This decision dismisses a petition for certiorari as moot. The petitioner, a municipal mayor, was charged with falsifying public documents but was acquitted. He challenged his suspension from office during the criminal proceedings. However, because he was acquitted, any resolution on the validity of his suspension would no longer affect his rights. The court also clarifies that falsifying public documents constitutes "fraud" under the law allowing suspension of officials charged with offenses involving fraud on government funds. While the case is moot, the court addresses the legal issue to provide guidance in similar future cases.
This decision dismisses a petition for certiorari as moot. The petitioner, a municipal mayor, was charged with falsifying public documents but was acquitted. He challenged his suspension from office during the criminal proceedings. However, because he was acquitted, any resolution on the validity of his suspension would no longer affect his rights. The court also clarifies that falsifying public documents constitutes "fraud" under the law allowing suspension of officials charged with offenses involving fraud on government funds. While the case is moot, the court addresses the legal issue to provide guidance in similar future cases.
This decision dismisses a petition for certiorari as moot. The petitioner, a municipal mayor, was charged with falsifying public documents but was acquitted. He challenged his suspension from office during the criminal proceedings. However, because he was acquitted, any resolution on the validity of his suspension would no longer affect his rights. The court also clarifies that falsifying public documents constitutes "fraud" under the law allowing suspension of officials charged with offenses involving fraud on government funds. While the case is moot, the court addresses the legal issue to provide guidance in similar future cases.
This decision dismisses a petition for certiorari as moot. The petitioner, a municipal mayor, was charged with falsifying public documents but was acquitted. He challenged his suspension from office during the criminal proceedings. However, because he was acquitted, any resolution on the validity of his suspension would no longer affect his rights. The court also clarifies that falsifying public documents constitutes "fraud" under the law allowing suspension of officials charged with offenses involving fraud on government funds. While the case is moot, the court addresses the legal issue to provide guidance in similar future cases.
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G.R. NO.
184496 December 2, 2013
HADJI HASHIM ABDUL, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: "Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging."1 Challenged in the instant Petition for Certiorari2 with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) is the May 14, 2008 Resolution3 of respondent Sandiganbayan (respondent) in Criminal Case No. 27744. Said Resolution suspended for a period of 90 days petitioner), Tan-Alem Abdul (Abdul) and Candidato S. Domado (Domado) from their respective official positions as Municipal Mayor, Human Resource Management Officer, and Budget Officer of the Municipality of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. Likewise questioned is respondent’s Resolution4of September 2, 2008 denying petitioner ‘s Motion for Reconsideration. The Undisputed Facts Petitioner was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 election and re-elected for a second term in the May 2001 election. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an Information on September 5, 2002 charging petitioner, along with Abdul and Domado, with falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).5 The Information6 states: That sometime on 22 April 1999, or prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused HADJI HASHIM ABDUL, being then the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur, a high ranking official, TAN-ALEM ABDUL, being then the Human Resource Management Officer, and CANDIDATO S. DOMADO, being then the Budget Officer, all public officers, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring with one another, make it appear that Engr. Zubair F. Murad as Municipal Engineer prepared and signed the Local Budget Preparation Form Nos. 152, 153 and 154 known as the Program Appropriation and Obligation by Object, Personnel Schedule and Functional Statement and General Objective, respectively, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that said Zubair F. Murad was never employed as Municipal Engineer of the said Municipality, to the damage and prejudice of public interest. CONTRARY TO LAW.7 During the arraignment, petitioner and his co- accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Before the commencement of the trial, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) moved for the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his co-accused as mandated under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,8 which provides: Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. – Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title Seven, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. x x x The OSP averred that suspension under the above- quoted section is mandatory. In his Comment,9 petitioner asserted that he cannot be suspended pendente lite because the crime for which he was charged is not among those enumerated under Section 13 of RA 3019. He was not charged under RA 3019 or Title Seven, Book II of the RPC. Neither does fraud upon government or public funds or property cover falsification of public document nor fraud per se, an ingredient of the offense of falsification of public document. Finding the charge as squarely falling within the ambit of Section 13, RA 3019, respondent granted in its Resolution10 of October 9, 2003 the OSP’s motion and accordingly ordered the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his co-accused from their respective positions and from any other public office which they may now or hereafter be holding for a period of 90 days from notice. