SALVADOR YAPYUCO y G.R. Nos.

120744-46
ENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,

- versus -

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------x
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. G.R. No. 122677
REYES and VIRGILIO A.
MANGUERRA,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x--------------------------x
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and G.R. No. 122776
ERNESTO PUNO,
Petitioners, Present:
PERALTA, J., Acting Chairperson,*
- versus - BERSAMIN, **
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR., *** and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 25, 2012
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
 Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to
wanton violence is never justified when their duty could be performed otherwise.
A shoot first, think later disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society.
Never has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public
peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the June 30, 1995 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 cases for murder, frustrated murder and
multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a
shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel
Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr.
(Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who
were members of the Integrated National Police (INP)[2]stationed at the Sindalan
Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario
Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively;
Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David,
Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and
Carlos David (David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF) or civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and
frustrated murder in three Informations, the inculpatory portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 16612:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the life of
Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing
directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S.
Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily
mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Criminal Case No. 16613:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S.
Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican
with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw
jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto
G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission of
murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the
murder by reason of some cause or accident other than their own
spontaneous desistance.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Criminal Case No. 16614:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, being
then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil
Home Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually
helping one another, and while responding to information about the
presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting surveillance
thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then
and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of Noel C.
Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at
the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and
 inflicting multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal and
having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of
murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the
defendants will, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given to
said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities,[6] the accused except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990,[7] and
Yapyuco who was then allegedly indisposed[8] entered individual pleas of not
guilty.[9] A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at
his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea.[10] In the meantime, Mario Reyes,
Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for
Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612.[11] Said motion was heard on the
premise, as previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and the defense, that
these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said hearing
would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits.[12] On May 10,
1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612.[13] Yapyuco
likewise applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May
21, 1991.[14] Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992,[15] and accordingly, the
charges against him were dismissed.

At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the
pre-trial inquest. [16] Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from
where the presentation of evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.

The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva,

Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as
guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company
decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had
passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on
the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the
road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back
of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with
headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road, they
met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and
bleeding profusely.[17]

Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim,
allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them down.[18] In open court, Flores
executed a sketch[19] depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the
road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and the house
situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had
taken a left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron
where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened fire at him and his
companions. He could not tell how many firearms were used. He recounted that
after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped
out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the
yard of Narons house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself
and his companions to be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead,
Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. At this point, he was
distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon Salangsang for help
as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsangs house
as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also
there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be
taken to the hospital.[20] This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as
soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to
the nearby St. Francis Hospital.[21]

Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very
rapidly succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all
contrary to what the defense would say.[22] He professed that he, together with his
co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and
inside it he observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the
driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off
at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with
his two armed companions.[23] He further narrated that the day after the shooting,
he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the latter expired on April 7,
1988.[24] He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known to him
prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wifes
uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for
that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. [25] He claimed the
bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there
were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle.[26]

Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant,

affirmed the presence of his companions at his residence on the subject date and
time, and corroborated Villanuevas and Flores narration of the events immediately
preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after
the procession had passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully on
the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley
of gunfire from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores frantic call for
help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by
the lamppost just outside the gate of Narons house where, inside, he noticed a
congregation of more or less six people whom he could not recognize. [27] At this
point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney
occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys
of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mothers
house, but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the
wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the
same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in
patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his mothers house and in
the morning, a policeman came looking for him with whom, however, he was not
able to talk.[28]

Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the
electric post in front of Narons house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and
that none of the neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty
as to whether it was Yapyucos group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his
injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the
Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his
injured companions to the hospital.[29]

Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
in Camp Olivas, affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected
to have been used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for
gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine exactly when the firearms
were discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were discharged that
night nor the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to
administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the
opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having
also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most
of which had punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at oblique and
perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets that
hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or
moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the
road.[30] Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the
INP-Pampanga Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of firearms and
ammunitions to members of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members,
identified in court the memorandum receipts for the firearms he had issued to
Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco.[31]
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center,
examined the injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered
multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region of Villanuevas head as well as
from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in
that the incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a
bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that
this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim,
assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground and
the firearm was fired from the level of the assailants waist; but if the victim was
seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming
from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that
if the shot would come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the
seated victim and exit at a lower level.[32]
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when
examined. On the patient, he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region
of the head one consistent with being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a
bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which suggested that
Licup was upright when fired upon from the front: one is a through-and-through
wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another,
through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third
one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the stomach and
the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger seat as
claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have been in
front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the
leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and
crossed over to and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have
been positioned at Licups left side. He explained that if this wound had been
inflicted ahead of that in the forearm, then the former must have been fired after
Licup had changed his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He said
that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at the victims
back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface
prior.[33]

Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licups right forearm must have been
caused by a bullet fired from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the
victim.Hypothesizing, he held the improbability of Licup being hit on the
abdomen, considering that he might have changed position following the infliction
of the other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who fired multiple
shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out
the possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the gunfire was
delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of Licups three wounds was first
inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the
others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with
his head lying low and steady.[34]

Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police

Commission (NAPOLCOM) affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno had been administratively charged with and tried for gross
misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident and that he had in
fact conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which
culminated in their dismissal from service.[35] Dolly Porquerio, stenographer at the
NAPOLCOM, testified that at the hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco
authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated April 5, 1988 which he had
previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the sketch
showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the Tamaraw
jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM
Central Office for consideration.[36] The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these
documents together with the joint counter-affidavits which had been submitted in
that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.

Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He
identified himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San
Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and
of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays Quebiawan and
Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men
were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon
for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan,
concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco
allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the
time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and
instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with
them.[37]

Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with
Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long
firearms. As if sizing up their collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated
that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought
in a number of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members convened
at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of
his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the
road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make
an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it
was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him, allegedly
flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the
jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his
fellow police officers Cunanan and Puno,[38] to fire warning shots but the jeepney
continued pacing forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and
instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Narons
house directly at the subject jeepney.[39]

Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and
exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees.
Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but
found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his
jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men
returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired
directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise
gone.[40]

Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay

Quebiawan at the time was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law
enforcement officers in the area who had been ambushed supposedly by rebel
elements,[41] and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account of reported
sightings of unidentified armed men therein.[42] That night, he said, his group
which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and
Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, [43] the team composed of Pamintuan
and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that
all of them, including himself, were armed.[44] He denied that they had committed
an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would
have been killed. [45] He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of
the jeepney did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather
from Cafgu members assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots
were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they
were assembled.[46]

Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any

one of the accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet
he did know that his co-accused had already been investigated by the main police
station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and
Puno.[47] He admitted an administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the
close of which they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the
decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an
investigation independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt.
Rolando Cinco. [48]
S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San
Fernando, Pampanga acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation
in his jurisdiction, where members of the police force had fallen victims of
ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has actually conducted
investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to
infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has
accordingly conducted clearing operations in sugarcane plantations in the
barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident, Yapyucos team had already
been alerted of the presence of NPA members in the area. Corroborating Yapyucos
declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting incident and making a
report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuans statement
referring to Flores as being married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan and
found after surveillance to be frequently visited by NPA members. He affirmed
having found that guns were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator
was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. [49]

Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony
of Yapyuco as well as the latters documentary evidence.[50] Mario Reyes, Andres
Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence
and submitted their memorandum as told.[51]

The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted
in the regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace
and order either as barangay officials and as members of the police and the CHDF,
and hence, could take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11
(5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the
victims with the intent of killing them.[52] With the evidence in hand, it found
Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-
principals in the separate offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup
(instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of attempted
homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It
acquitted all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in
respect of Flores, Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of
the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario
Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and
 penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and
crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or
proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of P77,000.00
as actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages,
and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs of said action.

II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the
accused charged in the information, namely, Salvador
Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto
Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Baez, Ruben
Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera,
Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are
hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder
charged therein, with costs de oficio.

III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,

Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario
Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as
defined and penalized under Article 249, in relation to Article 6,
paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them
with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without
any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as the minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount
of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
plus P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their
proportionate share of the costs of said action.

SO ORDERED.[53]

The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to

Villanueva and which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by
petitioners herein willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order; [54] that
the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the
execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to
kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action
deliberately and consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily
performed those acts negates their defense of lawful performance of official
duty;[55] that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise benefit petitioners
because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or probable
cause to rely fully on Pamintuans report that the victims were armed NPA
members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or
gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did;[56]that there was
insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the
jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-
coordinated police operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted
by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish
attempt to gain commendation.[57]

These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of
prosecution witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the
circumstances prior to the subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the
Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly been flagged down as
claimed by Yapyuco especially since as it turned out after the search of the vehicle
they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared of. [58] It
observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of
Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay
captain no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which
were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of the
victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsangs house that evening could not
have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuans Sworn
Statement dated April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the
identities of the victims as well as his apparent certainty on the identity and
whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney. [59] It surmised how the defense,
especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large
group of armed men which allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring
barangays were assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners
were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it
inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be
coming from the direction of Salangsangs house such knowledge is supposedly
evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at
the scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact
that the house of Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by
prosecution witnesses were deliberately not lit that night.[60]

