VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

Chavez v COMELEC COMELEC. The obvious intention of this provision is to equalize, as far as
G.R. No. 162777 practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former
August 31, 2007 from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign “war chests.”
Azcuna, J: This Court ruled therein that this objective is of special importance and urgency
Francisco Chavez ran for the position of Senator in the 2004 elections, in a country which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity in income
representing the political alliance of PROMDI, REPORMA and distribution between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the
AksyonDemokratiko. Prior to such filing, he entered into private contracts with prevalence of poverty, with so many of our population falling below the poverty
96°North (clothing company), Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corp, line.
and G-Box. In line with these contracts, his face was the subject of endorsement
billboards posted by these different companies (three billboards in Balintawak, Under the Omnibus Election Code, “election campaign” or “partisan political
one more billboard at Roxas Boulevard for G-Box, a gaming and amusement activity” is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
corporation). COMELEC issued Resolution 6520, and Section 32 provides that: particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities included under
“All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on this definition are:
walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and
all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or (5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a
mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display candidate.
thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by
said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to
after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to
station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his
premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image
Code.” COMELEC ordered him to have the billboards removed. assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his
candidacy. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the
Issue: next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image
Is the prohibition of billboards and other forms of private endorsements by model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image
candidates an invalid exercise of police power? even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a
circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:
Held:
No. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period.
objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field – It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for
for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or
candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, partisan political activity except during the campaign period.
by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and
publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid Equal opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level
reason for the exercise of police power as held in National Press Club v. of financial resources one may have at his disposal, is indeed of vital interest to
COMELEC,[2] wherein the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section the public. The State has the duty to enact and implement rules to safeguard
11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibited the sale or donation of print this interest. Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public
space and air time “for campaigning or other political purposes,” except to the interest contain an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the Disqualificationagainst Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the
impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police commencement of the campaign period.
power.
Andanar’s Contention:
Finally, petitioner contends that Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is On 29 March 2007 a day before the start of the authorized campaign period
invalid because of overbreadth. A statute or regulation is considered void for on 30 March 2007 Penera and her partymates went around via a motorcade the
overbreadth when it offends the constitutional principle that a governmental different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State the people to vote for them on the day of the elections.
regulations may not be achieved by means that sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Penera’s Contention:
The charge of premature campaigning was not true. Although Penera admitted
The provision in question is limited in its operation both as to time and scope. It that a motorcade did take place, she explained that it was simply in accordance
only disallows the continued display of a person’s propaganda materials and with the usual practice in nearby cities and provinces, where the filing of
advertisements after he has filed a certificate of candidacy and before the start certificates of candidacy (COCs) was preceded by a motorcade, which dispersed
of the campaign period. Said materials and advertisements must also show his soon after the completion of such filing. In fact, Penera claimed, in the
name and image. motorcade held by her political party, no person made any speech, not even any
of the candidates. Instead, there was only marching music in the background
Notes: and a grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in
the motorcade. Finally, Penera cited Barroso v. Ampigin her defense, wherein
There is no ex post facto law because the resolution punishes the non-removal the Court supposedly ruled that a motorcade held by candidates during the filing
and not merely the posting itself of posters, tarpaulins. of their COCs was not a form of political campaigning.

COMELEC Second Division resolves to disqualify Penera but absolves

the other candidates from Peneras party from violation of section 80 and 68 of
the Omnibus Elections [sic] Code.Penera filed before the COMELEC en banc a
Motion for Reconsideration which denied the same. Hence, this petition.
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, COMELEC Second Division, Commissioner Rene V. SarmientoDissenting
vs Opinion:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot be applied to the present case
G. R. No. 181613 September 11, 2009 since, as the Court held in Lanot v. Commission on Elections,[34] the election
campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited premature
FACTS: campaigning, should be designed to promote the election or defeat of a
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar (Andanar) were particular candidate or candidates. Under present election laws, while a person
mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections. may have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said
On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election person shall not be considered a candidate until the start of the campaign
Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period, there can be no election
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

