G.R. No. L-15140 December 29, 1960 G.R. No.

L-16456 June 29, 1963

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs. JUAN DEL ROSARIO, Defendant-Appellant. vs. DOLORES COQUIA, Defendant-Appellee.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.: REGALA, J.: law library

Defendant Juan del Rosario was, in an information filed with From an incident which occurred on July 1, 1957, one David
the Court of First Instance of La Union on October 24, 1957, C. Naval filed with the Municipal Court of the City of Naga a
charged with "maltreatment of a detention prisoner." It is complaint for grave oral defamation against the herein
alleged in the information "that on or about the 28th of defendant-appellee, Dolores Coquia. Thereafter and by
March, 1957, in the Municipality of Naguilian, Province of La virtue of that complaint, the same court ordered her arrest.
Union," said defendant, then a policeman, "took and confined On July 22, 1957, however, the same court forwarded the
one Emilio Sy as detention prisoner in the municipal jail records of the case to the Court First Instance of Camarines
thereat and once inside the jail and for the purpose of Sur for the continuance of the proceedings since the accused
extorting a confession from the latter, willfully, unlawfully had renounced her right to the second stage of preliminary
and feloniously maltreated said Emilio Sy by giving him investigation. In turn, on August 2, 1957, the last mentioned
several fist blows, kicked him several times and pulled him court endorsed the case to the Office of the City Attorney for
by the hair and head and as a result of which said Emilio Sy reinformation. For some explained reasons, the case was left
sustained injuries on the different parts of his body which completely unacted on by the City Fiscal's office until January
needed medical treatment for a period from three to four 26, 1959 when the City Fiscal filed with the Court of First
days." virtual law library Instance of Camarines Sur the corresponding, information for
grave oral defamation against the accused, appellee herein.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of
mauling Emilio Sy and inflicting upon him the injuries alleged The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
in the information. It did not, however, convict said prescription which was opposed by the prosecution Ruling on
defendant of the offense charged - there being no showing the motion, the court a quo sustained the movant and
that the offended party was a prisoner or detention prisoner dismissed the case. A motion for reconsideration therefor
under his charge - but only of slight physical injuries under having been denied, the City Attorney, represented by the
Article 266, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code and Solicitor General's Office, appealed to this Court.
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of 15 days of arresto
menor, plus costs. From this sentence, defendant appealed
The Solicitor General concedes that the delay in the filing of
directly to this Court. law library
the information for this case had been unduly long. Quite
subtly even, the concession extends to an admission that
In his brief, defendant admits liability for slight physical prescription had indeed set in. It was expressed, however,
injuries, a light offense, but contends that the crime has that the instant appeal was nevertheless interposed so that
already prescribed, the information against him having been a ruling may be secured as to the precise period when a
filed more than 6 months after its commission, or beyond the criminal proceeding should be considered as having been
2-month prescriptive period provided for light offenses. "unjustifiably stopped to mark the resumption of the running
of the period of prescription" pursuant to the provisions of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, hereunder quoted:
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that the
filing of the complaint or accusation with the office of the
Provincial Fiscal for preliminary investigation sometime ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The
before April 25, 1957 interrupted the running of the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
prescriptive period. law library which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses
run again when such proceedings terminate without the
prescribe in two months. Article 91 of the same Code
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is
shall commence to run again when such proceedings absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant a
him." The complaint or information referred to in the above
resolution of the issue raised. It is sufficient to indicate and
quoted provisions which interrupts the running of the
conformably to the doctrine expressed in the case of People
prescriptive period, as ruled in the case of People vs. Tayco
v. Juan del Rosario, G. R. No. L-15140, December 29, 1960,
(73 Phil., 509), is that which is filed in the proper court and
the prescriptive period for the case at bar was never
not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party
interrupted. In the said case, We declared that -
in the Fiscal's Office. Conformably to this ruling, the
defendant cannot legally be convicted of the crime of slight
physical injuries, which is a light offense, the information Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses
under which he is sought to be held liable having admittedly prescribe in two months. Article 91 of the same Code
been filed in court more than two months after the provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to
commission and discovery of the offense. run from the day on which the crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is reversed and the
shall commence to run again when such proceedings
case dismissed, with costs de oficio.
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
him." The complaint or information referred to in the above
provisions which interrupts the running of the prescriptive
period, as ruled in the case of People v. Tayco (73 Phil. 509),
is that which is filed in the proper court and not
the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in
the Fiscal's Office.

