31 Onstott Vs UTNA

11/14/2018 CentralBooks:Reader
G.R. No. 221047. September 14, 2016.*
MICHAEL A. ONSTOTT, petitioner, vs. UPPER TAGPOS

NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Courts acquire jurisdiction

over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the
service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court
and their submission to its authority.—Courts acquire jurisdiction over the
plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over
the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission
to its authority.
Same; Same; Same; The filing of motions to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to
the court’s jurisdiction.—In Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Dy Hong Pi, 588 SCRA 612 (2009), it was ruled that “[a]s a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion
to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the
court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to
have submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear
that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on
voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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Onstott vs. Upper Tagpos
Neighborhood Association,
Inc.
of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking

affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.”
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Property Relations; Article 160
of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage.—Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition duringthe coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this
presumption must first prove the said time element. Needless to say, the
presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged
to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence;
there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
Same; Legal Interest; Words and Phrases; “Legal interest” is defined as
interest in property or a claim cognizable at law, equivalent to that of a legal
owner who has legal title to the property.—“Legal interest” is defined as interest
in property or a claim cognizable at law, equivalent to that of a legal owner who
has legal title to the property. It must be one that is actual and material, direct
and immediate, not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, although the
taxable person who has actual and beneficial use and possession of a property
may be charged with the payment of unpaid realty tax due thereon, such
assumption of liability does not clothe the said person with the legal title or
interest over the property.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals.
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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Abbas, Alejandro-Abbas, Francisco for petitioner.
Leo B. Deocampo for respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the

Decision2 dated May 7, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated October 8, 2015
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98383,
which reversed and set aside the Order4 dated January 3, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC), insofar as
it ordered the Register of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. B-9655 in the name of respondent Upper
Tagpos Neighborhood Association, Inc. (UTNAI) and to reinstate
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (-2645-) M-556 in the name of
Albert W. Onstott (Albert).
The Facts
Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of

land with an approximate area of 18,589 square meters, covered by
OCT No. (-2645-) M-5565 situated in the Province of Rizal (subject
property). Due to nonpayment of realty taxes, the Provincial
Government of Rizal sold the subject property at public auction to one
Amelita A. De Sena (De Sena), the highest bidder, as evidenced by the
Certificate
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1 Rollo, pp. 7-24.

2 Id., at pp. 34-45. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate
Justices Rodil V. Zalameda and Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 47-48.
4 Id., at pp. 145-146. Penned by Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez.
5 Id., at pp. 53-54A.
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of Sale6 dated June 29, 2004.7Respondent UTNAI, an association

representing the actual occupants of the subject property, subsequently
redeemed8 the same from De Sena.9
Thereafter, or on March 31, 2008, UTNAI filed a complaint10for
cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 and for the issuance of a new
title in its name before the RTC against Albert and Federico M. Cas
(Cas), the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal.11 It alleged,
among others, that it became the owner of the subject property upon
redemption thereof from De Sena and that, consequently, it must be
issued a new title. Moreover, Albert was an American citizen who,
under Philippine law, is not allowed to own a parcel of land in the
Philippines.12
Efforts to serve summons upon Albert proved futile as he was not a
resident of the Philippines. Thus, summons was served through
publication.13Nonetheless, Albert still failed to file his answer. Hence,
upon the motion of UTNAI, Albert was declared in default and UTNAI
was allowed to present evidence ex parte.14
The RTC’s Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
In a Decision15 dated March 30, 2009, the RTC found that UTNAI
was able to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that it is the owner
of the subject property after having le-
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6 Id., at p. 76.
7 Id., at pp. 34-35.
8 See Certificate of Redemption, id., at p. 121.
9 Id., at p. 35.
10 Id., at pp. 49-52.
11 Id., at p. 35.
12 Id., at p. 50.
13 See Order dated July 9, 2008, id., at pp. 64, 67-72.
14 Id., at p. 35.
15 Id., at p. 80. Penned by Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez.
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gally redeemed the same from De Sena, the highest bidder at a public
auction. Accordingly, it directed Cas to: (1) annotate its Decision on
OCT No. (-2645-) M-556; (2) cancel the same; and (3) issue a new title
in the name of UTNAI.16
In an Order17 dated June 16, 2009, the RTC clarified that its March
30, 2009 Decision directing the cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-
556 and the issuance of a new one in its stead in the name of UTNAI
necessarily includes a declaration that the owner’s duplicate copy of
OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 is void and of no effect.
The RTC Decision lapsed into finality. As a consequence, TCT No.
B-9655 was issued in favor of UTNAI.18
On August 26, 2009, herein petitioner Michael Onstott (Michael),
claiming to be the legitimate son19 of Albert with a certain Josephine
Arrastia Onstott (Josephine) filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment
(Petition for Relief),20alleging that UTNAI, in its complaint, impleaded
only Albert, notwithstanding knowledge of the latter’s death.21He
averred that, as parties to the case, UTNAI fraudulently and
intentionally failed to implead him and Josephine in order to prevent
them from participating in the proceedings and to ensure a favorable
judgment.22 He contended that his mother Josephine was an
indispensable party to the present case, being the owner of half of the
subject property, which he claimed to be conjugal in nature.23 Moreover,
he argued that UTNAI had no legal personality to redeem the subject
property as pro-
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16 Id., at pp. 35-36.

