9/11/2018 People vs Legaspi: 136164-65 : April 20, 2001 : J.

Melo : En Banc

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 136164­65. April 20, 2001]

THE  PEOPLE  OF  THE  PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff­appellee,  vs.  EDGAR  LEGASPI  y

D E C I S I O N
MELO, J.:

On February 17, 1997, accused­appellant Edgar Legaspi y Libao was charged with the crimes of rape and
robbery in two separate Informations filed with Branch 170 of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Malabon. The Informations respectively read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 17640-MN

That on or about the 11th day of February, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while armed with a bladed weapon,
with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with HONORATA ONG Y GUEVARRRA, against her will and without her
consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 17641-MN

That on or about the 11th day of February, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while armed with bladed weapon, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violation and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and divest cash money in the amount of P500.00 to the damage and prejudice of the said
HONORATA ONG Y GUEVARRRA in the aforementioned amount of P500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(Rollo, pp. 4-5.)

Since the charges were related, the prosecutions motion that the two cases be jointly tried was granted. For
its  part,  the  defense  pointed  out  that  accused­appellant  had  been  previously  treated  at  the  National  Center  for
Mental  Health  from  February  28  to  March  2,  1996.  It  moved  that  the  arraignment  of  accused­appellant  be
deferred pending determination by the Center as to whether accused­appellant was mentally fit to stand the rigors
of trial. This motion was likewise granted.
Accused­appellant was finally arraigned on November 18, 1997, following submission of the report dated
September  1,  1997  of  the  National  Center  for  Mental  Health  stating  that  accused­appellant  could  stand  trial.
Upon  his  arraignment,  accused­appellant  pleaded  not  guilty  and  trial  thereafter  ensued,  with  the  prosecution
presenting  three  witnesses,  namely,  the  complainant  Honorata  Ong,  NBI  Medico­Legal  officer  Dr.  Ronaldo
Mendez, and barangay tanod Gerardo Ocampo. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused­appellant and
SPO4 Salvador Ibo.
On November 6, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, disposing:

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WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 17640-MN, the Court finds accused Edgar Legaspi y Libao guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE, and considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and
nighttime, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay Honorata Ong the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages plus cost of the suit;

2. In Criminal Case No. 17641-MN, the Court finds accused Edgar Legaspi y Libao guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of ROBBERY and there being the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling,
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to nine
(9) years of prision mayor, as maximum and to pay Honorata Ong the sum of P500.00 plus cost of suit;

SO ORDERED.

(Rollo, p. 18.)

The  supreme  penalty  of  death  having  been  imposed  for  the  rape,  the  case  is  now  before  this  Court  on
automatic review. As for accused­appellants conviction for robbery, accused­appellant did not appeal therefrom,
thus, as to that portion of the judgment against him, the same has become final and executory (Section 3[c], Rule
122).
The facts, as shown by the records, are as follows:
At  around  2:00  in  the  morning  of  February  11,  1997,  complainant  Honorata  Ong,  who  was  then  sleeping
inside  her  house  with  her  three  daughters,  was  awakened  by  the  sound  of  their  door  opening.  She  initially
thought that it was her husband coming home from work. When Honorata opened her eyes, however, she saw a
man armed with a knife standing by her feet. More terrifying, the man already had his pants and briefs down on
his knees and he was pointing to her eldest daughter. Alarmed, Honorata told the man not to touch her daughter.
The man poked his knife at her and told her to stand up and then was made to lie down on the adjacent sofa.
Thereafter, the man removed Honoratas panties and had sex with her. All this time, he had his knife at Honoratas
neck. Honorata noticed that the man reeked of alcohol. After slaking his lust, Honoratas assailant stood up then
asked for money. Since the man still had his knife pointed at her, Honorata could do nothing but comply. She
gave him the only money she had, several bills amounting to P500.00.
After threatening Honorata and her daughters with death if she reports the incident, the man left. Honorata,
out of fear, could do nothing but close the door. Later that day, however, Honorata mustered enough courage to
narrate her defilement to her sister­in­law and upon describing him, Honoratas sister­in­law exclaimed that she
knew a person living in Manapat Street fitting the description.
That  afternoon,  Honorata,  together  with  her  husband,  reported  the  incident  to  the  barangay  captain.
Thereafter,  the  captain,  along  with  two  tanods  patrolled  the  area  and,  on  the  next  day,  they  managed  to  nab  a
person  who  fits  the  description  given  by  Honorata  of  her  assailant.  When  the  suspect  was  brought  to  the
barangay  hall  for  confrontation,  he  was  positively  identified  by  Honorata  as  the  rapist.  This  person,  later
identified as accused­appellant Edgar Legaspi y Libao, was thus detained by the police.
The  next  day,  Honorata  had  herself  medically  examined  at  the  NBI  but  no  evident  signs  of  extragenital
physical injuries were found on her body.
On the other hand, all that accused­appellant could interpose as defenses were denial and alibi, stating that at
the time of the alleged incident, he was at his home in Manapat Street sleeping. Accused­appellant also testified
that he had been previously convicted of homicide and Roberto Eugenio, the victim therein, was a resident of the
exact  same  address  where  complainant  Honorata  was  living.  Accused­appellant  hinted  at  the  possibility  that
relatives of Roberto Eugenio had conspired with complainant Honorata to get rid of him.
Incidentally,  Rivera  Street  where  the  alleged  crime  occurred  is  only  two  streets  away  from  Manapat.
Moreover, aside from Honoratas address, accused­appellant did not present proof that the relatives of Roberto
Eugenio knew complainant Honorata.

