IJMA AND QIYAS AS THE

SOURCE OF ISLAMIC LAW

AVINASH DANGWAL
BALLB(H), 2ND YEAR
REGULAR
 ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE

Contents
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 2
IJMA ....................................................................................................................................................... 3
CLASSICAL DEFINITION OF IJMA ................................................................................................... 4
PROBLEM OF CONSESUS .................................................................................................................. 5
THE CRITIQUE OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY .............................................................................. 6
SUNNI VIEW ......................................................................................................................................... 7
THE PRINCIPLE OF QIYAS IN ISLAMIC LAW ................................................................................ 9
SUNNI INTERPRETATIONS ............................................................................................................. 14
VALIDITY AS A SOURCE OF LAW............................................................................................. 14
SUPPORT FOR ITS VALIDITY ..................................................................................................... 15
APPLICATION AS A SOURCE OF LAW ..................................................................................... 15
SHI’A INTERPRETATIONS ............................................................................................................... 16
TWELVER SHI’A ............................................................................................................................ 16
ISMAILI SHI’A ............................................................................................................................ 17
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 18
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................. 19

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INTRODUCTION
Ijmāʿ, (Arabic: “agreeing upon” or “consensus”) the universal and infallible
agreement of the Muslim community, especially of Muslim scholars, on any Islamic
principle, at any time. The consensus—based on the Hadith (sayings of Muhammad),
“My people will never agree in an error”—constitutes the third of the four sources of
Islamic jurisprudence, the uṣūl al-fiqh. In effect, ijmāʿ has been the most important
factor in defining the meaning of the other uṣūl and thus in formulating the doctrine
and practice of the Muslim community.

In Muslim history ijmāʿ has always had reference to consensuses reached in the past,
near or remote, and never to contemporaneous agreement. It is thus a part of traditional
authority and has from an early date represented the Muslim community’s
acknowledgment of the authority of the beliefs and practices of Muhammad’s city of
Medina.

Ijmāʿ also has come to operate as a principle of toleration of different traditions within
Islam. It thus allows, for example, the four legal schools (madhhabs) equal authority
and has probably validated many non-Muslim practices taken into Islam by converts.

Qiyas, Arabic qiyās, in Islamic law, analogical reasoning as applied to the deduction
of juridical principles from the Quran and the Sunnah (the normative practice of the
community). With the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and ijmāʿ (scholarly consensus), it
constitutes the four sources of Islamic jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh).

The need for qiyas developed soon after the death of Muhammad, when the expanding
Islamic state came in contact with societies and situations beyond the scope of the
Quran and the Sunnah. In some cases, ijmāʿ legitimized a solution or resolved a
problem. Very often, however, qiyas was used to deduce new beliefs and practices on
the basis of analogy with past practices and beliefs.

Muslim scholars consider qiyas a specific variant of the general concept of ijtihād,
which is original interpretation and thought. It is also related to raʾy, personal thought
and opinion, a forerunner of qiyas criticized by traditional authorities as too arbitrary.

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IJMA
Ijmā’ has been defined as the agreement of the Muslim jurisconsults in any particular
age on a juridical rule. The authority of Ijmā’ as a source of law is founded on Koranic
and Sunnah texts; one of each of which are given here;

“O ye who believe; Obey God and obey the Prophet and those of you who are inn
authority, and if ye have a dispute concerning any matter refer it to God and the
Prophet1”

“There can be no consensus on error or misguided behaviour amongst my people”

Ijma has been classified into three types

a) Ijmā’ of the companion of the prophet.

b) Ijmā’ of the jurists.
c) Ijmā’ of the people

While the first type is universally accepted and is incapable of being repealed, the other two
types are somewhat disputed.

The Shia School did not accept Ijmā’ except when it emanated from the family of Prophet or
unless the jurisconsults were endorsed in their consensus by the infallible Shia imam. Sunnis,
on the other hand, hold that since Koran enunciated only a few rules of law which, after the
death of Prophet, who used to give the guidance, are by no means sufficient to cover the
numerous questions of day to day developments, Ijmā’ becomes necessary in the
circumstances. As the learned alone are incompetent to make such deductions, their opinion
on any question must be of some authority.

