Transaction Cost

The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago
Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements

Author(s): Steven N. S. Cheung
Source: The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Apr., 1969), pp. 23-42
Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The Booth School of Business,
University of Chicago and The University of Chicago Law School
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TRANSACTION COSTS, RISK AVERSION, AND THE
CHOICE OF CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS*
STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG
University of Chicago
Every transaction involves a contract. The transactions condu

market place entail outright or partial transfers of property r
individual contracting parties. The contractual arrangements throu
these transfers are negotiated are several and varied.
It is common in land tenure literature to rank the relative ef
various lease contracts. For example, share tenancy (or sharecr
long been considered inefficient, as have leases with relatively sho
These views are based on an inquiry into the resource use imp
existing contractual arrangements. But the inquiry has been m
explicit consideration of the pertinent property right constraint a
account for the frequent choice of allegedly inefficient contracts.
question has been asked.
Elsewhere' I have derived the theory of share tenancy on th
that transaction costs, and in particular the costs of contractual n
and enforcement, are zero. It shows that economic efficiency
under various land tenure arrangements subject to the constraint
property rights. Although transaction costs exist in the real world,
enables us to understand much of the farming behavior.2 However
ence of a variety of contractual arrangements under the same con
competition poses the question of the choice of these arrangem
article, I set out an approach based on non-zero transaction co
* This article is an excerpt from my manuscript, The Theory of Share Te

Special Application to Asian Agriculture and the First Phase of Taiwan La
(to be published by The University of Chicago Press). For their helpful
am indebted to Armen A. Alchian, R. H. Coase, Harold Demsetz, Jack Hi
Gale Johnson, Harry G. Johnson, John McManus, Theodore W. Schultz,
J. Stigler. Thanks for financial support are given to the Lilly Endowme
porting the Study of Property Rights and Behavior at the University of
Los Angeles, and to the Ford Foundation grant for International Stud
Agricultural Economics at the University of Chicago.
1 Steven N. S. Cheung, Private Property Rights and Sharecropping, 76
1107 (1968).
2 See Steven N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, chs. 3, 7 and 8.
23
24 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
aversion to explain the observed contractual behavior in agriculture

observations used are largely drawn from the Chinese experience.
If a firm can increase efficiency in production by employing prod
resources of more than one resource owner, a contract to combine t
sources will obtain. The formation of the contract involves partial trans
of property rights in one form or another, such as leasing, hiring or m
gaging.3 These transfers, and the associated coordination of inputs of va
factors in production, are costly events.4 There are costs of negotiating
of enforcing the stipulations of the contract.
Given the state of personal wealth distribution and the portfolios of a
held as private property by resource owners, some owners will seek cont
tual arrangements with others in combining resources for production.5
is a variety of arrangements under which this is done. At least two reas
may be offered for the existence of different types of contractual arra
ments. First is the existence of natural risk, defined here as the contrib
by nature or the state of the world to the variance (or standard devi
of the product value.6 Given a non-zero variance for the expected o
yield (the total income for the contracting parties), different contr
arrangements allow different distributions of income variances amon
contracting parties. Under the postulate of risk aversion, an individu
seek to avoid risk if the cost of doing so is less than the gain from the
averted. He may avert risk either by searching for information abou
future (which may not be attainable even at infinitely high cost), by ch
ing less risky options when investing (which options include portfolio di
sification), or by choosing among arrangements with which his burd
risk can be dispersed to other individuals-such as insurance and va
contractual arrangements. A second reason for the existence of differen
tractual arrangements lies in the different transaction costs that are
ciated with them. Transaction costs differ because the physical attribute
input and output differ, because institutional arrangements differ, and
8 If only outright transfers exist for all resources, "owner" production will exis
all firms. Contracting for outright transfers does not concern us here.
4 See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, N.S.4 Economica 386 (1937). Rep
in Readings in Price Theory 331 (Kenneth E. Boulding & George J. Stigler, eds.
5 Portfolio selection is a complicated subject. The two major theses that have b
advanced center on anticipated changes in the general price level and on the av
of risk. Transaction costs may imply a third.
o While this concept has the advantage of treating risk as a measurable quantit
can be conveniently applied to observations, it also has some theoretical difficultie
for example, Jack Hirshleifer, Investment Decision under Uncertainty: Choice-The
Approaches, 79 Q. J. Econ. 509 (1965).
CHOICE OF CONTRACTURAL ARRANGEMENTS 25
cause different sets of stipulations require varying efforts in enfo

negotiation.7
Let me advance the following hypothesis: the choice of con
rangement is made so as to maximize the gain from risk dispe
to the constraint of transaction costs. In the following three sect
develop this hypothesis and apply it to some observations.
I. THE CHOICE OF CONTRACTS IN AGRICULTURE
Consider the three main forms of contracts in agriculture, namely, a fixed-

rent contract (rent per acre stated in cash or in crop), a share contract and
a wage contract. Under private property rights, the contracting parties are
free to choose among these forms. The observed patterns of contractua
choices vary from place to place. For example, share contracts were more
frequent than fixed rents in Taiwan and Southeast Asia before the agrarian
reforms; in China fixed rents were more frequent than share rents in the
1930's; in Japan, fixed rents predominated; and in general, wage contracts
(farm hands) have been infrequent, occurring in about one to five per cent
of the farming households in various localities.8 Why do the patterns of
contractual choices differ? What determines the choice of contracts?
Any contract combining resources from different owners for production
involves, in addition to negotiation costs, the enforcement costs of controlling
inputs and distributing output, according to the terms of the contract. Con-
tracting on a share basis appears to involve higher transaction costs as a
whole (the sum of negotiation and enforcement costs) than a fixed-rent or
a wage contract. The terms in a share contract, among other things, include
the rental percentage, the ratio of non-land input to land, and the types of
crops to be grown.9 These are mutually decided by the landowner and the
tenant. For fixed-rent and wage contracts, however, given the market prices,
one party alone is sufficient to decide how much of the other party's resources
he shall employ and what crops shall be grown. And since in a share contract
the sharing of output is based on the actual yield, efforts must be made by
7 Transaction costs may also depend on other factors, such as the number of partici-
pants and transactions, which I shall not explore here. Changes in prices and innovations
will also affect the costs of transactions. See for example, Theodore W. Schultz, Trans-
forming Traditional Agriculture 162-174 (1964).
8 For the case in China, see J. L. Buck, Land Utilization in China 198 (1938); for
Japan, see R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (1959); for other parts of Asia, see
sources cited in Steven N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, ch. 1 nn.10 & 14.
9These terms are implied by the theory in Cheung, Private Property Rights and
Sharecropping, supra note 1. Samples of share contracts obtained from China (see next
section) are consistent with this statement.
the landowner to ascertain the harvest yield. Thus negotiation and en