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Given the above circumstances, the trial court, as earlier mentioned, found accused­appellant guilty of rape
aggravated by dwelling and nighttime, and of robbery aggravated by dwelling; and thereupon, imposed upon him
the  supreme  penalty  of  death  for  the  rape,  and  an  indeterminate  penalty  of  six  months  to  nine  years  for  the
robbery.
Accused­appellants  plea  for  reversal  is  founded  on  the  arguments  that  his  guilt  was  not  shown  beyond
reasonable doubt, and that complainant Honoratas testimony is replete with inconsistencies. He  also  insists  on
his alibi and alleged insanity.
We have carefully reviewed the record and we find the above contentions devoid of merit.
In support of his first, second, and third assigned errors, which accused­appellant discussed jointly, he points
to  the  discrepancies  between  Honoratas  testimony  in  open  court  and  the  entry  in  the  police  blotter.  Accused­
appellant harps on the fact that as described in the blotter, the alleged rapist had an ala Babalu face (having an
attenuated chin similar to that of the late comedian Babalu) and a mole on the upper left part of his lips, while
accused­appellant is not Babalu and his mole is located not on the left but on the right side of his face.
That the facial features of accused­appellant differ from the description of Honoratas assailant as found in
the police blotter detracts not a whit from the credibility of Honoratas testimony. It must be kept in mind that
Honorata positively identified accused­appellant as her rapist, not only during the investigation conducted by the
police on the morning of January 15, but also during the trial. At the Malabon Police Station, Honorata identified
accused­appellant thus:
T: Bakit naman po kayo nandito ngayon sa aming himpilan at nagbigay ng malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
S: Para po ipagharap ng reklamo ang taong ito (affiant pointing/identifying person of EDGAR LEGASPI y LIBAO, @
EGAY, 29 years old, single, jobless, and residing at No. 86 Manapat Street, Barangay Taong, Malabon, MM who is
presently inside this room).
T: Ito po bang taong ito ay dati na ninyong kilala?
S: Hindi po.
T: Bakit naman po ninyo gustong ipagharap ng reklamo ang taong ito?
S: Ni rape niya ako.
(Original Record, p. 80.)
During the trial, Honorata likewise identified accused­appellant as the person who sexually violated her. She
testified that she was able to recognize accused­appellant because the fluorescent lamp inside her house was lit at
the time of the incident.
Q: It was dark. Why were you able to see that person?
A: Because the light inside the house is on, sir.
Q: And you saw that person?
A: Yes, sir.
(tsn, August 18, 1998, p. 3.)
Likewise, we have heretofore held that a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other than
during the sexual act (People vs. Fuertes, 296 SCRA 602 [1998]). We thus have on record Honoratas positive
identification  of  accused­appellant  as  her  assailant.  Coupled  with  the  oft­quoted  doctrine  that  entries  in  police
blotters, though regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the
truth stated in such entries since they are usually incomplete and inaccurate (People vs. Padlan, 290 SCRA 388
[1998]), we hold that any discrepancy in the police blotter entry and the open court testimony of Honorata does
not affect her credibility.
It must also be remembered that the entry in the police blotter was made at 6:30 on the morning of February
12, 1997, only a few hours after the rape and robbery. At that time, Honorata may not have yet fully recovered
from the traumatic ordeal she had gone through, resulting in an inaccurate entry in the police blotter. Besides,
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minor  lapses  are  to  be  expected  when  a  person  is  recounting  details  of  a  traumatic  experience  too  painful  to
recall (People vs. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]).
On the other hand, accused­appellant claims that if Honorata were indeed raped on the sofa of her one­room
house,  the  creaking  of  the  sofa  and  her  moans  would  have  awakened  her  three  sleeping  daughters.  He  asserts
that, strangely, this did not happen.
That Honoratas daughters, aged 3, 6, and 9 years, did not wake up during the assault is not as incredible as
accused­appellant would make it out. The failure of the three children to wake up during the commission of the