A few of the important requirements for the validity of Ijma are as follows: -

a) Once a question is determined by Ijmā’, it could not be opened by individual jurists.

b) One Ijmā’ may be revised by a subsequent Ijmā’.
c) When the jurists of an age have expressed only two views on a particular question, a
third view is inadmissible.

In the words of Abdur Rahim, there is one serious defect in Ijmā’. It is the omission to provide
a definite and a workable machinery for the selection of the jurists who are qualified to take
part in Ijmā’, and for ascertaining, collecting and preserving the results of their deliberations
in an authoritative form.2

1
Koran 4:59.
2
Abdur Rahim, at pp. 135-136.

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CLASSICAL DEFINITION OF IJMA

We may now discuss the definition of ijma1 as enunciated by the classical jurists and
the relevant problems. Abu'l Husayn al-Ba?rf (d.436 A.H.) defines it as agreement of
a group (jama'ah) on a certain matter by action or by abandonment.3 This was later
qualified by the condition of ijtihad (independent legal interpretation) and time.4 Al-
Ghazali gives it as agreement of the community of Muhammad (peace be upon him)
on a religious point. * Definitions, such as pronounced by al-Ghazall, which stipulate
the agreement of the whole Muslim community beginning from the rise of Islam till
the day of judgement have been severely criti cized by the jurists. This is because such
an ijma' according to them is not practically possible.6 Summing up all the definitions
given by the jurists in different ages al-Amidi has recorded the following definition of
ijma':

"Agreement of all the people of binding and loosing who belong to the community of
Muhammad, in a certain period of time, on a rule about a certain incidence."

This definition applies in case the masses are excluded from ijma'. But if they are
included the definition would be:

'Agreement of all those who are legally responsible and belong to the community of
Muhammad in a certain age, on a rule about a certain incidence'. The definition has
five component parts, namely agreement; people of binding and loosing; membership
of the Prophet's community; period of time; and moot questions. The word agreement
includes consensus by silence. The term 'people of binding and loosing' indicates
unanimous agreement of the jurists including agreement of the masses. The condition
of the 'membership of the Muslim community' implies exclusion of those who belong
to other communities. The phrase 'in a certain period' means the existing community
excluding the past and the future members of the community. And finally, the phrase
*on a rule about a certain incidence' includes positive and negative aspects of con
sensus, and rules about rational and legal questions3.

3
Amidi, op. cit., I, 280-82.

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PROBLEM OF CONSESUS
As to the number of scholars required for the validity of ijma\ it should be noted that
the classical theory does not elaborate. A group of jurists maintain that the minimum
number of scholars required for ijma' is three.8 Others hold that the number of scholars
required for ijma' must reach the proportion of tawatur (indefinite number of people
who cannot possibly agree upon a falsehood because of their huge number and
geographical situation). Both of these views are not recognized by the majority of
jurists. They contend that if there is no jurist except one in the community in a certain
age and he agrees on a certain opinion about a disputed question, his agreement would
be considered ijma'.9 Al Sarakhsl refutes this point of view by saying that if the body
of competent scholars agree on a certain point by verbal expression and the rest of the
scholars keep silent, then ijma' would be reached. The number of tawatur is a
necessary condition for the certainty of a report because it involves the possibility of
truth and falsehood. But ijma' involves no such possi bility. It already stands on the
concept of infallibility of the community.4 'Abd al-Malik al-Juwaynl qualifies it by
tawatur because there remains no possibility of error in an ijma' based on tawatur. If
the number of the participants of ijma' is less than that of tawdtur, it may be open to
error5. To this al-Amidi answers that it is inconceivable to establish the legitimacy of
ijma' on the basis of human reason. There is no way of proving it except by the oral
proofs (adillah sam'iyyah) based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The terms 'community'
and 'believers' would be applied to the participants of ijma', even if their number falls
very short of tawatur. The oral proofs establish their infallibility and hence adherence
to their consensus is binding. This argument has again been challenged by the
opponents, and al-Amidi has replied in detail6.