ment are more complex for a share contract than for a fixed-rent or
contract.
The ranking of transaction costs of fixed-rent and wage contracts appears

uncertain. The physical attributes of land are such that the cost of enforcing
the contracted amount of input is lower than in the case of labor. That is,
the "shirking" of labor input, which may exist in a wage contract (also in
a share contract) without either enforcing the input or checking the output,
is costly to prevent.1' But while this "shirking" problem does not appear
significant for land input in a fixed-rent contract, policing (or enforcing)
the maintenance of soil and other assets owned by the landlord is more costly
for a fixed-rent or a share contract than for a wage contract."
If we accept the above reasoning, pending empirical confirmation, and if
transaction cost is the only consideration, then the minimization of trans-
action cost implies that share contracts will never be chosen. Why, then, are
share contracts chosen?
Suppose the transaction cost is zero or the same for all forms of contract.
Let us employ a behavioral postulate of risk aversion, defined here to mean
that an individual, given the same expected average income, prefers a lower
to a higher variance. In agriculture, variables exogenous to the production
function, such as weather conditions and pests, are risk factors which are
difficult to forecast and which may significantly affect the variance of the
value of output. Under a fixed-rent contract, the tenant bears most, if not
all, of the risk; under a wage contract, the landowner bears most, if not all,
of the risk. Share tenancy may then be regarded as a device for risk sharing
(or risk dispersion); that is, the variance of the output yield is distributed
10 For the tenant's incentive to use an amount of input less than that stipulated in a
share contract, see Cheung, supra note 1. The adoption of different forms of contractual
payment for labor alone due to "shirking" problems and enforcement costs appears to
constitute an important subject which has not been explored. For example, a piece-rate
contract will be preferred to a wage contract on an hourly basis if checking output
costs less than enforcing input. However, with piece rates the worker is inclined to be
"sloppy" and produce products of lower quality. Thus, a piece-rate contract will be less
preferable if the physical attributes of the product are such that it is relatively costly
to police a specified standard. Similarly, commission payments (as in the case of insur-
ance salesmen) are preferred to other forms when the value of output depends on the
intensity of work per sale; "tipping" payments (as in the case of waitresses) are pre-
ferred to other forms when the quality of services is significant-in either case, the costs
of enforcing "intensity" and "quality" of work appear to be relatively high.
11 In horticulture, for example, the usual contracts other than owner cultivation are
wage or piece-rate contracts. This may imply that in horticulture, owner management
involves a lower cost of policing the orchard assets than fixed-rent contracts. On the
other hand, one expects wage contracts would be infrequent when the land holding is
large, for high costs of labor supervision would be incurred.
among the contracting parties. Given the postulate of risk aversion, a s

contract will be mutually preferred by the landowner and the tenant.1
ever, in varying degrees, risk exists in any tenancy. Why, then, are fixe
and wage contracts chosen at all?
I suggest that the choice of contract should be analyzed by emp
both the differences in transaction costs and the postulate of risk aver
Given the state of risk associated with a particular output, a higher
action cost will lead to lower returns to the productive assets. On th
hand, given the transaction cost, risk aversion implies that asset val
the variances of income are negatively related.13 While in itself the dis
of risk under a share contract will lead to higher values for the con
resources, the higher associated transaction cost will lead to lowe
values. Wealth maximization (or utility maximization, depending
relevant measurement problem) implies that the contractual arrang
chosen will be the one which yields the highest values for the con
resources.
Given the variance of output value and the rental perce

contract prescribes a specific distribution of income varian
tracting parties. The associated state of risk dispersion may n
the most preferable state according to the parties' prefer
However, since some dispersion of risk is preferred to no d
a share contract will be chosen rather than a fixed rent or
if the higher transaction cost is at least compensated for b
risk dispersion. There exist, of course, still other arrangemen
the dispersion of risk can be tailored to fit each case. But as w
in the next section, the transaction cost of an arrangement fo
more flexible than a share contract may be so high as to make
Evidence is available to support the applicability of this k
(1) Since transaction cost is assertedly higher for share t

rents, there would be room for some third parties to insur
crop yield. That is, if a third party (an insurance company
the expected mean yield, the contracting parties would cho
contract and would be willing to pay the insuring party an am
12 This result is implied in William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices

Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. Fin. 425 (1964); J
supra note 6, and Investment Decision Under Uncertainty: Applicatio
Preference Approach, 80 Q. J. Econ. 252 (1966). "Risk-exchange" mode
the current state-preference and mean, variability approaches, with th
worth-Bowley box, suggest that risk sharing is preferred-if we ignore
13 For a theoretical treatment of asset prices and risk premiums as d
market place, see Sharpe, supra note 12.
than the saving from a lower transaction cost plus a premium for the v
tually certain income now obtained as compared with the variable inco
in a share contract. Yet we seldom find the existence of such a crop insuran
without government taking an active role. The reason, perhaps, is that
cost of handling insurance transactions may be so high as to be prohibitive
the insuring agent would have to check not only the actual crop yields
also the amount of inputs. For the French metayage (sharecropping), h
ever, Constantia Maxwell observed:
The usual procedure for French seigneurs was, while retaining the chateau and
immediate neighborhood for their own use, to let out their lands in gros to midd
men or fermiers (to be distinguished from fermiers exploitants), who paid a f
sum to the proprietor and gathered the rents from metayage or from censita
at their own risk for a personal profit. Some of these middlemen, like the la
lords, were absentees and worked the estate through sub-agents.14
In this case we see the fermiers, a third party, interposing between landlor
and tenants to provide a more certain income for the former.1. To my kno
edge, no similar arrangement existed in China, though another practice pre
vailed (see next section). In Japan, share tenancy has been rare; and,
the same time, a compulsory crop insurance system has been enforced.16
(2) In China, share tenancy is reportedly more frequent in the whe
region than in the rice region. Taking the hectare yield data of wheat
rice crops in Taiwan, we find significantly higher proportional variances fo
wheat than for rice. This is shown in Table 1. Due to the lack of price data,
only the variances of physical output are computed, although value of outp
would be a more appropriate measure.
14 Arthur Young, Travels in France During the Years 1787, 1788 and 1789 at 395
n. (C. Maxwell, ed. 1929).
15 To interpret the existence of the fermiers on grounds of risk aversion alone seems
inconclusive. R. H. Coase has pointed out to me that the fermiers resembled the "farm-
ers" in England, who served to collect taxes and postal revenues for the Crown. Coase's
explanation for the existence of the English "farmers" is as follows: a collecting agent
who is allowed to take the difference between what he can collect and what he has to
pay the Crown has a greater incentive to maximize receipts than if the same agent i
paid a wage rate for his service. This argument, I believe, is correct, and can be ex-
pressed alternatively: transaction costs differ, among other things, because different set
of stipulations require varying efforts in enforcement and negotiation; and for collection
a "farming" contract involves a lower cost of enforcement than a wage contract. Th
fermier of France may therefore be viewed as a "farming" agent as well as an "insuring
agent.
16 See Agricultural Development in Modern Japan, ch. 13 (Takekayu Ogura ed. 1963).
I have been unable to discover the frequency of share contracts in Japan before the
introduction of the compulsory crop insurance.
TABLE 1
Mean Yield (iL) and Proportional Variance
p
(a2) of Wheat and Rice Hectare
Yield (kg.), Taiwan, 1901-1950
Period
Value Crop 1901-10 1911-20 1921-30 1931-40 1941-50
Wheat 880 710 759 1,058 625

Rice 1,318 1,379 1,588 1,927 1,648
a2 291 118 357 1,180 1,158
p Rice 31 32 46 62 180
Source: Computed from data in

struction, Taiwan Agricultural S
In Table 1,
P2 i=i )
where Xi is the hectare yield in kg., and n the number of yea
frequency of share contracts among wheat crops appears
phenomenon.17
(3) According to three independent surveys conducted
1935), share rent is generally slightly higher than fixed (c
this premium may be regarded as a return for risk bearing to
Let us summarize. The postulate of general risk aversion or t
tion of transaction costs, taken separately, do not explain wel
coexistence of several forms of contracts. For this reason
the choice of contracts is determined by weighing the gain
persions and the costs of contracting associated with differen
factors appear to be important in explaining different pattern
tual choices in different localities. First, different physical at
and types of climate often result in different variances of outp
17 See for example, J. L. Buck, supra note 8, at 198; and James O.

ancy and Productivity in Agriculture: The Case of the United States
Institute Studies 25 (Stanford Univ. 1963).
18 See Li Fa Yuan, Tung Chi Yueh Pao II, 5 (Legislative Yuan, Sta
1932); Nei Cheng Pu, Nei Cheng Kung Pao II (Dep't of Int. Affairs, Public Rep. of
Inst. Affairs 1932); Shih Yeh Pu, Chung Kuo Ching Chi Nien Chien G62-83 (Dep't of
Real Estates, China Econ. Yearbook, 1936). Some of these findings are reproduced in
Steven N. S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, App. B.
agricultural areas. Second, different legal arrangements, such as com

or subsidized crop insurance, affect the variances of incomes as well
ing transaction costs for the contracting parties. An examination
contractual details in the next section will suggest a third factor: dif
market arrangements also affect the choice of contractual forms.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF FIXED AND SHARE CONTRACTS

(CHINA, 1925-1940)
In this and the following section we analyze in some detail the observed
stipulations of fixed and share contracts. This will serve not only to clarify
the hypothesis that contractual arrangements are chosen to disperse risk
bearing and minimize transaction cost, but also to illustrate that the con-
tractual stipulations in sharecropping are consistent with efficient resource
use.19 I turn to some information from China, roughly from 1925 to 1940.
This choice of data is based not only on the availability of information, but
also on the fact that during this period in China, some 93 per cent of the
farm land was held under private ownership.20 Let me begin by translating
a few sample contracts of fixed rent.
Sample (a)-fixed (crop) rent contract with definite lease duration (Shan-
tung Province):
Tenant A now leases from landowner B [so many acres] of land at location C. We
hereby stipulate, with the presence of referee D, that the annual rent per acre
includes [so many catties] of millet, soybean and Indian corn. The payment in
wheat will be one month after the wheat harvest, and autumn crops two months
after the autumn harvest. In a famine year, rental payments shall be adjusted
[downward] according to local customs. The duration of the lease is [so many
years].21
Sample (b)-fixed (crop) rent contract with indefinite lease duration

