THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007.]

MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.,

INC.
petitioners, vs . MODESTO CALAUNAN,
CALAUNAN respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p

Assailed before Us is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909
which a rmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 42, in Civil Case No. D-10086, nding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) solidarily liable to pay damages and attorney's fees to
respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate
number CVD-478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic;
and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto
Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan,
together with Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his
owner-type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from
Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in
Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided. The front right side of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive
damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was rst brought
for treatment to the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the
conductor of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial
Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was led before the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Physical Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2
December 1991, respondent led a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic
and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The
criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case. Among those who testi ed in the criminal
case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos. HICSaD

In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued
as well as the venue and the identities of the vehicles involved;

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 2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;

3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;

4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan
and the existence of the medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep
being ahead of the bus;
6. That the weather was fair and the road was well paved and straight,
although there was a ditch on the right side where the jeep fell into. 3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) 4 of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza
and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as
much as these witnesses are not available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testi ed that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for
abroad sometime in November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took
the stand and said that his brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work.
Rosalia Mendoza testi ed that her husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look
for a job. She narrated that she thought her husband went to his hometown in Panique,
Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She went to her husband's hometown to
look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the
court where Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, 5 Marcelo Mendoza 6 and Fernando Ramos 7 in said case, together
with other documentary evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it
was Enrique Santos Guevara, Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and
identi ed the TSNs of the three afore-named witnesses and other pertinent documents he
had brought. 8 Counsel for respondent wanted to mark other TSNs and documents from
the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since the same were not
brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testi ed. The
TSN 9 of the testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No.
684-M-89 was marked and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he
was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the
TSNs 1 0 of the testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the
collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is
resolute in saying it was the former who caused the smash up. TEDaAc

The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2)
vehicles took place. According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising
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 at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway
when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking
the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the
time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In
other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the
jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and
Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another jeep following the Philippine
Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He said, the jeep
of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by
the Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the
jeep in which he was riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of
the plaintiff swerved to the right on a grassy portion of the road. The Philippine
Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine Rabbit Bus so that it could
not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit Bus. He
testi ed that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by
the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the
Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep in question. However, they explained that
when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the
jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in
front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal
case and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of
the manner how the collision took place was correct, would be determinative of
who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicles.] 1 1

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, speci cally petitioner
Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent
Calaunan and against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the
amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for the towing as well as the repair and
the materials used for the repair of the jeep in question; P100,000.00 as moral
damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P15,000.00 as
attorney's fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs. 1 2

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. 1 3
In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, nding no reversible
error in the decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects. 1 4
Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE

TRIAL COURT'S QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSN's AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. EaCSTc

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 II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE

TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW
THE ACCIDENT SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE

TRIAL COURT'S UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBL's DEFENSE
OF EXERCISE OF DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
EMPLOYEES.
IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE

TRIAL COURT'S QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEE.

With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal
with this Court, we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent led by his wife,
Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda. De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita
Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan. 1 5
In their Reply to respondent's Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a
Decision 1 6 of the Court of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge 1 7 of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching
thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the rst assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, 1 8 Marcelo Mendoza 1 9 and Fernando Ramos 2 0
should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the requisites
of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130 2 1 to apply, the following requisites must be satis ed: (a)
the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those
representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in
the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testi ed to by the
witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case; and (e) the
adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former case. 2 2
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth
by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-
M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal
case was led exclusively against petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI's employee. The
cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. 2 3
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case,
the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner
PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
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 waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a
failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to the statute is a waiver of
the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that these documents are
inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to object thereto, the same may
be admitted and considered as su cient to prove the facts therein asserted. 2 4 Hearsay
evidence alone may be insu cient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is
made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves. 2 5
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of
the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners. 2 6 Moreover,
petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN containing the testimony of Donato
Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of
plaintiff's witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in the instant case, why
then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case?
It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that
the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case
should not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the
witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be unfair. ASHEca

