SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110914. June 28, 2001]

ALFREDO CANUTO, JR. and ROMEO DE LA

CORTE, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking the reversal of the
Resolution[1] and Order[2] of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated April
22, 1993 and June 30, 1993, respectively, rendered in NLRC NCR CA No. 003891-92, declaring
petitioners to have been lawfully dismissed by private respondent.
Prior to their termination, petitioners Alfredo Canuto, Jr. and Romeo De La Corte were
employed by private respondent Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. (Colgate) as statistical
quality control supervisor and production foreman, respectively. Canuto was then earning a
salary of P9,540.00 per month plus a monthly allowance of P6,770.00, while De La Corte was
paid P8,250.00 per month.
On July 5, 1989, Colgate terminated petitioners services. The notice of termination, signed
by respondents officers, namely Aniceto Y. Dideles, Dexter C. Mendoza, and Ramon F. Alborte,
stated that petitioners were being dismissed for loss of confidence. Petitioners, it would appear,
were involved in a scheme to defraud respondent company. Basically, the plot consisted of an
attempt to induce the company to purchase several drums of perfume used in the manufacture of
its toilet soaps and shampoos. The deception was that Colgate already owned the drums of
perfume.
The plot was uncovered when Colgates Manufacturing Director, William Christopher,
received two (2) confidential letters detailing the anomaly. An investigation resulted, leading to
the entrapment of the malefactors, among whom were petitioners. For purposes of this
resolution, we deem it unnecessary to recount at length the complicated behind-the-scene
maneuverings which revealed petitioners complicity in the scheme, for reasons we shall
subsequently discuss.
On July 4, 1990, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal termination against Colgate.[3] The
complaint prayed for the payment of backwages and other benefits, as well as damages.
Hearings ensued. On September 8, 1992, Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday issued a
Decision[4] finding petitioners to have been illegally dismissed. He ordered private respondent to
reinstate petitioners and to pay them backwages and other benefits equivalent to P825,492.00
[Canuto] and P404,814.00 [De La Corte]. Colgate appealed the decision to the Commission. As
aforesaid, the Commission overruled the labor arbiters findings and declared petitioners to have
been dismissed for cause. However, it ordered Colgate to pay petitioners an indemnity of
P1,000.00 in view of the companys alleged failure to accord petitioners due process.
The petitioners then interposed the instant special civil action. As grounds for allowance of
their petition, petitioners argue, to wit:
I

Public Respondent gravely abused its discretion in completely ignoring the findings of
facts by the labor arbiter in the case at bar;
II
Public Respondent gravely abused its discretion in admitting/considering purely
respondent evidence in resolving the appeal made to them by respondent company
Colgate Palmolive Philippines despite its inadmissibility as ruled by the labor arbiter;
III

Public Respondent gravely abused its discretion in resolving that respondent Colgate
Palmolive Philippines, Inc. had sufficiently proven petitioners guilt in the labor
arbiters proceedings;
IV

Public Respondent gravely abused its discretion in ignoring petitioners evidence and
testimonies given in the proceedings undisputed;
V

Public Respondent gravely abused its discretion in not awarding petitioners of lawful
claim arising out of their illegal termination from employment as provided for by
existing jurisprudence.

The petition should be dismissed.

It has been revealed that prior to filing the illegal dismissal case before the labor tribunal,
petitioners filed an amended complaint for damages dated August 16, 1989 against Dideles,
Mendoza and Alborte, the officers whose signatures appeared in the notice of termination given
to petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-3291 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Abbreviating the proceedings before the trial court, the defendants therein filed a second
motion to dismiss the civil case after petitioners initiated the illegal dismissal case before the
labor arbiter on July 4, 1990. The defendants interposed the defense of lack of jurisdiction,
averring that the trial court had no jurisdiction over a labor dispute, and accused petitioners of
forum shopping. When the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the defendants elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 25418. On September 13, 1999, the former Ninth Division of the appellate court rendered
judgment dismissing the civil case on the ground of forum shopping. Reconsideration having
been denied, petitioners filed a petition for review of certiorari before us, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 142851.
On July 10, 2000, the Third Division of this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition
for its failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Further, the resolution
stated that petitioners failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error. Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file the aforesaid motion. In a Resolution dated October 18, 2000, we denied the motion
for extension for being a prohibited pleading. Accordingly, we decreed that no further pleadings
would be entertained, and that entry of judgment be made in due course. In a subsequent
Resolution dated November 27, 2000, we denied with finality petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Undeniably, the dismissal of G.R. No. 142851 affects the disposition of the present case,
exhibiting as it does petitioners clear act of forum shopping. Forum shopping is manifest
whenever a party repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in,
or already resolved adversely by, some other court.[5] It has also been defined as an act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.[6] Considered a
pernicious evil, it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs the court
dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and
mocks judicial processes.[7]
 There is no doubt that at the time the complaint for illegal dismissal was filed, there was
already pending before the regular courts another action involving substantially the same
issues. In relation thereto, Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:

Certification against forum shopping.The plaintiff or principal party shall certify

under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or
in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending
action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his
aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

We note that both Civil Case No. Q-89-3291 and NLRC NCR-00-07-03622-90 were filed
before the issuance of the pertinent circulars guarding against forum shopping. This is not to say,
though, that forum shopping was a tolerated practice then. The rule against forum shopping has
long been established and subsequent circulars of the Supreme Court merely formalized the
prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against the transgressors.[8] However, at the
time material to the case, when the instant petition for certiorari was filed on July 22, 1993, the
same was already subject to the provisions of Circular 28-91 which took effect on January 1,
1992.[9] In fact, we took pains to emphasize in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission[10] that compliance with the circular is mandatory even for labor
cases. Hence, petitioners were duty-bound to make the disclosures so required, and this they
failed to do.
To this end, we explained in Melo v. Court of Appeals[11] that the submission of a
certification against forum shopping is a different undertaking from the assurances stated
therein. Thus,

xxx [f]ailure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the fact that
plaintiff is not guilty of forum shopping. xxx The Circular applies to any complaint,
petition, application, or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing
it has actually committed forum shopping. Every party filing a complaint or any other
initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not committed nor will
he commit forum shopping. Otherwise, we would have an absurd situation where the
parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a violation
of said Circular, and compliance therewith would depend on their belief that they
might or might not have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the
requirement would defeat the very purpose of Circular 04-94.

Indeed, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from,
and independent of, the avoidance of forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a difference
in the treatmentin terms of imposable sanctionsbetween failure to comply with the
certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum shopping. The
former is merely a cause for the dismissal, without prejudice, of the complaint or
initiatory pleading, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and
constitutes direct contempt.

We need not belabor the point that petitioners, in failing to state the pendency of Civil Case
No. Q-89-3291, or even CA-G.R. SP No. 25418, engaged in a deliberate act of forum
shopping. It matters not that the defendant in the civil case differed from the respondent in the
labor case inasmuch as literal identity of parties in the two cases is not indispensable.[12] It is
material that the issues and causes of action involved in both actions revolve around the legality
of their dismissal. From the very same act of termination, petitioners seek damages either from
herein respondent which they claim unlawfully fired them, or failing that, from respondents
officers whom they claim terminated them without the sanction of the company. Both claims are,
quite obviously, contradictory, which only underscores their attempt to canvass for a friendly
forum, namely, that if their claim is defeated in the regular court, then they would attempt to
prevail in the labor tribunal, or vice versa.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of the case at bar is indubitably in order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of forum
shopping. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1]
Annex A of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 27-44.
[2]
Annex B of the Petition, Rollo, p. 46.
[3]
I Record, last page.
[4]
Annex C of the Petition, Rollo, pp. 49-64.
[5]
Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 487, 500 (1997).
[6]
Sto. Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 294 SCRA 382, 384 (1998).
[7]
Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 637 (1999).
[8]
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Flores, 287 SCRA 449, 456 (1998), citing Chemphil Export and Import
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 257, 291 (1995).
[9]
This subsequently became Revised Circular 28-91 effective April 1, 1994. The requirement of filing a
certification of non-forum shopping was extended to complaints and initiatory pleadings filed before all other courts
and agencies, per Administrative Circular No. 4-94.
[10]
298 SCRA 378, 384 (1998).
[11]
318 SCRA 94, 102 (1999).
[12]
Cf. First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 259 (1996).