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,11 but the same was denied in a Resolution12 dated February 11, 2004. Thus, on March 2, 2004 he filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO13 alleging that the suspension order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In a Resolution14 dated March 10, 2004, the Court dismissed the Petition, which dismissal attained finality on July 12, 2004.15 The suspension order, however, was no longer implemented because it was superseded by the expiration of petitioner’s second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May 2004 election. During the May 2007 election, petitioner emerged as the winner in the mayoralty race and again sat as Mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. On February 21, 2008, the OSP once again moved for his and his co-accused’s suspension pendente lite to implement respondent’s final and executory suspension order of October 9, 2003. 16 In his Comment and Opposition, 17 petitioner called attention to respondent’s pronouncement in its Resolution18 dated December 20, 2004 that his defeat in the May 2004 election has effectively rendered his suspension moot and academic. Nonetheless, respondent, through its Resolution of May 14, 2008, 19 ordered anew the suspension of petitioner from his present position for a period of 90 days. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,20 but the same was denied in a Resolution21 dated September 2, 2008.1âwphi1 Undeterred, petitioner filed on October 2, 2008 the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for TRO submitting again the sole issue of whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his position as mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. On December 3, 2008, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of the suspension Order.22 Subsequently, on November 24, 2009 while the present Petition was pending before the Court, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision23 acquitting petitioner and his co-accused of the offense charged. Our Ruling We dismiss the Petition for being moot and academic. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy. Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco24 we have ruled that "[w]here the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually challenging." In the present case, the acquittal of herein petitioner operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of the order of suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged. Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition, petitioner nevertheless implores us to make a clear and categorical resolution on whether the offense of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is included in the term "fraud" as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019. As earlier quoted, to warrant the suspension of a public officer under the said Section 13, he must be charged with an offense (1) under RA 3019, or (2) under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. Admittedly, petitioner in this case was not charged under RA 3019. Neither was he charged under Title Seven, 25Book II of the RPC as the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is covered by Title Four, 26 Book II thereof. The relevant question now is whether falsification of public documents is considered as fraud upon government or public funds or property. This issue is not of first impression. Close but not exactly similar with the factual backdrop of this case is Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan.27 Petitioner therein was charged with falsifying municipal vouchers which, as used in government, are official documents.28 He asserted the said offense does not involve "fraud or property;" hence, his suspension finds no basis in Section 13 of RA 3019. In construing the term "fraud" as used in Section 13 of RA 3019, the Court held in said case that the same is understood in its general sense, that is, referring to "an instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation."29 And since vouchers are official documents signifying a cash outflow from government coffers, falsification thereof invariably involves fraud upon public funds.30 Again, in Bartolo v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, 31 the Court citing Bustillo underscored the fact that "the term fraud as used in Section 13 of [RA] 3019 is understood in its generic sense."32 In upholding the suspension of therein petitioner, the Court held that "the allegation of falsification of the three public documents by making it appear that the flood control project was 100% complete [when in fact it was not,] constitutes fraud upon public funds."33 In the same vein, the act imputed against petitioner constitutes fraud upon government or public funds.1âwphi1 This was aptly explained by respondent in its Resolution34 dated October 9, 2003, viz: x x x The existence of fraud in the commission of the offense charged can be easily associated from the natie of the acts of herein accused when they made it appear and signed Local udget Preparation Forms No. 152, 153 and 154, when in truth and in fact, said Engr. Murad was not even an employee of the Municipality of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. As a consequence of this act, several projects, their costs and extent, were authorized without the careful assessment of [the] legitimate municipalengineer. This alone is sufficient to justify the Court’s conclusion that, indeed, the alleged act of accused constitutes fraud upon the government.35 In fine , we reiterate that he issue on the validity or invalidity of petitioner’s suspension had mooted considering his acquittal by the Sandiganbayan in its November 24, 2009 Decision. As such, there is no justiciable controversy for this Court to adjucate. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 205413 December 2, 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES, Appellee, vs. ROGELIO MANICAT y DE GUZMAN, Appellant. DECISION BRION, J.: We resolve the appeal, filed by Rogelio Manicat y de Guzman (appellant), from the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated May 4, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR- HC No. 03930. The decision affirmed with modification the January 14, 2009 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 169, Malabon City, in Crim. Case No. 24550-MN, finding the appelant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, and sentencing hime to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without elligibility of parole. The RTC Ruling In its January 14, 2009 decision, the RTC found the appelant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple rape. It gave credence to the testimony of AAA, the 13-year old victim, that while she was on her way to buy coffee and sugar, the appellant pulled her inside his house, undressed her, and then forced her to lie down on her back. The appellant afterwards inserted his penis inside her vagina. AAA explained that she felt pain but she did not cry because the appellant threatened to kill her if she made any noise. According to the RTC, the fact that AAA is afflicted with mild mental retardation with a mental age of 7-8 years old does not make her an incompetent witness, as she testified in a clear and straightforward manner. Thus, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordered him to pay the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The CA Decision On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment with the modification that the award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 be deleted. The CA held that AAA testified in a "straightforward, candid and convincing manner." 3 Her testimony was corroborated by Medico Legal Report No. M-257-01 dated April 29, 2001 stating that the victim is in a non-virgin physical state. The CA noted that the Clinical Abstract issued by the National Center for Mental Health does not indicate whether AAA’s condition impairs her capacity as a witness. It also explained that AAA’s credibility cannot be impaired by her behavior as a rape victim because rape victims do not all react in the same way. The CA rejected the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi for failure to substantiate these defenses. Lastly, the CA found that the penalty of "reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole" was proper because under Resolution No. 24-4- 10, 4 those convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua are disqualified from the benefit of parole. Our Ruling We deny the appeal, but modify the awarded indemnities. For the charge of rape (under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code [RPC], as amended) to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the RPC. First, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA was straightforward when she testified that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Her testimony was supported by Medico Legal Report No. M-257-01 dated April 29, 2001, reflecting the victim’s non-virgin physical state. We have held that when the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.5 Second, the appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to satisfy his lust. AAA categorically testified that she resisted when the appellant pulled her inside his house. She also recalled that she cried when the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Nonetheless, she was helpless and afraid to make further noise because the appellant threatened to kill her. These facts sufficiently indicate that the appellant’s acts were against AAA’s will. Being afflicted with mild mental retardation does not mean that AAA’s testimony was merely imagined. We agree with the RTC and the CA’s conclusion that the testimony of a mental retardate depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make these known to the court.6 In the present case, the questions asked were couched in terms that AAA could easily understand, as recommended by Ma. Cristina P. Morelos, M.D., Medical Officer III.7 Hence, we are convinced that AAA understood the questions propounded to her, which she answered in a clear and straightforward manner. Contrary to the appellant’s argument, the behavior of the victim does not establish the truth or falsity of her accusation. "As a matter of settled jurisprudence, rape is subjective and not all victims react in the same way; there is no typical form of behavior for a woman when facing a traumatic experience such as a sexual assault." 8 In addition, the appellant’s denial cannot overturn his conviction in light of AAA’s positive testimony. We have consistently held that positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive of the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the mere denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.9 We reject the appellant’s argument that the phrase "without eligibility for parole" is a penalty which is appropriate only to qualified rape. Article 266-B of the RPC10 is explicit that rape committed through force, threat, or intimidation is punishable by reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, Resolution No. 24-4-1011 states that those convicted of offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua are disqualified for parole. Thus, the RTC did not alter the appropriate penalty for simple rape as it merely reflected the consequence of having been convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. We reinstate the award of exemplary damages to deter similar conduct and to set an example against persons who abuse and corrupt the youth. We set the amount of ₱30,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. Finally, interest at rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be applied to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages from the finality of judgment until fully paid. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03930 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the appellant is further ordered to pay AAA ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) he is ordered to pay interest, at the rate of 6% per annum to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages from finality of judgment until fully paid. G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013 GEORGE ANTIQUERA y CODES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session. The Facts and the Case On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case 04-0100- CFM. 2 Since the accused Cruz jumped bail, the court tried her in absentia. 