Constilaw Finals
Constilaw Finals
Constilaw Finals
TAKE NOTE:
1. 2 kinds of veto: pocket and item veto
2. sinecure clause
3. compatibility clause for forbidden office
4. power of the sword
5. power of the purse
6. exception when a bill becomes a law without the action or inaction of the president- special elections,
since there is no president to sign such bill. it becomes a law after the 3rd reading
7. gerrymandering
8. pork barrel
TAKE NOTE:
1. executive impoundment
2. 2 senses of qualification: eligibility (sec 2), and taking the oath
3. midnight appointment
4. presidential immunity
5. Can Erap become president again? Yes, by way of succession
6. executive privilege
7. Presidential oath/ affirmation
8. presentment clause
9. amnesty v pardon
10. budgetary powers (4 steps)
11. doctrine of qualified political agency/ alter-ego doctrine
12. Can a VP run again after 2 consecutive terms in the future?
13. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
14. control v supervision
15. LGUs- not in the control of the President or the executive dept, only supervision
16. Open Court doctrine
17. sole organ doctrine
18. rules of succession for President and VP
19. Marcos v Manglapus (landmark case)
20. De Castro v JBC
CASE DOCTRINE
***Marcos v residual powers the power of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
Manglapus specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
***De Castro v midnight In this case, PGMA appointed CJ Reynato Corona as successor to
JBC appointment retired CJ Reynato Puno.
Said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. There is
no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.
Pormento v re: disqualification of dismissed the petition to have Erap disqualified from participating in
Estrada Erap from 2010 the 2010 elections, considering the fact that Estrada was not actually
Presidential Elections elected President for the second time and any discussion of his “re-
election” will simply be hypothetical and speculative.
Estrada v Presidential after his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from
Desierto Immunity suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was
President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.
David v Arroyo presidential it is not proper to implied President Arroyo as respondent. However,
immunity this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone.
Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he
may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and
that is by impeachment.
Manubay v doctrine of qualified department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President
Garilao political agency and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless
disapproved or reprobated by him.
Macalintal v Presidential Electoral The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is no other than the Supreme
PET Tribunal Court itself. The new provision in the 1987 Constitution simply
constitutionalizes the decision of the SC in Lopez v. Roxas.
Senate v Ermita Executive Privilege right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to
withhold information from Congress, the Courts, and ultimately, the
public.
CASE DOCTRINE
Limbona v 1 year residency rule the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
COMELEC exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community.
Aquino v theory of legal it would be legally impossible to impose the 1 year residency
COMELEC impossibility requirement in a newly created political district.
(189793) (In the case, it was the Congressional district of Makati, which was
barely 4 months old at the time of the May 1995 elections.)
Aquino v rule of there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a a 250,
COMELEC apportionment of 000 minimum population that must compose every legislative
(120265) legislative districts district. Sec 5(3) of the Constitution plainly requires it ONLY for a
city, not for a province.
Belgica v Ochoa PDAF/ pork barrel declared unconstitutional by the SC with a 14-0 vote.
*Atong party-list system the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
Paglaum v representation.
COMELEC
People v privilege from arrest members of Congress are not exempt from detention for crime. They
Jalosjos may be arrested, even when the House is in session, for crimes
punishable by a penalty of more than six years.
PCA v Enriquez power of the “power of the purse” belongs to Congress, subject only to the
appropriation, power veto power of the president. It carries with it the power to specify the
of the purse project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law.
PCA v Enriquez executive refusal of the President to spend funds already allocated by Congress
impoundment for a specific purpose. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type.
PCA v Enriquez doctrine of any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which
inappropriate extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation is
provisions considered an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed
separately from an item.
CASE DOCTRINE
Senate v Ermita quorum majority of all members of Congress means majority of the entire
composition of Congress regardless of the number of members
present or absent during time the question is brought to the floor as
long as there is quorum.
ex. (24/2) +1 for Senate
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders
of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Held:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work
experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
De Castro v JBC
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in
2010.
After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief
Justice was left vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that, "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of
nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15,
Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the President or the Acting President
from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next Presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the
position from the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice
Reynato C. Corona who was chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief
Justice.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next
Chief Justice since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the
Constitution intended the prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly
stated it in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.
RULING:
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.
If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of
Chief Justice, then they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under Section 15 (THE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT), Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT).
Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive
Department.
Marcos v Manglapus
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought
to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant
by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment
(Section 19), treaty making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power
(Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to
the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government
that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.