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COUNCIL OF TEACHERS AND G.R. No. 216930

STAFF OF COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSIDES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (CoTeSCUP),
SENTRO NG MGA
NAGKAKAISANG
PROGRESIBONG MGA
MANGGAGAWA (SENTRO),
FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (FFW), NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF LABOR
(NCL), PUBLIC SERVICES
LABOR INDEPENDENT
CONFEDERATION (PSLINK),
PARTIDO MANGGAGAWA (PM),
ADAMSON UNIVERSITY
FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, FACULTY
ALLIED AND WORKER UNION
OF . CENTRO ESCOLAR
UNIVERSITY, FACULTY
ASSOCIATION MAPUA
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, HOLY
ANGEL UNIVERSITY /
TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES
UNION, LYCEUM FACULTY
ASSOCIATION, SAN BEDA
COLLEGE ALABANG
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
SILIMAN UNIVERSITY
FACULTY ASSOCIATION,
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST
RAMON MAGSAYSAY
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
FFW (UERMEA-FFW), UNION OF
FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES OF
ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY,
 Decision 2 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

FACULTY UNION, PROF.
FLORDELIZ ABANTO (in her
capacity as Vice President of St.
Scholastica's College Faculty
Association), PROF. REBECCA T.
ANONUEVO (in her capacity as
President of Miriam College Faculty
Association), PROF. MARIA RITA
REYES CUCIO (in her capacity as
faculty of San Beda College), and
MR. JOMEL B. GENERAL (in his
capacity as employee of Philippine
School of Business Administration
and Officer of the FFW),
Petitioners,

- versus -

SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, CHAIRPERSON
OF THE COMMISSION ON
IDGHER EDUCATION,
SECRETARY OF THE
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND
SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, and
MIRIAM COLLEGE,
Respondents.

x--------------------------x
DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA G.R. No. 217451
(Pambansang Alagad ng Sining at
Professor Emeritus, University of the
Philippines/UP); CONG. ANTONIO
TINIO (ACT Teachers' Partylist);
CONG. FERNANDO "KA
PANDO" HICAP (Anakpawis
Partylist at tagapangulo ng
PAMALAKAYA); CONG. JAMES
MARK TERRY RIDON (Kabataan
Partylist); DR. RHODERICK
NUNCIO (Vice-Dean, ng Kolehiyo
ng Malalayang Sining, De La Salle

{*
 Decision 3 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

University/DLSU); PROP. AURA

ABIERA (Tagapangulo ng
Departamento ng Filipino at
Panitikan ng Pilipinas sa University
of the Philippines-Diliman); DR.
ERNESTO CARANDANG II
(Tagapangulo ng Departamento ng
Filipino, De La Salle University-
Manila); DR. ROBERTO AMPIL
(Tagapangulo ng Departamento ng
Filipino ng University of Santo
Tomas); PROP. MARVIN LAI
(Tagapangulo ng Departamento ng
Filipinolohiya ng Polytechnic
University of the Philippines/PUP);
PROP. NELSON RAMIREZ
(Tagapangulo ng Departamento ng
Filipino, University of the East/UE-
Manila); DR. ESTER RADA
(Tagapangulo ng Kagawaran ng
Filipino, San Beda College-Manila);
PROP. JORGE PACIFICO
CUIBILLAS (Tagapangulo ng
Departamento ng Filipino, Far
Eastern University-Manila); PROP.
ANDREW P ADERNAL
(Tagapangulo ng Kagawaran ng
Filipino, Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Pasig/PLP); PROP. MICHAEL
DOMINGO PANTE (Faculty
Member sa History Department,
Ateneo de Manila University);
BENJAMIN VALBUENA
(Tagapangulo ng Alliance of
Concerned Teachers/ACT-
Philippines); DR. PRISCILLA
AMPUAN (Pangulo ng Quezon City
Public School Teachers'
Association/QCPSTA); PROP.
CARL MARC RAMOTA (Pangulo
ng Alliance of Concerned Teachers-
State Universities and Colleges/ACT-
SUC); DR. ROWELL MADULA
(Pangulo ng Alliance of Concerned
Teachers-Private Schools/ACT-
Private); DR. AURORA BATNAG
(Pangulo ng Pambansang Samahan

~
 ' . l ,

Decision 4 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

sa Linggwistika at Literaturang
Filipino/PSLLF); DR. JUDY
TAGUIWALO (Full Professor sa
College of Social Work and
Community Development, UP
Diliman); DR. DANILO ARAO
(Associate Professor sa Department
of Journalism, College of Mass
Communication, UP Diliman); DR.
DAVID MICHAEL SAN JUAN
(Executive Council Member ng
National Commission for Culture
and the Arts-National Committee on
Language and Translation/NCCA-
NCLT); RONNEL B. AGONCILLO
JR., (Pangulo ng Philippine Normal
University/PNU-Student
Government); DR. REVEL
MOLINA AGUILA (Palanca Hall of
Farner at Tagapayo ng KATAGA-
Samahan ng mga Manunulat sa
Pilipinas); ERICSON ACOSTA
(manunulat at dating bilanggong
politikal, at kasapi ng Anakpawis
Partylist); PROP. ADRIAN
BALAGOT (Direktor ng Center for
Continuing Education, Pamantasan
ng Lungsod ng Marikina/PLMar);
PROP. PENAFRANCIA RANIELA
BARBAZA (Associate Professor,
Departamento ng Filipino at
Panitikan ng Pilipinas, University of
the Philippines-Diliman); PROP.
HERMAN MANALO BOGNOT
(Faculty Member sa Department of
European Languages, University of
the Philippines); PROP.
LAURENCE MARVIN CASTILLO
(Instructor sa Department of
Humanities, University of the
Philippines-Los Banos); DR.
ANTONIO CONTRERAS (Full
Professor sa Political Science
Department, De La Salle
University/DLSU); PROP.
RAMILITO CORREA (Pangulo ng
Sanggunian sa Filipino/SANGFIL);

(~
 Decision 5 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

GEROME NICOLAS DE LA PENA

(Pangulo ng Samahan ng mga Mag-
aaral sa Asignaturang Filipino,
SamFil-Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Pasig/PLP); PROP. WENNIELYN
FAJILAN (Faculty Member ng
Departamento ng Filipino,
University of Santo Tomas); FLODY
FERNANDEZ (Pangulo ng Ramon
Magsaysay High School (Cubao)
Faculty Club); PROP. SANTIAGO
FLORA (Vice-President for
Operations ng Quezon City
Polytechnic University); PROP.
MELANIA FLORES (National PRO
ng All UP Academic Employees'
Union, University of the
Philippines/UP); DR.
LAKANDUPIL GARCIA (Full
Professor ng Departamento ng
Filipino, De La Salle University-
Dasmarifias); DR. FANNY GARCIA
(Palanca Awardee at Faculty
Member ng Departamento ng
Filipino, De La Salle
University/DLSU); PROP.
JONATHAN GERONIMO
(Coordinator ng KATAGA-Manila
at Faculty Member ng
Departamento ng Filipino ng
University of Santo Tomas/UST);
PROP. VLADIMEIR GONZALES
(Assistant Professor sa
Departamento ng Filipino at
Panitikan ng Pilipinas-University of
the Philippines-Diliman); PROP.
FERDINAND PISIGAN JARIN
(Palanca Awardee at Pangulo ng
KATAGA-Samahan ng mga
Manunulat sa Pilipinas); JOHN
ROBERT MAGSOMBOL (Pangulo
ng University of Santo Tomas-
Panulat); PROP. JOEL
MALABANAN (Tagapayo ng
Kapisanang Diwa at
Panitik!KADIPAN sa Philippine
Normal University/PNU); PROP.

~
 • I

Decision 6 G.R.Nos. 216930,217451,217752,

218045,218098,218123 &218465

DENNIS MANGUBAT (Faculty

Member ng Departamento ng
Filipino ng San Beda College-
Manila); PROP. JOANNE
MANZANO (Faculty Member ng
Departamento ng Filipino at
Panitikan ng Pilipinas-University of
the Philippines-Diliman); PROP.
BERNADETTE NERI (Assistant
Professor sa Departamento ng
Filipino at Panitikan ng Pilipinas,
University of the Philippines-
Diliman); RAYMOND PALATINO
(Tagapangulo ng Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan/BAYAN-National
Capital Region); PROP. APRIL
PEREZ (Assistant Professor sa
Departamento ng Filipino at
Panitikan ng Pilipinas, University of
the Philippines-Diliman); PROP.
JAYSON PETRAS (Deputy Director
ng Institute of Creative Writing,
University of the Philippines-
Diliman); PROP. CRIZEL SICAT-
DE LAZA (Katuwang ng Kalihim ng
Sanggunian ng Filipino/SANGFIL at
Faculty Member sa Departamento
ng Filipino ng University of Santo
Tomas/UST); PROP. DENNIS
JOSEPH RAYMUNDO (Faculty
Member ng Kalayaan College); DR.
BEYERLY SARZA (Faculty
Member ng Philosophy Department,
De La Salle University-Manila); DR.
RAQUEL SISON-BUBAN
(Associate Professor sa
Departamento ng Filipino ng De La
Salle University-Manila); PROP.
VIVENCIO M. TALEGON, JR.
(Full-Time Faculty sa University of
Asia and the Pacific, Ortigas Center,
Pasig); ISAAC ALI TAPAR
(Pangulo ng Manila Science High
School Faculty Association); DR.
DOLORES TAYLAN (Associate
Professor sa Departamento ng
Filipino, De La Salle University-

M
 Decision 7 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Manila); DR. ALITA TEPACE

(Propesor sa Philippine Normal
University-Manila); PROP. OM
NARAYAN VELASCO (Instructor
sa University of the Philippines-Los
Banos); ANDREA JEAN YASONA
(Pangulo ng Kapisanang Diwa at
Panitik-PNU); PROP. REYNELE
BREN ZAFRA (Faculty Member ng
Departamento ng Filipino ng
University of Santo Tomas); DR.
RUBY ALUNEN (Faculty Member
ng Departamento ng Filipino ng De
La Salle University-Manila); PROP.
BAYANI SANTOS, JR. (Faculty
Member ng Departamento ng
Filipino ng Manuel Luis Quezon
University/MLQU); PROP.
CHRISTO REY ALBASON (Guro
sa Sining ng Bayan/GUSI); PROP.
LILIBETH OBLENA-QUIORE
(Faculty Member ng Departamento
ng Filipino ng De La Salle University-
Manila); PROP. DANIM
MAJERANO (Direktor ng
Pananaliksik at Edukasyon,
Samahang Saliksik Pasig, Inc.);
RUSTUM CASIA (KM 64 Poetry
Collective); CHARISSE
BERNADINE BANEZ
(Tagapagsalita ng League of Filipino
Students/LFS); DR. JENNIFOR
AGUILAR (Chairperson ng
Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education ng Polytechnic
University of the Philippines/PUP);
PROP. MOREAL NAGARIT
CAMBA (Tagapangulo ng
Departamento ng Filipino,
University of Asia and the Pacific -
Pasig); PROP. CLEVE
ARGUELLES (Chairperson ng
Political Science Program,
Department of Social Sciences,
University of the Philippines-
Manila); DR. MARIA LUCILLE
ROXAS (Faculty Member sa
 . '

Decision 8 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Departamento ng Filipino ng De La
Salle University-Manila); PROP.
VOLTAIRE VILLANUEVA
(Faculty Member sa Philippine
Normal University); DR. JOSEFINA
MANGAHIS (Faculty Member sa
Departamento ng Filipino ng De La
Salle University-Manila); PROP.
EMMA SISON (Faculty Member sa
Departamento ng Filipino ng De La
Salle University-Manila); AYLEEN
ORTIZ (manunulat); PROP.
EFREN DOMINGO (Faculty
Mem her sa Departamento ng
Filipino ng De La Salle University-
Manila); PROP. LESLIE ANNE
LIWANAG (Faculty Member sa
Departamento ng Filipino ng De La
Salle University-Manila); DR.
LAKANGITING GARCIA (Faculty
Member sa Departamento ng
Filipino ng De La Salle University-
Manila); PROP. MIRYLLE
CALINDRO (Faculty Member sa
Departamento ng Filipino ng De La
Salle University-Manila); DR.
LAKANDUPIL GARCIA (Faculty
Member sa Departamento ng
Filipino ng De La Salle University-
Dasmariiias); DR. DEXTER
CAYANES (Faculty Member sa
Departamento ng Filipino ng De La
Salle University-Manila); DR.
TERESITA FORTUNATO (Faculty
Member sa Departamento ng
Filipino ng De La Salle University-
Manila); DR. MA. RITA ARANDA
(Faculty Member sa Departamento
ng Filipino ng De La Salle University-
Manila); DR. EMMA BASCO
(Faculty Member sa Departamento
ng Filipino ng De La Salle University-
Manila),
Petitioners,

- versus -

~
 Decision 9 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

PANGULONG BENIGNO
SIMEON "NOYNOY" C. AQUINO
ill, at PUNONG KOMISYUNER
NG KOMISYON SA LALONG
MATAAS NA EDUKASYON/
COMMISSION ON IDGHER
EDUCATION (CHED) DR.
PATRICIA LICUANAN,
Respondents.

x---------------------------x

ANTONIO "SONNY" F. G.R. No. 217752

TRILLANES IV, GARY C.
ALEJANO and FRANCISCO
ASHLEY L. ACEDILLO,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,

JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Education and the
DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION,
Respondents.

x----------------------------x
EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR. and G.R. No. 218045
AURELIO P. RAMOS, JR.,
Petitioners,

- versus -

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
(DepEd) and The SECRETARY
OF THE DepEd,
Respondents.

x---------------------------x
RICHARD TROY A G.R. No. 218098
COLMENARES, RENE LUIS M.
TAD LE, ERLINDA C.
PALAGANAS, RUTH THELMA P.
TINGDA, RONALD TAGGAOA,

~
 ..
Decision 10 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

JOSEPH PORFIRIO ANDAYA,

FLORANTE DULACA, FROILAN
A. ALIPAO; KATHLEA
FRANCYNN GAWANI D.
YANGOT, MIEL ALEXANDRE A.
TAGGAOA, AGATHA ZITA
DISTOR, ISABELLE C. UMINGA,
ALDWIN GABRIEL M. PINAS,
ATREENA MARIE DULAY, ZION
GABRIEL SANTOS, SIBLINGS
BRENNAN KEANE, BREN KIMI,
AND BASLEY KICH, ALL
SURNAMED DELA CRUZ,
JASSEL ANGELO ENRIQUEZ,
SIBLINGS GYRO MATTHEW
AND MARGA RAUXIELLE
AGLAIA, BOTH SURNAMED
GUEVARRA, SIBLINGS ALTHEA,
ALEXA, AND AMANDA, ALL
SURNAMED ABEJO, AND
ELEANNIE JERECE S. CAWIS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR
PARENTS LEANDRO B.
YANGOT, JR., JENNIFER A.
TAGGAOA, MILO DISTOR, JOSE
MARI UMINGA, GABRIEL PAUL
PINAS, SOFRONIO DULAY, LUZ
A. SANTOS, BARBY M. DELA
CRUZ, RUBY G. ENRIQUEZ,
ROWENA C. GUEVARRA,
MARISEL P. ABEJO, AND
VITTORIO JERICO L. CAWIS,
RESPECTIVELY, FOR
THEMSELVES AND THE CLASS
THEY REPRESENT;
REVENENDO R. VARGAS,
ANNIELA R. YU-SOLIVEN,
VILMA C. BENIGNO, MARIA
CRISTINA F. DUNGCA, LIZA
DAOANIS, ROMMEL M.
FRANCISCO, FELIZA G.
AGUSTIN, EMELITA C. VIDAL,
ROMMEL D. RAMISCAL,
JOCELYN ELEAZAR DE
GUZMAN, ANDREA P.
VILLALON, AND JOYCE FE T.
ALMENARIO, FOR
 Decision 11 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

THEMSELVES AND THE CLASS

THEY REPRESENT,
Petitioners,

- versus -

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, COMMISSION ON
IDGHER EDUCATION
CHAIRPERSON PATRICIA B.
LICUANAN, TECHNICAL SKILLS
AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY DIRECTOR-
GENERAL JOEL J.
VILLANUEVA, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
SECRETARY ROSALINDA D.
BALDOZ, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY CESAR V.
PURISIMA, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SPEAKER FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE,
Respondents.

x---------------------------x
CONG. ANTONIO TINIO G.R. No. 218123
(Representative, ACT Teachers
Party-List); CONG. NERI
COLMENARES (Representative,
Bayan Muna Party-List); DR.
BIENVENIDO LUMBERA
(National Artist for Literature and
Professor Emeritus, UP); CONG.
CARLOS ZARATE
(Representative, Bayan Muna
Party-List); CONG. FERNANDO
"KA p ANDO" mcAP
(Representative, Anakpawis Party-
List; Chairperson,
PAMALAKAYA); CONG.
LUZVIMINDA ILAGAN
(Representative, Gabriela Women's
Party); CONG. EMMI DE JESUS
(Representative, Gabriela Party-

~
 . '

Decision 12 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

List); CONG. TERRY RIDON

(Representative, Kabataan Party-
List); RENATO REYES, JR.
(Secretary-General, Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan/ BAYAN
and parent of an elementary
student); BENJAMIN VALBUENA
(Chairperson, Alliance of
Concerned Teachers-Philippines);
MARTIN DINO (Chairperson of
the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption); JOVITA MONTES
(Spokesperson, Parents' Movement
Against K to 12); KHARLO
FELIPE MANANO (Secretary-
General, Salinlahi Alliance for
Children's Concerns);
GERTRUDES LIBANG (National
Vice-Chairperson, Gabriela);
RONEL AGONCILLO (Student
Regent, PNU); VENCER MARIE
CRISOSTOMO (National
Chairperson, Anakbayan);
CHARISSE BERNADINE BANEZ
(National Spokesperson, League of
Filipino Students/LFS); EINSTEIN
RECEDES (National Chairperson
Student Christian Movement of the
Philippines); MICHAEL
BELTRAN (National Spokesperson,
Kabataang Artista para sa Tunay na
Kalayaan); SARAH JANE ELAGO
(National President, National Union
of Students of the Philippines);
MARC LINO ABILA (National
President, College Editors Guild of
the Philippines); VANESSA FAYE
BOLIBOL (Convenor, STOP K to
12); DR. ROLANDO TOLENTINO
(Dean, College of Mass
Communication, UP); DR.
FEDELIZ TUY (Associate Vice
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences,
SBC Manila); DR. ERNESTO
CARANDANG II (Chairperson,
Filipino Department, DLSU
Manila); PROF. MARIA

I~
 Decision 13 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

LOURDES AGUSTIN
(Chairperson, Institute of Teaching
and Learning, PNU); PROF.
ROWENA RIVERO (Chair,
English, Foreign Languages and
Literature Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. CLEVE
ARGUELLES (Chairperson,
Political Science Program, DLSU
Manila); DR. ANNABEL QUILON
(Chair, Psychology Department,
SBC Manila); DR. BAYANI
MATITU (Chair, Human Kinetics
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
MARVIN LAI (Chairperson,
Departamento ng Filipinolohiya,
PUP Manila); PROF. MERDEKA
C. MORALES (Chief, PUP Center
for Creative Writing); DR.
ROBERTO AMPIL (Chairperson,
Filipino Department, UST); PROF.
NELSON RAMIREZ (Chairperson,
Filipino Department, University of
the East Manila); DR. JENNIFOR
AGUILAR (Chairperson, MA
Filipino Program, Graduate School,
PUP); DR. LIWAYWAY ACERO
(Chairperson, Human Biology and
Sciences Department, SBC Manila);
DR. ESTER RADA (Chairperson,
Filipino Department, SBC Manila);
DR. MARVIN REYES (Prefect of
Student Activities, College of Arts
and Sciences, SBC Manila); PROF.
NEILIA BALANON-RAMIREZ
(Assistant Prefect of Student
Discipline, College of Arts and
Sciences, SBC Manila); PROF.
LUISITO MACAPAGAL
(Chairperson, Mathematics
Department, SBC Manila); DR.
NOEL SANTANDER
(Chairperson, Theology
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
GERARD SANTOS (Assistant
Prefect of Student Discipline,
College of Arts and Sciences, SBC

~
 . '

Decision 14 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Manila); PROF. ALBERT OASAN

(Assistant Prefect of Student
Discipline, College of Arts and
Sciences, SBC Manila); PROF.
JULIUS TUTOR (Assistant Prefect
of Student Activities, College of Arts
and Sciences, SBC Manila); PROF.
SYBIL AGREDA (Assistant Prefect
of Student Activities, College of Arts
and Sciences, SBC Manila); PROF.
LEOMAR REQUEJO (Chief,
Music Section, PUP); DR.
AURORA BATNAG (Pangulo,
Pam bansang Samahan sa
Linggwistika at Literaturang
Filipino); PROF. RAMILITO
CORREA (President, Sanggunian
sa Filipino/SANGFIL); PROF.
CHRISTO RAY ALBAZON (PRO,
Guro sa Sining ng Bayan, PUP); DR.
RAMON GUILLERMO (President,
All UP Academic Employees'
Union); PROF. MELANIA
FLORES (National PRO, All UP
Academic Employees' Union);
PROF.ORESTESDELOSREYES
(President, Adamson University
Faculty and Employees); PROF.
JAMES PLATON (Vice President
for Labor Education, UST Faculty
Union); MR. FELIX PARINAS,
JR., (Public Relations Officer, All
UP Workers' Union); PROF.
MICHAEL PANTE (Faculty,
History Department, Ateneo de
Manila University); PROF.
VLADIMEIR B. GONZALES
(Faculty, UP-Diliman); PROF.
LAURENCE MARVIN S.
CASTILLO (Faculty, UP-Los
Banos); DR. ROMMEL
RODRIGUEZ (Associate Professor,
UP-Diliman); DR. DOLORES
TAYLAN (Faculty Member,
Filipino Department, DLSU
Manila); DR. TERESITA
FORTUNATO (Faculty Member,