17 See CA Decision, id., at pp. 36-37.
18 Id., at p. 36.
19 See Certificate of Birth; id., at p. 109.
20 Id., at pp. 81-89.
21 Id., at pp. 82-83.
22 Id., at p. 83.
23 Id.
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vided for in Section 26124 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise
known as the “Local Government Code of 1991.”25
Later, Michael filed an Omnibus Motion:26 (1) to recall and/or set
aside the Certification of Finality of Judgment; (2) to set aside the Order
dated June 16, 2009; and (3) to cancel TCT No. B-9655 and reinstate
OCT No. (-2645-) M-556. He maintained that, based on the records, the
Decision dated March 30, 2009 of the RTC was not served upon the
defendant, Albert, by publication, as required under Section 9,27
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24 Section 261. Redemption of Property Sold.—Within one (1) year from the date of

sale, the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein, or
his representative, shall have the right to redeem the property upon payment to the local
treasurer of the amount of the delinquent tax, including the interest due thereon, and the
expenses of sale from the date of delinquency to the date of sale, plus interest of not more
than two percent (2%) per month on the purchase price from the date of sale to the date of
redemption. Such payment shall invalidate the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser
and the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein shall
be entitled to a certificate of redemption which shall be issued by the local treasurer or his
deputy.
From the date of sale until the expiration of the period of redemption, the delinquent
real property shall remain in possession of the owner or person having legal interest
therein who shall be entitled to the income and other fruits thereof.
The local treasurer or his deputy, upon receipt from the purchaser of the certificate of
sale, shall forthwith return to the latter the entire amount paid by him plus interest of not
more than two percent (2%) per month. Thereafter, the property shall be free from the lien
of such delinquent tax, interest due thereon and expenses of sale.
25 Entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991,” approved on
October 10, 1991.
26 Rollo, pp. 90-93.
27 Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions.—Judgments, final
orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party
summoned by publication
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Rule 13 of the Rules of Court; hence, the same has not yet attained
finality.28 Accordingly, the Certification of Finality of the said Decision
was prematurely issued and must therefore be set aside.29 In addition,
TCT No. B-9655 in favor of UTNAI must be cancelled and OCT No.
(-2645-) M-556 in the name of Albert should be reinstated.
Treating the Petition for Relief as a motion for reconsideration30 of
its Decision, the RTC, in an Order31 dated January 3, 2012, denied the
same and ruled that UTNAI, having legal interest in the subject property
and having redeemed the same from the highest bidder in a tax auction,
must be issued a new title in its name. It added that the matters raised by
Michael are best ventilated in a separate case for reconveyance.
However, while the RTC denied the petition, it found that its March 30,
2009 Decision never attained finality for not having been served upon
Albert by publication in accordance with Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, the issuance of the certificate of finality was erroneous.
Consequently, the cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 in Albert’s
name and the issuance of TCT No. B-9655 in UTNAI’s name were
premature; hence, it directed the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No.

B-9655 and to reinstate OCT No. (-2645-) M-556.32
Dissatisfied, both parties separately appealed33 to the CA. In its
appeal, UTNAI ascribed error to the RTC in finding that its March 30,
2009 Decision never attained finality for
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has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall
be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
28 Rollo, p. 91.
29 Id., at pp. 91-92.
30 See Order dated December 28, 2009; Id., at p. 104.
31 Id., at pp. 145-146. Penned by Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez.
32 Id.
33 See Appellant’s Brief dated October 30, 2012 id., at pp. 147-184; seeAppellee’s
Brief dated January 17, 2013; id., at pp. 187-199.
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failure to publish the same and that it also erred in declaring that the
cancellation of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 in Albert’s name and the
issuance of TCT No. B-9655 in its name were premature.34
On the other hand, Michael insisted that at the time of the filing of
the instant case in 2008, Albert was already dead, which means that the
ownership of the subject property had already devolved to his
compulsory heirs. Consequently, the latter should have been impleaded
as defendants, failing which, the Decision rendered by the RTC was null
and void for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, he asserted that his mother
Josephine was an indispensable party to this case, being a compulsory
heir and the owner of the half portion of the subject property, which he
claimed was conjugal in nature. He reiterated that UTNAI had no legal
interest to redeem the subject property.35
The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision36 dated May 7, 2015, the CA found UTNAI’s appeal