3 The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.4 While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing.5 A forensic chemical officer examined the confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."6 Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question, he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them shoved him and said, "D’yan ka lang, pusher ka." He was handcuffed and someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges against them. They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his house.7 On July 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to a prison term ranging from six months and one day to two years and four months, and to pay a fine of ₱10,000.00 each and the costs of the suit. The RTC said that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the police caught accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession. Since no ill motive could be attributed to PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan, the court accorded full faith and credit to their testimony and rejected the self-serving claim of Antiquera. The trial court gave no weight to accused Antiquera’s claim of illegal arrest, given PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan’s credible testimony that, prior to their arrest, they saw Antiquera and Cruz in a pot session at their living room and in possession of drug paraphernalia. The police officers were thus justified in arresting the two without a warrant pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision10 on September 21, 2007 affirming in full the decision of the trial court. The accused moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it.11 The accused is now before this Court seeking acquittal. The Issue Presented The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia. Ruling of the Court The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found there. The prosecution contends that, since the seized paraphernalia tested positive for shabu, they were no doubt used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing dangerous drug into the body in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act 9165. That the accused tested negative for shabu, said the prosecution, had no bearing on the crime charged which was for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, not for illegal use of dangerous drugs. The prosecution added that even assuming that the arrest of the accused was irregular, he is already considered to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty.12 Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.13 The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14 But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. 1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it. 2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Thus, PO1 Cabutihan testified: THE COURT: Q – By the way, Mr. Cabutihan, when you followed your companion towards the open door, how was the door open? Was it totally open, or was it partially open? A – It was partially open Your Honor. Q – By how much, 1/3, 1/2? Only by less than one (1) foot? A – More or less 4 to 6 inches, Your Honor. Q – So how were you able to know, to see the interior of the house if the door was only open by 6 inches? Or did you have to push the door? A – We pushed the door, Your Honor. xxxx Q – Were you allowed to just go towards the door of the house, push its door and peeped inside it, as a police officer? A – Kasi po naghinala po kami baka may… Q – Are you not allowed to – Are you not required to get a search warrant before you can search the interior of the house? A – Yes, Your Honor. Q – What do you mean by yes? Would you first obtain a search warrant before searching the interior of the house? A – Yes, Your Honor. Q – So why did you not a [sic] secure a search warrant first before you tried to investigate the house, considering your admission that you suspected that there was something wrong inside the house? A – Because we saw them that they were engaged in pot session, Your Honor. Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to peep through its opening because you did not know what was happening inside? A – Yes, Your Honor.15 (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above- mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.16 Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.17 One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.18 WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 The Court further ORDERS the cancellation and release of the bail bond he posted for his provisional liberty. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 206738 December 11, 2013 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ERLINDA MALI y QUIMNO a.k.a. "Linda", Accussed-Appellant. DECISION REYES, J.: For review is the Decision1 dated January 31, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00863-MIN which affirmed the Decision2 dated August 11, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 5228 (20390), convicting Erlinda Mali y Quimno a.k.a. "Linda" (accused-appellant) of illegally selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The Antecedents On January 26, 2004, a buy-bust operation was carried out in Sucabon,Zone II, Zamboanga City, by the members of the Task Group Tumba Droga, now the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force,3 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) inZamboanga City. The operation led to the arrest of the accused-appellant4 who was charged of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Actof 2002, under the following criminal information, viz: That on or about January 26, 2004, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, transport, distribute or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, SELL and DELIVER to PO1 HildaD.Montuno, a member of