~
 Decision 15 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Filipino Department, DLSU

Manila); DR. RAQUEL SISON-
BUBAN (Faculty Member, Filipino
Department, DLSU Manila);
PROF. LILIBETH QUIORE
(Faculty Member, Filipino
Department, DLSU Manila); DR.
MA. RITA ARANDA (Faculty
Member, Filipino Department,
DLSU Manila); PROF. PORTIA
PLACINO (Faculty Member, UP
Diliman); PROF. JOEL
MALABANAN (Faculty Member,
College of Language and Literature,
PNU); DR. LUCIA B. DELA CRUZ
(Registered Guidance Counselor;
Professor, University of Makati);
PROF. GERARDO LANUZA
(Professor, Department of
Sociology, UP Diliman); PROF.
SARAH JANE S. RAYMUNDO
(Assistant Professor, Center for
International Studies, UP Diliman);
PROF. FERDINAND JARIN
(Faculty Member, Philippine
Normal University); PROF.
EMELITO SARMAGO (Faculty
Member, UST); PROF. MARY
ANNE MALLARI (Faculty
Member, UST); PROF.
WENNIELYN F AJILAN (Faculty
Member, UST); PROF. REYNELE
BREN ZAFRA (Faculty Member,
UST); PROF. JOHN KELVIN
BRIONES (Faculty Member,
English Department, College of Arts
and Letters, Bulacan State
University); PROF. DENNIS
MANGUBAT (Faculty Member,
Filipino Department, SBC Manila);
PROF. MINERVA SERRANO
(Faculty Member, Mathematics
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
MARIE JOCELYN BENGCO
(Faculty Member, Psychology
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
CLYDE CORPUZ (Faculty

~
 Decision 16 G.R. Nos. 216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Member, Social Sciences

Department, SBC Manila); DR.
LIZA CRUZ (Faculty Member,
Human Biology and Sciences
Department, SBC Manila); DR.
SOCORRO DE JESUS (Faculty
Member, English, Foreign
Languages, and Literature
Department); PROF. TERESITA
DULAY (Faculty Member,
Mathematics Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. JULIO
CASTILLO, JR. (Faculty Member,
Department of Management, SBC
Manila); PROF. ESTHER
CUARESMA (Faculty Member,
Information and Communication
Technology Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. ARNOLD
DONOZO (Faculty Member, Math
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
ROAN DINO (Faculty Member,
Kagawaran ng Filipinohiya, PUP);
DR. MARIA ELIZA CRUZ
(Faculty Member, Natural Sciences
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
JOSEPHINE DANGO (Faculty,
Theology Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. IDPOLITO
RUZOL (Faculty, Kagawaran ng
Filipino, SBC Manila); PROF.
KERWIN MARK MARTINEZ
(Faculty, Social Sciences and
Humanities Department, SBC
Manila); DR. VIOLETA REYES
(Faculty, Social Sciences and
Humanities Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. LUISITO DE LA
CRUZ (Faculty, Social Sciences and
Humanities Department, SBC
Manila); ATTY. ALDEN REUBEN
LUNA (Faculty, Social Sciences and
Humanities Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. DON SANTANA
(Faculty, Mathematics Department,
SBC Manila); PROF. CHARLES
BRONASA (Faculty, Mathematics

~
 Decision 17 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Department, SBC Manila); PROF.

JESSTER FONSECA (Faculty,
Theology Department, SBC
Manila); DR. NERISSA REVILLA
(Faculty, English, Foreign
Languages and Literature
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
ROMANA ALIPIO (Faculty,
English, Foreign Languages and
Literature Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. JOSEPHINE PAZ
ANDAL (Faculty, English, Foreign
Languages and Literature
Department SBC Manila); PROF.
MIGUELA MIGUEL (Faculty,
English, Foreign Languages and
Literature Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. ARJAN
ESPIRITU (Faculty, English,
Foreign Languages and Literature
Department, SBC Manila); PROF.
PILIPINO RAMOS (Faculty,
Accountancy Department, SBC
Manila); PROF. KIM GUIA
(Faculty, Psychology Department,
SBC Manila); PROF. JONA IRIS
TRAMBULO (Faculty,
Technological University of the
PhilippinesffUP); ELIZABETH
ANTHONY (University of Santo
Tomas); EMELITO SARMAGO
(University of Santo Tomas);
RONALD P. TAGGAOA (Associate
Professor, Philosophy Department,
Saint Louis University); TERESITA
MENNA K. DE GUZMAN
(Faculty, Physical Education
Department, Saint Louis
University); SAMUEL D.
BARTOLOME (Professor, Religion
Department, Saint Louis
University); REYNALDO 0.
DUMPAYAN (Professor, Religion
Department, Saint Louis
University); JEROME P. ARO
(Faculty, CAD-SCIS Department,
Saint Louis University); SAMUEL
 ''

Decision 18 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

D. SILOG (Faculty, Religion

Department, Saint Louis
University); ROSALINDA P.
SEGUNDO; (Professor, Social
Sciences Department, Saint Louis
University); BRIGITTE P.
AWISAN (Faculty, Religion
Department, Saint Louis
University); RAUL LEANDRO R.
VILLANUEVA (Assistant
Professor, Philosophy Department,
Saint Louis University);
LAWREN CE DEXTER D. LADIA
(Professor, Religion Department,
Saint Louis University); GEORGE
M. TAW AO (Special Services
Department, Saint Louis
University); DONNIE D.
EVARISTO (Special Services
Department, Saint Louis
University); CHERRY M.
RAFANAN (Nursing Aide, Hospital
of the Sacred Heart SLU); JULIO U.
BERSAMIRA, JR. (Printing Press
Assistant, Printing Press Office
SLU); JONES Q. CALINGAYAN
(Faculty, Physical Education
Department, Saint Louis
University); BRIAN LORENZO A.
SALVALEON (Kitchen Helper,
SLU Ladies' Residence Halls);
ROLLY L. MARANES
(Laboratory Technician, School of
Engineering, SLU); CAROL ANN
F. BALAUS (Accounting Clerk,
UFESLU SLU Employees Union);
MICHELLE B. BRAGAS
(Accounting Clerk, UFESLU SLU
Employees Union); ERNESTO
JOEY F. CHOMAWIN (Special
Services Department, Saint Louis
University); GIAN CARLO C.
GEGUIERA (Faculty, Religion
Department, Saint Louis
University); MON KARLO
MAN"GARAN' (Barangay
Councilor, Caniogan, Malolos,

~
 Decision 19 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Bulacan); MARY ANGELICA H.

REGINALDO (Student, M.A.
Malikhaing Pagsulat, DFPP-KAL,
UP Diliman); RUSTUM CASIA
(KM64 Poetry Collective);
ELIZABETH ANTHONY
(President, UST Panulat); ARIES
GUPIT (League of Filipino
Students); BRIX JUSTINE
PAGTALUNAN (Partido-
Pagkakaisa ng Demokratikong
Mag-aaral/PDM-Bulacan State
University); FRANCIS JAMES
PAGDANGANAN (Partido-
Pagkakaisa ng Demokratikong
Mag-aaral-BulSU); ANGELO
SUALIBIO (Students for the
Advancement of Democratic Rights
in Bulacan State University/STAND
BulSU); MARK JOSEPH
DOMASIG (Students for the
Advancement of Democratic Rights
in BulSU); JOHN RAVEN
BALDOVINO (Students for the
Advancement of Democratic Rights
in STAND BulSU); CEDRIQ
CLEMENTE (Students for the
Advancement of Democratic Rights
in STAND BulSU); MARIE
ANTONETTE VALENCIA
(Students for the Advancement of
Democratic Rights in STAND
BulSU); REINARD SANCHEZ
(STAND BulSU); RICHARD
P ATRIARCA (Students for the
Advancement of Democratic Rights
in Bulacan State University/STAND
BulSU); JOEL A. CAPULONG
(Tontongan ti Umili, Baguio City);
JEANETTE R. CAWIDING
(Tontongan ti Umili); MILAGROS
K. AO-WAT (Tontongan ti Umili);
HILDRINE L. ALVAREZ
(Tontongan ti Umili); VICENTE R.
TOCA ill (Tontongan ti Umili);
TRACY ANNE D. DUMALO
(Tontongan ti Umili); KING CRIS

~
 '.

Decision 20 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

P. PULMANO (Tontongan ti
Umili); MARBEN M.
P ANLASIGUI (Tontongan ti
Umili); LUKE T. BAGANGAN
(Tontongan ti Umili); NINO
JOSEPH Q. OCONER (Tontongan
ti Umili); DR. PRISCILLA
AMPUAN (President, Quezon City
Public School Teachers'
Association/ QCPSTA); JACKSON
BACABAC (Treasurer, QCPSTA);
RAYMOND PALATINO
(Chairperson, BAYAN-National
Capital Region); LOUIE ZABALA
(President, Manila Public School
Teachers' Association); PROF.
CARL MARC RAM OTA
(President, ACT SUC); DR.
ROWELL MADULA (President,
ACT Private); PROF. JONATHAN
GERONIMO (Secretary General,
ACT Private Schools); MICHAEL
ESPOSO (Auditor, ACT Private
Schools); DR. DAVID MICHAEL
SAN JUAN (Public Information
Officer, ACT Private Schools); MR.
ISAAC ALI TAPAR (President,
Manila Science High School Faculty
Association); PROF. RAMIR M.
CRUZ (President, Faculty
Association, College of Engineering,
PUP),
Petitioners,

- versus -

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON

"NOYNOY" C. AQUINO,
COMMISSION ON IDGHER
EDUCATION (CHED)
CHAIRPERSON DR. PATRICIA
LICUANAN, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION (DEPED)
SECRETARY BR. ARMIN
LUISTRO, TECHNICAL
EDUCATION AND SKILLS
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

{~
 Decision 21 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

(TESDA) DIRECTOR JOEL

VILLANUEVA,
Respondents.

x---------------------------x
MA. DOLORES M. BRILLANTES, G.R. No. 218465
SEVERO L. BRILLANTES,
EMELITA C. VIDAL, FELIZA G. Present:
AGUSTIN, EVELYN G. ASTILLA,
BRENDA P. BASCOS, ENRICO C. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, CJ.,
PUNO, MERIAM N. CARPIO,
CHAMACKALAYIL, MA LINDA T. PERALTA,
FERNANDO, MARIBEL R. BERSAMIN,*
LORENZO, CARMELO A.YAMBAO, DEL CASTILLO,
JOSEPHINE M. DE GUZMAN, PERLAS-BERNABE,
ELENA B. CABARLES, GIRLIE M. LEONEN,
TALISIC, JACQUELYN N. JARDELEZA,
MARQUEZ, VIVIAN G. SADAC, CAGUIOA,
FELIZA G. AGUSTIN, MARIBEL R. TIJAM,
LORENZO, GRACE G. ORALLO, A. REYES, JR.,
ROSARIO ANTES, GERALDINE G. GESMUNDO, * and
LUI, WALLY Y. CAMACHO, J. REYES, JR.,** JJ.
STANLEY FRANCIS M. LIBERATO,
MARJORIE M. SUN, BELEN Promulgated:
PANTALEON, IRENE N. ROCHA,
CRISTINA T. SANTOS, MARIFE P.
OROLFO, CRISTINA L. GANALON,
MARITES R. LAZARO, JUANITO
SALAZAR, CHRISTINA G. CRUZ,
RAMONETTE P. SONCUYA, PAUL
ROMMEL C. CAPISTRANO,
EDGARDO B. ALVINEZ, JENNIFER
C. RODELAS, MARIA VILMA M.
ANOS, TERESITA F. ESPEJO, CHRIS
C. KATAPANG, FERDINAND
BADULIS, MELODY M. RAMIREZ,
MINERVA DV. CRUZ, MARIA
BERNADETTE A. CALORACAN,
MA.. CINDERELLA B. ESPIQUE,
EVANGELINE A. OBNIAL, ANALYN
B. REYES, MARY E. BALLELOS,
ANALEA A. RIVERA, HELEN T.
TABIOS, VALENTINE B.
CUSTODIO, ROSE ANDRADE,
CHERYL JOY MIRANDA, JOCELYN

• On official business.
•• On wellness leave.
 '.

Decision 22 G.R. Nos.216930,217451,217752,

218045,218098,218123 &218465

MARIANO, REBECCA C.
CUARTERO, MARIA MARIETES B.
LAURETA, SPS. GIL L. ANISTA &
MARLYN P. ANISTA, MARLOUE
ABAINZA, FLORDELIZA C. DE
VERA, MA. MARGIE G. MIRALLES,
MILAGROS M. ESTABILLO,
ANGELICA D. BINGCO, ROSFELIZ
GEMINI CATIPAY, CHERRYL C.
MIRHAN, ROGER S. BERNAL,
SAMUEL C. EGUIA, LIZA C.
SALVADOR, SLENDA CAGAS, MA.
FRANCISCA ANTONIO, EVELYN R.
SUMAYLO, LESLEY V.
ARGUELLES, for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children,

MATTHEW M. BRILLANTES,
PATRICIA GINGER C. VIDAL,
JELIZA G. AGUSTIN, ANGELO
JOSE G. ASTILLA, BRYAN
CHRISTOPHER P. BASCOS, RENEE
LOUISE L. PUNO, RUBEENA N.
CHAMACKALAYIL, KIMBERLY T.
FERNANDO, SHANAYAH R.
LORENZO, MICHAEL ADRIAND G.
YAMBAO, JOHANSSON EDWARD
DE GUZMAN, RANIER B.
CABARLES, JAELA MARIE
TALISIC, JANUS ROMELL N.
MARQUEZ, RYAN DAVID G.
SADAC, SHANAYAH R. LORENZO,
PAUL ORALLO, EMILSON RYAN
ANTES, GRACE ANN ERICKA LUI,
SOFIA MARIYA KYSHA
CAMACHO, BEATRICE COLLEEN
LIBERATO, CHLOE SOFIA SUN,
GELAH PANTALEON, JUSTINE
ELIZA N. ROCHA, EDRIN CLYDE T.
SANTOS, CONSTANCIO P. OROLFO
III, RONIN RIC GANALON, SOFIA
KAYLE LAZARO, DJ SALAZAR,
DAN PRECIOSO G. CRUZ, JULIE
ANNE LOI P. SONCUYA, RICCI
PAULINE CATHERINE J.
CAPISTRANO, PAUL ED JEREMY
M. ALVINEZ, JOSEPH C. RODELAS,

I~
 Decision 23 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

RONALD M. ANOS, JASON F.

ESPEJO, LAURA CHRISTINE C.
KATAPANG, KEITH GABRIEL
BADULIS, RON EDRICH RAMIREZ,
TOMMIE DANIEL DV. CRUZ,
DENISE ANN A. CALORACAN,
ELLA MAE B. ESPIQUE,
ROSEMARY KEITHLEY A.
OBNIAL, RONALDO B. REYES, JR.
& ANNA LETICIA B. REYES,
CARYLLE ALEX E. BALLELOS,
JACKLORENZ A. RIVERA, KARL
ADRIAN TABIOS, BREN
CHRISTIAN B. CUSTODIO, SHANIA
CIDER ANDRADE, CARL JUSTINE
MIRANDA, ERIN MARIANO,
DENISE NICOLE CUARTERO,
GRANT PAUL LAURETA, MA.
PATRICIA ANN P. ANISTA, MARDI
LOUISE ABAINZA, JAYLORD
MOSES C. DE VERA, HANNAH
MARIE MIRALLES, SANREE M.
ESTABILLO, GIO ANN TRINIDAD
BINGCO, ARFEL DOMINICK B.
CATIPAY, KITH CEAZAR MIRHAN,
JEAN RYAN A. BERNAL,
SAMANTHA NICOLE EGUIA;

OFFICERS OF THE MANILA

SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL
FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES
CLUB, represented by: ISAAC ALI
TAPAR,RUTHDAYRIT,RAYMOND
APOSTOL, GINAROSE HABAL,
CYNTHIA LYNNE CAUZON,
ANABELLE BAYSIC, CRISTINA
RICO, KRISTIN MACARANAS,
ROMEO BINAMIRA,

And THE CLASS HEREIN

REPRESENTED,
Petitioners,

- versus -

PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C.

~
 Decision 24 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

AQUINO III, DEPT. OF EDUCATION

SECRETARY BR. ARMIN LUISTRO,
NCR REGIONAL DIRECTOR LUZ S.
ALMEDA, MANILA SCHOOLS
DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
PRISCILA C. DE SAGUN, MANILA
SCIENCE IDGH SCHOOL
PRINCIPAL MARIA EVA S.
NACION, SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES SPEAKER
FELICIANO R. BELMONTE,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - ---------------------x
DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Doon sa ang trono 'y ginawa ng dunong, bagong kabataa '.Y sadyang
umuusbong, mga kamalia '.Y kanyang natutunton, at dangal ng diwa ang
pinayayabong; ang liig ng bisyo '.Y kanyang napuputol; sala '.Y namumutla
kung nasasalubong: sinusupil niya ang bansang ulupong, at hangal mang
tao '.Y kanyang inaampon.

- Jose Rizal 1

Before the Court are consolidated petitions under Rule 65, assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10533 2 (K to 12 Law), RA No.
10157 3 (Kindergarten Education Act), and related issuances of the
Department of Education (DepEd), Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) implementing the K
to 12 Basic Education Program.

History of the Philippines' Basic

Education System

On January 21, 1901, the Philippine Commission created the

Translation from Spanish into Filipino of Jose Rizal's poem Par la Educacion Recibe Lustre la Patria
(Dahil sa Karununga '.Y Nagkakaroon ng Kinang ang Bayan) written in April 1876 originally published
by the Jose Rizal Centennial Commission in 1961 (Rizal's Centennial) and reprinted by the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines in 1995 and 2008 respectively.
AN ACT ENHANCING THE PHILIPPINE BASIC EDUCATION SYSTEM BY STRENGTHENING ITS CURRICULUM
AND INCREASING THE NUMBER OF YEARS FOR BASIC EDUCATION, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, May 15, 2013.
AN ACT INSTITUTIONALIZING THE KINDERGARTEN EDU CA TJON INTO THE BASIC EDUCATION SYSTEM
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, January 20, 2012.

i~
 Decision 25 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Department of Public Instruction4 through Act No. 74 5• All schools

established under the auspices of the Military Government were made under
the control of the officers of the Department of Public Instruction 6 and as early
as this law, the primary education established through it was considered free. 7
Act No. 74 also made English language as the basis of all public school
instruction8 and allowed optional religious instruction in all schools. 9

On March 10, 1917, Act No. 2706 10 was passed mandating the
recognition and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of
Public Instruction in order to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all
private schools and colleges. 11 The authority of the Secretary over private
schools and colleges was later on expanded under Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 180 12 • The Secretary was vested with the power "to supervise, inspect and
regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of
instruction given in the same." 13

The concept of free public primary instruction was also enshrined in the
1935 Philippine Constitution. Specifically, the State's interest in a complete
and adequate system of public education was stated in Section 5, Article XIV:

SEC. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision

of and subject to regulation by the State. The Government shall
establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public
education, and shall provide at least free public primary instruction,
and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to
develop moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and
vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of citizenship. Optional
religious instruction shall be maintained in the public schools as now
authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall enjoy
academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and
letters for specially gifted citizens. (Emphasis supplied)

On August 7, 1940, CA No. 586, 14 otherwise known as the Educational

Act of 1940, was enacted to comply with the constitutional mandate on free

4
Act No. 74, Sec. l.
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND
APPROPRIATING FORTY THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND MAINTENANCE OF A
NORMAL AND A TRADE SCHOOL IN MANILA, AND FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR THE ORGANIZATION
AND MAINTENANCE OF AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL IN THE ISLAND OF NEGROS FOR THE YEAR NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND ONE, January 21, 1901.
6
Act No. 74, Sec. 2.
Id.
Id., Sec. 14.
Id., Sec. 16.
10
AN ACT MAKING THE INSPECTION AND RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES
OBLIGATORY FOR THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, March IO,
1917.
11
Act No. 2706, Sec. 1.
12
AN ACT TO AMEND SECTIONS 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 AND I2 OF ACT No. 2706, AS AMENDED BY ACT No. 3075,
November 13, 1936.
13
CA No. 180, Sec. I.
14
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE REVISION OF THE SYSTEM OF PUBLIC ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN THE
PHILIPPINES INCLUDING THE FINANCING THEREOF, August 7, 1940.