(Kiangsi Province):
19 The prevailing inefficiency argument against sharecropping can be briefly stated as

follows. Since under sharecropping a portion of every output unit is taken as rent, it
is similar to an ad valorem excise tax-where part of every unit produced is "taxed" by
the landowner (government). The distribution of output is not the same as with fixed
rent or owner cultivation-where the tiller obtains the entire incremental product. Share-
cropping, therefore, is said to result in less intensive (and less efficient) farming because
the tenant's incentive to work or invest in land is reduced. This thesis, however, ignores
the terms in a share contract which the participating parties must mutually agree to
abide by when the contract is formed.
20 See J. L. Buck, Farm Ownership and Tenancy in China (1927).
21 Kuo Min Cheng Fu, Tung Chi Chu, Chung Kuo Tsu Tien Chih Tu Chi Tung Chi
Fen Hsi 52-53 (Nat'l Gov't, Statistics Dep't, Statistical Analysis of Tenancy System in
China, 1942).
. . we contractually establish an iron-sheet [firmly fixed] rent .

of good or bad years, not a fraction of rent can be reduced .... In
the rental payment is reduced or delayed, the landowner is free t
land, together with all existing crops, and [the right] to contract a
cultivation..... Furthermore, the landowner shall pay the tenant 2
for the delivery of every 100 catties of grains.22
Sample (c)-fixed (crop) rent contract with landowner provi

farming inputs (Tsinghai Province):
. . . the landowner will furnish [so many catties] of seed, together
pairs] of water buffalo, [so many head] of donkeys, and all essen
equipment. The durable assets are for use purposes only, and shall
or lost [by the tenant], . . . and they must be returned to the land
delay at the termination of the lease. The [aforementioned] renta
to adjustment according to local customs in a famine year.23
The above samples of fixed (crop) rent contracts are about

tative as I could find. They are identical to cash rent contracts i
except that in the latter rental payments are stated in mon
According to observations collected by the Department of
covering 22 provinces in China, cash rents are generally slightly
crop rents.25 This differential can be explained by landown
the product selling cost undertaken by tenants. We may also no
inflation occurring in 1938, due to the Sino-Japanese War begin
13.3 per cent of cash rents were converted into crop rents and
were converted into share contracts.26 This observation, of cours
with minimizing transaction cost. Under inflation, renegotiation
contracts becomes more frequent and thus more costly.
The characteristics of fixed-rent contracts are not of speci
cept for one feature. The one feature which we single out t
here is the frequent inclusion of the provision for rental reduc
to "local customs" in a "famine" year [see samples (a) and (c)
which is absent under an "iron-sheet" rent [see sample (b)]
this provision an escape clause for the tenant, the inclusion
fixed-rent contract imposes a risk burden on the landowner.
22 Pe-Yu Chang & Yin-Yuen Wang, Chung Kuo Nung Tien Wen T'i 6
Farm Tenancy in China, 1943).
23 Nat'l Gov't, supra note 21, at 54-55.
24 See Nat'l Gov't, supra note 21, at 53-54 and Chang & Wang, supra no
25 Shih Yeh Pu, Chung Kuo Ching Chi Nien Chien G62-83 (Dep't o
China Econ. Yearbook, 1936).
26 Hsing Cheng Yuan, Ti Chuan Pien Tung No. 2 (Executive Yuan, Changes in Land
Rights 1942). The data were obtained from sample contracts in 14 provinces in 1938.
We may interpret "local customs" as a set of market prices for

adjustments, even though the exact magnitude of the possible re
rent is not stated when the contract is signed. The escape clause
play only in a year so "bad" that the market considers it to be
Given a sufficiently large number of fixed-rent contracts which in
escape clause, competition among landowners to keep their tenants
certain market rates of rental reduction which each landowner will follow.
Other things being equal, the increased risk burden on the landowner asso-
ciated with the inclusion of the escape clause implies that a premium will
be added to the "fixed" rent over the "iron-sheet."27
Although shifting the risk burden by including the escape clause in a fixed-
rent contract is not quite the same as the risk dispersion in a share contract,
we may imagine the formation of share contracts via the escape clause. Sup-
pose "famine" is defined as occurring when the actual harvest is reduced to
a certain per cent of the expected mean yield due to natural causes. The
tenant under fixed rent has the option to choose between agreeing to an
"iron-sheet" contract or buying an "escape" right by paying an "insurance"
premium to the landowner-such that in the event of "famine," rental pay-
ment will be reduced by a certain percentage according to a market rule.
To further the argument: there could exist in the market place not just
one escape clause as observed, but a wide range of similar clauses each asso-
ciated with a different level of "famine," such that the tenant could obtain
any or several of them by paying different premiums to the landowner. As
such, the risk burden could be dispersed between the contracting parties in
an infinite number of ways each with slightly different arrangements. This
hypothetical world would perhaps exist if the costs of negotiating and mar-
keting all of the different escape clauses were zero. But with increasing trans-
action cost associated with additional escape clauses-in particular the cost
of defining different levels of "famine" in the market place and the cost of
negotiating the rental reduction for each-the incremental gains of having
them may be so small that no further "custom" is developed by the market.
Instead, an alternative device chosen is a share contract, under which mul-
tiple "escape" provisions for the tenant will be implicit, and within which
the rental payment is no longer fixed.28
From the above we may deduce two implications with respect to trans-
action cost and risk aversion. First, we have argued that the transaction cost
27 Unfortunately, I have been unable to find data that would confirm or refute this
statement.
28 Note that with a share contract the landowner not only shares in the possible loss
in a bad year, but also the gain of a good harvest which will reduce the risk premium
by a fraction.
is higher for share rent than for fixed rent, pending empirical
Observed contractual arrangements in China suggest that th
cost for a wide range of escape clauses is higher than for sh
reason is that a wide range of escape clauses would allow a gr
of choice for risk dispersion than a share contract, and yet o
clause is observed as available. Thus, the range of contractu
constrained by transaction cost. Second, since, as noted earlier
dicates that share rent is slightly higher than fixed rent due
risk burden imposed on the landowner, we conjecture that th
income would be higher than with a share contract if an esca
adopted to the effect that the tenant's income variance is red
Imaginative as it may seem, we find such an escape clause exi
world, disguised under the name of a wage contract.
Available data on the frequencies of escape clause adoptions u
ent contracts support my suggestions. A survey conducted by th
of Nanking, covering four provinces in China in 1935, reveals th
clause [as in contract samples (a) and (c) ] was adopted in 83 per cent
of the crop (fixed) rent contracts, 63 per cent of the cash (fixed) rent con-
tract, and not at all in share contracts.29 The higher frequency of adoption
for crop rent than cash rent is what we would expect. In the event of a
generally poor harvest, the market price of agricultural yield will rise, and
with cash rent the tenant's income will be compensated by the rise in price
more than with crop rent; hence, the escape clause will become less prefer-
able to the tenant.
The existence of the escape clause in the market implies, other things
being equal, a more frequent choice of fixed-rent contracts than of share
contracts. Outside China in Southeast Asia, before the agrarian reforms, the
escape clause was unpopular. However, there existed some guaranteed mini-
mum rents or wages associated with share contracts. These guarantees could
be similarly analyzed with the suggested choice-theoretic approach if more
information were available. The different market practices explain, in part,
the higher frequency of share contracts in Southeast Asia than in China.
Indeed, the fermiers of the French metayage, the escape clause associated
with fixed rents in China, and the minimum guarantees associated with
share rents elsewhere are market practices that serve as intermediate ar-
rangements between pure fixed rents and pure share rents. Each of them has
different risk distributions and transaction costs, thus widening the range of
contractual choices. Why these intermediate arrangements differ in different
markets is a question which I do not seek to answer.
29 See the University of Nanking, Ssu Hsing Chi Tsu Tien Chi Tu 65-67, Rental Sys-
tems in Four Provinces (1936).
Turning to sample contracts of share rents in China, we find that

