1) The petitioner, Juan Tañada, was a Justice of the Peace who was transferred to a new jurisdiction after turning 65 years old.
2) Act No. 3899 mandated retirement for justices who reached 65 years of age as of January 1, 1933.
3) The Supreme Court held that since Tañada turned 65 after the act took effect, he was not required to retire and could continue serving as a Justice of the Peace for life, as his transfer did not constitute a new appointment requiring confirmation. The court must follow the plain meaning of the words in the statute.
1) The petitioner, Juan Tañada, was a Justice of the Peace who was transferred to a new jurisdiction after turning 65 years old.
2) Act No. 3899 mandated retirement for justices who reached 65 years of age as of January 1, 1933.
3) The Supreme Court held that since Tañada turned 65 after the act took effect, he was not required to retire and could continue serving as a Justice of the Peace for life, as his transfer did not constitute a new appointment requiring confirmation. The court must follow the plain meaning of the words in the statute.
1) The petitioner, Juan Tañada, was a Justice of the Peace who was transferred to a new jurisdiction after turning 65 years old.
2) Act No. 3899 mandated retirement for justices who reached 65 years of age as of January 1, 1933.
3) The Supreme Court held that since Tañada turned 65 after the act took effect, he was not required to retire and could continue serving as a Justice of the Peace for life, as his transfer did not constitute a new appointment requiring confirmation. The court must follow the plain meaning of the words in the statute.
1) The petitioner, Juan Tañada, was a Justice of the Peace who was transferred to a new jurisdiction after turning 65 years old.
2) Act No. 3899 mandated retirement for justices who reached 65 years of age as of January 1, 1933.
3) The Supreme Court held that since Tañada turned 65 after the act took effect, he was not required to retire and could continue serving as a Justice of the Peace for life, as his transfer did not constitute a new appointment requiring confirmation. The court must follow the plain meaning of the words in the statute.
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Tanada vs Yulo Case Digest
Tanada v. Yulo No. 43575 (May 31, 1935)
FACTS: Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas. Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 birthday on October 35, 1934, subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the time said Act takes effect on January 1, 1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No. 3899.
ISSUE: 1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office. 2. W/N his transfer is considered a “new transfer” and requires confirmation by the Philippine Commission.
HELD: No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter. Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated. No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on original appointment.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 43575. May 31, 1935.]
JUAN TAÑADA, petitioner, vs. JOSE YULO, Secretary of Justice, EDUARDO
GUTIERREZ DAVID, Judge of First Instance of the Thirteenth Judicial District, and SANTIAGO TAÑADA, Justice of the Peace of Alabat, Tayabas, respondents.
Pedro Ynsua for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Hilado for respondents.
||| (Tañada v. Yulo, G.R. No. 43575, [May 31, 1935], 61 PHIL 515-522)
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; LEGISLATIVE INTENTION; EXTENT OF JUDICIAL POWER. — The
determination of the legislative intent is the primary consideration. That legislative intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the statute is to legislate not to interpret. Courts are bound to follow the plain words of the statute as to which there is no room for construction, regardless of the consequences.||| (Tañada v. Yulo, G.R. No. 43575, [May 31, 1935], 61 PHIL 515-522)