the PNP, who acted as buyer, one (1) small size heat-sealed transparent plastic packweighing 0.0188 grams of white crystalline substance which when subjected to qualitative examination, gave positive result to the tests for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (shabu), knowing [the]same to be a dangerous drug. CONTRARY TO LAW.5 On March 17, 2004, an ocular inspection was conducted, whereby the shabustated in the criminal information was presented before the RTC and the accused-appellant by the Forensic Chemist of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Mercedes D. Diestro (Diestro). The presentation was witnessed by a representative from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Bonifacio Morados.6 In the ensuing arraignment, the accused-appellantentered a "Not Guilty" plea. Thereafter, pre-trial and trial were held. The prosecution presented the testimoniesof the police officers whoparticipatedinthebuy-bust operation,Police Officer(PO) 1 Hilda D. Montuno (Montuno) and SPO 1 Amado Mirasol, Jr. (Mirasol), as well as the investigator in charge of the case, PO3 Efren A. Gregorio(Gregorio), and PC/Insp.Ramon Manuel, Jr. (Manuel), Officer-in- Charge of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office. Documentary and object evidence were likewise submitted, such as: Request for Laboratory Examination,7Chemistry Report No. D-024- 2004,8 Affidavit of Poseur-buyer,9 Affidavit of Arresting Officer,10 Complaint Assignment Sheet No. 1234,11 Acknowledgment Receipt of the buy-bust money,12 Case Report,13 Forwarding Report,14 one piece small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing shabu,15 six strips of folded aluminum foils16 and marked money consisting of one ₱100.00 bill with serial number KM67878817. Taken collectively, the foregoing evidence showed that: On January 26, 2004, at around 1:00p.m., a confidential informant arrived at the Zamboanga City Police Station and reported to PO1 Montuno about illegal drug activities in Sucabon, Zone II, by a woman known as "Linda". PO1 Montuno forthwith relayed the information to Police Senior Inspector (PS/Insp.)Ricardo M. Garcia (Garcia) who, thereafter, summoned the members of the Task Group Tumba Droga for a briefing. They came up with an entrapment plan to be staged by a buy-bust team composed of PS/Insp. Garcia,SPO1Mirasol, PO2 Rudy Deleña,PO2 Ronald Cordero, and PO1 Montuno, who was designated as the poseur- buyer.18 PS/Insp. Garcia prepared and gave Montuno ₱100.00 as marked money19 with serialnumberKM678788for whichshe signed an Acknowledgment Receipt.20 At around 2:15 p.m., the team proceeded to Sucabon on board an L-300 van which they parked in front of the Bureau of Fire before walking towards the inner portion of Sucabon. PO1 Montuno and the informant sauntered in front of the group with SPO1 Mirasol trailing behind from a distanceof about eight to ten meters while the rest of the team followed.21 When they reached the target area, theinformant pointed to a lady in brown sleeveless shirt and pants waiting by a table and identified her as Linda.22 PO1 Montuno and the informant approached Lindawho,upon recognizing the latter, asked how much they intendedto buy. PO1 Montuno answered "pisolang", which in street lingo means one hundred pesos. Linda then took out a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance from her pocket and handed the same to PO1 Montuno, whointurngave the ₱100.00 marked money.23 Immediately thereafter, PO1 Montuno executed the pre-arranged signal by extending her left hand sideward.24 Upon seeing PO1 Montuno’s signal, SPO1 Mirasol, who positioned himself at a nearby billiard hall, approached them.25 PO1 Montunointroduced herself as a police officer to Lindaand placed her under arrest by asking her to sit. She then frisked Linda andwas able to recover from her a small plastic sachet containing six strips of aluminum foil. Afterwards, she informed Linda of her violation and apprised her of her constitutional rights.26 Linda was taken to the Zamboanga City Police Station where it was learned that her full name is Erlinda Mali yQuimno.27 PO1 Montuno marked the plastic sachet suspected as containing shabuwith her initials "HM" as well as the sachet containing strips of aluminum foil. She also wrote her initials "HDM" on the ₱100.00 marked money.28 PO1 Montuno turned over the confiscated items, the marked money and thepersonof accused-appellantto PO3 Gregorio.29 Upon receipt, PO3 Gregorio wrote his initials "EG" on the plastic sachet suspected as containing shabuand "EAG" on the other sachet of aluminum foil strips.30 Subsequently, PO3 Gregorio prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination and personally brought the same together with the seized evidence to thePNP Crime Laboratory Office.31 Forensic chemist, PC/Insp. Diestro conducted a laboratory examinationon the specimen subject of the request and it tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" as shown in Chemistry Report No. D-024-2004.32 PC/Insp. Diestro was unable to take the witness stand because at the time of trial, she was on official study leave in Manila. Instead, it was PC/Insp. Manuel as the Officer-in-Chargeof the Crime Laboratory Office who brought a copy of the chemistry report to the court. The actual evidence custodian of the report isPO1 Christopher Paner who was, however, dispatched to Basilan hence unavailable to testify.33 For her part, the accused-appellant, interposed the defense of denial and frame-up.1âwphi1 She and the other defense witness, Kalingalang Ismang(Ismang), claimed that there was no buy-bust operation actually conducted by thepolice and the prohibited drugpresented as evidence was planted. They narrated that at around 2:00 p.m. of January 26, 2004, they were outside the accused-appellant’s house in Sucabon playing Rami-rami,a cards game, with a certain Golpe. During the game, the accused- appellant left to urinate and when she came back, a woman arrived and asked Ismangwho Erlinda was. In reply, Ismangpointed tothe accused-appellant who just remained silent.34 The woman, who was with four male companions in civilian clothing but armed, then approached