stipulations are more complex than those of fixed rents, due to the
stipulations on tenant inputs and crops to be grown.
Sample (d)-share contract with uniform sharing percentages for all cro
(Shantung Province) :
. . tenant A agrees to cultivate [so many mows] of land for landowner B.

hereby stipulate that tenant A provides [so many head] of water buffalo
many bodies] of men; and every year the tenant must cultivate wheat once,
corn three times, and soybean twice. Fertilizer expenses are to be shared [in ce
proportions]. The yields of all crops are to be shared [in certain proportion
lease may terminate only after the autumn harvest . . . .30
Sample (e)-share contract with varying sharing percentages (H

Province):
[Stipulations of land size and nonland inputs] . . . We hereby stipulate that wheat
yield will be split 20-80; millet, yellow bean, sesame, green bean-all will be
split 30-70; cotton and sweet potatoes split 50-50 . . . ; millet straws, and bean
and sesame stalks split 30-70 ... .31
Sample (f)-share contract with some products unshared (Honan Prov-

ince):
... Tenant A ... voluntarily agrees to furnish [so many] men, [so many head] of
water buffalo and donkeys . . . and all plowing equipment . . . . We clearly stipu-
late that seeds of major crops are to be provided by the landowner, and seeds of
minor crops by the tenant. All crop yields will be split equally, in dry and clean
form .... But the straws go to the [tenant's] water buffalo entirely; the droppings
go to the [landowner's] soil; . . . . and all fertilizer expenses are to be borne
equally by both parties. All grinding equipment and living rooms are provided
[by the landowner], which the tenant shall repair for his own use. These assets
must be returned to the landowner at lease cancellation.32
In share contracts, several things should be noted. First, the explicit

stipulations of tenant inputs and crop plantations are implied by economic
theory. These stipulations are unnecessary for fixed rents. Evidence indicates,
however, that only the actual yields are inspected, for by comparison with
adjacent farms or past experience the landowner will be able to decide
whether the contracted terms have been fulfilled:
. . . the absentee landlords send their agents, or go themselves, to the fields and
30 Nat'l Gov't, supra note 21 at 54.

1s Chang & Wang, supra note 22 at 63.
82 Chang & Wang, supra note 22 at 63-64.
estimate the yield of the crop and the share given by the tenant is based
estimate. Such men are very expert in approximating the true yield . .
tenant] commonly cheats by skilfully hiding some of the threshed grain
division takes place and also by giving the landlord inferior crops. On the
hand, the landlord or his agent often uses a large measure. When the agen
lects rent the tenant has to treat the agent very well and often has to bri
in order to keep the land for cultivation another year.33
Exaggerated as this quotation might be, an intramarginal tenant

specific farming knowledge (hence, with higher yields than marginal t
can "hide" as much as the rent imputed to his special skill and still
his tenancy; an agent can collect enforcement cost in "bribes" from
the landowner and the tenant as much as other competing agents
Nonetheless, this justifies our claim that transaction cost is higher
share contract than for fixed rent.
A second characteristic of share contracts is that the precise and at times
complex delineation of resource rights between the contracting parties sug-
gests that the sharing of investment inputs can be adjusted together with
the rental percentage so as to use resources efficiently. This is consistent
with a conclusion I have reached elsewhere:34 the landowner may either
require the tenant to invest more in land and charge a lower rental per-
centage, or the landowner may invest in land himself and charge a higher
rental percentage; the investment will be made in one way or the other if
it leads to a higher rental annuity.
A third characteristic of share contracts is that the rental percentage may
vary among different crops in one contract [see sample (e)]. As implied by
the theory of share tenancy, the rental percentage is dependent upon the
cost of tenant inputs and the relative fertility of land. Since different crops
usually require different intensities of tenant inputs relative to land, the
sharing percentages for different crops should be expected to differ within
a single contract. However, any set of different rental percentages for differ-
ent crops can also be expressed in terms of a single (weighted time average)
rental percentage, uniform for all crops, to yield the same present value of
the rental return. It appears that the latter option of a uniform rental per-
centage [see contract sample (d)] would be more convenient. However, if
tenancy is subject to dismissal at any moment of time in the event of poor
performance, the use of one rental percentage uniform for crops harvested
at different seasons would be likely to lead to disputes or renegotiation
should tenancy dismissal be in effect. We usually find a uniform rental per-
3J J. L. Buck, Chinese Farm Economy 149-150 (1930).