I~
 ''

Decision 26 G.R.Nos.21693~217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

public primary education. This resulted in the revision of the public

elementary system, 15 which had the following objectives:
x x x (a) to simplify, shorten, and render more practical and
economical both the primary and intermediate courses of instruction so as
to place the same within the reach of the largest possible number of school
children; (b) to afford every child of school age adequate facilities to
commence and complete at least the primary course of instruction; (c) to
give every child completing the primary course an adequate working
knowledge of reading and writing, the fundamentals of arithmetic,
geography, Philippine history and government, and character and civic
training; and (d) to insure that all children attending the elementary schools
shall remain literate and become useful, upright and patriotic citizens. 16

To give effect to the foregoing objectives, the Department of Public

Instructions was authorized to revise the elementary school curriculum, to be
approved by the President, and adjust the academic school calendar to
coincide with the working season in the Philippines. 17 In addition, Section 4
set standards for the age of admission to public elementary schools and the
minimum length of time for the completion of primary and intermediate
courses, to wit:
SEC. 4. With the approval of the President of the Philippines, the
required age for admission to the public elementary schools may be raised
to not more than nine years and the length of time required for the
completion of the elementary instruction comprising both the primary and
intermediate courses reduced to not less than five years. Any increase that
may be approved in accordance with this section regarding the minimum
age of school children shall not affect those already enrolled before the
school year 1940-1941.

The law also made compulsory the attendance and completion of

elementary education, except when the child was mentally or physically
incapable of attending school or when it was inconvenient to do so considering
the means of transportation available or on account of economic condition of
the parents the child could not afford to continue in school. 18 The parents or
guardians or those having control of children therein required to attend school
without justification were liable to a fine of not less than twenty nor more than
fifty pesos. 19

In 1947, Executive Order (EO) No. 94 20 was issued renaming the

Department of Instructions to the Department of Education.

15
COM. ACT No. 586, Sec. 2.
ic, Id.
17
Id., Section 3.
18
Id., Sec. 5.
19 Id.
20
REORGANIZING THE DIFFERENT EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS, OFFICES, AND AGENCIES OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MAKING CERTAIN READJUSTMENTS OF PERSONNEL
AND REALLOTMENTS OF FUNDS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, October 4,
1947.

~
 Decision 27 G.R.N"os.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

In 1953, RA No. 896 21 or the Elementary Education Act of 1953 was

passed, again revising the elementary school system and instituting a primary
course composed of Grades I to IV, and an intermediate course composed of
Grades V to VII, thus:

SEC. 3. To put into effect the educational policy established by this

Act, the Department of Education is hereby authorized to revise the
elementary-school system on the following basis: The primary course shall
be composed of four grades (Grades I to IV) and the intermediate course of
·three grades (Grade V to VII). Pupils who are in the sixth grade of the time
this Act goes into effect will not be required to complete the seventh grade
before being eligible to enroll in the first year of the secondary school:
Provided, That they shall be allowed to elect to enroll in Grade VII if they
so desire.

This law also made the enrollment and completion of elementary

education mandatory. 22 Every parent or guardian or other person having
custody of any child was required to enroll such child in a public school upon
attaining seven years of age except when: (1) the child enrolled in or
transferred in a private school, (2) the distance from the home of the child to
the nearest public school exceeded three kilometers or the said public school
was not safely or conveniently accessible, (3) on account of indigence, the
child could not afford to be in school, ( 4) child could not be accommodated
because of excess enrollment, and (5) child was being homeschooled, under
the conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Education. 23

The revision of the elementary school system was guided by the policy
stated in Section 5, Article XIV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution and with
the consideration that it was "the main function of the elementary school to
develop healthy citizens of good moral character, equipped with the
knowledge, habits, and ideals needed for a happy and useful home and
community life." 24

In 1972, the Department of Education was again renamed to

Department of Education and Culture, through Proclamation No. 1081 ;25 and
was later on converted to Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978. 26

The 1973 Philippine Constitution maintained the State's interest in a

free public elementary education. This concept of free education was,
however, expanded to the secondary level, if the finances of the State
permitted it, thus:
Article XV
21
AN ACT TO DECLARE THE POLICY ON ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN THE PHILIPPINES, June 20, 1953.
22
RA No. 896, Sec. 5.
23 Id ..
24
RA No. 896, Sec. 2.
25
Historical Perspective of the Philippine Educational System, <http://www.deped.gov.ph/history> (last
accessed on September 28, 2018).
26
CONVERSION OF DEPARTMENTS INTO MINISTRIES, Presidential Decree No. 1397, June 2, 1978.

~
 ' '

Decision 28 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

SEC. 8. (1) All educational institutions shall be under the

supervision of, and subject to regulation by, the State. The State shall
establish and maintain a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the goals of national development.

xx xx

(5) The State shall maintain a system of free public elementary

education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain
a system of free public education at least up to the secondary level.
(Emphasis supplied)

Legislations under the 1973 Philippine Constitution implemented the

foregoing policies. In Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 232, 27 or the Education Act
of 1982, it was declared as a policy of the State "to establish and maintain a
complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to the goals
of national development." 28 And under BP Blg. 232, "Formal Education" was
defined as the hierarchically structured and chronologically graded learnings
organized and provided by the formal school system and for which
certification was required in order for the learner to progress through the
grades or move to higher levels." 29 It corresponded to (1) elementary
education, which was primarily concerned with providing basic education and
usually corresponds to six or seven years, including the preschool programs; 30
and (2) secondary education as "the state of formal education following the
elementary level concerned primarily with continuing basic education and
expanding it to include the learning of employable gainful skills, usually
corresponding to four years of high school." 31 This law also created the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, 32 which later on became the
Department of Education Culture and Sports by virtue ofEO No. 117. 33

As shown above, both the 193 5 and 1973 Philippine Constitution did
not state that education at any level was compulsory. This changed in the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which made elementary education mandatory, thus:
Article XIV

SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens
to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to
make such education accessible to all.

SEC. 2. The State shall:

xx xx

(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in

27
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF
EDUCATION, September 11, 1982.
28
B.P. 232, Section 3.
29
Id., Sec. 20.
30
Id., Sec. 20(1 ).
31
Id., Sec. 20(2). Emphasis supplied.
32
Title IV, Chapter I, Section 54, B.P. 232.
'' REORGANIZATION ACTOE THE MINISTRY OE EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, Janua<y 30, 1987. ~
 Decision 29 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the natural right
of parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for
all children of school age[.] (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequent legislations implemented the policies stated in the 1987

Philippine Constitution. Thus, secondary education was provided for free in
RA No. 6655, 34 otherwise known as the Free Public Secondary Education Act
of 1988. Under RA No. 6655, students in public high schools were free from
payment of tuition and other school fees. 35 And in response to the mandate of
the Constitution to promote and make quality education accessible to all
Filipino citizens, RA No. 6728, 36 otherwise known as Government Assistance
To Students and Teachers In Private Education Act, was enacted in 1989
where the voucher system under the Private Education Student Financial
Assistance Program (PESFA) 37 was implemented as follows:
SEC. 5. Tuition Fee Supplement for Student in Private High School.
- ( 1) Financial assistance for tuition for students in private high schools
shall be provided by the government through a voucher system in the
following manner:

(a) For students enrolled in schools charging less than one thousand
five hundred pesos (Pl,500) per year in tuition and other fees
during school year 1988-1989 or such amount in subsequent
years as may be determined from time to time by the State
Assistance Council: The Government shall provide them with a
voucher equal to two hundred ninety pesos (P290.00): Provided,
That the student pays in the 1989-1990 school year, tuition and
other fees equal to the tuition and other fees paid during the
preceding academic year: Provided, further, That the
Government shall reimburse the vouchers from the schools
concerned within sixty (60) days from the close of the
registration period: Provided, furthermore, That the student's
family resides in the same city or province in which the high
school is located unless the student has been enrolled in that
school during the previous academic year.

(b) For students enrolled in schools charging above one thousand

five hundred pesos (Pl,500) per year in tuition and other fees
during the school year 1988-1989 or such amount in subsequent
years as may be determined from time to time by the State
Assistance Council, no assistance for tuition fees shall be
granted by the Government: Provided, however, That the
schools concerned may raise their tuition fees subject to Section
10 hereof.

(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall
be granted and tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be increased, on the
condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount subsidized allotted for

34
AN ACT ESTABLISHING AND PROVIDING FOR A FREE PUBLIC SECONDARY EDUCATION AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES, May 26, 1988.
35
RA No. 6655, Sec. 4.
36
AN ACT PROVIDING GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO STUDENTS AND TEACHERS IN PRIVATE EDUCATION,
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, June 10, 1989.
37
RA No. 6728, Sec. 4(4).
 •
Decision 30 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries,
wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching
personnel except administrators who are principal stockholders of the
school, and may be used to cover increases as provided for in the collective
bargaining agreements existing or in force at the time when this Act is
approved and made effective: Provided, That government subsidies are not
used directly for salaries of teachers of non-secular subjects. At least twenty
percent (20%) shall go to the improvement or modernization of buildings,
equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the
payment of other costs of operation. For this purpose, school shall maintain
a separate record of accounts for all assistance received from the
government, any tuition fee increase, and the detailed disposition and use
thereof, which record shall be made available for periodic inspection as may
be determined by the State Assistance Council, during business hours, by
the faculty, the non-teaching personnel, students of the school concerned,
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and other concerned
government agencies.

The voucher system was expanded in RA No. 8545, 38 or the Expanded

Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act,
as follows:
SEC. 5. Tuition Fee Supplements for Students in Private High
Schools. - (1) Financial Assistance for tuition for students in private high
schools shall be provided by the government through a voucher system in
the following manner:

(a) For students enrolled in schools charging an amount as may be

determined by the State Assistance Council, the government shall provide
them with a voucher in such an amount as may be determined by the
council: Provided, That the government shall reimburse the vouchers from
the schools concerned within one hundred twenty (120) days from the close
of the registration period.

(2) Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraph (a) shall be

guaranteed to all private high schools participating in the program for a
number of slots as of the effectivity of this Act as the total number of
students who availed of tuition fee supplements for school year 1997-1998:
Provided, That the State Assistance Council may in subsequent years
determine additional slots and/or additional participating high schools as
may be deemed necessary.

In the same law, elementary and secondary education were redefined.

Elementary education was the first six (6) years of basic education, excluding
pre-school and grade seven; 39 while secondary education was the next four (4)
years after completion of basic education. 40

38
AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6728, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PROVIDING
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO STUDENTS AND TEACHERS IN PRIVATE EDUCATION AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR," ESTABLISHING A FUND FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUBSIDIZING SALARIES OF PRIVATE
SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, February 24, 1998.
39
RA No. 8545, Sec. 2.
4o Id.

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 Decision 31 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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In 2001, RA No. 8980 41 or the Early Childhood Care and Development

(ECCD) Act was implemented. This law established a national ECCD system
which "refers to the full range of health, nutrition, early education and social
services programs that provide for the basic holistic needs of young children
from birth to age six (6), to promote their optimum growth and
development." 42 These programs include, among others, optional center-
based and home-based early childhood education. 43

In the same year, RA No. 9155 44 or the Governance ofBasic Education

Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 2 thereof declared it as a State policy "to
protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality basic education and to
make such education accessible to all by providing all Filipino children a free
and compulsory education in the elementary level and free education in the
high school level. " 45 Basic education was defined in this law as "the education
intended to meet basic learning needs which lays the foundation on which
subsequent learning can be based. It encompasses early childhood, elementary
and high school education as well as alternative learning systems for out-of-
school youth and adult learners and includes education for those with special
needs. " 46 It was also in this law where the then Department of Education
Culture and Sports was renamed the DepEd. 47

Education for All 2015 and the

Kindergarten Education Act

In 2000, at the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, one hundred

sixty four ( 164) governments, including the Philippines, pledged to achieve,
by 2015, the following six (6) Education for All (EFA) goals: (1) expansion
and improvement of early childhood care and education; (2) universal access
to complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality; (3)
equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills program for youth and
adult; (4) improvement of levels of adult literacy, especially for women; ( 5)
gender parity and equality in education; and ( 6) improvement of all aspects of
the quality of education and ensuring their excellence. 48

In consonance with the country's agreement to achieve these goals, the

DepEd, in 2002, undertook the preparation of the Philippine EF A 2015 Plan
of Action, in collaboration with various stakeholders at the national and field
41
AN ACT PROMULGATING A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY AND A NATIONAL SYSTEM FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD
CARE AND DEVELOPMENT (ECCD), PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, December
5, 2000.
42
RA No. 8980, Sec. 4(a).
43
Id., Sec. 4(a)(l) and (2).
44
AN ACT INSTITUTING A FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNANCE FOR BASIC EDUCATION, ESTABLISHING
AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, RENAMING THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS AS THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, August 11, 2001.
45
RA No. 9155, Sec. 2.
46
Id., Sec. 4(b).
47
Id., Sec. 6.
48
Education for All 2000-2015: Achievements and Challenges, UNESCO (2015), pp. xii-xiv,
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002322/232205e.pdt> (last accessed on September 28, 2018).

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 Decision 32 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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levels, including relevant government agencies and civil society groups. 49 The
primary goal of the Philippine EF A 2015 Plan of Action, which the
government officially adopted in 2006, 50 is to provide "basic competencies
for all that will bring about functional literacy. " 51 The Philippine EF A 2015
Plan of Action translated the sic (6) Dakar goals into four (4) objectives and
nine (9) critical tasks, to wit:

Universal Goals and Objectives of Philippine EFA 2015

1. Universal Coverage of out of school youth and adults in
providing learning needs;
2. Universal school participation and total elimination of dropouts
and repeaters in grades 1-3;
3. Universal completion of the full basic education cycle with
satisfactory annual achievement levels; and
4. Total community commitment to attain basic education
competencies for all.

Nine Urgent and Critical Tasks

1. Make every school continuously improve its performance.
2. Expand early childhood care and development coverage to yield
more EF A benefits.
3. Transform existing non-formal and informal learning options
into a truly viable alternative learning system yielding more
EF A benefits;
4. Get all teachers to continuously improve their teaching
practices.
5. Increase the cycle of schooling to reach 12 years of formal basic
education.
6. Continue enrichment of curriculum development in the context
of pillars of new functional literacy;
7. Provide adequate and stable public funding for country-wide
attainment of EF A goals;
8. Create network of community- based groups for local attainment
of EF A goals; Monitor progress in effort towards attainment of
EF A goals. 52

On January 20, 2012, the Philippine Congress took a pivotal step

towards the realization of the country's EFA goals with the enactment of the
Kindergarten Education Act. Section 2 thereof declared it the policy of the
State "to provide equal opportunities for all children to avail of accessible
mandatory and compulsory kindergarten education that effectively promotes
physical, social, intellectual, emotional and skills stimulation and values
formation to sufficiently prepare them for formal elementary schooling" and
"to make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs, cognitive
and cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity ofleamers, schools and

49
See DepEd Order No. 36, s. 2002, Education for All (EF A) 2015 Plan Preparation.
50
Rodriguez, Carolyn, Towards Achieving EFA Goals by 2015: The Philippine Scenario, available at
<http://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/cice/wp-content/uploads/2014/07 /JEF-E7- l 2.pdf.> (last accessed on
September 28, 2018).
51 Id.
51
Education for All, Coalition for Better Education, available at <http://www.cbephils.net/efa.html> (last
accessed on September 28, 2018).
 Decision 33 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and learning."

The Kindergarten Education Act institutionalized kindergarten

education, which is one ( 1) year of preparatory education for children at least
five years old, 53 as part of basic education, and is made mandatory and
compulsory for entrance to Grade 1. 54 It also mandated the use of the learner's
mother tongue, or the language first learned by a child, 55 as the primary
medium of instruction in the kindergarten level in public schools, except for
the following cases wherein the primary medium of instruction would be
determined by the DepEd:

a. When the pupils in the kindergarten classroom have different

mother tongues or when some of them speak another mother tongue;

b. When the teacher does not speak the mother tongue of the learners;

c. When resources, in line with the use of the mother tongue, are not
yet available; and

d. When teachers are not yet trained how to use the Mother Tongue-
Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) program. 56

On April 17, 2012, DepEd, in consultation with the Department of

Budget and Management, issued DepEd Order (DO) No. 32, 57 the
Kindergarten Education Act's implementing rules and regulations. DO No. 32
provides that the Kindergarten Education General Curriculum (KEGC) shall
focus on the child's total development according to his/her individual needs
and socio-cultural background. The KEGC shall be executed in a play-based
manner and shall address the unique needs of diverse learners, including
gifted children, children with disabilities, and children belonging to
indigenous groups. 58

The K to 12 Law and related

issuances.

. Before the enactment of the K to 12 Law, the Philippines was the only
country in Asia and among the three remaining countries in the world that had
a 10-year basic education program. 59 The expansion of the basic education
program, however, is an old proposal dating to 1925. The studies are as
follows: (a) the Monroe Survey (1925) stated that secondary education did
not prepare for life and recommended training in agriculture, commerce, and
53 RA No. 10157, Sec. 3(c).
54
Id., Sec. 4.
55
Id., Sec. 3(d).
56
Id., Sec. 5.
57
IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT (RA) NO. 10157 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
"THE KINDERGARTEN EDUCATION ACT", April 17, 2012.
58
DO No. 32, Sec. 8.
59
Discussion Paper on the Enhanced K+12 Basic Education Program (DepEd discussion paper), October
5, 2010, p. 4.

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 Decision 34 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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industry; (b) the Prosser Survey (1930) recommended to improve phases of

vocational education such as 7th grade shopwork, provincial schools, practical
arts training in the regular high schools, home economics, placement work,
gardening, and agricultural education; (c) the UNESCO Mission Survey
(1949) recommended the restoration of Grade 7; (d) the Education Act of 1953
mandated that the primary course be composed of four grades (Grades I to IV)
and the intermediate course of three grades (Grade V to VII); (e) the Swanson
Survey (1960) recommended the restoration of Grade 7; (j) Presidential
Commission to Survey Philippine Education (PCSPE) (1970) gave high
priority to the implementation of an 11-year program, consisting of six years
of compulsory elementary education and five years of secondary education;
(g) Congressional Commission on Education (EDCOM) Report (1991),
recommended that if one year was to be added, it might either be seven years
of elementary education or five years of secondary education; (h) Presidential
Commission on Educational Reforms (2000) proposed to include the
establishment of a one-year pre-baccalaureate system that would also bring
the Philippines at par with other countries; and (i) Presidential Task Force on
Education (2008) emphasized that in a 12-year pre-university program, it was
important "to specify the content of the 11th and the 12th years and benchmark
these with programs abroad." 60

Despite these proposals, the 10-year basic education cycle remained in

force. Thus, prior to the enactment of the K to 12 Law, the Philippines, joined
only by Djibouti and Angola, were the only countries in the world with a 10-
year basic education system. 61

To be at par with international standards and in line with the country's

commitment in EF A 2015, the Philippine Congress, on May 15, 2013, passed
the K to 12 Law, which took effect on June 8, 2013. The K to 12 Law seeks to
achieve, among others, the following objectives: (1) decongest the
curriculum; (2) prepare the students for higher education; (3) prepare the
students for the labor market; and (4) comply with global standards. 62

One of the salient features of the K to 12 Law is the expansion of basic

education from ten (10) years to thirteen (13) years, encompassing "at least
one ( 1) year of kindergarten education, six (6) years of elementary education,
and six (6) years of secondary education x x x. Secondary education includes
four (4) years of junior high school and two (2) years of senior high school
education. " 63

The K to 12 Law also adopts the following key changes in the Basic
Education Curriculum (BEC): (1) Mother Tongue (MT) will be used as a
60
Id. at 5-6.
61
Senate Economic Planning Office, K to 12: The Key to Quality Education (A Policy Brief), p. I,
<httpsJ/www.senate.gov.ph/publications'PB'%202011-02o/a2Cl°/a20K'%20too/a20120/a20The"/a20Keyo/a20to0/a20Quality.pdf>
(last accessed on September 28, 2018).
62
Id. at 4.
61
RA No. I 0533, Sec. 4.

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 Decision 35 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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primary medium of instruction from Kindergarten to Grade 3 and an

additional learning area in Grades 1 to 3; 64 (2) the time allotted per learning
area in elementary will generally be reduced to allow off-school learning
experiences at home or in the community; while the time allotment in
secondary level will generally increase in view of the additional two (2) years
in Senior High School; 65 (3) the spiral progression approach will be used in
Science, Mathematics, Araling Panlipunan, MAPEH and Edukasyon sa
Pagpapakatao, wherein the learning process is built upon previously learned
knowledge for students to master their desired competencies by revisiting the
subject several times and relating new knowledge or skills with the previous
one; 66 and (4) specialization courses will be offered to prepare students for
employment or engage in profitable enterprise after high school. 67

Apart from mastering core subjects, the additional two (2) years of
Senior High School will allow students to choose among academic, technical-
vocational, or sports and arts, as specialization, based on aptitude, interest and
school capacity. 68 Hence, graduates of Senior High School under the K to 12
BEC are envisioned to already be prepared for employment, entrepreneurship,
or middle-level skills development should they opt not to pursue college
education. 69

Furthermore, the K to 12 Law extends the benefits provided under RA

No. 8545 to qualified students. 70 DepEd is mandated to engage the services of
private education institutions and non-DepEd schools offering Senior High
School through the programs under RA No. 8545 and other financial
arrangements based on the principle of public-private partnership.

