Case Brief: Estino V People
Case Brief: Estino V People
Case Brief: Estino V People
ESTINO
vs
PEOPLE
FACTS:
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June
14, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos.
26192 and 26193 entitled People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G.
Pescadera.
In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal
their conviction of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for failure to pay the Representation
and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of
Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his conviction of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 Of the Revised Penal Code for failure
to remit the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the
provincial government employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30.
ISSUE:
Whether a new trial is proper in the determination the guilt of the petitioners in non-
payment of RATA in violation of Sec 3(e) of RA 3019.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner’s defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this
purpose, they submitted documents which allegedly show that they paid the RATA
under the 1998 reenacted budget. They also claim that the COA Report did not
sufficiently prove that they did not pay the RATA because the alleged disbursement
vouchers, which were supposed to be annexed to the COA Report as proof
of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report. Rule 121 of the Rules
of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes
final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the
documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us
that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of
conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.
Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it
appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during
trial was unnecessary.
vs.
PONENTE: Leonen
FACTS:
On December 8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several
masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that
required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity and separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted and
frustrated murder of Sigma Rho fraternity members.
RTC found Alvir, Feliciano Jr., Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and attempted murder. Others were acquitted. The case against
Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his apprehension. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.
ISSUES:
HELD:
The Court held that an information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the
charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense. The argument of appellants that
the information filed against them violates their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them holds no water. The Court found no merit
on the appellants’ arguments that the prosecution should not have included the phrase
“wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since they were
presenting testimonial evidence that not all the accused were wearing masks or that their
masks fell off.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise
as an aggravating circumstance.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that
“the act of one is the act of all.” This would mean all the accused had been one in their
plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of
them might not have done so.
The Court held that the accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the
prosecution. It was held that the trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand, found
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution to be credible. Slight inconsistencies
in their statements were immaterial considering the swiftness of the incident.
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive
value in this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer Salvador, when he arrived at the scene,
he interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they could not recognize the attackers
since they were all masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could be given as
part of the res gestae.
The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value
since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points
and at different points in time. Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of
the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some
remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims
who witnessed the entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close
range, the former become merely corroborative of the fact that an attack
occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be given
considerably less weight than that of the victims.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The
only way they could parry the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were
unarmed and outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight back against the
attackers. The attack also happened in less than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to help them until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to
retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this case.