meritorious. Although it found that the March 30, 2009 Decision of the
RTC did not attain finality, not having been served upon Albert by
publication, the CA also held that UTNAI was entitled to the issuance of
a new title in its name as a matter of right. It concurred with UTNAI’s
contention that the cancellation of Albert’s OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 is
the direct legal consequence of UTNAI’s redemption of the subject
property from the highest bidder at the public auction sale. Thus, as the
absolute owner of the subject property, UTNAI has the right to be
placed in possession thereof following the consolidation of ownership in
its name and the issuance of the corresponding title.37
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34 Id., at pp. 38-39.

35 Id., at p. 39.
36 Id., at pp. 34-45.
37 Id., at pp. 39-41.
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On the other hand, the CA dismissed Michael’s appeal and rejected

his theory that his mother Josephine was an indispensable party to the
complaint filed by UTNAI against Albert. It found that the subject
property was registered in the name of “Albert Onstott, American
citizen, married to Josephine Arrastia” which is merely descriptive of
the civil status of Albert and does not show that Josephine co-owned the
subject property. Hence, contrary to Michael’s stance, the subject
property was not conjugal in nature and it cannot be presumed to be
conjugal in the absence of evidence showing that it was acquired during
their marriage.38
Furthermore, the CA pointed out that if Michael were indeed
Albert’s compulsory heir, he could have transferred the subject property
in his name by right of succession upon his father’s death, or redeemed

the same in 2005 after it was sold at public auction in 2004, or
intervened in the proceedings before the RTC. Having failed to avail of
any of the said legal remedies, he can no longer claim ownership of the
subject property by the simple expedient of filing a petition for relief.
Parenthetically, considering that the March 30, 2009 Decision of the
RTC had not yet attained finality as of the filing of said petition for
relief, the same was without legal basis.39
Meanwhile, it appears that UTNAI published a copy of the March
30, 2009 Decision of the RTC for two (2) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation.40
In view of its findings, the CA reversed and set aside the Order dated
January 3, 2012 rendered by the RTC, insofar as it directed the Register
of Deeds to cancel TCT No. B-9655 issued in UTNAI’s name and
reinstate OCT No. (-2645-) M-556 in the name of Albert. It likewise
declared the March 30, 2009 Decision of the RTC final and executory.41
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38 Id., at pp. 41-43.

39 Id., at pp. 43-44.
40 Id., at p. 22.
41 Id., at p. 44.
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Michael’s motion for reconsideration42 was denied in a

Resolution43 dated October 8, 2015; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred

in directing the issuance of a title in favor of UTNAI notwithstanding
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the person of Albert, the registered
owner of the subject property who has been dead prior to the institution
of UTNAI’S complaint; (b) the failure to implead his mother, Josephine,

as an indispensable party, since the subject property was allegedly
conjugal in nature; and (c) the lack of legal interest on the part of
UTNAI to redeem the subject property.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil
case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or
through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its
authority.44
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong
45
Pi, it was ruled that “[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare
that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsid-
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42 Id., at pp. 262-273.

43 Id., at pp. 47-48.
44 Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation, 707 Phil. 284, 290; 694 SCRA 302, 308
(2013).
45 606 Phil. 615; 588 SCRA 612 (2009), cited in Reicon Realty Builders Corporation
v. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204796, February 4, 2015,
750 SCRA 37, 52-53.
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eration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, is considered voluntary submissionto the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional

appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot
be considered to have submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the
foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general
rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth
in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading
or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution.”46
In this case, records show that Albert, the defendant in UTNAI’s

complaint, died in the United States of America in 2004.47 Thus, on the
strength of his right as Albert’s compulsory heir who has an interest in
the subject property, Michael filed the Petition for Relief before the
RTC, assailed the proceedings therein for failure to implead him and his
mother, Josephine, as an indispensable party, and sought affirmative
relief, i.e., the reversal of the RTC’s March 30, 2009 Decision and the
reinstatement of OCT No. (-2645-) M-556.48 The RTC, holding that its
own Decision never attained finality for failure to publish the same,
treated the Petition for Relief as a motion for reconsideration and after
due proceedings, ruled upon its merits.
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46 Id., at pp. 633-634; pp. 627-628. Emphasis supplied.

