OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Syllabus 465 U. S.

KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 82-485. Argued November 8, 1983-Decided March 20, 1984

Petitioner, a resident of New York, brought a libel suit against respondent
magazine publisher (hereafter respondent), an Ohio corporation, in Fed-
eral District Court in New Hampshire, alleging jurisdiction by reason of
diversity of citizenship. Petitioner's only connection with New Hamp-
shire is the circulation there of a magazine that she assists in producing.
Respondent's contacts with New Hampshire consist of monthly sales of
some 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its nationally published magazine. The
District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade application of New Hamp-
shire's long-arm statute in order to acquire personal jurisdiction over re-
spondent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that petitioner's lack
of contact with New Hampshire rendered that State's interest in re-
dressing the tort of libel to petitioner too attenuated for an assertion of
personal jurisdiction over respondent, and that in view of the "single
publication rule," which would require an award of damages caused in all
States, as well as New Hampshire's unusually long (6-year) limitation
period for libel actions, it would be "unfair" to assert jurisdiction over
respondent.
Held: Respondent's regular circulation of magazines in the forum State is
sufficient to support an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on
the contents of the magazine. Pp. 773-781.
(a) New Hampshire jurisdiction over a complaint based on this circula-
tion of magazines satisfies the Due Process Clause's requirement that a
State's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant be
predicated on "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the State.
Pp. 774-775.
(b) In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on "the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation." Shaf-
fer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204. Thus, it is relevant to the jurisdic-
tional inquiry here that petitioner is seeking to recover damages suffered
in all States in one suit. The contacts between respondent and the
forum must be judged in light of that claim, rather than a claim only for
damages sustained in New Hampshire. P. 775.
(c) The combination of New Hampshire's interest in redressing inju-
ries that occur within the State and its interest in cooperating with other
States in applying the "single publication rule" demonstrates the propri-
 KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.

770 Syllabus

ety of requiring respondent to answer a multistate libel action in New

Hampshire. Pp. 775-778.
(d)Any potential unfairness in applying New Hampshire's statute of
limitations to all aspects of this nationwide suit has nothing to do with
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims. And the chance duration of stat-
utes of limitations of nonforum States has nothing to do with the contacts
among respondent, New Hampshire, and the suit. Pp. 778-779.
(e)The fact that petitioner has very limited contacts with New Hamp-
shire does not defeat jurisdiction, since a plaintiff is not required to have
"minimum contacts" with the forum State before that State is permitted
to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. A plain-
tiff's residence in the forum State is not a separate jurisdictional require-
ment, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the
basis of the defendant's contacts. The victim of a libel, like the victim of
any other tort, may choose to bring suit in any forum with which the de-
fendant has "certain minimum contacts.., such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316.
Pp. 779-781.
(f)Here, where respondent has continuously and deliberately ex-
ploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its
magazine. And, since respondent can be charged with knowledge of the
"single publication rule," it must anticipate that such a suit will seek
nationwide damages. There is no unfairness in calling respondent to
answer for the contents of its national publication wherever a substantial
number of copies are regularly sold and distributed. P. 781.
682 F. 2d 33, reversed and remanded.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,

C. J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and
O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment, post, p. 782.

Norman Roy Grutman argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs was Jeffrey H. Daichman.
Stephen M. Shapiro, by invitation of the Court, 464 U. S.
958, argued the cause as amicus curiae in support of the
judgment below. Lea Brilmayer, David Kahn, and Henry
Monaghan filed a brief for respondents.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Motor Vehi-
cle Manufacturers Association by Robert L. Stern, Stephen M. Shapiro,
 OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Opinion of the Court 465 U. S.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Kathy Keeton sued respondent Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., and other defendants in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Hampshire, alleging
jurisdiction over her libel complaint by reason of diversity
of citizenship. The District Court dismissed her suit because
it believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution forbade the
application of New Hampshire's long-arm statute in order to
acquire personal jurisdiction over respondent. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, 682 F. 2d 33 (1982),
summarizing its concerns with the statement that "the New
Hampshire tail is too small to wag so large an out-of-state
dog." Id., at 36. We granted certiorari, 459 U. S. 1169
(1983), and we now reverse.
Petitioner Keeton is a resident of New York. Her only
connection with New Hampshire is the circulation there of
copies of a magazine that she assists in producing. The mag-
azine bears petitioner's name in several places crediting her
with editorial and other work. Respondent Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., is an Ohio corporation, with its principal place
of business in California. Respondent's contacts with New
Hampshire consist of the sale of some 10,000 to 15,000 copies
of Hustler Magazine in that State each month. See App.
81a-86a. Petitioner claims to have been libeled in five
separate issues of respondent's magazine published between
September 1975 and May 1976.1

