ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM- 9) CODE: 1414

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

SESSIONS COURT OF JALANDHAR

CASE (CRM) NO._____OF 2018

UNDER SECTION 177 r/w 209 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

STATE ………………………………………………………….………………PROSECUTION

V.

M.L.A., CONGRESS & ORS.……………..…………….….……………….............DEFENSE

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SESSIONS JUDGE

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENSE

SHREYA SINGH

ROLL NO. – 1414

 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………….…………..…………2

Index of Authorities……………………………………………………….…………….……...3

Statement of Jurisdiction……………………………………………….……………………….5

Statement of Facts…………………………………………………………………………..…..6

Statement of Issues……………………………………………….……………………………..7

Summary of Arguments ……………………………………………………………………….8

Arguments Advanced…………………………………………………………………………..9

ISSUE 1: THAT THE ACCUSED & CO- ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY OF MURDER

UNDER SECTION- 302 r/w SECTION- 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

ISSUE 2: THAT THE ACCUSED & CO- ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY OF

UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY UNDER SECTION- 149 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,

1860.

ISSUE 3: THAT THE ACCUSED & CO- ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY OF

CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION UNDER SECTION- 509 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,

1860.

Prayer………………………………………………………………………………….……….17

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

And
&

¶ Paragraph

A.I.R All India Reporter

AP Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article

Bom Bombay
CLT Cuttuck Law Times
CrLJ Criminal Law Journal
ed. Edition

Hon’ble Honorable

IPC Indian Penal Code

Ltd. Limited

LW Law Weekly
M.P Madhya Pradesh
Mad Madras
Mys Mysore
Ori Orissa
P. Page

Pat Patna
S.C. Supreme Court

S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases

S.C.R. Supreme Court Reports

v. Versus

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

LEGISLATIONS REFERRED

1. THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (ACT 2 OF 1973)

2. THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 (ACT 18 OF 1872)

3. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (ACT 45 OF 1860)

BOOKS REFFERED

1. Gaur, KD, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, (6th Ed. 2009)

2. Gupte and Dighe, Criminal Manual, (7th Ed. 2007)

3. Kelkar, R.V. Criminal Procedure, (5th Ed. 2011)

4. Lal, Batuk, The Law of Evidence, (18th Ed. 2010)

5. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 33rd Ed. (2011)

6. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Law of Evidence, 22nd Ed. (2006)

LEXICONS

1. BLACKS LAW LEXICON, 7TH ED. 1999

2. OXFORD DICIONARY, 8TH ED.
3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 8TH ED.
4. WHARTONS’ LAW LEXICON, 15TH ED.

WEBSITES REFERRED

 www.ssconline.com

 www.manupatra.com

 www.indiankanoon.com

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

SUPREME COURT CASES REFFERED

1. State of U.P v. Sahrunnisa, AIR 2009 SC 3182

2. Prem Sagar v. Dharanveer, AIR 2014 SC 21.
3. State of Orissa v. Arjun Das Aggrawal , AIR 1999 SC 3229.
4. Subramanian v. State of Kerala, (1993) 3 SCC 32.
5. Bhudeo Mandal v. State of Bihar, (1989) Cr LJ 1466 (SC).
6. Rambilas v. State of Bihar, 1964 CriLJ 573; (1964)1SCR775
7. Chandra Bihari Gautam v. State of Bihar, 2007CriLJ3265; I(2007)DMC824SC;
JT2007(6)SC424; 2007(6)SCALE464
8. Dani Singh v. State of Bihar, 2004 AIR SCW 3719

HIGH COURT CASES REFFERED

1. Diwanchand v. State, 1984 Cri L.J. 1045 (Delhi).

2. Chanakya Dhibar v. State of W.B, 2004 CriLJ 3832
3. State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao, 2003 CriLJ 4470

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE COUNSEL ON THE BEHALF OF THE DEFENCE HAS APPROACHED THE

HON’BLE SESSIONS COURT, UNDER SEC-177 r/w 209 OF THE CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE CODE.