According to the orthodox view, ijma' is the unanimous agreement of the community
or of the scholars. If the whole community or compe tent scholars are agreed upon a
certain point, this would constitute ijma'. But the disagreement of a single competent
scholar invalidates ijma'A ^ A group of jurists differ from this point of view, and

4
Sarakhsi, op. cit., I, 312.
5
Op. cit., fo. 195.
6
Al-Amidi, op. cit., I, 358-60; 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, al-Ijmd' fVl -SharVat al-lsldmiyah (Cairo, Dar al-Fikr al-
Arabi, 1947), pp. 72-73.

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maintain that the majority opinion of competent scholars constitutes ijma'. We

presently discuss both points of view and the arguments of their supporters

THE CRITIQUE OF THE CLASSICAL THEORY

Before we deal with the main problem, let us briefly mention the classical theory of
Ijma. It has been defined in different ways. One definition says: "Ijma is an agreement
of the Muslim Community on a religious point." Another definition states: "Ijmā’ is a
consensus of opinion of the persons competent for Ijma (ahl al-ijma), when a religious
issue arises, whether rational or legal." A third definition runs: "Ijma is a unanimous
agreement of the jurists of the Community of a particular age on a certain issue."7 The
first two definitions have been criticized by the later jurists themselves,8 while the
third has been accepted as the standard definition. This is no doubt a theoretical
definition agreed to by the jurists, but it should be noted that it does not represent the
actual historical process of Ijma in Islam. This definition does not allow difference of
opinion of even one jurist of the generation in which any Ijma is supposed to have
taken place. The reason is that, according to the classical theory, Ijmā’ is not
completed, if even one person competent for ijtihad (inter pretation) and nazar
(thinking) remains opposed to the agreed decision.9 Further, to substantiate total Ijma
it is said that Ijma is not subject to reason, but it is the privilege (karamah) of the
Community. Infallibility, therefore, iinheres in the total Community and not in the
majority10. Now, the question arises: Is 'total Ijma’ possible on points of detail? Apart
from the essentials, we find a large number of points on which Ijma is said to have
taken place, but still there are differences among the jurists with regard to these points.
This shows that either the classical definition of Ijma is defective, or Ijma is only a
theoretical concept.

Again, Ijma\ according to the Zahiris and Ahmad b. Hanbal, is the consensus of the
Companions alone. Malik validates only the practice of Medina. The ShTah recognize
only the agreement of the members of the Prophet's family. These different opinions
about the definition of Ijma show that it was never 'total', as the classical definition of
Ijma suggests. Goldziher, rightly remarks that the scope of Ijma is extensive and

7
Ala' al-Din b. 'Abd al-'Aziz, Kashf al-Asrar 'aid Usul al-Bazdawi, Istanbul, 1308, in: 227
8
Ibid., 227.
9
AH b. Muhammad al-Bazdawi, Usul al-Bazdawi, Istanbul, 1308, III: 245.
10
Ibid.. 242, 243,

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cannot be strictly defined and limited. The jurists have given, he continues, many
definitions of Ijma; but 'total Ijma especially in respect of dogmatic issues, is difficult,
without difference of opinion, because what is held by one group about a certain point
is not held by the other11.

SUNNI VIEW
The hadith of Muhammad which states that "My ummah will never agree upon an
error" is often cited as a proof for the validity of ijmā'. Sunni Muslims regard ijmā' as
the third fundamental source of Sharia law, just after the divine revelation of the
Qur'an, and the prophetic practice known as Sunnah. While there are differing views
over who is considered a part of this consensus, the majority view is split between two
possibilities: that religiously binding consensus is the consensus of the entire Muslim
community, or that religiously binding consensus is just the consensus of the
religiously learned. The names of two kinds of consensus are:

 ijmā’ al-ummah - a whole community consensus.

 ijmā’ al-aimmah - a consensus by religious authorities.

Malik ibn Anas held the view that the religiously binding consensus was only the
consensus of Muhammad's companions and the direct successors of those companions
in the city of Medina.