It should be recalled that the proper court in the present

litigation was the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur.
The records of this case clearly show that no formal
complaint or information is contemplated by the
aforementioned Article 91 of the Penal Code was ever filed
therein within the reglementary period. As a matter of fact,
the said formal complaint or information was filed only after
the lapse of more than one year. Considering that under the
Code, the prescriptive period for grave oral defamation is six
months (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code), the only conclusion
deducible is that the same has prescribed.

Applying the principle laid down in the aforecited case of

People v. Del Rosario, supra, We can not speak of the
resumption of the prescriptive period since it has never been
interrupted.

WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by the Government is hereby

dismissed and the order dismissing the information is hereby
affirmed in full. Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-45674 May 30, 1983 thereby imputing upon the offended party, Dr. Patrocinio
Angeles, the attending physician of the wife of Romulo Cruz
and one of the physicians at the Morong Emergency Hospital,
EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B.
professional incompetence, inefficiency, or negligence thus
BERNARDINO, petitioners,
casting public contempt and ridicule upon the reputation of
vs.
the said Dr. Patrocinio Angeles.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Contrary to law.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Pasig, Rizal, October 8, 1966.
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated August 25, 1976 which modified the On February 1, 1973 the trial court rendered its decision
decision of the lower court by finding petitioners guilty of the convicting the accused Harry Bernardino and Emiliano
crime of simple slander instead of grave oral defamation as Francisco of the crime of grave oral defamation, sentenced
the former Court of First Instance has held, and imposed on each of them to suffer a penalty of four (4) months of arresto
him a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
of insolvency and ordered them to pay complainant the correccional as maximum and each of the accused was
amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages. directed to pay complainant t the amount of ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00).
On February 6, 1966 complainant Dr. Patrocinio Angeles,
who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency On appeal to the Court of Appeals the decision of the trial
Hospital, filed a case for intriguing against honor allegedly court as already stated was modified finding the accused
committed on December 26, 1965 against Dr. Emiliano guilty of simple slander.
Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. On May 3, 1966, the Provincial
As found out by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case
Fiscal filed an information in the former Court of First
are as follows:
Instance of Rizal accusing Francisco and Bernardino of the
crime of grave oral defamation. On October 8, 1966 the
information upon order of the court, was amended by adding The evidence of the prosecution is that Mrs. Lourdes Cruz,
the particular statements uttered by each accused allegedly wife of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal
constituting the crime of slander to wit: bleeding since November 24, 1965; that she consulted a Dr.
Custodio about her ailment and the latter was able to stop
the bleeding for two days; that thereafter her bleeding
AMENDED INFORMATION
recurred that Mrs. Cruz then consulted a Dr. Floreza who
advised her that if her bleeding continued she should go to a
The undersigned Special Counsel accuses Harry Bernardino hospital; that her bleeding continued so on December 9,
and Emiliano Francisco of the crime of Grave Oral 1965 Lourdes Cruz entered the Morong Emergency Hospital
Defamation, committed as follows: that she was attended by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the
complainant; that her ailment was tentatively diagnosed by
Dr. Angeles as "H-Mole, abortion and pregnancy"; that an x-
That on or about the 26th day of December, 1965, in the
ray examination conducted on Mrs. Cruz, however, revealed
municipality of Tanay, province of Rizal, Philippines and
that she was negative for pregnancy; that Mrs. Cruz
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