William H. Crabtree, and Edward P. Good; for the Association of Ameri-

can Publishers, Inc., by R. Bruce Rich; and for CBS Inc. et al. by Robert
D. Sack, Douglas P. Jacobs, Harvey L. Lipton, Peter C. Gould, Bruce
W. Sanford, and Lawrence Gunnels.
IInitially, petitioner brought suit for libel and invasion of privacy in
Ohio, where the magazine was published. Her libel claim, however, was
dismissed as barred by the Ohio statute of limitations, and her invasion-of-
privacy claim was dismissed as barred by the New York statute of limita-
 KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.

770 Opinion of the Court

The Court of Appeals, in its opinion affirming the District

Court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint, held that peti-
tioner's lack of contacts with New Hampshire rendered the
State's interest in redressing the tort of libel to petitioner too
attenuated for an assertion of personal jurisdiction over re-
spondent. The Court of Appeals observed that the "single
publication rule" ordinarily applicable in multistate libel cases
would require it to award petitioner "damages caused in all
states" should she prevail in her suit, even though the bulk of
petitioner's alleged injuries had been sustained outside New
Hampshire. 682 F. 2d, at 35.2 The court also stressed New
Hampshire's unusually long (6-year) limitations period for
libel actions. New Hampshire was the only State where
petitioner's suit would not have been time-barred when it
was filed. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals
concluded that it would be "unfair" to assert jurisdiction
over respondent. New Hampshire has a minimal interest in
applying its unusual statute of limitations to, and awarding
damages for, injuries to a nonresident occurring outside the
State, particularly since petitioner suffered such a small pro-
portion of her total claimed injury within the State. Id.,
at 35-36.
We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred when it af-
firmed the dismissal of petitioner's suit for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Respondent's regular circulation of magazines
in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion of ju-

tions, which the Ohio court considered to be "migratory." Petitioner then

filed the present action in October 1980.
2The "single publication rule" has been summarized as follows:
"As to any single publication, (a) only one action for damages can be main-
tained; (b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the
one action; and (c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits
of any action for damages bars any other action for damages between
the same parties in all jurisdictions." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 577A(4) (1977).
 OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Opinion of the Court 465 U. S.

risdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the maga-

zine. This is so even if New Hampshire courts, and thus the
District Court under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U. S.
487 (1941), would apply the so-called "single publication rule"
to enable petitioner to recover in the New Hampshire action
her damages from "publications" of the alleged libel through-
out the United States.'
The District Court found that "[t]he general course of con-
duct in circulating magazines throughout the state was pur-
posefully directed at New Hampshire, and inevitably affected
persons in the state." App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a. Such regu-
lar monthly sales of thousands of magazines cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be characterized as random, iso-
lated, or fortuitous. It is, therefore, unquestionable that
New Hampshire jurisdiction over a complaint based on those
contacts would ordinarily satisfy the requirement of the Due
Process Clause that a State's assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant be predicated on "mini-
mum contacts" between the defendant and the State. See
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286,
297-298 (1980); InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U. S. 310, 317 (1945). And, as the Court of Appeals ac-
knowledged, New Hampshire has adopted a "long-arm" stat-
ute authorizing service of process on nonresident corpora-
tions whenever permitted by the Due Process Clause. 682
F. 2d, at 33.4 Thus, all the requisites for personal juris-
"'It is the general rule that each communication of the same defamatory
matter by the same defamer, whether to a new person or to the same per-
son, is a separate and distinct publication, for which a separate cause of
action arises." Id., §577A, Comment a. The "single publication rule" is
an exception to this general rule.
' New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. §300:14 (1977) provides in relevant
part:
"If a foreign corporation . . . commits a tort in whole or in part in New
Hampshire, such ac[t] shall be deemed to be doing business in New Hamp-
shire by such foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the ap-
 KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.