According to Iraqi academic Majid Khadduri, Al-Shafi'i held the view that religiously
binding consensus had to include all of the Muslim community in every part of the
world, both the religiously learned and the layman. Thus, if even one individual out
of millions would hold a differing view, then consensus would not have been reached.
In an attempt to define consensus in a form which was more likely to ever occur, Al-
Ghazali expanding on al-Shafi'i's definition to define consensus as including all of the
Muslim community in regard to religious principles and restricting the meaning to
only the religiously learned in regard to finer details.

Abu Hanifa, Ahmad bin Hanbal and Dawud al-Zahiri, on the other hand, considered
this consensus to only include the companions of Muhammad, excluding all
generations which followed them, in Medina and elsewhere.

11
Ignaz Goldziher, he Dogme et la Loi de L'I slam, Paris, 1958,152.

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Views within Sunni Islam branched off even further in later generations, with
Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi defining even a simple majority view as constituting
consensus and Ibn Taymiyyah restricting consensus to the view of the religiously
learned only. Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari's position was not entirely clear, as
modern scholarship has attributed to him both the view that consensus means a simple
majority, and that it means only the consensus of the companions of Muhammad.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF QIYAS IN ISLAMIC LAW

In Islamic jurisprudence, qiyās (Arabic: ‫ )قياس‬is the process of deductive analogy in
which the teachings of the Hadith are compared and contrasted with those of the
Qur'an, in order to apply a known injunction (nass) to a new circumstance and create
a new injunction. Here the ruling of the Sunnah and the Qur'an may be used as a means
to solve or provide a response to a new problem that may arise. This, however, is only
the case providing that the set precedent or paradigm and the new problem that has
come about will share operative causes (‫ ِعلة‬, ʿillah). The ʿillah is the specific set of
circumstances that trigger a certain law into action. Qiyas is a systematic form of
reasoning in law. Before it developed into a sophisticated doctrine in the post-Shall!
period, it was simply used to show a resemblance between two parallel cases or
institutions. It started with the use of personal opinion (ra’y) in cases not covered by
an explicit text (nass). The employment of sound personal opinion (ra’y) to settle
important matters was not uncommon in pre-Islamic Arabia. Men of opinion
(dhu'Ura’y) and men weak in mind (mufannad) were two distinct categories of people
in respect of reasoning. The exercise of ra’y was therefore not something novel in
Islam. The Qur'an of course alludes to its use by the Prophet12, and points to its
significance in ancient history13. The Qur'an lays great stress on the use of rational
faculty. Its recurrent insistence upon 'thinking' and 'reflection', and its sporadic
mention of ratio ('illah), and purpose of injunctions made for the exercise of ra’y and
ultimately qiyas in Islamic jurisprudence.

The Prophet himself acted as a judicial authority in Medina, and also reportedly
appointed a number of persons as judges in various parts of Arabia. The settlement of
disputes naturally requires exercise of reason and personal opinion. The interpretation
of a textual injunction and its application to a particular case obviously pre-supposes
the use of reason and intelligence. The Prophet, we are told, consulted his Companions
in doubtful situations when he was not guided by revelation14. The emphasis of the
Qur'an on mutual consultation in matters of social policy and its special directive to
the Prophet to consult the Companions signify the importance of the role of individual

12
Quran, 4:105.
13
Quran, 11:27
14
Ibn Hisham, Strat al-Nabl, Cairo: Matba'ah JJijazi

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reasoning and judgement in Muslim society. The well-known tradition of Mu'adh ibn
Jabal, though much disputed15, more or less points to this general phenomenon.

It seems that ra’y was a generic term representing overall reasoning frequently
employed by the early schools of law before al-Shafi'I (d. 204/ 819-20). During its
various phases of development, it emerged under different names, viz. qiyas
(analogy), istihsan (approbation), Istislab (public interest) and istishab (to take a
decision on the basis of accompanying circumstances), etc. In the later period, great
emphasis was laid on reasoning based on the text (naff). This movement, though
initiated a little earlier, was launched vigorously by al-Shafi'I, culminating in the
emergence of the literalist schools of Dawud and Ibn rTazm. Ra’y was debunked
either by trenchant criticism of the traditionists, or by the stereotyped reasoning of the
classical jurists. The principle of qiyas was consequently substituted for ra’y and
became a recognized mode of reasoning.