The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores sketch depicting the
position of the Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that
judging by the bullet holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations
of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup,
the assailants were inside the yard of Narons residence and the shots were fired at
the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the
testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners
had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating
that they had indeed been discharged.[61]

The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming

circumstantial evidence pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and
location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims,
as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and injuries;
particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front
passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right
side of the street and inside the front yard of Narons house; the deliberate shutting
off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the positive ballistic
findings on the firearms of petitioners. [62]

This evidentiary resum, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified

petitioners admission that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a
predicate to its conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a
common purpose, design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent
victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several
accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally
wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those
who were shown to have discharged their firearms that night petitioners
herein.[63] Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by which the accused
collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously
with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of
them, had a grudge against the employees of San Miguel Corporation; [64] and that
on the basis of the self-serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could
possibly have been a massive cover-up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary
and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM.[65] It likewise
found very consequential the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the
witness stand; this, supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to
individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of the
prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful
performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in their affidavits
to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Narons
residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by
Yapyuco himself.[66]

As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that

the qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was
supposedly not shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing
injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second,
this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious
adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or
from circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds
true for evident premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the
summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David and the time he and his
men responded at the scene, there was found to be no sufficient time to allow for
the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance.[67]

Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave
from work for 60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave
credits;[68]that he was earning P8,350.00 monthly;[69] and that he had
spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney.[70] Also, Teodoro Licup
had stated that his family had spent P18,000.00 for the funeral of his
son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot and P20,000.00
in attorneys fees for the prosecution of these cases.[71] He also submitted a
certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased
son.[72] On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and
severally, to indemnify (a) Villanueva P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory
damages and P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate
costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased Licup in the amount
of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages,
plus the proportionate costs of the action.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present

recourse.

In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayans finding of

conspiracy and labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a
quo has not clearly established that he had by positive acts intended to participate
in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and that his participation
in a supposed common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at
the scene only after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were
taken to the hospital on his jeepney.[73] He also points out the uncertainty in the
Sandiganbayans declaration that the incident could not have been the product of a
well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a hidden agenda
concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an amateurish
attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter
alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated
homicide but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. [74] He laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the
victims were caused by his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated
because he responded to the scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the
police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the incident was in line with
the fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof a fact
which has been affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal
the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno. [75] He also
invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan the
responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had entertained
the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements.[76]

In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
claim that the Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and the assailed decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been
adduced at a separate trial but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that
there were two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police officers comprised of
Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs
comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the
presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-
vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay
officials and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. They
emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and CHDFs did not
participate in the presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and,
hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly
based on an established fact.[77] Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the
Sandiganbayan were based on inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence
rejected by the court itself and those presented in a separate trial. They label the
assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious and, hence,
antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal
prosecution.[78] Finally, they lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in
evidence and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with the other
accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among those who fired at the
victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of the crime. [79]

In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of
conspiracy. They claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the
Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the result of a legitimate police
operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain commendation,
conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they
believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown that
they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that
alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police officers, they
merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy to the
conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the
shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of
criminal design with the rest of the accused.[80] They affirm Yapyucos statement
that they fired warning shots at the subject jeepney,[81] but only after it had passed
the place where they were posted and only after it failed to stop when flagged
down as it then became apparent that it was going to speed away as supposedly
shown by bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the
jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would have
otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of the
victims had been personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they
were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they
did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact,
they immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of
San Miguel Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they
could have easily fired at the victims directly.[82]

Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands

by the finding of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of
them armed, had assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though
having previously known that it would be coming from Salangsangs residence. It
posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon demonstrates a
community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged.[83] It believes that
criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the
road that would give them a direct line of fire at the target as shown by the
trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney.[84] This intent was
supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores and Licup were
wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence.[85]It refutes the
invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual
basis to support the belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the
NPA, as indeed they have not shown that they had previously verified the
whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that the accused had
merely responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through
David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof when they
fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals
instead.[86]

As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the
evidence adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon
should not be binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together
with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their
motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted the case for decision as
to them with the filing of their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due
process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the
evidence on the motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation
to forego with the presentation of their own evidence. The right to present
witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried and testifies in court,
the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter has failed to
register his objection thereto.[87]