34 Cheung, supra note 1.
centage being used in a share lease with specified duration, and that
multiple percentages are found in a lease with indefinite duration, a unif
percentage is usually used for different crops harvested in the same
[see contract sample (e)].
We may summarize the characteristics of share contracts by quotin
observation made by two writers--who were critical of tenant farmi
China:
Under the system of share rent, the yields after each harvest are to be shared
according to certain mutually stipulated percentages between the landowner and
the tenant. With the exception of some land used for farmstead purposes, the tenant
is required to cultivate almost all the assigned fields for the production of crops.
Sometimes, the tenant is even required to furnish farming equipment . .. and other
expenses. The landowner and the tenant mutually decide the area to be used for
each crop . . . . Besides the above, the only affair of management over which the
landowner exercises control is confined to permanent improvements of land assets.
This last characteristic is identical with fixed-rent contracts.35
III. THE DURATION OF LEASE CONTRACTS
An investigation conducted in China (1934), covering a total of 93 pr

fectures in 8 provinces, shows that the distribution of lease durations
as follows: 29 per cent of the tenant contracts were indefinite (that is,
specified and usually terminable after every harvest), 25 per cent ann
leases, 27 per cent from 3 to 10 years, 8 per cent from 10 to 20 years,
11 per cent were perpetual leases.36 Two things should be noted. First
stipulated lease duration means only that tenancy may not be termina
as long as the contracted terms are fulfilled by each party. That the du
tion of the lease is specified does not prohibit mutual renegotiations within
the lease duration. Second, as the frequency of short-term leases has b
used to illustrate the turnover rate of tenancy, it should be pointed out th
lease termination is not the same as tenancy dismissal. Available data re
that the frequency of tenancy dismissal was not high.37
35 Chang & Wang, supra note 22, at 49. For similar observations see Ching-Moh Che
Chung Kuo Ko Hsing Te Ti Tsu (Land Rents of Various Provinces in China, 19
Chi-Ming Chiao, Chung Kuo Nang Ch'un She Hui Ching Chi Hsueh ch. 9 (A Social
Economic Study of Farm Villages in China, 1938); and Chung Kuo Ke Hsueh Yan Ch
Chi Yen Chiu So, Chung Kuo Ching Tai Nung Yeh Shih Tze Liao 1912-1927, at 8
(China Econ. Research Dep't, Source Materials of Recent Chinese Agricultural Histo
1957).
3 These precentages are computed from Shih Yeh Pu, Chung Kuo Ching Chi N
Chien 101-104 (Dep't of Real Estates, China Econ. Yearbook, 1935). A similar invest
tion conducted in the same localities ten years earlier yielded a virtually identical dis
bution, id.
37 According to a survey conducted by the Executive Yuan, supra note 26, covering
14 provinces in China (1937), 7.5%o of the lease contracts were dismissed in that year.
In the literature of land tenure, two arguments have been commonly us

in attacks upon the efficiency of lease durations of less than 10 years
of these claims that short durations impose insecurity on the tenant
thus impair his incentive to farm. But insecurity, although undesirab
the tenant, may provide a stimulus to farming activity.38 Another argum
is that the short-term lease discourages investment in land. However,
is refuted by the fact that yields per acre on tenant farms are not lower
on owner farms; nor has any evidence been offered to show that, in Chin
productivity under tenancy varies with the duration of a leasing contract
The right to each privately owned resource is, by definition, transferab
and exclusively delineated. Rights to resources invested in land and o
assets are no exception. In the formation of a lease contract, the participa
resource owners are free to accept or reject the contractual terms being n
gotiated. Again, the choice for the duration of the contract is no exceptio
Thus the relevant question here is not whether a "short-term" lease i
efficient; the relevant question is why different lease durations are chose
In a world uncomplicated by transaction costs and risks, in which
right to the income generated by private investment could be costlessly s
cured and transferred, and in which changes in contractual stipulations co
be costlessly negotiated at any time, the duration of the lease become
relevant and its explicit stipulation superfluous. With transaction cost
cluded, I argue that the lease duration will be chosen so as to minimize th
costs. To do so, it is convenient to separate the cost advantages for "l
and "short" lease durations.
1. The Choice of Relatively Long Lease Duration

A relatively long lease duration is chosen to reduce the cost of transferrin
(transacting) tenant assets attached to land. There exist differences in
physical attributes of capital assets which involve different moving costs at
lease dismissal. For example, a water buffalo owned by a tenant for gra
However, since inflation began in the same year, the cited percentage might be high
than that of preceding years. For the rise in prices due to the Sino-Japanese war, s
Chang & Wang, supra note 22, at ch. 9.
38 Armen A. Alchian has argued that the desire for security leads to "long-term"
contracts. But his analysis is based on a property right system which is not private, whe
the private cost of acquiring security is relatively low. See his Private Property and th
Relative Cost of Tenure, The Public Stake in Union Power 350-71 (Philip Bradley ed
1959).
39 During the period 1925-1937, surveys conducted by five organizations in China sho
no notable differences in acre yields or land prices that are attributable to differen
tenure arrangements. Among these surveys, two volumes are particularly comprehensi
Nat'l Gov't, supra note 21 and Land Utilization in China-Statistics-A Study of 16,78
Farms in 168 Localities and 38,256 Farm Families in Twenty-two Provinces in Chin
1929-1933 (J. L. Buck ed., 1937).
grinding is easier to move at lease dismissal than an improvement in

