30 dominion of movable property without his

privity and consent and without animus

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
revertendi, as when the owner or juridical
People vs. Tan possessor does not give his consent to the taking;
or, if the consent was given, it was vitiated; or
G.R. No. 135904. January 21, 2000.* where an act by the receiver soon after the actual
transfer of possession constitutes unlawful
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
taking.—Even solely from this testimony, this
vs. ALVIN TAN y LAGAMAYO, accused-appellant.
Court finds that there was no unlawful taking. A
Criminal Law; Carnapping; Theft; Robbery; felonious taking may be defined as the act of
Without the anti-carnapping law (Republic Act depriving another of the possession and
No. 6539), the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle dominion of movable property without his
would fall within the purview of either theft or privity and consent and without animus
robbery which was certainly the case, before the revertendi. Thus, an unlawful taking takes place
enactment of said statute.—There is no arguing when the owner or juridical possessor does not
that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, give his consent to the taking; or, if the consent
different from the crimes of robbery and theft was given, it was vitiated; or in the case of Roxas,
included in the Revised Penal Code. It Trinidad and de Vera, where an act by the
particularly addresses the taking, with intent of receiver soon after the actual transfer of
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another possession constitutes unlawful taking. In the
without the latter’s consent, or by means of last scenario, the receiver’s act could be
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by considered as having been executed without the
using force upon things. But a careful consent of the giver. SEE’s testimony clearly
comparison of this special law with the crimes of evinced his assent to TAN’s taking of the car not
robbery and theft readily reveals their common only at the time he yielded the physical
features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful possession thereof for the alleged test-driving
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property but even thereafter, for he neither withheld his
belonging to another is taken without the latter’s consent nor withdrew the same during the seven
consent. However, the anti-carnapping law month period the car was with TAN. At the very
particularly deals with the theft and robbery of least, SEE tolerated TAN’s possession of the car. A
motor vehicles. Hence, a motor vehicle is said to contrary conclusion inspires only disbelief. For if
have been carnapped when it has been taken, the car was truly carnapped, why did SEE wait
with intent to gain, without the owner’s consent, for seven months before he reported the same?
whether the taking was done with or without Further, TAN’s alleged refusal to meet SEE
violence or intimidation of persons or with or despite his repeated attempts to do so should
without the use of force upon things. Without the have sufficiently alerted him of the former’s
anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a supposed malevolent intent, yet he still did not
motor vehicle would fall within the purview of report the taking. Even if he failed to report the
either theft or robbery which was certainly the taking, months after the alleged test-driving, he
case before the enactment of said statute. had allegedly seen his car in the initial stages of
dismemberment on 19 May 1993 yet, again, he
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A did not report the carnapping on that day nor on
felonious taking may be defined as the act of the next, but much later on 7 June 1993 or
depriving another of the possession and almost a month thereafter.
Same; Same; If an owner believes that his vehicle conviction rests upon the strength of evidence of
would be returned to him for friendship’s sake the prosecution and not on the weakness of the
then he could not have at the same time also evidence for the defense; and assuming that the
believe that this friend would carnap his car.— evidence of the accused is weak, the same is no
SEE said he believed and expected that the car reason to convict, especially, as in this case,
would inevitably be returned to him. This is not where the case of the prosecution is not strong
only unsatisfactory but irreconcilable and enough to sustain a conviction. To reiterate, the
contradictory with his imputations of burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, and
carnapping. For if he believed that the vehicle unless the State succeeds in proving by
would be returned to him for friendship’s sake overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused,
then he could not have at the same time also the constitutional presumption of innocence
believed that this friend carnapped his car. applies. A conviction in criminal cases must rest
Clearly, SEE’s behavior immediately preceding, on nothing less than the moral certainty of guilt.
contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision
unlawful taking was definitely not the distraught
of the Court of Appeals.
conduct of a man whose car was carnapped. He
was even able to register the averred stolen
vehicle without sounding the alarm.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; A court
cannot magnify the weakness of the defense and The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
overlook the prosecution’s failure to discharge
Gutierrez, Sundiam & Villanueva for Alvin Tan.