The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences

that seem to rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the
case and found that evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at
the situs of the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco,
in his testimony which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno as well as Manguerra,
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which had been offered in
evidence by the prosecution,[88] explained that their presence at the scene was in
response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel
elements on board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were
reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that
petitioners now appeal to justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it was not by
accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became
apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to
whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and
who among them had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of
Licup and injured Villanueva.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify
the criminal.[89] To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the
joint counter-affidavit[90] of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-
affidavit[91] of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit[92] of Cunanan and Puno;
the counter-affidavit[93]of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit[94] of Yapyuco,
Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in question. In brief,
Cunanan and Puno stated therein that [their] team was forced to fire at the said
vehicle when it accelerated after warning shots were fired in air and when it
ignored Yapyucos signal for it to stop; [95] in their earlier affidavit they, together
with Yapyuco, declared that they were constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the
said fleeing vehicle.[96] Yapyucos open court declaration, which was adopted by
Cunanan and Puno, is that he twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to
the subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to stop when flagged down and second,
at the tires thereof when it came clear that it was trying to escape. [97] He suggested
substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was the whole team [which
fired] at the fleeing vehicle [98] that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the
ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of
Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken
post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle.[99]
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it
was only Manguerra from their group who discharged a firearm but only into the
air to give warning shots,[100] and that it was the policemen [who] directly fired
upon the jeepney.[101] Manguerra himself shared this statement.[102] Yet these
accounts do not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the
passenger door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony,
described to have come from bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique
directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyucos claim that he, Cunanan and
Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and had already
moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an
oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously,
gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan
and Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the
yard of Narons house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and where
Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of
fire would be direct and perpendicular to it.[103]
While Dabors ballistics findings are open to challenge for being
inconclusive as to who among the accused actually discharged their firearms that
night, her report pertaining to the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney
affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of Narons house
had indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and
Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be
applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted,
they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion for separate
trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on them of
the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco.[104]
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is
admissible only against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other
accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial
admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is
admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial
admission.[105] It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of
Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latters testimony implicating them in
the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in
fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-
participation in the offenses charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had
been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-
examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and,
accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.

II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of a right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the
lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office.[106] The justification is based on the
complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as
guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault
or negligence.[107] Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the
offense charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting
injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or
the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the
accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the
burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the
Revised Penal Code do not obtain in this case.
 The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a
legitimate law enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the
claim that all of them who were either police and barangay officers or CHDF
members tasked with the maintenance of peace and order were bound to, as they
did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the locality. Theirs,
therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and
search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may
even effect a bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects
had just committed, were committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it
may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it is interesting that
nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an official
order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even
more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such
aggression as would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having
exhibited such defiance of authority that would have instigated the accused,
particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with their firearms in self-
defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to show that the
accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except
maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably
prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA
members and whether or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the
present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as accused in the prosecution at
hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed them to be,
the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against
reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of
policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be
thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always exercise the highest
caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire his weapon if the
person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his
next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police
work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the
completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies.[108]
 A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as
is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily
harm.[109] United States v. Campo[110] has laid down the rule that in the performance
of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an
extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other
means to comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the
offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such force, the same
could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the
officer had used necessary force.[111] He is, however, never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting
to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.[112] People v.
Ulep[113] teaches that

The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only
as a last resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender
cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe
police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It
may be true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma
when pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but
legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment
and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must
be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they
must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within
the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy
law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and
violence upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear
in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against
whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings
with human rights.[114]

Thus, in People v. Tabag,[115] where members of the Davao CHDF had

killed four members of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were
NPA members, and the accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the
justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in
dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:
 In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5
and 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the
Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the fulfillment of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order
issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. Other than suspicion,
there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn,
and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they were
members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On
that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their humble home
expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore,
nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the
Magdasals. The massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style
execution.[116]

Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney
by claiming that it failed to heed the first round of warning shots as well as the
signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee. While it is possible that the jeepney
had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights
dimmed missed petitioners signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that
the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to, [117] still, we
find incomprehensible petitioners quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact
there was at least one other vehicle at the scene the Sarao jeepney owned by
Yapyuco which they could actually have used to pursue their suspects whom they
supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity
justifies the use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such
necessity. We find, however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the
employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force,
petitioners in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the rational
necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No
explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at
their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their
careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded the fulfillment of
police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting Licup
with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of
the passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb all of which could
not have been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.
 III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact
faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a mistake of fact is a
misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission
which is the subject of the prosecution.[118] Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact
is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime.[119] It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent.[120] The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant,[121] and
it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person.[122] A
proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest and
reasonable;[123] (b) that it be a matter of fact;[124] and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime[125] or the existence of the mental state
which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.[126]