irrigation made by him. Of course, the landowner could have invested i
water irrigation himself, or he could purchase the tenant's committ
provement outright.40 But when assets attached to land are owned b
tenant, disputes may arise in the event of tenancy dismissal. A lease wit
sufficiently long duration may become the preferred option.
However, the cost of moving the physical asset is not necessarily the
vant cost to consider. The tenant's property right to his committed inv
ment may be transferred, either to a third party or to the landowner,
market price. The problem is that such a price may not exist, or can
obtained in a short period of time, due to transaction costs. One nee
point out that the depreciated value of a used asset is costly to evaluate;
landowner may choose to select his new tenant instead of allowing any
who purchases the asset to take over the lease. Also, other information
lems exist in the market place. An appropriately long lease duration
thus reduce disputes and the anticipated cost of transferring the t
property right. This choice, however, can be made only at the expe
some cost advantage which a shorter lease duration provides.
The foregoing discussion can be supported by observations on the
petual lease in China:
Under perpetual leases the landowner holds ownership right to the [botto
land, and the tenant owns the right to the soil . ... These two rights are se
The occurrences of perpetual leases are confined to the following: (1) The
exploited [privately owned] wasteland and developed it into farm lan
gaining a perpetual [ownership] right to the soil from the landowner. (2
manent improvements in land made by the tenant .... such as building up
conserving devices in otherwise sandy fields . . . . (3) . . . where labor is
and land plentiful, the landowners attracted tenants from afar by offeri
perpetual right to till [the soil] .... (4) The tenant had paid a lump-sum pay
to obtain the perpetual right to till . . . . And (5) the peasant, when in n
money, sold the ownership right to the land bottom but retained the ri
till the soil. Since ownership rights to the bottom and surface of land are sep
both the landowner and the tenant can sell their rights freely, without the c
from each other ... .41
40oTwo independent surveys (China, 1921-1924 and 1935) reveal that, among tenant
farms, landowners owned about 60 to 70% of the housing assets; tenants owned about
75% of the draft animals and 95% of the farming equipment. The total values of non-
land assets on owner and tenant farms were roughly the same. See Nat'l Gov't, supra
note 21, at 99-116.
41 Chiao, supra note 35, at 261. For similar observations see Nat'l Gov't, supra note 21,
at 56-58; and China Econ. Research Dep't, supra note 35 at 84-89.
In every case, the tenant's asset attached to land (for exam

the soil) is physically "permanent." With the perpetual lea
tracted terms in effect, the landowner may not arbitrarily ra
rent (or use other devices) to drive the tenant away. Yet su
tion would not be necessary if transaction costs were zero:
and "surface" rights were clearly delineated and costlessly
vate, and if these rights could be costlessly transferred, t
market prices for these rights at which transfers could be
time.42 Thus there would be no need for long lease durations
"immobile" investments of the tenant. The same can be said for other assets
attached to land.
2. The Choice of Relatively Short Lease Duration

The adoption of a relatively long lease duration involves forgoing some
cost advantage which a shorter duration provides. When assets attached to
land owned by the tenant are to be exhausted in a short period of time, or
when the landowner provides all the "permanent" assets, a relatively short
lease duration reduces the costs of enforcing the contracted terms and of
renegotiating these terms.
When a contract is formed, the contracting parties may lack sufficient in-
formation on each other's reliability. Within a specified lease duration, the
violation of the contracted terms by either party may call for increasing
enforcement efforts, or for revoking the contract before its termination date
through court action or other means-all to be done at some cost. The
choice of a shorter lease duration, which facilitates tenancy dismissal, will
reduce these costs. As noted at the beginning of this section, however, the
frequency of tenancy dismissals was far less than that of short-term leases,
suggesting that most terminated leases were renewed. Available data show
that the frequency of lease dismissals caused by rental disputes was low.43
I conjecture, therefore, that in China short-term leases are chosen more as
a device to facilitate contractual renegotiation rather than as a device to
reduce the costs of enforcing the contracted terms.
42 I apply here the thinking in R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law &
Econ. 1 (1960).
43 Legal records which cover 56 prefectures in 6 provinces (China, 1934-35) reveal a
total of 124 tenancy disputes (mostly in rental payments) over a one year period. Even
though the number of total tenant contracts is not available, the number of disputes
brought to court appears to be so small that one suspects a substantial number of disputes
were never brought to court. Over two-thirds of these recorded cases ended in tenancy
dismissals, together with payment settlements. See Dep't of Real Estates, supra note 36,
at G118-120; and supra note 25, at G143-144.
It is useful to distinguish two types of contractual renegotiation (revisi

though at times one relates to the other. The stipulated terms in any ten
contract in essence specify two things: (a) the state of resource use, o
location, mutually agreed upon by the contracting parties, and (b)
contracted distribution of income for the parties. To revise (a) thr
renegotiation for more efficient resource use may benefit all parties to a
tract, that is, all parties may gain or lose less. However, to revise (b)
party must lose.
Consider the contractual renegotiation which entails mainly a reallocati
of resources, for example, changes in relative product prices which call f
shifts to different crops, or innovations which call for the adoptions of
seeds or new methods of cultivation. Renegotiations of this type are large
confined to share contracts, since under fixed rents the tenants are le
make their own decisions on resource use except improvements in lan
maintenance of the landowner's assets. In principle, since all contract
parties expect to benefit from the revision, renegotiation can take place at
time and lease termination becomes unnecessary. However, different indi
ual knowledge of the market may give rise to difference in opinions
whether the revision is desirable. A relatively short lease duration is a
venient device which allows resource reallocation in the event of unsuccessful
renegotiation.44 This, together with the more complicated contractual en-
forcement required for share contracts, explains why durations for share
leases are generally shorter than fixed rents.45
Consider further the contractual renegotiation which entails the revision
of income distribution, when one party gains at the expense of the other. It
applies to fixed and share contracts alike. Resource allocation may also be
affected. For example, changes in relative asset prices of the contracted re-
sources, a cash-rent contract with unanticipated inflation, or decision errors
made in the initial contract-which call for a revision of the rental rates-
are cases in point. Since some party must lose when revising the initial
distributional terms, that is, the gainer either cannot or will not fully com-
pensate the loser in making the revision, lease termination (hence, the choice
44 With lease termination, for example, a share tenant who alone wants changes in
production plan can request a fixed-rent contract, purchase the land outright, or seek
tenancy with another landowner. Without lease termination, further negotiation may still
take place if one party who wants the revision pays the reluctant party an amount to
make the revision "convincing."
45 Localities with higher frequencies of share leases (China, 1934) were associated with
higher frequencies of short-term leases. See Nat'l Gov't, supra note 21, at 43, Tables
20 and 21; and at 59, Table 26.
of an appropriately short duration) is essential.46 Again, this