the onus probandi—it cannot ignore the basic
legal precepts that conviction rests upon the DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
strength of evidence of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
— From this line of reasoning, we easily deduce In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
that the Court of Appeals simply equated the lack Rules of Court, petitioner Alvin Tan (hereafter
of a written deed of sale to SEE’s lack of consent TAN) seeks his acquittal by a reversal of the 29
to TAN’s taking of the car. But the mere absence June 1998 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
of a written contract of sale in this case does not CA-G.R. CR No. 20688 which affirmed his
necessarily mean that SEE did not also consent to conviction for violating Republic Act No. 6539,
the taking nor that TAN’s possession of the car An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping.2
was unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus TAN’s motion for reconsideration of said decision
probandi of showing that TAN’s taking was and motion for oral arguments were denied for
unlawful. What took place in these proceedings lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in its 6
was that the appellate court magnified the October 1998 resolution.3 Said decision and
weakness of the defense and overlooked the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
prosecution’s failure to discharge the onus 19 December 1994 judgment of conviction
probandito show beyond reasonable doubt that against TAN by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
the crime of carnapping was indeed perpetrated. 95, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
In short, the Court of Appeals and the trial court 45449.
simply believed and accepted the prosecution’s
tale. It ignored the basic legal precepts that TAN’s indictment4 for violation of Republic Act
No. 6539 reads as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1992, Thus, Philip started to call up and look for Alvin
in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named at his office at Roosevelt Avenue, QC, but Alvin
accused, with intent to gain and without the avoided him by refusing to answer the telephone
consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there calls or pretending he was not around; and
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal Philip’s attempts to see Alvin at his office
and carry away one (1) Mitsubishi Gallant car similarly proved futile, for whenever Philip
colored blue, bearing Plate No. CGS-723 owned would go to said office, Alvin would refuse to see
by one PHILIP SEE, of undetermined value, to the him. Dismayed though he was, Philip desisted as
damage and prejudice of said Philip See. long as he could from reporting and complaining
about the matter to the authorities; Philip still
Upon his arraignment on 14 July 1993 and with
believed that being a friend, Alvin eventually
the assistance of counsel, Tan pleaded not guilty
would come around to returning the car to him.
to the charge. Trial immediately ensued as the
Meanwhile, sometime on March 5, 1993, with the
parties waived the holding of a preliminary
assistance of some personnel of the Land
conference.
Transportation Office (LTO), Philip was able to
The trial court’s terse recapitulation of the cause the car’s 1993 renewal registration in the
prosecution evidence proceeded in this absence of the vehicle and he was issued the
manner:5 corresponding official receipt therefor.

x x x [P]rivate complainant Philip See is the Sometime on May 19, 1993, Philip again tried to
registered owner of a 1987 Mitsubishi Gallant see Alvin at his place at Roosevelt. Again Philip
four-door valued at P420,000.00, bearing plate was told that Alvin was not around. One of
no. CGS-723, colored blue, and with motor no. Alvin’s employees, however, advised Philip to the
4G32-FG2704 and serial/chassis no. A161UL- effect that the car was parked and hidden right
3011. Sometime in March 1992, accused Alvin behind Alvin’s warehouse. The location of the
Tan was introduced to Philip by Alvin’s fiancee, warehouse having been given to him, Philip went
one Vienna Yu, and from then on, Philip and to the place and at a distance of some five feet, he
Alvin became friends and started to see each saw the vehicle parked at the rear end of the
other on several occasions thereafter. warehouse. To his shock and surprise, he saw
that parts of the car, like the bumper, a door, and
On November 7, 1992, about 9:30 a.m., Philip several interior accessories, had been dismantled
together with his wife Ruby See and Robert Chua and were already missing. Worse, several pieces
(a neighbor) was at his place of residence x x x of wood were piled on top of the car as if
when Alvin arrived thereat. He made it known to purposely hide and conceal it from view.