the accused-appellant, held her and brought her inside her house. The woman asked the accused-appellant who was sellingshabu. The accused-appellant replied thatshe does not know. Thereafter, the woman’s companions searched the accused- appellant’s house but found nothing. They then brought the accused-appellant to the police station in Zamboanga City where she was again questioned about the peddler of shabu to which she gave the same reply. She was thereafter detained and then brought to the Hall of Justice.35 Ruling of the RTC The RTC accorded more credence to the straightforward and consistent testimony of PO1 Montuno which proved all the elements for illegal sale of drugs. Her testimony also showed that the entrapment operation passed the objective test as she was able to narrate the complete details of the transaction, from how she acted as a buyer, to the consummation of the sale and the accused- appellant’s eventual arrest. The RTC also noted that in view of the lack of a showing that the arresting officers were impelled by evil motive to indict the accused-appellant, they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner and as such their positive testimonies carry more evidentiary value than the accused-appellant’s bare denial, an inherently weak and self-serving defense. Accordingly, the accused-appellant was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced as follows in the RTC Decision36 dated August 11, 2010, viz: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds ERLINDA MALI y QUIMNO guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000[.00]) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The methamphetamine hydrochloride used as evidence in this case is hereby ordered confiscated and the Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the same to the proper authorities for disposition. SO ORDERED.37 Ruling of the CA On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant argued that the totality of the evidence for the prosecution did not support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to the following errors, viz: (1) no buy-bust operation transpired and the prohibited drug presented by the prosecution as subject of the alleged illegal sale was planted; (2) the arresting officers did not comply with the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 when they failed to mark, inventory and photograph the prohibited drug allegedly seized from her; (3) the chemistry report wasnot properly identified during trial by the forensic chemist; and (4) no evidence was presented asto what happened to the sachet from the time it was submitted to the crime laboratory until it was presented in court. In its Decision38 dated January 31, 2013, the CA denied the appeal and concurred with the RTC’s findings and conclusions. The CA upheld the veracity of the buy-bust operation. Anent the supposed non-compliance with the marking, inventory and photography requirements in R.A. No. 9165, the CA remarked that the accused-appellant is considered to have waived any objections on such matters since she failed toraise the same before the RTC. At any rate, non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of theseized prohibited drug because the apprehending team was able to preserve their evidentiaryvalue and integrity whentheyimmediately turned over the effects of the crime and the buy-bust money to the police investigator on the same day. This, the CA concluded, manifests the prudence of the arresting officers in securing the integrity and probative value of the items confiscated from the accused appellant. Moreover, non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 concerns not the admissibility of evidence but rather its evidentiary weight or probative value, which, in this case was correctly ruled by the RTC to heavily favor the prosecution. The CA’s judgment is now subject to the Court’s automatic review.39 In a Resolution40 dated July 8, 2013, the Court required the parties to file their supplemental briefs. Instead of so filing, however, the parties manifested that they are instead adopting their respective Briefs before the CA where their legal arguments and positions havealready been fully expounded and amplified.41 The Manifestations are hereby noted and we shall resolve accordingly. The Issue Forthe Court’s resolutioniswhether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant for illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabuwas proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Court’s Ruling We affirm the accused-appellant’s conviction and the penalties meted her. Illegal sale of prohibited drugs, like shabu, is committed upon the consummation of the sale transaction which happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. If a police officer goes through the operation as a buyer, the crime is consummated when he makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the accused, and there is an ensuing exchangebetween them involving the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the police officer.42 In any case, the successful prosecution of the offense must be anchoredona proofbeyond reasonable doubtoftwoelements,to wit: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, theidentity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. What is material is the proof showing that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti.43 The confluence of the above requisites is unmistakable from the testimony of the poseur-buyer herself, PO1 Montuno, who positively testified that the illegal sale actually took place when she gave the ₱100.00 marked money to the accused-appellant in exchange for the shabu, thus: PROSECUTOR ORILLO: xxxx Q:And, what happened next, after the briefing, which according to you, took for, more or less, thirty (30) minutes? A:We proceeded, at or about 2:15, to the area at Sucabon.44 x xxx Q:So, what happened next? A:When we reachednearthe area, we stopped, because the Informant pinpointed to me that "the lady waiting there, at the wooden table, wearing brown sleeveless shirt and pants is your target". xxxx Q:After the Informant pointed to you the place where that certainLinda was, what did you do next? A:We approached Linda. xxxx Q:So, when you approached, you and the Informant approached Linda, what happened next? A:Since the Informant and Linda, they know each other already, it was Linda who said, "cuanto tu compra?"