We find contradictory statements about ra’y in the post-Shafi'I period. Al-Sha'bl has
been portrayed as an enemy, and Rabrah as a great exponent of ra’y. But the general
trend of individual reasoning and free thinking in the early schools contradict the
historical accounts of the classical period. Further, the traditional reports of the later
period seek to show that the 'Iraqis were the protagonists of ra’y and the Medinese
were the advocates of traditions. This is also not true. A closer study of the early
schools of law will show that the exercise of ra’y was not peculiar to the 'Iraqis. The
Medinese and the Syrians equally shared this characteristic. Al-Shafi'I, despite his
own discountenance of ra’y, could not escape its influence on his own reasoning.

With the development of traditions in the third century after the Hijrah, reports
ascribed to the Prophet about the condemnation of ra’y and qiyas permeated the
Ifadith literature16. A tradition, for instance, goes: "My Community will split up into
more than seventy sects; the most perversive of them will be people who weigh up
religion with their individual opinion, whereby making lawful what Allah made
unlawful and unlawful what Allah made lawful.17" The use of ra’y by the Prophet was
justified on the plea that he was always correct in his opinion because God guided

15
Schacht, Joseph, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1959, 105-6.
16
Al-Bukhan, al-JdmV al-$ahtb> BSb ma Yadhkaru min dhamm al-ra'y wa takalluf al-qiyds; al-Darimi, Sunan,
Babfi Karahiyatiakhdh al-qiyds.
17
Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, JamV Bayan al-llm wa Fadlihl, Cairo: Idarat al-Tiba'at al-Muni riyyah, n.d., II, 134.

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him. But the exercise of ra’y by the people other than him is a sheer speculation (zann)
and artifice (takalluf)18. The hostility on the part of the traditionists towards the use of
ra’y led them to the extreme. They stigmatized their opponents (people of opinion) as
the enemies of Sunnah19.

Originality which is essentially based on the use of reason and intelligence was
denounced as an innovation in religion (bid'ah). Hence allegiance (ittibd6) and
originality (ibtida*) became two conflicting strands of medieval legal thought.20 This
literal-radical attitude in legal reasoning paved the way for the close of the door of
ijtihad21.

Curiously enough, the interpretation of the Qur'anic verses could not escape this bias.
Al-Zamakhshari tells us that the verse ["if we had only heard, or had understood, we
would not have been the inhabitants of the blaze" (67:10)] has been construed as the
followers of the people of tradition (nasma'u - we hear) or the adherents of the people
of opinion (na'qilu - we understand). Oddly, he remarks, it appears from the inter
pretation as if the verse in question was revealed after the genesis of these schools22.
Tradition (sam’) and reason (aql’) represented these two trends in legal thought in the
later period. Tradition and reason are complementary and interdependent: one cannot
be separated from the other. The conflict between these two began at the time when
they were thought exclusive to each other in an absolute sense under the influence of
the traditionists. A text, whether of the Qur'an or of the Sunnah, cannot be applied to
a situation without reasoning. A lawyer applies a text to a given situation in the light
of overall teaching, spirit and wisdom of the Qur'an, or of the Sunnah, and not
exclusively on the basis of a particular report. A traditionist, on the contrary solely
depends on the explicit text. Hence the conflict between these two approaches was
natural. The literalist attitude however dominated in the wake of compilation of liadith
in the classical period. Al-Shafi'i earlier brought in the method of synthesis to stem
the tide of free thinking in law. But this could not go a long way owing to the

18
Ibid,
19
Ibid.
20
ibid
21
We find in Arabic literature condemnation of ra'y.
For instance: 1. The religion of the Prophet Muhammad is a select one. What an excellent mount the traditions
are for a man!
2. Do not detest the tradition and its people; opinion is night while tradition is day. (Ibn Abd al-Barr, JamV
Bayan al-'llm, II, 35).
22
Al-Zamakhshari, al-Kashshaf, Cairo: Matba'ah Mustafa Muhammad, 1354 A.H. IV, pp. 122-23.