Philip that he was intending to buy Philip’s
aforesaid car and that he wanted to test-drive it. Still failing to recover his car, Philip on or about
On account of their friendship and believing June 2, 1993, formally lodged a complaint for
Alvin’s assurance that he would return the car carnapping against Alvin before the QC police
after he shall have test-driven it, Philip granted station. Some two days later, or on June 4, 1993,
Alvin’s request x x x. On thus getting hold of the Philip reported the loss of his car to the
car, Alvin sped away and never returned. In vain, Philippine National Police (PNP) Traffic
Philip waited for Alvin to show up and return the Management Command and he accordingly
car; Alvin simply did not show up, much less signed the corresponding complaint sheets. Too,
cause the return of the car. an alarm for the subject car was issued. To his
further shock and consternation, Philip was
informed by the PNP’s Highway Patrol Group friends for they shared a similar acumen for
(HPG) that somebody had applied for a clearance business and passion for target shooting.
to sell the car and that the applicant was made to Inevitably, they engaged in and entered into
appear as one Philip See. x x x Philip denied his several business transactions which resulted in
alleged signature on the application and also TAN’s indebtedness to SEE in the amount of
denied having supposedly applied for clearance P800,000. Inspite of this, SEE still offered to sell
to sell his vehicle. the subject Mitsubishi Galant to TAN for the
amount of P280,000. TAN declined the offer. SEE
Meanwhile, acting on the complaint lodged by
persisted to the extent that he brought the car to
Philip against Alvin before the QC police station
TAN’s residence on 26 November 1992 and
1, the police authorities scheduled a visit to the
generously suggested that he would just add into
place of Alvin, with Philip being asked by them to
the latter’s existing indebtedness to him the car’s
pinpoint and identify Alvin in the course thereof.
purchase price.
Accordingly, at Alvin’s place, he was identified
and invited by the police to the station for Sometime in February 1993, SEE tried to collect
investigation. While still at Alvin’s office, Philip the car’s purchase price but TAN had still no
saw on top of Alvin’s table what Philip believed funds. So TAN suggested that he would apply
to be accessories from his car, consisting of a with a bank for a car loan using the car as
two-way radio antenna and car stereo, which security and apply the proceeds of said loan in
appeared to him to have been dismantled from payment for the car. SEE agreed. Subsequently,
the subject car. TAN submitted in his name a loan application
with the BPI Family Bank in Makati. In
At that time Alvin took the car supposedly to
compliance with the requirements of the loan
test-drive it on November 7, 1992, the car was in
application, SEE personally supervised the car’s
top condition, had low mileage, was ‘fully loaded’
appraisal and inspection on 19 March 1993. TAN
with complete interior accessories including an
additionally maintained that he and SEE signed a
imported Kenwood stereo, and had imported
deed of sale covering the subject automobile but
magwheels.
that TAN did not receive a copy of said deed upon
Expectedly, Tan impugned the prosecution’s SEE’s pretext that he would use it for facilitation
version and presented a completely diverse tale. of the loan.

Firstly, TAN asserted that Philip See (hereafter The bank approved the loan application but only
SEE) filed the complaint to purposely collect a in the amount of P129,000. Naturally, SEE
debt from him and wittingly use the court as considered the amount insufficient and hence,
collecting agent. Secondly, TAN claimed that SEE refused to accept the terms of the loan.
instituted the complaint in revenge of the Consequently, TAN did not seek the release of the
quarrels they had over TAN’s girlfriend whom loan. The friendship eventually soured and the
SEE wooed, and in retaliation against the resulting “mis-understanding”—with SEE
complaint for grave threats and illegal impelled TAN on 19 May 1993 to instruct his
possession of firearms filed by one of TAN’s warehouse overseer to return the car to SEE’s
employees against SEE. residence. TAN’S employee drove the car to SEE’s
house, parked the car outside the gate and then
TAN then traced this legal predicament to the handed over the keys of the car to SEE’s wife,
time when his girlfriend introduced him to SEE Ruby.
in March 1992. TAN and SEE instantly became
Tan was therefore surprised when on 14 June costs, without prejudice to the application of
1993, police officers arrived at his residence and Rep. Act No. 6127 in accused’s favor.