continued to lose blood and had to be given a transfusion of
abovenamed accused conspiring and confederating together,
fresh blood on December 11, 1965; that as the bleeding did
with the deliberate intent of bringing one Dr. Patrocinio
not stop Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complaint Dr.
Angeles into public discredit, disrepute and contempt, after
Patrocinio ; that her uterus which contained three (3) dead
having knowledge that the wife of one Romulo Cruz who was
foetal triplets was removed that the operation was successful
a former patient of the Morong Emergency Hospital was
and her bleeding was arrested, that on December 26, 1965
operated thereat by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, did then and
at about 9:20 o'clock in the evening the two accused Dr.
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly speak
Emiliano Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino together with
and utter the following insulting and defamatory words and
Dr. Crisologo Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went to the house
expressions, to wit:
of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal that the two accused
interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her husband Romulo Cruz about
Dr. Francisco (To Romulo Cruz): her operation; that the couple informed the two that they are
satisfied with the operation; that in the course of this
Your wife should not have been operated. If I were the interview the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco said that the
doctor, all that I should have done was to do a curretage operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz should not
raspa on her. have been operated on and that if he were the one he would
not conduct an operation but only curretage (raspahin); that
on the same occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino
Atty. Bernardino: that the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no
good, are incompetent and they are not surgeons and said
Those doctors are incompetent. They are not surgeons. They accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for
are just bold. murder through reckless imprudence; that the accused Dr.
Francisco was formerly a member of the Courtesy Medical
Staff on the Morong Emergency Hospital and as such he could
Dr. Francisco: bring in his private patients who needed the facility of the
hospital for proper management; that, however, on
The operation was unusual. December 15, 1965 his membership in the said staff was
cancelled by the Credential Committee of said hospital at a
meeting called for that purpose by the complainant Dr.
Atty. Bernardino:
Angeles who was then the Director of the Morong Emergency
Hospital; that the accused Harry Bernardino, as counsel of a
The doctors who operated on your wife could be charged for Dr. Lerma, had earlier moved for the ouster of Dr. Angeles
murder thru reckless imprudence. The doctors there are no as Director of the Morong Emergency Hospital; that the case
good. They are not surgeons. was bitterly contested that it even reached the Office of the
President; that, furthermore, during the incumbency of the
accused Atty. Bernardino as Mayor of Morong, Rizal he slander, which prescribed in two months under Article 90 of
caused the passage of a resolution wherein he was given the Revised Penal Code, the said court should have dismissed
authority to recommend all charity cases for admission to the the case, and sustained the acquittal of the accused on the
Morong Emergency Hospital and that this resolution, ground that said crime had already prescribed. He pointed
however, was ignored by the complaint Dr. Angeles in out the alleged defamatory remarks were committed on
accordance with the policy of the Director of the Bureau of December 26, 1965, and the information charging the
Medical Services. accused of the greater offense of grave oral defamation was
filed with the court more than four (4) months later on May
3, 1966.
The evidence of the defense is that as Chairman of the Ethics
Committee of the Eastern District of Rizal Medical Society,
the accused Dr. Francisco sought to find out what could be Disputing the foregoing, the Solicitor General contends that
done with the reported wrong operation of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz for the purpose of determining the proper prescriptive
by complainant Dr. Angeles which resulted in the removal of period, what should be considered is the nature of the
triplets; that so the accused Dr. Francisco consulted the other offense charged in the information which is grave oral
