CASE #1 LIETZ v.

CA
FACTS: Respondent Agapito Buriol previously owned a parcel of unregistered land situated at Capsalay Island,
Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan. On August 15, 1986, respondent Buriol entered into a lease agreement with Flavia
Turatello and respondents Turatello and Sani, all Italian citizens, involving one (1) hectare of respondent Buriol’s
property. The lease agreement was for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. Turatello and Sani took
possession of the land after paying respondent Buriol a down payment of P10,000.00.5 The lease agreement, however,
was reduced into writing only in January 1987.

On November 17, 1986, respondent Buriol sold to petitioner Rudolf Lietz, Inc. the same parcel of land for the
amount of P30,000.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale embodying the agreement described the land as follows:
“A parcel of land, consisting of FIVE (5) hectares, more or less, a portion of that parcel of land declared in the name of
Agapito Buriol, under Tax Declaration No. 0021, revised in the year 1985, together with all improvements thereon,
situated at the Island of Capsalay, Barangay Port Barton, municipality of San Vicente, province of Palawan which
segregated from the whole parcel described in said tax declaration, has the following superficial boundaries: NORTH,
Sec. 01-017; and remaining property of the vendor; EAST, by by Seashore; SOUTH, 01-020; and WEST, by 01-018
(now Elizabeth Lietz).”

Lietz later discovered that respondent Buriol owned not 5 hectares but only four (4) hectares, and with one more hectare
covered by a lease agreement with Turatello and Sani, only three (3) hectares were actually delivered to petitioner.
Thus, petitioner instituted on April 3, 1989 a complaint for Annulment of Lease with Recovery of Possession with
Injunction and Damages against respondents and Turatello before the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the delivery of the entire five hectares or its equivalent
HELD: No, Lietz is not entitled to the delivery of the entire five hectares or its equivalent.
RATIO:
As correctly noted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the sale between petitioner and respondent Buriol
involving the latter’s property is one made for a lump sum. The Deed of Absolute Sale shows that the parties agreed
on the purchase price on a predetermined area of five hectares within the specified boundaries and not based on a
particular rate per area. In accordance with Article 1542, there shall be no reduction in the purchase price even if the
area delivered to petitioner is less than that stated in the contract. In the instant case, the area within the boundaries
as stated in the contract shall control over the area agreed upon in the contract.

CASE #2 GABRIEL v. MABANTA

FACTS: Spouses Mabanta were the registered owners of two lots located in Isabela. On October 25, 1975, they
mortgaged both lots with the DBP as collateral for a loan of P14,000.00.
In 1980, Sps. Mabanta sold the lots to Susana Soriano by way of a “Deed of Sale of Parcels of Land With
Assumption of Mortgage.”4 Included in the Deed is an agreement that they could repurchase the lots within a period of
two (2) years.
Sps. Mabanta failed to repurchase the lots. But sometime in 1984, they were able to convince Gabriel to purchase the
lots from Soriano. As consideration, Gabriel delivered to Soriano a 500-square meter residential lot with an actual value
of P40,000.00 and paid Sps. Mabanta the sum of P5,000.00. On May 15, 1984, spouses Mabanta executed a “Deed
of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage”5 in favor of Gabriel. Soriano, in turn, executed a document entitled “Cancellation
of Contract”6whereby she transferred to Gabriel all her rights over the two lots.
Gabriel and his son cultivated the lots. They also caused the restructuring of spouses Mabanta’s loan with the
DBP.7However, when they were ready to pay the entire loan, they found that spouses Benito and Pura Tan had paid it
and that the mortgage was already cancelled.
On August 18, 1985, a certain Benito Tan with a barangay official approached Gabriel to refund to him the
P5,000.00 he paid to Mabanta. Gabriel refused because Tan was unwilling to return the former’s 500-square meter lot
delivered to Soriano as purchase price for the lots. It was later found out that the daughter of Tan, Zenaida Tan-Reyes
bought the land from Mabanta even after Gabriel paid Soriano and taking possession of the land.
Reyes now claims that she is in good faith when she bought the land and registered its title under her name.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Zenaida Tan-Reyes acted in good faith when she purchased the subject lot and
had the sale registered.

HELD: Reyes acted in bad faith when she purchased the subject lot and has the asle registered even after
learning that another person has bought the land and has been occupying it for some time.
RATIO: In the case at bar, certain pieces of evidence, put together, would prove that respondent Reyes is not a buyer
in good faith. The records show that on August 18, 1985, spouses Mabanta offered to her for sale the disputed lot.
They told her it was mortgaged with respondent DBP and that she had to pay the loan if she wanted to buy it. 17 She
readily agreed to such a condition. The following day, her father Benito Tan, accompanied by barangay official Tridanio,
went to petitioner Alejandro’s house offering to return to him the P5,000.00 he had paid to spouses Mabanta. Tan did
not suggest to return the 500-square meter lot petitioner delivered to Susana Soriano. 18 For this reason, petitioner
refused Tan’s offer and even prohibited him from going to respondent DBP.
Good faith is something internal. Actually, it is a question of intention. In ascertaining one’s intention, this Court must
rely on the evidence of one’s conduct and outward acts.
In cases of double sale of immovables, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second buyer
was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is, without
knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. Mere registration of title is not enough, good faith must concur
with the registration. To be entitled to priority, the second purchaser must not only establish prior recording of his deed,
but must have acted in good faith, without knowledge of the existence of another alienation by the vendor to the other

CASE #3 TEN FORTY v. CRUZ

FACTS: Ten Forty REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. (TFDRC), represented by its President, VERONICA G.
LORENZANA filed an ejectment case against Marina Cruz. Cruz allegedly occupied the lot that TFRDC bought from
Barbara Galino. TFDRC further claims that Cruz’ occupation was by the corporation’s mere tolerance.