campaign or partisan political activity designed to promote the election or the official ballot, as preferred by the female candidate. Under
defeat of a particular candidate to public office because there is no candidate to each proposition to be vote upon, the choices should be
speak of. uniformly indicated using the same font and size.
A fixed space where the chairman of the board of election
According to the Dissenting Opinion, even if Peneras acts before the inspector shall affix her/her signature to authenticate the
start of the campaign period constitute election campaigning or partisan political official ballot shall be provided.
activities, these are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the
Code given that she was not yet a candidate at that time. On the other hand, filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
Peneras acts, if committed within the campaign period, when she was already a registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
candidate, are likewise not covered by Section 80 as this provision punishes only person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
acts outside the campaign period. period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of
the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
The Dissenting Opinion ultimately concludes that because of Section 15 of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions
Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, the prohibited act of premature applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon the start of
campaigning in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, is practically the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any
impossible to commit at any time. person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers, and
On 10 February 2007, Republic Act No. 9369[33] took effect. Section 13 employees in government-owned or-controlled corporations,
of Republic Act No. 9369 amended Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 and shall be considered ipso factor resigned from his/her office and
renumbered the same as the new Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436. The must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of
pertinent portions of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by his/her certification of candidacy. (Emphases ours.)
Republic Act No. 9369, now read:
SECTION.15. Official Ballot. - The Commission shall prescribe
ISSUE:
the format of the electronic display and/or the size and form
of the official ballot, which shall contain the titles of the 1. Whether or not Penera has engaged in an election campaign or partisan
position to be filled and/or the proposition to be voted upon in political activity outside the campaign period.YES
an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Where practicable, 2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
electronic displays must be constructed to present the names amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction in finding that the act of
of all candidates for the same position in the same page or Penerain conducting a motorcade before the filing of her certificate of
screen, otherwise, the electronic displays must be constructed candidacy constitutes premature campaigning.NO
to present the entire ballot to the voter, in a series of 3. Whether or not Section 11 of RA 8436 was repealed by Section
sequential pages, and to ensure that the voter sees all of the 13 of RA 9369.NO
ballot options on all pages before completing his or her vote
and to allow the voter to review and change all ballot choices
prior to completing and casting his or her ballot. Under each HELD:
position to be filled, the names of candidates shall be arranged 1. The prohibited act of premature campaigning is defined under Section 80 of
alphabetically by surname and uniformly indicated using the the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
same type size. The maiden or married name shall be listed in
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

SECTION 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding political caucuses,
outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or or against a candidate[.] A motorcade is a procession or parade of automobiles
partisan political activity except during the campaign or other motor vehicles.[31] The conduct thereof during election periods by the
period: Provided, That political parties may hold political candidates and their supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its
conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious purpose of the conduct of
within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek
period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice- to be elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to
Presidential election. (Emphasis ours.) facilitate the recognition and recollection of their names in the minds of the
voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no
If the commission of the prohibited act of premature campaigning is other purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or
duly proven, the consequence of the violation is clearly spelled out in Section 68 candidates.
of the said Code, which reads:
2. There is no absolute and irreconcilable incompatibility between Section 15 of
SECTION. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, and Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final Code, which defines the prohibited act of premature campaigning. It is possible
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the to harmonize and reconcile these two provisions and, thus, give effect to both.
Commission of having xxx (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83,
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph The following points are explanatory:
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if
he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who The line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which provides that
is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shalltake effect only upon
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office the start of the campaign period, does not mean that the acts constituting
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as premature campaigning can only be committed, for which the offender may be
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in disqualified, duringthe campaign period. Contrary to the pronouncement in the
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the dissent, nowhere in the said proviso was it stated that campaigning before the
election laws. (Emphases ours.) start of the campaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry
out the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her
In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can
Andanars evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election
partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March 2007, participated in a Code as election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said
motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period,
waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers. can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at
More importantly, the conduct of a motorcade is a form of election the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts
campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the
undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature
campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates
who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had ROSALINDA A. PENERA,
previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair vs
headstart in promoting his/her candidacy. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR,

3. Despite the disqualification of Penera, we cannot grant Andanars prayer to be G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
allowed to assume the position of Mayor of Sta. Monica. The well-established RESOLUTION
principle is that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared Motion for reconsideration: the main issue is whether or not Penera
elected.[51] was already a candidate to be liable for election offenses such as premature
campaigning.
In this case, the rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall HELD:
apply, to wit: Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Court explained:
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan
the xxx mayor, the x xx vice-mayor concerned shall become political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a
the x xx mayor. particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
period.
x xxx The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under
Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a
when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his candidacy before the campaign period to make the person filing to become
office. (Emphases ours.) immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This
legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear
Considering Peneras disqualification from holding office as Mayor of Sta. intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x xx fixed by
Monica, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as Mayor. existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline
"will still not be considered as a candidate."3
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during
hereby DISMISSED. the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and
committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992,
for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day
campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical
law. The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and
political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period
inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar
starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts
are lawful. restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on
newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning
political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no
reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys,
which are relatively objective.

Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001 Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No.
Mendoza, J: 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral
(DIAO) process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It
contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results
FACTS: during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process
surveys in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on the other hand,
resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2)
publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and
it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the
features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and
Kamahalan are contesting the validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited
Election Act), especially section 5.4 which provides that surveys affecting both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7
national candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7 days before the results but only require timeliness.
election.
ISSUE:
SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a
elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part,
present danger to justify such restraint
intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on
May 14, 2001.
RULING/RATIO:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
freedom of speech, expression, and the press.
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates total of: one hundred twenty (120) minutes (for candidates) and one hundred
of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among eighty (180) minutes (for political parties).
candidates.
Petitioners ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN), ABC Development Corporation
Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this (ABC), GMA Network, Incorporated (GMA), Manila Broadcasting Company, Inc.
section pass the O’brient test for content related regulation because (1) it (MBC), Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (NBN), Radio Mindanao Network,
suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, Inc. (RMN) and Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) contend that
etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the
government interest because the interest can e protected by narrower press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information
restrictions such as subsequent punishment. relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the
forthcoming elections. Petitioners sent their respective letters to the COMELEC
questioning the provisions of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the
Note: Justice Kapunan’s dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, respondent COMELEC issued
and present danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless,
section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and the petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence,
balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the present petitions.
the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show
why, on the balance, the other considerations (for example, prevention of last On April 16, 2013, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 20 (TRO) in
minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. view of the urgency involved and to prevent irreparable injury that may be
caused to the petitioners if respondent COMELEC is not enjoined from
implementing Resolution No. 9615.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolutions promulgated by the COMELEC relative to the
GMA NETWORK vs. COMELEC conduct of the 2013 national and local elections are unconstitutional.
GR No. 205357 02 September 2014
Peralta, J. HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to
FACTS: effect a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and
During the previous elections of May 14, 2007 and May 10, 2010, COMELEC political parties would be able to campaign through the air because it appears
issued Resolutions implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006 that the COMELEC did not have any other basis for coming up with a new
(Fair Election Act) regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is manner of determining allowable time limits except its own idea as to what
entitled to the aforestated number of minutes “per station.” However, for the should be the maximum number of minutes based on its exercise of discretion
May 2013 elections, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, as to how to level the playing field.
changing the interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime
limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a “per station” basis, There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and
to a “total aggregate” basis, limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

without limitations – or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or interest which would justify such a substantial
regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it restriction on the freedom of candidates and
might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something political parties to communicate their ideas,
that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is philosophies, platforms and programs of
not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a
government.
legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the
rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis. Based on the Section 9 (a) of Resolution Candidates and political parties need adequate
transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC after it had already 9615 is violative of the breathing space – including the means to
promulgated the Resolution, the respondent did not fully explain or justify the people’s right to suffrage. disseminate their ideas. This could not be
change in computing the airtime allowed candidates and political parties, except reasonably addressed by the very restrictive
to make reference to the need to “level the playing field.”
manner by which the respondent implemented
the time limits in regard to political
Also, the COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting
advertisements in the broadcast media.
“aggregate” basis in the determination of allowable airtime. The supreme court
likewise concludes that the Congress intended to provide a more expansive and
liberal means by which the candidates, political parties, citizens and other stake
In fine, when it comes to election and the exercise of freedom of speech, of
holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a chance to fully explain
expression and of the press, the latter must be properly viewed in context as
and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the
being necessarily made to accommodate the imperatives of fairness by giving
electorate to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the
teeth and substance to the right to reply requirement.
candidates by virtue of the FAIR ELECTION ACT. In this regard, the media is also
given a very important part in that undertaking of providing the means by which
the political exercise becomes an interactive process. All of these would be
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED,
undermined and frustrated with the kind of regulation that the respondent
Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, is
came up with. If anything, the change in language meant that the computation
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, therefore, NULL and VOID. The
must not be based on a “per day” basis for each television or radio station. The
constitutionalities of the remaining provisions of Resolution No. 9615, as
same could not therefore lend itself to an understanding that the total allowable
amended by Resolution No. 9631, is upheld and remains in full force and effect.
time is to be done on an aggregate basis for all television or radio stations.
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC The assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime In view of this Decision, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on
Resolution No. 9615 on limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly April 16, 2013 is hereby made PERMANENT.
airtime limits also goes restricts and constrains the ability of
against the constitutional candidates and political parties to reach out
guaranty of freedom of and communicate with the people. Here, the
expression, of speech adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-
and of the press. based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field
– does not constitute a compelling state
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

