 People vs. Real, 308 SCRA 244.
Your Honor, we will object to the testimony of this witness
because it is not one of those purposes for which this 5 People vs. Tomolin, 311 SCRA 498.
witness is being offered in evidence. 6 Ibid.

"ATTY. CABALTERA: 7 People vs. Ebrada, 296 SCRA 353.

That is precisely Your Honor part of the mitigating 8 TSN, 26 December 2000, pp. 5-8.
circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the 9 People vs. Langres, 316 SCRA 769.
part of the offended party that immediately preceded the 10 People vs. Joyno, 307 SCRA 655.
act.
"COURT:
Let him answer.
"ATTY. CABALTERA:
Okay.
"Q. What happened next after that?
"A. He was still scolding me. He threatened to hack me.
"Q. After he threatened to hack you what did you do next
if any?
"A. Now as he was still scolding me and I was getting so
much embarrassed now I saw something dark and I shot
my father. My vision darkened and I was able to shoot my
father.
"Q. For how many times did you shoot your father?
"A. Two (2) times.
 29

G.R. No. 103613 February 23, 2001 looked for the gun and ran after Tangan, joining the mob
that had already pursued him. Tangan found a policeman
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
who allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived
vs.
and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his
COURT OF APPEALS and ELADIO C. TANGAN, respondents.
nephew. Then he went back to where Generoso lay and
x------------------x there found two ladies, later identified as Mary Ann
Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a
G.R. No. 105830 February 23, 2001 taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the
ELADIO C. TANGAN, petitioner, hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General
vs. Hospital but he expired on the way.1âwphi1.nêt
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF Tangan was charged with the crime of murder with the use
APPEALS, respondents. of an unlicensed firearm.2 After a reinvestigation, however,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: the information was amended to homicide with the use of
a licensed firearm,3 and he was separately charged with
At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain illegal possession of unlicensed firearm.4 On arraignment,
Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard Tangan entered a plea of not guilty in the homicide case,
heading south. He had just come from Buendia Avenue on but moved to quash the information for illegal possession
an intelligence operation. At the same time, Generoso of unlicensed firearm on various grounds. The motion to
Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in quash was denied, whereupon he filed a petition for
the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, certiorari with this Court.5 On November 5, 1987, said
Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel. petition was dismissed and the joint trial of the two cases
Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, was ordered.6
firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him
to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew During the trial, the prosecution and the defense
his horn several times. Generoso, slowed down to let stipulated on the following: that the amount of P126,000.00
Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook was incurred for the funeral and burial expenses of the
Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced victim;7 that P74,625.00 was incurred for attorneys fees;
speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the and that the heirs of Generoso suffered moral damages,
right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. As he the amount of which is left for the courts to determine.
approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make After trial, the lower court acquitted Tangan of illegal
a U-tum. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of possession of firearm, but convicted him of homicide. The
the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-
out. As the Mirandas got near Tangan's car, Generoso defense and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of
loudly retorted, " Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party
sasakyan ko?" Generoso and Tangan then exchanged and of passion and obfuscation were appreciated in his
expletives. Tangari pointed his hand to Generoso and the favor; consequently, the trial court ordered him to suffer an
latter slapped it, saying, "Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of arresto
ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of
countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With this, Tangan prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the
went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front heirs of the victim.8 Tangan was released from detention
seat. The subsequent events per account of the parties' after the promulgation of judgment and was allowed bail
respective witnesses were conflicting: in the homicide case.

According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Private complainants, the heirs of Generoso Miranda, filed
Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when 102677, challenging the civil aspect of the court a
Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed quo's decision, but the same was dismissed for being
his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused premature. On the other hand, Tangan appealed to the
pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial
shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter but court but increased the award of civil indemnity to
because the arm of the accused was extended, the P50,000.00.10 His subsequent motion for reconsideration
muzzle of the gun reached to about more or less one foot and a motion to cite the Solicitor General in contempt
away from the body of Generoso Miranda. The shot hit the were denied by the Court of Appeals.11
stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall The office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
and while still conscious, Generoso Miranda told Manuel prosecution, alleging grave abuse of discretion, filed a
Miranda, his uncle, to get the gun. Manuel Miranda petition for certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as G.R.
grappled for the possession of the gun and during their No.103613, naming as respondents the Court of Appeals
grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the and Tangan, where it prayed that the appellate court's
gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a judgment be modified by convicting accused-appellant
man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man of homicide without appreciating in his favor any
in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to mitigating circumstance.12 Subsequently, the Office of the
get the gun where the man in red T-shirt placed it. Solicitor General, this time acting for public respondent
On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused Court of Appeals, filed a motion for extension to file
and his witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that comment to its own petition for certiorari.13 Discovering its
after the gun was taken by the accused from inside his car, glaring error, the Office of the Solicitor General later
the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun withdrew its motion for extension of time.14 Tangan filed a
and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas Reply asking that the case be submitted for decision.15
were trying to wrest away the gun from the accused, they Meanwhile, Tangan filed a separate petition for review
fell down at the back of the car of the accused. under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 105830.16 Since the
According to the accused, he lost the possession of the petition for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General
gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they remained unresolved, the two cases were
hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting consolidated.17 The Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Generoso Miranda.1 manifestation in G.R. No. 105830, asking that it be ex6used
After the gun went off, Tangan ran away. Meanwhile, from filing a comment to Tangan's petition for review, in
Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel, order to avoid taking contradictory positions.18
 30

In the recent case of People v. Velasco and Galvez,19 we xxx xxx xxx
held that the prosecution cannot avail of the remedies of
ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. - The following are
special civil action on certiorari, petition for review on
mitigating circumstances:
certiorari, or appeal in criminal cases. Previous to that, we
categorically ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be 1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all
used by the State in a criminal case to correct a lower the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from
court's factual findings or evaluation of the evidence.20 criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying
Procedure, is clear: act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the
burden of proving the crime charged in the information is
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When
not shifted to the accused.23 In order that it may be
an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
majority of the requirements of self-defense be present,
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part
a valid complaint or information or other fom1al charge
of the victim.24 Unlawful aggression by itself or in
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
combination with either of the other two requisite suffices
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
incomplete,25 because if there is nothing to prevent or
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
basis.26
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged
in the former complaint or information. There is no question that the bullet which hit the victim was
fired from the caliber. 38, which was issued to Tangan by
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar
the Philippine Navy. The cause of death was severe
to another prosecution for an offense which, necessarily
hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the
includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
abdomen, caused by the bullet fired from a gun of the
information under any of the following instances:
said caliber. The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance of about
facts arising from the same act or omission constituting the one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when
former charge; he grappled with Generoso and Manuel Miranda for
possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and accidentally
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became
fired, hitting the victim.
known or were discovered only after a pleas was entered
in the former complaint or information; or When the testimonies of witnesses in open court are
conflicting in substantial points, the calibration of the
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made
records on appeal becomes difficult. It is the word of one
without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended
party against the word of the other. The reviewing tribunal
party, except as provided in section 1(f) of Rule 116.
relies on the cold and mute pages of the records, unlike
In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies the trial court which had the unique opportunity of
or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he shall be observing first-hand that elusive and incommunicable
credited with the same in the event of conviction for the evidence of the witness' deportment on the stand while
graver offense. testifying.27 The trial court's assessments of the credibility of
witnesses is accorded great weight and respect on
Based on the foregoing, the Solicitor General's petition for appeal and is binding on this Court,28 particularly when it
certiorari under Rule 65, praying that no mitigating has not been adequately demonstrated that significant
circumstance be appreciated in favor of accused- facts and circumstances were shown to have been
appellant and that the penalty imposed on him be overlooked or disregarded by the court below which, if
correspondingly increased, constitutes a violation of considered, might affect the outcome hereof.29 The
Tangan's right against double jeopardy and should be rationale for this has been adequately explained in that,
dismissed.
The trial court has the advantage of observing the
We now come to the petition for review filed by Tangan. It witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion
not invoke self-defense but claimed that Generoso was or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving self- mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
defense,21 which normally would have belonged to ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious
Tangan, did not come into play. Although Tangan must shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
prove his defense of accidental firing by clear and sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh,
convincing evidence,22 the burden of proving the the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
commission of the crime remained in the prosecution. solemnity of an oath, and carriage and mien.30
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated Equally, when a person fabricates a story, he usually
in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating circumstance adopts a simple account because a complex one might
of incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation lead to entanglement from which he may find it hard to
to Article 11 (1), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: extricate himself. Along the same line, the experience of
ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not the courts and the general observations of humanity
incur any criminal liability: teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive
faculties are such that if a witness delivers in court a false
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain
provided that the following circumstances concur: to fall into fatal inconsistencies to make statements which
First. Unlawful aggression. can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the
falsity of his message.31 Aside from this, it is not also unusual
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to that the witness may have been coached before he is
prevent or repel it. called to the stand to testify.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the Somewhere along the painstaking review of the evidence
person defending himself. on record, one version rings the semblance of truth, not
 31

necessarily because it is the absolute truth, but simply Having established that the shooting was not accidental,
because it is the best approximation of the truth based on the next issue to be resolved is whether Tangan acted in
the declarations of witnesses as corroborated by material incomplete self-defense. The element of unlawful
evidence. Perforce, the other version must be rejected. aggression in self-defense must not come from the person
Truth and falsehood, it has been well said, are not always defending himself but from the victim.
opposed to each other like black and white, but
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
oftentimes, and by design, are made to resemble each
sufficient.37 Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and
other so as to be hardly distinguishable.32 Thus, after
invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no
analyzing the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses, the
matter how objectionable, could not be considered as
trial court found that:
unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical
When the accused took the gun from his car and when he assault.38 There being no lawful aggression on the part of
tried to get out of the car and the two Mirandas saw the either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense
accused already holding the gun, they started to grapple falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but
for the possession of the gun that it went off hitting the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be
Generoso Miranda at the stomach. The court believes that said that the former had no intention of killing the victim
contrary to the testimony of the accused, he never lost but simply to retain possession of his gun. However, the fact
possession of the gun for if he did and when the gun fell to that the victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot
the ground, it will not first explode or if it did, somebody is wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to
not holding the same, the trajectory of the bullet would not kill, does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused
be perpendicular or horizontal.33 the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the
consequences of his felonious act. He brought out the
The Court of Appeals agreed -
gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the
The finding of the lower court that Generoso Miranda III gun may be taken from him, he fired and fled.
was shot while the accused and the Mirandas were
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the
grappling for the possession of the gun immediately after
part of the person defending himself is not supported by
the accused had taken his gun from inside his car and
evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the
before the three allegedly fell to the ground behind the
Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the
car of the accused is borne out by the record. The court
one who provoked the former. The repeated blowing of
also agrees with the court below that it was the accused-
horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating
appellant who shot and killed Generoso Miranda III. If the
to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be
accused-appellant did not shoot Generoso III during the
considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to
scuffle, he would have claimed accidental killing by
incite provocation for the other party to act violently.
alleging that his gun exploded during the scuffle instead of
falsely testifying that he and the Mirandas fell to the The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances
ground behind his car and the gun exploded in the of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation
possession of Manuel Miranda. The theory of the under Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 6,39 have no factual
prosecution that the shooting took place while the three basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete
were grappling for the possession of the gun beside the self-defense is different from sufficient provocation as a
car of appellant is completely in harmony with the findings mitigating circumstance. As an element of self-defense, it
and testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the relative position pertains to its absence on the part of the person defending
of the three and the precarious nearness of the victim himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its
when accused-appellant pulled the trigger of his gun. Dr. presence on the part of the offended party. Besides, only
Ibarrola explained that the gun was about two (2) inches one mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and the
from the entrance wound and that its position was almost same act.40 Assuming for the sake of argument that the
perpendicular when it was fired. It was in fact the closeness blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking can be
of the Mirandas vis-à-vis appellant during the scuffle for the considered as acts of provocation, the same were not
gun that the accused-appellant was compelled to pull the sufficient. The word "sufficient" means adequate to excite
trigger in answer to the instinct of self-preservation.34 a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be
proportionate to its gravity.41 Moreover, Generoso's act of
No convincing reason appears for the Court to depart
asking for an explanation from Tangan was not sufficient
from these factual findings, the same being ably
provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill
supported by the evidence on record. In violent deaths
or injure Generoso.42
caused by gunshot wounds, the medical report or the
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim must as much as For the mitigating circumstance of passion and
possible narrate the observations on the wounds obfuscation to be appreciated, it is required that (1) there
examined. It is material in determining the truthfulness of be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
the events narrated by the witnesses presented. It is not condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the
enough that the witness looks credible and assumes that obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
he indeed witnessed the criminal act. His narration must be the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
substantiated by the physical evidence available to the the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.43
court.
In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted
The medical examiner testified that the distance between upon an impulse for there was no sudden and unexpected
the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2 inches occurrence which wuld have created such condition in his
but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the point mind to shoot the victim. Assuming that his path was
of exit and the trajectory transit of the wound, the victim suddenly blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the
and the alleged assailant were facing each other when firecrackers, it can no longer be treated as a startling
the shot was made and the position of the gun was almost occurrence, precisely because he had already passed
perpendicular when fired.35 These findings disprove them and was already the one blocking their path.
Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver is not Tangan's acts were done in the spirit of revenge and
prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance of
mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure passion or obfuscation can arise.
was exerted on the trigger. If it were uncocked, then
With respect to the penalty, under the laws then existing,
considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to
homicide was penalized with reclusion temporal,44 but if
fire the revolver.36
the homicide was committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the penalty shall be death.45 The death
 32

penalty, however, cannot be imposed on Tangan the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named with intent to kill,
with treachery and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and
because in the meantime, the 1987 Constitution there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot Generoso
proscribed the imposition of death penalty; and although Miranda III, thereby inflicting upon his mortal gunshot wounds which directly
it was later restored in 1994, the retroactive application of caused his death, contrary to law." (Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 12).
the death penalty is unfavorable to him. Previously the 3 The Amended Information reads: "That on or about the 1st day of
accused may be prosecuted for two crimes: (1) homicide December, 1984, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila,
or murder under the Revised Penal Code and (2) illegal Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named with intent to kill and armed with a gun, did then and there willfully,
possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with the said firearm
1866.46 (licensed) one Generoso Miranda III, thereby hitting the latter in the
abdomen and inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds which directly
P.D. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294,47 which provides caused his death, contrary to law." (Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p.
that if an unlicensed firearm is used in murder or homicide, 12).1âwphi1.nêt
such use of unlicensed firearm shall be appreciated as an 4 Criminal Case No. T-19350: "That on or about the 1st day of December,
aggravating circumstance and no longer considered as a 1984, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
separate offense,48 which means that only one offense the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused willfully
and feloniously have in possession, custody and control a Smith and
shall be punished - murder or homicide. However, this law Wesson Cal. 38 revolver with Serial No. C61898 (Yoke No. 7566) and five (5)
cannot apply retroactively because it will result in the live ammunitions and one (1) empty shell without having procured the
imposition on Tangan of the maximum period of the corresponding license or permit therefor and which the said accused used
penalty. Moreover, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the in the commission of the crime of homicide against the person of Generoso
Miranda III, contrary to law." (Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 13).
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,49 the aggravating
circumstance must be alleged in the information. Being 5 G.R. No. L-73963.
favorable, this new rule can be given retroactive effect as 6 Tangan v. People, 155 SCRA 435 (1987).
they are applicable to pending cases.50 In any case, 7 Rollo, p. 105.
Tangan was acquitted of the illegal possession case.
8 The dispositive portion of the Regional Tria1 Court Decision dated August
Consequently, Tangan should be sentenced to suffer the 16, 1989 penned by Judge xxxx reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered in
penalty of reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 64 of the Criminal Case No. 178587 for the crime of Homicide defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the attendance of the
Revised Penal Code, if the prescribed penalty is privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self defense and
composed of three periods, and there is neither mitigating ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of
nor aggravating circumstance, the medium period shall the offended party, and passion and obfuscation. For which reason, the
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two
be applied. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the
(2) months of ARRESTO MAYOR, as minimum to two (2) years and four (4)
maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be that months of PRISION CORRECCIONAL, as maximum, with all the accessories
which, in view of the attendant circumstances, may be of the law.
properly imposed, which in this case is reclusion The preventive confinement of the accused shall be credited full time in his
temporal medium with an imprisonment range of from favor. The accused is further ordered to pay to the heirs of Generoso
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to Miranda namely, Ruby Miranda and Maria Miranda the following:
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The minimum of 1. P30,000.00 for and as Indemnity for causing the death of Generoso
the indeterminate sentence shall be the next lower degree Miranda:
which is prision mayor with a range of from six (6) years and 2. P42,000.00 for funeral burial and other related expenses;
one (1) day to twelve (12) years.51 Hence, petitioner
3. P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against the accused.
Tangan is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum; to With respect to Criminal Case No.19350 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ammunitions Used in the Commission of Homicide, and finding the accused
innocent to the charge against him, he is hereby ACQUITTED." (Rollo in G.R.
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. No. 105830, p. 14).

The death indemnity of P30,000.00 was correctly increased 9 Illegal possession of firearms and homicide with the use of unlicensed
by the appellate court to P50,000.00 in line with firearm are generally non-bailable offenses under the 1973 Constitution
which was in force at the time of the commission of the crimes herein.
jurisprudence.52 Moral damages are awarded in criminal
cases involving injuries if supported by evidence on 10The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated October 30, 1991,
record,53 but the stipulation of the parties in this case penned by Justice Cacdac, Jr. with Justices de Pano, Jr. and Guingona,
concurring consisting of 51-single space pages reads: "WHEREFORE, the
substitutes for the necessity of evidence in support thereof. decision appealed, from is hereby MODIFIED with respect to the indemnity
Though not awarded below, the victim's heirs are entitled for the death of the victim Generoso Miranda in the amount of P50,000.00.
to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 which is In all other respects, the appealed decision is affirmed. Costs against
considered reasonable considering the pain and anguish accused- appellant.
brought by his death.54
SO ORDERED." (Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 131).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. 11 CA Resolution promulgated June 23, 1992 penned by Justice De Pano,
The appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830 Jr., with Justices Guingona and Garcia, concurring; Rollo in G.R. No. 105830,
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: pp. 133-136.
12Petition for Certiorari filed by the Solicitor General (Francisco Chavez);
(1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty Rollo in G.R. No. 103613, pp. 105-106.
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
13The several motions for extension filed by the Office of the Solicitor
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
General were signed by Solicitor General Ramon S. Desuasido and the
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the other by Acting Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro.
accessory penalties. 14Comment signed by Solicitor General Montenegro dated July 22, 1992;
(2) Tangan is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as Rollo in G.R. No. 103613, p. 407.
civil indemnity, P42,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, 15 Reply to Comment dated September 28, 1992 filed by private respondent
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, and P50,000.00 as moral in G.R. No. 103613, Rollo, p. 412.
damages. 16 Petition for Review, pp. 1-71; Rollo in G.R, No.105830, pp. 7-77.

SO ORDERED. Rejoinder in G.R. No.103613 of the new Solicitor General (Raul Goco)
17

dated November 25, 1992, p. 3; Rollo, p. 422.

Davide, Jr., Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Manifestation and Motion by the Office of the Solicitor General (Raul
18

Goco) dated December 2, 1992, p. 3; Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 264.

Footnotes: 19 G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000.
1 Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, pp. 125-126. 20 Soriano v. Hon. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, August 31, 2000.
2Criminal Case No. T-17587; "That on or about the 1st day of December,
1984, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
21People v. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474 (1998); People v. Timblor, 285 SCRA 64
(1998).
 33

22 People v. Arroyo, 111 SCRA 689 (1982); People v. Capitania, 49 Phil. 475. G.R. No. 144505 August 6, 2002
23Rule 119, Section 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the following
order:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ERNESTO SAN JUAN Y DELA PEÑA, accused-appellant.
xxx xxx xxx
PUNO, J.:
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial It came from the mouth of the accused San Juan himself
may be modified accordingly.
that the blood of the victim Cortez is on his hands. He
24 See People v. Navarro, 7 Phil. 713: People v. Martin, 89 Phil. 18. claims that he killed his prey to defend himself, but the
25People v. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 (1990); Ortega v. Sandiganbayan, 170 Court is not persuaded.
SCRA 38 (1989); People v. Picardal, 151 SCRA 170 (1987).
On January 17, 1996, an information was filed against the
26 People v. Yuman, 61 Phil. 786. accused San Juan, viz:
27 People v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999.
"The undersigned accuses ERNESTO SAN JUAN Y DELA
28People v. Mamalayan, 280 SCRA 748 (1997); People v. Jagolingay, 280 PEÑA alias NESTOR BUWANG of the crime of Murder,
SCRA 768 (1997); Rabajao v. CA, 280 SCRA 290 (1997); Padilla v. CA, 269
SCRA 402 (1997).
committed as follows:
29 People v. Dizon, G.R. No. 126044-45, July 2, 1999. That on or about (the) 13th day of January 1996, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
People v. Alitagtag; G.R. Nos. 124449-51, June 29, 1999 citing People v.
30

Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, 212-213 [1996]. willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault
31 People v. San Juan, G.R. No. 130969, February 29, 2000 citing People
v. Gana, Jr., 265 SCRA 260 (1996) and US v. Burns, 41 Phil. 418.
and use personal violence upon one BERNARDO CORTEZ
Y CEZAR, by then and there stabbing the latter with a
32 Johnson v. Emerson, (1871).
bladed weapon once in the body thereby inflicting upon
33 Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. 126. the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and
34CA Decision, dated October 30, 1991, p. 49; Rollo in G.R. No. 105830, p. immediate cause of his/her death thereafter.
129.
Contrary to law."1
35 Rollo, p. 84.
The accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
37People v. Pasco, Jr., 137 SCRA 137 (1985); People v. Rey, 172 SCRA 149
(1989). Valentino Socorro, Chief Barangay Tanod, took the witness
38 U.S. v. Carrero, 9 Phil. 544. stand. He knew the victim Cortez because the latter
always loitered at the corner of Salvador Street, Paco,
39 Article 13. The following are mitigating circumstances:
Manila, where the barangay hall was located. At around
xxx xxx xxx 2:30 a.m. on January 13, 1996, Socorro was at the door of
4. that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party the barangay hall. He was then on duty. He saw Cortez
immediately preceded the act . running to the hall and asking for help as he had a stab
xxx xxx xxx wound below his left breast. Socorro also saw the accused
running from Salvador Street to Trece de Agosto Street. He
6. that of !laving acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation.
knew the accused and saw him always drinking with the
victim and a group of men on Salvador Street. Socorro and
40 People v. delos Sontos, 85 Phil. 870.
another person known as Tikoy brought Cortez to the
41 People v. Naboro, 73 Phil. 434. hospital on a pedicab. Tikoy drove while Socorro and the
42 See People v. Laude, 58 Phil. 933. victim occupied the sidecar.1âwphi1.nêt
43 I Reyes. The Revised Penal Code, p. 272 (1998). On the way to the hospital, Socorro asked Cortez who
44Article 249, Revised Penal Code. The penalty for homicide was not
stabbed him and he answered that it was Ernesto Buwang.
changed by R.A. No. 7659 though another law (Section 10, R.A. No. 7610) Cortez uttered, "Tulungan ninyo ako at sinaksak ako ni
provides that if the victim is under 12 years of age the penalty shall be one Ernesto Buwang."2 According to Socorro, Cortez' condition
degree higher. was "fifty-fifty" at the time he said this. It took the group 30
45 P.D.1866. minutes to reach the Philippine General Hospital. The
46 Pursuant to the old provisions of Section 1, P. D. 1866 and the court's ruling
victim was still alive when they arrived. When the doctors
in People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996). were already attending to Cortez, Socorro fetched the
victim's parents. The latter immediately went to the
47 An act amending the provisions of P.D. 1866, as amended, entitled
"Codifying the laws on illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing in, hospital. The following day, Cortez' parents told Socorro
acquisition or distribution of firearms, ammunitions, or explosives or that their son had expired. Socorro executed a Sworn
instruments used in the manufacture of firearms, ammunitions or explosives Statement regarding the stabbing incident. Later,
and imposing stiffer penalties for certain violations thereof and for relevant
purposes." (Took effect July 6, 1997).
Barangay Kagawad Cesar Lopez informed Socorro that
he apprehended the accused.
48People v. Nepomuceno, Jr., G.R. No. 130800, June 29, 1999 citing People
v. Bergante, 286 SCRA 629 (1998); People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637 Socorro identified the accused during his testimony.
(1998); People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742 (1998). According to him, the accused was called "Ernesto
49 Took effect December 1, 2000. Buwang" in their neighborhood.3
50 See Oriental Assurance v. Solidbank, G.R. No. 139882, August 16, 2000. Barangay Chairman Cesar Lopez testified. On January 13,
51 People v. Acuram, G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000. 1996, at about 1:30 a.m., he was at Leroy Street, Barangay
679, Zone 74, District 5, Paco, Manila. He was then peeling
52 People v. Pedroso, G.R. No. 125128, July 19, 2000.
squash. All of a sudden, there was a commotion and when
53People v. Cayago, G.R. No. 128827, August 18, 1999 he looked around, he saw a person stab another. He was
citing People v. Arguelles, 222 SCRA 166 (1993).
about eight meters away. The place where the stabbing
People v. Reynaldo Langit, G.R. Nos. 134757-58, August 4, 2000; People v.
54
took place was well-lighted. The back of the assailant was
Mindanao, G.R. No. 123095, July 6, 2000.
towards him. The culprit immediately ran away after
stabbing the victim. Being a barangay official, Lopez
approached the victim and recognized him as Cortez. The
latter told him that he was stabbed by Totoy Buwang.
Cortez looked like he was dying. He was weak and very
pale. He, along with two barangay tanods, brought the
victim to the Philippine General Hospital, but the victim
was already dead when they arrived there. He and two
 34

policemen then looked for the victim's assailant. Two to the crime was committed on January 13, 1996. The Solicitor
three days after the stabbing incident, between 2:00 a.m. General argues that, in fact, the accused "consciously
to 3:00 a.m., they found the accused at the corner of Paz admitted in court that he stabbed Bernardo Cortez with a
and Trece de Agosto Streets. They apprehended him and knife on the date in issue allegedly in retaliation for hitting
brought him to the police headquarters. (punching) him on his forehead. . . Such admission
indicates in clear terms that appellant understood the
Lopez identified the accused in court. He also said that the
nature of his act and the consequences thereof. In short,
accused is the only person known as "Totoy Buwang" in
the act was willfully, voluntarily and knowingly
their barangay. He executed a Sworn Statement
executed."8 Finally, the Solicitor General avers that the
regarding the stabbing incident.4
Motion to Remand is procedurally flawed as it aims to
The accused took the witness stand. On January 13, 1996, reopen the case, but a motion to reopen a case is proper
he was in his house near the Paco Church. Cortez went to only after either or both parties have formally offered and
his house. They talked and later on had a heated closed their evidence, but before judgment.9
exchange of words regarding the job that he (the
The parties then filed their respective Briefs. The accused
accused) gave Cortez. The latter boxed him on the
makes the following assignment of errors:
forehead. When he testified, he showed the court his
scarred forehead. "I.
On cross-examination, the accused added that Cortez THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
also had a fan knife at the time he boxed him. Aside from APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
boxing him, he claims that Cortez also stabbed him with a CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
fan knife on the left side of his face.5 FOR THE PROSECUTION.
After one week, the accused retaliated. In another part of II.
his testimony, he stated that he retaliated on the same day
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS
that Cortez boxed him. He was very angry. He stabbed the
GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES
victim Cortez with a knife and hit him on the left side. That
WHICH ARE NOT ONLY EXCESSIVE BUT ARE BEREFT OF ANY
same day, he learned that Cortez died. He then
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS."10
surrendered to his parents and the Manila Police. He told
the police that he killed Cortez in self-defense. The Solicitor General correctly points out that even
assuming that the October 6, 1997 medical certificate
The trial court convicted the accused San Juan, viz:
were admitted in evidence, it would only prove the mental
"The accused admitted stabbing the victim, but asserted condition of the accused on that date, and not at the time
that he did it in retaliation for earlier being boxed on the of the commission of the crime on January 13, 1996, over
forehead by the victim. The previous act of the victim in a year prior to the issuance of the medical certificate.
hitting with his fist the forehead of the accused, could not In People v. Madarang,11 we held that the evidence of
justify the felony committed by the accused, given the insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous
fact that at the time the victim was stabbed he was with the commission of the offense with which he is
sleeping so, there was no unlawful aggression on his part. charged. Although the accused is diagnosed with
Neither could such act of the victim be considered as a schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident,
mitigating circumstance since the boxing incident did not the evidence of insanity after the commission of the
immediately precede the stabbing incident (Arts. 11 & 13, offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof
Revised Penal Code). of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous
to the commission of the crime.12 The Motion to Remand is
WHEREFORE, the accused, Ernesto San Juan, is hereby
thus denied.
convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory The accused asserts in his first assignment of error that the
penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. prosecution's evidence to establish that he was Cortez'
assailant is insufficient. The accused, however, must not
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay
forget that in his testimony, he admitted that he stabbed
the legal heirs of the victim moral and nominal damages
the victim, but invoked self-defense. Thus, he cannot now
in the sum of P200,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively,
raise the issue of identity which he has already admitted.
and compensation for the loss of the life of the victim in the
When the accused theorized self-defense, he, in effect,
amount of P50,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 6%
assumed the onus probandi to substantiate the same. It
per annum from this date until fully paid."6
became his inescapable burden to prove clearly and
The accused appealed the decision to this Court. But convincingly the elements of self-defense provided in
before filing his Brief, he filed a "Motion to Remand Case to Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.13
the Court a Quo for Further Reception of Defense
The Revised Penal Code provides in Article 11, par. 1, viz:
Evidence." The PAO lawyers handling his case on appeal
averred that while studying the case, they discovered that "Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not
a Medical Certificate dated October 6, 1997 and incur criminal liability:
prepared by Senior Inspector and Medical Officer Arthur
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
G. Lorenzo of the Bureau of Jail Management and
provided that the following circumstances occur:
Penology was attached to the case records. It stated that
accused San Juan was diagnosed to have "R/O First. Unlawful aggression;
Schizophrenia." The medical certificate was not, however,
formally offered by the last PAO lawyer who handled the Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
case in the lower court. Neither was Dr. Lorenzo presented prevent or repel it;
in court. Invoking substantial justice, the accused's new Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
PAO lawyers prayed for the remand of the case to the person defending himself."
court a quo for further reception of evidence of the
accused's insanity at the time of the commission of the The Code also provides in Article 13, par. 1, viz:
crime as his mental state would exempt him from liability.7 "Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. - the following are
The Solicitor General filed an Opposition to the Motion to mitigating circumstances:
Remand, pointing out that the medical certificate, even if
admitted, would only prove the accused's insanity when
he was diagnosed on October 6, 1997, and not at the time
 35

1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the Q: What was the position of the victim when you hit him?
requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from
A: He was standing facing me.
criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant."
Q: What happened after you were able to hit him with
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-
a knife?
defense, whether complete or incomplete under Articles
11 or 13, respectively.14 Unlawful aggression refers to an A: I just stayed there at the house.
actually materialized attack or at the very least, a clearly
imminent attack.15 When an unlawful aggression has Q: Did you know what happened to Bernardo Cortez?
ceased to exist, the one making a defense has no right to A: He died, sir.
kill or injure the former aggressor.16
Q: When did you come to know that Bernardo Cortez
The accused testified, viz: died?
"Q: Mr. Witness, you are being accused of killing of (sic) A: That same day.
one Bernardo Cortez on January 13, 1996. What can you
say about this accusation? Q: What did you do, Mr. Witness, after you learned that
he died?
A: They hurt me and I hit them back.
A: I surrendered to my parents and also to the Manila
xxx xxx xxx Police.
THE COURT: Q: When you brought (sic) to the Manila Police did you
Q: Who hurt you on your forehead? tell them that you killed Bernardo Cortez for self-defense?

A: Bernardo Cortez. A: Yes, sir."17 (emphasis supplied)

Q: What was used by Bernardo Cortez in (sic) your The accused's testimony is uncorroborated. But even
head? assuming arguendo that Cortez boxed the accused, thus
committing an unlawful aggression against him, the
A: He just boxed me. accused failed to establish that the aggression had not
ceased at the time he stabbed Cortez. In one part of his
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, that happened on that same day,
testimony, the accused said that Cortez boxed him on
January 13, 1996?
January 13, 1996 and he stabbed Cortez on the same day,
A: Yes, sir. without indicating the interval between the boxing and
the stabbing. In another part of his testimony, he stated
Q: What time?
that it was a week after Cortez boxed him that he
A: Noontime, sir. retaliated and stabbed Cortez. In the absence of proof
that there was continued unlawful aggression on the part
Q: Prior to that fist blows (sic) by Bernardo Cortez what of Cortez, the accused's theory of self-defense cannot
were you doing, Mr. Witness? benefit him whether as a justifying circumstance or a
A: I was in my house and he went there. mitigating circumstance under Articles 11 or 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively.
Q: Where is your house, Mr. Witness?
We come now to the aggravating circumstances. The trial
A: Near the Paco Church. court found the accused guilty of murder qualified by
Q: When the victim went to your house what treachery and evident premeditation, viz:
happened? "And since the victim was sleeping when the accused
A: We talked. repeatedly stabbed him, thereby making it impossible for
him to defend himself, the crime committed is murder
THE COURT: qualified by treachery and premeditation under Article
Q: Then what happened? 248 of the Revised Penal Code."18

A: We have (sic) a heated exchange of words. The trial court was in error in appreciating the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Q: What were you arguing about? For treachery to be appreciated, the manner of attack
must be proved. Without any particulars on the manner in
A: Concerning our work. The work that I was able to give
which the aggression commenced or how the act which
him.
resulted in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot
Q: What happened after that heated argument? be appreciated.19 Circumstances qualifying criminal
responsibility cannot rest on mere conjectures, no matter
A: He was the first one to hit me. He hit me in (sic) the
how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts
forehead.
of unquestionable existence.20 In the case at bar, no
Q: After you were hit by Bernardo Cortez what did you evidence was presented that the victim was sleeping
do, Mr. Witness? when the accused stabbed him.
A: I went home and I retaliate (sic) when I came back. Neither can we appreciate evident premeditation. The
following are the elements of evident premeditation: (1)
Q: How long did it take for you to go back to retaliate? the time when the accused decided to commit the crime;
A: After one week. (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to
his determination; (3) sufficient lapse of time between
Q: On January 13, 1996, you said that the victim went decision and execution to allow the accused to reflect
to your house and then boxed you in (sic) the forehead? upon the consequences of his act.21 There is a dearth of
A: Yes, sir. evidence with respect to these elements.

Q: When he boxed you, what did you do? In the absence of any aggravating circumstance to
qualify the killing to murder, we adopt the
A: I got hold of the knife and stabbed him. recommendation of the Solicitor General to lower the
Q: What part of the body were you able to hit him? crime to homicide.