770 Opinion of the Court

diction over Hustler Magazine, Inc., in New Hampshire are

present.
We think that the three concerns advanced by the Court of
Appeals, whether considered singly or together, are not suf-
ficiently weighty to merit a different result. The "single
publication rule," New Hampshire's unusually long statute of
limitations, and plaintiff's lack of contacts with the forum
State do not defeat jurisdiction otherwise proper under both
New Hampshire law and the Due Process Clause.
In judging minimum contacts, a court properly focuses on
"the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 204 (1977).
See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U. S.320, 332 (1980). Thus,
it is certainly relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry that peti-
tioner is seeking to recover damages suffered in all States in
this one suit. The contacts between respondent and the
forum must be judged in the light of that claim, rather than a
claim only for damages sustained in New Hampshire. That
is, the contacts between respondent and New Hampshire
must be such that it is "fair" to compel respondent to defend
a multistate lawsuit in New Hampshire seeking nationwide
damages for all copies of the five issues in question, even
though only a small portion of those copies were distributed
in New Hampshire.
The Court of Appeals expressed the view that New Hamp-
shire's "interest" in asserting jurisdiction over plaintiff's mul-
tistate claim was minimal. We agree that the "fairness" of

pointment by such foreign corporation of the secretary of the state of New

Hampshire and his successors to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom
may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings against such
foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such.., tort."
This statute has been construed in the New Hampshire courts to extend
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations to the fullest extent permitted
under the Federal Constitution. See, e. g., Roy v. NorthAmerican News-
paper Alliance, Inc., 106 N. H. 92, 95, 205 A. 2d 844, 846 (1964).
 OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Opinion of the Court 465 U. S.

haling respondent into a New Hampshire court depends to

some extent on whether respondent's activities relating to
New Hampshire are such as to give that State a legitimate
interest in holding respondent answerable on a claim related
to those activities. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, supra, at 292; McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U. S. 220, 223 (1957). But insofar as the State's "in-
terest" in adjudicating the dispute is a part of the Fourteenth
Amendment due process equation, as a surrogate for some of
the factors already mentioned, see Insurance Corp. of Ire-
land v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694,
702-703, n. 10 (1982), we think the interest is sufficient.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that petitioner was
suing, at least in part, for damages suffered in New Hamp-
shire. 682 F. 2d, at 34. And it is beyond dispute that New
Hampshire has a significant interest in redressing injuries
that actually occur within the State.
"'A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial
jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its terri-
tory. This is because torts involve wrongful conduct
which a state seeks to deter, and against which it at-
tempts to afford protection, by providing that a tort-
feasor shall be liable for damages which are the proxi-
mate result of his tort."' Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N. H.
294, 298, 319 A. 2d 626, 629 (1974) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 36, Comment c (1971)).
This interest extends to libel actions brought by nonres-
idents. False statements of fact harm both the subject of
the falsehood and the readers of the statement. New
Hampshire may rightly employ its libel laws to discourage
the deception of its citizens. There is "no constitutional
value in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 340 (1974).
New Hampshire may also extend its concern to the injury
that in-state libel causes within New Hampshire to a nonres-
 KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.

770 Opinion of the Court

ident. The tort of libel is generally held to occur wherever

the offending material is circulated. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 577A, Comment a (1977). The reputation of the
libel victim may suffer harm even in a State in which he has
hitherto been anonymous.' The communication of the libel
may create a negative reputation among the residents of a
jurisdiction where the plaintiff's previous reputation was,
however small, at least unblemished.
New Hampshire has clearly expressed its interest in pro-
tecting such persons from libel, as well as in safeguarding its
populace from falsehoods. Its criminal defamation statute
bears no restriction to libels of which residents are the vic-
tim.6 Moreover, in 1971 New Hampshire specifically deleted
from its long-arm statute the requirement that a tort be com-
mitted "against a resident of New Hampshire."I
New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperat-
ing with other States, through the "single publication rule,"
to provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and dam-
ages claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding.8
This rule reduces the potential serious drain of libel cases
on judicial resources. It also serves to protect defendants
from harassment resulting from multiple suits. Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 577A, Comment f (1977). In sum,
the combination of New Hampshire's interest in redressing
injuries that occur within the State and its interest in cooper-
'We do not, therefore, rely for our holding on the fact that petitioner's
name appears in fine print in several places in a magazine circulating in
New Hampshire.
'New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:11(I) (1974) makes it a misde-
meanor for anyone to "purposely communicat[e] to any person, orally or in
writing, any information which he knows to be false and knows will tend to
expose any other living person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule."
(Emphasis added.)
7
See N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 300:14 (1977), History.
'The great majority of the States now follow the "single publication
rule." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A, Appendix, Reporter's Note
(1977).
 OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Opinion of the Court 465 U. S.