The K to 12 Law also imposes upon the DepEd, CHED, and TESDA,
the task to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations, which shall
provide, among others, appropriate strategies and mechanisms to ensure the
smooth transition from the existing 10-year basic education cycle to the K to
12 cycle addressing issues such as multi-year low enrollment and
displacement of faculty ofHigher Education Institutions (HEis) and Technical
Vocational Institutions (TVIs). 71

DepEd is likewise mandated to coordinate with TESDA and CHED in

designing the enhanced BEC to ensure college readiness and avoid remedial

64
K to 12 Toolkit: Reference Guide for Teacher Educators, School Administrators and Teachers (K to 12
Toolkit), 2012, pp. 20-2 I, <http://www.seameo-innotech.org/eNews/Kto 12Toolkit ao l 7july2012.pdt>
(last accessed on September 28, 2018).
65
Id. at 23 and 33.
66
Id. at 26.
67
Id. at 47.
68
See id. at 27-32.
69
Senate Economic Planning Office, K to 12: The Key to Quality Education (A Policy Brief), p. 5
<https:/!www.senate.gov.phlpublicationslPB%202011-02"/o20-%20Ko/o20to"/o2012<'/o20The°/o20Keyo/o20to"/o20Quality.pdf>
(last accessed on September 28, 2018).
70
RA No. 10533, Sec. 10.
71

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Id., Sec. 12 and 16.
 Decision 36 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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and duplication of basic education subjects; 72 and to consult other national

government agencies and other stakeholders in developing the K to 12 BEC,
which shall adhere to the following standards:
(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and
developmentally appropriate;

(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;

(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;

(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;

(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are

constructivist, inquiry-based, reflective, collaborative and integrative;

(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of Mother
Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) which starts from
where the learners are and from what they already knew proceeding
from the known to the unknown; instructional materials and capable
teachers to implement the MTB-MLE curriculum shall be available;

(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to ensure
mastery of knowledge and skills after each level; and

(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow schools to
localize, indigenize and enhance the same based on their respective
educational and social contexts. The production and development of
locally produced teaching materials shall be encouraged and approval
of these materials shall devolve to the regional and division education
units. 73

On September 4, 2013, the K to 12 implementing rules and regulation

(K to 12 IRR) were issued. 74 Rule VI of the K to 12 IRR covers the
implementation of RA No. 8545 for qualified students enrolled in senior high
school. The programs of assistance are available primarily to students who
complete junior high school in public schools and taking into consideration
other factors such as income background and financial needs of the students. 75
The forms of assistance that the DepEd may provide include a voucher
system, "where government issues a coupon directly to students to enable
them to enroll in eligible private education institutions or non-DepEd public
schools of their choice under a full or partial tuition or schooling subsidy". 76

Further, Section 31 of the K to 12 IRR confers upon the DepEd, in

collaboration with the DOLE, CHED and TESDA, the duty to promulgate the
appropriate joint administrative issuance to ensure the sustainability of the
private and public educational institutions, and the promotion and protection
of the rights, interests and welfare of teaching and non-teaching personnel.
72
Id., Sec. 5.
73 Id.
74
DO No. 43, s. 2013.
75
K to 12 IRR, Sec. 22.
76
Id., Sec. 23.
 Decision 37 G.R.N"os.216930,217451,217752,
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For this purpose, the DOLE was tasked to convene a technical panel with
representatives from the DepEd, CHED, TESDA and representatives from
both teaching and non-teaching personnel organizations, and administrators
of educational institutions. 77

In compliance with the foregoing mandate, DOLE organized three area-

wide tripartite education fora on K to 12 in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
DOLE also conducted regional consultations with HEis, teaching and non-
teaching personnel. 78

As a result of the tripartite consultations, DOLE, DepEd, TESDA and

CHED issued on May 30, 2014 the Joint Guidelines on the Implementation of
the Labor and Management Component of Republic Act No. 10533 (Joint
Guidelines). The Joint Guidelines was issued to (a) ensure the sustainability
of private and public educational institutions; (b) protect the rights, interests,
and welfare of teaching and non-teaching personnel; and (c) optimize
employment retention or prevent, to the extent possible, displacement of
faculty and non-academic personnel in private and public HEis during the
transition from the existing 10 years basic education cycle to the enhanced K
to 12 basic education. 79

To achieve these goals, the Joint Guidelines provides that the following,
in the exercise of management prerogative, shall be observed:

a. ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-

making processes affecting their rights, duties, and welfare;

b. the DepEd and private educational institutions may hire, as

may be relevant to the particular subject, graduates of
science, mathematics, statistics, engineering, music and
other degree courses needed to teach in their specialized
subjects in elementary and secondary education, provided
they passed the Licensure Examination for Teachers;

c. graduates of technical-vocational courses may teach in their

specialized subjects in secondary education, provided that
they possess the necessary certification from TESDA and
undergo in-service training;

d. the DepEd and private educational institutions may hire

practitioners, with expertise in the specialized learning areas,
to teach in the secondary level, provided that they teach on
part-time basis only;

e. faculty of HEis offering secondary education shall be given

77
Id., Sec. 31.
78
See rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 2, pp. 1185-1225.
79
Joint Guidelines, Sec. 3.
 Decision 38 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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priority in hiring, provided said faculty is a holder of a

relevant Bachelor's degree and must have satisfactorily
served as a full time HEI faculty;

f. if it is impossible for the affected HEI faculty members and

academic support personnel to be placed within the
institution, they shall be prioritized in hiring in other private
and public senior high schools (SHS);
g. faculty of HEis may be allowed to teach in their general
education or subject specialties in secondary education,
provided said faculty is a holder of a relevant Bachelor's
degree and must have satisfactorily served as a full time HEI
faculty;

h. without prejudice to existing collective bargaining

agreements or institutional policies, HEI faculty and non-
teaching personnel who may not be considered may avail of
the retrenchment program pursuant to the provisions of the
Labor Code; and

i. in educational institutions where there is no collective

agreement or organized labor union, management may adopt
policies in consultation with faculty or non-academic clubs
or associations in the school consistent and in accordance
with the aforementioned criteria. 80

K to 12 Program Implementation and

CHED Memorandum Order (CMO)
No. 20, Series of 2013

The K to 12 basic education was implemented in parts. Universal

kindergarten was offered starting School Year (SY) 2011-2012. 81 In 2012,
DepEd started unclogging the BEC to conform to the K to 12 Curriculum.
Thus, DO No. 31 was issued setting forth policy guidelines in the
implementation of the Grades 1 to 10 of the K to 12 Curriculum. DO No. 31
provides that effective SY 2012-2013, the new K to 12 BEC, which follows a
spiral approach across subjects and uses the mother tongue as a medium of
instruction from Grades 1 to 3, shall be first implemented in Grades 1 and 7
of all public elementary and secondary schools; and while private schools are
enjoined to do the same, they may further enhance the curriculum to suit their
school's vision/mission. 82

Five (5) school years from SY 2012-2013, the implementation of the K

to 12 basic education was to be completed. In 2018, the first group of Grade

so Id.
81
K to 12 Toolkit, p. 14.
82
See DO No. 31.

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 Decision 39 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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6 and Grade 12 students under the K to 12 BEC are set to graduate.

Accordingly, to accommodate the changes brought about by the K to

12 Law, and after several public consultations with stakeholders were held, 83
CMO No. 20, entitled General Education Curriculum: Holistic
Understandings, Intellectual and Civic Competencies was issued on June 28,
2013. CMO No. 20 provides the framework and rationale of the revised
General Education (GE) curriculum. It sets the minimum standards for the GE
component of all degree programs that applies to private and public HEis in
the country. 84

Previously, there were two General Education Curricula (GECs), GEC-

A and GEC-B. CMO No. 59, Series of 1996 provided for GEC-A, which
required 63 units divided into 24 units of language and literature, 15 units of
mathematics and natural sciences, 6 units of humanities, 12 units of social
sciences, and 6 units of mandated subjects. This was taken by students
majoring in the humanities, social sciences, or communication. Meanwhile,
CMO No. 4, series of 1997 implemented GEC-B, which was taken by all other
students. GEC-B required 51 units divided into 21 units of language and
humanities, 15 units of mathematics, natural sciences, and information
technology, 12 units of social sciences, and 3 units of mandated subjects.

Under CMO No. 20, the GE curriculum became outcome-oriented and

categorized into: (a) Intellectual Competencies; (b) Personal and Civic
Competencies; and (c) Practical Responsibilities. 85 This GE curriculum
requires the completion of 36 units as compared to the previous 63/51 units
requirement. These 36 units are distributed as follows: 24 units of core
courses; 9 units of elective courses; and 3 units on the life and works of
Rizal. 86 The required GE core courses are: (1) Understanding the Self; (2)
Readings in Philippine History; (3) The Contemporary World; (4)
Mathematics in the Modem World; (5) Purposive Communication; (6) Art
Appreciation; (7) Science, Technology and Society; and (8) Ethics. 87 Further,
the GE curriculum provided an element of choice88 through elective courses
which include the following: (1) Mathematics, Science and Technology; (2)
Social Sciences and Philosophy; and (3) Arts and Humanities. 89

The Petitions

Claiming that the K to 12 Basic Education Program violates various

constitutional provisions, the following petitions were filed before the Court
praying that the Kindergarten Education Act, K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO

83
Rollo (G.R. No. 217451), Vol. I, pp. 6-7.
84
Background and Rationale, CHED MO No. 20, s. of2013.
85
CMO No. 20, Sec. 2.
86
Id., Sec. 3.
87 Id.
88
Id., Appendix E.
89
Id., Sec. 4.
 Decision 40 G.R. Nos. 216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

No. 31, Joint Guidelines, and CMO No. 20, be declared unconstitutional:

1. Petition for Certiorari90 filed by Council for Teachers and Staff of

Colleges and Universities of the Philippines and several other
organizations duly organized under Philippine laws, representing
faculty and staff of colleges and universities in the Philippines,
docketed as G.R. No. 216930;

2. Petition to Declare Republic Act No. 10533, otherwise known as the

"Enhanced Basic Education Act of 2013, " as Unconstitutional
and/or Illegal 91 filed by petitioners Antonio "Sonny" Trillanes, Gary
C. Alejano, and Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers, and members of Congress, docketed as G.R. No.
217752;

3. Petition to Declare Unconstitutional, Null, Void, and Invalid Certain

Provisions ofR.A. No. 10533 And Related Department of Education
(DepEd) Implementing Rules and Regulations, Guidelines or
Orders 92 filed by petitioners Eduardo R. Alicias, Jr. and Aurelio P.
Ramos, Jr., in their capacities as citizen, taxpayer, parent and
educator, docketed as G.R. No. 218045;

4. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus 93 filed by

petitioner Richard Troy A. Colmenares in his capacity as citizen
invoking strong public interest and transcendental importance,
petitioners Kathlea Francynn Gawani D. Yafi.got and several others,
as a class, and on behalf of others who stand to suffer direct injury
as a result of the implementation of the K to 12 Basic Education
Program, and petitioners Rene Luis Tadle and several others, in their
capacities as taxpayers concerned that public funds are being
illegally and improperly disbursed through the enforcement of the
invalid or unconstitutional laws and issuances, docketed as G.R. No.
218098;

5. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 94 docketed as G.R. No.

218123, filed by Antonio Tinio, et al., suing in their capacities as
taxpayers and concerned citizens;

6. Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus 95 filed by

petitioners Spouses Ma. Dolores M. Brillantes and Severo L.
Brillantes and several others, as students, parents and teachers, who

90
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. I, pp. 7-389, including Annexes.
91
Rollo (G.R. No. 217752), Vol. I, pp. 3-113, including Annexes.
92
Rollo (G .R. No. 218045), Vol. 1, pp. 3-168, including Annexes.
93
Rollo (G.R. No. 2 I 8098) Vol. 1, pp. 3 -194, including Annexes.
94
Rollo (G.R. No. 218123) Vol. 1, pp. 3-477, including Annexes.

~
95
Rollo (G.R. No. 218465) Vol. 1, pp. 3-125, including Annexes.
 Decision 41 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

stand to suffer direct injury from the K to 12 BEC and

implementation of the two (2) additional years of high school,
docketed as G.R. No. 218465; and

7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Dr. Bienvenido

Lumbera and several others who are faculty and staff of colleges and
universities in the Philippines who stand to suffer direct injury in the
implementation of CMO No. 20 and Congressman Antonio Tinio
and other party-list representatives in their capacities as members of
the Congress, who are also collectively suing in their capacities as
taxpayers and concerned citizens, docketed as G.R. No. 217451. 96

The present consolidated petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the
implementation of the K to 12 Law and other administrative issuances in
relation thereto.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the public respondents, opposed

these petitions. 97 Private respondent Miriam College in G.R. No. 216930 also
filed its Comment/Opposition. 98

On April 21, 2015, the Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 217451,
enjoining the implementation ofCMO No. 20 insofar only as it excluded from
the curriculum for college the course Filipino and Panitikan as core courses. 99

However, in G.R. Nos. 216930, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218923 and

218465, the Court denied petitioners' prayer for issuance ofTRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction on the implementation of the K to 12 Law, its
implementing rules, the Kindergarten Education Act, and other administrative
issuances in relation thereto, for lack of merit. 100

In the Resolutions dated April 5, 2016 101 and April 12, 2016, 102 the
Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The Issues

Culled from the submissions of petitioners, public respondents, through

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and respondent Miriam College,
the following are the issues for the Court's resolution:

96
Rollo (G.R. No. 217451) Vol. 1, pp. 3-343.
97
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 1, pp. 511-607; Vol. 2, pp. 820-1272; Vol. 3, pp. 1273-1656.
98
Rollo (G.R. No. 216903), Vol. 2, pp. 459-491.
99
Rollo (G.R. No. 217451), Vol. 1, pp. 350-356.
100
See Resolution dated March 15, 2016, rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 3, pp. 1782-G to 1782-1.
101
Resolution dated April 5, 2016, id. at 1803-A to 1803-C.
102

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Resolution dated April 12, 2016, rollo (G.R. No. 217451), Vol. 2, pp. 1252-1253.
Decision 42 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

A. Procedural:

1. Whether the Court may exercise its power ofjudicial review over
the controversy;

2. Whether certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are proper

remedies to assail the laws and issuances.

B. Substantive:

1. Whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted;

2. Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of

legislative power;

3. Whether DO No. 31 is valid and enforceable;

4. Whether the K to 12 Law, K to 12 IRR, DO No. 31 and/or the

Joint Guidelines contravene provisions of the Philippine
Constitution on:

a. establishing and maintaining a system of free elementary and

high school education and making elementary education
compulsory for all children of school age (Section 2[2],
Article XIV);

b. the right to accessible and quality education at all levels and

duty of the State to make such education accessible to all
(Section 1, Article XIV);

c. the primary duty of parents to rear and prepare their children

(Section 2[2], Article XIV);

d. the right of every citizen to select a profession or course of

study (Section 5[3], Article XIV);

e. patriotism and nationalism (Sections 13 and 17, Article II,

Section 3[1] and [2], Article XIV);

f. the use of Filipino as medium of official communication and

as language of instruction in the educational system (Section
6, Article XIV); and regional languages as auxiliary media of
instruction (Section 7, Article XIV);

g. academic freedom (Section 5[2], Article XIV); and

h. the right of labor to full protection (Section 18, Article II,

Section 3, Article XIII and Section 5 [4], Article XIV);

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 Decision 43 G.R.Nos. 216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

5. Whether CMO No. 20 contravenes provisions of the Philippine

Constitution on:

a. the use of Filipino as medium of official communication and

as language of instruction in the educational system (Section
6, Article XIV);
b. preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino
national culture (Sections 14, 15, and 16, Article XIV);
c. inclusion of the study of the Philippine Constitution as part of
the curriculum of all educational institutions (Section 3 [ 1],
Article XIV);

d. giving priority to education to foster patriotism and

nationalism (Section 17, Article II and Sections 2 and 3,
Article XIV); and

e. the protection of the rights of workers and promotion of their

welfare (Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII).

6. Whether CMO No. 20 violates the following laws:

a. RA No. 7104 or the Commission on the Filipino Language

Act
'

b. BP Big. 232 or the Education Act of 1982; and

c. RA No. 7356 or the Act Creating the National

Commission for Culture and the Arts, Establishing
National Endowment Fund for Culture and the Arts and
For Other Purposes.

7. Whether the K to 12 Law violates petitioners' right to substantive

due process and equal protection of the laws.

THE COURT'S RULING

Procedural Issues

Power of Judicial Review and the

Remedies of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus

The OSG submits that the cases filed by petitioners involve the
resolution of purely political questions which go into the wisdom of the law:
they raise questions that are clearly political and non-justiciable and outside

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 Decision 44 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

the power of judicial review. 103 The OSG further asserts that the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition sought by petitioners are unwarranted because
Congress, DepEd and CHED did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function, nor did they unlawfully neglect the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, with regard to the assailed
issuances. 104

The Court disagrees.

The political question doctrine is "no longer the insurmountable

obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review" 105
under the expanded definition of judicial power of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Section 1, Article VIII thereof authorizes courts of justice not
only "to settle actual case controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In determining whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess

or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality
of the government, the Court is guided primarily, by the Constitution, and
secondarily, by existing domestic and international law, which set limits or
conditions to the powers and functions conferred upon these political
bodies. 106 Thus, when a case is brought before the Court with serious
allegations that a law or executive issuance infringes upon the Constitution,
as in these consolidated cases, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the Court to settle the dispute. 107 In doing so, the Court is "not judging
the wisdom of an act of a coequal department, but is merely ensuring that the
Constitution is upheld." 108 And, if after said review, the Court does not find
any constitutional infringement, then, it has no more authority to proscribe the
actions under review. 109

Moreover, that the assailed laws and executive issuances did not
involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial function is of no moment.
Contrary to the Solicitor General's assertion, it has long been judicially settled
that under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, the writs of certiorari and

103
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 4, pp. 1953-1962.
104
Id. at 1943-1952.
105
Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., 777 Phil. 280, 347-348 (2016), citing Oposa v. Factoran, 296 Phil. 694, 718
(1993).
106
See Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 904 (2003).
107
See Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan v. Executive
Secretary, 685 Phil. 295, 307 (2012); Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the
Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 589 Phil. 387, 486 (2008); Tanada v. Angara, 338 Phil.
546, 574 (1997).
108
See J. Panganiban, Separate Concurring Opinion in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra
note 106, at 975.
109
Sps. Im bong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1, 121 (2014).

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 Decision 45 G.R.Nos. 216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to

review and/or prohibit or nullify, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. 110

That said, the Court's power is not unbridled authority to review just
any claim of constitutional violation or grave abuse of discretion. The
following requisites must first be complied with before the Court may exercise
its power of judicial review, namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a personal and
substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of
constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the very lis mota of the case. 111 Of these four, the most important
are the first two requisites, and thus will be the focus of the following
discussion.

Actual case or controversy

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal

rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution
as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute since the
courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions. 112 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of "ripeness," and a question is ripe when the act being
challenged has a direct effect on the individual challenging it. 113 For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had been
accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court
may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. 114

Relevantly, in Sps. lmbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 115 (lmbong) where the

constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Law was challenged, the Court
found that an actual case or controversy existed and that the same was ripe for
judicial determination considering that the RH Law and its implementing
rules had already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law had already been passed. Moreover, the petitioners therein had
sufficiently shown that they were in danger of sustaining some direct injury

110
Jardeleza v. Sereno, 741 Phil. 460, 491 (2014), citing Arau/lo v. Aquino, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014);
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 757 Phil. 534, 544 (2015).
111
Roy 111 v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016, 810 SCRA 1, 31.
112
Roy I!lv. Herbosa, id. at 32, citing Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 721Phil.416, 519-520 (2013).
113
Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., id. at 519; Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government, G.R.
Nos. 218406, 218761, 204355, 218407 & 204354, November 29, 2016, 811SCRA284, 297.
114
Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., id. at 519-520; Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government, id.
115
Supra note 109.

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 Decision 46 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

as a result of the act complained of. 116

Similar to lmbong, these consolidated cases present an actual case or

controversy that is ripe for adjudication. The assailed laws and executive
issuances have already taken effect and petitioners herein, who are faculty
members, students and parents, are individuals directly and considerably
affected by their implementation.

Legal Standing

Legal standing refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such

that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. 117 In constitutional cases, which are often
brought through public actions and the relief prayed for is likely to affect other
persons, 118 non-traditional plaintiffs have been given standing by this Court
provided specific requirements have been met. 119

When suing as a concerned citizen, the person complaining must allege

that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he
is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 120

In the case of taxpayers, they are allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. 121

On the other hand, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the

prerogatives, powers, and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which infringe upon their legislative prerogatives. 122

An organization, asserting the rights of its members, may also be

granted standing by the Court. 123

Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 216930 and 218465 include

116
Id. at 124-125.
117
Galicto v. Aquino Ill, 683 Phil. 141, 170 (2012).
118
Province a/North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, supra note 107, at 486, citing Vicente V. Mendoza, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS 137 (2004); Osmei'ia I/Iv. Abaya, 778 Phil. 395, 417 (2016).
119
See Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on
Ancestral Domain, id. at 486-489; see also Osmei'ia Ill v. Abaya, id. at 417-421.
120
Province ofNorth Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, id. at 486, citing Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note I 06, at 895-896;
Osmei'ia Ill v. Abaya, id. at 419.
121
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 196 (2012); Osmefia III v. Abaya, id.
122
Osmena III v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp., 770 Phil. 409, 427 (2015).
123
Osmei'ia Ill v. Abaya, supra note 118, at 419-420.