invited him to the police station; this, to TAN’s
TAN filed a motion for new trial on the ground of
additional bewilderment, was in connection with
newly discovered evidence which was granted by
SEE’s complaint for the carnapping of the car he
the trial court in its 4 July 1994 order. SEE then
already returned. TAN peacefully went with the
moved for reconsideration, but was denied by
police authorities to the station.6
the trial court in its 1 March 1995 order. SEE
Weighing the evidence thus proffered, the trial challenged these aforementioned orders of the
court believed in the prosecution’s version, trial court in a petition for certiorari filed with
particularly in SEE’s clear, positive, and the Court of Appeals. On 23 August 1995, the
straightforward accountwhich said court found appellate court gave due course to and granted
amply demonstratedthat SEE had withdrawn the the petition. TAN assailed the decision of the
consent initially given to TAN when the latter Court of Appeals through a petition for review
went beyond test-driving and appropriated the before the Supreme Court, which promptly
car for his own use and benefit. To the trial court, dismissed the petition.8
TAN’S failure to return the car and his
Subsequently, based on TAN’S “Notice of Appeal
consequent appropriation thereof constituted
Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam,” the trial court
unlawful takingthe gravamen of the crime
ordered the elevation of the records of the case
charged. It then concluded that TAN was
to the Court of Appeals.
obviously actuated by intent to gain. The trial
court then considered as completely undeserving Meanwhile, TAN challenged the Court of Appeals’
of belief, TAN’s supposition that despite his affirmance of his conviction. He argues before
heavy indebtedness and given his increasing this Court that the appellate court erred in (1)
difficulty to pay his loans, SEE had benignly ignoring the peculiar nature of the law on
extended him credit, delivered to him the subject carnapping, (2) disregarding that there was no
car and bestowed upon him the ultimate unlawful taking, and (3) rejecting circumstances
privilege of paying the car at his convenience. on record which, if considered, would be
Thus, in a decision promulgated on 19 January sufficient to acquit him on reasonable doubt.
1994, the trial court convicted TAN, the
dispositive portion of which read as follows:7 In invoking the specificity of the carnapping law,
TAN. contends that the Court of Appeals should
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alvin Tan not have employed as bases for his conviction the
y Lagamayo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of basic principles in theft enunciated in (1) People
the crime of carnapping charged herein, defined v. Roxas,9 where rice was received, carted away
and punished in Sec. 2, in connection with Sec. and consumed, (2) U.S. v. de Vera,10 where a bar
14, both of Rep. Act No. 6539 x x x and, of gold and P200 in bank notes were received for
accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the examination and changing into coins but instead
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of from appropriated, and (3) People v. Trinidad,11
fourteen years, eight months, and fifteen days as where a ring was received for pledging but was
minimum, to seventeen years and four months as sold and the proceeds thereof appropriated for
maximum; to restore to the offended party, Philip the personal use of receiver.
See, the subject car x x x or in default thereof, to
indemnify said offended party in the sum of four A cursory reading of the pertinent portion of the
hundred twenty thousand pesos; and, to pay the challenged Court of Appeals decision reveals that
the basic principles of theft alluded to pertain to either theft or robbery which was certainly the
the signification of unlawful taking and as to case before the enactment of said statute.
when this takes place. Thus, the Court in Roxas,
Obviously, TAN’s proposition that the rudiments
de Vera and Trinidad declared that “the unlawful
of theft, particularly as regards unlawful taking,
taking or deprivation may occur at or soon after
should not have been applied by the Court of
the transfer of physical possession”—where “an
Appeals, was misplaced. We shall see later on
act done by the receiver soon after the actual
that the appellate court’s interpretation
transfer of possession resulted in unlawful
redounded in TAN’s favor. As an element
taking.”—In such a case, “the article was taken
common to theft, robbery and carnapping,
away, not received, although at the beginning the
unlawful takingits import, intention and
article was in fact given and received.”—Hence,
conceptshould be considered as also common to
in applying these principles, the Court of Appeals
these crimes.15 However, we reject the Court of
adopted the theory of the Solicitor General that
Appeals’ acceptance, hook, line and sinker of the
SEE entrusted his car to TAN merely for test
Office of the Solicitor General’s thesis that there
driving, and the latter initially received the same
was unlawful taking in this case.
