G.R. No. 155996: (A 1924 Case), The Court
G.R. No. 155996: (A 1924 Case), The Court
G.R. No. 155996: (A 1924 Case), The Court
"x x x.
In the 1906 case of U.S. v. Castillo,[138] the Court laid down the rule that the
utterance or use of a forged instrument, when unexplained, is strong evidence
tending to establish that the user himself (or herself) either forged the instrument or
caused it to be forged. In this case, the accused merely denied ever presenting the
forged check to the complainant or receiving the amount it represented; the Court
found no merit in these denials. In People v. De Lara[139] (a 1924 case), the Court
again applied the presumption after finding the explanation of the accused – on how
he came into possession of checks that were subsequently encashed – to be “unusual
and unreasonable as to carry conviction.”[140]
In the more recent (1992) Caubang v. People,[149] the accused - who claimed
to have the authority to transact (in behalf of an entity) with a government agency in
Manila - attempted to overthrow the presumption of authorship against him by
alleging intervening circumstances from the time he arrived in Manila until the
transaction with the government agency was made. The accused claimed the he did
not carry the forged document when he arrived in Manila and that third persons
(including a “fixer”) actually transacted with the government. Allegedly, these
claims disproved that he had any knowledge or inference in the making of the
submitted forged document. Rejecting this claim, the Court ruled that:
[U]tilizing a fixer as part of the scenario becomes a convenient ploy to divert the mind of the court
from the more plausible inference that the accused-petitioner engineered the spurious [document].
xxxx
Even if the allegation that some other person [did the transaction] was true, the accused-
petitioner would still be subjected to the same conclusion.
xxxx
Having been the one responsible for the filing of the registration papers, including the
means he felt necessary to accomplish the registration, the accused must likewise be accountable
therefor. As the authorized representative, he is deemed to have been the one in custody or
possession, or at least the one who has gotten hold even for a short while, of the papers which
included the [falsified document]. That he knew of the execution of the statement is a possibility
not too difficult to imagine under the circumstances.
xxxx
The [submission] of the previously inexistent document [with the government] subjects the
accused-petitioner to the inference that he used it as part of the registration papers. In the absence
of a credible and satisfactory explanation of how the document came into being and then filed with
the [government agency], the accused is presumed to be the forger [.][150] (italics supplied)
The above case law instructs us that if a person had in his possession (actual
or constructive) a falsified document and made use of it, taking advantage of it and/or
profiting from such use, thepresumption that he authored the falsification also
applies.[153]
These cited cases, however, already involve a determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused, requiring the application of the rigid standard of moral
certainty. In a preliminary investigation that merely inquires into the probability of
guilt of a respondent, no reason exists why the same presumption cannot
apply mutatis mutandis, taking into account the different level of certainty
demanded.
Where the evidence before the investigating prosecutor jibes with the factual
premises[154]necessary for the application of the presumption of authorship, a prima
facie[155] case for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is
created. Correspondingly, the legal presumption gives rise to the necessity for the
presentation of contrary evidence by the party (against whom the presumption
applies) to overcome the prima facie case established;[156] otherwise, the existence
of probable cause cannot be disputed.[157]