A: (Witness pointing to the left rear side of his body)

 36

Anent the damages, the trial court was correct in ordering G.R. No. 135050 April 19, 2002
the accused to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00. We
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
reduce, however, the grant of moral damages in the
EFREN TEJERO, LUCIO PORTON, CESAR TEJERO and ARNEL
amount of P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 in accordance with
TEJERO, accused-appellants.
prevailing jurisprudence.22 With respect to nominal
damages, we cannot sustain the Solicitor General's prayer QUISUMBING, J.:
for the deletion of the award of nominal damages on the
ground that "x x x the trial court had already awarded civil On appeal is the decision1 dated July 3, 1998, in Criminal
indemnity and moral damages in the amount of Case No. C-2163, of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman,
P50,000.00, and P200,000.00, respectively."23 Nominal Northern Samar, Branch 20, finding appellants Efren, Cesar
damages are awarded so that a right which has been and Arnel, all surnamed Tejero, and Lucio Porton guilty of
violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the murder and sentencing each to suffer the penalty
purpose of indemnification. The award of civil indemnity of reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally pay the heirs
and moral damages do not preclude the recovery of of Alfredo Balase the sum of ₱50,000, and to pay the costs.
nominal damages. We, however, reduce the amount of Appellants were charged with murder under the following
nominal damages from P100,000.00 to P10,000.00.24 Information:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned decision is MODIFIED. The That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, at about 1:00
accused-appellant is found guilty of Homicide and o’clock in the morning, inside the auditorium of Barangay
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6) San Pedro, Municipality of Biri, Province of Northern Samar,
years, eight (8) months and ten (10) days of prision Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten Court, the above-named accused armed with a bladed
(10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion weapon and a stick locally called "Tadlok", with deliberate
temporal medium as maximum,25 and to pay the heirs of intent to kill thru treachery and evident premeditation,
the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral conspiring with, confederating together and mutually
damages, and P 10,000.00 as nominal damages. No helping one another did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
costs.1âwphi1.nêt and feloniously attack, assault and stab and/or pierce
SO ORDERED. ALFREDO BALASE with the use of said weapons which the
accused had provided themselves for the purpose,
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. thereby inflicting upon said Alfredo Balase multiple
Footnotes stabbed wounds which caused the death of said victim.
1 Original Records, p. 1. CONTRARY TO LAW.2
2 TSN, Valentino Socorro, July 29, 1998, p. 2. When arraigned, Efren Tejero, Lucio Porton, Cesar Tejero
3 Id., pp. 2-7. and Arnel Tejero with the assistance of counsel de oficio,
entered pleas of not guilty to the charge.3
4 TSN, Cesar Lopez, October 21, 1999, pp. 2-5.
5 TSN, Ernesto San Juan, February 4, 2000, pp. 2-5; April 14, 2000, pp. 2-4. At the trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses,
namely: Dr. Ma. Sylvia M. Agudo, Romeo Balase, Henry
6 Rollo, p. 14; Decision, p. 2.
Quiling and Visitacion Balase.
7 Id., pp. 25-27.
DR. MA. SYLVIA M. AGUDO, the municipal health officer of
8 Id., pp. 1-2.
Biri, Northern Samar, testified that she conducted the
9 Id., p. 52. autopsy on the body of the victim, Alfredo Balase. She
10 Rollo, p. 35.
prepared an autopsy report that contained these findings:
11 332 SCRA 99 (2000). 1. Stab wound, 1cm involving muscles at supraclavicular
area, left
12 Ibid.
13 People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680 (1999). 2. Stab wound, 1cm involving muscles at supraclavicular
area, right
14 People v. Antonio, 303 SCRA 414 (1999).
15 People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680 (1999). 3. Stab wound, 1cm midsternal line at level of 4th
intercostal space
16 People v. Bitoon, 309 SCRA 209 (1999).
17 TSN, Ernesto San Juan, February 4, 2000, pp. 3-5.
4. Stab wound, 1cm midclavicular line, level of 6th
intercostal space, right
18 Rollo, p. 14; Decision, p. 2.
5. Stab wound, 3cm anterior axillary line at level of 7th
19People v. Rios, 333 SCRA 823 (2000), citing People v. Nalangan, 336 Phil.
970, 975 (1997). intercostal space, right
20 People v. Cantonjos, G.R. No. 136748, November 21, 2001. 6. Lacerated wound, 9cm upper extremity involving
21People v. Tan, et al., G.R. No. 116200-02, June 21, 2001, citing People v.
muscles of middle third, lateral forearm, right
Jose, G.R. No. 130666, January 31, 2000.
-----HEMOTHORAX
22 People v. Panado, et al., 348 SCRA 679 (2000).
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe secondary to
23 Rollo, pp. 100-101. wounds at midclavicular line, level of 6th intercostal
24 People v. Carillo, 333 SCRA 338 (2000). space, right, anterior axillary line at level of 7th intercostal
25 People v. Anacan, G.R. No. 144318, April 3, 2002.
space, right.4
ROMEO BALASE, the brother of the victim Alfredo Balase,
testified that on June 17, 1995 at around 9:00 P.M., he
entered the auditorium of Brgy. San Pedro, Biri, Northern
Samar where a dance was being held in celebration of
the barangay fiesta. He and his two other companions
occupied a table about two meters apart from that
occupied by Alfredo. He recounted that Alfredo was
drinking "Red Horse beer" together with Henry Quiling,
Boboy Albario, Manolo Tejero and Danilo Tejero. Past
midnight, or about 1:00 A.M. of June 18, 1995, witness
 37

Romeo Balase saw his brother Alfredo, who had longer remember how many. Afterwards, he left Alfredo at
consumed about four bottles of beer, resting his head the center of the auditorium and went home.10
propped up by his hand on the table he (Alfredo) and his
In the early morning of June 18, 1995, he and the three
companions were occupying.5 Suddenly, appellant Efren
appellants were arrested and held at the Municipal Hall of
Tejero, coming from the gate, approached Alfredo and
Biri as suspects in the killing of Alfredo, but were released
stabbed the latter with a small bolo locally known as
afterwards since no case was filed against them.11
"dipang", hitting Alfredo on the right armpit. Efren
immediately delivered a second blow but Alfredo parried BLAS DOCENA corroborated appellant Efren Tejero’s story.
it with his arm and ran towards the main gate of the He narrated that on June 17, 1995, he went to San Pedro,
auditorium. When Alfredo reached the gate, Lucio Porton Biri, Northern Samar to witness the dance being held there.
hit him with a club. Alfredo parried the swing of the club. At around 11:00 P.M., he saw Efren chased by Alfredo
Then, according to Romeo, Cesar Tejero came to the towards the gate of the auditorium. When Alfredo was
scene of the fight and held the head of Alfredo with his already near the table of Efren, he delivered a thrust at
two hands. While Alfredo tried to free himself from the Efren, but he did not hit Efren as the former lost his balance
grasp of Cesar, Lucio Porton held Alfredo’s right arm. Then and fell causing his bolo to be thrown away. Efren picked
appellant Arnel Tejero approached Alfredo and also up the bolo and with it stabbed Alfredo who was hit at the
stabbed him twice with a small pointed bolo on the chest. right side of his body. Afterwards, Alfredo grappled for the
Not contented, Arnel stabbed him again on the left and possession of the bolo but to no avail. After stabbing
right sides of his shoulders. Witness Romeo Balase said he Alfredo, Efren ran away leaving Alfredo in the middle of
saw all these details because the scene of the incident the dance hall.12
was illuminated with several fluorescent lights.6
Appellants Arnel Tejero, Cesar Tejero and Lucio Porton
HENRY QUILING, corroborating the testimony of Romeo disavowed any complicity in the killing of Alfredo Balase,
Balase, testified that on June 17, 1995 at around 9:00 P.M., claiming that they were in their respective houses at the
he arrived at the auditorium and occupied a table with time of the incident. In effect, they interposed denial and
the victim, Alfredo Balase, and three others. He narrated alibi as their defense.
that past midnight, at around 1:00 A.M. of June 18, while
Alfredo rested his head upon his arm on the table, Efren Appellant ARNEL TEJERO testified that at about 1:00 A.M.
Tejero approached the former and immediately thrust his of June 18, 1995, he was at home asleep. At the same
bolo on the right side of Alfredo’s body. He delivered hour, however, he was awakened by his wife due to the
another thrust using the same weapon and hit the victim commotion at the auditorium. After informing him of the
on his right forearm. The witness said he was only two stabbing incident, his wife fainted. He attended to his wife
meters away when Efren stabbed the victim twice. Alfredo until she regained consciousness, then he went back to
ran and was chased by Efren towards the gate. Alfredo sleep.13 He denied ever going to the auditorium.
was then accosted by appellant Lucio Porton who struck Appellant LUCIO PORTON testified that he was at home on
him with a "tadlok", but Alfredo was able to parry the blow. the evening of June 17, 1995. He went to the auditorium to
Then Cesar held both hands of Alfredo, while Lucio also take a peek at the celebration. At about 10:00 P.M. he was
held only the right hand of Alfredo. Meanwhile, appellant asked by his wife to go home.14 According to Lucio, the
Arnel Tejero came upon Alfredo and also stabbed him on following day, he was brought to the Chief of Police of Biri
the chest with a bolo. After stabbing him, Lucio and Cesar and was detained in jail for a day and a half. On February
released their hold on Alfredo causing the victim to squat 7, 1996, while he was in Cabuyao, Laguna where he was
on the ground and support his body with his hands. working as a construction worker with Efren Tejero, he was
Immediately thereafter, Arnel stabbed him again on the arrested by some NBI agents who, according to him, shot
left and right sides of his neck. While this was all happening, him on the left side of his back after one Renato Balase
Efren served as a look-out.7 pointed to him and identified him as Lucio Porton.15
On cross-examination, witness Henry Quiling stated that he Appellant CESAR TEJERO testified that he did not attend
was not alarmed when Efren approached Alfredo the dance since he was busy attending to his visitors at his
because he did not expect that Efren intended to kill home.16 According to him, witnesses Henry Quiling and
Alfredo.8 Romeo Balase testified against him because the two got
The last prosecution witness, VISITACION BALASE, was the mad at him when he refused to testify as a witness for
mother of the victim. She testified that she incurred P5,000 Renato Balase, the brother of Romeo Balase, who was
for the victim’s coffin and niche, and other miscellaneous accused of killing a Salvador Galo.
expenses.9 On July 3, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision
In their defense, appellants testified together with witness rejecting the defense’s theory of self-defense as well as
Blas Docena. alibi and gave full credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who positively identified appellants
Appellant EFREN TEJERO admitted the killing, but asserted as the culprits. The dispositive portion of said decision
that it was in self-defense. He testified that on June 17, 1995 reads:
at about 10:00 P.M., he went to the auditorium to attend
the dance that was held as part of the fiesta celebration. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
According to Efren, at about 1:00 A.M. the following day accused EFREN TEJERO, LUCIO PORTON, ARNEL TEJERO
or on June 18, he went outside the gate of the auditorium and CESAR TEJERO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
to answer the call of nature. While he was urinating, crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248
Alfredo asked him if he was Efren, the brother of Ramon. of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to
When he answered in the affirmative, Alfredo immediately suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
drew his small bolo from the right side of his waist. Thinking the heirs jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00
that he might be stabbed by Alfredo, Efren ran towards without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
the main gate to escape. Alfredo overtook him and as he to pay the costs.
was about to stab Efren, the former stumbled down, SO ORDERED.17
releasing his hold of the bolo. Efren picked up the bolo and
when Alfredo was about to stand, Efren stabbed him on Hence, this appeal.
the right side of his body. They ran to the center of the The Court issued a resolution on November 24,
auditorium, Efren recounted that he took away Alfredo’s 199918 dismissing appellant Arnel Tejero’s appeal pursuant
bolo and, remembering that he has his own bolo, he drew to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,19 after it was
it and stabbed Alfredo several times that he could no proven during the pendency of this appeal that he
 38

escaped from the provincial jail at Dancalan, Bobon, insure the success of their criminal act. All four appellants
Northern Samar on July 12, 1998. We reiterated the appear to have acted in concert during the fatal attack
dismissal in another resolution dated September 6, against the victim. Each performed specific acts with such
2000.20 Thus, as for Arnel Tejero, his conviction for the killing close coordination as to indicate beyond doubt a
of Alfredo Balase is deemed affirmed and had become common criminal design or purpose. As conspirators, they
final and executory. As for the remaining three appellants, are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and
their appeal stands, which we will now resolve. extent of their participation since, in point of law, the act
of one would be the act of all.26
Accused-appellants contend that:
As already stated, Efren claims that he acted in self-
I.
defense. Thus, he has the burden of proving: (a) unlawful
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ALL THE ACCUSED aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ON THE BASIS OF THE THEORY OF necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
CONSPIRACY WHICH IS BUT A SPECULATION AND NOT A and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part.27 Efren
FACT. testified that when Alfredo was about to stab him after a
brief chase, Alfredo stumbled, releasing his hold of the
II. bolo. Efren picked up the bolo, it was then that he stabbed
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE Alfredo. Assuming arguendo that this version were true,
SELF-DEFENSE OR INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE OF EFREN unlawful aggression, assuming it was initially present, had
TEJERO AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE OTHER APPELLANTS already ceased the moment Efren had possession of the
LUCIO PORTON, CESAR TEJERO AND ARNEL TEJERO, ON weapon and he no longer had any right to attack his
REASONABLE DOUBT. alleged offender. With the absence of the primordial
element of unlawful aggression, the other requisite of self-
III. defense would have no leg to stand on.28 Moreover, it is
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY worth noting that appellant himself admitted that when he
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.21 faced Alfredo at the center of the auditorium, he
remembered that he had his own bolo, drew it and
In sum, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the trial stabbed Alfredo several times. He could not even
court correctly held appellants equally liable for the death remember how many times he did. Clearly, even if we
of the victim on the basis of conspiracy, and (2) whether follow Efren’s version, there was no reasonable necessity of
treachery was sufficiently proven to sustain appellants’ the means employed by him to prevent or repel the
conviction for murder. alleged attack. The gravity of the wounds inflicted on the
Appellants contend that the trial court’s finding of victim is indicative of a determined effort to kill and not just
conspiracy rests merely on speculation and not on fact. to defend.29
They claim that there was no evidence to prove that Also, the testimony of defense witness Docena, in an
appellant Efren Tejero met with the other appellants and attempt to corroborate Efren’s theory of self-defense, fails
that together they planned the killing of Alfredo. to impress us. As pointed out by the trial court, he is a
Appellants argue that their mere presence at the gate of biased witness since during his stay in Brgy. San Pedro, he
the auditorium did not prove conspiracy, since their was a helper of Pedro Tejero, a close relative of Efren. Also,
presence and that of others at the dance was not unusual according to the trial court, he was fidgety in his seat while
or unexpected.22 testifying and would smile every time he answered the
After examining carefully the testimonies of witnesses for questions propounded to him.
the prosecution as well as the defense, the trial court’s Needless to say, findings of the trial court on the credibility
finding of the existence of a conspiracy to kill the victim is of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear
well-taken. It must be noted that Article 8, paragraph 2 of advantage of a trial judge in the appreciation of
the Revised Penal Code provides that "conspiracy exists testimonial evidence.30 For indeed the trial court is in a
when two or more persons come to an agreement better position to decide the question of credibility, having
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
commit it." It is a well-settled rule that conspiracy need not manner of testifying during the trial.31
be established by direct evidence of a prior agreement. It
is sufficient that the accused acted in concert at the time We now come to the defense of alibi and denial raised by
of the commission of the offense, that they had the same the two remaining appellants, namely Cesar Tejero and
purpose or common design, and that they were united in Lucio Porton. It is settled that for alibi to prosper as a
its execution.23 defense, the accused must show that they were so far
away that they could not have been physically present at
In this case, the accused’s synchronous presence at the the place of the crime at the time of its commission and
crime scene was not a mere coincidence 24 but was part their presence elsewhere renders it impossible for them to
of a design to kill Alfredo Balase. As the trial court be the guilty parties.32 In this case, the trial court estimated
observed, appellant Efren Tejero had to call the other the distance of Cesar’s house from the auditorium to be a
appellants to help him kill Alfredo to preempt the latter’s mere 20 meters, and that of Lucio to be a mere 50
threat to liquidate their whole family. All the appellants meters.33Given the relative proximity of the locus
waited for the opportune time for them to carry out their criminis established by the trial court, the appellants’
plan. It is noteworthy also that appellants are related to defense of alibi must necessarily fail.
each other: Efren Tejero is the uncle of brothers Arnel and
Cesar Tejero, while Lucio Porton is the brother-in-law of Moreover, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive
Efren.25 testimony of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses,
Balase and Quiling,34 concerning appellants’ actual
Additionally, the evidence on record shows that (1) participation and identification. Although it may be
appellant Efren Tejero suddenly stabbed the victim while conceded that their testimonies differ in some respects
the latter was resting his head on his arms at the table; (2) (e.g. to which gate of the auditorium did Alfredo go and
when the victim ran to the gate to escape, the other the supposed parts of Alfredo’s body hit by the blows), yet
appellants were waiting for him. Appellant Cesar Tejero these differences do not refer to the crux of the matter,
held the victim’s head while appellant Lucio Porton held which is their presence at the scene and their participation
the victim’s arm to render him immobile and preclude any in the commission of the crime. Besides, witnesses are not
potential resistance from him, thus enabling appellant expected to remember every single detail of an incident
Arnel Tejero to consummate their dastardly act; and (3) with perfect or total recall.35
while this was all happening, Efren acted as a look-out to
 39

Finally, appellants contend that assuming Efren may be 14 TSN, July 11, 1997, pp. 2-3.
held liable for the killing of Alfredo Balase, it cannot be 15 Id. at 5-9.
murder for the following reasons: (a) the killing of the victim 16 TSN, August 15, 1997, p. 3.
was not attended by the qualifying circumstance of
17 Rollo, p. 26.
treachery; and (b) the attack on the victim was not so
sudden and unexpected since they were facing each 18 Id. at 46-47.
other when the stabbing took place. 1âwphi1.nêt 19 Rule 124, Sec. 8 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This contention is devoid of merit. The essence of treachery xxx
is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor
The court may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion,
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement or
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.
thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the 20 Rollo, p. 136.
aggressor. In this case, treachery was already present
21 Id. at 57.
when Efren, armed with a bolo, approached Alfredo and
suddenly stabbed him. Alfredo did not have the faintest 22 Id. at 58-59, 61.
idea that he was vulnerable to an attack, considering that 23 People vs. Tami, G.R. Nos. 101801-03, 244 SCRA 1, 22 (1995).
he was resting his head on his arms at the table oblivious
24 People vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 116600, 258 SCRA 1, 31 (1996).
of the sinister intent of Efren. Due to the suddenness of the
attack, witness Quiling who was just beside Alfredo was not 25 TSN, January 15, 1997, p. 13.
able to help him. He had no inkling whatsoever that Efren 26 People vs. Abordo, G.R. No. 107245, 321 SCRA 23, 39 (1999).
would stab Alfredo since the former did not carry his
27 Article II, par. 1, The Revised Penal Code.
weapon openly. Only when Efren got near the victim did
he immediately draw his weapon.36 While Efren may not 28 People vs. Baniel, G.R. No. 108492, 275 SCRA 472, 481 (1997).
have succeeded in his initial thrusts, as in fact, Alfredo was 29 Id. at 482.
able to parry his first blow, this nonetheless is quite
30 People vs. Benito, G.R. No. 128072, 303 SCRA 468, 476 (1999).
insignificant because the existence or non-existence of
treachery is not dependent on the success of the 31 People vs. Durado, Sr., G.R. No. 121669, 321 SCRA 498, 512 (1999).
assault.37The fact that Alfredo was facing Efren at the 32 People vs. Enoja, G.R. No. 102596, 321 SCRA 7, 20 (1999).
same moment as the latter’s attack did not erase its
33 Rollo, p. 23.
treacherous nature. Even if the assault were frontal, there
was treachery if it was so sudden and unexpected that the 34 People vs. Cabangcala, G.R. No. 135065, August 8, 2001, p. 14.
victim had no time to prepare for his defense.38 35 People vs. Benito, G.R. No. 128072, 303 SCRA 468, 478 (1999).

In fine, the trial court correctly considered the killing of 36 TSN, September 16, 1996, p. 10.
Alfredo Balase as murder qualified by treachery. There 37 People vs. Zamil, G.R. No. 105284, 275 SCRA 182, 190 (1997).
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
38 People vs. De Manuel, G.R. No. 117950, 263 SCRA 49, 59 (1996).
attending the killing, the applicable penalty would thus
be reclusion perpetua.39 The award of P50,000 as death 39 Article 63 (2), Revised Penal Code.
indemnity to the victim’s heirs is likewise affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court convicting appellants Efren Tejero,
Cesar Tejero and Lucio Porton of the crime of murder and
sentencing them to reclusion perpetua, and to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of Alfredo Balase P50,000 as civil
indemnity as well as the costs is AFFIRMED.
With regard to appellant Arnel Tejero who is at large, his
conviction by the trial court for the killing of Alfredo Balase
is deemed affirmed and had by now become final and
executory. The court a quo is directed to order the
immediate arrest and commitment of appellant Arnel
Tejero to the New Bilibid Prison for service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman) Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Corona, J., No part in the deliberations.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 16-26.
2 Records, p. 17.
3 Decision, p. 1; Rollo, p. 16.
4 Id. at 5.
5 TSN, August 5, 1996, pp. 8-10.
6 Id. at 4-6.
7 TSN, September 16, 1996, pp. 2-5.[7]
8 Id. at 9.
9 TSN, October 31, 1996, p. 5.
10 TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 4-8.
11 Id. at 11-12.
12 TSN, May 19, 1997, pp. 2-6.
13 TSN, February 27, 1997, p. 2.
 40

G.R. No. 133580 July 20, 2001 Thereafter, Geneblazo chased them for he wanted to
know why he was being stoned and because he wanted
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
to get even.
MAXIMO GENEBLAZO, accused-appellant.
Geneblazo caught up with Momoy. When he was about
BUENA, J.:
to box the latter, Momoy drew out a knife. Momoy struck
Accused-appellant Maximino Geneblazo appeals the the bridge of the nose and finger of Geneblazo with the
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calauag, Quezon, knife. When Geneblazo fell down he heard a gunshot.
Branch 63 in Criminal Case No. 2151-C, entitled "The Momoy was about to stab Geneblazo again but when he
People of the Philippines versus Maximino Geneblazo", heard the shot he was startled so the latter was able to
convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion wrest the weapon from Momoy.
perpetua.
Geneblazo then stabbed Momoy in the abdomen. He was
On October 16, 1992, an information was filed against about to stab Momoy again when SPO1 Quiogue arrived
Maximino Geneblazo charging him of murder committed on the scene. While SPO1 Quiogue was pacifying them,
as follows: Geneblazo hit Momoy in the neck. As he did not recognize
SPO1 Quiogue he accidentally hit the latter’s left hand
"That on or about the 15th day of January 1988, at with the knife but when recognition dawned on him who
Barangay Pinagtalyeran, Municipality of Calauag, SPO1 Quiogue was, he ran away and hid until his surrender
Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction to a police officer Baloloy.
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, and with Salvacion Opalsa y Conohan, the mother of the victim,
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and testified for the prosecution declaring that her family
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon incurred expenses in the total amount of P45,000.00 for the
one Domingo Opalsa, thereby inflicting upon the latter burial and wake of the victim. The P45,000.00 is broken
wounds on the different parts of his body which directly down as follows: P5,000.00 for funeral expense, P16,000.00
caused his death."That the accused attacked and was spent during the wake, P6,000.00 was expenses for the
stabbed said Domingo Opalsa suddenly and cemetery, P8,000.00 was spent to look for the accused, an
unexpectedly without giving the latter any opportunity to additional P5,000.00 for funeral services and P5,000.00
defend himself or to escape. spent during the nine-day prayers for the deceased after
the interment. A certification from the Sutarez Funeral
"Contrary to law."[1] Homes stating that it rendered funeral services to the late
Upon arraignment on December 3, 1992, accused Domingo Opalsa in the amount of P5,000.00[2] and a
Maximino Geneblazo, assisted by counsel, pleaded not handwritten list of the expenses[3] were presented as
guilty to the crime charged. The Regional Trial Court evidence.
thereafter proceeded with the trial. On February 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision
Culled from the records are the following: convicting the accused the decretal position of which
reads:
Alex Obien, the first witness for the prosecution, testified
that on January 15, 1988, at around 12:00 midnight he and "WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
Domingo Opalsa were walking along Quezon Street, reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the Court
Calauag, Quezon, bound for home when Maximino hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty
Geneblazo and around six unknown companions stoned of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay P50,000.00 as moral
them. Obien and Opalsa retaliated by also throwing damages and an additional P45,000.00 as actual
stones at Geneblazo and company. However, upon damages to the heirs of Domingo Opalsa and to pay the
seeing that Geneblazo was about to draw his knife, they costs.
ran away. "SO ORDERED."[4]
Maximino Geneblazo caught up with Domingo Opalsa Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the
and stabbed the latter twice – the first stab landed on the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
left side of the body in the area of the armpit, while the
second landed on the left side of the face. "I

SPO1 Emmanuel Quiogue of the Philippine National Police, "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
at Calauag, Quezon was at home on the night in question. APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER, HAVING
He heard a commotion outside. Peeping out the window APPRECIATED THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
he saw some men throwing stones at each other. He got TREACHERY.
his gun and went outside. Noticing the chase which
"II
ensued, he went after the men.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
At the scene of the incident, SPO1 Quiogue saw two men
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED
almost locked in an embrace. He fired his gun but the two
BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."
did not draw apart so he stood between them so as to
separate them. One of the men fell to the ground while The appeal is meritorious in the sense that the penalty
the person who was left standing stabbed him. Only his should be lowered.
finger was hit. He recognized the person who stabbed him
Accused-appellant Maximino Geneblazo alleges that he
as Maximino Geneblazo.
killed the victim Domingo Opalsa in self-defense.
Thereafter SPO1 Quiogue, Obien and Barangay Captain
Well-settled is the rule that in interposing self-defense, the
Torres of Pinagtalyeran brought Opalsa to St. Peter’s
offender admits authorship of the killing. The onus
Hospital where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.
probandi is thus shifted to him to prove the elements of
Maximino Geneblazo, who was the lone witness for the self-defense and that the killing was justified; otherwise,
defense, testified that he was standing in front of the having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable.
market at about 12:00 midnight on January 15, 1988, when Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own
two men who were drunk passed by. They challenged him evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s
to a fight. He recognized these two men as Adie Obien evidence. For self-defense to prosper, it must be
and Momoy (Domingo Opalsa). When he refused to fight established that: (1) there was unlawful aggression by the
them, the latter threw stones and flowerpots at him. victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel
 41

such aggression was reasonable; and (3) that there was both. First they threw stones at their attackers, and when
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person they saw that the accused-appellant was about to draw
defending himself.[5] his knife they ran away. While the stoning incident was
sudden, the attack upon the victim was not. The victim,
It was sufficiently established by the prosecution that the
aware that the accused-appellant was armed with a
victim Domingo Opalsa and his companion Alex Obien
weapon, knew that the latter was of a mind to use the
were merely walking on the road when they were pelted
weapon and that the only thing he could do to avoid
with stones by Maximino Geneblazo and his companions;
being wounded was to outrun the accused-appellant.
that Opalsa and Obien retaliated; that they ran away
Unfortunately the accused-appellant caught up with
when they saw that Geneblazo was about to draw his
Opalsa and inflicted a fatal stab on him which led to his
knife; that Geneblazo pursued them; that Geneblazo
demise. We do not agree with the trial court that the killing
stabbed Opalsa when he caught up with the latter.
was attended by treachery that would make the
It is quite apparent that it was not the victim who accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder. We find
committed the unlawful aggression but the accused- the accused-appellant guilty of homicide only.
appellant himself.
The trial court ordered the accused-appellant to pay
Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and P50,000.00 as moral damages and an additional
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not P45,000.00 as actual damages to the heirs of Domingo
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude -- there has Opalsa and to pay the costs.
to exist a real danger to the life or personal safety of the
The award of actual damages amounting to P45,000.00 to
person claiming self-defense.[6]
the heirs of the victim cannot be sustained. Said amount
Assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant’s version was allegedly incurred in the interment of the deceased.
of the events of the night in question is the truth and that Except for the amount of P5,000.00 that was supported by
the unlawful aggression emanated from the victim and his a certification/receipt, the sum of P40,000.00 was not
companion who were drunk at the time, the aggression substantiated by competent evidence. The award of
ceased to exist when the victim and his companion ran actual damages cannot rest on the bare allegation of the
away. There was no longer any real danger to the life or heirs of the offended party.[11]
personal safety of the accused. An act of aggression,
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, civil
when its author does not persist in his purpose, or when he
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be awarded
discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his
to the heirs of the victim.
attack is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression
warranting self-defense.[7] Based on our findings that homicide, not murder, was
committed, the penalty imposed upon accused-
When accused-appellant Geneblazo pursued the two
appellant should correspondingly be lowered to reclusion
men, it was then that he became the aggressor.
temporal. There being no aggravating nor mitigating
Finally, belying accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense circumstance, the proper imposable penalty should
is his testimony that as soon as he grabbed the knife from be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
the victim he stabbed the latter in the abdomen. Still he Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is
didn’t stop there. He again stabbed the victim in the neck anywhere within the range of prision mayor, or from 6 years
even in the presence of SPO1 Quiogue who arrived to and 1 day to 12 years, and the maximum within the range
pacify them. of reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from 14
years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.
Having divested the victim of his knife, the accused-
appellant was placed at an advantage as he already had IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court
control of the bladed weapon. The victim was therefore at Calauag, Quezon Br. 63, finding accused-appellant
left unarmed and accused-appellant Geneblazo did not guilty of the crime of murder, is MODIFIED. Instead, this
testify nor is there anything on record to show that the Court finds accused-appellant Maximino Geneblazo guilty
vicitm tried to grapple with him for possession of the knife. of the crime of Homicide, and sentenced to suffer the
A third person (a police officer, at that) was present to indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
pacify them. There was really no need for the accused- of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
appellant to stab the victim. And his doing so revealed his years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
murderous intent. temporalmedium, as maximum. The accused is ORDERED
to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount
However, the matter of whether or not the deceased was of P50,000.00, actual damages of P5,000.00, moral
the aggressor is factual. It is a settled rule that the trial court damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
is in a better position to ascertain the facts under the
circumstances. In the absence of any justifiable reason, SO ORDERED.
this Court is bound to uphold the findings of the trial court.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza and De Leon, Jr.,
The accused-appellant admitted that he recognized JJ., concur.
SPO1 Quiogue after he had stabbed the victim for the Quisumbing, J., on official business.
second time. His taking flight and going into hiding instead Footnotes
of surrendering to SPO1 Quiogue on the spot was highly
1 Orig. Records, pp. 12-13.
evidentiary of guilt, and incompatible with his claim of self-
defense. Flight negates self-defense and indicates guilt.[8] 2 Exhibit "C."

The prosecution failed to prove that the qualifying

3 Exhibit "D."

circumstance of treachery was present in this case. 4 Orig. Records, p. 129.

Treachery must be proven as clearly and as cogently as 5 People vs. Ringor, Jr., 320 SCRA 342 [1999].
the crime itself.[9]
6 People vs. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474 [1998].
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected 7 David vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 727 [1998].
attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself
8 People vs. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380 [1996].
and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to 9 People vs. Albao, 287 SCRA 129 [1998].
himself.[10] 10 People vs. Reyes, 287 SCRA 229, 238 [1998].
When Opalsa and Obien were pelted with stones, they 11 People vs. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 [1998].
had the option of retaliating or running away. They did
 42

G.R. No. 139822 December 6, 2000 living was nil because a vital organ was involved; and that
there is a probability that the assailant was in front of the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
victim.
SALVADOR CAGUING, accused-appellant.
The version of the defense is based on the testimony of
DECISION
Noe Malcaredo y Bebot, friend of accused-appellant, and
MELO, J.: accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant denied
the charge. The defense that accused-appellant and the
Accused-appellant Salvador Caguing was charged with victim had an altercation and that he shot the victim in
the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 34267 of the self-defense was also advanced.
Regional Trial Court of the Sixth Judicial Region (Branch 33,
Iloilo City), under the following Information: On March 20, 1999, a judgment of conviction was
rendered, disposing:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1989, in the
Municipality of Cabatuan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, WHEREFORE, this Court finds and so holds that:
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, with
1. Accused Salvador Caguing y Caballero is guilty of
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with
Murder as defined and penalized by Art. 248, Revised
treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a 12
Penal Code, as proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
gauge homemade shotgun, commonly known as
evidence on record;
"pugakhang" and without any justifiable cause or motive,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously 2. The penalty of Reclusion Perpetua is hereby imposed
assault, attack and shoot one ALLAN DOMINGUEZ with the upon him because neither aggravating nor mitigating
firearm accused was then provided, inflicting upon said circumstance is present.
victim fatal gunshot wound on the head which caused the
3. Accused Salvador Caguing is further ordered to
immediate death of said Allan Dominguez.
indemnify the heirs of the victim Allan Dominguez the
Contrary to law. amount of P50,000.00; to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages and the sum of P30,000.00 as moral
(p. 8, Rollo.)
damages, and with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
At his arraignment on August 27, 1997, accused-appellant insolvency.
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.
SO ORDERED.
The prosecution’s version of the generative facts as
(pp. 24-25, Rollo.)
gathered from the testimony of its witnesses – Guillermo
Dominguez, father of the victim, and Annalyn Dominguez, In accused-appellant’s brief, he assigns the following
sister of the victim – is abstracted in the Appellee’s Brief, as alleged errors:
follows:
I
At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening of December 12,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
1989, prosecution witnesses Guillermo Dominguez and his
ACCUSED, AFTER DISARMING THE VICTIM, SHOT THE SAID
Daughter Annalyn Dominguez, together with his son, Allan
VICTIM IN SELF-DEFENSE.
Dominguez, were in the house of the spouses Gonzalo and
Duliana Cornita situated at Janipaan Central, Cabatuan, II
Iloilo.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
Appellant Salvador Caguing and his companion Bebot "DEMEANOR" OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHEN IN
Malcaredo were also inside said house. Appellant was FACT THE PRESIDING JUDGE NEVER WITNESSED IN COURT
engaged in conversation with the spouses Gonzalo and SAID "DEMEANOR" BECAUSE HE TOOK OVER THE CASE
Duliana Cornita. In the course thereof, appellant asked for ONLY AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAS RESTED.
the identity of Allan Dominguez.
III
After finding out the identity of Allan, appellant suddenly
shot the former on the head with a shotgun resulting in his THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDINGS NOT BASED
instantaneous death. Allan was seated on a chair beside OR FOUND IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
a table while appellant was standing when the former was WHICH INDICATE THE PRESIDING JUDGE DID NOT
fatally shot. EXTENSIVELY GO OVER THE SAME, AS HE SHOULD DO,
HAVING TAKEN OVER IN HEARING THE CASE ONLY AFTER
Afterwards, appellant reloaded his shotgun and warned THE PROSECUTION HAS RESTED.
the people inside the house not to move. Thereafter,
appellant and his companion Bebot Malcaredo fled. (pp. 39-40, Rollo.)