We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI's argument that it will be denied due

process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando
Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner
PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs. For failure to object at the
proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals , 2 7 this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno, 2 8 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite
therein petitioner's assertion that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN,
the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSN was
belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to object based on said
ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been
admitted in the instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony
or deposition." We nd such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only
of testimony and deposition, it does not mean that documents from a former case or
proceeding cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they being part of the
testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted. Accordingly, they shall be given the
same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled. 2 9
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner
Manliclic as to how the accident occurred is more credible than respondent's version. They
anchor their contention on the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of
Appeals of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries.
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 To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclic's acquittal in the civil
case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one
arising from, or based on, quasi-delict. 3 0 Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence
or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its
failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of its
employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was
on board the above-described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along
the North Luzon Expressway heading South towards Manila together with
MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving the same;

"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express

Way, the above-described motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No. 353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being
driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then
travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had apparently lost control of his
vehicle;

"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described

motor vehicle was forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside
where it fell on its driver's side on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-
described motor vehicle which maybe valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by pictures to be presented during
the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily
injuries which compounded plaintiff's frail physical condition and required his
hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and until July 22, 1988, copy of the
medical certi cate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part
hereof;

"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the
above-described motor vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was
solely due to the reckless imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic
who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or
observance of existing traffic rules and regulations;

"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to

exercise the diligence of a good father of (sic) family in the selection and
supervision of its drivers; . . ." 3 1

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent
notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of
negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following ndings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant
was negligent "when the bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that
"the proximate cause of the accident was his having driven the bus at a great
speed while closely following the jeep"; . . .

We do not agree.
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 The swerving of Calaunan's jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in
front of it was beyond the control of accused-appellant.ECDaAc

xxx xxx xxx

Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held

liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. 3 2

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner
Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the
author of the act complained of which is based on Section 2 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a nal judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The
afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not
to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 3 3
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and
the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. 3 4 It is
now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a nding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. 3 5
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his
civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a nal judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability
based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to
speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action,
if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a
nal judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. 3 6 An acquittal
or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case 3 7 based on quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana.

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 Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred
and to disregard that of respondent's. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in
the process of overtaking respondent's jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved
to the left (fast) lane in order to overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the
collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The
factual ndings of the trial court, especially when a rmed by the appellate court, are
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court. 3 8 Not being a trier of facts, this Court will
not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a nding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond
the issues of the case and its ndings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellees; (7) the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said ndings of fact are conclusions
without citation of speci c evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the ndings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record. 3 9

After going over the evidence on record, we do not nd any of the exceptions that
would warrant our departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the nding of the trial
court, as a rmed by the Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was
negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which was the cause of the collision. In giving credence
to the version of the respondent, the trial court has this say:
. . . Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took
place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicle.
aIcSED

In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic

(Exh. 15) given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was
made by him about the fact that the driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep
when the collision took place. The allegation that another jeep was being
overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testi ed to by him only in Crim. Case No.
684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this
Court. Evidently, it was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio
Manliclic so that he could explain why he should not be held responsible for the
incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also apparent when it would
be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of
Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his
testimony before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this
Court, he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the
jeep when the collision took place. For this inconsistency between his statement
and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how the collision between
the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true that
in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV
Cabading, it was mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act
of overtaking another jeep when the collision between the latter jeep and the
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 Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that his statement was
given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement
should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the
two statements would be signi cant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar
Buan having received legal advise before giving his statement. Apart from that, as
between his statement and the statement of Manliclic himself, the statement of
the latter should prevail. Besides, in his A davit of March 10, 1989, (Exh. 14), the
unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear
its "ugly head" when he did not mention in said a davit that the jeep of Calaunan
was trying to overtake another jeep when the collision between the jeep in
question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took place.

xxx xxx xxx

If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic,

and his conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already
somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision
on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its
rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having
been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit
was running very fast as testi ed to by Ramos which was not controverted by the
defendants. 4 0

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic's negligence that caused the smash up,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. 4 1 Under Article 2180 4 2
of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employee. 4 3
In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner
Manliclic. In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner
Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence
in the supervision of its employees, it argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban
and Cabading) is su cient proof that it exercised the required due diligence in the
supervision of its employees. DACIHc

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them

as to their quali cations, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees,
the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off
vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence,
that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. 4 4
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 4 5 it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes
the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees
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 and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public
and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case
of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and bene cial to their employer. To this, we add
that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said
rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable
supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employees may be deemed su cient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily
invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and
supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it
has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring
procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not
sufficient to overcome such presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that

"the formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they
were being complied with is not su cient to exempt petitioner from liability
arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show
that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." . . . .