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found

in United States v. Ah Chong,[127] but in that setting, the principle was treated as a
function of self-defense where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally
manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There,
the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his bedroom door
being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having
demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill
the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed
against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally
stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide,
he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused
had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:

x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake

in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every
crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor
from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence
on his part and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused
must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." x x x
 If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable
cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing or, in
terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the rule is
founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them he is
legally guiltless of homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life
of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words,
and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently
sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault
or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law
will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has
really no occasion for the extreme measure. x x x [128]

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis[129] and Baxinela v. People,[130] the

justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact,
must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused.[131] Thus, Ah
Chong further explained that

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this

jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from
criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which
would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.
To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that
under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always
that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith.[132]
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated
homicide has been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal
cases is that the prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness
of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility
of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[133] By reasonable doubt is meant that
doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.[134] The
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[135]
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable
doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive
evidence.[136] Corpus delicti consists of two things: first, the criminal act and
second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. [137] In homicide (by dolo)
as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some
other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide;
and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally
responsible for the act which produced the death.In other words, proof of homicide
or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such
evidence may consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location
and number of wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the
malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the
victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.[138] In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime
is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law
looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. [139] Evidence of intent to
kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same is
an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same
degree of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses.[140]

The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the

prosecution. It is interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their
acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-
accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an
ugly one: petitioners affidavits as well as Yapyucos testimony are replete with
suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the
suspects as it was he who their (petitioners) minds that which they later on
conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one,
stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that Flores, a relative of his
(Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San Miguel
Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA
members. He also affirmed Yapyucos claim that there had been a number of
ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in
the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the
incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan
had died during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify
in court emerged.[141]
Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance
and materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an
element of a crime. It gains significance when the commission of a crime is
established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive.[142] The
question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the
defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt
that the defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so
important to know the reason for the deed.[143]
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did
not intend to kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their
service firearms; and the manner by which the bullets concentrated on the
passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the shots were
intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances
abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to
sustain a finding of intention to kill, and that there are instances where the
attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in fact
animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with
which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not
merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop
in the evidence.[144]
The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand
rifle and .30 caliber carbine.[145] While the use of these weapons does not always
amount to unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At
the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is not difficult to imagine the
possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed
that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that
moment, it is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to
imagine the peril to which its passengers would be exposed even assuming that the
gunfire was aimed at the tires especially considering that petitioners do not appear
to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in encounters with lawless
elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and
the firearms employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact
even the driver himself of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the
least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be consistent with the uniform claim of
petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to
them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this,
their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the
tires thereof, or to debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The
evidence we found on the jeepney suggests that petitioners actuations leaned
towards the latter.

This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on

Licup who was seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying
the wheel, together with all the consequences arising from their deed. The
circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the firing was
deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps
v. State[146] tells that:

This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and
natural consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital
cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the
determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind
passion, the law presumes that every man always thus acts, until the
contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have killed
another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves
show that it was not intended, but was accidental, it is presumed
that the death of the deceased was designed by the slayer; and the
burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.

V.

Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with
the deliberate intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyucos
alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found
guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated
homicide. Here is why:

First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being the incident of
another act performed without malice.[147] People v. Guillen[148] and People v.
Nanquil [149] declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially
inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo,[150] we
held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless negligence
inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent to
kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.

Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found

by the Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless
imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when
two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they
had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and
unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.[151]

Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period

prior to the occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time
of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were
united in its execution.[152] The instant case requires no proof of any previous
agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a violent attack upon
their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the
moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and
strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we
nevertheless find that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to
let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred
to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated
despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point,
petitioners were confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no
chances by preventing the jeepneys supposed escape even if it meant killing the
driver thereof. It appears that such was their common purpose. And by their
concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the
posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of the
suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did
achieve their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the
passenger side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed,
there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged their
weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva
and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayans conclusion that since
only herein petitioners were shown to have been in possession of their service
firearms that night and had fired the same, they should be held collectively
responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation which
had gone terribly wrong.[153]

VI.

The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-

principals in the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for
the death of Licup and for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that
they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused, of the charge of
attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims.[154] The allegation of
evident premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the
evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the
minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their suspects to be
attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery, inasmuch as
there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was consciously and
deliberately adopted by petitioners.

Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished

by reclusion temporal whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to
Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed for
principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no
aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the Sandiganbayan has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the
penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have denominated the same
as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had
committed attempted homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The
penalty of attempted homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated
homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence
to be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period of prision
correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence, which
under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to
indemnify the heirs of Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 in moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva,
petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and severally, the amount
of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27,
1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
 (a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the indeterminate sentence is hereby
modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as the
maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs
of Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00
in moral damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as
actual and compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.