ating with other States in the application of the "single publi-

cation rule" demonstrates the propriety of requiring respond-
ent to answer to a multistate libel action in New Hampshire.'
The Court of Appeals also thought that there was an ele-
ment of due process "unfairness" arising from the fact that
the statutes of limitations in every jurisdiction except New
Hampshire had run on the plaintiff's claim in this case."1
Strictly speaking, however, any potential unfairness in ap-
plying New Hampshire's statute of limitations to all aspects
of this nationwide suit has nothing to do with the jurisdiction
of the court to adjudicate the claims. "The issue is personal
jurisdiction, not choice of law." Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U. S. 235, 254 (1958). The question of the applicability of
New Hampshire's statute of limitations to claims for out-of-
state damages presents itself in the course of litigation only
after jurisdiction over respondent is established, and we do
not think that such choice-of-law concerns should complicate
or distort the jurisdictional inquiry.

'Of course, to conclude that petitioner may properly seek multistate

damages in this New Hampshire suit is not to conclude that such damages
should, in fact, be awarded if petitioner makes out her case for libel. The
actual applicability of the "single publication rule" in the peculiar circum-
stances of this case is a matter of substantive law, not personal jurisdiction.
We conclude only that the District Court has jurisdiction to entertainpeti-
tioner's multistate libel suit.
" Under traditional choice-of-law principles, the law of the forum State
governs on matters of procedure. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 122 (1971). In New Hampshire, statutes of limitations are consid-
ered procedural. Gordon v. Gordon, 118 N. H. 356, 360, 387 A. 2d 339,
342 (1978); Barrett v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 104 N. H. 70, 178 A. 2d 291
(1962). There has been considerable academic criticism of the rule that
permits a forum State to apply its own statute of limitations regardless of
the significance of contacts between the forum State and the litigation.
See, e. g., R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws §9.2B,
p. 517 (2d ed. 1980); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law,
61 Cornell L. Rev. 185, 221 (1976); Comment, The Statute of Limitations
and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L. J. 492, 496-497 (1919). But we find it
unnecessary to express an opinion at this time as to whether any arguable
unfairness rises to the level of a due process violation.
 KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.

770 Opinion of the Court

The chance duration of statutes of limitations in nonforum

jurisdictions has nothing to do with the contacts among re-
spondent, New Hampshire, and this multistate libel action.
Whether Ohio's limitations period is six months or six years
does not alter the jurisdictional calculus in New Hampshire.
Petitioner's successful search for a State with a lengthy stat-
ute of limitations is no different from the litigation strategy
of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable sub-
stantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local populations.
Certainly Hustler Magazine, Inc., which chose to enter the
New Hampshire market, can be charged with knowledge of
its laws and no doubt would have claimed the benefit of them
if it had a complaint against a subscriber, distributor, or
other commercial partner.
Finally, implicit in the Court of Appeals' analysis of New
Hampshire's interest is an emphasis on the extremely limited
contacts of the plaintiffwith New Hampshire. But we have
not to date required a plaintiff to have "minimum contacts"
with the forum State before permitting that State to assert
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. On the
contrary, we have upheld the assertion of jurisdiction where
such contacts were entirely lacking. In Perkins v. Benguet
Mining Co., 342 U. S. 437 (1952), none of the parties was a
resident of the forum State; indeed, neither the plaintiff nor
the subject matter of his action had any relation to that State.
Jurisdiction was based solely on the fact that the defendant
corporation had been carrying on in the forum "a continuous
and systematic, but limited, part of its general business."
Id., at 438. In the instant case, respondent's activities in the
forum may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction
over a cause of action unrelated to those activities." But
"The defendant corporation's contacts with the forum State in Perkins
were more substantial than those of respondent with New Hampshire in
this case. In Perkins, the corporation's mining operations, located in the
Philippine Islands, were completely halted during the Japanese occupation.
The president, who was also general manager and principal stockholder of
the company, returned to his home in Ohio where he carried on "a continu-
 OCTOBER TERM, 1983

Opinion of the Court 465 U. S.

respondent is carrying on a "part of its general business" in

New Hampshire, and that is sufficient to support jurisdiction
when the cause of action arises out of the very activity being
conducted, in part, in New Hampshire.
The plaintiff's residence is not, of course, completely irrele-
vant to the jurisdictional inquiry. As noted, that inquiry fo-
cuses on the relations among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation. Plaintiff's residence may well play an impor-
tant role in determining the propriety of entertaining a suit
against the defendant in the forum. That is, plaintiff's resi-
dence in the forum may, because of defendant's relationship
with the plaintiff, enhance defendant's contacts with the
forum. Plaintiff's residence may be the focus of the activi-
ties of the defendant out of which the suit arises. See Calder
v. Jones, post, at 788-789; McGee v. InternationalLife Ins.
Co., 355 U. S. 220 (1957). But plaintiff's residence in the
forum State is not a separate requirement, and lack of resi-
dence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of
defendant's contacts.
It is undoubtedly true that the bulk of the harm done to
petitioner occurred outside New Hampshire. But that will
be true in almost every libel action brought somewhere other
than the plaintiff's domicile. There is no justification for
restricting libel actions to the plaintiff's home forum. 2 The
victim of a libel, like the victim of any other tort, may choose
to bring suit in any forum with which the defendant has "cer-
tain minimum contacts ... such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub-
ous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities
of the company." 342 U. S., at 448. The company's files were kept in
Ohio, several directors' meetings were held there, substantial accounts
were maintained in Ohio banks, and all key business decisions were made
in the State. Ibid. In those circumstances, Ohio was the corporation's
principal, if temporary, place of business so that Ohio jurisdiction was
proper even over a cause of action unrelated to the activities in the State.
"As noted in Calder v. Jones, post, at 790-791, we reject categorically
the suggestion that invisible radiations from the First Amendment may de-
feat jurisdiction otherwise proper under the Due Process Clause.
 KEETON v. HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC.

770 Opinion of the Court

stantial justice.' Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 463

[(1940)]." InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S.,
at 316.
Where, as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hamp-
shire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there in a libel action based on the contents of its
magazine. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U. S., at 297-298. And, since respondent can be charged
with knowledge of the "single publication rule," it must antic-
ipate that such a suit will seek nationwide damages. Re-
spondent produces a national publication aimed at a nation-
wide audience. There is no unfairness in calling it to answer
for the contents of that publication wherever a substantial
number of copies are regularly sold and distributed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,"3 and
the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.

"In addition to Hustler Magazine, Inc., Larry Flynt, the publisher, edi-
tor, and owner of the magazine, and L. F. P., Inc., Hustler's holding com-
pany, were named as defendants in the District Court. It does not of
course follow from the fact that jurisdiction may be asserted over Hustler
Magazine, Inc., that jurisdiction may also be asserted over either of the
other defendants. In Calder v. Jones, post, at 790, we today reject the
suggestion that employees who act in their official capacity are somehow
shielded from suit in their individual capacity. But jurisdiction over an
employee does not automatically follow from jurisdiction over the corpora-
tion which employs him; nor does jurisdiction over a parent corporation
automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary. Con-
solidated Textile Co. v. Gregory, 289 U. S. 85, 88 (1933); Peterson v. Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 205 U. S. 364, 391 (1907). Each defendant's con-
tacts with the forum State must be assessed individually. See Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U. S. 320, 332 (1980) ("The requirements of International
Shoe... must be met as to each defendant over whom a state court exer-
cises jurisdiction"). Because the Court of Appeals concluded that jurisdic-
tion could not be had even against Hustler Magazine, Inc., it did not in-
quire into the propriety of jurisdiction over the other defendants. Such
inquiry is, of course, open upon remand.
 OCTOBER TERM, 1983

BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment 465 U. S.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that "[r]espondent's regular circula-
tion of magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support
an assertion of jurisdiction in a libel action based on the con-
tents of the magazine." Ante, at 773-774. These contacts
between the respondent and the forum State are sufficiently
important and sufficiently related to the underlying cause of
action to foreclose any concern that the constitutional limits
of the Due Process Clause are being violated. This is so,
moreover, irrespective of the State's interest in enforcing
its substantive libel laws or its unique statute of limitations.
Indeed, as we recently explained in Insurance Corp. of Ire-
land v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694
(1982), these interests of the State should be relevant only to
the extent that they bear upon the liberty interests of the re-
spondent that are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
"The restriction on state sovereign power described in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. [v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286,
291-292 (1980)] must be seen as ultimately a function of the
individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal juris-
diction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention
of federalism concerns." Id., at 702-703, n. 10.