for that purpose only; TAN must perforce be
deemed to have unlawfully “taken”—the car soon SEE asserted that on 7 November 1992 he turned
after the test-driving for he failed to show-up and over possession of his Mitsubishi Galant to TAN
return said vehicle.12 for test-driving only, but the latter did not return
the same after the lapse of not just several hours
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law
but a number of months. SEE formally filed the
is a special law, different from the crimes of
complaint for carnapping on 2 June 1993. In the
robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal
meantime, during the seven-month interval
Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with
when the car was allegedly in TAN’s possession,
intent of gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
(1) SEE had persistently and perseveringly
another without the latter’s consent, or by means
attempted to talk to and see TAN but the latter
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or
adamantly refused to respond to his telephone
by using force upon things.13 But a careful
calls or personally receive him in his visits; (2)
comparison of this special law with the crimes of
SEE was able to register the car with the LTO on
robbery and theft readily reveals their common
5 March 1993; and (3) SEE had seen his car on
features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful
19 May 1993 from a distance of some five feet,
taking, intent to gain, and that personal property
parked at the rear of TAN’s warehouse and in the
belonging to another is taken without the latter’s
initial stages of dismantling. SEE also believed
consent. However, the anti-carnapping law
that “being a friend, [TAN] eventually would
particularly deals with the theft and robbery of
come around to returning the car to him.”—16
motor vehicles.14 Hence, a motor vehicle is said
to have been carnapped when it has been taken, Even solely from this testimony, this Court finds
with intent to gain, without the owner’s consent, that there was no unlawful taking. A felonious
whether the taking was done with or without taking may be defined as the act of depriving
violence or intimidation of persons or with or another of the possession and dominion of
without the use of force upon things. Without the movable property without his privity and
anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a consent and without
motor vehicle would fall within the purview of
_______________
15 In affirming the conviction of the accused for much later on 7 June 1993 or almost a month
carnapping in People v. Alhambra, 233 SCRA 604, thereafter.
614 (1994), the Court applied the principle of
SEE said he believed and expected that the car
larceny, thus:
would inevitably be returned to him. This is not
When it is proven that the property stolen is only unsatisfactory but irreconcilable and
found in the possession of a person, who is contradictory with his imputations of
unable to give a satisfactory explanation as to his carnapping. For if he believed that the vehicle
possession of such property, a prima facie case is would be returned to him for friendship’s sake
made against such person sufficient to justify his then he could not have at the same time also
conviction of the crime of larceny of said believed that this friend carnapped his car.
property. Men who come honestly into the Clearly, SEE’s behavior immediately preceding,
possession of the property have no difficulty in contemporaneous and subsequent to the alleged
explaining the method by which they came into unlawful taking was definitely not the distraught
such possession. animus revertendi.17 Thus, an conduct of a man whose car was carnapped. He
unlawful taking takes place when the owner or was even able to register the averred stolen
juridical possessor does not give his consent to vehicle without sounding the alarm.
the taking; or, if the consent was given, it was
A fortiori, the cases of Roxas, Trinidad and de
vitiated; or in the case of Roxas, Trinidad and de
Vera cited by the Court of Appeals have no
Vera, where an act by the receiver soon after the
application here as no unlawful deprivation or
actual transfer of possession constitutes
taking of SEE’s possession of, enjoyment and
unlawful taking. In the last scenario, the
benefit over the car occurred soon or long after
receiver’s act could be considered as having been
his initial consent to the transfer thereof. Neither
executed without the consent of the giver. SEE’s
was there an act executed by TAN soon after the
testimony clearly evinced his assent to TAN’s
alleged test-driving that would constitute
taking of the car not only at the time he yielded
unlawful taking. These conclusions are
the physical possession thereof for the alleged
buttressed by TAN’s testimony, duly supported
test-driving but even thereafter, for he neither
by documentary evidence, that SEE cooperated
withheld his consent nor withdrew the same
with him for the availment of a car loan with the
during the seven month period the car was with
BPI Family Bank in Makati, and that SEE
TAN. At the very least, SEE tolerated TAN’s
personally attended to the inspection and
possession of the car. A contrary conclusion
appraisal of the subject car. The records,
inspires only disbelief. For if the car was truly
therefore, do not support the finding of
carnapped, why did SEE wait for seven months
carnapping.