The above Sections read as:

‘177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial-

Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local

jurisdiction it was committed.‟

Read with Section 209:

‘ 209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it-

When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought

before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by

the Court of Session, he shall-

(a) commit the case to the Court of Session;

(b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody

during, and until the conclusion of, the trial;

(c) send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which

are to be produced in evidence;

(d) notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.‟

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

It is Respectfully Showeth,

1. Mala and Rahul were married in 2001 and were residents at Vijaynagar, Bangalore. Their

relationship got strained after a few years and had regular quarrels over frivolous issues. One

day, Mala left her matrimonial house with her elder daughter Pinto and started living with her

father Gopalakrishna at Jayanagar, Bangalore.

2. Rahul kept his younger daughter Pinkoo with his sister, Deepa and prevented Mala from

seeing her. One noon Mala forcefully took Pinkoo along with her from Deepa’s house. Rahul

on hearing this reached Gopalakrishna’s house and quarreled.

3. Rahul and Gopalakrishna happened to meet at a market place and started to quarrel and

grappled with each other. They both fell down and Gopalakrishna, in the heat of passion thus

generated slapped Rahul saying he would kill him. Rahul in a fit of rage took a stick lying

nearby and gave a blow to Gopalakrishna’s stomach who was suffering from a diseased

spleen as a result of which he fell down instantly.

4. Gopalakrishna, before dying, gave his Dying Declaration regarding the fight and knowledge

about the enlarged spleen. Rajajinagar Police arrested Rahul and filed the charge sheet.

Evidence was led by the Prosecution in the Sessions Court and during the trial an eye witness

stated that it was Gopalakrishna who slapped Rahul and started the fight.

5. Trial Court relying on the Dying Declaration convicted Rahul for Commission of Murder and

sentenced him for life imprisonment.

6. Rahul challenged the conviction by filing a Criminal Appeal, before the High Court, relying

on the deposition of the eyewitness.

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. WHETHER THE ACT COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED & CO- ACCUSED

AMOUNTS TO MURDER OR NOT?

1.1. That the Accused had no intention to commit Murder.

1.2 That the Accused & Co- Accused had no Common Intention under Section- 34 to commit
Murder.

2. WHETHER THE ACT COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED & CO- ACCUSED

AMOUNTS TO UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY OR NOT?

2.1 That the conduct of the Accused and Co- Accused does not amount to unlawful assembly.

2.2. That there is no common object attributable on part of the Accused & Co- Accused.

3. WHETHER THE ACT COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED & CO- ACCUSED

AMOUNTS TO CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION OR NOT?

3.1 That the Accused is not guilty of Criminal Intimidation under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. THAT THE ACCUSED & CO- ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY OF MURDER
UNDER SECTION- 302 r/w SECTION- 34 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused is not guilty of murder as the
facts and circumstances clearly portray that there was no intention or knowledge to any of the
Congress supporters to commit the alleged crime and thus they lack the requisite mens rea to
commit such a crime. Furthermore the issue as to whether or not he had committed the actus reus
must be put into question as the direct evidence has several infirmities and inconsistencies.
Hence the crime of murder cannot stand against the accused.

2. THAT THE ACCUSED AND CO- ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL
ASSEMBLY UNDER SECTION 149 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the accused MLA and others are not guilty
of the offence of Unlawful assembly leading to murder as there was no prior concert or a
common object that my client was trying to come to. There was no prior meeting of minds and
hence no common intention between the supporters of Congress to murder a member of the
Akali Dal. It is an ingredient to invoke Section 149 that the knowledge of others is imperative
and it is very clear from the facts of the case that there was no former meeting, common
intention or knowledge to any of the Congress supporters that circumstances will lead to such an
unfortunate accident.
3. THAT THE ACCUSED AND CO- ACCUSED ARE NOT GUILTY OF CRIMINAL
INTIMIDATION UNDER SECTION 506 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, the accused did not seek to criminally
intimidate anyone and is not liable to be punished under section 506. The injury threatened to be
caused must be illegal. In the present case, the accused did not do anything to criminally
intimidate the prosecutors. In fact, it was the prosecutors who tried to criminally intimidate the
police

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. That the Accused & Co- Accused are not guilty of Murder under Section- 302 r/w
Section- 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Congress M.L.A. (hereinafter referred to
as the Accused) along with his two gunmen and 13 supporters (hereinafter referred to as the
Co- Accused) are not guilty of Murder of one of the supporters of Akali Dal (hereinafter
referred to as the Deceased) under Section- 3021 r/w Section- 34 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860. The offence of murder is defined under Section 3002 of the IPC. However, in order to
apply Section 300, it is necessary to prove that the homicide committed by the Accused falls
under the four clauses of the defining section and none of the exceptions of the said section are
applicable. Therefore, the submission of the respondent towards this is twofold:-

Firstly, That the Accused had no intention to commit Murder.