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 Decision 47 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

organizations/federations duly organized under the laws of the Philippines,

representing the interest of the faculty and staff of their respective colleges
and universities, who allegedly are threatened to be demoted or removed from
employment with the implementation of the K to 12 Law. Petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 217752 and 218045 are suing as citizens, taxpayers and in their personal
capacities as parents whose children would be directly affected by the law in
question. Petitioners in G .R. Nos. 218123 and 217 451 are suing in their
capacities as teachers who allegedly are or will be negatively affected by the
implementation of the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20, respectively, through
job displacement and diminution of benefits; and as taxpayers who have the
right to challenge the K to 12 Law and CMO No. 20 as public funds are spent
and will be spent for its implementation.

Under the circumstances alleged in their respective petitions, the Court

finds that petitioners have sufficient legal interest in the outcome of the
controversy. And, considering that the instant cases involve issues on
education, which under the Constitution the State is mandated to promote and
protect, the stringent requirement of direct and substantial interest may be
dispensed with, and the mere fact that petitioners are concerned citizens
asserting a public right, sufficiently clothes them with legal standing to
initiate the instant petition. 124

Substantive Issues

I.

K to 12 Law was duly enacted

Petitioners question the validity of the enactment of the K to 12 Law

claiming that: (1) sectors which would be directly affected by the K to 12
Basic Education Program were deprived of their right, under Section 16,
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, to be consulted or participate in matters
which involved their interest prior to the passage of the law; 125 (2) the enrolled
bill which the President signed into law varies significantly from the
reconciled version of the bill as approved by Congress and reported in the
Senate Journal on January 30, 2013, 126 and that the Court, pursuant to its
ruling in Astorga v. Villegas, 127 (Astorga) should look into the entries in the
Journal to determine whether the K to 12 Law was duly enacted; 128 and (3)
the K to 12 Law was incomplete because it failed to provide sufficient
standards by which the DepEd, CHED and TESDA, might be guided in
addressing the possible impact of the implementation of the K to 12 Law on
labor; thus, Section 31 of the K to 12 !RR and the Joint Guidelines, which

124
See Francisco, Jr. v. House ofRepresentatives, supra note 106, at 896.
125 Rollo (G.R. No. 217752), Vol. 2, p. 1082.
126
Rollo (G.R. No. 218098), Vol. 2, pp. 1115-1137.
127
155 Phil. 656 (1974).
128
Rollo (G.R. No. 218098), Vol. 2, pp. 1131-1137.
 •

Decision 48 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

spring forth from such undue delegation of legislative power, are invalid and
unconstitutional. 129

For its part, the OSG contends that the K to 12 Law was enacted in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Constitution and that contrary
to petitioners' assertion, the text of the enrolled bill which was eventually
signed into law is not different from the consolidated bill drafted by the
Bicameral Conference Committee and approved by the Senate and House of
°
Representatives. 13 Further, the OSG argues that there is no undue delegation
of legislative power because the K to 12 Law provides a sufficient standard
on the impact on labor due to its implementation. 131

Private respondent Miriam College shares the same view that the K to
12 Law sufficiently provided standards to guide the relevant administrative
agencies and the private educational institutions in the implementation of the
K to 12 Law and address all issues on labor. 132

The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the K to 12

Law was validly enacted.

First, petitioners' claim of lack of prior consultations is belied by the

nationwide regional consultations conducted by DepEd pursuant DepEd
Memorandum Nos. 38 133 and 98, 134 series of2011. The regional consultations,
which aimed "to inform the public [and] to elicit their opinions, thoughts, and
suggestions about the K to 12 program," 135 ran from February to March 2011
and were participated in by students, parents, teachers and administrators,
government representatives, and representatives from private schools and
private sectors. 136

The Philippine Congress, in the course of drafting the K to 12 Law, also

conducted regional public hearings between March 2011 to February 2012,
wherein representatives from parents-teachers' organizations, business,
public/private school heads, civil society groups/non-government
organizations/private organizations and local government officials and staffs
were among the participants. 137 And even assuming that no consultations had
been made prior to the adoption of the K to 12, it has been held that the
"[p]enalty for failure on the part of the government to consult could only be
reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify government action." 138

129
Rollo (G.R. No. 217752), Vol. 2, pp. 1083-1088; rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 3, pp. 1866-1882.
130
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 4, pp. 1963-1973.
131
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 1, pp. 533-535.
m Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 4, pp. 2107-2114.
133
Regional Consultations on the Enhanced K+ 12 Basic Education Program, February 4, 2011; rollo (G.R.
No. 216930), Vol. 2, pp. 957-969.
134
Consultation Workshops on the K to 12 Curriculum Mapping Outputs, April 25, 2011; id. at 970-977.
135
K to 12 Consultations Report Executive Summary; id. at 978.
136 Id.
137
See id. at 997-1040.

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138
Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Ermita, 558 Phil. 338, 363 (2007).
 Decision 49 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the
"enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and
the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also
as to its due enactment. 139 The rationale behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests
on the consideration that "[t]he respect due to coequal and independent
departments requires the [Judiciary] to act upon that assurance, and to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;
leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, [as in the
instant consolidated cases], whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution." 140

Jurisprudence will show that the Court has consistently adhered to the
enrolled bill doctrine. Claims that the required three-fourths vote for
constitutional amendment has not been obtained, 141 that irregularities attended
the passage of the law, 142 that the tenor of the bill approved in Congress was
different from that signed by the President, 143 that an amendment was made
upon the last reading of the bill, 144 and even claims that the enrolled copy of
the bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been
"surreptitiously" inserted by the conference committee, 145 had all failed to
convince the Court to look beyond the four comers of the enrolled copy of the
bill.

As correctly pointed out by private respondent Miriam College,

petitioners' reliance on Astorga is quite misplaced. They overlooked that in
Astorga, the Senate President himself, who authenticated the bill, admitted a
mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider. 146 Without such attestation, and consequently there
being no enrolled bill to speak of, the Court was constrained to consult the
entries in the journal to determine whether the text of the bill signed by the
Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. 147

In stark contrast to Astorga, this case presents no exceptional

circumstance to justify the departure from the salutary rule. The K to 12 Law
was passed by the Senate and House of Representatives on January 20, 2013,
approved by the President on May 15, 2013, and, after publication, took effect
on June 8, 2013. Thus, there is no doubt as to the formal validity of the K to
12 Law.

139
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 343 Phil. 42, 71 (1997); see Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance, 305 Phil. 686, 752
(1994).
140
Arroyo v. De Venecia, id. at 72-73.
141
Mabanagv. Vito, 78 Phil. I (1947).
142
Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra note 139, at 72; Abakada Gura Party List v. Ermita, 506 Phil. 1, 88-89
(2005).
143
Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 117 Phil. 363 (1963).
144
The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 298 Phil. 502, 511 (1993).
145
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, supra note 139, at 753.
146
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, id.
147
Astorga v. Villegas, supra note 127, at 666-667.

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Decision 50 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

Third, there is no undue delegation of legislative power in the

enactment of the K to 12 Law.

In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation

of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete
in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. 148 The
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate must be set
forth therein. 149 The sufficient standard test, on the other hand, mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of
the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate's authority,
announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is
to be implemented. 150

The K to 12 Law adequately provides the legislative policy that it seeks

to implement. Section 2 of the K to 12 Law provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall establish, maintain
and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education
relevant to the needs of the people, the country and society-at-large.

Likewise, it is hereby declared the policy of the State that every

graduate of basic education shall be an empowered individual who has
learned, through a program that is rooted on sound educational principles
and geared towards excellence, the foundations for learning throughout life,
the competence to engage in work and be productive, the ability to coexist
in fruitful harmony with local and global communities, the capability to
engage in autonomous, creative, and critical thinking, and the capacity and
willingness to transform others and one's self.

For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education
system that will develop productive and responsible citizens equipped with
the essential competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning and
employment. In order to achieve this, the State shall:

(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education

that is globally competitive based on a pedagogically sound curriculum; that
is at par with international standards;

(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college

preparation, vocational and technical career opportunities as well as creative
arts, sports and entrepreneurial employment in a rapidly changing and
increasingly globalized environment; and

(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs,

cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity oflearners,

148
Disini, Jr. v. The Secretmy ofJustice, 727 Phil. 28, 144 (2014), citing Gerochi v. Department of Energy,
554 Phil. 563, 585 (2007).
149
Abakada Gura Party list v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246, 272 (2008).
1so Id.
 Decision 51 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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schools and communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and

learning, including mother tongue as a learning resource.

Moreover, scattered throughout the K to 12 Law are the standards to

guide the DepEd, CHED and TESDA in carrying out the provisions of the
law, from the development of the K to 12 BEC, to the hiring and training of
teaching personnel and to the formulation of appropriate strategies in order
to address the changes during the transition period.
SEC. 5. Curriculum Development. - The DepEd shall formulate
the design and details of the enhanced basic education curriculum. It shall
work with the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to craft
harmonized basic and tertiary curricula for the global competitiveness of
Filipino graduates. To ensure college readiness and to avoid remedial and
duplication of basic education subjects, the DepED shall coordinate with
the CHED and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA).

To achieve an effective enhanced basic education curriculum, the

DepED shall undertake consultations with other national government
agencies and other stakeholders including, but not limited to, the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC), the private and public schools associations,
the national student organizations, the national teacher organizations, the
parents-teachers associations and the chambers of commerce on matters
affecting the concerned stakeholders.

The DepED shall adhere to the following standards and principles

in developing the enhanced basic education curriculum:

(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and

developmentally appropriate;

(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;

(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;

(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;

(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are

constructivist, inquiry-based, reflective, collaborative and integrative;

(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of

Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) which starts
from where the learners are and from what they already knew proceeding
from the known to the unknown; instructional materials and capable
teachers to implement the MTB-MLE curriculum shall be available;

(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to

ensure mastery of knowledge and skills after each level; and

(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow

schools to localize, indigenize and enhance the same based on their
respective educational and social contexts. The production and
development of locally produced teaching materials shall be encouraged
and approval of these materials shall devolve to the regional and division

~·
 ' .
Decision 52 G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

education units.

xx xx

SEC. 7. Teacher Education and Training. - To ensure that the

enhanced basic education program meets the demand for quality teachers
and school leaders, the DepED and the CHED, in collaboration with
relevant partners in government, academe, industry, and nongovernmental
organizations, shall conduct teacher education and training programs, as
specified:

(a) In-service Training on Content and Pedagogy. - Current

DepED teachers shall be retrained to meet the content and performance
standards of the new K to 12 curriculum.

The DepED shall ensure that private education institutions shall be

given the opportunity to avail of such training.

(b) Training of New Teachers. - New graduates of the current

Teacher Education curriculum shall undergo additional training, upon
hiring, to upgrade their skills to the content standards of the new curriculum.
Furthermore, the CHED, in coordination with the DepED and relevant
stakeholders, shall ensure that the Teacher Education curriculum offered in
these Teacher Education Institutes (TEis) will meet the necessary quality
standards for new teachers. Duly recognized organizations acting as TEis,
in coordination with the DepED, the CHED, and other relevant
stakeholders, shall ensure that the curriculum of these organizations meet
the necessary quality standards for trained teachers.

(c) Training of School Leadership. - Superintendents, principals,

subject area coordinators and other instructional school leaders shall
likewise undergo workshops and training to enhance their skills on their role
as academic, administrative and community leaders.

Henceforth, such professional development programs as those stated

above shall be initiated and conducted regularly throughout the school year
to ensure constant upgrading of teacher skills.

SEC. 8. Hiring of Graduates of Science, Mathematics, Statistics,

Engineering and Other Specialists in Subjects with a Shortage of Qualified
Applicants, Technical-Vocational Courses and Higher Education
Institution Faculty. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 26, 27
and 28 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise known as the "Philippine
Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994", the DepED and private
education institutions shall hire, as may be relevant to the particular subject:

(a) Graduates of science, mathematics, statistics, engineering, music

and other degree courses with shortages in qualified Licensure Examination
for Teachers (LET) applicants to teach in their specialized subjects in the
elementary and secondary education. Qualified LET applicants shall also
include graduates admitted by foundations duly recognized for their
expertise in the education sector and who satisfactorily complete the
requirements set by these organizations: Provided, That they pass the LET
within five (5) years after their date of hiring: Provided, further, That if such
graduates are willing to teach on part-time basis, the provisions of LET shall
no longer be required;
 Decision 53 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

(b) Graduates of technical-vocational courses to teach in their

specialized ·subjects in the secondary education: Provided, That these
graduates posse~.;_;; the necessary certification issued by the TESDA:
Provided, further, That they undergo appropriate in-service training to be
administered by the DepED or higher education institutions (HEis) at the
expense of the DepED;

(c) Faculty ofHEis be allowed to teach in their general education or

subject specialties in the secondary education: Provided, That the faculty
must be a holder of a relevant Bachelor's degree, and must have
satisfactorily served as a full-time HEI faculty;

(d) The DepED and private education institutions may hire

practitioners, with expertise in the specialized learning areas offered by the
Basic Education Curriculum, to teach in the secondary level: Provided, That
they teach on part-time basis only. For this purpose, the DepED, in
coordination with the appropriate government agencies, shall determine the
necessary qualification standards in hiring these experts.

xx xx

SEC. 12. Transitory Provisions. -The DepED, the CHED and the
TESDA shall formulate the appropriate strategies and mechanisms needed
to ensure smooth transition from the existing ten (10) years basic education
cycle to the enhanced basic education (K to 12) cycle. The strategies may
cover changes in physical infrastructure, manpower, organizational and
structural concerns, bridging models linking grade 10 competencies and the
entry requirements of new tertiary curricula, and partnerships between the
government and other entities. Modeling for senior high school may be
implemented in selected schools to simulate the transition process and
provide concrete data for the transition plan.

To manage the initial implementation of the enhanced basic

education program and mitigate the expected multi-year low enrolment
turnout for HE Is and Technical Vocational Institutions (TVIs) starting
School Year 2016-2017, the DepED shall engage in partnerships with HEis
and TVIs for the utilization of the latter's human and physical resources.
· Moreover, the DepED, the CHED, the TESDA, the TVIs and the HEis shall
coordinate closely with one another to implement strategies that ensure the
academic, physical, financial, and human resource capabilities of HEis and
TVIs to provide educational and training services for graduates of the
enhanced basic education program to ensure that they are not adversely
affected. The faculty of HEis and TVIs allowed to teach students of
secondary education under Section 8 hereof, shall be given priority in hiring
for the duration of the transition period. For this purpose, the transition
period shall be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR).1s1

Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in
its entirety, is complete in all essential terms and conditions and contains
sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and
TESDA. The fact that the K to 12 Law did not have any provision on labor
does not make said law incomplete. The purpose of permissible delegation to

1s1 K to 12 Law.
 Decision 54 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

administrative agencies is for the latter to "implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by 'filling in' the details whicq the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide." 152 With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the legislature
has found it necessary to entrust to administrative agencies, who are supposed
to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them, the authority to provide
direct and efficacious solutions to these problems. 153 This is effected by the
promulgation of supplementary regulations, such as the K to 12 IRR jointly
issued by the DepEd, CHED and TESDA and the Joint Guidelines issued in
coordination with DOLE, to address in detail labor and management rights
relevant to implementation of the K to 12 Law.

DO No. 31 is valid and

en/orceahle

Petitioners also claim that DO No. 31 is a usurpation of legislative

authority as it creates a law without delegation of power. 154 According to
petitioners, DO No. 31, which changed the curriculum and added two (2) more
years to basic education, has no statutory basis. It also violates the
constitutional right of parents to participate in planning programs that affect
them and the right to information on matters of public concem. 155 Petitioners
further contend that since DO No. 31 imposes additional obligations to parents
and children, public consultations should have been conducted prior to its
adoption and that the assailed DO should have been published and registered
first with the Office of the National Administrative Register before it can take
effect. 156

Again, petitioners' arguments lack factual and legal bases. DO No. 31

did not add two (2) years to basic education nor did it impose additional
obligations to parents and children. DO No. 31 is an administrative regulation
addressed to DepEd personnel providing for general guidelines on the
implementation of a new curriculum for Grades 1 to 10 in preparation for the
K to 12 basic education. DO No. 31 was issued in accordance with the
DepEd' s mandate to establish and maintain a complete, adequate and
integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national
development, 157 formulate, plan, implement, and coordinate and ensure access
to, promote equity in, and improve the quality of basic education; 158 and
pursuant to the Secretary's authority to formulate and promulgate national
educational policies, 159 under existing laws.

152
Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. v. Department of Education, 781 Phil. 399, 423 (2016), citing
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 248 Phil. 762, 773
(1988).
153
See id. at 422-423.
154
Rollo (G.R. No. 218098), Vol. 2, pp. 1137-1144.
155
Id. at 1141-1143.
156
Id.at1140-1145.
157
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Executive Order No. 292, Title VI, Chapter I, Sec. 2.
158
RA No. 9155, Sec. 6.
159

~
Id., Sec. 7.
 Decision 55 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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Moreover, more than a year prior to adoption of DO No. 31, and

contrary to petitioners' assertions, DepEd conducted regional consultations
and focus group discussions, participated in by students, parents, teachers and
administrators, government representatives, and representatives from private
schools and private sector, 160 to elicit opinions, thoughts and suggestions
about the K to 12 basic education. 161

There is also no merit in petitioners' claim that publication is necessary

for DO No. 31 to be effective. Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, including the rules and guidelines to be followed by
subordinates in the performance of their duties are not required to be
published. 162 At any rate, the Court notes that DO No. 31 was already
forwarded to the University of the Philippines Law Center for filing in
accordance with Sections 3 and 4 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and took
effect pursuant to said provisions. 163

Having established that the K to 12 Law and its related issuances were
duly enacted and/or validly issued, the Court now discusses whether they
contravene provisions of the Constitution.

II.

Police power of the State

Police power is defined broadly as the State's authority to enact

legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. This all-comprehensive definition provides
ample room for the State to meet the exigencies of the times depending on the
conditions and circumstances. As the Court eruditely explained in Basco v.
Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp. 164 (Basco):
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction.
It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1)
an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163
SCRA 386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even

to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus

160
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 2, pp. 955-996.
161
See id. at 978-996.
162
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra note 110, at 553, citing Tanada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528,
535 (1986).
163
Rollo(G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 4, p. 1967.
164
274Phil.323(1991).
 Decision 56 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra).

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it

does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and
eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty.
It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform
the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression
has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state
"to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978).
The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection
and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil.
136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of
the winds of change. 165

From the legislative history of the Philippine education system as

detailed above, one can easily discern that the enactment of education laws,
including the K to 12 Law and the Kindergarten Education Act, their
respective implementing rules and regulations and the issuances of the
government agencies, are an exercise of the State's police power. The State
has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education and the
general welfare of the people. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 166 the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations
for the control and duration of basic education." 167

Here, petitioners essentially assail the State's exercise of police power

to regulate education through the adoption of the K to 12 Basic Education
Program, because the K to 12 Law and its related issuances purportedly violate
the Constitutional provisions as enumerated in the outline of issues above.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. 168 For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. 169 The grounds for nullity must be clear beyond
reasonable doubt. 170 Hence, for the Court to nullify the assailed laws,
petitioners must clearly establish that the constitutional provisions they cite
bestow upon them demandable and enforceable rights and that such rights
clash against the State's exercise of its police power under the K to 12 Law.

To be sure, the Court's role is to balance the State's exercise of its

police power as against the rights of petitioners. The Court's pronouncement
in Secretary ofJustice v. Lantion 171 (Lantion) instructs:

165
Id. at 336-337.
166
406 us 205 (1972).
167
Id. at 213. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
168
Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp., supra note 163, at 343.
169
Id. at 343-344.
170
Id. at 344.

~
171
397 Phil. 423 (2000).
 Decision 57 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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x x x The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of interests

approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." The
approach requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation." These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of
his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government's promotion of
fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. 172

In fact, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 173 where the question was the validity of
a statute criminalizing the failure of parents to allow their children to attend
compulsory high school education, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
although the State's interest in universal education is highly ranked in terms
of State functions, this does not free this exercise of State function from the
balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests,
specifically the Free Exercise Clause, thus:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations
for the control and duration of basic education. See, e.g., Pierce v Society
of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534, 69 L Ed 1070, 1077, 45 S Ct 571, 39 ALR 468
(1925). Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a
State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield
to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately
operated system. There the Court held that Oregon's statute compelling
attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably
interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their
offspring, including their education in church-operated schools. As that case
suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and
education of their children in their early and formative years have a high
place in our society. See also Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639 20 L
Ed 2d 195, 203, 88 S Ct 1274 (1968); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 67
L Ed 1042, 43 S Ct 625, 29 ALR 1446 (1923); cf. Rowan v Post Office
Dept., 397 US 728, 25 L Ed 2d 736, 90 S Ct 1484 (1970). Thus, a State's
interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally
free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights
and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents
with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they,
in the words of Pierce, "prepare [them) for additional obligations." 268
US at 535, 69 L Ed AT 1078. 174

As quoted above, this balancing of interest approach has been applied

in this jurisdiction in Lantion in determining whether there was a violation of
the private respondent's right to due process when he was not furnished a copy
of the request for his extradition. This right was balanced against the country's
commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to extradite to the United
States of America persons who were charged with the violation of some of its
laws. 175

172 Id. at 437.

173
Supra note 165.
174
Id. at 213-214.
175
See Secretary ofJustice v. Lantion, supra note 171, at 437-438.
 Decision 58 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

The Court held in Lantion that at the stage of the extradition, it was only
at an evaluation stage; thus there was yet no requirement that he be given
notice of the proceedings. At that stage, the balance was tilted in favor of the
interest of the State in helping suppress crime by facilitating the extradition of
persons covered by treaties entered into by the govemment. 176

It is with these standards and framework that the Court exammes

whether the enactments of the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 Law
and their implementing rules and regulations, were valid exercises of the
State's police power to regulate education.