Emilio Ramon “E.R.” Ejercito vs. Commission on Elections and Edgar San Luis On May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent ExParte Motion to Issue
Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the
G.R. No. 212398; November 25, 2014
Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of
J. Peralta Respondent. However, these were not acted upon by the COMELEC. The next
day, Ejercito and Ramil Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of
Facts: Laguna. Based on the Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained
Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, San Luis filed 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’ 471,209 votes.
a petition for disqualification before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution,
against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the disqualifying Ejercito from holding the Office of the Provincial Governor of
incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. Alleged in his Petition are as Laguna, pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC. Ejercito filed a Verified Motion for
follows: Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, which unanimously affirmed the
First Cause of Action: During the campaign for the 2013 elections, Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
Ejercito distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna
the so-called "Orange Card", which could be used in any public
hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs as Issues:
declared by the statements of witnesses. The complaint alleged 1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the alleged acts of giving
that the so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material material consideration and election overspending
consideration in convincing the voters to cast their votes for
2. Whether or not Ejercito should be disqualified
 for spending in his
Ejercito’s favor in clear violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus
election
 campaign an amount in excess
 of what is allowed by the OEC
Election Code (OEC).
Second Cause of Action:Applying the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Fair Election Act, a candidate for the position of Held:
Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an
1. Yes. The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate
election expense amounting to P4,576,566.00. However, Ejercito
from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013
election laws. A petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed pursuant to
election. For television campaign commercials alone, Ejercito
Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
already spent the sum of P23,730,784.00.
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or
(Computation as to the limit on an election expense: 1,525,522
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
registered electorate in the Province of Laguna * P3.00 for every
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:
voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
filed his certificate of candidacy = P4,576,566.00)
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered politicalparty
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess may spend for election campaign shall be as follows:
of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
and Vice President; and for other candidates, Three
(e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from
the constituency where he filed his certificate of
continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding
candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any
the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
political party and without support from any political
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his
every such voter; and
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the (b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every
election laws. voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates.
All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the
OEC, not to violations of other penal laws. In other words, offenses that are Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any
punished in laws other than in the OEC cannot be a ground for a Section 68 contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or
petition. coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the
Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly
ruled that the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for prosecution Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166. These
of election offense but for disqualification as well. provisions, which are merely amended insofar as the allowable amount is
concerned, read:
2. No.The exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct a preliminary
investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws stated SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates.– No
in Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a candidate shall spend for his election campaign an aggregate
disqualification case. It has been repeatedly underscored that an election amount exceeding one peso and fifty centavos for every voter
offense has its criminal and electoral aspects. While its criminal aspect to currently registered in the constituency where he filed his
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of candidacy: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall
summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate,
be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land,
that is summary in character. water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and
paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, That where
2. Yes. Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses
the land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and
of candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus:
paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

amount commensurate with the expenses for the use thereof, contributions of third parties made with the consent of the candidate? The
based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included Court holds not.
in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can
SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties.– A be said, therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through
duly accredited political party may spend for the election of its the years: to regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but also of
candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the aggregate
official candidates an aggregate amount not exceeding the limit of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter. The phrase
equivalent of one peso and fifty centavos for every voter currently "those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate"is sufficiently
registered therein. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters, or adequate to cover those expenses, which are contributed or donated in the
committees of such political party shall be included in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a contribution or
computation of the total expenditures of the political party. donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person authorized by
Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as
such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
expenses of their respective individual candidates and subject to
debemus. (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should We.) There
limitation under Section 100 of this Code.
should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.–
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable
No person, except the candidate, the treasurer of a political party
limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’
or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer, shall
rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
make any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any
As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to curtail the message
candidate or political party. Expenditures duly authorized by the
or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure
candidate or the treasurer of the party shall be considered as
equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less
expenditures of such candidate or political party.
financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidentaland
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of
which shall be furnished the Commission signed by the candidate promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and
or the treasurer of the party and showing the expenditures so reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in Section 26,
authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
person so designated.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure
The focal query is: How shall We interpret "the expenses herein referred to shall for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the
include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate"and "except essence of a truly democratic form of government.
the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such
candidate or treasurer"found in Sections 100 and 103, respectively, of the OEC?
Do these provisions exclude from the allowable election expenditures the
 VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC Party List AnakPawis

G.R. NO.205728, JAN. 21, 2015
LEONEN, J.:
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as
TOPIC: CAMPAIGN Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The
FACTS: election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).
approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the
front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates order.
as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay"
with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH ISSUE:
Law.Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as 1. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay": citizens?
2. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the
TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of
Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo expression?

Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy

HELD:
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
1. No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie support their position that they had the power to regulate the
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain
to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates.
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have
the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to
Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren
freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
Party List AngPamilya Party List Gabriela
2. Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
Party List Akbayan
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.Moreover, the
Party List Bayan Muna respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private
and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.The Court held places with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or
that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the
candidates.
named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean
it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which
return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May
group.By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7
included, while sponsored messages are covered. thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda.– During the

campaign period, it is unlawful:
1-UTAK (UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON) VS COMELEC x xxx
G.R. NO .206020; APRIL 14, 2015
PONENTE: REYES, J. (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda
(HOJILLA) material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places,
or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
FACTS:
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any
of the following:
On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006, otherwise known as the
x xxx
"Fair Elections Act", was passed. Section 9 thereof provides:
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs,
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. – The COMELEC may authorize ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas
for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as 6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus
plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
can post, display or exhibit election propaganda: Provided that the
size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause
feet or its equivalent. for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the
owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006
authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet
or its equivalent.
In its letter dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its president,
Melencio F. Vargas, sought clarification from the COMELEC as regards the
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in ISSUE: WHETHER SECTION 7(G) ITEMS (5) AND (6), IN RELATION TO SECTION
relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) 7(F), OF RESOLUTION NO. 9615, WHICH PROHIBITS THE POSTING OF ANY
and transport terminals. The petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in ELECTION CAMPAIGN OR PROPAGANDA MATERIAL, INTER ALIA, IN PUVS AND
the aforementioned provisions impedes the right to free speech of the private PUBLIC TRANSPORT TERMINALS ARE VALID REGULATIONS.
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the
COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of HELD:
the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
terminals. violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are
not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary
On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13- to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the
0214,5 which denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
of Section 7(g) items(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction
9615. between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and other properties.
Hence, the instant petition.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one's political
The COMELEC posits: candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction
on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable
* That privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals are public spaces that are feature of the democratic way of life.
subject to its regulation. It explains that under the Constitution, the COMELEC
has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is
conduct of an election, including the power to regulate the enjoyment or hereby GRANTED. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
utilization of all franchises and permits for the operation of transportation Resolution No. 9615 issued by the Commission on Elections are hereby
utilities. declared NULL and VOID for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of
* The COMELEC points out that PUVs and private transport terminals hold a the 1987 Constitution.
captive audience – the commuters, who have no choice but be subjected to the
blare of political propaganda. Thus, the COMELEC avers, it is within its RATIO:
constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned PUVs and transport
terminals from concurrently serving campaign materials to the captive audience 1. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
that they transport. No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech.
* The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a valid content-
neutral regulation and, thus, does not impinge on the constitutional right to Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
freedom of speech. It avers that the assailed regulation is within the unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech.
constitutional power of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs
Constitution. and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting
of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree
with them.
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615,
campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under
carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity
make the owner thereof liable for an election offense. to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, 3. The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate
owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election
offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate. Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and
regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization "of all franchises or permits
2. The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an for the operation," inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The
invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do
clause. not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to
the franchise or permit to operate the same
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents
of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the
well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election
campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport
 First, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership
the Government; – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or
transport terminal.
 Second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
4. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified
 Third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free under the captive-audience doctrine.
expression; and
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical
 Fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be
exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication
cannot be avoided.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of
materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective
regulation. restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. political advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved
were facilities owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and
be justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress
otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and their political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on
(6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; their properties.
the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign
materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of 6. Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same
unbearably intrusive. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the
free speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic
5. Lehman’s case not applicable principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right,
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to
the city government, which prohibits political advertisements on government- the members of the purported class. However, the classification remains
run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and
that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that is not germane to the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and
advertisement space on government-run buses, “although incidental to the transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the former,
provision of public transportation, is a part of commercial venture.” In the same to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a
way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the
advertising from the general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles. regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the
prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city the PUV and transport terminals.
government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide
which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses. As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of
PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport
the city government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If
placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their
Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their
terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties. properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction
between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles
VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA, ETC.

and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a

valid classification.

The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the
public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private
vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that
would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many
people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and
other places frequented by the public, e.g. commercial establishments, would
also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of
PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election
campaign materials.