accused Atty. Bernardino on the proper steps to take; that defamation, not the crime committed by the accused, as said
upon the advice of accused Atty. Bernardino, the accused Dr. crime was found by the Court to constitute only simple
Francisco accompanied by Dr. Crisologo Golla who was a slander. Hence, the period of prescription here should be six
Committee member, and the accused, Atty. Bernardino went (6) months.
on December 26, 1965 to Tanay, Rizal the hometown of Mrs.
Lourdes Cruz; that they interviewed the spouses Romulo
Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, the complaint
Cruz and Lourdes Cruz regarding the operation performed on
was filed by the offended party before the Fiscal's office on
Mrs. Cruz on December 13, 1965; that in that interview the
February 3, 1966 or only thirty-nine (39) days after the
two accused sought the facts regarding the case pursuant to
incident in question which is still within the prescriptive
the Ethics Committee decision to conduct the fact finding
period. He cited the case of People v. Olarte 1 which
investigation; and that after the interview with the Cruz
overruled the case of People v. del Rosario 2 and held that
spouses Dr. Golla and the accused Dr. Francisco went to Dr.
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
Floreza, in coming president of the Rizal Medical Society on
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
December 27, 1965, to take up the matter with him but they
investigation should, and does, interrupt the period of
were advised to take it up with the Eastern District of Rizal
prescription of criminal responsibility, even if the court where
Medical Society, which they did.
the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on
the merits. It makes no difference whether the case was filed
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded in the Fiscal's Office and not in the Municipal Court as in the
that while it is true that the statements were made on the Olarte case, since Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does
occasion of the so-called fact finding interview pursuant to not require that the complaint be one filed in court in order
the Ethics Committee decision, the accused went out of to toll the running of the period.
bounds by imputing to the complainant acts which are not
only derogatory but constitute a crime that can be
Where an accused has been found to have committed a
prosecuted de oficio. It went on to rule however that the
lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he
defamation committed by the accused cannot be considered
cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already
as grave under the circumstances, and the worst that was
prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the
said of the complainant was that he should not have
circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple
performed the operation, and that he could be prosecuted for
expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.
murder through reckless imprudence.
The principle has the support of overwhelming authorities in
American jurisprudence:
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
present case was instituted. While the case was pending,
The general rule, as stated in 22 CJS,
Atty. Harry Bernardino one of the petitioners herein died,
Criminal Law, sec. 225b, is "as a general
hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the case was
rule, one indicted for an offense not barred
dismissed insofar as he is concerned.
by limitation, but convicted of a lesser
included offense which is so barred, is
Petitioners' brief, prepared by their counsel with notable zeal entitled to discharge", and in 15 Am. Jur.,
raises several questions. In synthesis, they are: Criminal Law, Sec. 343; "It frequently
happens that a change of felony includes
an offense of a lower grade with a different
1. Whether or not the crime of simple slander found by the
period of limitation so that, while the felony
Court of Appeals to be the offense committed by the
is not barred, the statute has ran as to the
petitioners has prescribed;
lesser offense. In this situation, the rule is
that if the statute has not run against the
2. Whether or not the alleged defamatory remarks of felony, while the lesser offense is barred.
petitioners may be considered libelous; the bar cannot be evaded by the defendant
for the felony and convicting him of the
3. Whether or not there was conspiracy; lesser offense." 3