In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions of the

Constitution embody judicially enforceable rights and therefore give rise to
causes of action in court. 177 Accordingly, it is necessary to determine first
whether the constitutional provisions invoked by petitioners are self-
executing; and if they are, is there a conflict between these rights and the
State's police power to regulate education? If a conflict does exist, do the
rights of petitioners yield to the police power of the State?

Non-self-executing constitutional
provisions

As defined, "a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature

and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the
subject is referred to the legislature for action." 178

In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 179 it

was ruled that all provisions of the Constitution are presumed self-
executing, 180 because to treat them as requiring legislation would result in
giving the legislature "the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law." 181 And this could result in a cataclysm. 182

This pronouncement notwithstanding, however, the Court has, in

several cases, had occasion to already declare several Constitutional
provisions as not self-executory.

In Tanada v. Angara, 183 it was settled that the sections found under
Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution are not self-executing

176
Id. at 438-439.
177
See Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 697-698 ( 1995).
178
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, 335 Phil. 82, I 02 (1997).
119 Id.
180
Id.at102.
181 Id.
1s2 Id.
183
Supra note I 07.
 Decision 59 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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provisions. In fact, in the cases of Basco, 184 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 185 and
Tonda Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, 186 the
Court categorically ruled that Sections 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of Article II,
Section 13 of Article XIII, and Section 2 of Article XIV, of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, respectively, are non-self-executing. The very terms
of these provisions show that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but merely guidelines for legislation. 187 And the failure of the legislature
to pursue the policies embodied therein does not give rise to a cause of action
in the courts. 188

In specific application to the present petitions, in Tolentino v. Secretary

of Finance, 189 the Court also ruled that Section 1, Article XIV on the right of
all citizens to quality education is also not self-executory. The provision "for
the promotion of the right to 'quality education' x x x [was] put in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable
rights." 190

Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the Filipino language as a

medium of instruction is also not self-executory. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission confirm this:
MR. DE CASTRO. Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Just a matter of clarification. On the first

sentence, we use Filipino as an official medium of communication in all
branches of government. Is that correct?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes.

MR. DE CASTRO. And when we speak of Filipino, can it be a

combination of Tagalog and the local dialect, and, therefore, can be
"Taglish"? Is that right?

MR. VILLACORTA. Not really "Taglish," Madam President.

MR. BENNAGEN. It can be standard.

MR. DE CASTRO. Or the combination of the local language and

Tagalog?

MR. VILLACORTA. As it naturally evolves.

MR. DE CASTRO. Suppose I am a Muslim official from Sulu and

I will use Filipino in my communication. So I will write: "Di makadiari ang

184
Supra note 163.
185
Supra note 176.
186
554 Phil. 609, 625-626 (2007).
187
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, supra note 178, at 106-107.
188
Espina v. Zamora, Jr., 645 Phil. 269 (20 I 0).
189
Supra note 139.
190
Id. at 766.

/tc
Decision 60 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

iniisip mo." It is a combination of Tausog - "di makadiari" and Tagalog

- "ang iniisip mo." The one receiving in the main office may not
understand the whole thing. I am just clarifying because when we
use Filipino as a medium of official communication, there is a possibility
that the message may not be understood when it reaches the central office
or when it goes to another area.

MR. VILLACORTA. That is why the wording is, "The government

shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino." And in Section 1,
it says: "as it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched," the
implication being that it will be standardized as a national language.

MR. DE CASTRO. Yes, but then in Section 2, we come out

with Filipino as a medium of official communication. I am just giving an
example that as an official communication, it may not be understood by the
one at the receiving end, especially if one comes from the South and whose
message is received in the North or in the center. As I said, "Di makadiari
ang iniisip mo," is half Tausog and half Tagalog.

MR. VILLA CORTA. Commissioner Bennagen, who is an expert on

culture and minorities, will answer the question of the Gentleman.

MR. BENNAGEN. I think what we envision to happen would be for

government agencies, as well as other nongovernmental agencies involving
this, to start immediately the work of standardization - expanding the
vocabularies, standardizing the spelling and all appropriate measures that
have to do with propagating Filipino.

MR. DE CASTRO. In short?

MR. BENNAGEN. The work will codify this national lingua

franca as it is taking place and will be subjected to other developmental
activities.

MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I say a word?

MR. DE CASTRO. In short, does the committee want us to

understand that Section 2, even if ratified, will not as yet be effective
because it is still subject to the provisions of law and as Congress may
deem appropriate? So the medium of official communication among
branches of government cannot as yet be Filipino until subject to
provisions of law and as Congress may deem appropriate. Is that
correct?

MR. OPLE. Madam President.

MR. DE CASTRO. No, I am asking the committee, please.

THE PRESIDENT. What is the answer of the committee?

MR. VILLACORTA. That is correct, Madam President.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

MR. OPLE. I just wanted to point out that when the words
"official communication" is used, this must satisfy the
standards of accuracy, precision and, perhaps, clarity or lack of ambiguity;
 Decision 61 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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otherwise, it will not be communication. One can lose a war through

imprecise communication in government and, therefore, I think the word
"communication" should be understood in its correct light - that when one
writes from Sulu, as in the example given by Commissioner de Castro, he
has to consider the following: Is his communication clear? Is it
unambiguous? Is it precise? I just want to point out that when we
speak of official communication, these normal standards of good
communication ought to be recognized as controlling, otherwise, the
interest of public administration will be vitally affected.

Thank you, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. Shall we vote now on the first sentence?

MR. RODRIGO. I think it should be on the first two sentences.

THE PRESIDENT. There was a suggestion, and that was accepted

by the committee, to vote on the first sentence.

MR. RODRIGO. Only on the first sentence? But there are two
sentences.

THE PRESIDENT. No, that was already approved.

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, may I ask for a vote now

because this has been extensively discussed.

THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman read what is to be voted

upon?

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, the first sentence reads:

"SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS OF LAW AND AS CONGRESS MAY
DEEM APPROPRIATE, THE GOVERNMENT SHALL TAKE STEPS
TO INITIATE AND SUSTAIN THE USE OF FILIPINO AS A MEDIUM
OF OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION AND AS LANGUAGE OF
INSTRUCTION IN THE EDU CATI ON AL SYSTEM."

VOTING

THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of the first sentence,

please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their hand.)

As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised
his hand.)

The results show 37 votes in favor and none against; the first
sentence is approved. 191

Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection oflabor and security of tenure,

was also declared by the Court in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 192 (Agabon) as not self-executory. ReiteratingAgabon, the Court
explained in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 193 that Section 3,

191
IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 498-499.
192
485 Phil. 248 (2004).
193
601 Phil. 245 (2009).
 Decision 62 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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Article XIII, does not automatically confer judicially demandable and

enforceable rights and cannot, on its own, be a basis for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, to wit:
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-
executing, there are some which this Court has declared not judicially
enforceable, Article XIII being one, particularly Section 3 thereof, the
nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, has described to be not self-actuating:

Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to

labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing
in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and
observed without need for any enabling legislation.
However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are
enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied
therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed,
would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such
view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad
and exaggerated. The guarantees of"full protection to labor"
and "security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are
facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible
suggests a blanket shield in favor of labor against any form
of removal regardless of circumstance. This interpretation
implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment -
a utopian notion, doubtless - but still hardly within the
contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still
needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to
ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of
the labor sector, but of the employers' as well. Without
specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a
loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at
least the aims of the Constitution.

Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII

cannot, on its own, be a source of a positive enforceable
right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause
owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As
manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the
provisions on social justice require legislative enactments
for their enforceability. (Emphasis added)

Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source

of direct enforceable rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause
may be declared unconstitutional. It may unwittingly risk opening the
floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over every conceivable
violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.

It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly

bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes
it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection
through executive or legislative action andjudicial recognition. Its utility
is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the
working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda

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 Decision 63 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate
Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept
that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection - such as the working class or a section thereof - the Court
may recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same
to strict judicial scrutiny.

The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict

judicial scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee Association
exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless
apprehension. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the
equal protection clause. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the
equal protection clause, has no life or force of its own as elucidated in
Agabon. 194

Here, apart from bare allegations that the K to 12 Law does not provide
mechanisms to protect labor, which, as discussed, have no legal bases,
petitioners have not proffered other bases in claiming that the right to protect
labor and/or security of tenure was violated with the implementation of the K
to 12 Law. To be sure, the protection of labor from illegal dismissal has
already been set in stone with the enactment of the Labor Code and the Civil
Service Law.

Given the foregoing, petitioners cannot claim that the K to 12 Law

and/or any of its related issuances contravene or violate any of their rights
under the foregoing constitutional provisions because these provisions simply
state a policy that may be "used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment
of laws." 195 They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights. 196 In other words, the Kindergarten Education Act, the K to 12 Law
and its related issuances cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners' bare
allegations that they violate general provisions of the Constitution which are
mere directives addressed to the executive and legislative departments. If
these directives are unheeded, the remedy does not lie with the courts, but
with the power of the electorate in casting their votes. 197 As held in Tanada v.
Angara: 198 "The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged
infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic
considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade 'into
the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy-making. "' 199

In view of the foregoing, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the
remaining constitutional provisions, international treaties, and other special

194
Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., id. at 302-304.
195
Tanadav. Angara, supra note 107, at580-58l.
196
Id. at 581.
191 Id.
198
Supranotel07.
199
Id. at 581.
 Decision 64 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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laws invoked by petitioners, which have allegedly been violated by the

implementation of the K to 12 Law. For the constitutional provisions, the
Court shall determine whether these constitutional provisions are in conflict
with the police power of the State in enacting and implementing the K to 12
Law, and if so, whether these constitutional provisions yield to the police
power of the State.

Compulsory Elementary and High

School Education

Petitioners argue that the legislature violated the Constitution when

they made kindergarten and senior high school compulsory. For petitioners,
compulsory kindergarten and senior high school expanded the constitutional
definition of elementary education and that the Congress violated the rule of
constitutional supremacy when it made kindergarten and senior high school
compulsory. 200

On the other hand, the OSG contends that while Section 2, Article XIV
states that elementary education shall be compulsory, it did not preclude
Congress from making kindergarten and secondary education mandatory
(based on the clear wording of the law and deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission). 201 Further, the laws advance the right of child to education, and
they do not violate any international agreement (Universal Declaration of
Human Rights [UDHR], the International Covenant of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights [ICESCR] and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
[CRC]) to which the Philippines is a signatory. 202

The State's policy in implementing the K to 12 Program is stated as

follows:
x x x [I]t is hereby declared the policy of the State that every
graduate of basic education shall be an empowered individual who has
learned, through a program that is rooted on sound educational principles
and geared towards excellence, the foundations for learning throughout life,
the competence to engage in work and be productive, the ability to coexist
in fruitful harmony with local and global communities, the capability to
engage in autonomous, creative, and critical thinking, and the capacity and
willingness to transform others and one's self.

For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education
system that will develop productive and responsible citizens equipped with
the essential competencies, skills and values for both life-long learning and
employment. In order to achieve this, the State shall:

(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive

quality education that is globally competitive based on a
pedagogically sound curriculum that is at par with

200
Rollo (G.R. No. 218098), Vol. 2, pp. 1145-1148.
201
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 4, pp. 1991-2002.
202
Id. at 2009-2011.

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international standards;

(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for

college preparation, vocational and technical career
opportunities as well as creative arts, sports and
entrepreneurial employment in a rapidly changing and
increasingly globalized environment; and

(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive

to the needs, cognitive and cultural capacity, the
circumstances and diversity of learners, schools and
communities through the appropriate languages of teaching
and learning, including mother tongue as a learning
resource. 203

There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and related issuances and

the Constitution when it made kindergarten and senior high school
compulsory. The Constitution is clear in making elementary education
compulsory; and the K to 12 Law and related issuances did not change this as,
in fact, they affirmed it.

As may be gleaned from the outlined history of education laws in the

Philippines, the definition of basic education was expanded by the legislature
through the enactment of different laws, consistent with the State's exercise
of police power. In BP Blg. 232, the elementary and secondary education were
considered to be the stage where basic education is provided. 204 Subsequently,
in RA No. 9155, the inclusion of elementary and high school education as part
of basic education was affirmed. 205

The legislature, through the Kindergarten Education Act, further

amended the definition of basic education to include kindergarten. Thereafter,
the legislature expanded basic education to include an additional two (2) years
of senior high school. Thus, by then, basic education comprised of thirteen
(13) years, divided into one (1) year of kindergarten, six (6) years of
elementary education, and six (6) years of secondary education - which was
divided into four (4) years of junior high school and two (2) years of senior
high school.

The Constitution did not curtail the legislature's power to determine the
extent of basic education. It only provided a minimum standard: that
elementary education be compulsory. By no means did the Constitution
foreclose the possibility that the legislature provides beyond the minimum set
by the Constitution.

Petitioners also contend that the expansion of compulsory education to

include kindergarten and secondary education violates the UDHR, the

203 RA No. l 0533, Sec. 2.

204
BP Big. 232, Sec. 20.
205
RA No. 9155, Sec. 4(b).
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ICESCR and the CRC. 206

Petitioners' argument is misleading.

There is nothing in the UDHR, ICESCR and CRC which proscribes the
expansion of compulsory education beyond elementary education.

Article 26 of the UDHR states:

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least
in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be
made generally available and higher education shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human

personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further
the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be
given to their children. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

There is absolutely nothing in Article 26 that would show that the State
is prohibited from making kindergarten and high school compulsory. The
UDHR provided a minimum standard for States to follow. Congress complied
with this minimum standard; as, in fact, it went beyond the minimum by
making kindergarten and high school compulsory. This action of Congress is,
in tum, consistent with Article 41 of the CRC which provides that "[n]othing
in the present Convention shall affect any provisions which are more
conducive to the realization of the rights of the child and which may be
contained in: (a) [t]he law ofa State party; or (b) [i]nternational law in force
for that State."

The enactment of the K to 12 Law was the manner by which the

Congress sought to realize the right to education of its citizens. It is indeed
laudable that Congress went beyond the minimum standards and provided
mechanisms so that its citizens are able to obtain not just elementary education
but also kindergarten and high school. Absent any showing of a violation of
any Constitutional self-executing right or any international law, the Court
cannot question the desirability, wisdom, or utility of the K to 12 Law as this
is best addressed by the wisdom of Congress. As the Court held in Tablarin
v. Gutierrez207 :
x x x The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair, unreasonable and inequitable
requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners

206
Rollo (G.R. No. 218098), Vol. 2, pp. 1145-1146.
207
236 Phil. 768 (1987).
 Decision 67 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it
"unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that
passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the
admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and
other admission requirements established by internal regulations of the
various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners' arguments thus
appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT
requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a question of power or
authority: this Court has neither commission nor competence to pass upon
questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or
administrative regulation. Those questions must be addressed to the
political departments of the government not to the courts.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail:

the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute,
to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-
waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the
· important interests and needs-in a word, the public order- of the general
community. An important component of that public order is the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no
one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation. 208

Petitioners also claim that the K to 12 basic education and the two (2)
additional years in high school should not have been applied retroactively in
violation of Article 4 of the Civil Code. 209 Petitioners assert that students who
had already began schooling prior to 2013 or upon the passage of the K to 12
Law already acquired a "vested right" to graduate after the completion of four
(4) years of high school, pursuant to Sections 9(2) and 20 of BP Blg. 232;
thus, the K to 12 BEC cannot be applied to them. 210

Again, petitioners' contentions are without merit.

The K to 12 Basic Education Program is not being retroactively applied

because only those currently enrolled at the time the K to 12 Law took effect
and future students will be subject to the K to 12 BEC and the additional two
(2) years of senior high school. Students who already graduated from high
school under the old curriculum are not required by the K to 12 Law to
complete the additional two (2) years of senior high school.

More importantly, BP Blg. 232 does not confer any vested right to four
(4) years of high school education. Rights are vested when the right to
enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular
person or persons as a present interest. The right must be absolute, complete,
and unconditional, independent of a contingency, and a mere expectancy of
future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on anticipated

208
Id. at 781-782.
209
Rollo (G.R. No. 218465), Vol. 3, pp. 1508-1509.
210
Id. at 1508-1510.
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continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. 211 Contrary to
petitioners' assertion, the rights of students under Section 9 of BP Blg. 232
are not absolute. These are subject to limitations prescribed by law and
regulations. In fact, while Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 232 states that students have
the right to continue their course up to graduation, Section 20 of the same law
does not restrict elementary and high school education to only six (6) and four
(4) years. Even RA No. 9155 or the Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001, which was enacted under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, does not
specify the number of years in elementary and high school. In other words,
BP Blg. 232 or RA No. 9155 does not preclude any amendment or repeal on
the duration of elementary and high school education. In adding two (2) years
of secondary education to students who have not yet graduated from high
school, Congress was merely exercising its police power and legislative
wisdom in imposing reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education, in compliance with its constitutional duty to promote quality
education for all.

Right to select a profession or course

of study

Petitioners in G.R. No. 218123 insist that the implementation of the K

to 12 Law is a limitation on the right of senior high school students to choose
their professions. 212 For petitioners, a number of prospective senior high
school students will be unable to choose their profession or vocation because
of the limit on what senior high schools can offer and the availability of the
different strands. This lacks basis.

There is no conflict between the K to 12 Law and its IRR and the right
of the senior high school students to choose their profession or course of study.
The senior high school curriculum is designed in such a way that students
have core subjects and thereafter, they may choose among four strands: 1)
Accountancy, Business and Management (ABM) Strand; 2) Science,
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Strand; 3) Humanities
and Social Sciences (HUMSS) Strand; and 4) General Academic (GA)
Strand. 213

Petitioners have failed to show that the State has imposed unfair and
inequitable conditions for senior high schools to enroll in their chosen path.
The K to 12 Program is precisely designed in such a way that students may
choose to enroll in public or private senior high schools which offer the
strands of their choice. For eligible students, the voucher program also allows
indigent senior high school students to enroll in private institutions that offer
the strands of their choice.

211
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 722 (I 956), citing 16 C.J.S. 214-215.
212
Rollo (G.R. No. 218123), Vol. 2, pp. 1267-1268.
m DO No. 11, series of2015; rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol 3, p. 1416.
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Mother Tongue as medium of

instruction

Petitioners argue that the use of the MT or the regional or native

language as primary medium of instruction for kindergarten and the first three
(3) years of elementary education contravenes Section 7, Article XIV of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, which expressly limits and constrains regional
languages simply as auxiliary media of instruction. 214 This is an argument of
first blush. A closer look at the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal the contrary. In
fine, there is no conflict between the use of the MT as a primary medium of
instruction and Section 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Sections 6 and 7, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

provides:
SEC. 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it
evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing
Philippine and other languages.

Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem

appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use
of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of
instruction in the educational system.

SEC. 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official

languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by
law, English.

The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the

regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also confirm that

MT or regional languages may be used as a medium of instruction:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. When the
Commissioner speaks of auxiliary official languages in their respective
regions, what exactly does he have in mind?

MR. BENNAGEN. In addition to Filipino and English, they can

be accepted also as official languages, even in government and in
education.

MR. SUAREZ. So that not only will they be a medium of

instruction or communication but they can be considered also as official
languages.

MR. BENNAGEN. That is the intention of the committee. We

should respect also the regional languages. x x x215 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

214
Rollo (G.R. No. 218045) Vol 1, pp. 563-571.
215
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Decision 70 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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xx xx

MR. DAVIDE. May I be enlightened on some of the aspects of this

proposed substitute amendment? The first is, does it follow from the
wording that the regional languages shall serve as an auxiliary media of
instruction and no law can prohibit their use as such? This means that
subject to provisions of law and as Congress may deem appropriate, it
would refer only to what are included in the first sentence. It will not apply
to the second sentence relating to regional languages as auxiliary media of
instruction.

MR. TRENAS. That is correct. Precisely, there is a period after

"educational system" and that is a new sentence.

MR. DAVIDE. As an auxiliary medium of instruction, it can

actually be the primary medium, until Congress shall provide
otherwise.

MR. TRENAS. It shall be auxiliary.

MR. DAVIDE. But in the meantime that Congress shall not have
deemed appropriate or that there is no provision of law relating to the use
of Filipino as the medium of instruction, it can itself be the primary
medium of instruction in the regions.

MR. TRENAS. That is correct because of the provision of the first

sentence.

MR. DAVIDE. On the supposition that there is already a law that

Congress had deemed it appropriate, the regional language shall go hand in
hand with Filipino as a medium of instruction. It cannot be supplanted in
any way by Filipino as the only medium of instruction in the regional level.

xx xx

VOTING

xx xx

MR. VILLACORTA. Shall we vote now on the next sentence,

Madam President?

THE PRESIDENT. Will the chairman please read the next sentence.

MR. VILLACORTA. The next sentence, Madam President, reads:

"THE REGIONAL LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS AUXILIARY
MEDIA OF INSTRUCTION IN THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS."