Secondly, That the Accused & Co- Accused had no Common Intention under Section- 34 to
commit Murder.

1.1 That the Accused had no intention to commit Murder.

That the present case does not direct with clarity to the fact that the Accused had an intention to
murder the Deceased. The Post Mortem report suggests that the death of the Deceased was
caused by bullet shot. However, the Post Mortem Report does not explicitly state that the shot
was fired from the AK-47 which was held by the M.L.A. as was filmed by the Press present on
the spot.
1
Section 302- Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or [imprisonment
for life], and shall also be liable to fine.
2
“Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide2 is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is
done with the intention of causing death, or--
Secondly.--If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause
the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or--
Thirdly.--If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or--
Fourthly.--If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,
cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring
the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

Thus the Prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused had the
intention of causing the death of the Deceased because of the mere political rivalry existing
between the two due to the recent assembly election which took place.

1.2 That the Accused & Co-Accused had no common intention under Section-34 to commit
Murder.

Section 343 of the IPC deals with Acts committed by several persons in furtherance of Common
Intention.

ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF SECTION-34

To attract the principle of joint liability under Section 34 there should be:
a) Some Criminal Act;
b) Criminal Act done by more than 1 person
c) Criminal Act done by such persons in furtherance of the Common intent of all of them;
d) Common Intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan between such persons;
e) Participation in some manner in the act constituting the offence by the persons sought to
be prosecuted.
f) Physical presence at the time of commission of crime of all the persons.

It is the humble submission on behalf of the Defense that essentials of Section- 34 are not
fulfilled in the instant case as there was no criminal act that can be attributed on part of the
Accused as the Post Mortem report suggests that the death of the Deceased was caused by bullet
shot. However, the Post Mortem Report does not explicitly state that the shot was fired from the
AK-47 which was held by the M.L.A. as was filmed by the Press present on the spot.

Further, in the case of State of U.P v. Sahrunnisa 4 , the State of U.P appealed against the
acquittal of two respondents by the High Court against their conviction under 300, 302 read with
Section 34 of IPC of Sessions Court. Dismissing the appeal the apex court refuting the states
claim of involvement of respondents in the gruesome acts of murder in which these two
respondents were present said that their presence by itself cannot be of criminal nature in the

3
Section 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention –
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such persons is
liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
4
AIR 2009 SC 3182

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

sense that by their mere presence, a common intention cannot be attributed to them. Indeed they
have not done anything. No overt act is attributed to them.

In Diwanchand v. State5 it was held that where the informant in his statement merely stated that
one of the accused had conspired with another accused who inflicted the blow but no overt act
showing his common intention was alleged the existence of prearranged plan could not be said to
be established and therefore, it could not be said that the injury of victim was caused in
furtherance of common intention of the accused person, that being so he is entitled to benefit of
doubt.

The Accused and Co- Accused are also entitled to the same in the present case. There was no
overt act done by him to show his involvement. There was no pre-meeting of minds between the
Accused and the Co- Accused. It is necessary that prosecution links the co-accused with the
occurrence in a manner so as to attract Section 34 of the IPC 6.In order to attract Section 34 there
must be active involvement of the co-accused in the criminal act7 which is absent in the present
case as the co- accused though were involved in the verbal abuse and free fight that broke out
due to provocation and upon incitement by the Akali Dal supporters. However, there was no pre-
arranged plan or meeting of minds of the Accused and Co-accused to murder the Deceased; it
was merely an unfortunate accident that was a result of the fight that happened between the two
parties and it is still unclear as to which gunshot resulted in the death of the Deceased because
the factsheet clearly states that it was the supporters of Akali Dal who had assembled outside the
Police station in protest armed with lathis, swords and guns whereas the fact sheet nowhere states
that the Congress Supporters too were armed with lethal weapons except for the Gunmen of the
M.L.A, who are authorized to have weapons for protection.