4. Whether or not the failure to allege in the information that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period
petitioners acted with "malice" is fatal; and of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities. or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
5. Whether or not the Court erred in giving credence to the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. run again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
As the case against the late Harry Bernardino has already stopped for any reason not imputable to him."
been dismissed, We shall discuss only those matters as may
be pertinent to petitioner Francisco. Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs.
Tayco 4 held that the complaint or information referred to in
Francisco argues that since the Court of Appeals had found Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not
that the offense committed was the lesser offense of simple the denuncia or accusation lodged by the offended party in
the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because proceedings may terminate without
under this rule it is so provided that the period shall conviction or acquittal if the court should
commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by discharge the accused because no prima
the filing of the complaint or information terminate without facie case has been shown.
the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the
proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court
acquittal or conviction of the accused.
conducting a p investigation, a proceeding in the Fiscal's
Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was
disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case, cited by the
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the Olarte
case there was diversity of precedents on the issue of
prescription. One view declares that the filing of the To the writer's mind, these reasons
complaint with the justice of the (or municipal judge) does in logically call with equal force, for the
the course of prescriptive term. This view is found in People express overruling also of the doctrine in
v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that
therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the
v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other pronouncement is offended party with the City Fiscal's Office
that to produce interruption, the complainant or information which is required by law to conduct the
must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction preliminary investigation does not
to try the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. interrupt the period of prescription. In
del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People v. Coquia, chartered cities, criminal prosecution is
L- 15456, June 29, 1963. generally initiated by the filing of the
complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal
for preliminary investigation. In the case of
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated
provincial fiscals, besides being
the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor General. The reasons
empowered like municipal judges to
for the doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar
conduct preliminary investigations, they
reads:
may even reverse actions of municipal
judges with respect to charges triable by
In view of this diversity of precedents, and Courts of First Instance. ... 5
in order to provide guidance for Bench and
Bar, this Court has re-examined the
Clearly, therefore, the firing of the denuncia or complaint for
question and, after mature consideration,
intriguing against honor by the offended party, later changed
has arrived at the conclusion that the true
by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the
doctrine is, and should be, the one
Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory remarks
established by the decisions holding that
were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
the period of prescription.
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of Nevertheless, petitioner Francisco cannot be held liable, for
prescription of the criminal responsibility, his statements —
even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on Your wife would not have been operated, If
its merits. Several reasons buttress this I were the doctor, all that I should have
conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of done was to do a curretage raspa on her.
the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that
the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or xxx xxx xxx
information" without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed in the court The operation was unusual.
for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the
merits. Second, even if the court where the are clearly not libelous per se. Complainant Angeles had
complaint or information is filed may only admitted that he committed a mistake in the management of
proceed to investigate the case, its the case of Mrs. Cruz. The remarks made by Francisco were
actuations already represent the initial but a harmless expression of his opinion on what should have
step of the proceedings against the been done in treating her, if he were the doctor managing
offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the her. His statements were nothing more than a comment that
injured party of the right to obtain complainant committed a mistake in the diagnosis and
vindication on account of delays that are management of the patient. An impartial observer would
not under his control. All that the victim of readily note that such remarks do not degrade the
the offense may do on his part to initiate competency of a doctor, for the latter, because of human
the prosecution is to file the requisite limitations cannot be expected to be accurate at all times in
complaint. the diagnosis of patients. As noted in the case of Blende vs.
Hearst Publications, 93 P 2d. 733, a "physician is only
required to possess the ordinary knowledge and skill of his
And it is no argument that Article 91 also profession, and is not liable for mistakes if he uses the
expresses that the interrupted prescription methods recognized and approved by those reasonably
"shall commence to run again when such p skilled in the profession. Clearly, a criticism in a physician's
terminate without the accused being wrong management of the case, such as that of Francisco
convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating cannot be considered libelous. In the same American case, it
that the court in which the complaint or was held:
information is filed must have power to
acquit or convict the accused. Precisely,
the trial on the merits usually terminates It is clear that to charge a physician merely
in conviction or acquittal not otherwise. with the mismanagement of the making of
But it is in the court conducting a a wrong diagnosis in a particular case is not
preliminary investigation where the of itself actionable. Such a charge implies
 nothing more, at most, than ignorance or
unskillfulness in that case, and does not
materially affect his reputation as respects
his general competency to practice his
profession.