rape was probably due to the fact that they were sound asleep. It is not unusual for children of tender ages to be
moved  from  their  sleeping  mats  and  transferred  to  another  bed  without  eliciting  the  least  protest  from  them,
much less, awakening them (People vs. Mustacisa, 159 SCRA 227 [1988]). It is also to be noted that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence
of other persons around them. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than grown­ups
and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night (People vs. Ignacio, 233 SCRA 1
[1994]).
As  to  accused­appellants  submission  that  the  absence  of  spermatozoa  in  Honoratas  organ  negates  the
commission  of  rape,  the  same  rings  hollow,  the  presence  or  absence  of  spermatozoa  being  immaterial  in  the
prosecution  of  a  rape  case,  as  it  is  well­settled  that  it  is  penetration,  however  slight,  and  not  ejaculation,  that
constitutes  rape  (People  vs.  dela  Paz,  Jr.,  299  SCRA  86  [1998]).  That  there  was  penetration  is  shown  by
Honoratas testimony, thus:
Q: When he removed your panty what did he do next?
A: He inserted his organ in mine, sir.
Q: How did you come to know it was his penis that entered your private part?
A: I felt pain, sir.
(tsn, August 18, 1998, p. 5.)
Finally,  accused­appellant  contends  that  Honorata  lied  when  she  claimed  not  having  known  accused­
appellant or his family prior to the incident. Accused­appellant takes this to be indicative that Honorata plotted
with  the  family  of  Roberto  Eugenio  to  get  rid  of  him.  As  proof  of  Honoratas  alleged  prevarication,  accused­
appellant  presented  the  voters  registration  record  of  a  certain  Roberto  Eugenio,  allegedly  accused­appellants
victim in a homicide case four years prior to the incident in question, indicating that Robertos address was 27­D
Rivera Street, Taong, Malabon, Metro Manila, the exact same address of Honorata.
Accused­appellant has not presented proof that Honorata knew Roberto Eugenio or his relatives. Neither has
he  shown  that  any  relative  of  Eugenio  still  resides  at  Honoratas  address,  27­D  Rivera  Street.  Moreover,  mere
residence at the same address is not proof that Honorata conspired with the relatives of Roberto Eugenio in an
attempt  to  get  rid  of  accused­appellant.  False  testimony  or  incriminatory  machinations  must  be  proved  by
evidence more substantial than a voters registration record.
In his defense, accused­appellant raises the defense of alibi, claiming that he was asleep at his house at #86
Manapat Street, Taong, Malabon at the time of the incident. Accused­appellants defense of alibi must, however,
be looked upon with suspicion, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be
easily fabricated and concocted (People vs. Tulop, 289 SCRA 316 [1998]). For alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity (People vs. Ballesteros,
285 SCRA 438 [1998]).
In the case at bar, accused­appellant has failed to meet both requisites. Aside from his testimony that he was
asleep at the time of the incident, no other witness came forward to corroborate his version. Moreover, Manapat
Street is only two streets away from Rodriguez Street, the scene of the crime. Accused­appellant even admitted
during  the  trial  that  this  was  only  a  five­minute  walk  from  his  residence.  Counterbalanced  against  Honoratas
conduct  immediately  after  the  incident  and  her  positive  identification  of  accused­appellant  as  her  assailant,
accused­appellants defense of alibi is unavailing. In the words of the trial court:
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Honorata did not know the accused before the incident. She immediately revealed the fate that befell on her to
her sister-in-law. They then reported the incident to the barangay and thereafter to the police authorities;
executed a sworn statement; submitted herself to a physical examination by a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI;
and subscribed and swore to a complaint for rape which would necessarily result in her exposure to the rigors of
public trial. The spontaneity of these acts clearly demonstrates her sincere desire to bring the accused to justice.
Moreover, no married woman in her right mind would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation in order
to perpetuate a falsehood. Neither would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and family had
she not been violated and robbed of her money.