Henceforth, it is humble submission on behalf of the Respondent that none of the ingredients of
Section 34 can be applied in the case at hand. Also, the mere fact that the Accused made some
verbal remarks on the Deceased in response to what was started by the Deceased and his fellow
supporters cannot be valid justification for such serious allegations on the Accused and the Co-
Accused.

5
1984 Cri L.J. 1045 (Delhi).
6
Prem Sagar v. Dharanveer, AIR 2014 SC 21.
7
State of Orissa v. Arjun Das Aggrawal , AIR 1999 SC 3229.

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

2. That the Accused & Co- Accused are not guilty of Unlawful Assembly under Section
149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

It is humbly stated before this Hon’ble Court that Accused along with the Co- Accused are not
guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object in an unlawful assembly8 under
Section 1499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Firstly, That the conduct of the Accused and Co- Accused does not amount to unlawful
assembly.

Secondly, That there is no common object attributable on part of the Accused & Co- Accused.

2.1 That the conduct of the Accused and Co- Accused does not amount to unlawful

assembly.

It is the humble submission on behalf of the counsel for Defense that the Accused or the Co-
Accused in the present case did not in any manner conduct themselves which leads to the
presumption that they have gathered with an intention to disrupt the functioning of the Police
officials or to carry out any illegal act in unlawful manner. It so happened that the Accused along
with Co- Accused reached the police station at the same time which could be for any umpteen
reasons possible.

8
Section 141, IPC- Unlawful assembly.—An assembly of five or more persons is designated an “unlawful
assembly”, if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is—
(First) — To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1[the Central or any State Government or
Parliament or the Legislature of any State], or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power of such public
servant; or
(Second) — To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
(Third) — To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
(Fourth) — By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain possession of any
property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal
right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right; or
(Fifth) — By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what he is not legally
bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do. Explanation.—An assembly which was not unlawful
when it assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly.
9
Section 149, IPC: Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common
object.—If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of
that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of
that offence.”

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

In Subramanian v. State of Kerala10, the Supreme Court held that the existence of an unlawful
assembly is a necessary postulate for invoking section 149. Where the existence of such an unlawful
assembly is not proved, the conviction with the aid of section 149 cannot be recorded or sustained.

In Bhudeo Mandal v. State of Bihar11, the Supreme Court held that before convicting any person
with the aid of section 149, the evidence must clearly establish not only the common object, but also
show that the common object was unlawful. In the absence of evidence that there was either an
unlawful object or the accused has shared it, conviction under 149 is not sustainable.

Rather it is evident from the fact sheet itself that it was the supporters of Akali Dal who fulfilled
all the essentials of an unlawful assembly. They tried to disrupt the functioning of the Police
officials by forcefully entering the Police Station and demanded the release of the Sarpanch, an
affiliate to Akali Dal, who was arrested on the complaint of the Congress members for indulging
in illegal acts during the election campaigns. Further, Congress supporters are law abiding
citizens and chose the proper course to address the issue. Thus, it is submitted that the assembly
was a peaceful gathering assembled for a lawful purpose to report malpractices of the Akali Dal.

2.2 That there is no common object attributable on part of the Accused & Co- Accused.

Before recording a conviction under section 149, the essential ingredient of section 141 must be
established. What is to be noted is that emphasis is on common object. Prosecution must prove
that the accused were a part of the unlawful assembly at the time when the assembly became
unlawful.

It is difficult to prove the common object by the prosecution by adducing direct evidence. The
common object of the unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms
used by them and the behavior of the assembly at or before the scene of occurrence. It is an
inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of the case.

The law on this aspect is very well established in the decision reported in Rambilas v. State of
Bihar12, wherein it was held:

10
(1993) 3 SCC 32.
11
(1989) Cr LJ 1466 (SC).
12
1964 CriLJ 573; (1964)1SCR775

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

"...It is true that in order to convict persons vicariously under Section 34 or 149, IPC it is not
necessary to prove that each and every one of them had indulged in overt acts. Even so there
must be material to show that the overt act or acts or one or more of the accused was or were in
furtherance of the common intention on behalf of the accused or in prosecution of the common
object of the members of the unlawful assembly."