To charge a professional man with

negligence or unskillfulness in the
management or treatment of an individual
case is not more than to impute to him the
mistakes and errors incident to fallible
human nature. The most eminent and
skillfull physician or surgeon may make
mistake on the symptoms of a particular
case without detracting from his general
professional skill or learning. To say of him,
therefore, that he was mistaken in that
case would not be calculated to impair the
confidence of the community in his general
professional competency.

We cannot see our way clear on how Francisco's questioned

statements could be branded as libelous. To stigmatize them
as libelous would be a dangerous precedent whereby a mere
criticism on the actuation of another will generate criminal
liability for slander. His alleged defamatory remarks may be
likened to a criticism of a lawyer's or Judge's erroneous
handling of the case.

It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the Solicitor

General, the statements quoted and stigmatized as
defamatory are those only of accused Bernardino. 6 That
latter's statements are what the Solicitor General considered
as "strong words that are evidently serious and damaging."
Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General regarding the
statements uttered by Francisco. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General would like to hold Francisco liable by the utterances
of Bernardino on the ground of conspiracy. Assuming that
Bernardino's statement is libelous, Francisco cannot be held
liable for the same. Neither the lower court nor the Court of
Appeals found that they conspired with each other to commit
the alleged crane. This is so because no evidence was offered
to show that there was prior consultation on what each would
say. The fact alone that they were together when those
words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to
utter those words. Clearly, each accused spoke
spontaneously and individually.

Conspiracy being of a very far-reaching effect, the degree of

proof required for establishing it must be the same as that
required to support a finding of guilt for the crime
itself 7 which must be upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. 8

The finding of the Court of Appeals that the "statements were

made on the occasion of the so-called fact-finding interview
pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision" is obviously
incompatible with the notion that petitioners had gone to the
residence of the Cruz pursuant to a conspiracy to defame or
slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of going to
Tanay, Rizal, having been accepted as a fact by the Court of
Appeals, it is incongruous to allege, as respondents now do,
that Atty. Bernardino and Dr. Francisco had conspired to
slander Dr. Angeles.

From what has been said, there is no further need to discuss

the other issues raised in this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Emiliano

Francisco is hereby acquitted, with cost de oficio.
[G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.] Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, Petitioner, v. HON. ANDRES B. conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on
REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in
criminal cases is a substantive right.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT 7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR
APPLY TO OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE. — DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT THE INSTITUTION OF
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure NECESSARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The Court realizes
meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s
which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the
offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However,
phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph that possibility should not justify a misreading of the
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof
words in a statute should be read in relation to and not to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true
legislative intent.
DECISION
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION CRUZ, J.:
32(2) OF BP NO. 129. — Where paragraph (b) of the section
does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.
obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting
in such courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial
punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years purposes without a mayor’s permit in violation of Ordinance
and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of Province of Rizal.
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The
property through criminal negligence they shall have corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
not exceed twenty thousand pesos. These offenses are not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground
that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied.
3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was
VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITY ORDINANCES. — As it sustained by the responded judge.
is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that
among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or
city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner
petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of first argues that the charge against her is governed by the
Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
110.
SECTION 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the procedure in
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
THE CASE IS ACTUALLY FILED IN COURT. — Under Section the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in the following cases:
9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a B. Criminal Cases:
prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."
Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the 1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced
2. Violations of rental law;
only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution
decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means
that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that. 4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged does not exceed six months
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00),
WITH ACT NO. 3326. — This interpretation is in consonance or both, irrespective of other impossible penalties, accessory
with Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . ."
shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against (Emphasis supplied.)
the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2
thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission x x x
of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish SECTION 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal
as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by
complaint or by information filed directly in court without
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL CASES IS A investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT. — The Court feels that if there be a and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should,
be prosecuted de officio, the corresponding complaint shall and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
party. information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the
Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows: complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or
investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second,
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations
the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal already represent the initial step of the proceedings against
ordinances shall prescribe after two months. the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party
of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the requisite complaint.
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on
May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other
instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
constituting jeopardy. on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was
added on October 1, 1988.
SECTION 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be
acts defining and penalizing violations of law not included in That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied) offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way not apply to offenses which are subject to summary
beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last
alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the
should have been dismissed on the ground prescription. Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to
period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover
against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. the true legislative intent.
Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General
also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure
Criminal Procedure, providing as follows: that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal
or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against
SECTION 1. How Instituted. — For offenses not subject to the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance
the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of
institution of criminal action shall be as follows:chanrob1es Rule 110.
virtual 1aw library
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
investigation therein;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
the fiscal’s office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
office of the fiscal. irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof;
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of property through criminal negligence they shall have
prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.) exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does
not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent
maintains that the filing of the complaint with the Officer of These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary
the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such Procedure.
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all
cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the
Rule on Summary Procedure. complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this
adoption of the following dictum in Francisco v. Court of provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
Appeals: preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court,
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a
guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has re-examined the preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one actual filed in court and not on any date before that.
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act
No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof
are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish
as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between