(pp. 84-85, Rollo.) He particularly argues that treachery is negated by the

fact that if accused-appellant were indeed armed when
Dr. Mae Albacite, the Rural Health Physician who he arrived at 8 o’clock in the evening, an hour prior to the
conducted the autopsy on the victim’s body, testified: shooting incident, that would have already put the victim
that the cause of death of the victim was severe on guard; that both prosecution witnesses never testified
hemorrhage from a skull fracture due to a gunshot wound that accused-appellant was armed when he entered the
in the head; that the wound was located at the forehead, place of the incident and their testimony are full of
front with frontal and parietal bones missing which are inconsistencies; that it was the victim’s persistence in
parts of the skull; that the frontal lobe of the brain was attacking accused-appellant with a knife which led
already scattered on the face and skull of the victim; that accused-appellant to shoot the victim in self-defense; and
there was the presence of an incised and gaping wound lastly, the declarations of the prosecution witnesses do not
two inches by five inches located above the right ear up indicate any possible motive for accused-appellant to
to the backbone located at the right side of the back; that shoot the victim.
the wound located at the frontal area with missing frontal
and parietal bones was caused by a gunshot; that with Undisputed is the fact that accused-appellant shot one
regard to the incised wound, it had rugged edges which Allan Dominguez. Categorically, he admitted that he shot
could have been caused by a blunt object and there was the victim once in the forehead but asserts that he did so
the probability that it was caused by forcible tearing of the in self-defense.
tissue due to impact of the gunshot; that even with In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the
adequate medical attention the probability of the victim accused (People vs. Timblor, 385 SCRA 64 [1998]). It is
 43

incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing proving his defense, his conviction shall of necessity follow,
evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself, on the basis of his admission to the killing.
otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that
Accused-appellant argues that there was
he killed the victim (People vs. Cario, 288 SCRA 404 [1998]).
misappreciation of evidence since the judge who
There are three requisites to prove the claim of self-
decided the case was not the one who heard the
defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
evidence for the prosecution. We cannot ascribe merit to
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the
the argument since it is well-recognized that the trial
accused to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
judge’s assessment of the credibility of a testimony is not to
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
be anchored solely on how the witness conducted himself
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and on the witness stand. Aside from the danger of being
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof (People misled by appearance inherent in such a case, a judge is
vs. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 [1998]). The person defending supposed to render a decision on the basis of the
himself must have been attacked with actual physical evidence before him, meaning, the record and all. The
force or with actual use of weapon. Unlawful aggression is failure, to be sure, of the trial judge to have personally
a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of observed the prosecution witnesses’ manner and
self-defense, there can be no self-defense, complete or demeanor of testifying in no way affects the validity of the
incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful judgment rendered nor does ipso facto condemn the
aggression against the person defending himself (People judgment erroneous, more so where the same appears to
vs. Cario, supra [1998]). be fully supported by the evidence on record, as in the
case at bar (People vs. Rayray, 241 SCRA 1 [1995]).
In this case, the testimony of accused-appellant himself
belies the claim that he merely acted to prevent or repel Nonetheless, while the Court affirms the guilt of accused-
the unlawful aggression allegedly coming from the victim. appellant it is not persuaded that there was treachery
Accused-appellant’s unequivocal statements in open which would qualify the killing of Allan to murder.
court lead to the conclusion that, assuming arguendo that
Treachery exists when the offender employs means,
the victim indeed attempted to shoot accused-appellant
methods, or forms in the execution of the offense which
with a handgun, this aggression had ceased by the time
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
accused-appellant was able to take possession of the
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
gun. In other words, when accused-appellant successfully
party might make (People vs. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464
grabbed the gun from the victim, there was no longer any
[1998]). In order for treachery to be taken as an
unlawful aggression to prevent or repel. And this Court has
aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that
consistently held that when the unlawful aggression which
accused-appellant had consciously adopted a mode of
has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense
attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without
has no more right to kill or even wound the former
risk to himself (People vs. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360 [1998]).
aggressor (People vs. Albao, 287 SCRA 129 [1999]; People
vs. Sambulan, 239 SCRA 500 [1999]). Withal, a finding that It should preliminarily be observed that both the
there was no longer any unlawful aggression when the prosecution and the defense witnesses are consistent in
accused shot the victim rules out the possibility of self- their assertions that accused-appellant and his
defense, whether complete or incomplete (David vs. companion Bebot arrived in the crime scene at around 8
Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 727 [1998]). o’clock in the evening; and that accused-appellant and
his friend stayed on and conversed with the spouses
Just to be on the safe side, accused-appellant embellishes
Gonzalo and Duliana Cornita in the kitchen where Allan
his story by alleging that the victim, after having been
and his father Guillermo, and one Romulo Percy were at
disarmed of the gun, continued his aggression with a knife.
that time. It appears then that before accused-appellant
Here now comes the second element of self defense. For
shot the victim, he had been there for about an hour,
such posture to be properly appreciated, there should be
during which time there had been an on going drinking
a necessity in both the action taken as well as in the means
spree. For this reason, the Court finds it difficult to believe
used, and the latter depends on whether the aggressor
that Allan, Guillermo, spouses Gonzalo and Cornita, one
himself was armed, the nature and quality of the weapon
Romulo Percy, and accused-appellant and companion
used, and the physical conditions and sizes of both the
were all in one and the same kitchen, seated around in
aggressor and the person defending himself (Escoto vs.
one and the same table, and not talking to one another
CA, 273 SCRA 752 [1997]). Undoubtedly, if it is true that the
for about an hour. The Court perceives as odd and
victim had a knife and accused-appellant had a gun, his
unnatural that while Allan was seated alongside Bebot
shooting the victim may not be justified as accused-
and accused-appellant from 8 o’clock to 9 o’clock in the
appellant could not have been in any real danger of his
evening, they did not engage in any sort of conversation
life. The knife was no match to the home-made handgun
or discussion. Even the testimony of Guillermo that Allan
of accused-appellant and, in fact, there is no evidence
did not know accused-appellant and vice versa, so that
that accused-appellant sustained any injuries evincive of
accused-appellant had to wait an hour to ask for the
an aggression which would justify his firing the gun to
victim’s identity in order to kill him, is doubtful. It is of judicial
protect himself. Thus, the shooting was unwarranted and
notice that people in rural communities generally know
was an unreasonable act of violence, even as a means of
each other both by face and name (People vs. Reynaldo,
defense, under the circumstances. Moreover, accused-
291 SCRA 701 [1998]). Even the then 11-year-old Analyn
appellant left his victim and did not even bother to report
claimed she knew accused-appellant (tsn, Dec. 10, 1997,
the matter to the proper authorities. In this light, the
p. 4) making it doubly hard for the Court to believe that
justifying circumstance of self-defense may not survive in
accused-appellant and the victim did not know each
the face of accused-appellant’s flight from the crime
other.
scene, and his failure to inform the authorities of the
incident (People vs. Gerolaga, 263 SCRA 143 [1997]). Too, Another point to consider is the testimony of Analyn which
no knife was found in the crime scene, thus negating his narrated the incident in this wise:
tale of a second aggression.
Q. Now when you heard the gunshot you were playing?
All told, the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any A. We were already through playing. We were already
separate competent evidence but is also extremely talking with each other in the sala.
doubtful in itself (Jacobo vs. CA, 270 SCRA 270 [1997]). Q. You talked with each other together with the children
Accused-appellant having failed to discharge the burden of Dullana?
 44

A. Yes sir. Verily, treachery does not exist in this case because the
evidence does not show that accused-appellant
(Ibid., p. 12.)
deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to insure
xxx xxx xxx the killing of Allan with impunity, and without giving the
victim an opportunity to defend himself. The prosecution
Q. Meaning when Salvador Caguing and companion failed to distinctively establish the manner in which the
arrived, they seated around the table together with your assault against the deceased was committed to justify the
brother? appreciation of treachery. No particulars are shown as to
A. Yes, sir. the manner by which the aggression was commenced or
how the act which resulted in the death of the victim
Q. Also your father? began and developed. Treachery can in no way be
A. My father was in the improvised bed "papag" taking a established from mere supposition, drawn solely from
rest. circumstances prior to the killing (People vs. Cario, supra).
The crime committed, therefore, is not murder but the
Q. So while your brother was seated there in the table, lesser crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Caguing, Bebot and Duliana, your father was resting in the Penal Code.
papag?
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code punishes homicide
A. Yes, sir. with reclusion temporal. There being no mitigating or
Q. Because it was almost one hour after the arrival of these aggravating circumstances attending the crime, the
Salvador Caguing and companion when you heard the penalty should be imposed in its medium period (Art. 64
gunshot? [1], Revised Penal Code). Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty shall be an indeterminate
A. That was already nine o’clock when I heard the sentence, the minimum whereof shall be within the range
gunshot. And Salvador Caguing shot my brother. of prision mayor, and the maximum shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
(Ibid., p. 22.)
Anent the award of damages, the Court cannot sustain
xxx xxx xxx
the award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of
Q. At eight o’clock you were playing. You were the heirs of Allan Dominguez, as no aggravating
conversing? circumstance was proved in this case (People vs.
Bernaldez, 294 SCRA 317 [1998]). The award of actual
A. Yes sir.
damages of P9,250.00 as reimbursement for the expenses
Q. And you did not mind the accused and Bebot because incurred for the wake, burial, and funeral expenses as
you were conversing? supported by receipts, and the affirmance of the award
of P50,000 as indemnity for the loss of Allan’s life are in
A. Yes sir. They were conversing with other people inside order. Lastly, the award of moral damages in the
the house. increased amount of P50,000.00 to compensate the heirs
(Ibid., p. 21.) for injuries to their feelings is more in accord with recent
jurisprudence.
So far as one can see, it cannot be said that Analyn
witnessed how his brother Allan was killed by accused- WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Regional Trial
appellant. Admittedly, she was unmindful of what was Court is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Salvador
going on in the kitchen because she herself was Caguing is hereby found guilty of Homicide and
conversing with her friends in the sala. What caught her sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of Twelve
attention was the gunshot that she heard coming from the (12) Years of prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
kitchen and she inferred that accused-appellant shot his Years and Four (4) Months of reclusion temporal, as
brother Allan. maximum. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim death indemnity of P50,000.00; moral
Further, the testimony of Guillermo and Analyn are damages of P50,000.00; and actual damages of P9,250.00.
contradictory in relation to the physical position of
Guillermo at the time of the killing. Guillermo testified that SO ORDERED.
he was likewise seated around the table. On the other Vitug, Panganaiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
hand, Analyn said Guillermo was taking a rest in the
"papag".
The general rule is that inconsistencies and contradictions
in minor and trivial matter do not impair a witness’
credibility. However, the contradictory statements and
omission of important details by the prosecution witnesses
erode the credence of their testimony (People vs. Ortiz,
266 SCRA 641 [1997]). The physical position of Guillermo
when the victim was killed by accused-appellant is one
vital circumstance that would establish whether or not he
had really seen how the accused-appellant shot the
victim which will consequently prove the attendance of
treachery in the killing of the victim. The prosecution failed
in this endeavor.
It must be stressed that treachery cannot be presumed, it
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as
conclusively as the killing itself (People vs. Peña, 291 SCRA
606 [1998]). In treachery, the mode of attack must have
been sought of by the offender (People vs.
Demonteverde, 290 SCRA 175 [1998]), and the manner of
attack must be proven; it cannot be presumed or
concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime
(People vs. Asis, 286 SCRA 64 [1998]).
 45

G.R. No. 161007 December 6, 2006 Sanchez's account of the facts shows that he and Jamero
were tenants of adjacent lots located in San Jose,
CELERINO SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur.8 At about 7:00 o'clock in
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
the morning of September 4, 1993, Sanchez saw Jamero
DECISION destroying the dike which served as the boundary
between the two lots. Sanchez confronted Jamero and
TINGA, J.: told the latter that he was encroaching on his land.
Celerino Sanchez (Sanchez) assails the Decision1 of the Jamero struck him with a shovel. The shovel got stuck in the
Court of Appeals dated May 7, 2003 which affirmed his mud so Jamero resorted to throwing mud at Sanchez.
conviction of the crime of Homicide but modified the Fighting back, Sanchez hacked Jamero with a bolo,
penalty imposed by the trial court, and its resulting in the latter's death.9 Sanchez then proceeded to
Resolution2 dated October 21, 2003 which denied the municipal building to surrender upon the advice of his
reconsideration for lack of merit. son-in-law.10

The case stems from an Information3 dated March 24, Based on these facts, Sanchez insists in his Petition11 dated
1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-10-430, indicting November 17, 2003, that he acted in self-defense.
Sanchez for the death of Felix Jamero (Jamero). The According to him, Jamero was the unlawful aggressor
Information reads: having struck him with a shovel. Had he not fought back
by hacking Jamero with a bolo, he would have been the
That on September 4, 1993, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, one killed.
more or less, in Barangay San Jose, Municipality of
Mahayag, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of In its Comment12 dated September 16, 2004, the Office of
the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the plea of self-
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and defense, whether complete or incomplete, should fail
armed with a long sharp bolo, did then and there willfully, because there was no longer any unlawful aggression on
unlawfully and feloniously, assault[,] attack, hack and stab the part of Jamero when Sanchez hacked him.
one FELIX JAMERO, inflicting upon the victim multiple stab According to the OSG, Jamero's attack on Sanchez was
wounds in the different parts of his body which cause his unsuccessful because the latter was able to evade it and
instant death. Jamero's shovel got stuck in the mud. Jamero fled toward
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 the ricefield when Sanchez unsheathed his bolo. Sanchez
pursued him and struck his head with a bolo. Jamero fell
Sanchez pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Trial down but was able to stand up again. He ran away but
proceeded after which the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, after a short distance, fell down again. Sanchez
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur rendered a Decision,5 the approached him and stabbed him several times. Not
dispositive portion of which states: satisfied, Sanchez pushed Jamero's face down into the
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidences admitted at the knee-deep mud. After Jamero's aggression ceased when
trial, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable he fled and left his shovel stuck in the mud, there was no
doubt of the crime of homicide, and hereby imposes the longer any justification for Sanchez to go after him and
indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of hack him to death.
prision mayor as minimum, to fifteen years, of reclusion Sanchez filed a Reply to Respondent's People of the
temporal as maximum, of imprisonment, and to pay the Philippines Comment13 dated November 11, 2004,
heirs of the deceased victim the sum of P165,000.00, reiterating that he acted in self-defense.
itemized as follows:
We sustain the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Moral damages ------------------ P 50,000.00 Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers
exculpation from liability for crimes only if satisfactorily
Exemplary damages -------------- 50,000.00 shown. Self-defense requires: (a) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed by the accused to repel it; and (c) lack
Funeral Expenses ---------------- 65,000.00 of sufficient provocation on his part.14
Having admitted that he killed Jamero, the burden of
Total ------------------------------ P165,000.00
evidence that one acted in self-defense shifted to
Sanchez. It is textbook doctrine that when self-defense is
SO ORDERED.6 invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to
On appeal, Sanchez averred that the trial court erred in show that the killing was justified and that he incurred no
not ruling that he acted in self-defense and in failing to criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his
appreciate the mitigating circumstances of voluntary own evidence and not on the weakness of the
surrender and passion and obfuscation. Finding that prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it
unlawful aggression as an element of self-defense was not could not be disbelieved after his open admission of
present, the Court of Appeals affirmed Sanchez's responsibility for the killing. Hence, he must prove the
conviction. However, it decreased the penalty imposed in essential requisites of self-defense aforementioned.15
view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. In this case, Sanchez failed to prove the element of
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of unlawful aggression. The positive and categorical eye-
Appeals provides: witness account of Saturnino Umambac (Umambac) that
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby Jamero ran away from Sanchez but that the latter pursued
rendered partly granting the instant appeal. The decision Jamero, caught up with him and hacked him to death
of the trial court is MODIFIED in so far as the penalty is negates Sanchez's plea of self-defense. Umambac
concerned which should be SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) day testified:
of Prision Mayor as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS and Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
ONE (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. All other
aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED. No costs. Q: While the three (3) of you were working at that time on that
date and time, could you recall if there was an unusual incident
SO ORDERED.7 that happened?
A: There was.
 46

Q: Please tell the Court. Atty. Pedro S. Jamero

A: There was a person who arrived. Q: Now, while Felix Jamero was running on the rice field, what did
Celerino Sanche[z] do if anything?
Court
A: He chased him, Sir.
Q: How many person who [sic] arrived?
Q: What happened when Celerino Sanche[z] chased Felix
A: Only one (1). Jamero?
Q: Do you know the name of the person who arrived? A: He was able to catch up with Felix Jamero.
A: Yes[,] Sir. Q: And what happened when Celerino Sanche[z] was able to
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero catch up with Felix Jamero?

Q: Who [sic] is the name of that person? A: He hacked him.

A: Celerino Sanche[z]. Q: Who hacked who?

Court A: It was Celerino Sanche[z] who hacked Felix Jamero.

Q: Was he bringing anything at that time? Court:

A: Yes[,] Sir, a bolo was tucked at his waist. Q: Was Felix Jamero facing Celerino Sanche[z] at the time he was
hacked by Celerino Sanche[z]?
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
A: Yes, Sir, they were facing each other. ([W]itness demonstrated)
Q: What happened when Celerino Sanche[z] arrived at the place
where the three (3) of you were working? Q: And Felix Jamero was still bringing the shovel [when] he was
about to strike Celerino Sanche[z]?
A: Celerino Sanches said: "Lex, do not cut grasses on my land, look
at our boundary." A: Not any more, Sir.

Q: And then? Q: What was then being brought by Felix Jamero?

A: Felix Jamero continued shovelling dirt and grumbling at the A: Mud.

same time as if angry. Court:
Q: And what transpired next? Proceed.
A: He then acted as if to strike. ([W]itness demonstrated raising his Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
hand holding a shovel.) [A]t the same time Celerino S. Sanche[z]
pulled out his bolo. Q: Now, you said, at the time Celerino Sanche[z] hacked Felix
Jamero, was Felix Jamero hit?
Court
A: Yes[,] Sir.
Q: Who raised up the shovel?
Court
A: It was Felix Jamero.
Q: What part of the body was he hit?
Q: And how far was the accused to Felix Jamero at that time?
A: At the head. ([W]itness pointing at the head.)
A: Two (2) to three (3) meters.
Q: And what happened to Felix Jamero?
Q: Felix Jamero was on the act of striking the accused with the
shovel? A: He was able to stand up and ran away but a distance away he
fell down.
A: Yes[,] Sir.
Q: And what did Celerino Sanche[z] do?
Court:
A: He approached him and hacked him and stabbed him.
Proceed
Q: How many times did he hack Felix Jamero?
Q: Now, you said that at that instance Celerino Sanche[z] pulled
his bolo, what did he do after he pulled it? A: I was not able to count, Sir, but many times.
A: He hacked Felix Jamero. Q: How many times did Celerino Sanche[z] stab Felix Jamero?
Q: Was Felix Jamero hit? A: I was not able to count also, Sir.
A: No[,] Sir. Court:
Q: Now, since Felix Jamero was not hit, what happened next? Proceed
A: He ran away. Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
Q: Who ran away? Q: On those occasions when you said Celerino Sanche[z] hacked
and stabbed Felix Jamero, the number of which you could no
A: Felix Jamero. longer count, what was the exact position of Felix Jamero relative
Q: To what direction did Felix Jamero run away? to Celerino Sanche[z]?

A: In [sic] his rice land. A: He fell down on the mud.

Court Court

Q: Towards the direction of Celerino Sanche[z]? Q: The rice field was then very muddy at that time?

A: No[,] Sir, going away. A: Yes[,] Sir.

Q: Was he following the cement of the rice field or did he run Q: What did you do then at that time?
across the rice field? A: We were afraid to go near. So, we only watched them. We
A: He was running right inside the rice field. were only hired help, Sir.

Q: And the rice field then at that time[,] was [it] full of water or was Court:
it dry? Proceed
A: With water, Sir. Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
Court: Q: What transpired after that?
Proceed
 47

A: He then rode on top of Felix Jamero and pushed him to the Q: When the shovel of Felix Jamero got stuck to [sic] the mud and
mud, Sir. he was not able to pull it, that moment did it not occur to your
mind to go away from him to avoid further trouble?
Court
A: After he threw the mud at me[,] Sir, he pulled the shovel but the
Q: And then after that? shovel was buried at the mud [and] he was not able to entirely
A: Greg, the son-in-law of Celerino Sanche[z] arrived. pull it, so I hacked him.17

Q: And then? There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete,

unless the accused proves the first essential requisite—
A: His bolo was taken away.
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful
Q: Who took the bolo of whom? aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected or imminent danger on the life and limb of a
A: Greg, [sic] took the bolo of Celerino Sanche[z].
person – a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
Q: And what did he do with the bolo of Celerino Sanche[z]? sufficient. There must be actual physical force or a threat
A: I did not notice what he did with the bolo, only that it was he to inflict physical injury. In case of a threat, it must be
who get the bolo. offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not
imagined, intent to cause injury. Aggression, if not
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero
continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-
Q: After Greg took the bolo of Celerino Sanche[z], do you know defense.18
where did Celerino Sanche[z] go?
In this case, the twin circumstances of Jamero's shovel
A: He ran away but I do not know where he ran away. getting stuck in the mud and his running away from
Court Sanchez convincingly indicate that there was no longer
any danger to the latter's life and limb which could have
Q: Who ran away? justified his pursuit of Jamero and subsequent hacking and
A: It was Celerino Sanche[z]. killing of the latter.
Atty. Pedro S. Jamero Sanchez's failure to prove unlawful aggression by Jamero
and the prosecution's evidence conclusively showing that
Q: What about Felix Jamero, what happened to him?
it was Sanchez who was the unlawful aggressor
A: He was left on the mud where he was hacked and we and his completely discounts Sanchez's claim of self-defense.
wife carried him.16 [Emphasis supplied] Even incomplete self-defense by its very nature and
While Jamero was inceptually the unlawful aggressor by his act of essence would always require the attendance of unlawful
raising his shovel to strike Sanchez, the unlawful aggression aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be
ceased to exist when Jamero turned and ran towards the rice shown.19
field. Sanchez himself admits that he was not hit by Jamero's
shovel because he was able to step back and the shovel got WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of
stuck in the mud. He testified: the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 2003 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Atty. Pedro Jamero
Q: It is not a fact[,] Mr. Witness, that when you were first allegedly
SO ORDERED.
hit by Felix Jamero with his shovel you were not hit, is that correct? Quisumbing, J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio Morales, and
A: Yes[,] Sir, because I was able to step back. Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Q: And the shovel that was used by Felix Jamero in hacking you
stuck to [sic] the mud and he was not able to recover it, is that
correct? Footnotes

A: No[,] Sir, he was not able to pull the shovel back because it was 1Rollo, pp. 18-23; Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and
stuck hard in the mud. concurred in by Associate Justices B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz and Hakim S.
Abdulwahid.
Q: And that was the time that Felix Jamero threw mud on your 2 Id. at 25.
face, is that correct?
3 Records, p. 1.
A: Yes[,] Sir.
4 Rollo, p. 19.
Q: And after Felix Jamero threw mud at your face that was the
time that you hacked him several times which you said you could 5 Id. at 317-319.
not remember anymore because you lost consciousness or you 6 Id. at 319.
went black out?
7 Rollo, p. 22.
A: Yes[,] Sir.
8 TSN, June 21, 2000, p. 2.
Court 9 TSN, April 12, 2000, pp. 2-3.
Q: How did the spade get at [sic] the mud? 10 Id. at 4.
A: The shovel got stuck at the mud. (Witness demonstrating that 11 Rollo, pp. 7-16.
the face of the shovel was the one that got stuck in the mud,
sideways).
12 Id. at 64-74.

Q: That point of the shovel was directed at you but you were able
13 Id. at 80-82.
to evade [it]? 14 People v. Varona, 331 Phil. 3348, 354 (1996).

A: Yes[,] Sir. 15 People v. Deopante, 331 Phil. 998, 1012 (1996).

Q: And because of the force, the spade got buried at [sic] the 16 TSN, July 10, 1998, pp. 5-12.
mud? 17 TSN, June 21, 2000, pp. 3-4.
A: Yes[,] Sir, because of the force the shovel got stuck to [sic] the 18 Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144699, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 221.
mud and he was not able to pull it anymore, so he threw mud at
me.
19 People v. Deopante, 331 Phil. 998 (1996).

Court:
Proceed.
Atty. Pedro Jamero
 48

G.R. No. 137296 June 26, 2003 victim, while Hilda called Kagawad Elias Fernandez.
Appellant reported to the latter the unpleasant incident.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
While they were talking outside the house,9 the victim
vs.
passed by.10 He approached Kagawad Fernandez and
DIONISIO VICENTE y QUINTO, Accused-Appellant.
invited him to go to the dance hall.11 Then he tapped
DECISION appellant’s right shoulder,12 causing him to be pushed a
"little bit" backward. Without any warning, the victim pulled
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: out a knife and tried to stab appellant, shouting, "I will see
Retaliation is different from self-defense. In retaliation, the to it that I will kill you tonight."13 Appellant held the victim’s
aggression that was begun by the injured party already wrist and they grappled for the possession of the
ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In self- knife.14 While the knife was pointed at the victim, appellant
defense, the aggression was still existing when the accidentally stabbed him.15
aggressor was injured by the accused.1 Appellant surrendered to Kagawad Fernandez who, in
The present case is a clear illustration of retaliation and self- turn, brought him to the police station.
defense. Dr. Ophelia Rivera testified that two days after the
On appeal is the Decision2 dated December 15, 1998 of incident, appellant was brought to her clinic for medico
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City, in legal purposes. He had a hematoma on his upper left
Criminal Case No. 98-02266-D finding Dionisio Q. Vicente, arm.16 He was also complaining of pain in the head
appellant, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of although there was no external indication of injury.
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of The witnesses for the prosecution presented a different
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim, story.
Manuel C. Quinto, Jr., the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱88,000.00 as actual damages, ₱10,000.00 as Ronald Terte narrated that on May 30, 1998, at around 9:30
attorney’s fees, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and costs of o’clock in the evening, he was in the house of the victim
suit. at Gueguesangen, Mangaldan, there being a barrio
fiesta.17 They heard unusual cries from the neighborhood.
In the Information3 dated July 15, 1998, appellant was So they proceeded to appellant’s house and found that
charged with the crime of murder committed as follows: his brothers-in-law, Anoy and Sonny, were quarrelling.18 The
"That on or about May 30,1998 in the evening thereof, at victim tried to pacify Anoy.19 This infuriated appellant, thus,
barangay Gueguesangen, municipality of Mangaldan, he drew a "rambo knife" and aimed it at the victim.
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the Threatened, he and Ronald immediately went home.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named Thereafter, appellant followed the victim to his house and
accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, challenged him to a fight. The victim could only answer
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and back, "If you want we will rent a box ring and we will
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack and stab fight." 20
MANUEL C. QUINTO, JR., causing his death shortly
thereafter due to ‘CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST At around 9:45 o’ clock in the evening, the victim and
SECONDARY TO HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK DUE TO A STAB Ronald Terte returned to the house of appellant as the
WOUND’ as per Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Ophelia former intended to talk to him. On their way, they saw
Rivera, M.D., Rural Health Officer, Mangaldan, appellant conversing with Kagawad Fernandez. The
Pangasinan, to the damage and prejudice of the legal victim greeted21Kagawad Fernandez who inquired, "Are
heirs of said deceased Manuel C. Quinto, Jr. and other we going to the dance hall?"22 The victim answered in the
consequential damages relative thereto. affirmative. Then as a gesture of reconciliation, he
extended his hand to appellant. However, appellant
"CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as suddenly drew a knife and stabbed the victim in the
amended by RA 7659." chest.23 The victim uttered, "Pare, I was hit."24 Ronald
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.4 He immediately brought him to the hospital but he was
invoked self-defense, thus, a reverse trial ensued. pronounced dead on arrival.
Appellant, Hilda Vicente, Linda Vicente and Dr. Ophelia Jose Noe, Sr., a 64-year old resident of Gueguesangen,
Rivera testified for the defense. The prosecution presented Mangaldan, testified that on the same date and time, he
as its witnesses Jose Noe, Sr., Ronald Terte, and Juliana saw appellant and Kagawad Fernandez engaged in a
Quinto. serious conversation.25 He heard appellant saying, he
The version of the defense is as follows: would kill the victim.26 At that time, the victim and his
companion passed by. Upon seeing Kagawad Fernandez,
On May 30, 1998, at 8:30 o’ clock in the evening, while the victim greeted him, "Kagawad, you are
appellant was having supper in his house at here."27 Kagawad Fernandez then answered "yes." Then
Gueguesangen, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, his brothers-in- the victim advised appellant to "forget what had
law, Anoy and Sonny, quarreled. Anoy was abrasively happened."28 At this point, appellant abruptly drew his
scolding Sonny for smoking and gambling. This caused the knife and stabbed the victim in the chest.29
latter to howl at the top of his voice. The victim, then
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, responded to Juliana C. Quinto, the victim’s mother, testified that she
Sonny’s unusual cry. He entered appellant’s house and spent ₱20,500.00 for his funeral services,30 ₱14,000.00 for his
suddenly pushed Anoy, causing him to fall to the floor. tomb,31 ₱50,000.00 for his internment,32 and ₱2,000.00 for
Appellant pacified the victim saying, "don’t mind them his autopsy.33 When asked what she felt over the death of
because they are brothers and Anoy is only advising her son, she said that she always cried and suffered
Sonny."5 The victim felt insulted by such remark and said, "Is anxiety.34
that it? I am insulted. I regret coming here." 6 Thus, he went On December 15, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,
home and got a steel pipe. Upon his return, he hit the dispositive portion of which reads:
appellant at his upper left arm7 and shouted at him, "You
are shit, vulva of your mother, I will kill you today."8 But "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused DIONISIO
appellant was able to seize the steel pipe from the victim, VICENTE is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
prompting the latter to retreat and go home. of Murder as charged and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he has to
Present during the squabble were appellant’s wife Linda indemnify the private offended party the amount of
and sister Hilda. Linda advised appellant not to mind the ₱50,000.00 for the death of Manuel Quinto, Jr. He is likewise
 49

ordered to pay ₱20,500.00 for funeral services, ₱10,000.00 the part of the victim. Without it, there can be no self-
for the construction of the tomb, ₱4,000.00 for the washed defense, complete or incomplete.
out of the tomb, ₱50,000.00 for the amount spent for the
Under the circumstances here, we are convinced that
vigil, ₱2,000.00 for the autopsy of the cadaver of Manuel
appellant is the unlawful aggressor. As maybe gleaned
Quinto, Jr., ₱500.00 for the funeral mass, and ₱1,000.00 for
from the narrations of the witnesses, the incident has two
the cemetery lot, or a total of ₱88,000.00 as actual
stages. The first stage took place in appellant’s house
damages, ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱50,000.00 as
where the victim felt insulted when rebuked by the
moral damages, plus costs of suit. The period under which
appellant for interfering in a family squabble. This
the accused has been placed under detention is to be
prompted the victim to hit appellant’s upper left arm with
deducted against his sentence since reclusion perpetua,
a steel pipe. Afterwards, the victim left.
under RA 7659, has a range of 20 years and 1 day to 40
years. The second stage began when the victim met appellant
and Kagawad Fernandez along the road. At this time, the
"SO ORDERED."35
victim wanted to reconcile with the appellant. In fact, he
In finding the presence of treachery, the trial court offered appellant a handshake, telling him to forget what
ratiocinated: happened. Unfortunately, appellant, who had not yet
shaken off his ire against the victim, stabbed the latter.
"It is an oft-repeated rule that treachery to be considered
as a qualifying circumstance as charged in the While admittedly, the victim was the unlawful aggressor
information should be present at the inception of the during the first stage of the incident, however, he ceased
incident. This rule, however, admits of an exception. When to be in the second stage. The lapse of an appreciable
there is a second stage of the incident as in this case, time interval had cooled off his head as shown by the fact
treachery should be considered as a qualifying that he was trying to shake appellant’s hand and telling
aggravating circumstance if used as a means to insure the him, "forget what happened."
success of an attack against a fellow protagonist during
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and
the said second stage of the incident. Therefore, the
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof.39 For one
public prosecutor who charged the accused with murder
to be considered the unlawful aggressor, he must be
was correct in contrast to the recommendation of the
shown to have exhibited external acts clearly showing his
Investigating Judge of the lower court who conducted the
intent to cause and commit harm to the other.40 In the
preliminary investigation x x x."36
case at bar, the prosecution witnesses belied any act of
Unable to accept the verdict, appellant comes before us aggression on the part of the victim. The evidence shows
interposing the following assignments of error: he was unarmed and had no idea of the impending
attack against him.
"I
Certainly, the victim’s act of aggression during the first
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO
stage of the incident does not justify appellant’s conduct
THE ACCUSED’S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE;
during the second stage. Settled is the rule that when
II unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer
any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise,
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE PRESENCE OF THE retaliation, and not self-defense is committed.41
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THIS CASE;
AND Appellant implores us to give credence to the testimonies
of the defense witnesses. We are not swayed. It is a well-
III settled principle that when it comes to the matter of
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE FOR credibility, the appellate courts generally do not overturn
THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN the findings of the trial courts. The latter are in a best
NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF HOMICIDE ONLY position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and
AND NOT OF MURDER."37 spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation
of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, demeanor and
Appellant argues that his claim of self-defense is behavior in court.42We see no reason to deviate from this
buttressed by the fact that he immediately surrendered to principle.
the authorities after the incident and that the victim
sustained only one stab wound. Also, he stresses that if a With marked significance is the fact that there appears no
crime was indeed committed, it is only homicide because motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses Ronald
the attack was frontal and that a heated altercation Terte and Jose Noe, Sr. to falsely testify against appellant.
preceded the stabbing. Lastly, he contends that since he On his part, appellant proffered no explanation why these
sustained an injury in his upper left arm, as confirmed by witnesses implicated him. Worse, while the prosecution
Dr. Rivera, it follows that he is not the unlawful aggressor. presented disinterested witnesses, the defense called to
the witness stand only appellant’s wife and sister. Though
The Solicitor General counters that appellant’s claim of there is no presumption that a testimony of a relative is
self-defense is weak and unfounded because: first, as tainted, we cannot but cast an eye of suspicion on the
between appellant and the victim, it was the former who testimonies of appellant’s close relatives. It is the natural
had more reason to harbor ill-feelings; second, the victim’s tendency of a person to testify for and not against his
gesture of tapping appellant’s shoulder was a sign of relatives. In People vs. Ching,43 we ruled:
goodwill; third, the victim was stabbed in the chest
indicating an intent to kill on the part of appellant; fourth, "It is but natural, although morally unfair, for a close relative
appellant did not claim self-defense when he surrendered to give weight to blood ties and close relationship in times
to Kagawad Fernandez and the police; and fifth, he failed of dire needs especially when a criminal case is involved."
to present the knife to the authorities. The Solicitor General We quote the clear and straightforward account of the
likewise maintains that treachery was present because incident by prosecution witnesses Jose Noe, Sr. and Ronald
there was an element of surprise in the attack. Terte. Jose testified:
When the accused interposes self-defense, he must prove "ATTY. ESTEPA
that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack
of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed Q You just stated what you saw, but the accused claimed that it
was the deceased Manny Quinto who tried to stab Dionisio
reasonable means to prevent or repel the
Vicente, is that correct?
aggression.38 Although all these elements must concur,
self- defense is perched on proof of unlawful aggression on
 50

A No, because I have seen with my own eyes that he was the one A The rambo knife which I saw when we were in the house of
who made the thrust against Manny Quinto and in fact I saw his Dionisio Vicente, sir.
knife.
Q How many stabs were made by Dionisio Vicente against Manny
COURT Quinto?
Q The accused testified that it was the victim who first stabbed A Only one stab, sir.
the accused, what can you say about that?
Q When Manny Quinto was hit and he ran towards their house,
A It is not true, sir. were you still at the scene of the incident?
Q What is true, what took place? A I was just there, sir. In fact, I even saw Dionisio Vicente when he
returned the Rambo knife to the scabbard then speedily
A The one I saw that Dionisio Vicente drew his knife and
immediately made thrust against Manny Quinto and then he walked towards the east."45
returned to his back and went away. Notwithstanding the grueling cross-examination by the
Q Where is the knife? defense counsel, both witnesses were able to survive the
ordeal without deviating from their direct testimonies. Their
A I don’t know where is that knife but at the time of the incident I
testimonies meet the test of credibility because of their
saw him returned at his back after he stabbed Manny Quinto, sir.
being corroborated on material points. They were one in
Q The accused testified that he was stabbed initially by the victim saying that (a) the victim was not in a hostile mood when
with the victim’s knife, what can you say about that? he approached appellant; (b) it was appellant who
A No, sir, that’s not true because I was there and I saw it with my stabbed the victim; (c) the weapon used was a knife; and
own eyes and my distance from him was only one arm length (d) there was no struggle between the parties over the
away. possession of the knife. Their testimony that the victim was
stabbed once in his chest was further corroborated by Dr.
Q About the knife, was it the knife of the victim that was used by
the accused to stab the victim or what? Rivera who testified that his death was due to
"Cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock
A The knife was owned by the accused. due to a stab wound."46
Q The accused testified that when the victim stabbed him, the
But above all, what convinces us to affirm the trial court’s
accused wrestled the weapon from the victim and then stabbed
the victim and returned, is that what took place?
finding is the presence of badges of guilt that renders
appellant’s claim of self-defense dubious and unworthy of
A How could he get that knife from the victim since I saw it with belief. First, the victim suffered a fatal wound at the chest.
my own eyes that he was the one who drew the knife and It lacerated his vital organs. The location of the wound
stabbed Manny Quinto."44
belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It
Ronald Terte corroborated the foregoing testimony when he demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of
candidly narrated: the victim. Second, appellant failed to inform the
"ATTY. ESTEPA
authorities that he acted in self-defense. And third, he
failed to surrender the knife to the authorities. We have
xxxxxx ruled that failure to inform the authorities of the unlawful
Q You have just stated, Mr. witness, that you and the deceased aggression on the part of the victim and to surrender the
were instructors of martial arts especially on self-defense and you knife used in stabbing him militates against the claim of
said that Manuel Quinto will not need a knife to defend himself; self-defense.47 In People vs. Mier,48 we also held that the
my question is considering that you were an eyewitness, did he or non-presentation of the weapon which was allegedly
did he not make a thrust towards the direction of the accused? used by the victim in attacking the accused and the
A It was not Manny Quinto who made a thrust against Dionisio failure of the defense to account for its non-presentation
Vicente but it was Dionisio Vicente who made a thrust against are fatal to the accused’s plea of self-defense.
Manny Quinto, sir.
In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the
Q According to the accused, when Manny Quinto made that accused. His duty is to establish self-defense by clear and
attempt to thrust the knife, Dionisio Vicente twisted and grabbed convincing evidence, otherwise conviction would follow
and forced it right to the breast of Manny Quinto; as an from his admission that he killed the victim.49 Here,
eyewitness, what can you say to that?
appellant miserably failed to discharge such burden.
A That is not true, sir, because again it was not Manny Quinto who
drew the knife and stabbed Dionisio Vicente but it was Dionisio The trial court also held that the crime committed by
Vicente who drew his knife and unexpectedly made a thrust appellant is qualified by treachery.1âwphi1 There is
against Manny Quinto which caused his death. treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in
Q When the deceased Manny Quinto extended his hand towards
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
the accused, did Manny Quinto say anything to the accused?
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the
A Manny Quinto did not utter any word but as I understood since defense which the offended party might make.50
Kgd. Fernandez was there, he gave respect to Kgd. Fernandez
who was settling the dispute between him and Dionisio Vicente so Treachery is present in this case. The fact that the attack is
Manny Quinto extended his hand to Dionisio Vicente for a frontal does not negate the finding of treachery. Even a
handshake, sir. frontal attack can be treacherous if sudden and
xxxxxx unexpected and the victim is unarmed.51 Here, the victim
was suddenly stabbed when he was extending his hand to
Q After Manny Quinto was stabbed by Dionisio Vicente, what the appellant. With his mindset, the victim could not have
happened next?
any inkling that there was danger to his life when he
A When Manny Quinto was stabbed , he uttered the following approached appellant.
‘Pare, I was hit’ and he immediately ran home.
In People vs. Tobias52 we held that what is decisive is that
Q Will you tell the Honorable Court where in your body was Manny the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
Quinto specifically hit? victim to defend himself or retaliate. In this case, the
A Here, sir. (Witness pointing to his left chest) suddenness of the attack deprived the victim of the
opportunity to repel it or defend his person. There being
Q Did you see the weapon that was used by Dionisio Vicente in
treachery, appellant’s conviction of murder is in order.
stabbing Manuel Quinto?
A Yes, sir.
Significantly, the trial court should have appreciated in
favor of appellant the mitigating circumstance of
Q How does it look like? voluntary surrender under Article 13 of the Revised Penal
 51

Code. For voluntary surrender to be considered as a 16 TSN, September 3, 1998 at 7.

mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must 17 TSN, November 9, 1998 at 2-3.
concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 18 Id.
(2) he surrenders himself to a person in authority; and (3)
19 Id. at 4.
the surrender is voluntary. Here, appellant, after the
commission of the crime, immediately placed himself in 20 Id. at 6.
the disposition of Kagawad Fernandez who, in turn, 21 Id. at 7.
brought him to the police station. Under Section 388 of the
22 Id.
Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160),53 for
purposes of the Revised Penal Code, Kagawad Fernandez 23 Id. at 8.
is a person in authority. Clearly, the mitigating 24 Id. at 9.
circumstance of voluntary surrender is present here.
25 TSN, October 29, 1998 at 16 and 21.
Under Article 24854 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty 26 Id.
for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the
same Code provides that the lesser of the two indivisible 27 Id. at 23.
penalties shall be imposed, there being a mitigating 28 Id.