The scope of common object and inference regarding the same has been pointed out in a decision
reported in Chandra Bihari Gautam v. State of Bihar13, wherein it was held :

"Section 149 has two parts. First part deals with the commission of an offence by a member of
an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly and the second part
deals with the liability of the members of the unlawful assembly who knew that an offence was
likely to be committed in prosecution of the object for which they had assembled."

It was further held that the knowledge of the consequential action in furtherance of the initial
common object is sufficient to attract the applicability of Section 149 for holding the members of
the unlawful assembly guilty for the commission of the offence by any member of such
assembly.

It is also pertinent to refer to a decision reported in Chanakya Dhibar v. State of W.B14., wherein
it was held :

"Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a
common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out
in Section 141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused
persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is
whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained
one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141.”

It is also pertinent to refer to a decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao15, wherein

it was held :

13
2007CriLJ3265; I(2007)DMC824SC; JT2007(6)SC424; 2007(6)SCALE464
14
2004 CriLJ 3832
15
2003 CriLJ 4470

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

'The purpose for which the members of the assembly set out or desired to achieve is the object. If
the object desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge that that is the object which is
being pursued is shared by all the members and they are in general agreement as to how it is to
be achieved and that is now the common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the
human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available."

In a decision reported in Dani Singh v. State of Bihar16, it was held :

"Common object of the unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms
used by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before the scene of occurrence. It is an
inference to be deduced from the facts and circumstances of each case."

The scope of Section 149, IPC has been explained by this Court in various judgments holding
that application of Section 149, IPC would be highly unsafe unless it is positively proved that
each one of the accused shared the common object and accordingly participated in the
occurrence.

Bearing the above principle in mind, it has to be seen whether the accused who are convicted
with the aid of Section 149, IPC are the members of the unlawful assembly and whether they have
shared the common object to kill the deceased.

There is no direct evidence or the circumstantial evidence so as to infer that the other accused
who are convicted under. Section 149, IPC had intentionally joined or continued in that unlawful
assembly or that they knew of the common object of the unlawful assembly or that an offence
was committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly or that they knew that such
offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object.

Thus it is the humble submission that the Accused had the intention and knowledge that the blow
made by him on the Deceased’s stomach is likely to cause death due to the medical condition
suffered by the Deceased. Hence, the trial court is not erroneous in making the decision and it
should be upheld.

16
2004 AIR SCW 3719; (2004) Cri LJ 3328

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3. That the Accused & Co- Accused are not guilty of Criminal Intimidation under Section
506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, the accused did not seek to criminally
intimidate anyone and is not liable to be punished under section 50617. The essential ingredient
of criminal intimidation according to section 50318 is:-

a) There should be a threat of injury to the person, property or reputation of the person or
anyone in whom that person is interested.
b) The threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person or cause that person to do
an act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat or to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to
do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

In short, it is extending a threat to another, which results in a particular set of actions from the
other as a means of avoiding the threat. Mere threat does not amount to criminal intimidation.
Intention is the soul of the section 503 and it needs to be gathered from the surrounding
circumstances.19 Material has to be brought on record to show that intention was to cause alarm.
Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to
bring an application of section 506. The injury threatened to be caused must be illegal.

In the present case, the accused did not do anything to criminally intimidate the prosecutors. In
fact, it was the prosecutors who tried to criminally intimidate the police.

17
Section 503, IPC- Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or
to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or 1[imprisonment for
life], or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or
with both.
18
Section 503, IPC -Criminal intimidation.—
Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any
one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act
which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means
of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the
reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A,
for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of
criminal intimidation.
19
Vasant Waman Pradhan v. Dattatraya Vithal Salvi , (2004) 1 Mah LJ 487

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 ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, INTER CLASS MOOT- I (SEM-9)

PRAYER

IN THE LIGHT OF ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED & AUTHORITIES CITED,

THE COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE HUMBLY PRAYS TO THIS HON’BLE COURT TO

KINDLY ADJUDGE & DECLARE:

 That The Accused along with the Co- Accused be acquitted of the charges under

Sections- 302 r/w 34, 149 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

And pass any other appropriate order as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit.

And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the Defense, as in duty bound shall forever

pray.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

S/d ……………………………

(DEFENSE COUNSEL)

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