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized before we

proceed to vote.

MR. PADILLA. Section 2 of the committee report states:

The official languages of the Philippines are Filipino

and English, until otherwise provided by law. The regional
languages are the auxiliary official languages in their
respective regions.
 Decision 71 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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That second sentence in Section 2 of the committee report may be

amended by that second sentence which says: "THE REGIONAL
LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS AUXILIARY MEDIA OF
INSTRUCTION IN THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS." I believe we should
consider the first sentence of Section 2 and then say: "THE REGIONAL
LANGUAGES SHALL SERVE AS AUXILIARY MEDIA OF
INSTRUCTION IN THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS." That is my proposal.

THE PRESIDENT. In other words, the Commissioner's point is that

this particular second sentence here should be transposed to Section 2 of the
other committee report.

MR. PAD ILLA. Yes, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT. What does the committee say?

REV. RIGOS. Madam President, perhaps if we approve the second

sentence, we can delete the second sentence in Section 2. Is that the idea?

MR. PAD ILLA. That is correct.

REV. RIGOS. Since we are talking about medium of instruction

here, we would rather retain it in the first section.

MR. PADILLA. Madam President, but if no mention is made of

English, it might be the impression contrary to what has already been agreed
upon - that English may not be used as a medium of instruction. And it
· shall be clear that the first preference is Filipino, the national language,
without prejudice to the use of English and also the regional languages.

REV. RIGOS. Madam President, do we understand the

Commissioner correctly that he would rather delete that in the first section
and amend the second sentence in Section 2?

MR. PADILLA. Yes, Madam President. That is the reason I

suggested that the proposal be divided into two sentences. We approved the
first sentence. The second sentence should be corrected to Section 2 of the
committee report.

MR. VILLACORTA. Madam President, the committee is divided;

therefore, we would like the floor to decide on this matter.

MR. PAD ILLA. The only reason I am saying this is to make

clear in the Constitution that the medium of communication and the
language of instruction are not only Filipino as a national language,
and that the medium of instruction is the regional languages, otherwise,
there would be no mention of English. I believe that we are all agreed
that the first preference is the national language, Filipino, but it does
not prevent the use of English and also of the regional languages.216
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is thus clear from the deliberations that it was never the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to use only Filipino and English as the exclusive
media of instruction. It is evident that Congress has the power to enact a law

216
IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 495-496, 499-500.
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that designates Filipino as the primary medium of instruction even in the

regions but, in the absence of such law, the regional languages may be used
as primary media of instruction. The Congress, however, opted not to enact
such law. On the contrary, the Congress, in the exercise of its wisdom,
provided that the regional languages shall be the primary media of instruction
in the early stages of schooling. Verily, this act of Congress was not only
Constitutionally permissible, but was likewise an exercise of an exclusive
prerogative to which the Court cannot interfere with.

Petitioners further contend that the MTB-MLE is counter-productive,

anti-developmental and does not serve the people's right to quality of
education, which the State, under the Constitution, is mandated to promote. 217
Moreover, in contrast to the benefits of the MTB-MLE that respondents assert,
petitioners claim that comparative international and domestic data have shown
MT monolingualism to be inferior; while high literacy and proficiency in
English indicates human development, makes people more globally
competitive and relatively happier. 218

Petitioners' arguments are again misplaced. While the Constitution

indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the determination of
what constitutes quality education is best left with the political departments
who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the
same. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very
instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before
"education" to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the
exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set
satisfactory minimum requirements in all areas: curriculum, faculty,
internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities, et
cetera, and it should see to it that satisfactory minimum requirements are
met by all educational institutions, both public and private.

When we speak of quality education we have in mind such

matters, among others, as curriculum development, development of
learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and
laboratory facilities, innovations in educational technology and teaching
methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others. Here and in
many other provisions on education, the principal focus of attention and
concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view there is a slogan
when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be aware of,
which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if
the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on
improving it. 219 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, when the government, through the K to 12 Law and the DepEd
issuances, determined that the use of MT as primary medium of instruction

217
Rollo (G.R. No. 218045), Vol. 1, pp. 572-577.
218
Id. at 554, 579-581.
219
IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 57.
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until Grade 3 constitutes a better curriculum, it was working towards

discharging its constitutional duty to provide its citizens with quality
education. The Court, even in the exercise of its jurisdiction to check if
another branch of the government committed grave abuse of discretion, will
not supplant such determination as it pertains to the wisdom of the policy.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 218045 also claim that the provision on the use
of MT violates the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth, recognized under Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Petitioners aver that by using the MT in teaching the students, it
compels parents to do something utterly redundant, inefficient, and wasteful,
as the students are presumably already fluent in speaking their MT. 220 In other
words, they no longer need to be taught their native language.

Petitioners are once again incorrect as there is no conflict between the

use of MT as a primary medium of instruction and the right of parents in
rearing their children.

While Section 12, Article II grants parents the primary right to rear and
educate their children, the State, as parens patriae, has the inherent right and
duty to support parents in the exercise of this constitutional right. In other
words, parents' authority and the State's duty are not mutually exclusive but
complement each other. 221 In the matter of education, a parent is always the
first teacher. The language first learned by the child or his "mother tongue",
which the child understands best and hence, an effective tool for further
learning, is first and foremost taught by the parent. The inclusion in the K to
12 Program of the MT as a medium of instruction and a subject in the early
years of learning is, therefore, not intended to curtail the parents' right but to
complement and enhance the same.

Moreover, despite the provision on the use of MT as primary medium

of instruction for kindergarten and Grades 1 to 3, Filipino and English remain
as subjects in the curriculum during the earlier stages of schooling and will
later on be used as primary medium of instruction from Grade 4 onwards. In
other words, in addition to the MT, the basics of Filipino and English will still
be taught at the early stages of formal schooling; and should the parents, in
the exercise of their primary right and duty to rear their children, so desire to
give additional Filipino and English lessons to their children, they have the
absolute right to do so. Nothing in the K to 12 Law prohibits the parents from
doing so.

Academic freedom

Petitioners in G.R. No. 216930 also allege that faculty from HEI stand
220
Rollo (G.R. No. 218045), Vol. 1, p. 560.
221
See Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8,
2017, 835 SCRA 350, 429. ~
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to lose their academic freedom when they are transferred to senior high school
level as provided in the K to 12 Law, the K to 12 Law !RR and the Joint
Guidelines. 222

Without question, petitioners, who are faculty members in HEis, indeed

possess the academic freedom granted by Constitution. This Court, in its
previous decisions, has defined academic freedom for the individual member
of the academe as "the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event
that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that
be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments. " 223

However, the Court does not agree with petitioners that their transfer to
the secondary level, as provided by the K to 12 Law and the assailed issuances,
constitutes a violation of their academic freedom. While the Court agrees, in
principle, that security of tenure is an important aspect of academic freedom
- that the freedom is only meaningful if the faculty members are assured that
they are free to pursue their academic endeavors without fear of reprisals -
it is likewise equally true that convergence of security of tenure and academic
freedom does not preclude the termination of a faculty member for a valid
cause. 224 Civil servants, like petitioners, may be removed from service for a
valid cause, such as when there is a bona fide reorganization, or a position has
been abolished or rendered redundant, or there is a need to merge, divide, or
consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service. 225 Hence,
petitioners' contention that the law is unconstitutional based on this ground is
spec10us.

Free public education in the

elementary and high school levels

Petitioners claim that making kindergarten compulsory limits access to

education; 226 that 400,000 to 500,000 Grade 11 students will be forced to
enroll in private schools, pushed by government towards a more expensive,
not free education; 227 and that there will be a de facto privatization of senior
high school education (through the voucher system) and that this is a violation
of the constitutional provision mandating free high school education. 228

The OSG counters that the Senior High School Voucher program
(subsidy given to those who will enroll in non-DepEd schools) does not force

222
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 3, pp. 1872-1873.
223
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 942 (1975).
224
See Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation, 167 Phil. 667, 668 (1977).
225
Sec. 2, RA No. 6656, AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, June I 0, 1988.
226
Rollo (G.R. No. 218123), Vol. 2, pp. 1256-1267.
227
Id. at 1258.
228
Id. at 1256-1260.

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students to enroll in private SHS. It simply offers a viable alternative to both

student and government - to the student, a subsidized private education; and
to the government, decongested public schools. 229

The Court fully agrees with the OSG.

Petitioners' argument that the establishment of the voucher system will

result in the de facto privatization of senior high school is not only speculative,
it is also without any basis. The voucher system is one of the mechanisms
established by the State through RA No. 6728, otherwise known as the
Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education Act.
In Marino, Jr. v. Gamilla, 230 the Court recognized that RA No. 6728 was
enacted in view of the declared policy of the State, in conformity with the
mandate of the Constitution, to promote and make quality education
accessible to all Filipino citizens, as well as the recognition of the State of the
complementary roles of public and private educational institutions in the
educational system and the invaluable contribution that the private schools
have made and will make to education." 231 Through the law, the State
provided "the mechanisms to improve quality in private education by
maximizing the use of existing resources of private education x x x. " 232 One
of these is the voucher system where underprivileged high school students
become eligible for full or partial scholarship for degree or
vocational/technical courses.

The program was later expanded through RA No. 8545. In the K to 12

Law, the benefits under RA No. 8545, including the voucher system, were
made applicable to qualified students under the enhanced basic education,
specifically to the qualified students enrolled in senior high school. 233

The establishment and expansion of the voucher system is the State's

way of tapping the resources of the private educational system in order to give
Filipinos equal access to quality education. The Court finds that this manner
of implementing the grant of equal access to education is not constitutionally
infirm.

CMO No. 20 is constitutional

Petitioners assert that CMO No. 20 is violative of the Constitution

because the study of Filipino, Panitikan and the Philippine Constitution are
not included as core subjects.

The Court disagrees.

229
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 4, pp. 1976-1980.
23o 609 Phil. 549 (2009).
231
Id. at 576.
232
RA No. 6728, Sec. 2.
233
K to 12 IRR, Sec. 21.
 Decision 76 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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First, the constitutional provisions alleged by petitioners to be violated

are non-self-executing provisions. As discussed above, the framers of the
Constitution, in discussing Section 6 of Article XIV, explained that the use of
Filipino as a medium of official communication is still subject to provisions
oflaw. 234

In Knights ofRizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc. ,235 the Court held that Section
15 on arts and culture of Article XIV is not self-executory because Congress
passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural
heritage. 236 The Court was of the view that all sections in Article XIV
pertaining to arts and culture are all non-self-executing, which includes
Section 14 on Filipino national culture and Section 18 on access to cultural
opportunities. The Court in Basco 237 also ruled that Section 17, Article II on
giving priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports,
and Section 2, Article XIV on educational values, are non-self-executing.

Thus, the Court reiterates that these constitutional provisions are only
policies that may be "used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise
of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws." 238 The Court reiterates that they do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights. 239

Second, it is misleading for petitioners to allege that there is a violation

of the constitutional provisions for the simple reason that the study of Filipino,
Panitikan and the Constitution are actually found in the basic education
curriculum from Grade 1 to 10 and senior high school. To be sure, the changes
in the GE curriculum were implemented to ensure that there would be no
duplication of subjects in Grade 1 to 10, senior high school and college. Thus,
the allegation of petitioners that CMO No. 20 "removed" the study of Filipino,
Panitikan and the Constitution in the GE curriculum is incorrect.

As regards Section 3(1), Article XIV on the requirement that all

educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of
the curricula, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm that
the intention was for it to be constitutionally mandated. The Court agrees that
there is indeed a constitutional mandate that the study of the Constitution
should be part of the curriculum of educational institutions. However, the
mandate was general and did not specify the educational level in which it must
be taught. Hence, the inclusion of the study of the Constitution in the basic
education curriculum satisfies the constitutional requirement.

In this regard, it must be emphasized that CMO No. 20 only provides

234
IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 495.
235
G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017, 824 SCRA 327.
236
Id. at 393.
237
Supra note 163.
238
Tanada v. Angara, supra note 107, at 580-581.
239
Id. at 581.

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 Decision 77 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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for the minimum standards for the GE component of all degree programs.
Under Section 13 of RA No. 7722 or the Higher Education Act of 1994, the
CHED is authorized to determine the (a) minimum unit requirements for
specific academic programs; (b) general education distribution
requirements as may be determined by the Commission; and (c) specific
professional subjects as may be stipulated by the various licensing entities.
The provision further provides that this authority shall not be construed as
limiting the academic freedom of universities and colleges. Therefore, HEis
are given the freedom to require additional Filipino or Panitikan courses to
these minimum requirements if they wish to.

Third, petitioners aver that non-inclusion of these subjects in the GE

curriculum will result to job displacement of teachers and professors, which
contravenes the constitutional provisions on protection of labor and security
of tenure. Once more, Section 3, Article XIII and Section 18, Article II do not
automatically confer judicially demandable and enforceable rights and cannot,
on their own, be a basis for a declaration of unconstitutionality. Further, the
Court finds that, in fact, teachers and professors were given the opportunity to
participate in the various consultations and decision-making processes
affecting their rights as workers. 240

CMO No. 20 does not contravene any

other laws

As claimed by petitioners, CMO No. 20 violated Section 14 of RA No.

7104 or the Commission on the Filipino Language Act because it interfered
with the authority of the Commission on the Filipino Language (CFL) on
matters of language. Petitioners reiterate that it is the CFL who has the
authority to formulate policies, plans and programs to ensure the further
development, enrichment, propagation and preservation ofFilipino and other
Philippine language 241 and thus, CMO No. 20 should have retained the nine
(9) units of Filipino in the GE curriculum, as proposed by the CFL.

Petitioners also aver that CMO No. 20 violates RA No. 7356 or the Law
Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts because the non-
inclusion of Filipino and Panitikan as subjects in the GE curriculum is a
violation of our "duty x x x to preserve and conserve the Filipino historical
and cultural heritage and resources. "242

Lastly, petitioners allege that CMO No. 20 violates BP Blg. 232 or the
Education Act of 1982, specifically, Section 3 on the role of the educational
community to promote the social and economic status of all school personnel
and Section 23 on the objectives of tertiary education which includes a general
education program that will promote national identity and cultural
240
Rollo (G.R. No. 217451), Vol. 2, pp. 1348-1351.
241
RA No. 7104, Sec. 14(a).
242
RA No. 7356, Sec. 7.

(
 Decision 78 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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consciousness.

Again, the Court disagrees.

It must be noted that nothing in these laws requires that Filipino and
Panitikan must be included as subjects in the tertiary level. Further, as already
established, it is within the authority of the CHED to determine the GE
distribution requirements. The Court also reiterates that the study of Filipino
and Panitikan can easily be included as courses in the tertiary level, if the
HEis wish to. Thus, petitioners' arguments that CMO No. 20 violates the
aforementioned laws must fail.

III.

The K to 12 Law does not violate

substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws.

Petitioners also assert that the K to 12 Law is unconstitutional for

violating the due process clause, as the means employed is allegedly not
proportional to the end to be achieved, and that there is supposedly an
alternative and less intrusive way of accomplishing the avowed objectives of
the law. They point to studies which showed that lengthening the time did not
necessarily lead to better student performance. They further assert that
"[g]iven adequate instruction, armed with sufficient books, and a conducive
learning environment, the Filipino student does not need at all two (2)
additional years of senior high school" and hence the imposition of additional
years in senior high school is "unduly oppressive an unwarranted intrusion
into the right to education of all Filipino students, thus violating their right to
substantive due process." 243 In addition, they claim that the assailed law is
violative of the due process clause because, allegedly, the law served the
interests of only a select few. According to them, majority of the Filipinos will
never apply for graduate school admission to a foreign university or for
professional work in a foreign corporation, and these are the only people who
supposedly need the additional two years of basic education. They point to the
fact that Filipinos are being currently employed as caregivers, seafarers, house
helpers, etc. despite the fact that they have undergone only ten (10) years of
basic education. Hence, the assailed law is unconstitutional for serving the
interests of only a select few. 244

Again, the Court disagrees. There is no conflict between the K to 12

Law and right of due process of the students.

243
Rollo (G.R. No. 218645), Vol. 3, p. 1519.
244
Id. at 1520.
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It is established that due process is comprised of two components,

namely, substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property,
and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice
and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal. 245

Substantive due process, the aspect of due process invoked in this

case, requires an inquiry on the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with
the rights of the person to his property. In Abakada Gura Party List vs.
Ermita, 246 the Court held:

x x x The inquiry in this regard is not whether or not the law is being
enforced in accordance with the prescribed manner but whether or not, to
begin with, it is a proper exercise of legislative power.

To be so, the law must have a valid governmental objective, i.e., the
interest of the public as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires the intervention of the State. This objective must be pursued in
a lawful manner, or in other words, the means employed must be
reasonably related to the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive. 247 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, two things must concur: ( 1) the interest of the public, in general,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the intervention of
the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

Here, the K to 12 Law does not offend the substantive due process of
petitioners. The assailed law's declaration of policy itself reveals that,
contrary to the claims of petitioners, the objectives of the law serve the interest
of the public and not only of a particular class: 248

SEC. 2. Declaration ofPolicy. -The State shall establish, maintain

and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education
relevant to the needs of the people, the country and society-at-large.

Likewise, it is hereby declared the policy of the State that every

graduate of basic education shall be an empowered individual who has
learned, through a program that is rooted on sound educational
principles and geared towards excellence, the foundations for learning
throughout life, the competence to engage in work and be productive,
the ability to coexist in fruitful harmony with local and global
communities, the capability to engage in autonomous, creative, and
critical thinking, and the capacity and willingness to transform others
and one's self.

245
Secretary ofJustice v. Lantion, 379 Phil. 165, 202-203 (2000).
246
Supra note 142.
247
J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, id. at 224.

~
248
RA No. I 0533, Sec. 2.
 Decision 80 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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For this purpose, the State shall create a functional basic education
system that will develop productive and responsible citizens equipped
with the essential competencies, skills and values for both life-long
learning and employment. In order to achieve this, the State shall:

(a) Give every student an opportunity to receive quality education

that is globally competitive based on a pedagogically sound curriculum that
is at par with international standards;

(b) Broaden the goals of high school education for college

preparation, vocational and technical career opportunities as well as creative
arts, sports and entrepreneurial employment in a rapidly changing and
increasingly globalized environment; and

(c) Make education learner-oriented and responsive to the needs,

cognitive and cultural capacity, the circumstances and diversity of learners,
schools and communities through the appropriate languages of teaching and
learning, including mother tongue as a learning resource. (Emphasis
supplied)

All students are intended to benefit from the law. Without ruling on the
effectiveness of the revised curriculum, it is erroneous to view the K to 12
Law and the DepEd Orders in question extending basic education by two (2)
years simply to comply with international standards; rather, the basic
education curriculum was restructured according to what the political
departments believed is the best approach to learning, or what they call as the
"spiral approach." This approach, according to respondent, will yield the
following benefits for all students: ( 1) it is decongested and offers a more
balanced approach to learning; (2) it would help in freeing parents of the
burden of having to spend for college just to make their children employable;
(3) it would prepare students with life skills that they learn while schooling;
( 4) it is seamless; (5) it is relevant and responsive, age-appropriate, and
focused on making learners succeed in the 21st century; and (6) it is enriched
and learner-centered. 249 Thus, contrary to the claims of petitioners, the
assailed law caters to the interest of the public in general, as opposed to only
a particular group of people.

Furthermore, the means employed by the assailed law are

commensurate with its objectives. Again, the restructuring of the curriculum
with the corresponding additional years in senior high school were meant to
improve the quality of basic education and to make the country's graduates
more competitive in the international arena.

Respondents proffer, and petitioners concede, that the Philippines is the

last country to adopt a 12-year basic education curriculum. However,
petitioners submit that adding two (2) years in the basic education curriculum
is not the answer to achieve these objectives, and that there is supposedly a
less intrusive way to achieve these goals, namely, to increase the salaries of

219
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 2, p. 829.
 Decision 81 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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the teachers, invest in better and more resource materials, and building of
more classrooms to achieve the goal of improving the quality of education in
the Philippines. Petitioners ought to be reminded, however, that the objectives
of the law are two-pronged. It was meant not only to (J) improve the basic
education in the country, but also to (2) make it at par with international
standards. It is in this second purpose that the means employed by the assailed
law is justified. Thus, having established that the interest of the public in
general is at the heart of the law, and that the means employed are
commensurate to its objectives, the Court holds that the K to 12 Law is not
violative of the due process clause.

The students of Manila Science High School (MSHS), petitioners in

G.R. No. 218465, aver, in particular, that the decongestion of the originally
existing basic education curriculum and the lengthening of the basic education
cycle do not, and should not, be made to apply to them as their curriculum is
supposedly congested on purpose. 250 It supposedly should not apply to them
because "[they] are gifted and thus are advanced for their age, with the
capability to learn better and faster compared to other high school students.
Because of their higher mental capabilities, they neither need decongesting
nor a longer period of time or any spiral approach, for them to in fact master
their heavier in scope and more advanced math and science subjects." 251 They
are supposedly "not being trained for immediate employment after high
school but for them to pursue tertiary education, particularly career paths
either as mathematicians, scientists or engineers, which the country needs
most for its development." 252 This, these petitioners asseverate, makes the
means employed by the K to 12 Law not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of its intended purpose. Thus, as applied to MSHS students,
the K to 12 Law is arbitrary, unfair, oppressive, discriminatory and
unreasonable and thus violative of their substantive due process. 253 They
further allege that the law is violative of the equal protection clause for
treating them in the same way as all other high school students when they are
supposed to be treated differently for not being similarly situated with the
rest. 254

In essence, what these petitioners are saying is that the K to 12 Law did
not make a substantial distinction between MSHS students and the rest of the
high school students in the country when it, in fact, should have done so.