circumstance attending the commission of the crime and 29 Id.

there being no aggravating circumstance.
30 Id. at 5.
In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of the 31 Id.
victim are entitled to the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of
civil indemnity ex delicto.55 As regards the actual 32 Id.

damages, it appears that out of the ₱88,000.00 awarded 33 Id. at 6.

by the trial court, only ₱36,000.0056 was actually supported 34 Id. at 13.
by receipts. The rest was based solely on a list prepared by
the victim’s mother. To be entitled to actual damages, it is 35 Rollo at 33-34.
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a 36 Id. at 16.
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon 37 Id. at 55.
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to
the injured party.57 We therefore find it appropriate to 38 People vs. Rabanal, G.R. No. 119542, January 19, 2001, 349 SCRA 655.
reduce the award of actual damages to ₱36,000.00. The 39 People vs. Boniao, G.R. No. 100800, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 653.
moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00 is 40 People vs. Cueto, G.R. No. 147764, January 16, 2003.
affirmed, there being evidence that because of the
41 People vs. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 627.
victim’s death, his heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental
anguish, anxiety and similar injury.58 Considering that a 42 People vs. Ave, G.R. Nos. 137274-75, October 18, 2002; People vs. Alfanta,
qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery is 378 Phil. 95 (1999).
present here, exemplary damages in the sum of ₱25,000.00 43 310 Phil. 269 (1995).
are likewise awarded to the victim’s heirs.59 44 TSN, October 29, 1998 at 24-26.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision finding appellant 45 TSN, November 9, 1998 at 8-10.
Dionisio Q. Vicente guilty of the crime of murder and
46 Records at 11.
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is 47 People vs. Figuracion, 415 Phil. 12 (2001); Ingles vs. Court of Appeals, 336
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Manny C. Quinto, Jr. Phil. 118 (1997).

the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱36,0000.00 48 G.R. No. 130598, February 3, 2000, 324 SCRA 628.
as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, 49 Peoplevs. Clemente, G.R. No. L-23463, September 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 261;
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages and ₱10,000.00 as People vs. Corecor, G.R. No. L-63155, March 21, 1988, 159 SCRA 84.
attorney’s fees. 50 People vs. Almendras, G.R. No. 137277, December 20, 2001, 372 SCRA
737.
Costs de oficio.
51 People vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 121682, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 497.
SO ORDERED.
52 334 Phil. 881 (1997).
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio- 53 SEC.388. Persons in Authority. – For purposes of the Revised Penal Code,
Morales, JJ., concur. the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of
the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons
in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members
Footnotes who maybe designated by law or ordinance and charged with the
maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property,
1 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Fourteenth Edition, 1998, Book I at 151. or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any
2 Rollo barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
at 16-34, penned by Judge Luis M. Fontanilla.
deemed agents of persons in authority.
3 Id. at 5. 54 Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
4 Records at 50.
"ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
5 TSN, September 24, 1998 at 9. Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death x x x."
6 Id.
55 People vs. Ilo, G.R. No. 140731, November 21, 2002.
7 Id. at 11-12.
56 Records at 98-101 and 109.
8 Id. at 10.
57 People vs. Acosta, G.R. No. 140386, November 29, 2001, 371 SCRA 181;
9 Id. at 15-16. People vs. Suelto, 381 Phil. 851 (2000); People vs. Samolde, G.R. No. 128551,
10 Id. July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 632.
at 25-26.
58 People vs. Manlansing, G.R. No. 131736, March 11, 2002.
11 Id. at 27.
59 People vs. Catubig, 363 SCRA 636 (2001).
12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 28.
15 Id. at 29.
 52

G.R. No. 160341 October 19, 2004 3. At this time, Miguel Lumasac was no longer inside the
hut but fetching water;
EXEQUIEL SENOJA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent. 4. To prevent Leon Lumasac from entering the hut,
Exequiel Senoja (appellant) and Jose Calica stood by the
DECISION
door while simultaneously trying to pacify Leon Lumasac;
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
5. Exequiel Senoja with a knife then went outside and tried
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the to pacify Leon Lumasac but the latter angered by the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People v. gestures of the former tried to hack Exequiel Senoja;
Exequiel Senoja, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 26564,
6. To avoid any injury, Exequiel Senoja embraced Leon
affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional
which gave an opportunity to disarm the duo. Jose Calica
Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal
got the bolo of Leon and threw it away while Fidel Senoja
Case No. 2259, for homicide.
took the "colonial" knife of Exequiel;
The Case For the People
7. Jose Calica and Fidel Senoja were able to pacify Leon
As culled by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Lumasac so they invited him to get inside the hut. Inside
comment on the petition, the case stemmed from the the hut, Leon Lumasac tried to box Fidel Senoja for siding
following: with his brother, Miguel, but was prevented by Exequiel
Senoja who held Leon’s hands;
1. On April 16, 1997, petitioner Exequiel Senoja, Fidel
Senoja, Jose Calica, and Miguel Lumasac were drinking 8. After a while, Leon Lumasac left but returned and angrily
gin in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San demanded for his bolo. Jose Calica gave his own bolo
Luis, Aurora. An angry Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived at with a sabbard to replace the bolo of Leon which he threw
the said place, holding a bolo in his right hand and looking away;
for his brother Miguel. Petitioner and Jose tried to pacify
9. With Jose Calica’s bolo in him, Leon Lumasac left but
Leon. But when petitioner approached Leon, the latter
only after leaving a threat that something will happen to
tried to hack him so he embraced Leon and Jose took
Exequiel Senoja for siding with his brother;
Leon’s bolo. Then, Leon and petitioner talked things out
and later reconciled (pp. 2-4, TSN, November 16, 1998; pp. 10. After walking for about 10 meters away from the hut,
2-4, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 2, TSN, April 21, 1998; p. 5, TSN, Leon Lumasac turned around and saw Exequiel Senoja on
March 14, 2001; p. 2, CA Decision). his way home following him;
2. Subsequently, Leon walked out of Crisanto’s hut 11. Leon Lumasac walked back to meet Exequiel Senoja
followed by petitioner. Suddenly, about ten meters from and upon reaching him, the former suddenly and
the hut, petitioner stabbed Leon at the back. When Leon treacherously hacked the latter at the left side of his head
turned around, petitioner continued stabbing him until he and right thigh;
fell to the ground. Then, petitioner ran towards the
12. Unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon
barangay road and threw away the "kolonial" knife he
Lumasac who persisted in his criminal design, Exequiel
used in stabbing Leon. The latter died on the spot (pp. 2-6,
Senoja drew his "colonial" knife and stabbed Leon
TSN, November 22, 2000; p. 5, TSN, August 30, 2002; p. 3, CA
Lumasac in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiple
Decision).
wounds which caused his death.5
3. Dr. Pura Deveza Valenzuela-Uy, San Luis Municipal
On June 7, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment against
Health Officer, examined the cadaver of Leon and found
the petitioner, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
multiple lesions on his body and five fatal wounds on his
of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
chest. Dr. Uy issued a medico-legal report and death
certificate (Exhibits A and B, pp. 13-14, Records; pp. 3-5, WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
TSN, November 20, 1997).3 accused Exequiel Senoja GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide for the death of victim
On August 13, 1997, an Information was filed charging
Leon Lumasac and hereby sentences him, applying Article
petitioner Exequiel Senoja with homicide, the accusatory
64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1
portion of which reads:
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, (a) to suffer the
That on April 16, 1997 at around 11 o’clock in the morning penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum
in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, Philippines, and within to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, temporal as maximum; (b) to pay the heirs of the victim
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, the amount of Fifteen (sic) Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00)
with intent to kill, attack, assault, and use personal violence by way of civil indemnity; and (c) to pay the costs.
upon the person of one Leon Lumasac by then and there
SO ORDERED.6
stabbing him with a bladed weapon locally known as
"kolonyal" at the different parts of his body thereby In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the
inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds which were CA which rendered judgment affirming, with modification,
the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. the decision of the RTC. The petitioner now seeks relief from
this Court, contending that:
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital
The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the
facts which, if considered, would probably alter the result
affirmative defense of self-defense. His version of the fatal
of this case on appeal finding appellant’s plea of self-
incident is set forth in his petition at bar:
defense credible.7
1. On April 16, 1997 at about 11 o’clock in the morning,
The petitioner faults the CA for its analysis of his testimony,
Crisanto Reguyal, Fidel Senoja, Jose Calica, Miguel
as follows:
Lumasac, and Exequiel Senoja were in the hut of Crisanto
Reguyal in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, drinking gin; The injuries suffered by the petitioner at the left side of his
head and right thigh was confirmed by Dr. Rodolfo Eligio
2. Leon Lumasac suddenly arrived holding a bolo and
in open court. The relative positions of the wounds clearly
hacked the doorpost of Crisanto’s hut, angrily demanding
show that the drunken Leon Lumasac brandished and
for his brother, Miguel Lumasac, whom he suspected of
executed several hacking blows against Exequiel Senoja
drying up the ricefield he was plowing;
before he was stabbed, neutralized and finished by the
 53

latter. It would be physically and highly improbable for the 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
victim if he was treacherously hit at the left buttock and as provided that the following circumstances concur;
he turned around to face the petitioner, the latter stabbed
First. Unlawful aggression;
him successively and without let-up hitting him 9 times
resulting in 9 fatal wounds. This did not give a chance to Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
the victim to retaliate and inflict those wounds upon the prevent or repel it;
aggressor. The victim used Mr. Jose Calica’s bolo which
was secured by its scabbard. Unless earlier drawn, it would Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
be impossible for the victim to use it in defending himself person defending himself.
from the surprise attack and stabbing at a lightning fashion The affirmative defense of self-defense may be complete
inflicting nine (9) fatal wounds. Time element was the or incomplete. It is complete when all the three essential
essence of this encounter which, as narrated by the requisites are present; it is incomplete if only unlawful
Honorable Court, after the assailant poked the victim at aggression on the part of the victim and any of the two
the left side of the buttock with the use of the "colonial" essential requisites were present. In fine, unlawful
knife he stabbed him successively until he fell down dead. aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua
Under these circumstances, how could Exequiel Senoja non to self-defense, complete or incomplete. Whether or
suffered (sic) those hacking (sic) wounds inflicted by the not the accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact.
victim using Calica’s bolo? In all indications, it was Leon Like alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is
Lumasac who attacked his adversary first but lost in the inherently weak because, as experience has
duel considering that he was older than Exequiel Senoja demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
and drunk. Clearly, therefore, it was Leon Lumasac who disprove.10
was the aggressor both in the first and second phases of
the incident and Exequiel Senoja was compelled to The right of self-defense proceeds from necessity and
defend himself. limited by it. The right begins where necessity does, and
ends where it ends.11 There is, however, a perceptible
A closer scrutiny of the attending circumstances which difference between necessity and self-defense, which is
resulted in this stabbing incident shows that Exequiel that, self-defense excuses the repulse of a wrong;
Senoja has no compelling reasons to kill his godfather. On necessity justifies the invasion of a right. Hence, it is
that same occasion, Mr. Exequiel Senoja was with the essential to self-defense that it should be a defense against
brother of the victim, Miguel Lumasac, which only shows a present unlawful attack.12
that there was no pre-existing grudge between these
families. And still, what titillates our imagination is the fact Life can be taken under the plea of necessity, when
that Miguel Lumasac, who was then with the group necessary for the preservation of the life on the party
drinking gin at the hut of Crisanto Reguyal did not clearly setting up the plea. Self-defense is an act to save life;
impute this crime to petitioner. On the contrary, when he hence, it is right and not a crime.13 There is a need for one,
was presented to the witness stand, he was very evasive in indeed, for it is a natural right for one to defend oneself
answering the questions profounded by the prosecutors if when confronted by an unlawful aggression by another. It
he wanted the petitioner to be imprisoned. Miguel is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person
Lumasac could have told the real truth that Senoja attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life
murdered his brother.8 and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent
and actual, not merely imaginary. Absent such an actual
The CA declared that, based on the evidence on record: or imminent peril to one’s life or limb, there is nothing to
As seen from appellant’s testimony, Leon Lumasac’s repel; there is no necessity to take the life or inflict injuries
actions can be divided into two (2) phases: the first phase, on another.14
when Leon entered Crisanto Reguyal’s hut, up to the time But then what is the standard to use to determine whether
he and the appellant reconciled. The second phase was the person defending himself is confronted by a real and
when Leon left to go home. In phase one where Leon imminent peril to his life or limb? We rule that the test should
entered Reguyal’s hut, Leon was the aggressor but his be: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due
aggression was mostly directed to his brother Miguel who exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger? After all,
was not inside the hut anymore, although it was also partly the rule of law founded on justice and reason: Actus no
directed at the appellant and even at Fidel Soneja (sic). facit remin, nisi mens sit rea. Hence, the guilt of the
But Leon’s aggression against the appellant and Fidel accused must depend upon the circumstances as they
Senoja ceased since, as appellant testified, when Leon reasonably appear to him.15
tried to box Fidel Senoja and he (appellant) told Leon
"Huwag po, Huwag po," Leon was pacified. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not
In the second phase, when Leon left the hut to go home, merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.16 Hence,
his aggression had already ceased. when an inceptual/unlawful aggression ceases to exist,
It is uncontroverted that the appellant followed the victim the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the
when the latter went out of the hut to go home. former aggressor.17 After the danger has passed, one is not
Appellant’s testimony is that when he was two meters justified in following up his adversary to take his life. The
outside the hut, Leon turned around to face him saying "if conflict for blood should be avoided if possible.18 An
you’re not only my godson" in a threatening way, then assault on his person, he cannot punish when the danger
approached and hacked him (with Calica’s bolo) or peril is over. When the danger is over, the right of self-
inflicting wounds on the left side of his head and his right defense ceases. His right is defense, not retribution.19
thigh, thus, he (appellant) attacked the victim with the When the accused offers the affirmative defense of self-
kolonial knife he was holding. That appellant suffered such defense, he thereby admits killing the victim or inflicting
injuries was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Rodolfo injuries on him. The burden of evidence is shifted on the
Eligio.9 accused to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
The petition is denied. that he killed the victim or inflicted injuries on him to defend
himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own
Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
provides: prosecution because if the evidence of the prosecution
were weak, the accused can no longer be acquitted.20
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not
incur any criminal liability: We agree with the CA that, as gleaned, even from the
testimony of the petitioner, there were two separate but
 54

interrelated incidents that culminated in the petitioner’s (+) stab wound ½ inch to the right of the anterior median
stabbing and killing of the victim Leon Lumasac. The first line at the level of the xyphoid process 3½ inches deep
was the arrival of the victim, who was armed with a bolo, running superiorly.
in the hut of Crisanto Reguyal, looking for his brother Miguel
(+) stab wound at the level of the L nipple L anterior axillary
Lumasac, whom he was angry at. The victim hacked the
line 4½ inches in depth running superiorly to the left armpit.
wall of the house in anger. The petitioner, who was armed
with a knife, tried to pacify the victim. The victim (+) hack wound at the left armpit 3 inches long injuring the
attempted to hack the petitioner; nevertheless, the latter muscles and the blood vessels.
embraced and managed to pacify the victim. Forthwith,
Jose Calica took the bolo of the victim and threw it away. (+) lacerated wound on the left palm almost cutting off
For his part, Fidel Senoja took the petitioner’s knife. As it the proximal phalanx of the left thumb.23
was, the victim was already pacified. He and the Five of the wounds of the victim on his chest were
petitioner were already reconciled.21 Fidel even gave fatal.24 The victim also sustained a stab wound on the left
back the knife to the petitioner. buttock. According to the doctor, it was unlikely for the
The second incident took place when the victim victim to have survived even with medical
demanded that Calica return his bolo as he wanted to go attention.25 After the doctor made her initial autopsy and
home already. Because he had thrown away the victim’s submitted her report, she noted that the victim sustained
bolo, Calica was, thus, impelled to give his own. The victim a stab wound of about two inches deep at the left
then warned the petitioner three times, "May mangyayari buttock, thus:
sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas," and left the hut. When Q In this medico-legal report, you indicated that the cause
the victim had already gone about ten meters from the of death of the victim is "Hypovolemic shock 2º to multiple
hut, the petitioner followed the victim. The victim turned stab wounds, chest." Will you please explain this?
around and told the petitioner, "Kung hindi lang kita
inaanak." The victim then hacked the petitioner, hitting the A "Ito pong nakalagay o dahilan ng pagkamatay ng
latter on the left side of his head and thigh. Believing that biktima sa sobrang natapon na dugo gawa ng maraming
the victim would attack him anew, the petitioner stabbed saksak na tinamo ng biktima sa kanyang dibdib ang
the victim frontally several times.22 He also stabbed the nagbigay ng daan sa kanyang kamatayan."
victim on the left buttock. The petitioner could not recall Q Will you please tell us, Dr. Uy, if there is one amont (sic)
how many times he stabbed the victim and what parts of these lesions that is located at the back of the victim?
the latter’s body had been hit.
A I forgot to tell you that a day after I submitted the report,
The first episode inside the hut had been completed with the funeral parlor which attended the victim has called my
the protagonist, the victim, and the petitioner reconciled. attention because of the wound at the back of the victim
The second episode commenced inside the hut and and I attended immediately to see these lesions at the
continued outside, and ended with the petitioner stabbing home of the victim. I reviewed for (sic) these lesions and I
the victim several times. saw one lesion located at the left buttock of the victim.
The trial and the appellate courts gave no credence and Q What is the nature of the injury?
probative weight to the testimony of the petitioner. So do
we. A Stab wound, about two inches deep.

First. The findings of fact of the trial court and its conclusions Q By the nature of the lesion, is it not fatal?
based on the said findings are accorded by this Court high A It is not that fatal.
respect, if not conclusive effect, especially when affirmed
by the CA. This is because of the unique advantage of the Q In your expert opinion, by the nature of the wound
trial court of having been able to observe, at close range, sustained by the victim, what could have been the relative
the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses as they position of the victim in relation to his assailant?
testify. This rule, however, is inapplicable if the trial court
A Based on my examination, I think the victim and the
ignored, overlooked, or misinterpreted cogent facts and
assailant were facing each other. "Masyadong malapit."
circumstances which, if considered, will alter or reverse the
outcome of the case. We have reviewed the records and Q How many fatal wounds have (sic) the victim sustained
found no justification for a reversal of the findings of the in his chest?
trial court and its conclusions based thereon.
A Five fatal stab wounds on the chest.26
Second. The victim sustained six hack wounds and one
Considering the number, nature and location of the
lacerated wound. This is gleaned from the Necropsy
wounds sustained by the victim, the petitioner’s plea of
Report of Dr. Pura Uy, to wit:
self-defense is incredible.27 It bears stressing that the
FINDINGS: The victim lies in supine position, stocky in built; petitioner resolutely denied stabbing the victim at the
his clothing completely soaked with fresh blood. buttock and insisted that he stabbed the victim frontally:
CHEST: Q As a matter of fact, he sustained an injury at the back of
his buttock (pigi) and when he faced you, you stabbed
(+) stab wound 2 inches below the L nipple 4 inches deep
him again several times?
running medially to the anterior median line.
A That is not true, Sir.
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the L of the anterior median line
at the level of the L nipple 5½ inches deep running Q But you are admitting that you stabbed him several
posteriorly. times frontally?
(+) stab wound 1 inch above the L nipple 4 inches deep A Yes, Sir, because I am (sic) defending myself.
running inferomedially.
Q You also stabbed him in his left armpit?
(+) stab wound 2 inches to the left of the anterior median
A I don’t know, Sir.
line 4 inches deep running inferoposteriorly.
Q But you knew that you stabbed him in his buttock?
(+) stab wound 1 inch to the right of the anterior median
line at the level of the second right intercostal space 0.5 A No, Sir.
inch in depth.
Q After stabbing him several times and felt that he was
already dead, you already left the place?
 55

A Yes, Sir.28 A I did not place it, Sir.

The testimony of the petitioner is belied by the physical Q So, you don’t know?
evidence on record. The settled rule is that physical
A It is vertical, Sir, but I did not place it on the record. And
evidence is evidence of the highest order; it speaks more
the hack wound on the temporal region is oblique.
eloquently than a hundred witnesses.29
Q Were the injuries only slight?
Third. The petitioner threw away his knife and failed to
surrender it to the policemen; neither did he inform the A Yes, Sir.
policemen that he killed the victim in self-defense. The
petitioner’s claim that the victim was armed with a bolo is Q So, it is (sic) possible that these injuries were self-inflicted?
hard to believe because he even failed to surrender the A Probably, Sir, but I cannot comment on that.
bolo.30
Q You said that the patient was under the influence of
Fourth. The petitioner’s version of the events that transpired alcohol? Would you say that the patient was then so drunk
immediately before he stabbed the victim does not inspire at that time?
belief. He claims that when he saw the victim emerged
from the hut, the victim walked towards the petitioner A When I saw him at that time, he was moderately drunk.34
saying, "Kung hindi lang kita inaanak," but hit and hacked The doctor gave the petitioner due medications for 30
the latter on the left buttock.31 As gleaned from his minutes and the petitioner then went home:
statement, the victim was not disposed, much less
determined to assault the petitioner. And yet, the Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim
petitioner insists that without much ado, the victim, in this case Mr. Leon Lumasac?
nevertheless, hit him on the head and on the thigh with his A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.
bolo.
Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this
Fifth. According to the petitioner, the victim warned him case?
three times before leaving the hut, "May mangyayari sa
iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas." The petitioner testified that A Yes, Sir.
shortly before the victim uttered these words, the latter
Q Where?
even touched the blade of the bolo to see if it was
sharp.32 The petitioner was, thus, aware of the peril to his A Here, Sir.
life if he followed the victim. The petitioner, nevertheless,
And Witness is pointing to his left head.
followed the victim and left the hut after the victim had
gone barely ten meters. He should have waited until after Q Where else?
the victim had already gone far from the hut before going
home to avoid any untoward incident. A (His) right thigh.

Sixth. The petitioner presented his brother-in-law Ruben Q In what place did this incident happen?
Dulay to corroborate his testimony that the victim stabbed A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.
the petitioner and that this impelled the latter to stab the
former. But the testimony of Dulay contradicted the Q What is his real name?
testimony of the petitioner: A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.35
Q When Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon Lumasac several If, as claimed by the petitioner, the victim stabbed him
times, he immediately fell to the ground and was fatal[ly] frontally, it is incredible that the victim was able to hack
wounded, immediately died because of several stabs and the anterior part of his right thigh.
lay (sic) down?
Eighth. The testimony of the petitioner that the victim
A I did not see that scene because Exequiel Senoja stabbed him outside the hut on the left side of his head
stabbed Leon Lumasac, I turn (sic) back upon seeing Leon and the anterior portion of his right thigh is belied by his
Lumasac hack Exequiel Senoja, I turn (sic) back because I testimony on direct examination that the victim stabbed
was afraid then. When I turn (sic) back I saw them him while still inside the hut of Reguyal:
embracing each other, Sir.
Q How did it happen that you were able to kill the victim
Q And that is the time when Exequiel Senoja stabbed Leon in this case Mr. Leon Lumasac?
Lumasac?
A Because when I went out, he hacked me, Sir.
A I did not see the stabbing. What I only saw was that they
were embracing each other, Sir. Q Were you hit by the hack made by the victim in this
case?
Q So you are now changing your answer, you actually saw
Exequiel Senoja stabbing Leon Lumasac several times, A Yes, Sir.
after he was hack[ed] by Leon Lumasac? Q Where?
A I did not see that Exequiel Senoja stab Leon Lumasac, A Here, Sir.
Sir.33
And Witness is pointing to his left head.
Seventh. The bare fact that the petitioner sustained a five-
centimeter wound at the left temporal region and an Q Where else?
eight-centimeter hack wound on the anterior portion of his
A (His) right thigh.
right thigh does not preclude the fact that he was the
unlawful aggressor; nor buttress his plea that he acted in Q In what place did this incident happen?
self-defense. The petitioner failed to inform the doctor that
A In the hut of Tata Santos, Sir.
he sustained the wounds to defend himself. Moreover, the
doctor testified that the wounds the petitioner sustained Q What is his real name?
were slight:
A Crisanto Reguyal, Sir.36
Pros. Ronquillo:
But then, after the said incident, the petitioner and the
Q Does (sic) the wound at the right anterior thigh vertical, victim had reconciled. We agree with the following
diagonal or what? findings of the appellate court:
 56

The question that must be resolved is whether or not the 27 People v. More, 321 SCRA 538 (1999); People v. Real, 308 SCRA 244 (1999).
victim was the unlawful aggressor as the appellant’s 28 TSN, 7 September 2001, p. 9.
testimony pictures him to be. The Court rules in the 29 People v. Sunpongco, 163 SCRA 222 (1988).
negative. The victim had already left the hut and was ten
(10) meters away from it. There is no showing that the 30 People v. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 (1999).
victim, who was drunk, was aware that appellant was 31 TSN, 7 September 2001, p. 8.
following him, or that the appellant called out to him so 32 Id. at 7.
that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice him. It
is clear that at that point in time, the victim was simply
33 TSN, 29 January 2002, p. 13.
walking toward his home; he had stopped being an 34 TSN, 12 February 2002, pp. 3-4.
aggressor. It was the appellant who, smarting from the 35 TSN, 14 March 2001, pp. 3-4.
earlier incident in the hut where Leon told him "hindi ka
tatagal, sa loob ng tatlong araw mayroong mangyayari
36 Ibid.

sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas" repeated three times, 37 Rollo, p. 33.
wanted a confrontation. Appellant stabbed or poked the
victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound,
and when the latter turned around, successively stabbed
and hacked the victim in the armpit and chest until he fell.
In all, the victim suffered nine (9) wounds.
It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon
Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the
hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now the
unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their
confrontation. It bears mentioning that appellant
contradicted himself with respect for (sic) the reason why
he left the hut. First, it was to pacify Leon and the second
reason was that he was going home.
As for appellant’s injuries, it is clear that they were
sustained in the course of the victim’s attempt to defend
himself as shown by the lacerated wound on the victim’s
left palm, a defensive wound.37
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, with Associate
Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente, concurring.
2 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Armando A. Yanga.
3 Rollo, pp. 52-53.
4 Records, p. 1.
5 Rollo, pp. 11-12.
6 Id. at 22-23.
7 Id. at 13.
8 Id at 16-17.
9 Id. at 32-33.
10 People v. Noay, 296 SCRA 292 (1998).
11 Bishop, A Treatise on Criminal Law, 9th ed., Vol. I, pp. 599-600.
12 Id. at 180.
13 Wharton, Criminal Law, 12th ed., Vol. I, pp. 176-177.
14 People v. Langres, 316 SCRA 769 (1999).
15 Id. at 845-846.
16 People v. Arizala, 317 SCRA 244 (1999).
17 People v. Bitoon, Sr., 309 SCRA 209 (1999).
18 Bishop, supra, p. 617.
19 Wharton Criminal Law, 12th ed., Vol. I, p. 186.
20People v. Arizala, 317 SCRA 244 (1999); People v. Real, 308 SCRA 244
(1999).
21 TSN, 7 September 2001, pp. 6-7.
22 Id. at 8-9.
23 Exhibit "A," Records, p. 13.
24 TSN, 20 November 1997, p. 8.
25 Id. at 7.
26 Id. at 8.
 57

G.R. No. 153875 August 16, 2006 an Indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,vs.
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal x x x.
ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO Y
LEONIDA, Accused-Appellants. Both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, the
DECISION
sum of P31,845.00 as funeral and burial expenses, the sum
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: of

For review before the Court is the Decision dated June 20, P30,000.00 as and for [sic] attorney’s fees and the further
20021 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the sum of P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila,
Both accused shall be credited with the full extent of their
Branch 12 (RTC), dated February 18, 1993, in Criminal Case
preventive imprisonment. Both accused are hereby
No. 89-77467, finding the accused-appellants Otello
committed to the Director, National Penitentiary,
Santiano y Leonida (Santiano) and Rolando Dagani y
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila for service of Sentence.
Reyes (Dagani) guilty of the crime of Murder.
SO ORDERED.3
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
In brief, the RTC held that appellants failed to prove that
That on or about September 11, 1989, in the City of Manila,
Javier attempted to squeeze the trigger of the .22 caliber
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
gun when he pointed it at Dagani; that during the course
confederating together and mutually helping each other
of the struggle for the possession of the .22 caliber gun, the
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
danger to the life of the accused ceased to be imminent;
intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
that in grappling for the weapon, Dagani "controlled" the
assault and use of personal violence upon one ERNESTO
hands of Javier and pushed them away from his body; that
JAVIER Y FELIX by then and there shooting him with a .38
the appellants failed to produce the two empty shells as
caliber revolver, thereby inflicting upon the said ERNESTO
physical evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by
JAVIER Y FELIX mortal gunshot wounds which were the
Javier; that no points of entry or bullet markings on the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
walls of the canteen were shown; that, in light of these
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 findings, no unlawful aggression was present on the part of
the victim; that the appellants failed to prove that they
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial were on official duty at the time of the incidence; that,
ensued where the prosecution adduced evidence to since it was not established that Javier actually fired his
establish the following: gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as
At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a a necessary consequence of the due performance of an
group composed of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran official duty; that the appellants were acting in
(Miran), and two other individuals had been drinking at the conspiracy; that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
canteen located inside the compound of the Philippine attended the killing, considering that Javier had been shot
National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo, while his hands were being held by Dagani and as his body
Manila. All of a sudden, appellants, who were security was out of balance and about to fall; and that the
officers of the PNR and covered by the Civil Service Rules mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
and Regulations, entered the canteen and approached appreciated in favor of the appellants.
the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran, causing the The appellants appealed to the CA and assigned the
latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while following errors:
Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
I
The defense proceeded to prove their version of the facts:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk SELF DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED.
officer to investigate a commotion at the canteen. Upon
reaching the place, Santiano ordered his co-accused, II
Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE IN LAWFUL
of beer on the table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber PERFORMANCE OF AN OFFICIAL DUTY.
revolver and attempted to fire at Dagani, but the gun
III
failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the canteen,
Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
saw Javier and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun RULING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.
which belonged to Javier. During the course of the
IV
struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a
warning shot. He heard Javier’s gun fire again, so he THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
decided to rush into the canteen. Santiano then shot PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH BEYOND
Javier from a distance of less than four meters. REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF
MURDER.4
Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-
defense and lawful performance of official duty as PNR The CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
security officers. They also argued that the prosecution which states:
failed to establish treachery and conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is
The RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of MODIFIED. Appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion
which reads: perpetua. The award for attorney’s fees and appearance
fees for counsel are hereby deleted. In all the other
WHEREFORE, finding both accused Otello Santiano y
aspects, the appealed decision is maintained.
Leonida and Rolando Dagani y Reyes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and Let the entire records of the case be elevated to the
punished under Art. 248, RPC, with the presence of the Supreme Court for the mandated review.
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
granting them the benefit of [the] Indeterminate Sentence SO ORDERED.5
Law, both accused are hereby sentenced to each suffer
 58

The CA affirmed the findings of fact as well as the salient The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful
portions of the RTC Decision, but deleted the award of aggression on the part of Javier. They were unable to
attorney’s fees and the per appearance fees of counsel present evidence that the victim actually fired his gun. No
since, the spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were found and no
bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident.
CA reasoned, the instant case is criminal in nature which is
Javier also tested negative for gunpowder residue.
under the control of the public prosecutor, and,
Moreover, the trial court found appellant Dagani’s
additionally, the RTC failed to justify this award in the body
account of the incident to be incredible and self-serving.
of its Decision. And last, the CA found that the RTC
In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense
erroneously applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law
without any proof of the existence of its requisites.15
since the penalty for Murder, at the time of the incident,
was reclusion perpetua which is an indivisible penalty to Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the
be imposed in its entirety, regardless of the attending appellants so insist, the imminence of the danger to their
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. lives had already ceased the moment Dagani held down
the victim and grappled for the gun with the latter. After
Appellants are now before this Court submitting for
the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no
resolution the same matters argued before the CA.
longer any unlawful aggression
Through their Manifestation dated February 11,
2003,6 appellants prayed to dispense with the filing of that would have necessitated the act of killing.16 When an
additional briefs. unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the
one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even
As of date, the records show that despite the efforts
to wound the former aggressor.17 When Javier had been
exerted by the surety and the responsible law officers to
caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with
locate the appellants, the latter could not be found and
appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant
have jumped bail.7
Santiano, which impelled him to fire at the victim, had then
The appeal is partly meritorious. ceased to a reasonable extent,18 and undoubtedly,
Santiano went beyond the call of self-preservation when
Appellants argue that the courts a quo misappreciated he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries on
the facts and erred in finding that there was no unlawful Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had
aggression on the part of the victim. They insist that the already ceased.19
victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver at the time
he was struggling with appellant Dagani; that the former The second element of self-defense demands that the
"could have easily killed the latter;" that, given the fact that means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression are
Javier had been drinking, "it is quite probable for Javier to reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable
act harshly and aggressively towards necessity of the means employed does not imply material
commensurability between the means of attack and
peace officers such as the accused;"8 and that Javier defense. What the law requires is rational
actually fired three shots from his .22 caliber gun.9 equivalence.20 The circumstances in their entirety which
We are not convinced. surround the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and
Javier, such as the nature and number of gunshot wounds
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence sustained by the victim21 which amounted to two fatal
shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally wounds,22 that Dagani was able to restrain the hands of
justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the Javier and push
accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the
Court the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this them away from his body,23 that Dagani was larger than
extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this burden Javier and had finished Special Weapons and Tactics
by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, an (SWAT) hand-to-
otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly hand combat training,24 and Javier, as admitted by the
predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused. appellants, was inebriated at the time of the incident,25 do
Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful not justify appellant Santiano’s act of fatally shooting the
aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, victim twice.26
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of All things considered, the appellants’ plea of self-defense
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of
himself. All these conditions must concur.10 self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is
not only uncorroborated by any separate competent
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.27 Whether the
would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact. Like
attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person alibi, the affirmative defense of self-defense is inherently
– not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude 11 – but weak because, as experience has demonstrated, it is easy
most importantly, at the time the defensive action was to fabricate and difficult to disprove.28 This Court,
taken against the aggressor.12 To invoke self-defense therefore, finds no reversible error on the part of the courts
successfully, there must have been an a quo in rejecting the claim of self-defense.
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful
of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe performance of their official duties. They specifically aver
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable that they had been ordered by their desk officer to
means to resist the attack.13 proceed to the canteen in response to a telephone call
In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite stating that there was a group "creating trouble;" that they
probable" that Javier, during the course of the struggle for were in the call of duty and exercising their functions and
the firearm, "could have easily killed" the appellants are responsibilities as members of the PNR Civil Security Office
uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in to preserve peace and order and
contemplation of the law only when the one attacked protect the lives and property in the PNR
faces real and immediate threat to one’s life. The peril Compound;29 and that, invoking jurisprudence, as security
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not officers in the performance of duty, like the police, they
just speculative.14 must stand their ground and overcome the opponent,
To sum up the matter, we quote the findings of the CA: and the force that may be exerted must differ from that
which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense.30
 59

Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a indicative of a joint purpose and design by the
person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful appellants.37
exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused
liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense can
based on facts and not on mere conjectures,
prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the
presumptions, or suspicions.38 Other than the plain fact
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
that the victim had been shot by one of the accused while
or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
being held by a co-accused, there is no other evidence
committed should have been the necessary
that the appellants were animated by the same purpose
consequence of such lawful exercise.31 These requisites
or were moved by a previous common accord. It follows
are absent in the instant case.
that the liability of the accused must be determined on an
As found by the CA: individual basis. While no formal agreement is necessary to
establish conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were
from the circumstances attending the commission of the
in fact on duty at the time they were at the canteen. The
crime, yet, conspiracy must be established by clear and
trial court gave weight to the fact that the appellants were
convincing evidence.39
unable to submit their daily time records to show that they
were on duty at the time. Appellants’ assertion that they This Court has held that even if all the malefactors joined
were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR in the killing, such circumstance alone does not satisfy the
Security Investigator Rolando Marinay’s testimony that PNR requirement of conspiracy because the rule is that
security officers work in two 12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to
neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient
7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
proof of conspiracy. Conspiracy must be shown to exist
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his
as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the
gun, the injury inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as
offense itself.40 Thus, even assuming that Javier was
a necessary consequence of appellants’ due
simultaneously attacked, this does not prove conspiracy.
performance of an official duty.32
No evidence was presented to show that the appellants
As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger planned to kill Javier or that Dagani’s overt acts facilitated
to the life of the appellants had been neutralized when that alleged plan. The prosecution did not establish that
Dagani grappled with Javier and restrained his hands; that the act of Dagani in trying to wrestle the gun from Javier
Javier had been thrown off-balance; that Dagani had and in the process, held the latter’s hands, was for the
been specially trained for these purposes; and that Javier purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier. The
had been drinking immediately prior to the scuffle, this prosecution had the burden to show Dagani’s intentional
Court holds that the fatal injuries that appellant Santiano participation to the furtherance of a common design and
inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed to be necessary purpose41 or that his action was all part of a scheme to kill
consequences of the performance of his duty as a PNR Javier. That Dagani did not expect Santiano to shoot the
security officer.33 While it is recognized that police officers victim is established when Santiano testified that Dagani
– if indeed the appellants can be likened to them – must "seem[ed] to be shocked, he was standing and looking at
stand their ground and overwhelm their opponents, in the victim" as Javier gradually fell to the ground.42 And
People v. Ulep,34 this Court counseled: since Dagani’s conviction can only be sustained if the
crime had been carried out through a conspiracy duly
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be
proven, in view of the failure of the prosecution to
used only as a last resort, and under circumstances
discharge that burden, this Court is constrained to acquit
indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken
him.
without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police officers
with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may And this Court cannot say that treachery attended the
be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a attack. The RTC declared:
dilemma when pressured by a situation where an
[T]he Court believes that Javier was shot while his body
immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed.
was out-balanced and about to fall to the right side and
However, it must be stressed that the judgment and
while his hands were being held by Dagani. Javier,
discretion of police officers in the performance of their
therefore, was shot at when he has no means to defend
duties must be exercised neither capriciously nor
himself, hence, the killing was attended by the qualifying
oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence
circumstance of treachery.43
of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must
act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, which the CA affirmed as follows:
and within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot
countenance trigger-happy law enforcement officers The findings of the court a quo clearly showed that Javier
who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the was being held down and could not effectively use his
persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in weapon. As such, the trial court held that Javier could not
mind that although they are dealing with criminal be considered to be an armed man as he was being held
elements against whom society must be protected, these down and was virtually helpless.
criminals are also human beings with human rights.35 It has been held that when an assault is made with a
But this Court cannot agree with the findings of the courts deadly weapon upon an unarmed and unsuspecting
a quo that the appellants were in conspiracy. victim who [was] given no immediate provocation for the
attack and under conditions which made it impossible for
The RTC simply held: him to evade the attack, flee or make [a] defense, the act
is properly qualified as treachery, and the homicide
The Information cited conspiracy of the accused. Since it
resulting therefrom is classified as murder.44 x x x
can also be committed thru simultaneous/concerted
action and considering that Javier was shot by Santiano Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
while being held by Dagani, under jurisprudence, Code is defined as the deliberate employment of means,
conspiracy is present.36 methods or forms in the execution of a crime against
persons which tend directly and specially to insure its
The tenor of the factual findings of the CA is equally
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
unsatisfactory:
defense which the intended victim might raise. Treachery
Moreover, the facts show that Javier was shot by appellant is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that
Santiano as he was being subdued by appellant Dagani. the means, methods and forms of execution employed
The trial court held that the manner of the attack was gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
 60

himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods be imposed in its medium period, pursuant to Article 64 (4)
and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously of the aforesaid Code.
adopted by the accused without danger to his person.45
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the of appellant Santiano will consist of a minimum that is
infliction of the wound from behind the victim, the anywhere within the full range of prision mayor, and a
vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was maximum which is anywhere within reclusion temporal in
made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by its medium period. This Court hereby fixes it to be from
themselves render the eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one
attack as treacherous.46 This is of particular significance in
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused
whereby he gained an advantageous position over the As to the award of damages, prevailing jurisprudence
victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered entitles the heirs of the deceased to the amount
defenseless.47 The means employed for the commission of of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim
the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have without need of any evidence or proof of damages.56
been consciously or deliberately adopted by the accused
The CA erred in deleting the attorney’s fees and per
to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same
appearance fees for lack of factual basis. Although the
time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the
CA is correct in noting that the RTC failed to justify these
intended victim.48 For the rules on treachery to apply, the
awards in the body of its Decision, this appeal opens the
sudden attack must have been preconceived by the
entire case for review and, accordingly, the records show
accused, unexpected by the victim, and without
that the foregoing
provocation on the part of the latter.49 Treachery is never
presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that amounts had been stipulated by the parties,57 thereby
the manner of attack must be shown to have been dispensing with the need to prove the same.58
attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself.50
As to moral damages, however, the widow of the victim,
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the Erlinda Javier, is not entitled to the same. She did not testify
assault by the appellants had been deliberately adopted on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she
as a mode of attack intended to insure the killing of Javier suffered as a result of her husband’s death. No other heirs
and without the latter having the opportunity to defend of Javier testified in the same manner.59
himself. Other than the bare fact that Santiano shot Javier
while the latter had been struggling with Dagani over the Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of taking
possession of the .22 caliber gun, no other fact had been advantage of official position attended the killing, the
adduced to show that the appellants consciously planned Court awards exemplary damages in the amount
or predetermined the methods to insure the commission of of P25,000.00 in accordance with Articles 2230 and 2234 of
the crime, nor had the risk of the victim to the Civil Code and prevailing jurisprudence.60

retaliate been eliminated during the course of the struggle WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
over the weapon, as the latter, though struggling, had not G.R. CR No. 15304 dated June 20, 2002 is MODIFIED.
been Appellant Otello Santiano y Leonida is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and
completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate
emphasize that the mere suddenness of the attack, or the sentence from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
vulnerable position of the victim at the time of the attack, mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months,
or yet even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
by themselves make the attack treacherous.51 It must be Appellant Santiano is further ordered to pay the heirs of
shown beyond reasonable doubt that the means the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as death
employed gave the victim no opportunity to defend indemnity, P31,845.00 as funeral and burial
himself or retaliate, and that such means had been expenses, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00
deliberately or consciously adopted without danger to the as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00
life of the accused.52
per appearance of counsel. Appellant Santiano shall be
For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the credited with the full extent of his preventive imprisonment.
helpless position of Javier as merely incidental to the
attack, and that the decision to shoot Javier was made in Appellant Rolando Dagani y Reyes is hereby ACQUITTED.
an instant.53 SO ORDERED.
Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
must be proved as fully and convincingly as the crime Associate Justice
itself, any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in
Footnotes
favor of Santiano. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing to 1Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices
Eugenio S. Labitoria and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring, CA rollo, pp.
Murder, appellant Santiano may only be convicted of
203-210.
Homicide.54 The penalty, therefore, under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion temporal.
2 Records, p. 1.
3 CA rollo, pp. 88-89.
The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in that the
courts a quo failed to consider the aggravating 4 Id. at 121.
circumstance of 5 Id. at 209.

taking advantage of official position under Article 14 (1) of 6 Rollo, pp. 6-7.
the Revised Penal Code, since the accused, a PNR security 7 Id. at 3-87.
officer 8 CA rollo, pp. 121-122.
covered by the Civil Service, committed the crime with the 9 Id. at 123-124.
aid of a gun he had been authorized to carry as
People v. Dela Cruz, 400 Phil. 872, 878 (2000); Cabuslay v. People, G.R.
10
such.55Considering that the mitigating circumstance of
No. 129875, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 241, 253.
voluntary surrender, as duly appreciated by the courts a
quo, shall be offset against the aggravating circumstance
of taking advantage of official position, the penalty should
 61

11People v. Dela Cruz, supra note 10; Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, 53 See People v. Ulep, supra note 31, at 88.
September 24, 2004, 439 SCRA 94, 109; People v. Escarlos, 457 Phil. 580, 596
(2003).
54People v. Caratao, supra note 45, at 608; People v. Fernandez, 434 Phil.
224, 239 (2002).
12 People v. Dela Cruz, supra note 10.
55See People v. Tabion, G.R. No. L-32629, October 23, 1979, 93 SCRA 566,
13People v. Escarlos, supra note 11, at 595; People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 572; People v. Madrid, 88 Phil. 1, 15 (1951); Antonio L. Gregorio,
126145, April 30, 2001, 357 SCRA 447, 457. Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review 114 (1997).
14People v. Escarlos, supra note 11, at 596; People v. Damitan, 423 Phil. 113, 56People v. Malinao, G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 34,
123 (2001). 53; People v. Solamillo, 452 Phil. 261, 281 (2003).
15 CA rollo, p. 206. TSN, April 20, 1990, pp. 1-2; TSN, April 30, 1990, pp. 1-2; Exhibit "X;" RTC
57

Decision, CA rollo, p. 59; Formal Offer of Evidence of the Prosecution dated

16People v. Escarlos, supra note 11, at 597; People v. Calabroso, 394 Phil. April 26, 1990, p. 6.
658, 670 (2000); People v. Maalat, 341 Phil. 200, 206 (1997).
58Moreover, under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees may be
17People v. Escarlos, supra note 11, at 597; People v. Rabanal, 402 Phil. 709, recovered when exemplary damages have been awarded. See, e.g.,
715 (2001). Nueva España v. People, G.R. No. 163351, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 560.
18People v. Escarlos, supra note 11, at 597; People v. Geneblazo, 414 Phil. 59 People v. Ibañez, 455 Phil. 133, 166-167 (2003).
103, 110 (2001).
60Nueva España v. People, supra note 58, at 558; People v. Malinao, supra
19 People v. Escarlos, id. note 56, at 55.
20 Cabuslay v. People, supra note 10, at 262.
21See Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 695,
708; People v. Escarlos, supra note 11, at 597; People v. Ubaldo, 419 Phil.
718, 730 (2001); People v. Basadre, G.R. No. 131851, February 22, 2001, 352
SCRA 573, 585; People v. More, 378 Phil. 1153, 1161 (1999); People v. Real,
367 Phil. 524, 535-536 (1999).
22 CA rollo, p. 51.
23 Id. at 75.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 120.
26See People v. Escarlos, supra note 11; People v. Dela Cruz, supra note 10,
at 879; People v. Babor, 330 Phil. 923, 930-931 (1996).
27 Toledo v. People, supra note 11, at 110.
28Senoja v. People, supra note 21, at 703; People v. Noay, 357 Phil. 295, 308
(1998).
29 CA rollo, p. 124.
30 Id. at 125, citing, e.g., People v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784.
31People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA
535, 553; People v. Peralta, 403 Phil. 72, 89 (2001); People v. Ulep, 395 Phil.
78, 87 (2000); People v. Belbes, 389 Phil. 500, 509 (2000).
32 CA rollo, p. 207.
33 See People v. Catbagan, supra note 31, at 554.
34 Supra note 31.
35 Id. at 92.
36 CA rollo, p. 88.
37 Id. at 207-208.
38 See People v. Legaspi, 387 Phil. 108 (2000).
39Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005, 456 SCRA
45, 73; People v. Agda, 197 Phil. 306, 314 (1982).
40Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 39, at 73-74; People v. Dorico,
153 Phil. 458, 475 (1973).
41 Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 39, at 74.
42 TSN, Hearing of June 18, 1990, p. 10.
43 CA rollo, pp. 87-88.
44 Id. at 208.
45People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588, 606-607 (2003); People v. Gonzalez, Jr.,
411 Phil. 893, 915 (2001); People v. Cabodoc, 331 Phil. 491, 510
(1996); People v. Malabago, 333 Phil. 20, 34 (1996).
46 People v. Gonzalez, Jr., supra.
47Id.; People v. Cadag, 112 Phil. 314, 319 (1961); People v. Ardisa, 154 Phil.
229, 243 (1974); People v. Genial, G.R. No. 105692, December 7, 1993, 228
SCRA 283, 291.
48People v. Gonzalez, Jr., supra note 45, at 915-916; People v. Caratao,
supra note 45, at 607; Luces v. People, 443 Phil. 636, 646 (2003).
49People v. Gonzalez, Jr., supra note 45, at 916; Sison v. People, 320 Phil.
112, 135 (1995); People v. Abapo, G.R. Nos. 93632-33, December 28, 1994,
239 SCRA 469, 479.
50People v. Gonzalez, Jr., supra note 45, at 917; People v. Manalo, G.R. No.
L-55177, February 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 98, 108.
51 People v. Gonzalez, Jr., supra note 45.
52People v. Caratao, supra note 45, at 607; People v. Gonzalez, Jr., supra
note 45; People v. Cabodoc, supra note 45, at 510-
511; People v. Malabago, supra note 45.
 62

G.R. No. 146687 August 22, 2002 the security agency as proof that somebody attempted to
kill him.6
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BONNIE R. RABANAL, accused-appellant. That same day, accused-appellant voluntarily
surrendered himself and Pascua’s firearm to Supt. Enrique
DECISION
Galang at Camp Crame. He did not surrender at
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Dagupan because of Pascua’s influence as bodyguard of
Belen Fernandez. He was brought to the Lingayen Police
In the early dawn of August 11, 1996, a drunken and armed Station the following day.7
Roberto Pascua was fatally shot by the security guard of a
building in Dagupan City, Pangasinan. The prosecution On October 24, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment
asserts that Pascua was treacherously shot while the convicting accused-appellant and imposing on him the
defense contends that it was an act of self-preservation. supreme penalty of death, thus:

The security guard, Bonnie R. Rabanal, was charged with WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Bonnie R. Rabanal
Murder committed as follows: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
attended by the aggravating circumstance of cruelty and
That on or about the 11th day of August 1996, in the City not offset by any mitigating circumstances, and pursuant
of Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this to law, accused Bonnie R. Rabanal is sentenced to suffer
Honorable Court, the above-named accused BONNIE R. the Death Penalty and to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00
RABANAL, being then armed with a gun, with treachery to the heirs of the deceased.
and with intent to kill one ROBERTO PASCUA, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and The accused is ordered to pay P100,000.00 representing
use personal violence upon the latter by shooting him, expenses during the wake and P60,000.00 for the coffin
hitting him several times on vital parts of his body with the and tomb; P5,440,800.00 as indemnity for loss of earnings;
said gun, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
to "Cardio Respiratory Arrest, Massive Intra-thoracic and
The Service Revolver (caliber .38 with Serial No. 54913
Intra-Abdominal Hemorrhage, Gunshot Wound[s]" as per
[Exhibit 9] ) and the firearm with Serial Number FG66801, 9
Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death, both issued by
mm pistol, Colt MK IV, Exhibit "10", all in the possession of
Dr. Thomas G. Cornel, to the damage and prejudice of the
the City Prosecutor, are ordered confiscated and forfeited
legal heirs of said deceased, ROBERTO PASCUA, in the
in favor of the Government. The evidence custodian in the
amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
City Prosecutor’s Office, Dagupan City, is ordered and
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential
directed to turn over the firearms immediately to the
damages.
Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as City.
amended by R.A. 7659.1
With costs against the accused.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-01443-D
SO ORDERED.8
of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44.
Accused-appellant entered a negative plea when Before us on automatic review, accused-appellant argues
arraigned.2 The case thereafter proceeded to trial. that:
The prosecution’s version of the incident: A. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL
ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE WERE NOT OBTAINING BASED
At 2:00 a.m. of August 11, 1996, Freddie Soriano, a security
ON CONJECTURAL, PREPOSTEROUS, AND ILLOGICAL
guard of the CSI building in Dagupan City, saw accused-
REASONS.
appellant Bonnie Rabanal, a security guard of the
McDonald’s restaurant located in the same building, B. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
repeatedly shoot at close range the victim Rudy Pascua, TREACHERY. THERE WAS NO TREACHERY IN A FACE TO FACE
the security coordinator of the building. After the victim fell ENCOUNTER WITH DECEASED WHOSE FIREARM WAS WITHIN
down, accused-appellant fired another shot and then EASY REACH. FURTHERMORE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NEVER
took the victim’s gun and fled.3 EMPLOYED MEANS TO ENSURE SUCCESS WITHOUT RISK TO
HIMSELF.
The victim was rushed to the Pangasinan Provincial
Hospital, Dagupan City, where he was declared dead on C. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED FINDING CRUELTY
arrival. The victim suffered four gunshot wounds on the BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ALLEGED MORTAL WOUNDS
chest, all of which were fatal.4 SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT CRUELTY
REFERS TO THE MANNER OF EXECUTION AND NOT THE
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the
NUMBER OF MORTAL WOUNDS INFLICTED IN SELF-DEFENSE.
fatal shooting of Rudy Pascua was an act of self-defense.
He alleges that on August 11, 1996, at 2:00 a.m., Pascua, D. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SINCE
who was armed and reeking of alcohol, approached him ACCUSED-APPELLANT SURRENDERED AT CAMP CRAME
at his usual post in front of the McDonald’s restaurant and AND NOT AT DAGUPAN VOLUNTARY SURRENDER MUST NOT
suddenly kicked the podium, causing it to fall on him. BE APPRECIATED. NO OTHER SUBMISSION COULD BEST
When accused-appellant asked what was the matter, ADDRESS SUCH RULING THAN THAT THE PROFFERED REASON
Pascua uttered, "You’re hard-headed security guards, I IS UTTERLY WHIMSICAL, TWISTED, AND SHAMEFUL IN A
told you to give me P100.00 per head monthly but you SOCIETY OF THINKING MEN.
refused to give, are you going to give me or not?" He then
E. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN COMMITTING
drew his firearm and said, "If that’s the thing you want to
HIGHWAY ROBBERY BY AWARDING AN UNCONSCIONABLE
happen, I better kill you."5
AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.9
Accused-appellant pleaded for his life while Pascua
For self-defense to prosper, accused-appellant must prove
demanded that he surrender his firearm.1âwphi1 While
by clear and convincing evidence the following elements:
Pascua was reaching for accused-appellant’s holster, the
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
latter pushed him and grabbed his gun. Pascua lost his
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
balance and staggered backwards. At that instant,
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
accused-appellant drew his pistol and pulled the trigger
of the person defending himself.10 Although all the three
four times. Pascua fell to the ground. Accused-appellant
elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on
then took the gun from Pascua’s hand and brought it to
proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no
 63

unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the
may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or imminent danger of such injury.25
incomplete.11 In other words in self-defense, unlawful
In other words, whether or not the means employed is
aggression is a primordial element. It presupposes an
reasonable will depend upon the nature and quality of
actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition,
danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere
character, size and other circumstances and those of the
threatening or intimidating attitude – at the time the
person defending himself as well as
defensive action was taken against the aggressor.12
the place and occasion of the assault.26
In the case at bar, even if we sustain the version of
In the case at bar, assuming arguendo that the aggression
accused-appellant that the initial act of aggression came
was continuing, the means employed by accused-
from the deceased, we cannot uphold his plea of self-
appellant in repelling the assault of the unarmed victim
defense. While indeed, the drunken victim initially
was not reasonable. It must be noted that the deceased
brandished his handgun and aimed it at accused-
sustained four (4) gunshot wounds fired at close range, all
appellant, the evidence shows that he laid it down on the
of them concentrated on the chest area and each of
nearby concrete porchshortly before he was shot several
them fatal.27 It bears repeating in this regard that the
times by accused-appellant.13
nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused
When the deceased laid down his gun, unlawful are constantly and unremittingly considered as
aggression had already ceased and it was no longer important indicia which disprove the plea for self-defense
necessary for accused-appellant to have fired because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the
successively the way he did at the victim.14 Furthermore, victim and not just defend oneself.28
we note that accused-appellant had shoved the
All told, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of
intoxicated victim who staggered backwards. Hence, it
the court a quo insofar as accused-appellant’s culpability
was accused-appellant who became the aggressor when
is concerned.
he, despite such prevailing conditions, not to mention the
inebriated physical state of the deceased, proceeded to This brings us to the second issue, concerning the propriety
fire several shots at the victim. His act can no longer be of the imposition by the trial court of the death penalty on
interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a perverse the ground that the killing was qualified by treachery and
desire to kill.15 aggravated by cruelty.
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the unlawful It must be borne in mind that qualifying and aggravating
aggression of the victim was a "continuing one whether or circumstances which are taken into consideration for the
not he momentarily tripped, lost his balance or did similar purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty imposed
acts of temporary character."16 Thus, he argues that even must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of
if the deceased lowered his guard at some point, he was the act charged as criminal offense.29
still the aggressor. He also cites the fact that the victim was
"predisposed to using violence and intimidation while Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when qualified
accused-appellant was simply a security guard doing his by any of the circumstances listed under Article 248 of the
job;" and that the victim was armed with the more Revised Penal Code.30 Treachery or alevosia, which is
powerful and sophisticated .9mm Colt MK IV series 80, alleged in the information, is one such qualifying
while accused-appellant merely had an inferior .38 caliber circumstance.
pistol.17 We do not agree with the trial court that the killing of Rudy
These arguments fail to persuade. Pascua was attended by alevosia. There is treachery
when the offender commits any of the crimes against
There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
limb or right is either actual or imminent. Actual peril to execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
one’s life means that the danger must be present, that is, insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
actually in existence, or imminent in that the danger is on defense which the offended party might make.31 In this
the point of happening.18 This cannot be said in this case case, the two elements of treachery are not
because the victim was unarmed when he was shot by present, i.e. (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim
accused-appellant.19 Indeed, the danger had already was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the
ceased when the victim laid his gun down on the offender consciously adopted the particular means,
pavement, thus enabling accused-appellant to push him method or form of attack employed by him.32 The essence
away. of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the
unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the
Furthermore, even assuming that the victim was a gun club
part of the victim.33
member armed with a more powerful handgun than that
of accused-appellant, it must be pointed out that the For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and
deceased was at the time of the incident a middle-aged seen by the witness right at the inception of the
and drunken 46 year-old,20 with impaired and slowed attack.34 Where no particulars are known as to how the
physical reflexes on account of his intoxication. Accused- killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot
appellant, on the other hand, was a youthful and sober 27 merely be supposed.35 In the case at bar, there was neither
year-old security guard, in full possession of his physical a description of how the attack was commenced –
faculties.21 Accused-appellant stands 5’5"22 while the whether it was sudden, unexpected and whether the
victim’s height was only 5’2".23 Suffice it to state that under victim was caught totally unaware – nor has there been a
such conditions, it would have been easy for the bigger, showing that the method of execution in the commission
sober accused-appellant to subdue the intoxicated and of the crime was consciously or deliberately adopted by
already unarmed victim. the malefactor.
It must be remembered that the means employed by the To reiterate, the existence of alevosia must be based on
person making a defense must be rationally necessary to positive or conclusive proof, not mere suppositions or
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.24 What the law speculations,36 and must be proved as clearly and as
requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of convincingly as the killing itself.37 Any doubt as to the
which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the
imminent danger to which the person attacked is accused.38
exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or
impels the defense; and the proportionateness thereof Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty cannot
be appreciated in this case.1âwphi1 There is cruelty when
 64

the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, Prision
slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical Mayor. Thus, accused-appellant shall be sentenced to an
pain in the consummation of the criminal act.39 In other indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
words, for cruelty to be appreciated, it must be shown that of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as
victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him maximum.
unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is
Coming now to the matter of damages, we affirm the
aggravated because by deliberately increasing the
award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
suffering of the victim, the offender denotes sadism and,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.50 Such award
consequently, a marked degree of malice and
requires no proof other than the death of the
perversity.40
victim.51 Likewise, the award of moral damages in the
The test for determining the presence of cruelty is whether amount of P50,000.00 is consistent with controlling case
the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the law taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the
victim’s suffering.41 Consequently, there must be proof that victim’s family brought about by his death.52
that the victim was made to agonize before he was
However, the award of P26,000.00 for the Eternal Garden
killed.42 In this case, the wounds sustained by the victim
plot, P60,000.00 for the coffin of the victim and P100,000.00
came from four (4) gunshots fired in quick succession.
for the wake and other expenses incurred in connection
Furthermore, other than the number and location of the
with the death of the deceased, amounting to a total of
wounds, there is absolutely no evidence that would show
P186,000.00, should be modified. The trial court did not
accused-appellant’s cruelty and sadism. The mere fact of
present any computation to justify such an amount. In
inflicting several wounds successively upon a person to
fact, other than the bare allegations of the victim’s widow
cause his death, with no appreciable time intervening
to this effect, the records are totally bereft of any receipt
between the infliction of said injuries to show that the
or voucher to justify the trial court’s award for burial and
malefactor wanted to prolong the suffering of the victim,
other expenses. The rule is that every pecuniary loss must
is not sufficient to prove the existence of this aggravating
be established by credible evidence before it may be
circumstance.43
awarded.53 Credence can be given only to claims which
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot are duly supported by receipts or other credible
be appreciated given the factual milieu of this case. For evidence.54 Thus, the amount of actual damages should
voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the accordingly be reduced to P66,000.00, which is borne out
following elements must concur: (1) the offender has not by the evidence.55
been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
In the same vein, loss of earning capacity cannot be
himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
awarded to the victim’s heirs in the absence of competent
voluntary.44 For the circumstances of voluntary surrender, it
proof thereof. While the widow in this case testified on the
is sufficient that it be spontaneous and made in a manner
victim’s income,56 the same can no longer serve as basis
clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender
for lost earnings, in the light of our recent ruling in People v.
unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt
Panabang,57 and reiterated in People v. Cuenca.58 There
or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense
we held that indemnification for loss of earning capacity
which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and
partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be
capturing him.45
duly proven; and a self-serving statement, being
In the case at bar, accused-appellant fled after the unreliable, is not enough. For lost income to be recovered,
commission of the crime, taking with him the victim’s gun, there must be an unbiased proof of the deceased’s
although the Dagupan City Police Station was just a few average, not just gross, income.
meters away from the locus criminis. His supposed fear for
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
the victim’s influence in the community has no basis, and,
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in
if at all, even betrays his feelings of guilt at what transpired.
Criminal Case No. 96-01443-D is MODIFIED. Accused-
As has been aptly ruled in People v. Herrera:46
appellant Bonnie R. Rabanal is found GUILTY beyond
Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer
existence of a guilty conscience.1âwphi1 Indeed, flight is an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
an implied admission of guilt and accused-appellant’s act day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
of fleeing to Batangas after shooting the victims cannot eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion
but betray his guilt and his desire to evade responsibility Temporal, as maximum. He is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
therefor. Certainly, a righteous individual will not cower in the victim, Roberto Pascua, the amounts of P50,000.00 as
fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
possible opportunity if he were morally justified in doing P66,000.00 as burial and other expenses. The award of
so. If the accused-appellant honestly believed that his damages for lost income is DELETED. The decision under
acts constituted self-defense against the unlawful review is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
aggression of the victim, he should have reported the
SO ORDERED.
incident to the police instead of escaping and avoiding
the authorities. (Emphasis and italics supplied) Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ.,
The circumstances that accused-appellant neither
concur.
resisted arrest nor did he struggle to free himself when he
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
was taken into custody by the authorities do not amount
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
to voluntary surrender.47 Indeed, it was only later that he
decided to turn himself in. Needless to state, his surrender Footnotes
can hardly be deemed spontaneous. 1 Record, p. 1.

In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of 2 Ibid., p. 59.

treachery, the crime committed is Homicide and not 3 TSN, 18 November 1996, pp. 5-6, 10-12, 20.
Murder.48 The penalty therefor, under Article 249 of the
4 Id., p. 41.
Revised Penal Code, is Reclusion Temporal, to be imposed
in its medium period considering that there is no modifying 5 TSN, 27 April 1998, pp. 28-30; TSN, 17 July 1998, 10:15 a.m., pp. 17-18.
circumstance to aggravate or to mitigate criminal 6 TSN, 17 July 1998, 10;15 a.m., pp. 17-35.
liability.49 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
7 Ibid., pp. 31-35.
accused-appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term, to
 65

8 Id., pp. 404-421, at 420-421; penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron.

9 Rollo, pp. 57-58.
G.R. No. 156567 November 27, 2003
10 People v. Galvez, G.R. No. 130397, 17 January 2002.
11 People
JOSE RIMANO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 139970, 6 June 2002.
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
12 People v. Galvez, supra.
DECISION
13 TSN, 18 November 1996, 9:15 a.m., pp. 6, 12, 30-32; Exhibits F, F-1.
14 People
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
v. Antonio, G.R. No. 144933, 3 July 2002.
15 People v. Tampon, 258 SCRA 115, 124-125 [1996]; People v. Ganzagan, This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Jr., 247 SCRA 220 [1995]; People v. Jotoy, 222 SCRA 801 [1993]; People v. Rules of Court assailing the December 16, 2002 decision1 of
Gomez, 235 SCRA 444 [1994]. the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17838 which
16 Appellant’s Brief, p. 25. modified the penalty imposed on petitioner Jose Rimano
17 Ibid.,
for the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 3597 and
pp. 28-29.
frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 3595.2
18 I Reyes, Revised Penal Code, pp. 146-148, 14th Ed. (1998).
19 Exhibit
Petitioner was originally charged in three separate
F-1.
informations for the crimes of homicide and two counts of
20 Exhibit D. frustrated homicide. Upon arraignment on September 7,
21 Exhibit F. 1992, he pleaded not guilty3 to all the charges against him.
22 TSN,
After trial, the court a quo found him guilty beyond
17 July 1998, 10:15 a.m., p. 20.
reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Case No. 3597
23 Exhibit B. and of two counts of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case
24 I Reyes, Revised Penal Code, supra, at p. 173. Nos. 3578 and 3595. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
25 People
the latter acquitted petitioner in Criminal Case No. 3578 for
v. Encomienda, 46 SCRA 522, 534 [1972].
frustrated homicide and affirmed with modification his
26 I Reyes, Revised Penal Code, supra, at p. 174. convictions in Criminal Case No. 3597 for homicide and in
27 TSN, 18 November 1996, 2:00 p.m., p. 34; Exhibits B and C. Criminal Case No. 3595 for frustrated homicide. Hence, the
28 People
instant petition refers to his conviction insofar as Criminal
v. Zeta, G.R. Nos. 140901-02, 9 May 2002.
Case No. 3597 and Criminal Case No. 3595 are
29 People v. Latupan, G.R. Nos. 112453-56, 28 June 2001. concerned.
30 II Reyes, Revised Penal Code, p. 472, 14th Revised Ed. (1998).
The information in Criminal Case No. 3597 for homicide,
31 People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, 23 July 2002. reads:
32 People v. Galam, 325 SCRA 489 [2000].
That on or about the 16th day of October 1991, in the
33 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 129216, 20 April 2001. evening, in … Poblacion, Municipality of Malinao, Province
34 People v. Bautista, 312 SCRA 214, 235 [1999]; People v. Sioc, 319 SCRA 12, of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
22, [1999]; People v. Maldo, 307 SCRA 424, 440-441 [1999]. jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
35 People
v. Leal, G.R. No. 139313, 19 June 2001; People v. Silvestre, 307
accused, while armed with a deadly weapon, consisting
SCRA 424, 440-441 [1999]. of a knife, without justifiable cause and with intent to kill,
36 People
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
v. Tawas, 303 SCRA 86 [1999]; People v, Silva, 321 SCRA 647 [1999].
attack, assault and stab one NESTOR IMPORTADO, thereby
37 People v. Aytalin, G.R. No. 134138, 21 June 2001. inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to wit:
38 People v. Santos, 332 SCRA 394, 401 [2000].
Stabbed Wounds:
39 People v. Ballenas, 330 SCRA 519, 536 [2000].
(a) Right chest with moderate hemathorax at two (02)
40 People v. Magayac, 330 SCRA 767, 775 [2000].
points
41 People
v. Ricafranca, 323 SCRA 652, 663 [2000]; People v. Lebumfacil, 96
SCRA 573 [1980]. (b) Right upper quadrant, left wrist two (02) points, right
42 People
back at one (01) point, neck
v. Panida, 310 SCRA 66 [1999]; People v. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1
[1999]. Cause of Death:
43 People v. Basao, 310 SCRA 743 [1999].
Massive Hemorrhage due to multiple wound with
44 People v. Manlansing, G.R. No. 131736-37, March 11, 2002. penetration at the liver, gall bladder, small intestine at
45 People v. Alo, 348 SCRA 702, 712 [2000]. many points, diaphragm right.
46 G.R. Nos., 140557-58, 5 December 2001. as per Post Operative Findings issued by Dr. Reynaldo P.
47 People v. Siojo, 61 Phil. 307 [1935]. Sucgang, Jr. M.D., Medical Specialist 1, of Dr. Rafael S.
Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo, Aklan, attached
48 People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, 23 July 2002.
hereto as annex "A" and made an integral part of this
49 Revised Penal Code, Article 64 (1). information which injuries caused the death of said
50 People v. Amion, G.R. No. 140511, 1 March 2001. NESTOR IMPORTADO.
51 People v. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 131477, 20 April 2001. That as a consequence of the criminal acts of the
52 People
v. Pardua, et al., G.R. No. 110813, 28 June 2001; People v. Ereneo,
accused, the heirs of the deceased NESTOR IMPORTADO
326 SCRA 157 [2000]. suffered actual and compensatory damages in the
53 People
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).
v. Bayang, G.R. No. 134402, 5 February 2001.
54 People v. Dulay, 348 SCRA 239, 251 [2000]. CONTRARY TO LAW.4
55 Exhibits J, N, N-1 to N-12. Criminal Case No. 3595 (frustrated homicide) –
56 TSN, 23 December 1996, pp. 15-17; TSN, 2 January 1997, pp. 21. That on or about the 16th day of October 1991, in the
57 G.R. Nos. 137514-15, January 16, 2002. evening, in … Poblacion, Municipality of Malinao, Province
58 G.R.
of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the
No. 143819, January 29, 2002.
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a knife, with intent to kill, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
 66

assault and stab one ISAIAS IBARDOLASA,5 JR., thereby delivered another fist blow but he was accidentally
inflicting upon the latter physical injury, to wit: stabbed by the knife which was still in the hands of Nestor.
Nelson fell but was able to stagger towards the billiard
Stabbed wound left back with massive hemathorax left.
hall.20 As petitioner and Nestor struggled for the possession
as per Medico-Legal Report on Physical Injuries issued by of the knife, Isaias Ibardalosa, Nestor’s compadre,21 boxed
Dr. Reynaldo P. Sucgang, Medical Specialist I of the Dr. petitioner on the right eye. At this instant, petitioner got
Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo, Aklan, hold of the knife and swung it 2 or 3 times hitting Nestor
hereto attached and an integral part hereof, the accused who was behind him and pulled his collar.22 However, the
having thus performed all the acts of execution which knife was thrown away from his hand by Isaias. Petitioner
would have produced the crime of Homicide as a kicked Isaias but somebody hit him causing him to fall to
consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not produce it the ground face up.23 Isaias immediately pinned him
by reason of causes independent of the will of the down,24 holding his two arms.25 While they were in that
accused, that is, the timely and able medical assistance position, Nelson26 came back and delivered 2 stabbing
rendered to said ISAIAS IBARDOLASA, JR., which blows. The first thrust hit Isaias who was on top of petitioner
prevented his death. and the other one hit the ground. Petitioner was able to
free himself and he ran towards the Malinao Elementary
That by reason of the criminal acts of the accused, ISAIAS School.27The next day, he presented himself to the
IBARDOLASA, JR., suffered actual and compensatory authorities at Camp Pastor Martelino in Kalibo, Aklan.28
damages in the amount of P20,000.00.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision
CONTRARY TO LAW.6 on November 23, 1994, the dispositive portion thereof,
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: reads:

At around 8:30 in the evening of October 16, 1991, Nelson WHEREFORE, the accused Jose Rimano is hereby
Importado, suddenly attacked petitioner with a knife in sentenced in Criminal Case No. 3597 to suffer the penalty
front of a billiard hall at the corner of Sto. Rosario Street of imprisonment for eight (8) YEARS and ONE day
and Roxas Avenue, Malinao, Aklan. The area was well of prision mayor as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS,
illuminated by a fluorescent lamp. In the process of EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
grappling for the possession of the knife, petitioner was of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the
able to get hold thereof and stabbed Nelson twice. The heirs of the victim Nestor Importado FIFTY THOUSAND
latter retreated to the billiard hall, 8 meters away from PESOS (P50,000.00), and to pay the costs.
petitioner.7Thereafter, Nestor Importado, brother of The accused Jose Rimano is hereby sentenced in Criminal
Nelson, rushed towards the petitioner and boxed him, who Case No. 3595 to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
retaliated by delivering successive stabbing blows which TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
landed at the frontal portion of Nestor’s body.8 At this of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
point, Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr., tried to separate the two. and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, and to
When Nestor turned his back, petitioner stabbed him. The pay the victim Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr., … actual damage[s]
former was able to flee while Isaias and the petitioner in the amount of TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND, EIGHTY-EIGHT
wrestled. Shortly thereafter, they fell on the ground with PESOS & TWENTY-EIGHT CENTAVOS (P22, 088.28), and to
Isaias on top of the petitioner. Petitioner was facing up and pay the costs.
pinned by Isaias on the shoulders. But since petitioner’s
hands were free, he was able to stab Isaias at the back. The accused Jose Rimano is hereby sentenced in Criminal
Then, petitioner scampered away towards Malinao Case No. 3578 to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
Elementary School.9 The stabbing of Nestor and Isaias was TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
witnessed by Froilan Sucro from the window of his house, 5 of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
meters away from the victims.10 and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, and to
pay the costs.
Dr. Victor Sta. Maria, who interpreted the Post Operative
Findings on the deceased Nestor Importado, testified that SO ORDERED.29
the latter sustained six wounds,11 thus –
On appeal, the Court of Appeals acquitted petitioner of
(a) right chest with moderate hemathorax at two (2) frustrated homicide in Criminal No. 3578, after finding that
points; he acted in legitimate self-defense when he stabbed
Nelson Importado. His convictions in Criminal Case No.
(b) right upper quadrant, left wrist two (02) points, right 3597 for homicide and in Criminal Case No. 3595 for
back at one (01) point, neck.12 frustrated homicide were, however, affirmed with
On the other hand, the Medico Legal Report states that modification. The decretal portion thereof states:
Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr. sustained a single "stabbed wound WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered and pursuant
left back."13 to applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter and
Invoking self-defense, petitioner testified that at around evidence on hand, the instant appeal is hereby partly
8:30 p.m. of October 16, 1991, he and some of his students granted. The assailed judgment is hereby modified as
went to the police station of Malinao, Aklan, to report an follows:
assault on one of his baseball players.14 On their way back In Criminal No. 3578, accused-appellant is hereby
to their sleeping quarters at Malinao Elementary School, acquitted of the crime charged.
they passed by a group having a drinking spree in front of
a billiard hall. Petitioner’s students were walking about 8 In Criminal Case No. 3595, accused-appellant Jose
meters ahead of him.15 He proceeded and saw a man Rimano’s prison term is reduced to six (6) MONTHS
standing in the middle of the road, whom he later learned of arresto mayor as minimum to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4)
was the deceased Nestor Importado. Petitioner greeted months and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as
Nestor, "Good evening, let us go to sleep now."16 The latter maximum.
did not answer. He noticed a knife in Nestor’s right hand.
In Criminal Case No. 3597, appellant’s prison term is
The latter suddenly rushed towards him and tried to stab
reduced to TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
him. Petitioner, using both his hands, grabbed Nestor’s
DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) years
right hand and placed Nestor’s arms on his shoulder with
and ONE (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
his back facing him.17 While they were wrestling for the
possession of the knife, Nelson Importado,18 brother of All other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED. No Costs.
Nestor, came and boxed petitioner in the face.19 Nelson
SO ORDERED.30
 67