The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as
follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines has a very good procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the
maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence though that it is as good in the
supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence introduced by it
that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation
of its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles
assigned to them. There is no showing that somebody in the bus company has
been employed to oversee how its driver should behave while operating their
vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In regard to
supervision, it is not di cult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
has been negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts
of its employees, particularly the driver involved in this case.

We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident
is not enough to exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of
petitioner Manliclic. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases
above-mentioned. The presence of the investigators after the accident is not enough
supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have
been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack of supervision can
further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules and
regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI. 4 6 How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI
know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is
being lent to all the drivers?

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 For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily
responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic's negligence. ISDHEa

We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount
of P40,838.00 as actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the
towing and repair of his jeep. 4 7 As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages,
same, under the circumstances, must be modi ed. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial
court as moral damages must be reduced to P50,000.00. 4 8 Exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. 4 9 The amount awarded by
the trial court must, likewise, be lowered to P50,000.00. 5 0 The award of P15,000.00 for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law. 5 1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and
(2) the award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. CA rollo, pp. 191-193.

2. Records, pp. 437-456.

3. Pre-Trial Order; Records, p. 143.

4. TSNs were admitted per Order dated 13 September 1994; Records, p. 341.
5. Exhs. G-3 to G-10 (19 April 1991) and G-11 to G-36 (1 July 1991).

6. Exh. D-4 (5 February 1993).

7. Exh. E-4.

8. Exhs. A to H, with submarkings.

9. Exh. 19.

10. Exhs. M to P.
11. Rollo, pp. 45-47.
12. Records, p. 456.
13. Id. at 459.
14. CA rollo, p. 193.
15. Rollo, pp. 59-62, 88.
16. CA-G.R. CR No. 19749.
17. Crim. Case No. 684-M-89.
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 18. Exhs. G-3 to G-10 (19 April 1991) and G-11 to G-36 (1 July 1991).
19. Exh. D-4 (5 February 1993).

20. Exh. E-4.

21. Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition
of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

22. Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140079, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 462, 470.
23. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People, G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA
456, 471.
24. Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, 31 July 1997, 276 SCRA 582.
25. Top-Weld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED, S.A., G.R. No. 44944, 9 August 1985, 138 SCRA
118.
26. Records, pp. 336-337.

27. G.R. No. 139849, 5 December 2001, 371 SCRA 466, 474-476.
28. Now Chief Justice.

29. People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 116918, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 259, 272.
30. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provision of this Chapter.

31. Records, pp. 1-3.

32. Rollo, pp. 112-114.
33. Elcano v. Hill, G.R. No. L-24803, 26 May 1977, 77 SCRA 98, 106.
34. Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, 6 November 1990, 191 SCRA
195, 203-204.
35. Heirs of the Late Guaring, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 274, 279 (1997).
36. McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102 and No. 68103, 16 July 1992,
211 SCRA 517, 536.

37. Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48541, 21 August 1989, 176 SCRA 591, 598.
38. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. John Bordman Ltd. Of Iloilo, Inc., G.R. No.
159831, 14 October 2005, 473 SCRA 151, 162.

39. Sigaya v. Mayuga, G.R. No. 143254, 18 August 2005, 467 SCRA 341, 352-353.
40. Rollo, pp. 47-50.
41. Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, 21 June 1993,
223 SCRA 521, 539.

42. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
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 acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. DIcTaC

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

43. Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, 23 (1995).

44. Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Sarangaya III, G.R. No. 147746, 25 October 2005,
474 SCRA 191, 202.
45. Supra note 41 at 540-541.
46. TSN, 16 February 1995, pp. 23-24.
47. Exhs. C to C-4 and F. Records, pp. 232-236, 288. Article 2219 (2), Civil Code.

48. Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado, G.R. No. 85331, 25 August 1989, 176 SCRA 792, 803.
49. Article 2229, Civil Code.

50. Tiu v. Arriesgado, G.R. No. 138060, 1 September 2004, 437 SCRA 426, 451; Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120553, 17 June 1997, 273 SCRA
562, 574-575.

51. Article 2208 (1), (2) and (5), Civil Code.

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