47 Rollo, p. 110.
48 See Petition for Relief; id., at p. 82.
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Based on the foregoing factual milieu, the Court finds that although
it may be true that jurisdiction was not initially acquired over the person
of the defendant,49 i.e., Albert in this case — whose death, notably, was
never brought to the attention of the RTC until after it rendered
judgment — the defect in the lack of jurisdiction over his person was
effectively cured by the voluntary appearance of his successor-in-
interest/
compulsory heir, Michael, who sought affirmative relief before the RTC
through the filing of the Petition for Relief which the RTC treated as a
motion for reconsideration of its judgment. Michael voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when, without any
qualification, he directly and squarely challenged the RTC’s March 30,
2009 Decision as aforementioned. Having sought positive relief from an
unfavorable judgment, the RTC, therefore, acquired jurisdiction over his
person, and the due process requirements of the law have been satisfied.
That the RTC Decision was null and void for failure to implead an
indispensable party, Josephine, on the premise that the subject property
is conjugal in nature, is likewise specious. Michael posits that
Josephine, being Albert’s wife, was entitled to half of the portion of the
subject property, which was registered as “Albert Onstott, American
citizen, married to Josephine Arrastia.”
The Court is not convinced.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code50 provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that
the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
opera-
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49 See Boston Equity Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 711 Phil. 451, 467; 699
SCRA 16, 31 (2013).
50 The law which would apply to Albert and Josephine’s alleged marriage as may be
inferred from the Rollo, p. 112.
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tion of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party

who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time element.
Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property
acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is
rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there
must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.51
As Michael invokes the presumption of conjugality, he must first
establish that the subject property was acquired during the marriage of
Albert and Josephine, failing in which, the presumption cannot stand.
Indeed, records are bereft of any evidence from which the actual date of
acquisition of the subject property can be ascertained. Considering that
the presumption of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing
when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired,52 the subject
property is therefore considered to be Albert’s exclusive property.
Consequently, Michael’s insistence that Josephine who, the Court notes,
has never personally appeared in these proceedings to directly challenge
the disposition of the subject property sans her participation is a co-
owner thereof and necessarily, an indispensable party to the instant case,
must therefore fail.
With respect, however, to the question of whether UTNAI has legal
interest to redeem the subject property from the highest bidder at the tax
delinquency public auction sale, the Court finds that the CA erred in its
disquisition. Section 261 of RA 7160 provides:
Section 261. Redemption of Property Sold.—Within one (1) year from
the date of sale, the owner of
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51 Dela Peña v. Avila, 681 Phil. 553, 563-564; 665 SCRA 553, 565 (2012).
52 Go v. Yamane, 522 Phil. 653, 663; 489 SCRA 107, 117 (2006).
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the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein, or his
representative, shall have right to redeem the property upon payment to the
local treasurer of the amount of the delinquent tax, including the interest due
thereon, and the expenses of sale from the date of delinquency to the date of
sale, plus interest of not more than two percent (2%) per month on the purchase
price from the date of the sale to the date of redemption. Such payment shall
invalidate the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser and the owner of the
delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein shall be entitled
to a certificate of redemption which shall be issued by the local treasurer or his
deputy.
From the date of sale until expiration of the period of redemption, the
delinquent real property shall remain in the possession of the owner or person
having legal interest therein who shall be entitled to the income and other fruits
thereof.
The local treasurer or his deputy, upon receipt from the purchaser of the
certificate of sale, shall forthwith return to the latter the entire amount paid by
him plus interest of not more than two percent (2%) per month. Thereafter, the
property shall be free from the lien of such delinquent tax, interest due thereon
and expenses of sale. (Emphasis supplied)
“Legal interest” is defined as interest in property or a claim

cognizable at law, equivalent to that of a legal owner who has legal title
to the property.53 It must be one that is actual and material, direct and
immediate, not simply contingent or expectant.54 Moreover, although
the taxable person who has actual and beneficial use and possession of a
property may be charged with the payment of unpaid realty tax due
thereon,
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53 National Power Corporation v. Province of Quezon and Municipality of Pagbilao,