necessary if transaction cost were zero (even if unanticipated
independently). In the absence of transaction cost, a contra
designed to allow day to day changes in rental payments; wit
duration, the distribution of income would not be held fixed th
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
For generations economists and land tenure writers have sought to rank
the relative efficiency of resource use under different leasing arrangements.
But their inquiries were undertaken without explicit reference to the prop-
erty right constraint involved. And in many cases, the characteristics of
various lease contracts had not been carefully examined. Different contrac-
tual arrangements do not imply different efficiencies of resource allocation
as long as property rights are exclusive and transferable. The characteristics
of lease contracts presented above also confirm this statement.
In this article I have asked: Why are different contractual arrangements
chosen under the same system of private property rights? To answer this
question I have introduced transaction costs and risks. The attempt to for-
mulate a choice-theoretic approach to explain the observed contractual be-
havior in agriculture has perhaps raised more questions than it has answered.
Among some related problems that I have avoided explicitly, the follow-
ing are significant. First, with respect to risk aversion, a more general
analysis would include all risky choices, and not contractual choice alone.
The analysis would be less difficult if transaction costs were not involved.
Second, with respect to transaction costs, a more general analysis would
derive some specific and well-behaved cost function of transactions. This
step is essential to the development of a model of general equilibrium in-
cluding transaction costs.
Still other problems I have avoided implicitly. In particular, some level
of law enforcement by legal authorities is taken for granted. We may well
ask: What will happen to the choice of contracts if the government changes
its enforcement efforts? To what extent will these efforts be consistent with
the Pareto condition? What set of legal institutions is consistent with the
operation of the market place? With these questions unanswered, the con-
ditions defining efficiency with transaction costs are not all clear. Let me
explain.
46 Given an unexpired lease which fixes the rental rate, changing economic conditions
may lead to a redistribution of income. However, the efficiency of resource allocation may
not thereby be hindered.
In production, cost minimization requires not only the fulfillment

familiar set of marginal equalities, but also the choice of the low
production method available. In transactions, one relevant conside
the cost of alternative contractual arrangements, which we have
at some length. One might think that, as a cost constraint, efficienc
attained when, other things equal, the set of arrangements with the
transaction cost is chosen. However, transaction costs also depe
ternative legal arrangements. For example, the varying effectiveness
enforcement, or the varying corruptibility of courts, will affect th
transactions in the market place. Given the existing legal institution
attempted to explain the observed contractual arrangements. But
I have ignored the choice and development of the legal institut
Pareto condition with transaction costs is ambiguous.
I have also not explored the contractual behavior associated with dif
property right constraints. Various restrictions on the transfer of p
rights, or various methods of attenuating the right of a resource
obtain income from his resource, will affect the leasing arrangemen
as resource allocation.

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The Booth School of Business, University of Chicago

Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements

Every transaction involves a contract. The transactions condu

* This article is an excerpt from my manuscript, The Theory of Share Te

aversion to explain the observed contractual behavior in agriculture

cause different sets of stipulations require varying efforts in enfo

I. THE CHOICE OF CONTRACTS IN AGRICULTURE

Consider the three main forms of contracts in agriculture, namely, a fixed-

the landowner to ascertain the harvest yield. Thus negotiation and en

The ranking of transaction costs of fixed-rent and wage contracts appears

among the contracting parties. Given the postulate of risk aversion, a s

Given the variance of output value and the rental perce

(1) Since transaction cost is assertedly higher for share t

12 This result is implied in William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices

Wheat 880 710 759 1,058 625

Source: Computed from data in

17 See for example, J. L. Buck, supra note 8, at 198; and James O.

agricultural areas. Second, different legal arrangements, such as com

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF FIXED AND SHARE CONTRACTS

Sample (b)-fixed (crop) rent contract with indefinite lease duration

19 The prevailing inefficiency argument against sharecropping can be briefly stated as

. . we contractually establish an iron-sheet [firmly fixed] rent .

Sample (c)-fixed (crop) rent contract with landowner provi

The above samples of fixed (crop) rent contracts are about

We may interpret "local customs" as a set of market prices for

Turning to sample contracts of share rents in China, we find that

. . tenant A agrees to cultivate [so many mows] of land for landowner B.

Sample (e)-share contract with varying sharing percentages (H

Sample (f)-share contract with some products unshared (Honan Prov-

In share contracts, several things should be noted. First, the explicit

30 Nat'l Gov't, supra note 21 at 54.

Exaggerated as this quotation might be, an intramarginal tenant

3J J. L. Buck, Chinese Farm Economy 149-150 (1930).

III. THE DURATION OF LEASE CONTRACTS

An investigation conducted in China (1934), covering a total of 93 pr

In the literature of land tenure, two arguments have been commonly us

1. The Choice of Relatively Long Lease Duration

grinding is easier to move at lease dismissal than an improvement in

In every case, the tenant's asset attached to land (for exam

2. The Choice of Relatively Short Lease Duration

It is useful to distinguish two types of contractual renegotiation (revisi

of an appropriately short duration) is essential.46 Again, this

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In production, cost minimization requires not only the fulfillment

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