This contention is without merit.

To assure that the general welfare is promoted, which is the end of the
law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. 255
250
Rollo (G.R. No. 218465) Vol. 3, pp. 1514-1517.
251
Id. at 1514-1515.
252
Id. at 1515.
203 Id.
254 Id. at 1515-1516.
255
Bautista v. Juinio, 212 Phil. 307, 317 (1984).
 Decision 82 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they
can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common goal, was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at
the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. 256 This,
petitioners' failed to sufficiently show. For this reason, the Court holds that
the K to 12 Law did not violate petitioners' right to due process nor did it
violate the equal protection clause. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc.
v. Court ofAppeals, 257 the Court explained the object and purpose of the equal
protection clause in this wise:

The equal protection clause is directed principally against

undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is directed or
by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality,
but merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We have held, time and
again, that the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification for so long as such classification is based
on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the
subject of the particular legislation. If classification is germane to the
purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally
to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal
protection guarantee. 258 (Emphasis supplied)

To emphasize, valid classifications require real and substantial

differences to justify the variance of treatment between the classes. The
MSHS students did not offer any substantial basis for the Court to create a
valid classification between them and the rest of the high school students in
the Philippines. Otherwise stated, the equal protection clause would, in fact,
be violated if the assailed law treated the MSHS students differently from the
rest of the high school students in the country.

To be clear, the Court is not saying that petitioners are not gifted,
contrary to their claims. The Court is merely saying that the K to 12 Law was
not infirm in treating all high school students equally. The MSHS students
are, after all, high school students just like all the other students who are, and
will be, subjected to the revised curriculum.

The Court agrees with these petitioners to the extent of their claim that
they have the right granted by Article 3(3) and (6) of Presidential Decree No.
603, or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, to education commensurate with
their abilities. 259 However, the Court disagrees that the said right granted by
the Child and Youth Welfare Code was violated when the revised curriculum
under the K to 12 Law was applied to them. It bears repeating that the law is
being merely applied to the whole segment of the population to which

256
Id. at 3 I 7.
257
329 Phil. 87 ( 1996).
258
Id. at 102.
259
Rollo (G.R. No. 218465), Vol. 3, pp. 1512-1513.
 Decision 83 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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petitioners belong. Further, the basic education under the K to 12 was intended
to meet the basic learning needs of the students and it is broad enough to cover
alternative learning systems for out-of-school learners and those with special
needs. 260

This is not to say that they shall be continually subjected strictly to the
K to 12 curriculum which they describe as "inferior," "diluted," and
"anemic." 261 The K to 12 Law explicitly recognized the right of schools to
modify their curricula subject, of course, to the minimum subjects prescribed
by the DepEd: 262

SEC. 5. Curriculum Development. - The DepED shall formulate

the design and details of the enhanced basic education curriculum. It shall
work with the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) to craft
harmonized basic and tertiary curricula for the global competitiveness of
Filipino graduates. To ensure college readiness and to avoid remedial and
duplication of basic education subjects, the DepED shall coordinate with
the CHED and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA).

To achieve an effective enhanced basic education curriculum, the

DepED shall undertake consultations with other national government
agencies and other stakeholders including, but not limited to, the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC), the private and public schools associations,
the national student organizations, the national teacher organizations, the
parents-teachers associations and the chambers of commerce on matters
affecting the concerned stakeholders.

The DepED shall adhere to the following standards and principles

in developing the enhanced basic education curriculum:

(a) The curriculum shall be learner-centered, inclusive and

developmentally appropriate;

(b) The curriculum shall be relevant, responsive and research-based;

(c) The curriculum shall be culture-sensitive;

(d) The curriculum shall be contextualized and global;

(e) The curriculum shall use pedagogical approaches that are

constructivist, inquiry-based, reflective, collaborative and integrative;

(f) The curriculum shall adhere to the principles and framework of

Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education (MTB-MLE) which starts
from where the learners are and from what they already knew proceeding
from the known to the unknown; instructional materials and capable
teachers to implement the MTB-MLE curriculum shall be available;

260
RA No. 10533, Sec. 3.
261
Rollo (G.R. No. 218465), Vol. 3, pp. 1495, 1497, 1516-1517.
262
RA No. 10533, Sec. 5.
 Decision 84 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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(g) The curriculum shall use the spiral progression approach to

ensure mastery of knowledge and skills after each level; and

(h) The curriculum shall be flexible enough to enable and allow

schools to localize, indigenize and enhance the same based on their
respective educational and social contexts. The production and
development of locally produced teaching materials shall be encouraged
and approval of these materials shall devolve to the regional and division
education units. (Emphasis supplied)

In fact, the K to 12 IRR confirms the inclusiveness of the design of the

Enhanced Basic Education in mandating that the enhanced basic education
programs should be able to address the physical, intellectual, psychosocial,
and cultural needs of lean1ers. 263 The IRR mandates that the Basic Education
Program should include programs for the gifted and talented, those with
disabilities, the Madrasah Program for Muslim learners, Indigenous Peoples
Programs, and Programs for Learners under Difficult Circumstances. 264 The
K to 12 !RR also allows the acceleration of learners in public and private
educational institutions. 265 Therefore, the remedy of petitioner students is with
MSHS and/or DepEd, and not with this Court.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 218045 also challenge the K to 12 Law on the

ground of violation of the equal protection clause by arguing that private
schools are allowed to offer extra and optional curriculum subjects in addition
to those required by the K to 12 Law and DepEd Orders, and thus, rich families
will tend to enroll their children in private schools while poor families will be
constrained to enroll their children in English starved public schools. 266

The argument is untenable.

The Court, no matter how vast its powers are, cannot trample on the
previously discussed right of schools to enhance their curricula and the
primary right of parents to rear their children, which includes the right to
determine which schools are best suited for their children's needs. Even before
the passage of the K to 12 Law, private educational institutions had already
been allowed to enhance the prescribed curriculum, considering the State's
recognition of the complementary roles of public and private institutions in
the educational system. 267 Hence, the Court cannot sustain petitioners'
submission that the assailed law is invalid based on this ground.

Other arguments against the

constitutionality of the K to 12 Law

Petitioners in G.R. No. 217752 argue that DepEd's use of global

263
K to 12 IRR, Sec. 8.
264 Id.
265
K to 12 IRR, Sec. 9.
266
Rollo (G.R. No. 218045), Vol. 1, p. 555.
267
1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV, Sec. 4(1 ).
 Decision 85 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
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competitiveness as justification in the policy shift to K to 12 is not relevant to

the needs of the people and society, as not everyone will be working abroad. 268
Essentially, they are assailing the validity of the law for allegedly violating
Section 2(1), Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states
that:
SEC. 2. The State shall:

(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and

integrated system of education relevant to the needs of the people and
society[.]

As previously discussed, however, Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987

Philippine Constitution is a non-self-executing provision of the Constitution.
Again, as the Court already held in Basco, "Section 2 (Educational Values) of
Article XIV of the 1987 [Philippine] Constitution xx x are merely statements
of principles and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing,
meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate
such principles. " 269 The K to 12 Law is one such law passed by the Legislature
to bring the said guiding principle to life. The question of what is 'relevant to
the needs of the people and society' is, in tum, within the sole purview of
legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene.

Another assertion against the constitutionality of the K to 12 Law is that

it allegedly violates the constitutional State duty to exercise reasonable
supervision and regulation of educational institutions mandated by Section 4,
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners in G.R. No. 218123 allege
that DepEd's Basic Education Sector Transformation Program (BEST) is
supported by Australian Aid and managed by CardNo, a foreign corporation
listed in the Australian Securities Exchange. CardNo allegedly hires
specialists for the implementation of the K to 12 curriculum. 270 This
partnership between CardNo and DepEd is allegedly violative of the above
Constitutional provision, which reads:
SEC. 4. (1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public
and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

(2) Educational institutions, other than those established by

religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of
the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
· the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however,
require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions.

The control and administration of educational institutions shall

be vested in the citizens of the Philippines.

268
Rollo (G.R. No. 217752), Vol. 1, p. 31.
269
Supra note 163, at 343.
270
Rollo (G.R. No. 218123), Vol. I, pp. 41-42.
 .'

Decision 86 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens

and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment
in any school. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to schools
established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and,
unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents.

(3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of
the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of
in the manner provided by law.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively

owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the
limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.

(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments,

donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners point to Section 4(1) and Section 4(2), paragraph 2, as legal

basis for the supposed unconstitutionality of the partnership between DepEd
and CardNo in the implementation of the K to 12 curriculum.

Petitioners' reading of the above Constitutional provisions is erroneous.

Sections 4( I) and 4(2) deal with two separate matters that the Framers of the
Constitution sought to address. Section 4( 1) was a provision added by the
Framers to crystallize the State's recognition of the importance of the role that
the private sector plays in the quality of the Philippine education system.
Despite this recognition, the Framers added the second portion of Section 4(2)
to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still possesses
the power of supervision over private schools. The Framers were explicit,
however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed to
internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the
addition of the word "reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and
regulation"; two, the addition of the word "quality" before the word
"education"; three, the change of the wordings in the 1973
Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be
relevant to the goals of national development, to the present expression of
"relevant to the needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation
of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of education" by
defining the same as the recognition and strengthening of
the complementary roles of public and private educational institutions
as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine educational system.

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to

the external governance of educational institutions, particularly private
educational institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by
their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative
officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would
 Decision 87 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

still have the inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the
exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to restate the
supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 193 5 and
1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it
necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our
Supreme Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of
Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of Education and the Board of
Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I quote:

It is enough to point out that local educators and

writers think the Constitution provides for control of
education by the State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show

that the power to regulate means power to control, and
quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention to prove that State control of private education
was intended by organic law.

The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to

underscore the sense of the committee, that when the
Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in
any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the State to
provide regulations and to see to it that these regulations are duly
followed and implemented. It does not include the right to manage, dictate,
overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to dominate. 271
(Emphasis supplied)

In stark contrast, Section 4(2), Article XIV, which was copied from the
1973 Philippine Constitution, refers to ownership and administration of
individual schools. This interpretation is clear both from a plain reading of the
provision itself, and from the deliberations of the Framers of the Constitution:
MR. GUINGONA. The committee refers to both ownership and
administration. If I may be allowed to continue, may I refer the
Commissioner to the same section that I have specified in the 1973
Constitution. The Commissioner will notice that this particular provision
does not only refer to administration because it speaks also of educational
institution which should be owned solely by citizens or corporations of the
Philippines.

MR. REGALADO. Yes.

MR. GUINGONA. In other words, even in the 1973 Constitution,

the contemplation or the intention of the fundamental law was to include
both ownership and administration.

MR. REGALADO. They are not merely these, because otherwise

there is an error oflanguage in the Constitution then. Paragraph 7 of Section
8 states: "Educational institutions, other than those established by religious
orders, mission boards, or charitable organizations."

MR. GUINGONA. Yes.

271
IV RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 56-57.
 Decision 88 G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752,
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MR. REGALADO. In other words, with the exception of

educational institutions established by religious orders, mission boards, or
charitable organizations, then all educational institutions shall
be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines and at the time, of course, by
corporations or associations 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned
by citizens. In other words, educational institutions of religious orders were
exempted from that requirement by the very constitutional provision which
was further implemented and ramified with clarity in P.D. No. 176. 272

Thus, petitioners are mistaken in applying Section 4(2), Article XIV to

Section 4(1 ), Article XIV as they deal with completely different matters. The
restrictions expressed in Section 4(2), Article XIV only refer to ownership,
control, and administration of individual schools, and these do not apply to
the State's exercise of reasonable supervision and regulation of educational
institutions under Section 4(1 ), Article XIV. Hence, there is nothing under the
provisions of the Constitution which prohibits the State to forge a partnership
with a foreign entity, like CardNo, in the exercise of this supervision and
regulation of educational institutions.

Further, it is asserted that the K to 12 Law violates the constitutional

duty of the State to provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school
youth with training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills as
commanded by Section 2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioners decry the supposed lack of mechanisms in the K to 12 Law to
accommodate groups with special needs. 273 As previously discussed, Section
2, Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is not a self-executing
provision. Furthermore, petitioners' argument has no factual basis because
DepEd has already put in place programs to address the needs of indigenous
peoples, Muslim children, adult learners, PWDs, out of school youth and other
sectors of society in keeping with the aforesaid constitutional provisions, in
line with the K to 12 Law. The Court agrees with the following discussion by
the OSG in its Comment on this point:
The petitioners' argument has no factual basis because the DepEd
has already put in place programs to address the needs of the indigenous
peoples, Muslim schoolchildren, adult learners, and persons with
disabilities (PWDs) in line with the K-12 program. DepEd Order No. 103,
s. 2011 directed the creation of the Indigenous Peoples Education Office
(IPsEO), which is a mechanism for the mobilization, implementation, and
coordination of all the programs and projects of DepEd pertaining to IPs
education, pursuant to "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997." This
law mandates all government agencies to recognize and promote the rights
of Indigenous Cultural Communities and Indigenous Peoples within the
framework of national unity and development.

Dep[E]d Order No. 62, s. 2011 entitled "The National Indigenous

Peoples Education Policy Framework," was issued to serve as an instrument
in promoting shared accountability, continuous dialogue, engagement, and

272
Id. at 366.
m Rollo (G.R. No. 218123), Vol. I, pp. 46-47.
Decision 89 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

partnership among governments, IPs communities, civil society, and other

education stakeholders in upholding the IPs Learners' education rights. In
support of DepEd's commitment to strengthen its policy on Indigenous
Peoples Education (IPEd), DepEd Order No. 26, s. 2013 promulgated the
Implementing Guidelines on the Allocation and Utilization of the
Indigenous Peoples Education (IPEd) Program Support Fund.

Likewise, DepEd Order No. 46, s. 2013, entitled "Guidelines on the

Madrasah Education Program and Utilization of the Support Fund," was
issued to engage Muslim learners with relevant educational opportunities
and processes.

On the other hand, DepEd Order No. 39, s. 2013 was issued in
support of DepEd's Special Education Program for learners with special
needs and disabilities, including those who are gifted and talented. DepEd
Memorandum No. 108, s. 2013 entitled "2013 Alternative Leaming System
Accreditation and Equivalency (ALS & ALE) Test Registration and
Administration" was promulgated to facilitate the ALS & ALE Test,
designed to measure the competencies of those who have neither attended
nor finished the elementary or secondary education in the formal school
system. Passers of this test are given a certificate/diploma (which bears the
seal and the signature of the Secretary of the Department of Education)
certifying their competencies as comparable to graduates of the formal
school system. Hence, they are qualified to enroll in the secondary and post-
secondary schools.

DepEd Order No. 17, s. 2014 was also issued to provide the
guidelines on the Abot-Alam Program, a convergence program that is being
undertaken by a consortium of various national government agencies, non-
government organizations, the National Youth Commission, and
institutions under the leadership of DepEd to locate the out-of-school youth
(OSY) nationwide who are 15-30 years old and who have not completed
basic/higher education or who are unemployed, and to mobilize and
harmonize programs which will address the OSY's needs and aspirations.

DepEd Order No. 77, s. 2011 organized the Advisory Council for
the Education of Children and Youth with Disabilities (ACECYD) to
formulate an agenda for action and the framework for collaboration between
the DepEd and the disability sector and other stakeholders in providing
education to children and youth with disabilities.

DepEd Order No. 64, s. 2011 directed all Schools Division and City
Superintendents (SDSs) and District Supervisors to strictly implement
relevant policies and best practices on the promotion and compensation of
all Alternative Leaming System (ALS) mobile teachers and implementers
to ensure equal opportunities and standard implementation on the
promotion and compensation of the ALS implementers.

Likewise, DepEd Order No. 22, s. 2010, entitled "Mainstreaming

and Institutionalizing Madrasah Education Program by Transferring Its
Developed Components to the Bureau of Elementary Education, Regional
and Division Offices, and the Establishment of Madrasah Education Unit,"
was promulgated with the ultimate objective of peace building, national
unity and understanding. Under this scheme, DepEd shall develop the
Standard Madrasah Curriculum (SMC) for Pre-elementary and Secondary
levels, along with the development of instructional and learning materials,
 Decision 90 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

to complete the cycle of basic education Madrasah.

These inclusion programs are continuously being implemented to

respond to the needs of the education sector during the transition period.
They show the resolve of the DepEd to harness the necessary systems and
structures to respond to the needs of the indigenous peoples, Muslim
schoolchildren, adult learners, PWDs, OSYs, and the other sectors of
society, in keeping with the constitutional provisions on the rights of
indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, and to provide
training in civics, vocational efficiency, and other skills to adult, disabled,
and out-of-school youth. 274

In fine, the contentions of petitioners are therefore without any factual

basis and utterly devoid of merit.

IV.

Policy issues

In an attempt to bolster their case against the K to 12 Law, petitioners

also raised the following policy issues:

a) K to 12 only increases the resource gap by creating more need for

resources. The solution to the problem is closing the resource gap by
giving priority to education in the budget and public spending program
of the government and addressing the issue of poverty and malnutrition
and programs aimed at alleviating if not eradicating poverty in the long
run but instead government comes up with the K to 12 Law which is a
copycat and elitist solution. 275

b) K to 12 is problem-ridden. Instead, what we need is to prioritize

deficiencies in personnel, facilities and materials; and a nationalist-
oriented curriculum relevant to the needs of the people. 276

c) The Philippine government does not have enough funds to add two (2)
more years of senior high school. 277

d) Student-teacher ratio is far from ideal. 278

e) Teachers are paid low salaries. 279

f) There is no assurance that senior high school results in good

274
Rollo (G.R. No. 216930), Vol. 2, pp. 877 -879.
275
Rollo (G.R. No. 217752), Vol. I, pp. 28-29.
276
Rollo (G.R. No. 218123) Vol. I, pp. 50, 53.
277
Id. at 49.
21s Id.
279
Id. at 50.
 Decision 91 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

employment. 280

Policy matters are not the concern of the Court. To reiterate,

government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches
of the government. It is not for the Court to look into the wisdom or propriety
of legislative determination. 281 Stated otherwise, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. 282 Indeed,
whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound
economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results,
whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should
be exercised in a particular manner - all these are matters for the judgment
of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring
them within the range of judicial cognizance. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. 283 In the case of Tanada v. Cuenco, 284 the Court, quoting
American authorities, held:
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established
principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass
judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where,
therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by
statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to
judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the
question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive

departments are spoken of as the political departments of government
because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by
considerations of public or political policy. These considerations ofpublic
or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate
constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted
him by the Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do permit
the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of
facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together
with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the
courts. " 285 (Emphasis in the original)

Similarly, in Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.

DENR Region 12 Employees, 286 the Court held that:

xx x. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the

transfer rather than to its legality. It is basic in our form of government that
the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the
executive or the legislative department, for each department is supreme and
280
Id. at 51.
281
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, 463 Phil. 179, 204 (2003).
282
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
283
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, supra note 281, at 212.
284
103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
285
Id. at I 065.
286
456 Phil. 635 (2003).
 Decision 92 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to

encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the
other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability
or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the
other departments.

The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been

tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire
bureaucracy. Unless there is a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
Court's exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it may
seem to be, still must succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation
of powers. After a careful review of the records of the case, we find that
this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretion has not been shown to
exist. 287 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, the courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to

legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide
by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary, in the determination of
actual cases and controversies, must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the govemment. 288 The Court, despite its vast
powers, will not review the wisdom, merits, or propriety of governmental
policies, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and/or (2) grave abuse of discretion. 289 For
having failed to show any of the above in the passage of the assailed law and
the department issuances, the petitioners' remedy thus lies not with the Court,
but with the executive and legislative branches of the govemment. 290

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the Court declares Republic Act No. 10533, Republic Act No.
10157, CHED Memorandum Order No. 20, Series of 2013, Department of
Education Order No. 31, Series of 2012, and Joint Guidelines on the
Implementation of the Labor and Management Component of Republic Act
No. 10533, as CONSTITUTIONAL. The Temporary Restraining Order
dated April 21, 2015 issued in G.R. No. 217451 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

287
Id. at 648.
288
Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra note 282, at 158-159.
289
Disomangcop v. Datumanong, 486 Phil. 398, 424-425 (2004).
290
See Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., 791 Phil. 277, 299 (2016).
Decision 93 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123&218465

WE CONCUR:

j~~~~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Chief Justice

c:lcy
Senior Associate Justice

(On official business)

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
~~;;;
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(,(/~~~
JA(l ,(J.,Jl../
ESTELA M~PERLAS-BERNABE
· Associate Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice
NOEL G
Asso~Jlice '/
~E TIJAM

(On official business)

~
u
ANDRE,8 REYES, JR. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Asso e Justice Associate Justice

~
 f
.

Decision 94 G.R.Nos.216930,217451,217752,
218045,218098,218123 &218465

(On wellness leave)

JOSE C. REYES, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

J~~h~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Chief Justice

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

EDGAR/0. ARICHETA
....._c1~f Court En Banc
Supreme Court