624 Phil. 738, 748; 611 SCRA 71, 79 (2010).
54 Id., at p. 745; p. 76, citing Cariño v. Ofilada, G.R. No. 102836, January 18, 1993,
217 SCRA 206, 216.
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such assumption of liability does not clothe the said person with the
legal title or interest over the property.55
In this case and based on the above given definition, UTNAI, whose
members are the occupants of the subject property, has no legal
interest to redeem the same. Mere use or possession of the subject
property alone does not vest them with legal interest therein sufficient to
clothe them with the legal personality to redeem it, in accordance with
Section 261 above quoted. To rule otherwise would be to defeat the true
owner’s rights by allowing lessees or other occupants of a property to
assert ownership by the simple expedient of redeeming the same at a tax
delinquency sale. Consequently, UTNAI’s redemption of the subject
property as well as the issuance of a Certificate of Redemption56 in its
favor was erroneous. Since the redemption is of no legal effect, the said
Certificate of Redemption must therefore be cancelled, without
prejudice to the right of UTNAI to recover the full amount of the
redemption price paid by it in the appropriate proceeding therefor.
As things stand, UTNAI’s redemption should be deemed void for
being contrary to law. As a result, all proceedings springing from the
redemption ought to be nullified57 and the status quo prior thereto
should revert. Thus, as previously
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55 Id., at p. 751; p. 83.

56 Rollo, p. 121.
57 “All proceedings founded on the void judgment [or act] are themselves regarded as
invalid. In other words, a void judgment [or act] is regarded as a nullity, and the situation
is the same as it would be if there were no judgment [or act]. It, accordingly, leaves the
parties-litigants in the same position they were in before. x x x” (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 368 Phil. 412, 425; 309 SCRA 110, 122 [1999]; words in brackets supplied)
“All acts performed under a void order or judgment and all claims flowing out of it are
also void, for like the spring that cannot rise above its source, a void order cannot create a
valid and legally enforceable right.” (Caro v. Court of Appeals, 242 Phil. 1, 7; 158 SCRA
270, 275 [1988])
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stated, UTNAI may recover the full amount it had paid for the
redemption of the property subject of the public auction in the
appropriate proceeding therefor. In the same vein, De Sena and the
Provincial Government of Rizal, who have not been impleaded as
parties in this case, may commence the appropriate proceedings to assert
their rights under the law consequent to this disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Certificate of Redemption issued by the Provincial Treasurer of the
Provincial Government of Rizal in favor of respondent Upper Tagpos
Neighborhood Association, Inc. is hereby declared VOID and of no
legal effect, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-9655 issued in the
latter’s name shall be permanently CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro and Caguioa, JJ.,

concur.
Bersamin, J., On Official Leave.
Petition partly granted, Certificate of Redemption declared void.

TCT No. B-9655 permanently cancelled.
Notes.—All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the

conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. (Tan vs. Andrade, 703 SCRA 198 [2013])
In petitions for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals (CA), the
latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon: (a)
the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on
the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary submission of the
respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction. (Province of Leyte vs. Energy
DevelopmentCorporation, 760 SCRA 149 [2015])
——o0o——
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31 Onstott Vs UTNA

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11/14/2018 CentralBooks:Reader

G.R. No. 221047. September 14, 2016.*

MICHAEL A. ONSTOTT, petitioner, vs. UPPER TAGPOS

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Courts acquire jurisdiction

VOL. 803, 281

of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

282 SUPREME COURT

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the

Albert, an American citizen, was the registered owner of a parcel of

1 Rollo, pp. 7-24.

VOL. 803, 283

of Sale6 dated June 29, 2004.7Respondent UTNAI, an association

The RTC’s Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings

284 SUPREME COURT

16 Id., at pp. 35-36.

VOL. 803, 285

24 Section 261. Redemption of Property Sold.—Within one (1) year from the date of

286 SUPREME COURT

premature; hence, it directed the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No.

VOL. 803, 287

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision36 dated May 7, 2015, the CA found UTNAI’s appeal

34 Id., at pp. 38-39.

288 SUPREME COURT

On the other hand, the CA dismissed Michael’s appeal and rejected

in his name by right of succession upon his father’s death, or redeemed

38 Id., at pp. 41-43.

VOL. 803, 289

Michael’s motion for reconsideration42 was denied in a

The Issue Before the Court

The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred

of UTNAI’S complaint; (b) the failure to implead his mother, Josephine,

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

42 Id., at pp. 262-273.

290 SUPREME COURT

jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional

In this case, records show that Albert, the defendant in UTNAI’s

46 Id., at pp. 633-634; pp. 627-628. Emphasis supplied.

VOL. 803, 291

292 SUPREME COURT

Onstott vs. Upper Tagpos

tion of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party

VOL. 803, 293

SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

“Legal interest” is defined as interest in property or a claim

53 National Power Corporation v. Province of Quezon and Municipality of Pagbilao,

294 SUPREME COURT

55 Id., at p. 751; p. 83.

VOL. 803, 295

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro and Caguioa, JJ.,

Petition partly granted, Certificate of Redemption declared void.

Notes.—All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

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