("how much will you buy?") Q:And, then? A:And, then, I replied, "₱100.00"; "piso lang". Q:At that time, when your Informant was conversing with Linda, how far were you from Linda and the Informant? A:More or less, myself to the Stenographer’s table (estimated at 1 ½ meters) Q:Now, what happened next, Madam Witness, after you replied, "piso lang"? A:Then she got something from her pocket (witness demonstrated by gesturing as if getting something from her right front pocket). Q:And, then, what happened next, after she got something from her pocket? A:She gave it to me; the suspect gave it to me, and she demanded for money. Q:What was that something given? A:Small heat-sealed transparent plastic containing suspected shabu. Q:And, you said, she demanded for the money? A:Yes, Sir. Q:What did you do? A:I gave it to her. Q:How did you give it? A;When I got the shabu, I inspected it, I tried to check, then, I gave the money to her (witness is demonstrating by motioning the act of giving money, pretending to hold something and extending her right hand forward). PROSECUTOR ORILLO: Q:And, is that money the money, the marked money that was given to you by P/S Insp[.]Garcia during the briefing? A:Yes, Sir. Q:What does it consist of? A:It is a ₱100.00 bill. Q:And, you gave it to Linda? A:Yes, Sir. Q:The marked money? A:Yes, Sir. Q:Did she receive it? A:Yes, Sir.45[sic] The straightforward testimony of PO1 Montuno about the details of her transactionwiththe accused- appellant passed the"objective"testin buy-bust operations. It is clear from her narration that the following elements occurred: the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration and the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.46 The Court cannot accord merit to the accused- appellant’s claim that the foregoing events did not take place because she was actually framed-up. Such argument brings to the fore the appreciation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, a matter it is most competent to perform having had the first hand opportunity to observe and assess the conduct and demeanor of witnesses.47 Settled is the rule that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.48 By way of exception, such findings will be re-opened for review only upon a showing of highly meritoriouscircumstances such as when the court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if considered, would affect the result of the case.49 However, none of these circumstancesobtain in the present case and thus, there is no compelling reason for the Court to review or overturn the RTC’s factual findings and evaluation of the testimony of witnesses. At any rate, we have examined the records ofthe case and found that the prosecution’s narration vividly replicates the actual event that preceded the accused-appellant’s arrest and indictment. Moreover, allegations of frame-up aresusceptible to fabrication and are thus assessed with caution by courts. To substantiate such defense, the evidence must be clear and convincing and must show that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty otherwise the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.50 Here, the accused-appellantdid not even ascribe any illmotive to PO1 Montuno that could have induced her to falsely testify against the former. Neither do the records indicate any distorted sense of duty on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, with corroborative documentary evidence to back up the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, the presumption that PO1 Montuno and the rest of the buy-bust team regularly performed their duties must be upheld. The courts a quo correctly rejected the accused- appellant’s contention that the chain of custody rule was not fulfilled. First, the fact that PO1 Montuno marked the plastic sachet seized from the accused-appellant at the ZamboangaCity Police Station and notat the crime scene did not impair its admissibility as evidence or the integrity of the chain of custody. As clarified in People v. Angkob,51 marking upon "immediate"confiscation of the prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team.52 Theallegation that noinventory of theitemsseizedfromtheaccused-appellant was made is belied bythe ComplaintAssignment SheetNo. 1234 signed by PS/Insp. Garcia enumerating the items confiscated from the accused-appellant during the buy-bust operation: "one (1) small size heat sealed transparent plastic pack containing suspected shabu(methamphetamine hydrochloride), markedmoney of one hundred peso bill with SN KM678788 and six(6) strips/fol[d]ed aluminum foil."53 Anent the failure of the buy-bust team to take photographs of the confiscated plastic sachet of shabu, it must be noted that while Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 916554 dictates the procedural safeguards that must be observed in the handling and custody of confiscated drugs, the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of the law provides for a qualification such that non-compliance withthe procedure will not nullify the confiscation of the drugs, thus: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in thepresence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizuresof and custody over said items[.]55 (Emphasis ours) In the recent People v. Cardenas,56 we underscored the provisoby stressing that R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR do not require strict compliance with the chain of custody rule: The arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA 9165. We have emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that canrender void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation.57 (Emphasis supplied) The failure to photograph the confiscated sachet of shabuis not fatal to thetotality of the evidence for the prosecution. Such fact is immaterial to the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation for it is enough that it is established that the operation was indeed conducted and that the identity of the seller and drugs subject of the sale are proved.58 Second, the failure of the forensic chemist to testify in court did not undermine the case for the prosecution. The non-presentation of the forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. This is because the corpus delicti in criminal cases on prohibited drugs has nothing to do with the testimony of the laboratory analyst.59 The corpus delictiin dangerous drugs cases constitutes the dangerous drug itself. To sustain conviction, its identity must be established in that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.60 Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines "chain of custody" as follows: "Chain of Custody"means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized itemshall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.] In People v. Arriola,61 we enumerated the different links that the prosecution must establish with respect to thechain of custody in a buy-bust operation, to wit:(1)the seizure and marking,if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2)the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3)the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4)the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.62 Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that the prosecution adequately established that there was no break in the chain of custody over the shabuseized from the accused-appellant. During the buy-bust operation, the accused- appellant gave PO1 Montuno a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in exchangeforthe latter’s paymentof ₱100.00.63 After arresting the accused-appellant, PO1 Montuno heldon to the confiscated plastic sachet until they reached the Zamboanga City Police Station where she marked the same with her initials "HM".64 Thereat, an inventory of the items seized from the accused-appellant, including the small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, was also made in the Complaint Assignment Sheet signed by the team leader of Task Force Tumba Droga, PS/Insp. Garcia.65 Thereafter, PO1 Montuno turned over the marked plastic sachet to the investigating officer,66 PO3 Gregorio, who in turn, also wrote his initials "EG" thereon.67 Within the same day, PO3 Gregorio prepared the Request for Laboratory Examination and personally brought the marked plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office where it was received by PO2 Danilo Cabahug.68 Based on her Chemistry Report No. D-024-2004, forensic chemist, PC/Insp. Diestro received the plastic sachet with marking EG HM and examined itscontents which testedpositive for the presenceof shabu.69 Lastly, the same small transparent plastic sachet with markings EG HM and the white crystalline substance it contains were identified in open court by PO1 Montuno and she confirmed that the marking she placed at the police station is the same marking on the plastic sachet presented as evidence in court, viz: PROSECUTOR ORILLO: xxxx Q How about the shabu, which you said, you bought from the accused, and can you still identify it? A Yes, because I placed my marking before turning it over. Q Will you describe to this Honorable Court the condition of this item? A A very small heat-sealed plastic sachet. Prosecutor Orillo: Q I am showing to you, Madam Witness, a small heat-sealed transparentplastic pack containing shabu, will you go over this and tell the Honorable Court what is this, in relation to the shabu that you bought from the accused, using the marked money? A This is the very one, because I placed marking on it, the one I bought from the suspect. Q And, you said, you placed your marking on it? A Yes, Sir. Q When you turned it over to your Police Station? A Yes, Sir. Q Where is your marking? A These letters, HM; this is covered by the masking tape (witness pointing to the initial "HM", where "H" is covered by the white masking tape).70 The details by which PO1 Montuno was able to identify her markings leave no room for doubt that indeed, the heat-sealed plastic sachet of shabu presented during trial was the exact item sold to her by the accused-appellant during the buy-bust operation. As a matter of fact, even during cross- examination, PO1 Montuno was able to declare another distinct feature of the marking she placed on the confiscated sachet containing shabu amidst rigid cross-examination by the defense, thus: ATTY. TALIP: xxxx Q If shown to you another very orsmall sachet of about the same size with the same marking, HM, would you know the difference between one to the other? A Yes, Ma’am, after we placed the marking, we brought it already to the crime laboratory. Q Were you the one who brought it? A No, Ma’am. Q You have no knowledge of that? A As far as the purpose of the investigation only. Q Exactly, that's why I am asking you, because your knowledge of the sachet only stops there, on the sachet with marking HM. So, I am asking you, if shown another set of sachet of about the same size with the same marking, would you be able to distinguish one from the other? A Yes, it depends on the marking. Q Similar marking, HM; anyone could write those letters. A Because I am particular with my marking, because I wrote it with a blue pilot pen.71 Indeed, POI Montuno's meticulous identification of the small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing shabu precludes any misgivings of tampering from the time it was submitted to the crime laboratory until it was presented in court. All told, there exists no reason for the Court to overturn the courts a quo in finding the accused- appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal sale of shabu as defined and penalized in Section 5, Article II ofR.A. No. 9165.72 Pursuant to the same provision, the R TC and the CA were correct in imposing the penalty of life imprisonment and ₱500,000.00 fine upon the accused-appellant. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated January 31, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00863-MIN is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.