Hence, the instant petition based on the following In Criminal Case No. 3597, for homicide, while the
assignment of errors: aggression came from Nestor Importado, the second
attacker, there was no necessity for petitioner to stab him
A.
6 times, especially considering that the latter was
FOR CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3597, THE COURT OF APPEALS unarmed. Moreover, the stab wound at the back of the
COMMITTED A PALPABLE ERROR AND GRAVE deceased which was delivered by petitioner after the
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN NOT LIKEWISE ACQUITTING former already sustained wounds on his chest and
PETITIONER OF THE CHARGE OF HOMICIDE BECAUSE abdomen cannot certainly be considered as reasonably
CONTRARY TO ITS FINDING, PETITIONER EMPLOYED necessary. When Nestor turned his back, there was no
REASONABLE MEANS TO REPEL THE UNPROVOKED ATTACK more need to stab him because the danger he posed had
AND UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF NESTOR IMPORTADO ceased.
WHO WAS ARMED WITH A BLADED WEAPON.
As to the third requisite that the provocation must be
B. sufficient, it should be proportionate to the aggression and
adequate to stir the aggressor to its commission.34 To be
FOR CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3595, THE COURT OF APPEALS entitled to self-defense, however, the one defending
COMMITTED A PALPABLE ERROR AND GRAVE himself must not have given cause for the aggression by
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN NOT LIKEWISE ACQUITTING his unjust conduct or by inciting or provoking the
PETITIONER OF THE CHARGE OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE aggressor.35
BECAUSE CONTRARY TO ITS FINDING, PETITIONER
EMPLOYED REASONABLE MEANS TO REPEL THE In the instant case, petitioner’s act of stabbing Nelson
UNPROVOKED ATTACK OF ISAIAS IBARDALOZA, JR. WHO cannot be considered as sufficient provocation for Nestor
JOINED THE UNRELENTING AND VICIOUS ATTACK INITIATED to avenge his brother’s injuries. We note that in Criminal
BY THE IMPORTADO BROTHERS. Case No. 3578, for frustrated homicide, petitioner was
acquitted by the Court of Appeals for stabbing Nelson
C. because he was found to have acted in legitimate self-
ONLY ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONER MAY BE defense. Under the contemplation of law, while
CREDITED WITH THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING petitioner’s act may indeed stir Nestor to commit violence,
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE FOR the former should still be credited with the benefit of the
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3597, THE COURT OF APPEALS third requisite because the cause he gave arose from
COMMITTED A PALPABLE ERROR IN NOT REDUCING a just act to protect his life.
AND/OR LOWERING THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES In Criminal Case No. 3595, for frustrated homicide, we
PURSUANT TO THE HONORABLE COURT’S RULING IN TORRES sustain the finding of the court below that it was petitioner
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 143 SCRA 139, 145 [1986] WHICH IS and not Nelson Importado, as claimed by the defense,
APPLICABLE TO PETITIONER. who stabbed Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr. This is supported by the
D. testimony of Froilan Sucro, whose declaration is entitled to
full faith and credit inasmuch as he was not shown to have
ONLY ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PETITIONER MAY BE been impelled by ill motive to perjure himself.36 It cannot
CREDITED WITH THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING be denied, however, that the unlawful aggression came
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE FOR from Isaias who, after intervening between Nestor and
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3595, THE COURT OF APPEALS petitioner, wrestled with the latter. As previously stated,
COMMITTED A PALPABLE ERROR IN NOT REDUCING Isaias pinned petitioner to the ground face up while
AND/OR LOWERING THE PENALTY BY TWO DEGREES holding petitioner’s shoulders. While in this position,
PURSUANT TO THE HONORABLE COURT’S RULING IN TORRES petitioner was able to free himself by delivering a single
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 143 SCRA 139, 145 [1986] WHICH IS stabbing blow at the back of Isaias. Under the
APPLICABLE TO PETITIONER.31 circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner
When an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits did not use unnecessary means to repel an ongoing
authorship of the crime. Consequently, the burden of attack. It would not be proper and reasonable to require
proving his guilt, which lies upon the prosecution, is shifted petitioner to flee or use a less deadly weapon or defense,
to him. He must prove by clear and convincing evidence because in the situation in which he was placed, it was
the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful natural for him to use the weapon he was holding to
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means defend himself. In the natural order of things, following the
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; instinct of self preservation, he was compelled to resort to
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the the available defense.37 In emergencies of this kind,
person defending himself.32 Unlawful aggression is a human nature does not act upon processes of formal
condition sine qua non for upholding the justifying reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation;
circumstance of self-defense. Unless the victim has and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably
committed unlawful aggression against the other, there acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the sanction that act or to mitigate his liability.38
part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the Anent the third requisite, we find that petitioner gave
other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.33 sufficient provocation for Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr. to assault
In the case at bar, we find no error in the findings of the him. Contradistinguished to his act of stabbing Nelson
Court of Appeals that unlawful aggression existed and that Importado, which was justified and hence cannot be
the same came from the Importado brothers and Isaias considered as sufficient provocation insofar as his brother,
Ibardalosa, Jr. Evidence shows that Nelson Importado was Nestor, is concerned, petitioner’s act of stabbing Nestor 6
the first to attack petitioner with a knife and that the latter times can no longer be considered justified or a legitimate
was able to get hold of said weapon which he used to self-defense because of the unreasonable necessity of the
repel the unlawful aggression of Nelson, Nestor and Isaias, means he employed. Inflicting 5 stab wounds at the frontal
who attacked him one after the other. The assaults were portion of Nestor’s body and another one at the back
not simultaneous, but successive, enabling petitioner to before the latter fled can be considered as sufficient
separately and effectively repel the aggression of his provocation to cause Nestor’s friend, Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr.,
unarmed attackers. The question, therefore, lies in the to intervene and thereafter wrestle with petitioner. Hence,
presence or absence of the second and third requisites of self-defense cannot successfully be raised to justify
self defense, i.e., the reasonable necessity of the means petitioner’s act of stabbing Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr., because
employed by petitioner to protect his life and whether he gave the latter sufficient provocation to assault him. At
there was sufficient provocation on his part. the most, he could be credited with the privileged
 68

mitigating circumstance of incomplete self- which cannot be proved with certainty, temperate
defense.1âwphi1 damages in the amount of P25,000.00 may be awarded.49
Under Article 6939 of the Revised Penal Code, in order to In Criminal Case No. 3595, for frustrated homicide the
avail of the privileged mitigating circumstance of award of P22,888.28 as actual damages is affirmed
incomplete self-defense which at the discretion of the considering that it was supported by receipts.
court, reduces the penalty by one or two degrees, than
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the December 16,
that prescribed by law, appellant must prove the
2002 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
existence of a majority of the requisites for self-defense.
17838 finding petitioner Jose Rimano guilty beyond
In the case at bar, a majority of the requisites of the reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Case No. 3597,
justifying circumstance of self-defense, including the and of frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 3595, is
indispensable requisite of unlawful aggression on the part AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: In Criminal
of the victims, are present in Criminal Cases Nos. 3597 and Case No. 3597, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the
3595. Petitioner, a public elementary school teacher, was indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day
unsuspectingly walking along with his students without the of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4)
slightest inkling of an impending harm that would radically months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
change the rest of his life. While it is true that he may have maximum. In addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00,
over-reacted to the assault and in the process provoked petitioner is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
another attack, the fact remains that it was the unlawful deceased Nestor Importado, the amount of P50,000.00 as
aggression of the victims which set into motion the series of moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
events which brought upon themselves the injuries In Criminal Case No. 3595, petitioner is sentenced to suffer
complained of. Under the circumstances, we deem it the penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor and to pay the
proper to modify the penalties imposed by the Court of victim, Isaias Ibardalosa, Jr., the amount of P22,888.28 as
Appeals by lowering them by two degrees than that actual damages.
prescribed by law.40
Costs de oficio.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
SO ORDERED.
penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Considering
that the requisites of unlawful aggression and lack of Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and
sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner are present Azcuna, JJ., concur.
in Criminal Case No. 3597, he is entitled to a penalty two
Footnotes
degrees lower than reclusion temporal, that is, prision
1 Rollo,p. 10; penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred
correccional. There being no modifying circumstances
in by Associate Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and Amelita G.
attendant in the present case, the proper impossible Tolentino.
penalty is prision correccional in its medium
2 Decision dated 23 November 1994; penned by Judge Maria Carillo
period.41 Applying the indeterminate sentence law,
Zaldivar.
petitioner is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the
3 Criminal Case No. 3597, Records, p. 18; Criminal Case No. 3595, Records,
minimum of which shall be within the range of arresto
p. 20; Criminal Case No. 3578, Records, p. 26.
mayor, and the maximum of which shall be within the
range of prision correccional medium. 4 Criminal Case No. 3597, Records, p. 1.
5 Sometimes spelled as "Ibardaloza" in the records.
Pursuant to Article 5042 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for a frustrated crime is one degree lower than 6 Criminal Case No. 3595, Records, p. 1.
that prescribed by law for the consummated felony; thus, 7 TSN, 13 November 1992, p. 4.
frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor. Since a
8 Id., pp. 3-4.
majority of the requisites of self defense – unlawful
aggression and reasonable necessity of the means 9 TSN,13 November 1992, pp. 5-6; 4 January 1994, pp. 5-8; 23 July 1993, pp.
employed – are attendant in Criminal Case No. 3595 for 11-13.

frustrated homicide, petitioner is also entitled to a penalty 10 TSN, 4 January 1994, p. 5.

two degrees lower.43 The imposable penalty on petitioner 11 TSN, 21 June 1993, pp. 4-6.
would therefore be arresto mayor. The same shall be
12 Exhibit "G", Post Operative Findings.
imposed in its medium period as there are no attendant
modifying circumstances.44 Since the maximum term of 13 Exhibit "F".
imprisonment does not exceed one year, the 14 Id., pp. 140-141; 144-145.
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply.45
15 Id., pp. 146-147.
As regards his civil liability in Criminal Case No. 3597 for 16 Id., p. 148.
homicide, petitioner, in addition to the civil indemnity of
17 Id., pp. 148-151.
P50,000.00, should be further ordered to pay the heirs of
the deceased Nestor Importado, moral damages in the 18 TSN, 30 August 1994, p. 28.
amount of P50,000.00 and temperate damages of 19 TSN, 29 August 1994, p. 153.
P25,000.00 in lieu of actual damages. As testified by Merly
20 Id., pp. 153-154.
Importado, the widow of the deceased, she was shocked
and mentally tortured by the death of her 21 TSN, 23 July 1993, p. 4.
husband.46Hence, the award of moral damages, which 22 TSN, 29 August 1994, pp. 154-157.
current jurisprudence set at P50,000.00, is proper.47 To justify
23 TSN, 30 August 1994, pp. 2-3.
an award of actual damages, on the other hand, there
must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. 24 Id., p. 29.
Credence can only be given to those that are supported 25 Id., p. 4.
by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred
26 Id., p. 29.
in connection with the death, wake and burial of the
victim.48 Considering that the receipts presented by the 27 Id., pp. 4-6.
prosecution do not show that the expenses stated therein 28 Id., pp. 30-31.
were really incurred in connection with the death and 29 Rollo, p. 93.
burial of the victim, the claim for actual damages cannot
be allowed. However, since it cannot be denied that the 30 Rollo, pp. 69-70.
victim’s heirs suffered pecuniary loss but the amount of 31 Rollo, pp. 38-40.
 69

32 People v. Hugo, G.R. No. 134604, 28 August 2003.

33 Peoplev. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, 10 September 2003, citing People v.
Camacho, 411 Phil. 715 (2001); People v. Flores, G.R. No. 138841, 4 April
G.R. No. 139879 May 8, 2003
2001, 356 SCRA 332; People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103613, 23
February 2001, 352 SCRA 599; Calim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140065,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GABRIEL
13 February 2001, 351 SCRA 599. ANNIBONG y INGGAO, appellant.
34 People
v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366 (1947), cited in Reyes, The Revised Penal QUISUMBING, J.:
Code, Vol. I, 1998 Edition, p. 180.
35 Reyes,
For automatic review is the decision1 of the Regional Trial
The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1998 Edition, p. 179.
Court of Apayao, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 9-98,
36 People v. Garillo, G.R. No. 146189, 24 February 2003. convicting appellant Gabriel Annibong of murder and
37 People v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367, 369-370 (1907). sentencing him to death.
38 People v. Viernes, 331 Phil. 146, 162 (1996), citing People of the Philippines The information2 filed by the Provincial Prosecutor reads:
v. Encomienda, G.R. No. L-26750, 18 August 1972, 26 SCRA 522, 534; People
v. Lara, 48 Phil. 153 (1925). That on or about February 13, 1998 at around 2:00 o'clock
39 Art.
69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly P.M. at barangay Doña Loreta, Pudtol, Apayao, within the
excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of accused armed with a long firearm, with intent to kill and
the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt
from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12,
with the attendance of treachery and evident
provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of feloneously (sic) attack, assault and shot one Cpl. Fidel
the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. Obngayan,3 inflicting upon the latter gun shot wounds
40 People v. Bergaño, 52 Phil. 313 (1928). which caused death.
41 Article 64 (1), Revised Penal Code. CONTRARY TO LAW.
42 Art.
50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. —
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated charge. Although he admitted killing the victim, appellant
felony. invoked self-defense. Thus, the order of the trial was
43 Article 69, Revised Penal Code. reversed, with the defense presenting its evidence first.
44 Article 64 (1), Revised Penal Code. For the defense, appellant Gabriel Annibong and lone
45 Act No. 4103, Sec. 2, as amended.
eyewitness Artemio Tallong, a CAFGU member assigned at
the Army Camp Detachment at Doña Loreta, Pudtol,
46 TSN, November 29, 1993, p. 23.
Apayao, testified. Tallong was also adopted as a
47 Peoplev. Escarlos, G.R. No. 148912, 10 September 2003, citing People v. prosecution witness.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 139177, 11 August 2003; People v. Ibañez, G.R. Nos.
133923-24, 30 July 2003. Appellant, a kitchen aide serving at the camp, testified
48 People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 142467, 10 June 2003.
that on February 13, 1998, while he and Tallong were in
their camp at Barangay Doña Loreta, Pudtol, Apayao, the
49 People v. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, 7 February 2003.
victim arrived coming from Centro, Pudtol, Apayao. When
Obngayan went to the kitchen to get a drink, he was
irritated to discover the water container empty. Hopping
mad, Obngayan rushed to appellant and boxed him three
times in the stomach and uttered: "Vulva of your mother, it
is better that I will kill you." Obngayan proceeded to his
bunker, got his M-16 rifle and aimed it at appellant,
prompting the latter to shoot the victim once. After the first
shot, the victim managed to stand and aim his gun at
appellant prompting the latter to fire his M-16. But since the
M-16 malfunctioned, appellant grabbed the garand rifle
of Artemio Tallong and shot the victim once more.
Immediately after the shooting, appellant escaped with
Tallong and proceeded to Suan, Pudtol, Apayao. Two
days later, both surrendered to Governor Batara P. Laoat,
who advised them to surrender to the police.
ARTEMIO TALLONG was presented by the defense to show
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.4 As one of
the CAFGU's on duty at the time of the incident, he said he
witnessed the incident from the time Cpl. Obngayan
arrived at the detachment until he was shot.
Tallong narrated that on February 13, 1998, around 2:00
P.M., Cpl. Obngayan arrived at the Philippine Army
detachment in Brgy. Doña Loreta, Pudtol, Apayao where
he was then the commanding officer.5 Still perspiring and
thirsty from an operation in Centro, Pudtol, Apayao, Cpl.
Obngayan hurriedly proceeded to the camp's kitchen for
a drink. Incensed that all of the water containers were
empty, Obngayan confronted appellant whose duty it
was to maintain the camp's kitchen. He gave appellant a
jab in the abdomen, then slowly walked away towards his
bunker.
Infuriated, appellant without warning, picked up his M-14
armalite rifle and strafed the former on the back.
Obngayan sprawled bloodied on the ground. Shortly
after, appellant took the garand rifle of Artemio Tallong,
 70

and unleashed another barrage of gunshots. Obngayan By reason of the death sentence imposed upon appellant,
died instantaneously with his brain splattered and an eye the decision is now before us for automatic review.
fallen on the ground.
In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the
The prosecutor adopted the testimony of defense witness following errors:
Artemio Tallong for purposes of the prosecution. Other
I. IN FINDING AND HOLDING THAT THERE WERE NO
prosecution witnesses were Dr. Dan Redel Edroso, the
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM
Municipal Health Officer of Pudtol, Apayao, who
CORPORAL FIDEL OBNGAYAN AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
conducted a post-mortem examination on the victim's
body; Lt. Walfrido Felix Querubin of the Philippine Army; II. IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS THE QUALIFYING
Cpl. Robert Salarzon, from the Philippine Army assigned at CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WHICH WOULD QUALIFY
Nararragan, Ballesteros, Cagayan; Capt. Efren Paulino, THE CRIME TO MURDER.
from the Philippine Army assigned at the Headquarters
Service Battalion, Camp Upi, Gamu, Isabela; and Mrs. III. IN FINDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
Agnes Obngayan, the victim's widow. OF INSULT OR DISREGARD TO RANK IS PRESENT IN THE CASE
AT BAR.
DR. DAN REDEL EDROSO declared that on February 14,
1998, he conducted an autopsy6 on the victim's remains IV. IN FINDING THE LONE EYEWITNESS ARTEMIO TALLONG AS
which revealed nine gunshot wounds. From his CREDIBLE AND TRUSTWORTHY WITNESS TOGETHER WITH HIS
examination of the wounds, Dr. Edroso opined that two ORAL TESTIMONY.
were inflicted from the back of the victim while five were V. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED ACTED IN SELF-
inflicted while the victim was already lying down with his DEFENSE WHEN HE KILLED THE VICTIM.15
face up.7 He said, the multiple shots on the victim's head
caused his immediate death. We shall now consider the following pertinent issues: (1)
whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of Cpl.
LT. WALFRIDO FELIX QUERUBIN, the Platoon Leader of the Obngayan; (2) whether the killing was attended by the
Headquarters Company of the Philippine Army in qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
Capagaypayan, Luna, Apayao, testified that he arrived at premeditation; and (3) whether the imposition of the
the scene of the crime after Obngayan was death penalty on appellant is appropriate.
slain.8 According to him, he found the victim lying up, his
left eye fallen and brains scattered on the ground.9 Shortly Appellant admits shooting Cpl. Obngayan. But he claims
after his arrival, Lt. Querubin inventoried the firearms issued that he did so merely to repel the victim's unlawful
to the detachment and found the firearms all intact in the aggression. He contends that since the victim was the
cabinet except an M-14 and a garand rifle10 - the actual aggressor, there can be no treachery. He adds that
weapons used by appellant. he had not intended to insult or disregard the rank of the
victim. He insists that Artemio Tallong was a turncoat
CPL. ROBERT SALARZON and CAPT. EFREN PAULINO from whose testimony should, therefore, be considered
the Philippine Army corroborated the testimony of Lt. unworthy of credit.
Querubin as to the position of the victim's body when they
arrived at the scene of the crime for investigation.11 In his Brief, appellant offers no substantial reason, however,
why we should overturn the trial court's appreciation of the
MRS. AGNES OBNGAYAN testified that her husband was evidence presented against him. Instead, he merely
the sole breadwinner of the family and was earning P9,000 reiterates in this appeal his claim of self-defense. In cases
monthly, more or less.12 According to her, Cpl. Obngayan where the accused admits committing the crime but
was 35 years old when he died, leaving her with their two invokes self-defense, the basic rule that the burden of
children. As a result of Fidel's death, the Obngayans proving the guilt of the accused lies on the prosecution is
incurred expenses amounting to thirty thousand pesos reversed, and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused
more or less.13 to prove the elements of his defense.16 In our view, the
On June 15, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision defense has not discharged its burden successfully.
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the The elements of self-defense are (1) that the victim has
murder of his commander and sentencing him as follows: committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or
WHEREFORE, foregoing all considered, and finding the imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming
accused GABRIEL ANNIBONG y INGAO (sic) guilty beyond self-defense; (2) that there is reasonable necessity in the
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder committed means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
under Article 248 paragraph one (1) of the Revised Penal aggression; and (3) that there is lack of sufficient
Code of the Philippines as charged in the information with provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
the special aggravating circumstance of with insult or in defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the
disregard of the respect due the offended party on person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and
account of his rank under Article 14 paragraph 3 of the immediate cause of the victim's aggression.17
same Penal Code, this Court hereby sentences said Granting that the initial act of aggression came from the
accused Gabriel Annibong y Ingao to suffer the Supreme victim when he cursed and then punched appellant three
penalty of DEATH. times in the stomach, such aggression did not amount to
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the surviving actual or imminent threat to appellant's life as the victim
spouse of the victim, Cpl. Fidel Obngayan, in the amount already ceased and desisted thereafter. As defense
of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), for such death, in witness Tallong testified, the victim was already walking
addition to the payment of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS slowly away towards his bunker18 at the time appellant
(P20,000.00) for moral damages, TEN THOUSAND PESOS shot him incessantly. At that point, it was no longer
(P10,000.00) as and for exemplary damages, TWENTY FIVE necessary for appellant to shoot Obngayan in order to
THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) for actual expenses and protect himself. As held in People v. More,19 "In legitimate
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for the lost self-defense the aggression must still be existing or
earnings of the victim and the costs of the suit. continuing when the person making the defense attacks
or injures the aggressor. Thus when the unlawful aggression
The BJMP, Luna, Apayao is ordered to immediately shift the ceases to exist, the one making the defense has no more
person of the accused to the Bureau of Prisons, Muntinlupa right to kill the former aggressor."
City for detention thereat to await the automatic review
of this decision. Appellant's act of shooting the unarmed victim first with an
M-16 and a garand rifle, successively, belies his claim that
SO ORDERED.14
 71

he acted in self-preservation and indicates nothing more when the accused hatched the murderous plan, and the
than the desire to kill. Thus, Tallong testified: interval of time therefrom to its commission.
Q: You said that Gabriel Annibong used the M-14 rifle But we differ from the trial court's finding and conclusion
in shooting Fidel Ubngayan, how come that the garand with regard to the aggravating circumstance of disregard
was also used by Gabriel Annibong in shooting Fidel of rank as well as respect due to the offended party.
Ubngayan? Although the victim was the immediate superior officer of
the appellant, being his Detachment Commander at the
A: He used first the M-14 rifle in shooting Fidel
time of the commission of the crime,28 this fact was not
Ubngayan but when he was not satisfied he took the
alleged in the information. Hence, this circumstance
garand and used it again in shooting Ubngayan.20
cannot be appreciated to increase appellant's liability
Tallong's recital of the events, in our view, is more in accord following Section 8 of Rule 110.29
with the natural course of things and ordinary human
Appellant's surrender to police authorities after the
experience. Further, his testimony is validated by the
shooting should be credited in his favor as a mitigating
evidence on record on all material points. The post-
circumstance, pursuant to Article 13 (7) of the Revised
mortem examination of Dr. Edroso, while negating
Penal Code.30 There is voluntary surrender if three
appellant's tale that he shot the victim only twice,
conditions are satisfied: (1) the offender has not been
confirmed Tallong's story that there were more shots fired.
arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority
Tallong's narration, as to the position of the victim when
or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender
shot, tallied with the doctor's findings that two of the
was voluntary. There is no dispute that appellant voluntarily
gunshot wounds were inflicted while the assailant was
surrendered to the governor31 a person in authority, then
behind the victim and that the other five were dealt while
to the police, before he was arrested. In People v.
the victim was lying face up on the ground.21 His account
Antonio,32 the accused's surrender to the mayor was
that the victim was unarmed matched with Lt. Querubin's
considered as a mitigating circumstance. In the same
testimony that all of the weapons issued to the
way, appellant's voluntary surrender to the governor
detachment were found intact except the M-16 and the
should be considered in his favor. It is immaterial that
garand rifle used in perpetrating the crime.22
appellant did not immediately surrender to the authorities,
The credibility of prosecution witness Artemio Tallong is not but did so only after the lapse of two days. In People v.
in any way lessened, much less impaired, by the motives Bautista,33 the voluntary surrender of the accused to a
imputed to them by appellant. Appellant claims that police authority four (4) days after the commission of the
Tallong was a defector who fled the scene with him crime was considered attenuating. Finally, even if not
immediately after the incident, and surfaced with raised on appeal, since an appeal opens the whole case
appellant only two days after the shooting. Appellant's for review, we could take into account this mitigating
contention is nothing more than a desperate attempt to circumstance favorable to appellant.
discredit said witness. Different people react differently to
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death,
a given type of situation and there is no standard form of
both indivisible penalties. Conformably with Art. 63, par. 3,
behavioral response when one is confronted with a
of the Revised Penal Code, when the commission of the
startling, strange or frightful experience. Considering that
act is attended by one mitigating and there is no
appellant himself admitted that Tallong had no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
participation in the murder, the fact that he fled the scene
imposed. Considering that the crime was not attended by
with appellant should not by itself be taken against him.
the alleged circumstance of evident premeditation, the
This Court recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses
undisputed presence of the mitigating circumstance of
to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
voluntary surrender entitles appellant to the imposition of
aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to
the minimum penalty for murder. Thus, the proper
fear of reprisal is not uncommon.23
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, being the lesser
The element of treachery attended the slaying of penalty.34
Obngayan because (1) the means of execution
As to the award of damages, the trial court offered no
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to
explanation for the award of P500,000 as lost earnings. Cpl.
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of
Obngayan was 35 years old at the time of his death. His
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.24 In
wife and superiors testified that he was earning P9,000 a
this case, the victim was totally unprepared for the volley
month35 during his lifetime or an annual income of
of gunshots by appellant. The victim unarmed, while
P108,000. Using the accepted formula, we fix the
appellant was carrying a weapon.25 When shot, the victim
indemnity for loss of earning capacity36 of Cpl. Obngayan
was already retiring, as he was then slowly turning away
at P1,620,000, thus:
towards his bunker. As he was already walking away
towards his bunker, he was clueless of appellant's sudden 2 x (80-35) x [P108,000-½ (P108,000)]
Net earning
attack. Such unexpected and sudden attack under = -
capacity
circumstances that render the victim unable and 3
unprepared to defend himself constitutes alevosia.26
2 x (45) x P54,000
From the circumstances of this case, we are persuaded = -
that appellant consciously and purposely adopted the 3
means of attack to insure the execution of the crime
without risk to himself. Thus, the trial court did not err when = 35.33 x P54,000
it ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder.
= P1,620,000
As for evident premeditation, we agree that its elements
were not clearly established by the prosecution. To prove We delete the twenty five thousand peso-award for actual
this attendant circumstance, evidence must show: (1) the expenses in the absence of requisite proof, 37 but in
time the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an lieuthereof, P10,000 is awarded as nominal damages. 38
act indicating that the offender had clung to his As for moral damages, pursuant to current jurisprudence,
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the amount should be increased to P50,000. 39 The award
the determination to commit the crime and the execution of P50,000 as death indemnity to the heirs of the deceased
thereof to allow the offender to reflect upon the is retained as well as the award of P20,000 as exemplary
consequences of his act.27 There is no clear proof as to damages, which we find to be sufficient and justified by
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
 72

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 149275 September 27, 2004
Apayao, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 9-98, is AFFIRMED
VICKY C. TY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gabriel Annibong y Inggao
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
is declared guilty of murder, but his sentence is hereby
reduced to reclusion perpetua. Further, he is ordered to DECISION
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P1,620,000.00 for lost earnings, P10,000.00 as TINGA, J.:
nominal damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and Petitioner Vicky C. Ty ("Ty") filed the instant Petition for
P20,000 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio. Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision1 of
SO ORDERED. the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No.
20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decisionaffirmed
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ ., concur. guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas
Panganiban, J ., on leave. Pambansa Blg. 222 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the
Footnotes Bouncing Checks Law.
1 Rollo, pp. 20-30. This case stemmed from the filing of seven
2 Id. at 20-21; Records, p. 32. (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the
3 Also spelled "Ugnayan" and "Ubngayan" in other parts of the records.
RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The
4 TSN, 23 November 1998, p. 2.
accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No.
Id. at 2-3.
93-130465 reads as follows:
5

6 Records, p. 114.
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila,
7 TSN, 4 March 1999, p. 10.
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
8 TSN, 15 March 1999, pp. 3-4. unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
9 Id. at 5. Manila Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account or for value
10 Ibid. to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated
May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the
11TSN, 27 April 1999, pp. 4-5 (Cpl. Robert Salarzon); TSN, 27 April 1999, pp. 6-7 (Capt. Efren
Paulino). amount of ₱30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at
12 TSN, 15 March 1999, p. 31.
the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in
13 Id. at 30.
full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
Rollo, pp. 29-30. payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was
14

15 Id. at 64. subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for

16 People v. Vallador, 327 Phil. 303, 312-313 (1996). "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
17 People v. Enfectana, G.R. No. 132028, 19 April 2002, p. 10.
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors
Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement
18 TSN, 23 November 1998, p. 4.
for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days
19 G.R. No. 128820, 23 December 1999, 321 SCRA 538, 545. after receiving said notice.
20 TSN, 23 November 1998, p. 11.
Contrary to law.3
21 TSN, 4 March 1999, p. 10.
22 TSN, 15 March 1999, p. 5.
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the
number of the checks and dates of issue. The data are
23 People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 128900, 14 July 2000, 335 SCRA 646, 661.
hereunder itemized as follows:
24 People v. Mabubay, G.R. No. 87018, 24 May 1990, 185 SCRA 675, 680.
25 Supra, note 18. Criminal Check
Postdated Amount
26 Supra, note 17 at 11. Case No. No.
27 People v. Kinok, G.R. No. 104629, 13 November 2001, 368 SCRA 510, 521.
28 TSN, 23 November 1998, p. 3. 93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 ₱30,000.00
29 People v. Feliciano, G.R. Nos. 127759-60, 24 September 2001, 365 SCRA 613, 630.
30 ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances: 93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 ₱30,000.00
xxx xxx xxx

7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 ₱30,000.00
agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
30 December
xxx xxx xxx 93-130462 487707 ₱30,000.00
1992
31 TSN, 12 January 1999, p. 14.
32 G.R. No. 128900, 14 July 2000, 335 SCRA 646, 668.
30 November
93-130463 487706 ₱30,000.00
33G.R. No. 109800, 12 March 1996, 254 SCRA 621, 629, citing People v. Yecla, 68 Phil. 740 1992
(1939).
34 People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 132168, 10 October 2000, 342 SCRA 431, 440.
30 January
35 Supra, note 12. 93-130464 487708 ₱30,000.00
1993
36 Loss of earning capacity = Life expectancy x (gross annual income - living expenses)

Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - age at time of death)

93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 ₱30,000.004
Living expenses = 50% of gross annual income (People v. Gelin, G.R. No. 135693, 1 April
2002, p. 9.)
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her
37 People v. Nullan, 365 Phil. 227, 256 (1999).
arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.5
38 People v. Hate, G.R. No. 145712, 24 September 2002, p. 8.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother
39People v. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, 10 January 2002, p. 12; People v. Guzman, G.R. No.
132750, 14 December 2001, p. 14; People v. Herrera, G.R. Nos. 140557-58, 5 December Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors’
2001, p. 23. Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992.
Being the patient’s daughter, Ty signed the
"Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the
 73

Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.6 As of 4 (₱60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the
June 1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total check, in each case."15
liability of the mother in the amount of ₱657,182.40. Ty’s
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s
sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from
defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks
13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the
and the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s
amount of ₱418,410.55.8 The total hospital bills of the two
lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of
patients amounted to ₱1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty
issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense,
executed a promissory note wherein she assumed
it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the
payment of the obligation in installments.9 To assure
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for
payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to
checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The
its issuance.16
seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of
₱30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there
were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned was no valuable consideration for the issuance of the
unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills
the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the of Ty’s mother.17
complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by
registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the
complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of
instant case.10 Appeals18 wherein this Court declared that in determining
the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
because of "an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury." She observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and
averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty
release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and and economic usefulness, with due regard to the
harshly treated and would not discharge unless the protection of the social order.19
hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was
deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the
refrigerator and television set, and subject to same issues raised before the Court of Appeals. More
inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court
line, late delivery of her mother’s food and refusal to based on the following grounds:
change the latter’s gown and bedsheets. She also A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
bewailed the hospital’s suspending medical treatment of PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR COMPELLED IN THE
her mother. The "debasing treatment," she pointed out, so OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE
affected her mother’s mental, psychological and physical SUBJECT CHECKS.
health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would
not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF
her mother, and to comply with the demands of the AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN
hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY
her mother’s immediate discharge.11 SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION IN THE
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
the prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE
checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE
of her mother and rejected the theory of the ACCOUNT.
defense.12Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered
a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE
of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED
dispositive part of the Decision reads: CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of
issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation, In its Memorandum,20 the Office of the Solicitor General
which turned unfounded on their respective dates of (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a check issued
maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary
the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when
total of forty-two (42) months. a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will
generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was
SO ORDERED.13 issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued
defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse of nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The
an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
of a greater evil or injury." She also argued that the trial prohibitum.21
court erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly
there was absence of valuable consideration for the sustain Ty’s conviction.
issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and
that the trial court should not have applied the law conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
mechanically, without due regard to the principles of entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be
justice and equity.14 disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked certain facts or
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court circumstances which would substantially affect the
affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. disposition of the case.22Jurisdiction of this Court over
It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to
sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of
Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry
 74

even more weight when said court affirms the findings of required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the
the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are form of postdated checks or jewelry.30 And if indeed she
totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue
glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene
discretion.23 to avoid involvement.
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the
reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her
not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks
"because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big
subject of this case. She, however, claims that the issuance
problem."31 Besides, apart from petitioner’s bare assertion,
of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable
the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and
fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or
bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to
injury. She would also have the Court believe that there
cooperate with and give in to the hospital’s demands.
was no valuable consideration in the issuance of the
checks. Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of
her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying
However, except for the defense’s claim of uncontrollable
circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of
fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or
the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.
injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which
are best determined by the trial court. And, as previously We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three
intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this
of the defense and rendered judgment accordingly. paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of
done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and
arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and
less harmful means of preventing it.32
the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual
questions already passed upon twice below, rather than In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely
questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided
petition. is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the
future, this defense is not applicable.33 Ty could have
The only question of law raised--whether the defense of
taken advantage of an available option to avoid
uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption
committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the
from criminal liability--has to be resolved in the negative.
choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked
postdated checks to secure her obligation.
successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1)
existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be
real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater availing, the greater injury feared should not have been
than or at least equal to that committed.24 brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so,
the willful inaction of the actor.34 In this case, the issuance
It must appear that the threat that caused the
of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own
uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that
failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills.
the ordinary man would have succumbed to it.25 It should
be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the
life or limb.26 A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the
It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.27 A person justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her
invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty
compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as checks was done without her full volition. Under the
well.28 It must be of such character as to leave no circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither
opportunity to the accused for escape.29 uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or
injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was
not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the
to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly trial court in the Civil Case35 for damages filed by Ty’s
demanded of her before her mother could be mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes
discharged--for fear that her mother’s health might of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein
deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the may establish a claim for damages which, we may add,
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is need only be supported by a preponderance of
speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable
contemplated by law. doubt as to free Ty from liability.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon
illness was so life-threatening such that her continued stay issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the
in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment contrary, that the same was issued for valuable
would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her consideration.36 Section 2437 of the Negotiable Instruments
death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any Law creates a presumption that every party to an
fear exempts one from criminal liability much less instrument acquired the same for a consideration 38 or for
petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit value.39 In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that
suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not the checks were issued without consideration. She must
impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition present convincing evidence to overthrow the
and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved presumption.
exclusively by the hospital’s threats or demands.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left discharge her burden of proof. "Valuable consideration
with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take may in general terms, be said to consist either in some
advantage of the many opportunities available to her to right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who
avoid committing one. By her very own words, she makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss
admitted that the collateral or security the hospital or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given,
 75

suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special
valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical
or not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, application of the law.
such as the maker or indorser."40
Petitioner’s reliance on the case is misplaced. The material
In this case, Ty’s mother and sister availed of the services operative facts therein obtaining are different from those
and the facilities of the hospital. For the care given to her established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the
kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by bounced checks were issued to cover a "warranty deposit"
virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the
signature on her mother’s Contract of Admission financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandiwhereby
acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while
promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital. privately financing those in desperate need so they may
be accommodated. The maker of the check thus
Anent Ty’s claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills
became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under
was not her personal obligation because she was not the
the guise of a lease-purchase agreement. The maker did
patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the
not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were
checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.41 tells us that "it
used as collateral for an accommodation and not to
is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the
cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.
maker to say that there was no consideration which was
beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the
consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third receipt of an actual "account or for value." Substantial
person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals,
instance of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee has established that the checks were issued in payment of
foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment the hospital bills of Ty’s mother.
and the release and extinguishment of the original
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the
obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants
penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner
meets the requirement. Appellee accepted one debtor in
was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad
place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting
faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000,50 adopting the
obligation for the note executed by the appellants. This, of
rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals51 and Lim v.
itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes."
People,52 authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions.
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.42 B.P. of Administrative Circular 13-200153 which clarified
22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No.
obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation.43 The
12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
checks and putting them into circulation.44 As this Court
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,45 "what is primordial
is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of
its worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of preference in the application of the penal provisions of
their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22." B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the
offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of
clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the
provides:
more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - determination of whether circumstances warrant the
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.
which is refused by the drawee bank because of Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the ought not be deemed a hindrance.
check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular
such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon,
penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned
or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee
may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to
the checks for insufficiency of funds.46 If not rebutted, it impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of
suffices to sustain a conviction.47 the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise
be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the
fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine,
fact that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee
there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised
bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her
Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.54
liability.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July
funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as
2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating
deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty
a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance
is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the
thereof is inconsequential.48
amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
Appeals49 wherein this Court inquired into the true nature insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised
of transaction between the drawer and the payee and Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private
finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that complainant, Manila Doctors’ Hospital, the amount of Two
 76

Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (₱210,000.00) representing value, and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand
or at a future date.
the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against
the petitioner. 39SEC. 191. Definitions and meaning of terms.- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires:
SO ORDERED.
xxx
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario*, "Value" means valuable consideration.
JJ., concur.
Agbayani, Aguedo, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
40

Footnotes Commercial Laws of the Philippines, 1992 Edition, p. 235; Citations omitted.
1Penned by Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona, concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. 41 88 Kan 98, 127 Pacific Reporter 604, 9 November 1912; Citations omitted.
Labitoria and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
42Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99032, 26 March 1997, 270 SCRA
2Entitled "An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a 423; Aguirre v. People, G.R. No. 144142, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA
Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes." 672; Abarquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148557, 7 August 2003, 408
SCRA 500; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 105461, 11 November 1993,
3 Rollo, p. 44; See also Rollo, pp. 92 and 109. 227 SCRA 723.
4 Ibid; See also Rollo, pp. 62 and 93. 43 Llamado v. Court of Appeals, supra.
5 Id. at 44, 62, 93. 44Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, Adm. Matter No. MJT-93-849, 26
October 1994, 237 SCRA 724; Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738, 17
6 Id. at 46; Exhibits C and C-1.
June 1994, 233 SCRA 301.
7 Ibid.; Exhibits D, D-1 to D-3. 45 G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 436.
8 Exhibit D-4. 46 Meriz v. People, G.R. No. 134498, 13 November 2001, 368 SCRA 524.
9 Supra, note 3 at 61, citing Exhibits E and E-1. 47 Rosa Lim v. People. G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000, 340 SCRA 497.
10Id. at 46-47; See also Respondent’s Comment, Rollo, pp. 60-61 and 48 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738, 17 June 1994, 233 SCRA 301.
Respondent’s Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 90-91.
49 G.R. No. 96132, 26 June 1992, 210 SCRA 471.
11 Id. at 47 and 49.
12 Id. at 48.
50 Issued on 21 November 2000.
51 Supra note 14.
13 Id. at 44-45; Written by Honorable Zenaida R. Daguna, Presiding Judge.
52 Supra note 27.
14 Id. at 51.
53 Issued on 14 February 2001.
15 Id. at 53.
54Abarquez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148557, 7 August 2003, 408 SCRA
16 Id. at 51-52; Citations omitted.
500.
17 Id. at 51.
18 G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656, 659.
19 Supra, note 3 at 53.
20 Id. at 90-102; Dated 11 September 2002.
21 Id. at 95-96; Citations omitted.
22Spouses Villarico v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105912, 28 June 1999, 309
SCRA 193; Lim v. People, G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 436.
23Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127523, 22 March 1999, 305 SCRA
118; Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107737, 1 October 1999, 316 SCRA
43; Baguio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 119682, 21 January 1999,
301 SCRA 450; Lim v. People, G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA
436.
24 People v. Petenia, No. L-51256, 12 August 1986, 143 SCRA 361, 369.
25 U.S. v. Elicanal, No. 11439, 35 Phil 209, 212, 213 (1916).
26People v. Abanes, No. L-30609, 28 September 1976, 73 SCRA 44,
47; People v. Loreno, No. L-54414, 9 July 1984, 130 SCRA 311, 321,
322; People v. Serrano, No. L-45382, 13 May 1985, 136 SCRA 399, 405.
27People v. Jesus, No. L-2313, 88 Phil. 53, 56 (1951); People v. Palencia, No.
L-38957, 30 April 1976, 71 SCRA 679, 690; See also Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1997 Edition, Vol. 1, p. 234 and Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal
Law Review, 1997 Edition, p. 79.
28 People v. Tami, G.R. Nos. 101801-03, 2 May 1995, 244 SCRA 1, 23.
29People v. Villanueva, No. L-9529, 104 Phil. 450, 464 (1958), Citation
omitted; People v. De Los Reyes, G.R. No. 44112, 22 October 1992, 215 SCRA
63, 70; See also People v. Nuñez, G.R. Nos. 112429-30, 341 Phil 817, 828
(1997).
30Supra, note 3 at 15 and 112; See also TSN dated September 19, 1994, p.
24.
31 TSN dated September 19, 1994, p. 25.
32 Par. 4, Art. 11, Revised Penal Code.
33 Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 1998 Edition, Book 1, p. 191.
34 Id. at 192.
35Entitled "So Un Chua v. Manila Doctors’ Hospital," Civil Case No. 63958,
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 159.
36Lim v. People, G.R. No. 143231, 26 October 2001, 368 SCRA 436; Sec. 24,
The Negotiable Instruments Law.
37SEC. 24. Presumption of consideration.- Every negotiable instrument is
deemed prima facie to have been issued for valuable consideration; and
every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party
thereto, for value.
38SEC. 25. Value; What constitutes.- Value is any consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes
 77

G.R. No. 149152 February 2, 2007 The three policemen, i.e., petitioner, Diaz and Cruz, each
armed with a drawn handgun, searched the rooftop.
RUFINO S. MAMANGUN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
There, they saw a man whom they thought was the
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
robbery suspect. At that instance, petitioner Mamangun,
DECISION who was walking ahead of the group, fired his handgun
once, hitting the man. The man turned out to be Gener
GARCIA, J.: Contreras (Contreras) who was not the robbery suspect.
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Contreras died from the gunshot wound. The autopsy
Court, petitioner Rufino Mamangun y Silverio seeks the conducted by Dr. Benito B. Caballero yielded the
reversal of the Decision1 dated January 19, 2001 following findings:
(promulgated on February 13, 2001) of the
Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case No. 21131, convicting The cause of death was "Shock due to massive external
him of the crime of Homicide. and internal hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds
in the left arm side of the thorax, penetrating the left lung
The factual backdrop: and vertebral column." There were several wounds caused
On September 12, 1994, herein petitioner, then a police by one (1) bullet.
officer, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the As shown on the sketch of human body attached to the
crime of Murder, allegedly committed, per the indicting Certificate of Death, and as testified on by Dr. Caballero,
Information,2 docketed as Criminal Case No. 21131, as the bullet entered through the "lower third of the left arm,
follows: left side of the thorax and it penetrated the left lung and
That on or about the 31st day of July 1992, in the vertebral column and that is where the slug was found."
Municipality of Meycauyan, (sic) Province of Bulacan, From a layman’s appreciation of the sketch, the bullet
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable entered the outer, upper left arm of the victim, exited
Court, the said accused Rufino S. Mamangun, a public through the inner side of the said upper left arm, a little
officer, being then a Police Officer (PO2), duly appointed lower than the left armpit and the slug lodging on the
as such and acting in relation to his office, armed with a victim’s back where it was recovered at the vertebral
gun, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, column.3
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident From the foregoing admitted or undisputed facts, the
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attack, prosecution and the defense presented conflicting
assault and shoot one Gener M. Contreras with the said versions as to how the fatal shooting of Contreras by
gun, hitting the latter on his body, thereby inflicting (sic) petitioner Mamangun actually happened.
him serious physical injuries which directly cause (sic) his
death. According to Ayson, the lone eyewitness for the
prosecution, he accompanied the three policemen
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Mamangun, Diaz and Cruz) to the rooftop of Abacan’s
On arraignment, petitioner, as accused below, duly house. He was following petitioner Mamangun who was
assisted by a counsel de oficio, entered a plea of "Not ahead of the group. They passed through the second-floor
Guilty." door of the house to the rooftop. The roof was lighted by
an incandescent bulb from an adjacent house. He was
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented in evidence beside Mamangun when they saw, some four to five arms-
the testimonies of Crisanto Ayson (Ayson), an alleged length away, a man whom he (witness) recognized as
eyewitness, and Dr. Benito Caballero, then the designated Gener Contreras. Mamangun pointed his .45 cal. pistol at
Medico-Legal Officer of Bulacan who performed an the man, who instantly exclaimed, "Hindi ako, hindi ako!,"
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. to which Mamangun replied, "Anong hindi ako?" Before he
For its part, the defense adduced in evidence the (Ayson) could say anything, Mamangun fired his gun,
testimonies of the accused himself, Rufino Mamangun, his hitting the man who turned out to be Contreras. He
co-policemen at the Philippine National Police (PNP), (witness) approached the victim who was then lying on his
namely, PO2 Carlito Cruz, PO4 Hobert O. Diaz and Police left side unconscious. He brought down the victim and
Investigator SPO-1 Hernando B. Banez, all assigned at the they rushed him to the hospital where he died at about
Meycauayan Police Station; and those of Lorenzo S. 10:00 o’clock that same evening.
Abacan and Rogelio Ingco, son and son-in-law, The defense has its own account of what purportedly
respectively, of Antonio Abacan, owner of the house on actually transpired.1awphi1.net
which rooftop the shooting of the victim took place.
PO2 Mamangun, along with PO2 Cruz and PO2Diaz,
It is not disputed that on July 31, 1992, at about 8:00 in the denied the presence of Ayson at the rooftop during the
evening, in Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan a shooting incident. Corroborating one another, the three
certain Liberty Contreras was heard shouting, testified that they were the only ones at the scene of the
"Magnanakaw…Magnanakaw." Several residents shooting, and that it was dark. They claimed that each of
responded and thereupon chased the suspect who them, with Mamangun on the lead, went on separate
entered the yard of Antonio Abacan and proceeded to directions around a water tank. As they met each other at
the rooftop of Abacan’s house. the other side of the tank, PO2 Cruz pointed to a person
At about 9:00 o’clock that same evening, the desk officer crouching at the edge of the roof of the garage. Thinking
of the Meycauayan PNP Police Station, upon receiving a that the person was the suspect they were looking for,
telephone call that a robbery-holdup was in progress in Mamangun chased said person. They announced that
Brgy. Calvario, immediately contacted and dispatched to they were police officers but the person continued to run
the scene the crew of Patrol Car No. 601 composed of in a crouching position until Mamangun caught up with
Team Leader SPO1 Andres Legaspi, with PO2 Eugenio him and shouted, "Pulis. Tigil," whereupon the person
Aminas and herein petitioner PO2 Rufino S. Mamangun; suddenly stopped, turned around, faced Mamangun, and
and Patrol Car No. 602 composed of Team Leader PO3 raised a stainless steel pipe towards the latter’s head but
Sandiego San Gabriel, with PO2 Carlito Cruz and PO2 Mamangun was able to evade the attack. This prompted
Hobert Diaz. With the permission of Abacan, petitioner Mamangun to shoot the person on the left arm. All three
Mamangun, PO2 Diaz and PO2 Cruz went to the rooftop claimed that it was only at this point that PO2 Cruz and
of the house whereat the suspect was allegedly taking Diaz approached Contreras who told them, "Hindi ako.
refuge. Hindi ako." Mamangun went near Contreras and asked,
"Why did you go to the rooftop? You know there are
 78

policemen here." Contreras was thereafter brought to the consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise
hospital where he died. After the shooting incident, of such duty.7
Mamangun reported the same to the desk officer, POI
Concededly, the first requisite is present in this case.
Filomeno de Luna, who advised him to remain in the police
Petitioner, a police officer, was responding to a robbery-
station. De Luna directed Police Investigator Hernando
holdup incident. His presence at the situs of the crime was
Banez to investigate the incident. That same evening,
in accordance with the performance of his duty. However,
Investigator Banez went to the place where the shooting
proof that the shooting and ultimate death of Contreras
happened. Banez allegedly found a steel pipe about
was a necessary consequence of the due performance of
three (3) feet long on the depressed portion of the roof.
his duty as a policeman is essential to exempt him from
On January 19, 2001, after due proceedings, the criminal liability.
Sandiganbayan came out with its decision 4 finding the
As we see it, petitioner’s posturing that he shot Contreras
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of only the
because the latter tried to strike him with a steel pipe was
crime of Homicide. In so finding, the Sandiganbayan did
a mere afterthought to exempt him from criminal liability.
not appreciate the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and We see no plausible basis to depart from the
abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to Murder. Sandiganbayan’s findings that there was no reason for the
But even as the said court rejected the petitioner’s claim petitioner to shoot Contreras. The latter was unarmed and
that the shooting was justified by self-defense, it had already uttered, "Hindi po ako, Hindi po ako" before
nonetheless ruled that the crime of Homicide was the petitioner fatally shot him on the left arm. Prosecution
attended by an incomplete justifying circumstance of the witness Ayson, who was then behind the petitioner when
petitioner having acted in the performance of his duty as the latter shot Contreras, testified that to the victim’s
a policeman, and also appreciated in his favor the utterances, the petitioner even responded, "Anong hindi
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. ako," and immediately shot Contreras.8 As correctly
Dispositively, the decision reads: observed by the Sandiganbayan:
WHEREFORE, the accused, RUFINO S. MAMANGUN, is Besides being self-serving (with respect to the accused)
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the and biased (with respect to his co-policemen-witnesses),
crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article We find (1) the claim of the accused and his co-
249, Revised Penal Code, and taking into account the policemen-witnesses that the victim (Contreras) attacked
attendance of one (1) privileged mitigation (sic) the said accused and (2) their seemingly "positive"
circumstance, one generic circumstance and no identification of the stainless steel pipe (more of a rod) as
aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced under his weapon, to be of doubtful credibility, for the following
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer the penalty of reasons:
imprisonment of from Three (3) Years and Three (3) Months
of prision correctional as minimum, to Seven (7) years of (1) We have no doubt that, as claimed by PO2 Carlito Cruz
prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs and PO2 Hobert Diaz, the three policemen appropriately
(parents) of Gener Contreras in the total amount of identified themselves as police officers as they started
P352,025.00, and to past the costs. chasing the man they saw "crouching," and, as claimed
by accused PO2 Rufino Mamangun, that, as he was about
SO ORDERED. to catch up with said man, he shouted, "Pulis! Tigil!" With all
these introductions and forewarnings, it is utterly incredible
Unable to accept the judgment of conviction, petitioner is
and contrary to human experience that, that man, later
now with this Court via the present recourse alleging that
identified to be Gener Contreras and admittedly not the
the Sandiganbayan committed reversible error in failing to
person they were looking for, purportedly armed only with
apply paragraph 5, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code,
a stainless steel "lead" pipe (more of a rod) would suddenly
which would have absolved him from criminal liability on
stop, turn around and attack one of the three policemen
the basis of his submission that the shooting in question was
who were chasing him, one after the other, with drawn
done in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
guns.
of a right or office.
(2) When the victim (Gener Contreras) fell down after
First off, petitioner insists that the shooting, which ultimately
being shot by accused PO2 Mamangun, and as the latter
caused the demise of Contreras, was justified because he
went near the fallen victim, said accused asked, "Why did
was repelling Contreras’ unlawful attack on his person, as
you go to the rooftop. You know there are policemen
Contreras was then about to strike him on the head with a
here." He admits that he did not ask the victim, "Why did
steel pipe.
you try to hit me, if you are not the one?" This admission
We are not persuaded. clearly belies the claim of the police-witnesses that Gener
Contreras attacked the accused policeman with an iron
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings of the
pipe when he was shot, for the accused should have
Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon the Court except
asked the latter question.
where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inference (3) The location of the entry of the bullet fired by accused
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of Mamangun which is at the outer left arm at about the
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension bicep of the victim and its trajectory as it penetrated his
of facts and the findings of fact are premised on the body hitting his vital organs along the way belies the claim
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the of the accused that the victim was facing him and had just
evidence on record.5None of these exceptions obtains in missed his head with an iron pipe, as instead the victim
this case. must have instinctively shielded his body with his left arm.
Having admitted6 the fatal shooting of Contreras on the Moreover, petitioner’s pretense that Contreras struck him
night of July 31, 1992, petitioner is charged with the burden with a steel pipe is intriguing. As it is, petitioner did not
of adducing convincing evidence to show that the killing report the same to Police Investigator Banez when he
was done in the fulfillment of his duty as a policeman. reported back to the police station after the shooting
incident. It was only when a lead pipe was recovered from
The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under
the scene and brought to the police station that petitioner
paragraph 5, Article II, of the Revised Penal Code may be
conveniently remembered Contreras trying to hit him with
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that: (1)
a pipe. Such a vital information could not have escaped
the accused acted in the performance of a duty; and (2)
the petitioner’s mind. We are thus inclined to believe that
the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary
the alleged actuation of Contreras, which could have
 79

justified petitioner’s shooting him, was nothing but a policeman and the generic mitigating circumstance of
concocted story to evade criminal liability. Indeed, voluntary surrender.
knowing that he shot Contreras, the least that the
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED and the
petitioner should have done was to bring with him to the
assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in all
police station the very pipe with which Contreras tried to
respects.
attack him. As borne by the evidence, however, it was
only after a police investigator referred to the scene that No pronouncement as to costs.
the lead pipe surfaced.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner would likewise argue that the testimony of
prosecution witness Ayson was incredible and riddled with CANCIO C. GARCIA
inconsistencies. Associate Justice
The alleged contradictions cited by the petitioner, i.e.
where the victim was shot, where he died, and as to Footnotes
whether Ayson left his house after the shooting incident, 1Penned by Associate Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer with Associate Justices
are but minor details which do not affect Ayson’s Narciso S. Nario and Rodolfo G. Palatao, concurring; Rollo, pp. 25-46.
credibility. We have held time and again that few 2 Sandiganbayan Record, Vol. I, p. 1.
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a
witness referring to minor details and not in actuality 3 As culled from the Sandiganbayan decision, Id. at 29.
touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair 4 Supra note 1.
his credibility. Quite the contrary, such minor 5Resoso v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124140, November 25, 1999, 319 SCRA
inconsistencies even tend to strengthen credibility 238, 244.
because they discount the possibility that the testimony
6 TSN, p. 11; Hearing on May 27, 1996.
was rehearsed.9
7 People v. Cawaling, G.R. No. 117970, July 28, 1998, 293 SCRA 267.
For sure, the record reveals that Ayson’s answers to the
questions propounded by the defense counsel are clear
8 TSN, pp. 22, 29. Hearing on March 23, 1995.

and categorical. As to where the victim died, Ayson 9 People v. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, January 18, 2001, 349 SCRA 513, 530.
clarified that the victim was already at the rooftop even 10 TSN, pp. 9-10, March 23, 1996.
before the arrival of the police officers. As to why he was
11 Ibid at p. 20.
not able to warn Mamangun that the victim was his
relative, Ayson explained that he was not able to utter any 12 Ibid at p. 15.
word because when Contreras said "Hindi ako. Hindi ako,"
petitioner suddenly fired at the latter.10 As to the claim that
Ayson was also on the roof, record shows that the robbery-
holdup happened at around 8:00 in the evening. Before
the policemen arrived, Ayson and Contreras were already
pursuing the robber.11 Ayson also testified that when the
victim was shot by the petitioner, the former fell on his left
side unconscious; that he did not leave his house after the
incident because he was afraid that the policemen would
detain him.12
Self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be
appreciated as a valid justifying circumstance in this case.
For, from the above admitted, uncontroverted or
established facts, the most important element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim to justify a claim of self
defense was absent. Lacking this essential and primary
element of unlawful aggression, petitioner’s plea of self-
defense, complete or incomplete, must have to fail.
To be sure, acts in the fulfillment of a duty, without more,
do not completely justify the petitioner’s firing the fatal
gunshot at the victim. True, petitioner, as one of the
policemen responding to a reported robbery then in
progress, was performing his duty as a police officer as well
as when he was trying to effect the arrest of the suspected
robber and in the process, fatally shoot said suspect, albeit
the wrong man. However, in the absence of the equally
necessary justifying circumstance that the injury or offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty, there can only be incomplete
justification, a privileged mitigating circumstance under
Articles 13 and 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
There can be no quibbling that there was no rational
necessity for the killing of Contreras. Petitioner could have
first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against
Contreras who was one of the residents chasing the
suspected robber.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the
Sandiganbayan in convicting the petitioner of the crime
of Homicide attended by the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance of
having acted in the performance of his duty as a
 80

G.R. No. 138453 May 29, 2002 Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin
was at his mother's house, he received the more distressing
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MELECIO
news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by
ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO, appellant.
appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two not go to her house because he was afraid of what
indivisible penalties, as in the present case for parricide appellant might do. From his mother's house, which was
with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied about 150 meters away from his sister's home, Benjamin
in the absence of any aggravating circumstances. Hence, saw appellant who shouted at him, 'It's good you would
the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not see how your sister died.'
death.
"5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio
The Case Valdez who called the police station at Camiling, Tarlac.
SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the
For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 other members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac,
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro. The police,
Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay
Melecio Robiños2 y Domingo guilty beyond reasonable officials and barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the
doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional crime where they saw blood dripping from the house of
abortion and sentencing him to death. The decretal appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to come
portion of the Decision reads as follows: out of the house. When appellant failed to come out, the
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty police, with the help of barangay officials, detached the
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood was
parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby dripping. The removal of the wall exposed that section of
renders judgment sentencing him to suffer the penalty of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing
DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay [his] wife.
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim; "6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor.
and P22,800.00 s actual damages."3 Appellant, who was lying on his side and holding a
In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was
accused of killing his pregnant wife and the fetus inside embracing his wife. He was uttering the words, 'I will kill
her. It reads thus: myself, I will kill myself.' Lorenza, who was lying on her back
and facing upward, was no longer breathing. She
"That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in appeared to be dead.
Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of Camiling, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this "7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs
Honorable Court, the said accused Melecio Robinos, did of the house and pulled appellant away from Lorenza's
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by
means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his legitimate wife SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist the people who held
Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six (6) months pregnant him but was overpowered. The police, with the help of the
causing the instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robinos, barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a
and the fetus inside her womb."5 plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away from
the body of his wife and restrained by the police,
When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his
assistance of his counsel,6 pleaded not guilty.7 After due and a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife,
trial, the RTC convicted him. showing him the bloodstained knife.
The Facts "8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she
Version of the Prosecution was already dead. She was pale and not breathing. The
police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the Lorenza's body for autopsy. Appellant was brought to the
prosecution's version of how appellant assaulted his police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be
pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of
follows: a stab wound.
"1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the "9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante,
morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños was in his the Chief of Police at Camiling, Tarlac, prepared a Special
parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac. Report which disclosed that:
While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his parents,
appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza 'The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant.
Robiños, who were at the sala, quarrelling. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the different parts of her
body.
"2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you
come home, why don't you just leave?' After hearing what 'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of
his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five liquor/drunk [who] came home and argued/quarreled
meters, saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double
Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from where knife and delivered forty one (41) stab blows.
Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon 'Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to
witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo the Provincial Hospital.
immediately left their house and ran to his grandmother's
house where he reported the incident.1âwphi1.nêt 'Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp
knife about eight (8) inches long including handle.'
"3. At around eight o'clock in the morning of the same day,
Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim Lorenza Robiños, "10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not
was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at able to present the doctor who conducted the autopsy
Barangay San Isidro. Benjamin, a resident of Barangay on Lorenza Robiños' body. Nor, was the autopsy report
Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mother's house for presented as evidence."8
the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening Version of the Defense
of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro
 81

Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely
prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but seeks deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of will at
exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in
defense of insanity as follows: a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental
incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of
"Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant
insanity at the very moment when the crime was
interposed insanity. The defense presented the testimonies
committed.13 Only when there is a complete deprivation
of the following:
of intelligence at the time of the commission of the
"FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
testified that his parents had occasional quarrels[. B]efore considered.14
March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in
person went [sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill
the absence of proof to the contrary, every person is
him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father told the same
presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who
thing to his mother and because of this, his parents
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the
quarreled and exchanged heated words.
burden of proving it.16 Failing this, one will be presumed to
"LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, be sane when the crime was committed.
testified that she came to know Melecio Robiños only in
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that
May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell,
appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
accused isolated himself, 'laging nakatingin sa malayo',
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both
rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.
prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial
"BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac evidence that appellant was completely deprived of
Penal Colony, testified that he and the accused were reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal
seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o'clock in the killing of his wife.
morning up to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. He had
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution
observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in
witnesses, a domestic altercation preceded the fatal
the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell
stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked
even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of the
his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of the
penal colony.
nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was
"DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the a deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting
Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that as the accused's remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by their 15-
inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the year-old son Lorenzo Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo's
latter. Accused sometimes was lying down, sitting, looking, testimony in part as follows:
or staring on space and without companion, laughing and
"Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your
sometimes crying.
mother, do you recall if they talked to one and the other?
"MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified
A: Yes, sir.
that on March 25, 1995, he was in their house and there
was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He ATTY. IBARRA:
did not know that he was charged for the crime of
Q: Did you hear what they talked about?
parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not
remember when he was informed by his children that he A: Yes, sir.
killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife." 9
Q: What did you hear?
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case
was automatically elevated to this Court for review.10 A: 'Why did you come home, why don't you just
leave?', Sir.
The Issues
COURT:
Appellant submits for our consideration the following
assignment of errors: In other words, you better go away, you should have not
come back home.
"I
ATTY. IBARRA:
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the
testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Maria Q: After you mother uttered those words, what did your
Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be father do?
suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir."17
schizophrenia, paranoid type.
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he
"II had done to his wife. He was even bragging to her brother,
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified
defense of insanity."11 thus:

The Court's Ruling "ATTY. JOAQUIN:

The appeal is partly meritorious. Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see
the house of your sister?
Main Issue
A: Yes, sir.
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance
Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother,
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present Lorenzo Robiños was already there in the house of your
any evidence to contravene the allegation that he killed mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?
his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the
identity of the culprit and the commission of the complex A: Yes, sir.
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Appellant, Q: And he was the one who informed you about your
however, interposes the defense of insanity to absolve sister already dead?
himself of criminal liability.
A: Yes, Sir.
 82

Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon Except for appellant's 19-year-old son Federico
learning that she was already dead? Robiños,20 all the other defense witnesses testified on the
supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had
A: No, Sir.
already been detained in prison.
ATTY. JOAQUIN:
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the
Q: Why? commission of the offense, or the accused must have
been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would
A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir. still be criminally responsible.21 Verily, his alleged insanity
COURT: should have pertained to the period prior to or at the
precise moment when the criminal act was committed,
Q: Why do you know that he was amok? not at anytime thereafter. In People v. Villa,22 this Court
A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir. incisively ratiocinated on the matter as follows:

Q: How? "It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the

time he was examined at the center. But, in all probability,
A: It's good you would see how your sister died, Sir."18 such insanity was contracted during the period of his
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law detention pending trial. He was without contact with
enforcers how he had just killed his wife may have been a friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by
manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses
sentiment of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence
of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and of these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his
immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an inquiry
had no knowledge of what he had just done. Barangay into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate
Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of to the period immediately before or at the precise
appellant when the latter confessed to the former and to moment of doing the act which is the subject of the
the police officers, and even showed to them the knife inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period
used to stab the victim. Valdez's testimony proceeded as or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of
follows: determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs
more concrete evidence on the mental condition of the
"Q: And what did you discover when you went there at person alleged to be insane at the time of the perpetration
the house of Melecio Robiños? of the crimes in order that the exempting circumstance of
insanity may be appreciated in his favor. x x x."23 (Italics
A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it
supplied)
was closed. We waited for the police officers to arrive and
when they arrived, that was the time that we started going Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for
around the house and when we saw blood, some of our exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence must
companions removed the walling of the house and at that refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or
time, we saw the wife of Melecio Robiños lying down as if to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points
at that moment, the wife of Melecio Robiños was already to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the
dead, Sir. accused cannot be acquitted.24
Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the
did you do? psychiatrist who conducted an examination of the mental
condition of appellant, does not provide much help in
A: We talked to Melecio Robiños, Sir.
determining his state of mind at the time of the killing. It
xxx xxx xxx must be noted that she examined him only on September
11, 1995, or six months after the commission of the
Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?
crime.25Moreover, she was not able to make a
A: When we saw them they were both lying down and background study on the history of his mental condition
when we got near, he said he killed his wife and showing prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social
the weapon he used, sir. worker to gather data on the matter.26
Q: What is that weapon? Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the
accused had already been suffering from psychosis at the
A: Double bladed weapon, Sir. time of the commission of the crime,27 she likewise
COURT: admitted that her conclusion was not definite and was
merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial
What is that, knife? court, her declarations were merely conjectural and
A: It's a double bladed knife, sir. inconclusive to support a positive finding of insanity.
According to the RTC:
xxx xxx xxx
"The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who
COURT: examined accused at the National Center for Mental
He admitted to you that he killed his wife? Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination
accused Melecio Robiños was still mentally ill; that
A: Yes, sir. accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering
from insanity and it is possible that the sickness have
Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he
occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination;
tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or what?
and in her opinion accused was suffering from delusion
A: What I remember Sir he said, 'Pinatay ko ni baket ko' and hallucination. And her opinion that at the time
meaning 'I killed my wife,' Sir."19 accused stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is
merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx Aside from being her
Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not
opinion, she conducted the mental, physical and
undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of his act.
neurological examinations on the accused seven (7)
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense months after the commission of the offense. That span of
witnesses hardly supports his claim of insanity. The bulk of seven (7) months has given accused an opportunity to
the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza
mental condition after the commission of the crime. had no opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic)
 83

the behavior of the accused immediately before, during is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current
and immediately after the commission of the offense. Her jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim
finding is conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as
background examination of the mental condition of the actual damages, which were duly proven. No
accused before the incident by interviewing persons who pronouncement as to costs.
had the opportunity to associate with him."29
ORDERED.
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
proven that he had already been completely deprived of
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona,
proffered by the defense did not indicate that he had
JJ., concur.
been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of
will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a
defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, Footnote

as such, clear and convincing proof is required to establish 1 Rollo, pp. 36-49. The Decision was written by Judge Cesar M. Sotero.
its existence.31Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the 2 Also spelled "Robinos" in the records.
quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption
3 RTC Decision, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 48-49; records, pp. 196-197.
of sanity.1âwphi1.nêt
4 Rollo, p. 11; records, Vol. I, p. 1.
Second Issue:
5 Ibid.
Proper Penalty 6 Atty. Domingo R. Joaquin.
Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of 7 Order dated July 27, 1995; records, Vol. I, p. 30.
insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty
8Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 119-122. This was signed by Solicitor
on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez
considering the presence or the absence of aggravating and Solicitor Vida G. San Vicente.
and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the 9Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 81-82. This was signed by Attys. Arceli A.
capital penalty was not only baseless, but contrary to the Rubin, Amelia C. Garchitorena and Eden B. Chavez - all of the Public
rules on the application of penalties as provided in the Attorney's Office.
Revised Penal Code. Even the Office of the Solicitor 10 This case was deemed submitted for decision on August 24, 2000, which
General concedes this error in the imposition of the death is the deadline given by the Court for the filing of a Reply Brief, which,
penalty.32 however, was deemed waived as none had been filed by appellant within
the given period.
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of 11 Ibid., pp. 8 & 83. Original in upper case.
parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be
imposed on him should be that for the graver offense 12 People v. Danao, 215 SCRA 795, November 19, 1992.
which is parricide. This is in accordance with the mandate 13 People v. Diaz, 320 SCRA 168, December 8, 1999.
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: 14 People v. Condino, GR No. 130945, November 19, 2001.
"When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime 15 People v. Medina, 286 SCRA 44, February 6, 1998.
shall be imposed, x x x." 16 People v. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312, January 28, 1998.

The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is 17 TSN, August 1, 1995, pp. 9-10.
punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all cases in 18 TSN, August 3, 1995, pp. 13-14.
which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two 19 TSN, February 6, 1996, pp. 11-14.
indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose one
or the other, depending on the presence or the absence 20TSN, June 11, 1996, pp. 12-15. Federico Robiños testified that on March 23,
1995, or two days before the date of the commission of the crime, his father
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.33 The rules told him that there was a person who was going to enter their house who
with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of wanted to kill the father.
two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the 21 Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, 2000 ed., p. 53.
Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is
quoted as follows: 22 331 SCRA 142; April 27, 2000.
23 Ibid., pp. 153-154, per Bellosillo, J.
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules 24 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 ed., p. 213.
shall be observed in the application thereof: 25 TSN, December 12, 1995, pp. 26-27.

xxx xxx xxx 26 TSN, January 9, 1996, p. 14.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating 27 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser 28 Id., p. 16.
penalty shall be applied." (Italics supplied) 29 RTC Decision, p. 11.
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two 30 People v. Bañez, 301 SCRA 248, January 20, 1999.
indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor 31 People v. Danao, supra.
aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be
imposed.34 Considering that neither aggravating nor 32 See Brief for Appellee, pp. 19-20; rollo, pp. 135-136.
mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the 33 People v. Pedroso, 336 SCRA 163, July 19, 2000.
imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.35 34People v. Cayago, 312 SCRA 623, August 18, 1999; People v. Barellano,
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital 319 SCRA 567, December 2, 1999.

crime per se, it is not always punishable with death. The 35 People v. Naguita, 313 SCRA 292, August 30, 1999.
law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion 36People v. Reyes, 292 SCRA 663, July 20, 1998; People v. Javier, 311 SCRA
perpetua to death -- two indivisible penalties, the 576, July 28, 1999.
application of either one of which depends on the
presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.36
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal Case No. 95-45 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
 84

G.R. No. 162052 January 13, 2005 themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny
Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The buy-bust bundle of "money
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
bills" and the shabu were recovered. The two were
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar
DECISION Groyon conducted the investigation. The shabu was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN,
CALLEJO, SR., J.: July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13).
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 the shabu. She reported and testified that the specimen,
affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 31-36).4
accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in On the other hand, the accused therein were able to
relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, establish the following facts:
as amended.
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong,
charged with the said crime in an Information, the Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with
accusatory portion of which reads: a hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of themselves. They were later able to identify three of these
Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was
another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did then parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another car
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and while another person drove Sonny Zarraga’s car with Alvin
deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE Jose as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They
HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one
regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law. of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 Zarraga’s car. One of the men saw a substance inside the
said compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to Zarraga if he could come up with ₱1.5 Million peso (sic).
the charge. Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarraga’s
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
prosecution established the following: They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside
… [O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the the said room, Sonny Zarraga’s cellular phone rung. It was
Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received an information a call from Sonny Zarraga’s wife. Col. Castro talked to
from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay ₱1.5 Million
was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga
Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the
group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams amount of ₱75,000.00. The agreement was that in the
of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and
Calamba, Laguna. deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarraga’s
release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was and Pinky Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga
assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo refused to withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga was
and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the
team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money bank which prompted the bank manager to call the
consisting of a ₱1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make- police.
believe "money bills" supposedly amounting to
₱100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose
Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a who was left at the room and brought them to Camp
Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.1awphi1.nét
boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny
Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned Zarraga’s jewelry, ₱85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarraga’s
their cars at the parking area where they had a car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even
commanding view of people going in and out (TSN, able to withdraw the ₱2,000.00 using Sonny Zarraga’s ATM
October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7). card.5
It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when a Toyota On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment
Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was convicting both accused of the crime charged and
the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty.
approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the The fallo of the decision reads:
informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed
the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny
of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after
responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years
bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of ₱2
Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, million each and to pay the cost of suit.
handed the bundle of "money bills."
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to undergone both by the accused shall be credited in their
signify that the transaction was consummated (TSN, July favor.
30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo
and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced
 85

Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is since the CA made no such finding, he is entitled to an
hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the confiscated acquittal.
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts
Board.
that the allegation in the Information that the petitioner
SO ORDERED.6 and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell
the shabu subject of the Information sufficiently avers that
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred
the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was
that the trial court erred as follows:
no need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in
I the Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends
that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL make an express finding that the petitioner acted with
CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the
PROSECUTION. petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was
II sufficiently possessed with judgment to know that the acts
he committed were wrong.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS The petition is meritorious.
NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor
THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from
PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies
DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES. penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the
III burden of the minor to prove his age in order for him to be
exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental
FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED element of a crime – the capacity to know what is wrong
AGAINST THEM: as distinguished from what is right or to determine the
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in which the
AGAINST THEM. term is used in moral wrong.9 However, such presumption
is rebuttable.10 For a minor at such an age to be criminally
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A liable, the prosecution is burdened11 to prove beyond
FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence,
COST OF THE SUIT.7 that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision what he was doing and that it was wrong.12 Such
appealed from with modification. The appellate court circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of
reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the
its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the
committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and to a to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding
reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant the corpus delicti.
filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove
Information failed to allege that he acted with beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was
discernment when the crime was committed and that the thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was
prosecution failed to prove the same, he should be committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale
acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion. of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for prosecution against the petitioner is that he was in a car
review on certiorari, alleging that – with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter
inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra,
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in
ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called
PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT the petitioner to bring out and hand over
THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The
CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN petitioner handed over the plastic containing
CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA, the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the same to
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A the poseur-buyer:
DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE A The two of them, Sir.
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.8
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car,
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of what did you tell them?
the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under
fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted Q And what was your response?
with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.
Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as Q And what happened next?
provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He
avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the
acted with discernment, but that the prosecution failed to
affirmative specifically…. I withdraw that.
do so. The petitioner insists that the court is mandated to
make a finding that he acted with discernment under Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford
paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you that question?
A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.
 86

Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was merely sat inside the car and had no other participation
his response? whatsoever in the transaction between the accused
Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu? white paper before and at the time he handed over the
same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not
A Yes, Sir. bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that
Q What happened to the shabu? pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal
drugs. We quote the testimony of the poseur-buyer:
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny
Zarraga. ATTY. VERANO:

Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu? Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your
informant?
A He handed it to me, Sir.
A No, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened
next? Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?