the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail
as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No.
3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase
or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5)
of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to

observe that the decision would have been conformable to
Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral
defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the
instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for
which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a

crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably
with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays
the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is
too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious
intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The
remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a
rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime

imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged
commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of
Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May
30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the
filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after
the crime had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged

Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case
No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal,
is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998 be imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio,
Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p.
711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now
ISABELITA REODICA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited
in Gregorio's book, p. 718). 5
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the
On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00).
Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue,
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals,
because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 14660. After her
complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant
motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted,
sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car
she filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes,
amounted to P8,542.00.
and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for Filing
Appellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the denied this motion and directed petitioner to file her brief. 6
complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1 against
petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.
After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the
trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a
On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal decision.
Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for
Physical Injury." The information read:
reconsideration 8 raising new issues, thus:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE
of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED
Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:
AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO
BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT
abovementioned accused, Isabelita Velasco Reodica, being IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY
then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw LAW. 9
bearing plate no. NJU-306, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the
xxx xxx xxx
same in a reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent
manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations
and without taking the necessary care and precaution to REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON
avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing by GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION OR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said
vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate
In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied
no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, as
causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and
well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence,
prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of
the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
P8,542.00.
the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED
Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries which required
JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED
medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and
MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY
incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for
ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS
the same period of time.
OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A
charge. Trial then ensued. SECONDARY SOURCE.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE
rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the "quasi WHERE THE COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing her: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE
ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR
SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO
and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the
MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT
sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two
TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR
(P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary
COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERROR
impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4
COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
this wise:
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A
complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS ELLIPTICAL
I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.
C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees with petitioner
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its
LACK OF JURISDICTION. maximum period, instead of arresto mayor, pursuant to
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts
below misquoted not only the title, but likewise the ruling of As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that
the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight conformably with Buerano v. Court of Appeals, 14 which
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Concretely, frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was
the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. proper for the trial court to "complex" reckless imprudence
Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for with slight physical injuries and damage to property because
such quasi offense was arresto menor - not arresto mayor. what the law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless
imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there was no
need for two separate informations.
As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that
the courts below should have pronounced that there were
two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that
imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless although the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction to
imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the
them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of this case
. . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty
of six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus: for the damage to property, which was a fine equal to thrice
the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos
v. Garcia. 15
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less
serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to
P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did The OSG then debunks petitioner's defense of prescription of
not err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical the crime, arguing that the prescriptive period here was
injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office
graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L- three days after the incident, pursuant to People v.
37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365). Cuaresma 16 and Chico v. Isidro. 17