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contradictory traditions. But his attempts tended to arrest the free use of individual
reasoning in law in the later ages.

After studying ra’y and qiyas carefully one concludes that the scope of the former is
much wider than that of the latter, for ra’y stands on the legal acumen of a lawyer,
while qiyas is based on some authority, i.e., a text of the Qur'an, or of a tradition or
ijmā’23. Macdonald has defined ra’y as an opinion that is thoughtful, weighed and
reasonable as opposed to a hasty dictate of ill-regulated passion24. When it is
disparaged in medieval literature it means pronouncement of legal verdicts on
religious questions by the exercise of approbation (istihsdn), speculations (zunun) and
by indulging in hypothetical questions. Here ra’y stands for sheer conjecture. It is also
contended in favour of condemning ra’y that there is an apprehension of suspending
all the Sunnahs resulting in the negligence and renunciation of necessary knowledge
through frequent personal opinion25.

Ra’y in the later ages was divided into three categories, namely void, sound, and
doubtful. To follow the doubtful opinion is allowed only in the case of exigency. Just
as the eating of forbidden food is permitted in pressing necessity, so resort to doubtful
opinion is permitted in a similar situation.20 Further, a sound opinion, according to
the classical jurists, stands for the opinion of the Companions, that which explains the
text, that which is agreed upon by the Community and handed down from the past to
the present generation, and that which is based on the Qur'an, or on the Sunnah, or on
the opinions of the rightly-guided Caliphs, or on the verdicts of the Companions, and
finally that which is based on individual opinion. Such a type of opinion is termed al-
ra’y al-mahmud (approved opinion).21 Although the classical jurists seem to have
systematized the use of ra’y, yet the reports show that its use was never allowed in the
presence of an authority, i.e., a text or agreement of the Community.

So much about ra’y. We may now discuss the principle of qiyas. It must be noted that
qiyas in classical times became Aristotelian syllogism. It comprised the major and
minor premises, the middle term, and the result. The classical juristic literature
portrays it as a complex doctrine, full of controversies on details, a principle that could

23
Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, Lahore: Islamic Research Institute, 1970, p.
136.
24
Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf,
1960, p. 86.
25
Ibn'Abd al-Barr, Jami’ Badyan al ilm.II, 139

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not be prima facie digested by the jurists themselves. Qiyas came into being as a
systematizing legal principle of individual reasoning because the use of arbitrary
personal opinion (ra’y) resulted in divergence and chaos. But unfortunately, qiyas
itself fell a victim to capricious theorization on the part of the common run of the
jurists. One fails to understand clearly the complex system it involves, especially the
difficult question of ratio legis (illah), the common factor between two similar
institutions.

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SUNNI INTERPRETATIONS
Late and modern Sunni jurisprudence regards analogical reason as a fourth source of
Islamic law, following the Qur'an, prophetic tradition and binding consensus. While
Muslim scholarship in the later period traditionally claimed that analogy had existed
in Islamic law since their religion's inception, modern scholarship generally points to
Muslim scholar Abu Hanifa as the first to incorporate analogical reason as a source of
law. Since its inception, analogical reason has been the subject of extensive study in
regard to both its proper place in Islamic law and its proper application.

VALIDITY AS A SOURCE OF LAW

Among Sunni traditions, there is still a range of attitudes regarding the validity of analogy as a
method of jurisprudence. Imam Bukhari, Ahmad bin Hanbal, and Dawud al-Zahiri for example,
rejected the use of analogical reason outright, arguing that to rely on personal opinion in law-
making would mean that each individual would ultimately form their own subjective
conclusions. Bernard G. Weiss, one of today's foremost experts on Islamic law and philosophy,
explains that while analogical reason was accepted as a fourth source of law by later
generations, its validity was not a foregone conclusion among earlier Muslim jurists. Thus,
while its status as a fourth source of law was accepted by the majority of later and modern
Muslim jurists, this was not the case at the inception of Muslim jurisprudence as a field.