(RTC Decision, p. 4-5.)

In accused­appellants last assignment of error, he claims that the court a quo erred in not ruling that he is
entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity. For insanity to be considered, Paragraph 1, Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be
deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence
of  the  power  to  discern. The  defense  of  insanity  or  imbecility  must  be  clearly  proved,  however,  for  there  is  a
presumption that acts penalized by law are voluntary (People vs. Medina, 286 SCRA 44 [1998]).
To  prove  his  insanity,  accused­appellants  counsel  points  to  his  confinement  at  the  National  Center  for
Mental Health prior to the incident in question. Likewise, his counsel claims that when Honorata saw accused­
appellant, the latters pants and briefs were already down on his knees. He takes this to be an indicium of insanity.
Mere  prior  confinement  does  not  prove  that  accused­appellant  was  deprived  of  reason  at  the  time  of  the
incident. Firstly, accused­appellant did not submit proof that he was adjudged insane by the National Center for
Mental  Health,  only  that  he  had  been  confined  therein.  Note  also  that  accused­appellant  had  already  been
discharged  from  the  Center  prior  to  the  incident.  Even  if  accused­appellant  were  adjudged  insane  prior  to  the
incident, his discharge implies that he was already considered well. In fact, the psychiatric evaluation report of
accused­appellant states that his disorder runs a chronic course with periods of exacerbations and remissions. If
the  insanity  is  only  occasional  or  intermittent  in  nature,  the  presumption  of  its  continuance  does  not  arise.  He
who relies on such insanity proved at another time must prove its existence also at the time of the commission of
the offense (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87). This, accused­appellant has failed to do.
Neither does having ones pants and briefs on ones knees indicate deprivation of reason. If anything else, it
shows the lechery and depravity of accused­appellant. Mental depravity which results not from any disease of
the  mind,  but  from  a  perverted  condition  of  the  moral  system,  where  the  person  is  mentally  sane,  does  not
exempt one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence (People vs. Medina, supra). The Court
cannot, therefore, appreciate the defense of insanity brought by accused­appellant.
In sum, we find that the trial court did not err in finding Honoratas testimony to be clear, straightforward,
and worthy of credence, and consequently, in finding accused­appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape.
We  now  come  to  the  proper  penalty.  Under  Article  335  (now  Article  266­B)  of  the  Revised  Penal  Code,
whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
According to the trial court:

The rape charge was committed in the victims dwelling at nighttime. Dwelling and nighttime are aggravating
circumstances in rape (People vs. Padilla 242 SCRA 629). On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime cannot be appreciated in the robbery charge because of (sic) the notion to commit the crime was
conceived only shortly when the rape was committed at darkness. However, the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling is a different story and should be considered. Dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence against
or intimidation of person because this class of robbery can be committed without the necessity of trespassing the
sanctity of the offended partys house. Entrance into the dwelling house of the offended party is not an element of
the offense (People vs. Cabato 160 SCRA 98). Finally, for sexually assaulting a married woman thereby

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grievously wronged (sic) the institution of marriage, the imposition of exemplary damages by way of example to
deter others from committing the crime is just (sic) warranted.

(RTC Decision, pp. 5-6.)

Considering  the  presence  of  the  aggravating  circumstances  of  nighttime  and  dwelling,  the  trial  court
imposed the supreme penalty of death on accused­appellant for the crime of rape.
However,  a  cursory  examination  of  the  Information  filed  against  accused­appellant  would  show  that  the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling are not specified therein. Now,  at  the  time  the  trial  court
rendered its decision, the non­allegation of generic aggravating circumstances in the information was immaterial,
since the rule then prevailing was that generic aggravating circumstances duly proven in the course of the trial
could  be  taken  into  account  by  the  trial  court  in  determining  the  proper  imposable  penalty  even  if  such
circumstances were not alleged in the information (People vs. Deberto, 205 SCRA 291 [1992]).
Nonetheless,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  appreciation  by  the  trial  court  of  the  aggravating  circumstances  of
dwelling and nighttime, despite the non­allegation thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death upon accused­appellant. In People v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, August 15, 2000), We
had occasion to rule, thus:

In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136 [1995]), we admonished courts to proceed with more care where the possible
punishment is in its severest form death because the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable. Any decision
authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the Court to
exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties evidence. Safeguards designed to reduce to a minimum, if not
eliminate, the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored in a case involving the imposition of capital
punishment for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice. The accused must
thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the
difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly exercise extreme caution in reviewing the
parties evidence. This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the
penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information,
otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow the decision to
take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the accused in predicting what aggravating
circumstance will be appreciated against him.