A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then A I don’t know the exact age, what I know is that he is a
I handed to him the money, Sir. minor, Sir.

Q When you say money, which money are you referring Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?
to? A I don’t know, Sir.
A The ₱1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir. Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit,
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, you stated the age of the boy?
what happened next? A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
A I made signs to my companions, Sir. Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his
Q What signs did you give? age, were you not surprised that a young boy like that
would be in a group selling drugs?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
FISCAL:
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
A After scratching my head, my companions approached
us and arrested them. ATTY. VERANO:

Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why
Sonny Zarraga? or how this very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu.

A Yes, Sir. COURT:

Q Tell us. The witness may answer.

A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir. WITNESS:

Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being
Zarraga was arrested by these police officers? used by pushers.15

A Yes, Sir. Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to

elicit from the petitioner facts and circumstances showing
Q Please tell us. his capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the
A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir. questions of the public prosecutor on cross-examination
and the petitioner’s answers thereto:
Q And after that, what happened?
FISCAL:
A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.13
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
…
COURT:
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to
you by the accused? Please proceed.

A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir. FISCAL:

Q Who made the request for its examination? Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on
November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right that you went to
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir. Manuela at 5 o’clock in the afternoon?
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. WITNESS:
What did you do with the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William
Manglo, Sir. Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from
Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the o’clock?
accused, in what container was it contained?
A No, Sir.
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was
wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper, Sir.14 Q What time did you leave?

It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted A After lunch, Sir.
with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you
also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from were in the custody of the police, you said that at one
the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to be with
over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer
 87

car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to
of the seats of the car, is that correct? prove that the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to
sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the
A Yes, Sir.
capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement
to make a call to anybody since the day that you were between two or more persons to commit a crime and
arrested? decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of
the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that
phone.1a\^/phi1.net the petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused.
phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car? Indeed, in People v. Estepano ,17 we held that:

A No, Sir. Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish

Rene’s mental capacity to fully appreciate the
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-
that you were accosted by a male person at the workshop examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to show
and then you went out of Megamall and when you went his discernment. He was merely asked about what he
outside, this man saw the key of the car dangling at the knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and
waist. At whose waist? whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he
A From my cousin. was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt
from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the
Q And at that time, that person did not have any presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his
knowledge where your car was? age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided
A No, Sir. the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him
positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at regard, the government miserably squandered the
the third level parking area of SM Megamall, is that opportunity to incriminate him.181awphi1.nét
correct?
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
A Yes, Sir. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The
to anybody?
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for
A No, Sir. insufficiency of evidence.19
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of No costs.
Megamall, he had not made any call?
SO ORDERED.
A No, Sir.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of Nazario, JJ., concur.
the Megamall, you claimed that there was already this Footnotes
group which met you?
1Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices
A Yes, Sir. Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.

Q And this group were the policemen who are the

2 Penned by Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez.

companions of the male person who arrested you? 3 Rollo, p. 22.

A Yes, Sir. 4 Id. at 83-84.

5 Id. at 84-85.
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that
time? 6 Id. at 88.

A No, Sir.
7 Id. at 24-25.
8 Id. at 8.
Q These people do not know your car?
9 Wharton Criminal Law, Vol. I, p. 74.
A No, Sir. 10Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 321 SCRA 375
FISCAL: (1999); Guevarra v. Almodovar, 169 SCRA 476 (1989).
11 Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858).
No further question, Your Honor.
12 Adams v. State, 262 A.2d 60 (1970).
ATTY. VERANO:
13 TSN, 30 July 1996, pp. 7-9.
No re-direct, Your Honor. 14 Id. at 10.
COURT: 15 Id. at 29.

Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug 16 TSN, 23 September 1997, pp. 27-29.
user nor have you seen any shabu. In support of your claim, 17 307 SCRA 701 (1999).
are you willing to submit yourself to an examination?
18 Id. at 712.
WITNESS:
There is no showing in the Rollo whether the petitioner posted bail or is
19

detained.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this
Court?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The witness is discharged.16
 88

G.R. No. 136844 August 1, 2002 Lorenzo grabbed the barrel of his gun. The gun
accidentally fired and Lorenzo was hit.11
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SPO1 RODOLFO CONCEPCION y PERALTA, accused- Defense witnesses ESTELITA BALUYOT and MILAGROS
appellant. VILLEGAS corroborated appellant’s story. They said they
witnessed the incident because they were among the
DECISION
bystanders who saw the event happen from the time
QUISUMBING, J.: Lorenzo was brought to the barangay hall for investigation
until he was shot.
Appellant seeks the reversal of the decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case Estelita and Milagros testified that Lorenzo was seated
No. 9776, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him while being questioned and pacified by appellant.
to reclusion perpetua. Appellant was then standing. All of a sudden, according
to the lady-witnesses, appellant fired two warning shots in
On January 22, 1998, an information2 for murder was filed the air. Lorenzo stood up and grabbed the barrel of the
with the trial court charging him with murder allegedly gun which was then pointed upwards. When it fired,
committed as follows: Lorenzo was hit.12
That on or about November 24, 1997 between 10:00 and On November 10, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision
11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Brgy. Cut-Cut II, finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder.
Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and Its falloreads:
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said
accused, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot with his doubt of the crime of murder punished and defined by
Armalite rifle Lorenzo Galang hitting him at the different Article 248 in relation to RA 7659, accused is hereby
parts of his body and as a result of which said Lorenzo sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
Galang died instantly. and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P50,000.00 for his loss of life; P120,000.00 as expected
CONTRARY TO LAW. income; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, and attorney’s fees.13
thereafter trial commenced. Seasonably, appellant filed his notice of appeal. In his
The prosecution relied mainly on the eyewitnesses Maximo brief, he makes but one assignment of error:
Sison, Jr., an employee of Hacienda Luisita, and Arturo THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
Yarte, a tricycle driver, both of Barangay Cut-cut II, Tarlac THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED WERE
City. Other prosecution witnesses were Orlando Galang, UNINTENTIONALLY INFLICTED WHILE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
brother of the victim Lorenzo Galang, and Concordia WAS IN THE COURSE OF PERFORMING HIS LAWFUL DUTY AS
Galang, his mother. A POLICE OFFICER.14
Both MAXIMO SISON, JR. and ARTURO YARTE testified3 that The sole issue in this case is whether appellant is exempt
between 10:00 and 11:00 in the evening of November 24, from criminal liability. Under Article 12 (4) of the Revised
1997, Lorenzo Galang, a resident of their barangay, got Penal Code, among those exempted from criminal liability
involved in a quarrel at the town plaza. He was brought to is:
the barangay hall for questioning by Barangay Captain
Remigio Capitli. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
Shortly after, appellant Rodolfo Concepcion arrived and intention of causing it.
fired his rifle twice or thrice past the ears of Lorenzo, who
was then sitting, but without injuring him. After that, Well settled is the rule in criminal cases, that the
however, appellant thrust the barrel of the gun against the prosecution has the burden of proof to establish the guilt
abdomen of Lorenzo. Then there was an explosion. of the accused.15 However, once the defendant admits
Lorenzo was shot in the thigh. At least three more shots the commission of the offense charged, but raises an
were fired, hitting Lorenzo in the chest. According to Sison exempting circumstance as a defense, the burden of
and Yarte, appellant shot Lorenzo deliberately. Lorenzo proof is shifted to him. By invoking mere accident as a
died instantly. defense, appellant now has the burden of proving that he
is entitled to that exempting circumstance under Article 12
ORLANDO GALANG, the victim’s brother, recalled that he (4) of the Code.
arrived at the scene of the crime after Lorenzo was
slain.4 According to him, his brother was not brought to the The existence of accident must be proved by the
hospital.5 Orlando testified on the anguish he suffered for appellant to the satisfaction of the court. For this to be
having lost his brother. 6 properly appreciated in appellant’s favor, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that the accused was
CONCORDIA GALANG, mother of the victim, testified that performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is
Lorenzo worked at the Hacienda Luisita and was earning caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault
P1,000 more or less a week.7 According to her, Lorenzo was or intent on his part to cause the injury.16 Appellant must
27 years old when he died. He was married and had two convincingly prove the presence of these elements in
children.8 As a result of Lorenzo’s death, the Galang’s order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of
incurred expenses amounting to approximately half a accident. However, his defense utterly failed to discharge
million pesos.9 Concordia Galang presented a list of these this burden. Thus, we find no reversible error in the
expenses amounting to P257,259,10 but without supporting judgment of the trial court.
receipts.
By appellant’s own testimony, the victim was unarmed. In
In his defense, appellant RODOLFO CONCEPCION contrast, appellant had an armalite and a handgun. It is
claimed that the shooting was only accidental. According highly inconceivable that an unarmed man could pose
to him, he was investigating Lorenzo for the latter’s bodily harm to another who is heavily armed.
disorderly behavior at the town plaza when it happened.
He said Lorenzo appeared drunk and unruly, and even We note, that appellant’s gun discharged several shots
verbally challenged him to fight. At this juncture, that hit vital parts of the victim’s body. Was the discharge
according to appellant, he fired two shots in the air, but purely accidental? We don’t think so. As observed by the
trial court, recklessly appellant had put his finger on the
trigger of his cocked and loaded rifle. In that state, with
 89

the slightest movement of his finger,17 the rifle would fire Q: Incidentally at that time when Rodolfo Concepcion placed
readily. And it did not just once but several fires. the barrel of his gun about a distance away from the ear of
Lorenzo, how far was Lorenzo Galang positioned that time?
Appellant claims that the victim Lorenzo, who was drunk
A: He was leaning on the chair sir.
at the time, was brought to the barangay hall for
investigation. Lorenzo became unruly while being Q: What about Rodolfo Concepcion how was he positioned
questioned, so appellant was constrained to fire two when he fired those first two shots?
warning shots in the air to frighten him. However, the latter A: He was standing, sir.
stood up and immediately grabbed the nozzle of the gun
and pulled it towards him. The gun accidentally went off Q: Now after the right thigh of Lorenzo Galang was hit by third shot
and hit Lorenzo in the body. To buttress his claim, appellant what else transpired?
rationalizes that he could have killed Lorenzo immediately A: He again thrust the barrel of his gun on the chest or towards the
while creating trouble at the plaza, if that was indeed his chest of Lorenzo and simultaneously fired the gun.20
intention. Since he did not, appellant posits that there was
The autopsy report corroborates Sison’s testimony that the
no intent on his part to kill Lorenzo.
victim had three gunshot wounds: one at the right nipple,
But we note patent inconsistencies in his claims. He another at the mid-femur (thighbone), and another above
testified on query by the trial court that when he was the knee.21 Likewise, Sison’s declaration on material details
pacifying the victim, his rifle was hanging on his shoulder coincide with those narrated by Arturo Yarte, a
on a swivel, with its barrel pointed to the floor. At that barangay tanod who also witnessed the shooting
instance, the victim grabbed the barrel of the gun which incident. There is no proof of ill motive on the part of Sison
accidentally fired.18 However, on direct examination by his and Yarte that could have impelled them to falsely testify
defense counsel, he testified that the victim grabbed his against appellant. In fact, Sison was appellant’s childhood
rifle only after he had fired the two shots in the air. friend.22
His claims do not square with and could not overcome the The trial court found that treachery attended the
testimony of prosecution witnesses on this score. Note that commission of the crime. As hereafter explained, however,
Maximo Sison, Jr., an eyewitness, categorically declared in this case treachery is only an aggravating and not a
that he saw appellant shoot the victim with an M-16 qualifying circumstance.
armalite.19 On direct examination, Sison testified as follows:
To constitute treachery (alevosia), two conditions must be
Q: Earlier, you stated at the time you arrived at the barangay hall, present: (1) the employment of means of execution that
Rodolfo Concepcion was eight (8) meters away from Lorenzo, at give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
that time Rodolfo Concepcion shot Lorenzo Galang, how far is or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
Rodolfo Concepcion from Lorenzo Galang?
deliberately or consciously adopted.23 Here, treachery
A: He was near him because he approached him, sir. He was very was clearly present considering that the victim was totally
near. unprepared for the barrage of gunshots made by
xxx
appellant. It was undisputed that the victim was brought
to the barangay hall for questioning. He had submitted
Q: How many times did Rodolfo Concepcion shot (sic) Lorenzo himself to the authority of the barangay officials and to the
Galang? police authorities. He was seated, thereby excluding any
A: The first firing were two (2) shots, sir. insinuation that he was violent and unruly. He was weak
from drinking at the time so that he had very little physical
Q: Was Lorenzo Galang hit?
ability to cause harm to anyone, more so in the presence
A: No sir. of the barangay captain, barangay tanod and a police
officer in the person of appellant.24
Q: At the time Rodolfo Concepcion fired these two (2) shots,
according to you, it was near his left ear? From the circumstances of the case, the Court agrees with
A: Yes, sir. the prosecution that appellant consciously and purposely
adopted the means of attack to insure the execution of
Q: How far is the barrel from the ear of Lorenzo Galang when he the crime without risk to himself.
fired those two shots? Will you indicate by pointing your left ear?
However, we note that treachery, though stated in the
A: Less than a foot, sir.
information, was not alleged with specificity as qualifying
Q: When you are referring to the barrel of the gun which was the killing to murder. Following People vs. Alba, G.R. No.
pointed at the left ear of Lorenzo, how far is the barrel of the gun 130523, January 29, 2002, the information should state not
from the ears of Lorenzo?
only the designation of the offense and the acts and
A: The barrel was "lampas tainga" so Lorenzo was not hit, sir. omissions constituting it, but should also specify the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Since the
Q: What happened after that?
information in this case failed to specify treachery as a
A: He put down and thrust the barrel of the gun toward the circumstance qualifying the killing to murder, under the
stomach of Lorenzo Galang, sir. present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,25 treachery
Q: After Rodolfo Concepcion thrust the barrel of his gun towards has to be considered a generic aggravating
the abdomen of Lorenzo Galang what else transpired? circumstance only. Consequently, the crime committed
by appellant is homicide and not murder.
A: Because he was hurt he tried to push the barrel of the gun, sir.
Further, we find that the trial court misappreciated as an
Q: What did Lorenzo Galang use in pushing the barrel when
Rodolfo Concepcion thrust it towards the stomach? aggravating circumstance the fact that appellant was a
policeman on duty at the time of the killing. The
A: He just pushed a little bit to remove the barrel of the gun from information charging appellant bears no mention of this
his abdomen, sir. aggravating circumstance.1âwphi1 Pursuant to the
Q: After that what happened? Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that took effect on
December 1, 2000, every complaint or information must
A: After pushing the barrel of the gun simultaneously the firing and
state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
hitting Lorenzo at his right thigh, sir.
circumstances.26 This provision may be given retroactive
Q: What did Lorenzo Galang do after he was hit on the right thigh? effect in the light of the well-settled rule that statutes
A: Because Lorenzo was seated, he was lifted from his seat, sir. regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage.27 The aggravating circumstance of
 90

abuse of official position, not having been alleged in the SO ORDERED.

information, could thus not be appreciated to increase
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
appellant’s liability.
At any rate, appellant’s immediate surrender to police Footnotes
authorities after the shooting should be credited in his 1 Rollo, pp. 53-57.
favor as a mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 13
2 Id. at 4-5.
(7) of the Revised Penal Code.28
3 TSN, April 15, 1998, pp. 2-9 and TSN, May 5, 1998, pp. 3-21.
In sum, we find appellant guilty of homicide. The penalty
for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code 4 TSN, June 2, 1998, p. 5.
is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating 5 Ibid.

circumstance of voluntary surrender and one aggravating 6 Ibid.

circumstance of treachery, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period.1âwphi1 Applying the 7 TSN, July 7, 1998, p. 4.
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant’s sentence should 8 Ibid.

be within the range of prision mayor as minimum, and the 9 Id. at 5.

medium period of reclusion temporal as maximum.
10 TSN, October 14, 1998, p. 3.
As to the award of damages, the trial court offered no
11 TSN, November 5, 1998, pp. 2-10.
explanation for the award of P120,000 as expected
income. This figure is without basis. The victim’s lost 12 TSN, October 15, 1998, pp. 2-13; TSN, October 20, 1998, pp. 2-8.
earnings are to be computed according to the formula 13 Rollo, p. 57.
adopted by the Court in several decided cases, to wit: 14 Id. at 48.
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of the a reasonable 15 Balanay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112924, 344 SCRA 1, 10 (2000).
portion
16 People vs. Mat-an, G.R. No. 91115, 216 SCRA 843, 849 (1992).
victim at the time of x of the annual net
his death) income which would 17 Records, p. 78.
have been received by 18 TSN, November 5, 1998, p. 10.
the heirs for support29 19 TSN, April 15, 1998, p. 6.

Lorenzo was 27 years old at the time of his death. His 20 TSN, April 15, 1998, pp. 6-7.
mother testified that he was earning P1,000 a week during 21 Records, p. 23.
his lifetime or an annual income of P48,000. In the absence 22 TSN, April 15, 1998, p. 2.
of proof of his living expenses, his net income is deemed to
be 50 percent of his gross income.30 Using the above 23 Peoplevs. Mabuhay, G.R. No. 87018, 185 SCRA 675, 680 (1990) cited in
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I, 13th Ed., p. 429.
formula, we fix the indemnity for loss of earning capacity
of Lorenzo at P848,000, thus: 24 Records, p. 78.
25 Sec. 8, Rule 110. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or
2 (80-27) information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute,
Net earning x [P48,000 - aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
= and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
capacity P24,000] reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
3 punishing it.

Sec. 9, Rule 110. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions

2 (53) complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
= x P24,000 language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
3 what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
26 Ibid.
35.33 x
=
P24,000 27 People vs. Arrojado, G.R. No. 130492, 350 SCRA 679, 696 (2001).
28 ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances. – The following are mitigating
circumstances:
= P848,000
xxx
We find the award of P50,000 as death indemnity to the 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in
heirs of the deceased to be in accordance with existing authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before
jurisprudence.31 This civil indemnity is automatically the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any xxx
evidence other than the fact of the commission of the 29 People vs. Barnuevo, G.R. No. 134928, September 28, 2001, p. 10,
crime.32 As for moral damages, the amount should be citing People vs. Espanola, G.R. No. 119308, 271 SCRA 689, 717 (1997)
reduced to P50,000 also in accordance with existing and People vs. Aspiras, G.R. No. 121203, 330 SCRA 479, 495 (2000).
jurisprudence.33 The award of P10,000 as attorney’s fees is 30 People vs. Barnuevo, supra, note 29 at 10.
sufficient and justified.
31 Metro
Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 116617
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, and 126395, 298 SCRA 495, 506-507 (1998).
Tarlac, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 9776, convicting 32 People vs. Obello, G.R. No. 108772, 284 SCRA 79, 95 (1998).
appellant Rodolfo Concepcion of the crime of murder, is 33 People vs. Salva, G.R. No. 132351, January 10, 2002, p. 12; People vs.
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is found Guzman, G.R. No. 132750, December 14, 2001, p. 14; People vs. Herrera,
guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an G.R. Nos. 140557-58, December 5, 2001, p. 23.
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral
damages, P848,000 as lost earnings, P10,000 as attorney’s
fees, and the costs.
 91

G.R. No. 146309 July 18, 2002 reduced to four hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P450,000.00). It was agreed that payment and delivery of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROBERTO
shabu would be made on the following day, at the same
MENDOZA PACIS, appellant.
place.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"On April 17, 1998, around 6:30 in the evening, the NBI
Entrapment is a legally sanctioned method resorted to by agents and the informant went to appellant's house.
the police for the purpose of trapping and capturing Appellant handed to Atty. Yap a paper bag with markings
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plans. Bare "yellow cab". When he opened the bag, Atty. Yap found
denials by the accused cannot overcome the a transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance
presumption of regularity in the arresting officers' inside. While examining it, appellant asked for the
performance of official functions. payment. Atty. Yap instructed Senior Agent Congzon to
get the money from the car. When Senior Agent Congzon
The Case returned, he gave the "boodle money" to Atty. Yap who
Roberto Mendoza Pacis appeals the August 18, 2000 then handed the money to the appellant. Upon
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City appellant's receipt of the payment, the officers identified
(Branch 265) in Criminal Case No. 6292-D, in which he was themselves as NBI agents and arrested him.
sentenced to reclusion perpetua after being found guilty "Per instruction of Atty. Yap, Senior Agent Congzon
of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Act 6425 (RA transmitted the shabu to the Forensic Chemistry
6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659). Laboratory for examination.
The Information dated June 3, 1998, and signed by State "NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosales testified that on
Prosecutor Marilyn RO. Campomanes, charged appellant April 8, 1998, she received the specimen from Senior Agent
as follows: Congzon together with the letter request. The specimen
"That on the afternoon of April 07, 1998, inside Unit #375 weighed 497.292940 grams. After examination, the
Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde II, Pasig City and specimen was found positive for methamphetamine
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above hydrochloride." (Citations omitted)
named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully Version of the Defense
and feloniously sell, distribute and dispatch 497.2940 grams
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as Appellant, on the other hand, presents the following
"SHABU", a regulated drug to undercover NBI agents who version of the facts:7
acted as poseur-buyer[s], without the corresponding
"Accused-appellant, ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS is a
license, and/or prescription to sell, distribute and dispatch
legitimate businessman having been engaged in the sale
the aforementioned regulated drug, to the damage and
of imported automotive for quite a long time. On April 6,
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines."2
1998, he was in his house at 375 Caimito Street, Caimito
During his arraignment on July 30, 1998, appellant refused Ville, Valle Verde II, Pasig City. In the afternoon of April 6,
to plead despite the assistance of counsel.3 Hence, a plea 1998, he was in Caloocan City in Dome Street, in the house
of not guilty was entered for him.4 After due trial, the RTC of defense witness Ramon Ty. He was there to pick-up
rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which witness Ty because they had an agreement that he was
reads: to bring him to far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan. They left
right after lunch at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the Witness Ty mentioned to him that they were to meet Mr.
[a]ccused, ROBERTO MENDOZA PACIS, GUILTY beyond Andrada and Dr. Lachica. They reached Pangasinan at
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 15, about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon. They saw the persons
Article III [of] Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by they were supposed to meet in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and
Republic Act No, 7650, and hereby SENTENCES him to after seeing those persons, they stayed overnight. In his
RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED address at Valle Verde II, accused-appellant had a live-in
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), plus the cost of suit. partner named ANNIE GONZALES. He was a car owner
"The 'Shabu', subject matter of the Information in this case, and had a former driver named Rey, who drove for him for
is hereby ordered FORFEITED in favor of the [g]overnment less than a year. He had to dismiss his driver Rey because
and ordered TURNED OVER to the Dangerous Drugs Board he was always late or would be absent for work without
for proper disposal as provided by law."5 informing him ahead of time. After staying overnight in far
away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, they left for Manila on April
The Facts 7, 1998 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning. When they reached
Version of the Prosecution Manila proper, he dropped off witness Ramon Ty in his
house at Caloocan. Then, he went straight home to Valle
The prosecution's version of the facts is summarized by the Verde to take a nap. At more or less 3:00 o'clock in the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as follows:6 afternoon of April 7, 1998, he was at home at Valle Verde,
"On April 6, 1998, Atty. Jose Justo S. Yap, supervising agent together with his live-in partner, ANNIE GONZALES. Later
of the Dangerous Drugs Division-National Bureau of that afternoon, three (3)-armed persons entered his
Investigation, received information that a certain Roberto condominium unit. There was a commotion downstairs
Mendoza Pacis was offering to sell one-half (1/2) kilogram and his live-in partner Annie Gonzales opened the door
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" for the and he was awakened. Annie told him that there were
amount of nine hundred fifty pesos (P950.00) per gram or three (3) people with guns looking for him and they went
a total of four hundred seventy five thousand pesos up to the room right away. The three-armed men told him
(P475,000.00). The NBI Chief of the Dangerous Drugs that they were NBI agents but did not show any
Division approved the buy-bust operation. Atty. Yap and identification. Agent Justo Yap, Jr. was one of them. Agent
Senior Agent Midgonio S. Congzon, Jr. were assigned to Congzon Jr. was also one of them, but NBI Special
handle the case. Investigator Larosa was not one of them. When they
entered the room, the gun of NBI Agent Yap was already
"In the afternoon of the same day, Atty. Yap, Senior Agent pointed at him while the two (2) other agents were holding
Congzon and the informant went to the house of the butts of their guns. They were in civilian clothes. They
appellant at 375 Caimito Ville, Caimito Street, Valle Verde told him to step-out and that they were looking for [s]habu.
II, Pasig City. The informant introduced Atty. Yap to They were not able to find any in his room or downstairs.
appellant as interested buyer. They negotiated the sale of When they were looking for the [s]habu, the accused
one-half (1/2) kilogram of shabu. The total price was appellant responded "WHAT SHABU?" "What [s]habu are
 92

you looking for?" When he stepped out of the room to go They were able to get the gadget from him. They went to
down to the living room, he saw his former driver Rey Manila the following morning. They left at about 7:00
together with his father. Rey[,] as stated before was his o'clock in the morning of April 7, 1998 and reached his
former driver and he had seen the father of Rey once or house in Caloocan City at around 10:30 o'clock in the
twice before. Rey and his father were also in the living morning. Whe[n] they reached Caloocan, he went home
room. A paper bag with the lettering "CAB" was presented and Roberto Mendoza Pacis said that he will also go
to the accused appellant in his house. He noticed that the home."
bag came from Rey and was hiding it behind him when he
Ruling of the Trial Court
gave it to agent Yap. Agent Yap got it from the cabinet
near the kitchen. Agent Yap wanted him to admit that it The trial court gave full faith and credence to the
belongs to him and that it came from his condominium. testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, noting that they
Agent Yap also showed him the bag with white powder testified in a clear and straightforward manner. It
and what was shown to him was a white substance in debunked appellant's defense of "frame-up" as it was
powdery form. After it was shown to him and he was asked neither substantiated nor proven. It held that affirmative
to admit that it was taken from his place, he and his live-in testimony, especially when it came from the mouth of a
partner ANNIE GONZALES were brought to the NBI at Taft credible witness, was far stronger than a negative one.
Avenue. He did not see Rey and his father anymore at the
NBI Office. When they were at the NBI, the Agents asked Hence, this appeal.8
the accused-appellant to admit that the shabu was taken The Issues
from his apartment. He told them that it was not from his
apartment. Agent Yap told him that if he will not admit he Appellant raises the following alleged errors for our
will stay in jail longer or will be put behind bars. The consideration:
accused appellant was brought to the NBI Headquarters "1. The lower court erred in finding accused-appellant
on April 7, 1998. When he was taken from his house by the guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation
three NBI Agents, he was not informed or appraised of his of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425 as amended, despite
constitutional rights such as the right to counsel and to the inherent incredibility of the NBI (National Bureau of
remain silent. The same thing is true when he was brought Investigation) version of the manner the alleged buy-bust
to the NBI Headquarters, where he was not appraised of operation was conducted.
these basic rights. When he was asked to admit that the
shabu was taken from his place, he told them that it was "2. The court a quo gravely erred in giving too much weight
not from him and asked why [they were] doing [this] to to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution when
him. The NBI Agents insisted that he is hard-headed and if their testimonies were shot with material discrepancies
he would just follow them he will be free if he will tell the and inconsistencies.
source of the shabu. There were no statements taken from "3. The lower court erred when it failed to accord full
the accused-appellant in the afternoon of April 7, 1998; no significance [of] the fact that the informant was not
statements were also taken from him in the morning presented in court when circumstances demand for his
of April 8, 1998. The agents were trying to negotiate with presentation.
him. The negotiation was such that if he cannot produce
the source of the contraband, then he had to "4. The lower court erred when it failed to give weight and
produce P200,000.00 in order to get himself free. The NBI credence to the alibi offered by the accused as a
Agents agreed to let Annie Gonzales go and look for defense."9
money. Annie Gonzales was able to produce
These issues may be summed as follows: (1) whether the
only P40,000.00. It was brought back by Annie Gonzales to
"buy-bust" operation that led to appellant's arrest was
the NBI on April 8, 1998 and gave the sum to Agent Yap.
valid, (2) whether the presentation of the informant was
Agent Yap looked very disappointed when he received
necessary to prove appellant's guilt, and (3) whether the
the money. He said that it was not the agreement that was
trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to
made. That, the agreed price of P200,000.00 was short
appellant's alibi.
of P160,000.00. The accused-appellant requested again if
he could use the phone to call up his cousin J-C Mendoza. This Court's Ruling
He got in touch with his cousin, who said that he will try to
The appeal is not meritorious.
get the amount. He again requested Agent Yap if he
could allow Annie Gonzales [to] go to his cousin and see if First Issue:
there was cash that she can get. Annie Gonzales was
allowed to leave again but the P160,000.00 was not Validity of the Buy-Bust Operation
produced. Annie Gonzales did not come back anymore Claiming that he was framed by the agents of the National
because she was not able to produce the money. She did Bureau of Investigation (NBI), appellant assails the validity
not show up anymore at the NBI Headquarters because of the buy-bust operation that led to his arrest.
she will be detained together with him (accused-
appellant). Entrapment Distinguished from Instigation

"Defense witness Ramon V. Ty corroborated, on all material In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the
points, the testimony of the accused-appellant. He was purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the
the driver of Joey Albert, the singer, for three (3) years more execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other
or less. He knows accused-appellant because he is the hand, instigators practically induce the would-be
brother-in-law of Joey Albert. He first met Roberto defendant into the commission of the offense and
Mendoza Pacis at his house, when he together with become co-principals themselves. It has been held in
Vicente Pacis, husband of Joey Albert, went there. In the numerous cases by this Court that entrapment is
morning of April 6, 1998, he was at home. In the afternoon, sanctioned by law as a legitimate method of
they left his house at around 2:00 o'clock. They were bound apprehending criminal elements engaged in the sale and
[for] far away Urdaneta, Pangasinan, because his physical distribution of illegal drugs.10
therapist, Dr. Lachica who resided in Pangasinan, was A careful examination of the records shows that the
supposed to buy some instruments from him. He needed operation that led to the arrest of appellant was indeed
the instruments to help him exercise his body even without an entrapment, not an instigation. The trial court's
therapy because he had a stroke in 1993. When they assessment of the credibility of witnesses must be
reached Urdaneta, Pangasinan, he did not see his accorded the highest respect, because it had the
therapist because the latter was at his cousin's house. After advantage of observing their demeanor and was thus in a
being told where Dr. Lachica was, they went to see him.
 93

better position to discern if they were telling the truth or Hence, appellant was unable to disprove the testimonies
not.11 In the present case, the RTC noted that the of the prosecution witnesses that on April 6, 1998, he was
prosecution witnesses testified in a clear and discussing the terms of the sale with the poseur-buyers.
straightforward manner in narrating the events that had
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the positive
transpired before and during the buy-bust operation.
identification of the accused -- when categorical and
Furthermore, courts generally give full faith and credit to consistent and without any ill motive on the part of the
officers of the law, for they are presumed to have prosecution witnesses -- prevails over alibi and denial
performed their duties in a regular manner.12 Accordingly, which are negative and self-serving, undeserving of
in entrapment cases, credence is given to the narration of weight in law.18
an incident by prosecution witnesses who are officers of
Compared with the detailed, convincing and well-
the law and presumed to have performed their duties in a
documented Decision of the trial court, appellant's denial
regular manner in the absence of evidence to the
and alibi pale into insignificance.
contrary.13
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed
No Proof of Ill Motive on the Part of NBI Agents
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
It is not unusual in criminal cases of this kind to have a
SO ORDERED.
version of the prosecution so diametrically opposed to that
of the defense. However, upon a careful perusal of the Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
records, we find the evidence presented by the defense
to be unsound and self-serving.
Footnotes
Appellant did not submit any plausible reason or ill motive
1 Written by Judge Edwin A. Villasor; rollo, pp. 16-44; records, pp. 259-287.
on the part of the arresting officers to falsely impute to him
a serious and unfounded charge. Where there is nothing 2 Rollo, p. 5; records, p. 1.
to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were 3 Atty. Ernesto O. Pua.
moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they
4 Order dated July 30, 1998; records, p. 38.
were not so moved, and that their testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit.14 The records show that appellant had 5 Assailed Decision, pp. 28-29; rollo, pp. 16-44; records, pp. 259-287.
a ready supply of shabu for sale and disposition to anyone 6Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6; rollo, pp. 137-140. The Brief was signed by Assistant
willing to pay the right price. Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega, Assistant Solicitor General Amy C.
Lazaro-Javier and Associate Solicitor Elmira S. Cruz.
Elements of Crime Duly Proven
7Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-11; rollo, pp. 63-69. The Brief was signed by Atty.
Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as Benjamin B. Bernardino.
elements in the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) 8 This case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 4, 2002, upon
the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to receipt by this Court of appellee's Brief. The filing of a reply brief was
another, and (2) he knew that what he had sold and deemed waived, as none had been submitted within the reglementary
period.
delivered was a dangerous drug.15 These elements were
duly proven in the case herein. The records show that 9 Appellant's Brief, p. 1; rollo, p. 59. Original in upper case.
appellant sold and delivered the shabu to NBI agents 10People v. Lapatha, 167 SCRA 159, November 9, 1988; People v.
posing as buyers. It was seized and identified as a Rualo, 152 SCRA 635, July 31, 1987; People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA
prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence. 483, November 13, 1986.

Appellant was likewise shown to be aware that what he 11 People v. Ruedas, 194 SCRA 553, February 27, 1991.
was selling and delivering was a prohibited substance. 12 People v. Lamog, 172 SCRA 342, April 17, 1989.
Second Issue: 13 People v. Boholst, 152 SCRA 263, July 23, 1987.

Identity of Informant Not Necessary 14 People v. Sanchez, 173 SCRA 305, May 12, 1989.

People v. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561, 579, September 5, 1997; People v.

15
With respect to the informant's identity, we hold that it may
Manzano, 227 SCRA 780, 785, November 16, 1993.
remain confidential. There are strong practical reasons for
keeping its secrecy, including the continued health and
16 Ibid.
safety of the informant and the encouragement of others 17 People v. Barera, 262 SCRA 63, September 19, 1996.
to report any wrongdoing to police authorities.16 This is 18 People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February 13, 2002.
settled jurisprudence and we will not belabor it here.
Third Issue:
Alibi as a Defense
On April 6, 1998, NBI agents, acting as poseur-buyers of
illegal drugs, allegedly went to the house of appellant to
discuss with him preliminary arrangements for the sale.
However, Pacis disputed this allegation. To bolster his
claim, he presented his sister-in-law's driver, Ramon V. Ty,
who testified that he was with the former in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan on that same day; hence, appellant could
not have been with the poseur-buyers in Manila to discuss
the quantity and the price of the shabu to be delivered
the next day.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove
that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The
excuse must be so airtight that it admits of no exception.17
In the present case, however, we agree with the RTC that
the claim of Ty was not substantiated by the testimonies of
the persons he and appellant were supposed to have met
in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.