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner
investigating fiscal, is different from the instant case because expressed gratitude and appreciation to the OSG in joining
in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she
of lesiones menos graves and damage to property which considers the OSG's reliance on Buerano v. Court of
were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, Appeals 18 as misplaced, for nothing there validates the
constituted a complex crime. "complexing" of the crime of reckless imprudence with
physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that
case, two separate informations were filed - one for slight
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the
and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should
and the other for damage to property through reckless
have been charged in a separate information.
imprudence. She then insists that in this case,
following Arcaya v. Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two
She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light informations should have been filed. She likewise submits
offenses, both imposable in their maximum period and that Cuyos v. Garcia21 would only apply here on the
computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days assumption that it was proper to "complex" damage to
imprisonment and not six months as imposed by the lower property through reckless imprudence with slight physical
courts." injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro 22 is
likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide,
On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being
punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such, Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not
it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was be given retroactive effect; otherwise, it would either unfairly
filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling
the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had in Zaldivia24 favorable to her.
already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:
The pleadings thus raise the following issues:
In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the
offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should
I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.
have been charged in a separate information. And since, as
a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontok's criminal
liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence
and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00
Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to are light felonies.
quash that part of the information charging him with that
light offense.
III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in
Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with question.
the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts do not deal
with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to
IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be
property and slight physical injuries are light felonies and
questioned for the first time on appeal.
thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore,
only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could
have tolled the statute of limitations, this time V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the
invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes. 13 offenses in question.
VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already the reckless imprudence in this case did not result in damage
prescribed. to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article
365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods (1 month and 1 day to 4 months) for an act
I. The Proper Penalty
committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been
intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony. Note
We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused
of six months of arresto mayorimposed by the trial court and deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief
affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty
However, we cannot subscribe to their submission that the would then be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher
penalty. than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If
the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than
Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides: that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth
paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next
lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. - Any person who, by period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would
correccional in its medium period; if it would have be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; a maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since
if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the
of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall
exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall prescribed in article 64."
commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted
a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed. Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but
likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the
wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos. As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article
9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light
A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto
upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public
shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light
have constituted a light felony. penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale
provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower
In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless
their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light
in Article 64. felony.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in
applicable: damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized
with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
Since arresto mayoris a correctional penalty under Article 25
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a
lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this less grave felony - not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.
article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next
lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply. III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than
the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex
physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30 days. If the
offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act
deliberately or with malice, it is penalized with arresto constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a an offense is necessary a means for committing the other,
duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty same to be applied in its maximum period.
prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being
the case, the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365
applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in
resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25 committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court
declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal
negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex
As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in crime, thus:
the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph of Article 365,
which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 32 this Court found that a
is no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated lacuna existed in the law as to which court had jurisdiction
as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which
felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and was from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years, which was co-
slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of extensive with prision correccional. We then interpreted the
imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot law in this wise:
be charged in one information. They are separate offenses
subject to distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001;
Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized
See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).
with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction of justice of the
peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 of
serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has
P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty
err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical than the latter, in the absence of any express provision of
injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from
graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L- said provisions that its intention was to place offenses
37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365]. penalized with destierro also under the jurisdiction of justice
of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of
courts of first instance.
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following
felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not
of P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the
resulting in physical injuries. jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows
that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower
than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71
IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.
of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30
days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts.
Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight was cognizable by said courts.
physical injuries should have been charged in a separate
information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer
property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also
question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one
imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its
information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
minimum and medium periods - the duration of which was
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting
from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.
in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by
her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded
to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for
of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.
complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
VI. Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.
offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the
penalty for each of them. 29
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light
V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the
felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless
Quasi Offenses in Question.
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount
of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, prescribes in five years.
unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have
before its enactment. 30
already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the
filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after
At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive
law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known period.
as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section
32(2) 31 thereof provided that except in cases falling within
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts
(MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period
Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
"all offenses punishable with imprisonment of got exceeding the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to
of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the run again when such proceedings terminate without the
civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof." stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis
supplied)
The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then
determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the
amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
question thus arises as to which court has jurisdiction over complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the
offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation
resulting in slight physical injuries. only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals 34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court
held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's
office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary

Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby,
such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution
commences by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior
preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in
Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be
commenced only by information." However, this Section
cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is
interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information
directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a

matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-
making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and
the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be

recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a
municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as
amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription
for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to
Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is
suspended only when judicial proceedings are instituted
against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the
prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such
did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have
tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the
information in the proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by

the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings
in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive
period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by
the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days
after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in
the information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge

decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose
decision was affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.