Opposition to qiyas came from a number of angles. Professor Walîd b. Ibrâhîm al-`Ujajî Imam
Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University explains the opposition to qiyas as coming from
multiple angles:

Some of them argued that qiyas is contrary to reason. One argument given in this light was that:
“Delving into this method is intellectually repugnant in its own right”. Another argument was:
“Islamic legal rulings are based on human well-being, and no one knows human well-being
except the One who gave us the sacred law. Therefore, the only way we can know the sacred
law is from the revelation.” Other scholars said that qiyas is not contrary to reason, but
prohibited by the sacred law itself.

Scott Lucas, when mentioning Ahmad Dallal’s position on Salafism, states that Dallal:

...declared that Salafism "is better understood as a method of thinking of, or an approach to,
authoritative sources than as a distinct school of thought" that includes the elevation of the
Qur’an and sound hadith at the expense of the opinions attributed to the eponyms of the four
Sunni schools and the rejection (or sever curtailment) of qiyas.

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SUPPORT FOR ITS VALIDITY

Early support for the validity of analogical reason in jurisprudence came from Abu
Hanifa and his student Abu Yusuf. Al-Shafi'i was a proponent of analogical reasoning
as well, though his usage was less frequent than that of Abu Hanifa.

Acceptance of analogical reason gradually increased within the Muslim world. With
the Malikite and Hanbalite schools eventually granting full acceptance as the
Hanafites and Shafi'ites already had done, the overwhelming majority of Sunni jurists
from the late period onward affirmed its validity. Japanese scholar of Islam Kojiro
Nakamura defined the orthodox Sunni schools in regard to their eventual acceptance
of analogy in descending order of that acceptance: Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi'is, Hanbalis
and Zahiris. Much work was performed on the details of proper analogy, with major
figures such as Al-Qastallani, Al-Baqillani, Al-Juwayni and al-Amidi from the
Shafi'ite school and Ibn Abidin from the Hanafite school providing rules and
guidelines still used to this day.

APPLICATION AS A SOURCE OF LAW

Sunni scholar Baghawi gave a commonly accepted definition of analogy in Islamic
law: analogical reasoning is the knowledge by which one learns the method of
deriving a ruling from the Quran and prophetic tradition. In this case, the above-
mentioned ruling should not already be apparent in the Quran, prophetic tradition or
consensus. If there is no derivation involved due to the explicitness of the ruling in the
Quran and prophetic tradition, then such a person is not, by definition, a mujtahid.

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SHI’A INTERPRETATIONS
Not unlike the Sunni Hanbalis and Zahiris, the Shi’a rejected both pure reason and
analogical reason completely on account of the multitude of perspectives that would
arise from it, viewing both methods as subjective. There are various instances in which
the Qur'an disapproves of a divergence of beliefs such as the following:

And obey Allah and His Messenger; and fall into no disputes, lest ye lose heart and
your power depart; and be patient and persevering: For Allah is with those who
patiently persevere26:

TWELVER SHI’A
Within the Twelver Shi’i legal tradition, the fourth source for deriving legal principles
is not qiyās but rather the intellect’’'Aql’’. Twelver Shi’a regard the ulama (scholars)
as authorities in legal and religious matters during the Occultation (ghayba) of the
Imamah Mahdi. Until the return of the hidden Imam, it is the responsibility of the
ulāma’ to be his deputies and provide guidance on worldly matters. In modern
interpretations of Twelver Shi’ism, the most revered and learned scholars are styled
as references for emulation (marja taqlīd). This system of deriving legal principles
effectively replaces both the Sunni notion of consensus (ijmā’) and deductive analogy
(qiyās)[25]

Accordingly, in the chapter on Knowledge of the Twelver collection of prophetic

traditions, Kitab al-Kafi, one finds many traditions cited from the Imams that forbid
the use of qiyās, for example:

The Imam (a.s) said, "My father narrated from my great-great-great-great grandfather,
the holy Prophet (s.a) who said,

“Those who act on the basis of analogy will face their destruction and lead others to their
destruction. Those who give fatwas without the knowledge of the abrogating and the
abrogated, the clear text and that which requires interpretation, they will face destruction and
lead others to their destruction."