In a series of cases under the regime of Rep. Act No. 7659, the Court did not appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling which would have increased the imposable penalty to death when such circumstance
was not alleged in the information. In People v. Gaspar, et al. (318 SCRA 649 [1999]), the Court found that apart
from treachery, dwelling also attended the killing of the victim. Despite this finding and the absence of any
mitigating circumstance, the Court nonetheless did not appreciate dwelling and imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and not the greater penalty of death. Hence, in the case at bar, considering that the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the information, we cannot appreciate it and raise the penalty
imposed upon Raul Gallego from reclusion perpetua to death.

(Italics supplied.)

The principle above­enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that due to their non­
allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused­appellant, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and  dwelling  cannot  be  considered  in  raising  the  penalty  imposable  upon  accused­appellant  from  reclusion
perpetua to death.
Parenthetically, the above rule is inapplicable for the crime of robbery committed by accused­appellant, the
same not involving the imposition of the death penalty. For said crime, what remains applicable is the old rule
that generic aggravating circumstances if duly proven in the course of the trial could be taken into account by the
trial  court  in  determining  the  proper  imposable  penalty,  even  if  such  circumstances  were  not  alleged  in  the
Information. Thus, for the crime of robbery, the trial court correctly imposed an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
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It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been formalized in the
Revised  Rules  of  Criminal  Procedure,  which  took  effect  on  December  1,  2000.  Section  8  of  Rule  110  now
provide that:

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.

(Italics supplied.)

Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

(Italics supplied.)

Sections 8 and 9 were discussed by this Court En Banc on June 20, 2000. According to the minutes of said
session:

Justice Puno then invited the attention of the Court to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110. He explained that the
proposal requiring the allegation of qualifying circumstances in the information reflects the recent decisions of
the Court, especially in heinous crimes. However, the Court concerned itself with the proposed requirement of
likewise alleging aggravating circumstances in the information. Justice Panganiban raised the question of what
to do with an aggravating circumstance which was not alleged but was proved and not objected to during trial.
Justice Melo answered that it cannot be used to increase the penalty if it was not alleged even if proved. Justice
Puno explained that the proposal strengthens the right to due process of an accused, part of which is to be
shielded from surprises.

Chief Justice Davide and Justice Panganiban agreed and emphasized that the presence of aggravating
circumstances can make the difference between life and death where the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal
maximum to death or reclusion perpetua to death. Justice Panganiban added that the prosecutors will now be
compelled to prepare well-worded informations.

To make sure that the circumstances that need to be alleged are not missed out in the information, Justice
Mendoza suggested that the Court can prescribe an updated form in the Rules of Court.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus,  the  Rules  now  require  qualifying  as  well  as  aggravating  circumstances  to  be  expressly  and
specifically alleged in the Complaint or Information, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court even
if  proved  during  the  trial.  And  this  principle  is  applicable  in  all  criminal  cases,  not  only  in  cases  were  the
aggravating  circumstance  would  increase  the  penalty  to  death.  With  this,  the  Court  gives  fair  warning  to
prosecutors that henceforth, they must prepare well­crafted informations that allege the circumstances qualifying
and aggravating the crimes charged, otherwise the same will not be considered by the court in determining the
proper imposable penalty.
The  Court  further  notes  that  while  the  trial  court  awarded  the  victim  the  sum  of  P50,000.00  as  moral
damages  and  P30,000.00  as  exemplary  damages,  it  failed  to  award  civil  indemnity  to  the  victim.  Prevailing
jurisprudence holds that in rape cases, the victim should be awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another
P50,000.00  as  moral  damages  for  the  injury  evidently  suffered.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  victim  was  raped
inside her house in the presence of her children justifies the trial courts imposition of exemplary damages.
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WHEREFORE,  premises  considered,  the  decision  under  review  finding  accused­appellant  EDGAR
LEGASPI  y  LIBAO  guilty  beyond  reasonable  doubt  of  the  crime  of  rape  in  Criminal  Case  No.  17640­MN  is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is sentenced to suffer the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua
and  to  pay  Honorata  Ong  the  sum  of  Fifty  Thousand  pesos  as  civil  indemnity,  another  Fifty  Thousand  Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena,  Gonzaga­
Reyes, Ynares­Santiago, and Sandoval­Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on sick leave.
De Leon, Jr., J., on leave.

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