before he reported the same? Further, TAN’s
alleged refusal to meet SEE despite his repeated Noticeably, the Court of Appeals’ erroneous
attempts to do so should have sufficiently alerted contrary conclusions were heavily predicated on
him of the former’s supposed malevolent intent, the arguments of the Office of the Solicitor
yet he still did not report the taking. Even if he General that TAN’s failure to show a written deed
failed to report the taking, months after the of sale and to seek the release of his car loan
alleged testdriving, he had allegedly seen his car “were inconsistent with [the latter’s] idea of
in the initial stages of dismemberment on 19 sale.”—It then posed four questions which it
May 1993 yet, again, he did not report the concluded “certainly debilitated the pretensions
carnapping on that day nor on the next, but of [TAN],”—thus:18
If there was really a deed of sale, why could not overwhelming evidence the guilt of the accused,
[TAN] present a copy thereof? the constitutional presumption of innocence
applies. A conviction in criminal cases must rest
Assuming arguendo that [SEE] got [TAN’s] copy
on nothing less than the moral certainty of
of the deed of sale, why did he not secure
guilt.20
another copy from the notary public who
notarized the same? Or, better still, why did he There is no quarrel in the conclusiveness of the
not present the notary public to testify on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, for upon
fact of the sale? this principle hinges the rule that the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it
Why did [SEE] have to sell the subject car to
from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing
[TAN] at P280,000.00 when the latter was
errors of law. However, it appears on record that
admittedly indebted to the former to the tune of
the appellate court overlooked, ignored, and
P800,000?
disregarded some fact and circumstance of
If [TAN] really bought the subject car from weight or significance that if considered would
private complainant, why did he have to return have altered the result. Cogent reasons therefore
the same (car) to the latter on May 14, 1993? exist justifying the disregard of the findings of
the court, superseding the same with our own
From this line of reasoning, we easily deduce that determinations and conclusions, and ordering
the Court of Appeals simply equated the lack of a the reversal of the questioned decision and
written deed of sale to SEE’s lack of consent to resolution of said Court of Appeals.21
TAN’s taking of the car. But the mere absence of a
written contract of sale in this case does not WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
necessarily mean that SEE did not also consent to herein impugned 29 June 1998 decision and 6
the taking nor that TAN’s possession of the car October 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals
was unlawful. The prosecution still has the onus affirming the trial court’s judgment convicting
probandi of showing that TAN’s taking was accused-appellant Alvin Tan of violation of the
unlawful. What took place in these proceedings Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are hereby
was that the appellate court magnified the REVERSED and SET ASIDE; a new judgment is
weakness of the defense and overlooked the entered ACQUITTING said accused-appellant on
prosecution’s failure to discharge the onus ground of reasonable doubt.
probandito show beyond reasonable doubt that
Costs de oficio.
the crime of carnapping was indeed perpetrated.
In short, the Court of Appeals and the trial court SO ORDERED.
simply believed and accepted the prosecution’s
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
tale. It ignored the basic legal precepts that
concur.
conviction rests upon the strength of evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the Judgment reversed and set aside. Accused-
evidence for the defense; and assuming that the appellant acquitted.
evidence of the accused is weak, the same is no
reason to convict, especially, as in this case, Notes.In the absence of a satisfactory explanation
where the case of the prosecution is not strong for the possession of the accused of a recently
enough to sustain a conviction.19 To reiterate, stolen car, a prima facie case is made against
the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution, such person sufficient to justify their conviction
and unless the State succeeds in proving by
of the crime. (People vs. Alhambra, 233 SCRA
604 [1994])

If the prosecution fails to discharge the burden of

proving the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, then it is not only the
accused’s right to be freedit is, even more, the
court’s constitutional duty to acquit him. (People
vs. Mejia, 275 SCRA 127 [1997])