26
Sura 8 (Al-Anfal), ayah 46.

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ISMAILI SHI’A
Among the most notable Ismaili thinkers, Bu Ishaq Quhistani regarded the notion of
subjective opinion (qiyās) as completely contradictory to the Islamic notion of tawhīd
(unity) as it ultimately gave rise to a countless divergent conclusion, besides which
those who exercised deductive analogy relied on little more than their imperfect
individual intellects. According to Bu Ishaq, there must be a supreme intellect in every
age, just as Muhammad was in his time. Without this, it would be impossible for any
ordinary individual to attain knowledge of the Divine using mere speculation. The
supreme intellect, he reasoned, could be none other than the Imam of the age.

Bu Ishaq Quhistani referred to the Qur'anic tale of Adam and Eve to support his
argument for the necessity of a perfect teacher who could provide spiritual edification
(ta’līm) in place of what he felt were subjective whims and wayward personal opinions
(ra’y). Commenting on the Qur'anic foundational narrative, Bu Ishaq explains that
when God taught Adam the names of all things, Adam was commanded to teach the
angels, as in sura 2 (Al-Baqara), ayah 33. Spiritual instruction therefore had its root in
the Qur'an itself, however Satan, in his arrogance, refused to bow down before Adam.
Instead he protested, "I am better than he. You created me from fire and him from
clay." Thus, the first to use deductive analogy was none other than Satan himself, by
reasoning and challenging the command of God to prostrate. It was for this reason that
Satan was punished for eternity and fell from favour until the final day. In Ismaili
thought, therefore, the truth lay not in subjective opinion (ra’y) and analogy (qiyās),
but rather in the teaching of the bearer of truth (muhiqq), that is, the Imam of the time.
The supreme teacher therefore exists at all times for the imperfect human intellects to
submit (taslīm) to, as is proclaimed in the divine dictate:

This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and
have chosen for you Islam as your religion.27.

27
Sura 5 (Al-Ma'ida), ayah 3

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CONCLUSION
Ijma means the opinion of the learned. When persons knowledgeable in law would
agree upon a point, such consensual opinion was referred to as Ijma. Thus, Ijma is the
unanimous decision of jurists for a particular question with reference to that age or
communal legislation. It is through the tradition of the Prophet that Ijma derives its
validity and authority as a source of law. The Prophet is believed to have said that,
‘God will not allow his people to agree on an error’. The Hanafi doctrine of law
changing along with times found support in the Maliki view that new facts require
new decisions.

A major chunk of the fiqh or actual Muslim law came through Ijma. It explained the
Quran and traditions in terms of actual applicability as well as laid down new
principles of law so as to help the society to cope up with growth and progress. It was
through Ijma that the real opportunities for interpretation of the hereto rigid Quran and
Traditions came up. It is even referred to as the ‘living tradition’ at times.

Qiyas refers to ‘measurement’ in the Arabic language. It also refers to comparing a

thing in relation to a standard or ‘to establish an analogy’. Some have described it as
the analogical deduction from the reason of a text to a case not actually covered by its
language. In simple words, it is a method of comparing a problem in present times to
a similar problem for which the solution is provided in the texts.

It is a weak Ijtihad, one’s own exertions to find a solution through reason. But it is
more important and powerful than a mere rai or opinion of a jurist.

First, a similar problem with a solution is found and the reasoning behind it was taken
so as to establish a common cause. Then solution to the present problem is directly
deduced from the texts in form of a law derived. Here, the spirit or the implied
meaning of the text is taken into consideration.

Unanimous consensus between those deducting was not essential. The only
requirements are that the person deducing is a Mujtahid and he deduces the law from
a text of Quran, Traditions or Ijma.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Websites referred: -

www.scconline.com

www.JSTOR.org

www.heinonline.com

www.legalstudyindia.com

www.legallyindia.com

Books referred: -

Muslim law, Syed Khalid Rashid.

Outlines of Muhammadan law, AAA Faizi

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