Cruz, on the other hand, claims that Galino never sold the property to TFDRC but merely obtained a loan. In fact,
TFDRC never occupied the disputed lot. It was Galino who wasv in possession of the property at the time it was sold
to Cruz. Furthermore, TFDRC is not qualified to own the property which is a public land.

MTC ruled in favor of the corporation whereas the RTC reversed the decision saying that the execution of the Deed
OF Sale without actual transfer of the physical possession did not have the effect of making TFDRC the owner of the
property because there was no delivery of the object of the sale as provided in Article 1428 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not TFDRC, as the owner of the disputed lot, has the right to eject Cruz

HELD: The Court ruled that Cruz may not be validly ejected by TFDRC because it never acquired its ownership.

RATIO: Galino allegedly sold the property in question to petitioner on December 5, 1996 and, subsequently, to
respondent on April 24, 1998. Petitioner thus argues that being the first buyer, it has a better right to own the
realty. However, it has not been able to establish that its Deed of Sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of
Olongapo City.39 Its claim of an unattested and unverified notation on its Deed of Absolute Sale 40 is not equivalent
to registration. It admits that, indeed, the sale has not been recorded in the Registry of Deeds.

Certain basic parameters have been established by jurisprudence: First, the possession mentioned in
Article 1544 includes not only material but also symbolic possession.42 Second, possessors in good
faith are those who are not aware of any flaw in their title or mode of acquisition. 43 Third, buyers of
real property that is in the possession of persons other than the seller must be wary—they must
investigate the rights of the possessors.44 Fourth, good faith is always presumed; upon those who
allege bad faith on the part of the possessors rests the burden of proof.45
Earlier, the Court ruled that the subject property had not been delivered to petitioner; hence, it did not acquire
possession either materially or symbolically. As between the two buyers, therefore, respondent was first in actual
possession of the property.

CASE #4 URACA v. CA
FACTS: “The Velezes were the owners of the lot and commercial building in question located at Progreso and M.C.
Briones Streets in Cebu City.
Uraca, Ching, and Seng were the lessees of said commercial building.
On July 8, 1985, the Velezes through Carmen Velez Ting wrote a letter to Uraca et al. offering to sell the
subject property for P1,050,000.00 and at the same time requesting Uraca et al. to reply in three days. The lessees
accepted the offer to sell. However, on the next day, Velez-Ting informed Uraca that they want the lot to be sold
at P1,400,000 and not P1,050,000. Uraca agreed to the price but proposed that payment be paid in installments
with a down payment of P1,000,000.00 and the balance of P400,000 to be paid in 30 days. There is a dispute on
the fact whether the counter-offer was accepted or not.
Uraca failed to pay. The Velezes, on the other hand, sold the lot to Avenue Group.
The trial court found two perfected contracts of sale between the Velezes and Uraca involving the real property
in question. The first sale was for P1,050,000.00 and the second was for P1,400,000.00. In respect to the first sale,
the trial court held that “[d]ue to the unqualified acceptance by the plaintiffs within the period set by the Velezes,
there consequently came about a meeting of the minds of the parties not only as to the object certain but also as
to the definite consideration or cause of the contract.”7 And even assuming arguendo that the second sale was not
perfected, the trial court ruled that the same still constituted a mere modificatory novation which did not
extinguish the first sale. Hence, the trial court held that “the Velezes were not free to sell the properties to the
Avenue Group.”8 It also found that the Avenue Group purchased the property in bad faith

ISSUE: Whether or not Uraca should be entitled to the land for registering their notice of lis pendens ahead of the
Avenue Group’s registration of their deeds of sale taking into account Art. 1544, 2nd paragraph, of the Civil Code.

HELD: Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself
confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled
with good faith.

RATIO: After a thorough scrutiny of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that bad faith tainted the
Avenue Group’s purchase on July 13, 1985 of the Velezes’ real property subject of this case, and the subsequent
registration thereof on August 1, 1995. The Avenue Group had actual knowledge of the Velezes’ prior sale of the
same property to the petitioners, a fact antithetical to good faith. For a second buyer like the Avenue Group to
successfully invoke the second paragraph, Article 1544 of the Civil Code, it must possess good faith from the time
of the sale in its favor until the registration of the same. This requirement of good faith the Avenue Group sorely
failed to meet. That it had knowledge of the prior sale, a fact undisputed by the Court of Appeals, is explained by
the trial court thus:
“The Avenue Group, whose store is close to the properties in question, had known the plaintiffs to be the lessee-
occupants thereof for quite a time. Felix Ting admitted to have a talk with Ong Seng in 1983 or 1984 about the
properties. In the cross-examination, Manuel Ting also admitted that about a month after Ester Borromeo
allegedly offered the sale of the properties Felix Ting went to see Ong Seng again. If these were so, it can be safely
assumed that Ong Seng had consequently told Felix about plaintiffs’ offer on January 11, 1985 to buy the
properties for P1,000,000.00 and of their timely acceptance on July 10, 1985 to buy the same at P1,050,000.00.

CASE #5 LIETZ v. CA
FACTS:

ISSUE:

HELD:

RATIO:

CASE #1 LIETZ v. CA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
RATIO: