Edu v.

Ericta

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N it is proper for this  The petition before us is to demonstrate in a convincing fashion the validity of the challenged legislation. Respondent Galo would, on the other hand seek the declaration
Court to resolve the issue of nullity of the violation on the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights. Therefore, there is sufficient basis for us to determine
of the constitutionality of which should prevail.
the Reflector Law. - YES  Moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public, both vitally concerned with a final resolution of this question of validity, could know the definitive answer and
could act accordingly.

Issue 2:  It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted under the police power to promote public safety. The ff define police power
W/N the Reflector Law is  Calalang v Williams: “police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.
constitutional - YES Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
 Primicias v. Fugoso: the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
 Justice Malcolm: that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."
 To sustain respondent Galo would be to close one's eyes to the hazards of traffic in the evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of
concern for public safety.
 The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response, to a felt public
need. It can stand the test of the most unsympathetic appraisal.
 Justice Malcolm: "The doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern
period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of government activity.”
 To erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping
with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general
welfare through state action.
 Justice Laurel: Changes have taken place calling for a more affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power to curtail property rights.

Issue 3: The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
W/N Administrative
Order 2 is in excess of the  It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner, may,
authority conferred on with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its
the petitioner and provisions.
therefore violative of the  It is a fundamental principle owing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
principle of non- government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
delegation of legislative Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
power. - NO legislature.
 The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
 A distinction has been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may
not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.
 A standard in the form of the statute defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It is the criterion
by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. What is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress
being assumed.
 Justice JBL Reyes: It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless
the latter may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that
the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the
law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with
it; but conform to the standards that the law prescribes . . ."
 Chief Justice Concepcion: It’s one thing to delegate the power to determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to x the details in the
execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Brie y stated, the rule is that the delegated powers fall under the second category.
Ermita Malate v. City of Manila

Issue: Ratio:
W/N Ordinance No. 4760 of  The presumption is towards the validity of a law.
the City of Manila is violative  Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging-houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such, it
of the due process clause? NO is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance.
 There was proper use of police power as government wanted to curtail illegal or immoral uses of the rooms. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary,
because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
 There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the
then Councilor Herminio Astorga speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence
of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."
 The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and
guests to fill up a registration form. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
other -than legal"
 Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue.

White Light v. City of Manila

Issue: Ratio:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774  The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
is a valid exercise of police the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
power of the State. NO requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
 The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day.
The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements
as the general welfare clause.
 The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals,
by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all
means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
 SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would
seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized
the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or
wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed
into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been
endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
 Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence
accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
 It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative
for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
 Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
 Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.
So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact
collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
  SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the ordinance may be, it
is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting
out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

Phil. Association of Service Exporters

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the respondents acted with  No. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. On the other hand, the
grave abuse of discretion and/or scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas
in excess of their rule-making Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-
authority in issuing said circulars. ranging.
NO  The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment.
A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred" upon the respondents.
 Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register
as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. The
administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

JMM Promotion v. CA

Issues: Ratio:
W/N this was a valid exercise of  Police power is the least limitable of all powers. Police power gives the State the authority to curtail rights for the protection of the general welfare of the people.
police power. YES.  Nature and Scope of Police Power (Rubi v. Mindoro):
W/N workers were denied due o Inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society
process. NO. o Provided that the purposes of the law do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual
 At the time of the case, the Philippines was one of the world’s largest labor exporters, and 58% of those employed abroad were women. It was not uncommon
to hear of women who were working under exploitative conditions or being abused by their employers abroad. Some even entered prostitution as a means of
livelihood in foreign destinations.
o The standards set forth by the DOLE and EAIC were reasonable educational and artistic skills that would help OFWs face the unpredictable demands
of living and working in a foreign destination. It also sought to lessen exploitation and abuse by minimizing the subjectivity of the audition process
through the requirement of the ARB.
o Petitioners were even part of the EAIC that gave recommendations to DOLE.
 The court saw nothing wrong in the other provisions assailed by the petitioners. Documentation, minimum pay scale, registration of returning workers and
venue of work information allow for close monitoring of OFWs and their foreign employers, and keep away our citizens from prostitution fronts.
 There is, in fact, a duty of the government to provide the fullest protection to our OFWs
o Sec 18, Art II of Consti: The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
o Social Justice Provision, Consti: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
o PASEI v. Drilon: What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad
enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while
away from home.
 On accreditation as a property right:
 o No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid
exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
o To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police
power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.
o It’s not uncommon that occupations have regulatory bodies and requirements – Seamen, PRC, etc.
 On the Non-impairment Clause
o PASEI v. Drilon: “The non- impairment clause of the Constitution . . . must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government.”
 Were performers singled out? Was this class legislation that violated equal protection? NO
o The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which
is limited to the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all
persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.16 We have held, time and again, that the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having
a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.

Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers

Issue: Ratio:
W/N Ordinance No. 0309-07 is  The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07 under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under
unconstitutional on due process and Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
equal protection grounds for being appreciated.
unreasonable and oppressive, and an  Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the
invalid exercise of police power: motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the
(a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of
as an agricultural practice in Davao City Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from
under Section 5; the method of accomplishing the same.
(b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-  Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
period to shift to other modes of  A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements,
pesticide application under Section 5;
namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory;
and
(4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable. In
(c) in requiring the maintenance of the the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives
30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 of the Government. A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites,
thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the
City. means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first
requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Substantive
due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's action. This means that in exercising police
power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long
as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose
without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
 The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given
the topography and geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of
three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-month
period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute
abuse of police power.
 The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory;
and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
 In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the
 beneficial use of its property
 Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
 The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty
equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the
law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the
legitimate governmental objective.
 Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by
limiting the object to which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among
equals determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. In other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the
class.
 In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1)
discern the reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition
against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the law.
 Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents
and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial
distinction? We answer in the negative.
 The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual
spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to
the community and to the environment. A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the
process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an
irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.

Beltran v. Sec. of Health

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N the Sec. 7 of RA 7719 constitutes  To test undue delegation, it must be inquired whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of Legislature and
undue delegation of legislative power. NO nothing was left to the administrative body.
 RA 7719 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and
has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country.
 The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of
public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and
authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Sec. 11 gives the Sec. of Health powers to
execute, which he used in forming the IRR.

Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N Sec. 7 and the IRR violate the equal  There is valid classification when:
protection clause. NO o It is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences
o It must be germane to the purpose of the law
o It must not be limited to existing conditions only
o It must apply equally to each member of the class
 It was based on substantial distinctions: nonprofit blood banks operate on humanitarian reasons while commercial blood banks are for profit.
  The classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law: to provide the nation with an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than
a commodity.
 It does not solely address the peculiar circumstances of the situation.
 The law applies equally to all commercial blood banks.
Issue 3: Ratio:
W/N RA 7719 constitutes a valid exercise  Police power of the state is validly exercised if
of police power. YES o (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and,
o (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
 Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
Issue 4: Ratio
W/N RA 7719 infringes on the freedom of  Petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the
choice of an individual in connection to commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally
what he wants to do with his blood. NO as the human organs would constitute invalid classification.
Issue 5: Ratio
W/N the phase out of the commercial  The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
blood banks will be disadvantageous to may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of
them as it will affect their businesses and government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.
existing contracts with hospitals and other  The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which
health institutions (NON-IMPAIRMENT affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the
CLAUSE). NO community may require.

Drugstores Assn. of the Phil. v. NCDA

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the CA correctly ruled for the  R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to provide full support to the improvement of the total well-being of PWDs and their integration into the
respondents - YES mainstream of society. The priority given to PWDs fi its basis in the Constitution
 Hence, the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is supported by a valid objective purpose. It has a valid subject considering that the
concept of public use is longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
welfare, and public convenience.
 As in the case of senior citizens, discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public which these citizens
belong. The means employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and dire related.
 Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health care to PWDs reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive,
considering that as a for reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of medicine can be claimed by establishments as allowable
tax deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF Revenue Regulations No. 12009. Otherwise stated, the
discount reduces tax income upon which the tax liability of the establishments is computed.
 Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a proper exercise of police power using due process clause and the equal protection clause as
yardsticks, the State may interfere where the public interests demand it, and in this particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested in legislature to
determine, not only what interests of the public require, but what measures necessary for the protection of such interests. Thus, We are mindful of
the fundamental criteria for cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality statute. The burden of
proof is on him who claims that a statute is unconstitutional. Petition failed to discharge such burden of proof.
Southern Luzon Drug Corp. v. DSWD

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the 20% sales discount for senior  As held in Carlos Superdrug, the law is a legitimate exercise of police power, which has general welfare for its object. It has been described as “the most
citizens and PWDs is a valid exercise of essential, insistent, and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “the power vested in the legislature by the
Police Power - YES constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without,
not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.” Because
of this, when the conditions demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because proper rights
(though may be sheltered by due process) must yield to general welfare. In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, police power was defined as “the power
to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.”
 It is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in their lives when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources
have become scarce. They need support from the society, for whom they presumably spent their productive days. In a similar manner, aiding PWDs is
an equally important State responsibility; the State is obliged to give support to the improvement of their wellbeing and their integration to the society.
It is in the exercise of the police power of the Congress that it enacted RA 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003) and RA 9244 (Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons), mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It is also in the exercise of this power that
the legislature chose that the discount be claimed as tax deduction, and not tax credit.
 It is not an issue of just compensation, as what was held in Carlos Superdrug, the imposition of discount for senior citizens was in exercise of police
power. In the exercise of the said power, “property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.” To warrant such interference, there are two requisites: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State (lawful subject), (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
to the: attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (lawful method).
 The well-being of senior citizens and PWDs is a recognized public duty. The responsibility for their care devolves upon the concerted efforts of the State.
In addition to this, to treat the imposed discount as tax deduction rather than tax credit is fair, and no reasonable proof was presented to prove that it
was confiscatory (there must be taking of property without just compensation). It is within the bounds of the police power of the state to impose
burden on private entities, even if it may affect their profits, such as in the imposition of price control measures. RA 9257 and RA 9442 do not take
anything from business but only regulate its realization of profits.

SPARK v. Quezon City

Issue 1: W/N there are procedural Ratio:

issues that may dismiss the petition?  Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
NO o Judicial power includes determining whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
o There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
o Petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to any
judicial or quasi-judicial function.
 Direct Resort to the Court.
o A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in
the petition.
o The issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people.
o Petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
 Actual Case or Controversy.
o The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the TRO
enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and
apparent.
 Legal Standing
o Petitioners have no legal standing
 o This case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.

Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N the Ordinances are void for  The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are absent from this particular claim
vagueness. NO  Petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances
 Petitioners do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of
enforcement guidelines.
 Petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators
 RA 9344, Section 7. Determination of Age
Issue 3: Ratio:
W/N the ordinances violated the right  As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children.
of parents to rear their children. NO  The only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours.
 The ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence
or control their minors' activities.
 When actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the State may act to promote these legitimate
interests
 Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to
take a more active role in their children's upbringing
Issue 4: Ratio
W/N the ordinances of Navotas City  The strict scrutiny test must be used:
and Manila City violated the right to  Is there Compelling State Interest? YES
travel. YES o The court holds that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests
to justify regulations by the State.
o Respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late
hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves
 Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn? NO
o It hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed.
o It effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults and thus
the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
o Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their
concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Issue 5: Ratio
W/N the ordinance of Quezon City  The list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
violated the right to travel. NO religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
 Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within
the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
Issue 6: Ratio
W/N the penal provisions of the  The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings
Manila Ordinance are valid. NO and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor
 Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and
jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
o "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]."
MMDA v. Garin

Issue: Ratio:
W/N Section 5(f) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA,  A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.
which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or - The court agrees with petitioner that the license to operate a motor vehicle is NOT a property right but a privilege granted by the state, subject
revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of to reasonable regulation under police power in the interest of public safety.
traffic laws and regulations, is valid. NO - It is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles
may be operated on the state highways.
 The MMDA is not vested with police power.
- In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., the Court held that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA
with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
- Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Gov’t Code. MMDA is only a “development authority” limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system
and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
 Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
- MMDA’s efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.

Chavez v. Romulo

Issue 1: Ratio:
WON respondent Ebdane is  Although legislative power is vested in Congress and the general rule is “delegata potestas non potest delegari” (delegated power may not be delegated),
authorized to issue the assailed this is not absolute and inflexible. An exception is the practice that the legislative may delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations,
Guideline – YES towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors, as well as to promulgate necessary rules and regulations pursuant
thereto.
 Historically our laws on firearms have leaned towards delegation of licensing powers. PD 1866 issued by Marcos is the law governing possession of firearms,
Sec 2 and 3 of the IRR of which delegated the powers to the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary. The PNP absorbed the PC in RA 6975, and the PNP Chief
succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary, assuming the latter’s licensing authority. Both PD 1866 and RA 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed
Guidelines.

Issue 2:  Petitioner anchors his contention that the right to bear arms is a constitutionally protected right heavily because of American
WON the citizens’ right to bear arms authorities, namely the second Amendment of the US Constitution “A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the
is a constitutional right– NO people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” However, American jurisprudence has already applied the provision as the citizen’s “collective right”
to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens’ “individual right” to own and possess arms; the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment
as referring to the collective right of those compromising the Militia – a body of citizens enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual
right of citizen to bear arm.
 The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution and it contains no provision similar to the Second
Amendment.
o US v Villareal: the prohibition in the US Constitution against infringement of the right of the people of the US to keep and bear arms is not included
in the Philippine Bill
 Possession of firearms by PH citizens is the exception, not the rule; the right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right (statute:
PD 1866, amended by RA 8294 which reduced the imposable penalties); since it is a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an
inalienable or absolute right

Issue 3:  A license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege (like petitioner’s PTCFOR) is neither a property nor property right. There is no property interest
WON the revocation of petitioner’s existent and it therefore does not fall under the ambit of the due process clause in Sec 1, Art III of the Constitution which provides that “no person shall be
PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law”
Guidelines is a violation of his right o Tan v Director of Forestry: a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful… neither is it a property right, nor does
to property– NO it create a vested right
o Oposa v Factoran: all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action… not a contract, property or a property right protected by the
 due process clause of the Constitution
o The Government of the Philippine Islands v Amechazurra: no private person is bound to keep arms… he desires to possess arms, he must do so
u[on such terms as the Government sees fit to impose, for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law
 It is evident from the tenor of the IRR of PD 1866 that the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR, and it may be revoked at any time.
It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege.

Issue 4:  Even if the right to bear arms were a property right, all property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and
WON the issuance of the assailed general welfare
Guidelines is a valid exercise of  Test to determine validity of a police measure:
police power – YES 1. The interests of the public generally require the exercise of the police power
2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
 First requirement is met: basis for the issuance of the assailed Guidelines was the need for peace and order in society due to the proliferation of crimes,
particularly by the NPA; President Arroyo deemed it necessary to impose a nationwide gun ban for the interest of the public in general
 Second requirement is met: assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit the possession of firearms, only the carrying of it outside residences, and even for
that people can re-apply for a new PTCFOR. It is a reasonable regulation since criminals carry their weapons around to hunt for victims and it now would be
difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns and easier for the PNP to apprehend them; laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have
also historically been upheld as a reasonable exercise of the police power

Issue 5:  Not an ex post facto law because it is prospective in its application

WON the assailed Guidelines  Ex post facto law has been defined as one
constitute an ex post facto law – NO 1. which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
2. which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
3. which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or
4. which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in
order to convict the defendant.

National Dev’t Corp v. Phil. Veterans Bank

Issue: Ratio:
WON PVB as creditor of Agrix is still  A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do interests on loans, as well as penalties and
entitled for payment without charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given to another without just
prejudice to PD 1717. - YES compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the constitution.
 The court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between Agrix and the private respondent without justification. While it is true that
the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be
considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of greater number.
 Our finding in sum, is that PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject
and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of Agrix
constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in
violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new corporation being neither owned nor controlled by the government, should have been created
only by general and not special law. And in so far as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection with
the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
Association of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform

Issue: Ratio:
Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police  There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both
power or eminent domain. powers at the same time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose,
such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed
in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
 The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners
of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for
which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Reyes v. NHA

Issue: Ratio:
WON the judgment of expropriation was forfeited  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent NHA.
in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to  Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that
use the expropriated property for the intended the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is
purpose but for a totally different purpose. no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public
benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use."
 In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed
area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose
of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice.

City of Mandaluyong v. Aguilar

Issue 1: Ratio:
Whether the petitioner faithfully observed the  The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the law. (See Section 9 in the Notes) Where on-site
different modes of acquisition (as to #2 of development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in section 9 shall not apply. The local
arguments) – NO government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands.
 Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3)
unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program
(ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands.

As applied:
 There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and therefore last in the order of priority acquisition. However, the law
also provides that lands within the declared APDs which have not yet been acquired by the government are fourth in the order of priority.
According to petitioner, since the subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates that the lots be given priority in acquisition.
  Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must be read together with
Section 10 of R.A. 7279. (See NOTES)
 Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community
mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to
only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from
such acquisition.
 Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the heirarchy in their
acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of land acquisition or the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing. These are two
different things. They mean that the type of lands that may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the
modes authorized under Section 10. The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set
forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD, such as in the instant case, may be acquired only in the modes
under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10.
 As applied: It did not state with particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided to
expropriate the subject lots. The law states expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Petitioner alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. Petitioner, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots
from respondents but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution No.
516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the expropriation of the subject property
states whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
Issue 2:  While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992
1. Whether respondents qualify as small property introduced a limitation on the size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly exempted small property
owners and therefore exempted from expropriation owners from expropriation of their land for urban land reform. R.A. No. 7279 originated as Senate Bill No. 234 authored by Senator Joey Lina
(against #1 of petitioner’s arguments) – YES and House Bill No. 34310. Senate Bill No. 234 then provided that one of those lands not covered by the urban land reform and housing
1. Whether respondents consolidated and program was land actually used by small property owners within the just and equitable retention limit as provided under this Act.
partitioned lands in bad faith – NO  Small property owners were defined in Senate Bill No. 234 as: “4. Small Property Owners are those whose rights are protected under Section
9, Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, who own small parcels of land within the fair and just retention limit provided under this
Act and which are adequate to meet the reasonable needs of the small property owners family and their means of livelihood.”
 The exemption from expropriation of lands of small-property owners was never questioned on the Senate floor. This exemption, although
with a modified definition, was actually retained in the consolidation of Senate Bill No. 234 and House Bill No. 34310 which became R.A. No.
7279.
 Section 3 x x x (q) of RA 7279. Small property owners refers to those whose only real property consists of residential lands not exceeding
three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas.
 Small-property owners are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an
area of not more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own
real property other than the same.
 The case at bar involves two (2) residential lots in Mandaluyong City, a highly urbanized city. The lot under TCT No. 63766 is 687 square
meters in area and the second under TCT No. 63767 is 949 square meters, both totalling 1,636 square meters in area. TCT No. 63766 was
issued in the names of herein five (5) respondents. TCT No. 63767 was issued in the names of the five (5) respondents plus Virginia Aguilar.
 Respondent Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other registered owners are all siblings who inherited the subject property by intestate
succession from their parents. In 1986, however, the siblings agreed to extrajudicially partition the lots among themselves, but no action was
taken by them to this end. It was only eleven (11) years later, on November 28, 1997 that a survey of the two lots was made and on February
10, 1998, a consolidation subdivision plan was approved by the Lands Management Service of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. The co-owners signed a Partition Agreement on February 24, 1998 and on May 21, 1998, TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767 were
cancelled and new titles issued in the names of the individual owners pursuant to the Partition Agreement.
 At the time of filing of the complaint for expropriation, the lots-subject of this case were owned in common by respondents. Under a co-
ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual
can claim title to any definite portion of the community property until the partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner
has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
  Citing Article 493 of CC, it therefore gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest. The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a concrete specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common,
because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication. If the co-owner sells a concrete
portion, this, nonetheless, does not render the sale void. Such a sale affects only his own share, subject to the results of the partition but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
 The titles to the subject lots were issued in respondents names as co-owners in 1987 or ten (10) years before the expropriation case was
filed in 1997. As co-owners, all that the respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the lots. The partition in
1998, six (6) months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the
respective undivided shares of the co-owners.
 Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco, Thelma, Rodolfo and Antonio Aguilar each had a share of 300 square meters under
TCT Nos. 13849, 13852, 13850, 13851. Eusebio Aguilars share was 347 square meters under TCT No. 13853 while Virginia Aguilars was 89
square meters under TCT No. 13854.
 Virginia Aguilar, although granted 89 square meters only of the subject lots, is, at the same time, the sole registered owner of TCT No. 59780,
one of the three (3) titles initially sought to be expropriated in the original complaint. TCT No. 59780, with a land area of 211 square meters,
was dropped in the amended complaint.
 Eusebio Aguilar was granted 347 square meters, which is 47 square meters more than the maximum of 300 square meters set by R.A. 7279
for small property owners. In TCT No. 13853, Eusebios title, however, has this annotation: “subject to x x x, and to the prov. of Sec. 4 Rule 74
of the Rules of Court with respect to the inheritance left by the deceased Eusebio N. Aguilar.” In the end, after Eusebio died, his five heirs
became co-owners of his 347 square-meter portion. Dividing the 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4 square meters
of the land subject of litigation.
 Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A. 7279.

Lagcao v. Labra

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N the intended expropriation by the Mayor/City  Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’ property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9
of Cebu contravenes the Constitution and applicable of RA 7279.
laws. - YES  Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted.
 Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners property as
required by Section 19 of RA 7160.

Sison v. Ancheta

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, which imposes a  The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk
higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from of public funds. In another decision, the Court held that taxes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is
business or profession than on compensation is of the essence.
constitutional. YES.  The Court also held that contrary to what petitioner claims, said law does not violate the due process nor the equal protection clause. In the
case of Lutz V. Araneta, the Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held that: “it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.”
Reyes v. Almanzor

Issue: Ratio:
WON the Board erred in adopting the “Comparable  While both the “Income Approach” and “Comparative Sales Approach” are valid methods of determining how land value should be assessed,
Sales Approach” method in fixing the assessed value the assessors are bound to consider all circumstances in reaching their decision.
of the Reyes’ properties. – YES  Article VIII, Sec. 17(1) of the 1973 Constitution mandates that the rule of taxation must be uniform, equitable and progressive. Equitability
and progressivity are achieved when tax is based on an individual’s capacity to pay. Thus, in assessing one’s tax liability, it is important that
the spirit of equitability and progress be borne in mind. Otherwise, due process and equal protection clauses can be used to invalidate
revenue measures which burdens unjustly.
 In addition, P.D. No. 20 itself covers only specific properties (namely, those leased for below P300 monthly). Comparing said properties to
those not covered as in the case leads to obvious disparities in value. This cannot be nonchalantly dismissed via a straightforward application
of the law.
 “…it stands to reason that petitioners who are burdened by the government by its Rental Freezing Laws (then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20)
under the principle of social justice should not now be penalized by the same government by the imposition of excessive taxes petitioners
can ill afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of their properties.”

CIR v. Solidbank

Issue: Ratio:
One issue to consider Does the 20% FWT on bank’s  FWT and GRT are two different taxes.
interest income form part of its taxable gross  Although FWT never actually received, withheld and remitted directly to BIR, the fact that the amount redounded to the benefit of the bank
receipts for the 5% GRT. - YES makes it part of the taxable gross receipts.
 China Banking Corp v CA we held that the 20% FWT forms part of the gross receipts.
 %5 GRT a percentage business tax from Sec 119 Tax Code
 20%FWT income tax from Sec24(e)(1) Title II Tax on Income
 Therefore, there is no double taxation.

Lung Center v. Quezon City

Issue 1: Ratio:
WON petitioner is a charitable institution within the Under PD 1823, petitioner is a non-profit, non-stock corporation which was organized for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino people principally to
context of PD 1823, 1973 and 1987 Constitution, and help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines. Despite having paying patients or receiving government subsidies, a
Section 234(b) of RA 7160. YES. charitable institution does not lost its character, so long as the money received is devoted to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve.
Petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income for its patients and for the operation of the hospital, even incurring net losses in 1991
and 1992.
Issue 2: Ratio:
WON the real properties of the petitioner are The portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and
exempt from property taxes exclusively used for charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power.
Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception.
Section 2 of PD 1823 specifically provides that petitioner shall enjoy tax exemptions and privileges but did not state that property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon are included.
NAPOCOR v. City of Cabanatuan

Issue 1: Ratio:
WON NAPOCOR is excluded from the coverage of the  In its specific sense, a franchise may refer to a general or primary franchise, or to a special or secondary franchise. The former relates to the
franchise tax simply because its stocks are wholly right to exist as a corporation, by virtue of duly approved articles of incorporation, or a charter pursuant to a special law creating the
owned by the National Government and its charter corporation. The right under a primary or general franchise is vested in the individuals who compose the corporation and not in the
characterized is as a ‘non-profit organization’? - NO. corporation itself. On the other hand, the latter refers to the right or privileges conferred upon an existing corporation such as the right to
use the streets of a municipality to lay pipes of tracks, erect poles or string wires
o Congress unmistakably defined a franchise in the sense of a secondary or special franchise. This is to avoid any confusion when the
word franchise is used in the context of taxation. As commonly used, a franchise tax is “a tax on the privilege of transacting business in
the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state.” It is not levied on the corporation simply for existing as a corporation,
upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to it by the government.
o In simpler terms, Congress defines franchise tax is imposed based not on the ownership but on the exercise by the corporation of a
privilege to do business. The taxable entity is the corporation which exercises the franchise, and not the individual stockholders. By
virtue of its charter, NAPOCOR was created as a separate and distinct entity from the National Government. It can sue and be sued
under its own name, and can exercise all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Code. Moreover, the ownership by the
National Government of its entire capital stock does not necessarily imply that NAPOCOR is not engaged in business.
Sec. 2 of PD 2029 classifies government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) into those performing governmental functions
and those performing proprietary functions. Governmental functions are those pertaining to the administration of government,
and as such, are treated as absolute obligation on the part of the state to perform while proprietary functions are those that are
undertaken only by way of advancing the general interest of society, and are merely optional on the government. Included in the
class of GOCCs performing proprietary functions are “business-like” entities such as NAPOCOR.
Pursuant to this mandate, petitioner generates power and sells electricity in bulk. Certainly, these activities do not partake of
the sovereign functions of the government. They are purely private and commercial undertakings, albeit imbued with public
interest. The public interest involved in its activities, however, does not distract from the true nature of the petitioner as a
commercial enterprise,
 Verily, to determine whether NAPOCOR is covered by the franchise tax in question, the following requisites should concur: (1) that petitioner
has a “franchise” in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within
the territory of the respondent city government. NAPOCOR met this two.

Issue 2: Ratio:
WON Cabanatuan City government has the authority  Sec. 137 of the LGC does not admit any exception. In City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, MERALCO’s exemption from the
to issue Ordinance No. 165-92 and impose an annual payment of franchise taxes was brought as an issue before this Court. It was held:
tax on “businesses enjoying a franchise”? - YES. o “It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC to support their position that MERALCO’s
tax exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit language of section 137 which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax
‘notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law’ is all-encompassing and clear. The franchise tax is imposable
despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws.
 Sec. 193 of the LGC buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or
controlled corporations except (1) local water districts, (2) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the obvious import is to limit the exemptions to the
three enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
 READING TOGETHER SECTIONS 137 AND 193, we conclude that under the LGC the local government unit may now impose a local tax at a
rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar based on the incoming receipts realized within its
territorial jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or charter is clearly manifested by the
language used on Sections 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would
be not only tedious and impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or privileges, the
LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been
used.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro

Issue 1: Ratio:
WON they were deprived of due process of Due Process of Law and Equal Protection of the Laws
law. - NO  Liberty may be regulated by law. The liberty of an individual may be restrained for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
and order of society (e.g., in the interest of public health, public order and safety, within the proper scope of police power).
 The Mangyans understand liberty as the right to do anything they please—going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying
forests and making illegal kaingins thereon.
 The statute is a necessary measure for the protection of the Manguianes, protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized
customs among them.
 There is no violation of due process and equal protection because the law, seemingly reasonable, is: (1) enforced according to the regular methods
of procedure prescribed (2) applied alike to all persons in a class

Issue 2: (Additional Info) Ratio:

 In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purposes of the Government are to gather together the children for educational purposes,
and to improve the health and morals—is in fine, to begin the process of civilization
 In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch
in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of that great Island
 —The words "non-Christian" have a clear, definite and well settled signification when used in the Philippine statute-book as a descriptive adjective,
applied to "tribes," "peoples" or "inhabitants," dwelling in more or less remote districts and-provinces throughout the Islands.
 The tests for the determination of the fact that an individual or tribe is, or is not of the "low grade of civilization" denoted by the words "non-Christian"
are, and throughout the period of American occupation always have been, "the mode of life, the degree of advancement in civilization, and
connection or lack of connection with some civilized community."
 The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be
found to have advanced, to justify its removal from the class embraced within the descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term" is used in the
Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend
to, and enforce upon its membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and judicial, which control the conduct of the
admittedly civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices which tend
to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the lives or property of those
who may be brought in contact with the members of the tribe

Ynot v. IAC

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the said EO is unconstitutional. - YES  Though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second requisite
for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
 The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary
to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Corona v. United Harbors Pilots Assn.

Issue 1: Ratio:
WON AO 04-92 violated the procedural due - Procedural Due Process “refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced”
process of UHPAP members - NO - Though the respondents argued there was no hearing conducted for the pilots to ventilate their views, jurisprudence states “as long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law.” The pilots were actually able
to question the AO at least 4 times before the matter reached the SC. For an administrative body, notices and hearings are only required in the
exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, not their executive and legislative functions, that latter being the situation in this case.

Issue 2: Ratio:
WON AO 04-92 violate the substantive due - Substantive Due Process “requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable and just.”
process of UHPAP members - YES - Respondents argued that the pilots have the exclusive and vested right to exercise harbor pilotage, which can only be withdrawn or shortened by
observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law. Pilotage as a profession is a property right. A license is a right or permission granted by a
competent authority to carry on a business/ do an act. The granting of the license is a vested right. The pilots had gone through stringent tests (5
tests) in order to obtain the license. Taking away the security of their licensure with the already adequate tests/ this pre-cancellation is what makes
the AO unreasonable and is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

Tanada v. Tuvera

Issue: Ratio:
W/N publication in the Official Gazette is a  Article 2 of the Civil Code states that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
requirement for a law to take effect.. - YES unless it is otherwise provided.” It does not, however, preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of effectivity. This is further supported by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 which seeks to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without notice and publication, the maxim “ignorantia legis non
excusat” would lose its basis for application.
 The publication of presidential issuances of a public nature and of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before
a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

Nunez v. Sandiganbayan

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the creation of Sandiganbayan violates - SC ruled against Nuñez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving
equal protection insofar as appeals would public officials charged with graft and corruption.
be concerned – NO - The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of
which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been
aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a
private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
- Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it “must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the
class.”
- Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices – a showing that decisions therein are more
conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.
Ang Tibay v. CIR

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the Union was denied due process by The CIR, a special court created under CA 103 → more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation
CIR - NO ● Not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government
● No tlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by
the parties litigant
○ CIR Function: more active, affirmative and dynamic
○ Exercises judicial or quasi - judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions
in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
■ functions are far more comprehensive and expensive
○ Has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising
between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them
■ May appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture
■ Interplay of executive and judicial functions → a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect
the avowed legislative purpose.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before
it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but t he evidence must be
substantial. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against
them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of
securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating
and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (6) The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
 proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
- In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
- This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would
be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable
to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is granted, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the
CIR.

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N petitioner has power to issue ex  Under Section 7(a) of PD 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment
parte order. YES. pose an “immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life,” or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed “the
allowable standards set by the [NPCC].”
 Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an
“immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life.”
 Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents
into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety
of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several
years.
 It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests
like those here involved, through the exercise of police power.

Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N there was prima facie evidence for  The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations, for which the
the issuance of the ex parte order. YES maximum permissible levels are “For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering and industrial cooling and processing.”
 Findings of November 1986 inspection: the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation, was issued a Notice of Violation on 20
December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed
and operational. The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during the inspection/water
sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a re-inspection/sampling text should be conducted first. The
owner continuously violates the directive of the Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP.
The analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our water resources.
 Findings of September 1988 inspection: combined wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute.
About 80% of the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan- Tinejeros river by means of a bypass. The
remaining 20% was channeled into the plant’s existing wastewater treatment plant (WTP). The WTP was noted not yet fully operational—some
accessories were not yet installed. Only the sump pit and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. There was no effluent
discharge [from such collection tank]. The bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others.
 Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and September 1988 re-inspections were
conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed.
 Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by
imposing upon the public threats and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti-pollution
statutes and their implementing regulations.
 Where the establishment affected by an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board
must hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex parte order. That such an
opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Non v. Dames

Issue: Ratio:
W/N denial of petitioners’ re-enrollment was 1. Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school
exercised with due process - NO • While highest regard must be afforded exercise of rights to free speech and assembly, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are
virtually powerless to discipline students
• Stated in Guzman, imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process:
1. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel if desired
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. Evidence must be duly considered by investigating committee
2. The nature of the contract between a school and its student
• Contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract; it is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions
• “Termination of contract” theory does not find support in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
o par. 137 clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein tuition fees are collected and paid on
an installment basis. Thus, even if a student does not complete the semester but has stayed for more than 2 weeks, he may be required to pay for
tuition fees for whole semester
o par. 137 not to be construed to mean that student shall be enrolled for only one semester, and after that, his re-enrollment is dependent solely
on the sound discretion of the school
o Manual recognizes the right of student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it
3. Academic freedom not a ground for denying students’ rights
• Of petitioners, 5 students did not incur failing marks but were refused reenrollment without just cause. They should be allowed to re-enroll
• No due process: decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what incurred the ire
fo school authorities was the student mass actions
• Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for action taken against them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline is a
denial of due process and violates basic tenets of fair play
• Of the 8 students with failing grades, some only have 1 or 2 failures à failures cannot be considered marked academic deficiency
• For students who had failing marks: not clear if failures were incurred only in 1 semester or through course of several semesters
• Respondents did not allege academic standards either
• These should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken against petitioners for breach of discipline
o Petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings but penalty must be imposed only after requirements of procedural due process
have been complied with as provided in par. 145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
Central Bank Employees Assn. v. BSP

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the proviso is unconstitutional for being • Equal protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate –
violative of equal protection clause. - YES so long as the classification is not unreasonable. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons themselves, but
on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
• In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the
BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file
and the resulting discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However,
in the subsequent passages of the amendment on the charters of other GFI, the surrounding circumstances of the case changed.
• The subsequent amendments of the other GFIs’ charter (i.e., express authorization to determine and institute its own compensation and wage
structure, and explicit exemption – without distinction as to salary grade or position – all employees of the GFI from the SSL) resulted to the oppressive
results of Congress’ inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the seven other GFI. In the case at bar, it is precisely
the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify
the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law
is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the
seven other GFIs.
• The subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees of the exemption from
SSL breached the latter’s right to equal protection.
• The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.

Phil. Judges Assn. v. Pardo

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N the act is violative of the equal - The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
protection clause. - YES play. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
- What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
- There is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to
suspect, however, that not enough care (or attention) was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege
from the Judiciary.
- SC does not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this
serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments of the government.
- The only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a
waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the
people.
- There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the
franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
- The respondents' conclusion, based on data from the Postal Service Office show that out of more than P90M+ total frank mail volume. P86M cane from
the judiciary and other agencies whose functions include judicial processes (73M coming out from Judiciary) is that because of this considerable volume
of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
- The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very
much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice).
- If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where
there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.
 - In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a
category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege,
there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
- While the Postal Office may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of
the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is the free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their
own public functions.
- At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only
further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the
courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest
appropriation in the national budget. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to
every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
- We find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things
similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary
and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Ichong v. Hernandez

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the Act is violative of equal protection • The equal protection clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege but is not intended to prohibit legislation. Police power and
of the law. – NO constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection are supposed to co-exist; and the balancing is the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. While constitutional guarantees make no distinction accdg to race, color or nationality,
equal protection does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons be treated alike under like circumstances
and conditions. Thus, the requirements for its exercise are 1) it applies alike to all persons w/in such class, and 2) reasonable ground exists for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
• In this case, the Court held that there is a general public sentiment that the alien retailer holds a controlling and dominant position in the nation’s
economy (as proven by statistics)—controlling food, clothing, and almost all articles of daily life. The dangers arising from alien control and domination
in retail is founded on their ability to endanger national interest, economy, and security in its power to fix prices and supply. This factual milieu reflects
the legislation’s purpose and target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization law. The Court also held that such reasonable distinction exists
primarily in the fact that alien residents owe no such allegiance to the country and the control and is naturally lacking in that spirit of regard, sympathy
and consideration for his Filipino consumers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weaknesses and exploiting them. Also, the alien
makes no genuine contribution to national income and wealth, his stay being transient and temporary, not investing in industries that would help the
economy and increase national wealth.

• Citizenship has been held to be a legal and valid ground for classification in the exercise of police power. Aliens are under no special constitutional
protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. This would
require a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes of citizens. And when the classification is actual, real and reasonable,
and all persons of one class are treated alike, legislation is generally upheld to be within legislative prerogative, since the wisdom of the law shall not
be adjudged by the Court.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N RA 875, as amended by RA Argument 1
3350, is unconstitutional. - NO  Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with
labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication
therefrom.
  Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association.
 A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up
his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership
with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union.
 The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is limited. By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before
the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become
a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
 To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the
Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in
any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees
belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members
of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in
spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they
are not members of the collective bargaining union.
 The Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it.
Argument 2
 The agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been
incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job
even if he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from
the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union security clause. The Company was partly absolved by law from the
contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions.
 There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by law from its performance.
 the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified.
 Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the
means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate. APPLY POLICE POWER!
 The Act’s purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members
of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents.
 the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements —
is reasonable.
Argument 3
 Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution not only prohibits legislation for the support
of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude.
 In Aglipay v. Ruiz, this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the
incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect.
 Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely
happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that
religious exercise be preferentially aided.
Argument 4
 The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither
does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from
a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation
from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to
resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.
Argument 5
  The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs
and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas
and cannons.
 Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas
existing only in the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules. of human conduct and the justification of
certain acts. Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive character, its tone, its
happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness. To certain persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion,
or their not having any religion.
 The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious
belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements.
 Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to
be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there
are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor
unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.
 Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its provision.
Argument 6
 Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those
who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining
whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the
state be benefited thereby.
 Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community. Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic
stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security in their employment,
notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the proper economic and social
equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions
that have closed shop agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions
with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership.
Argument 7
 A statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are
unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question.
 The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. But
there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us.
 The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to
be measured.

Dumlao v. COMELEC

Issue: Ratio:
WoN Section 4, BP Blg. 52 is  Petitioner’s contention that Section 4 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
violative of the equal protection candidates for local positions based in the challenged provision have been already filed with the COMELEC.
clause- NO  Furthermore, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.
 Valid reason for the provision: To allow the emergence of young blood in local governments. In addition to that, the tiredness of the retiree for government
work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
 The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
 That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class.
Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N the COMELEC Resolutions Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941
should be overturned? - YES • There has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
• Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
• COMELEC’s use of religious text to justify Ang Ladlad’s dismissal is violative of the Non-establishment clause.

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration

• Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
• Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society.
• Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

Equal Protection
• “From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the
same basis as other political parties similarly situated.”
• “We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment.”

Freedom of Expression and Association

• Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
Issue 2: Ratio:
The Court’s application of • In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
International Law • The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
• In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of
sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations
bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
• The UDHR provides:

Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
• Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25. Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
• We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations, the blanket
invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills.
• We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context
of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations.
Tatad v. Sec. of Energy

Issue: Ratio
W/N RA 8180 violates the constitutional  The fundamental principle espoused by section 19, Article XII of the Constitution is competition. Ideally, this kind of competition requires the
prohibition against monopolies, combinations in presence of not one, not just a few but several players. A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of players
restraint of trade and unfair competition (Sec. 19, (oligopoly) is hardly the market where honest-to-goodness competition will prevail. Monopolistic or oligopolistic markets deserve our careful
Art. XII). scrutiny and laws which barricade the entry points of new players in the market should be viewed with suspicion.
(this also relates to the equal protection issue:  It cannot be denied that our oil industry is controlled by an oligopoly (Petron, Shell, and Caltex). These have existing refineries. The tariff
W/N the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the differential of 4% therefore works for their immense benefit. This also poses a high barrier to entry of new players who will need to build their
three existing oil refineries and discriminates own refineries for billions if they want to keep their product cost competitive.
against prospective investors in the downstream  The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and
oil industry who do not have their own refineries Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors
and will have to source refined petroleum again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the
products from abroad.) - YES cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition
and enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Garcia v. Drilon

Issue: Ratio:
W/N RA 9262 is discriminatory and  Delving into the deliberations of RA 9262, the Court held that the intent in excluding men from the protection afforded by RA 9262 was in light of the inherent
violative of the equal protection and historical inequalities between the genders in society. Statistics also clearly point to the prevalence of violence against women and children (“usual” and
clause and therefore “most likely” victims) and that this was a special law to address the need for their protection.
unconstitutional - NO  There are, of course, cases of domestic violence against men but it is relatively few and these incidents do not render RA 9262 invalid as the classification
used is valid.
 They also held that the equal protection clause requires “that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.”
 Held also that valid classification is allowed for as long as it is reasonable, meaning that “classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make
for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class.” And that every classification by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.
 “The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice MacIntyre succinctly states, the
accommodation of differences...is the essence of true equality.”

Biraogo v. PTC

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the Philippine Truth  The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. It was mentioned in three portions of EO 1 (Whereas clause, Sec. 1, & Sec.
Commission violates the Equal 2). The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Protection Clause - YES  The differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations enumerated by the respondent (OSG) are not substantial enough to merit
the restriction of the investigation to the “previous administration” only. It must include earlier administrations. However, it would be difficult to investigate
on the same. For instance, dead presidents and cases that prescribed can no longer be subjects of inquiry by the PTC. PTC must at least have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
 In order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. Perhaps a
revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to
the Constitution.
Stonehill v. Diokno

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N the petitioners have the • Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality
legal standing to assail the of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate
legality of search warrants and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
issued against the corporation whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
of which they were officers. impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
• Officers of certain corporations cannot validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises
of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N the search warrants issued • The Constitution provides:
partakes the nature of a general The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
search warrants. warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
• Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
• Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
• General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers.
• To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
• Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravened the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the elimination of
general warrants.
Issue 3: Ratio:
W/N the seized articles were • Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
admissible as evidence means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
regardless of the illegality of its As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical
seizure. way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that
is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
• The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To
be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing
expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff

Issue: Ratio:
WON the two search warrants • Section 2, Article III of the 1973 Constitution contains provisions against illegal searches and seizures, denoting strict criteria to be adhered to in order to sustain
issued were valid. – NO the validity of a search. No search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge.
• Probable cause is defined as “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.” When the warrant targets a newspaper
publication in connection with subversive materials, the warrant must contain a specific mention of the articles to be seized. Mere generalization, such as the
ones contained in the affidavits provided by the respondents, fail to reach this criteria.
• Personal knowledge (obtained from the complainant or witnesses) of the facts is required in order for a search warrant to be seized, following the ruling in
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance.
• Equally hindering the case of respondents is the fact that the warrants used were in the nature of general warrants, which do not fit the criteria for specificity
that the Constitution demands.

People v. Marti

Issue 1: Ratio:
WON evidence obtained violated  The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by the government and its agents,
Marti’s right against unreasonable not private individuals
searches and seizures – NO o The packages were opened by Reyes who was following SOP, and later inspected again in the sight of NBI who were present. Evidence was handed over to
NBI after it was plain to see that the packages contained drugs.
o In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State; the marijuana came into
Gov’t possession without it having to transgress Marti’s rights so there’s no cogent reason why it should not be admitted against Marti in the prosecution.
o If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality
o Commissioner Bernas (deliberations of the Constitutional Commission): The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy.
Protection against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not
the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the
private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.
o Jurisprudence:
1. Villanueva v Querubin: The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of one’s person from interference by
the government… Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and
to respect the privacies of his life
2. Burdeau v McDowell: its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies
3. State v Bryan: parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and
participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution
 Petitioner contends: NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure later on
o The NBI made no search and seizure; the mere presence of the NBI did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and
seizure. The contraband articles were identified without NBI’s violation of the right.
 Issue 2: Ratio:
WON Marti’s explanation that he is  Marti’s version: he was not the owner of the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met
not the owner of the drugs can be in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the
given credence – NO cost of the shipment since the German national was about to leave the country the next day
o person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a
complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship
the same from a complete stranger on his mere sayso
o as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany
o appellant signed the contract (of shipment) as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses,
or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him

People v. Aruta

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the police correctly searched • The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
and seized the drugs from the 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence
accused. 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit
in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
• The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
• In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of
accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia.
• Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
• The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude
that she was committing a crime.
• It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out
as the suspect.
• The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated
by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing
finger of the informant.
• This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.
• There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
• the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant
• the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond
cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on
evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law
 • While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above --
did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied
acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
• Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize
may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.
• Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for
the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply
not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
• The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

Valmonte v. De Villa

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the installation of • The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
checkpoints violates the right of pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded
the people against unreasonable as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift
searches and seizures? to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as
abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
• True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible
of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

Aniag v. COMELEC

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the ordinance is void for • The Supreme Court held that, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority.
being a violation of valid searches • BUT a search can be done without a warrant if it is in cases of moving vehicles, the seizure of evidence in plain view and the search conducted at police or
and seizures? YES. military checkpoints which are not illegal for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is merely limited to a visual search, and the Stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information.
• However, in this case, the bags were in guns at the back of the car in gun bags expressly showing that the PNP could not have known of such without having
searched the car extensively. Considering as well that the motorist (Arellano) was not an offender nor was the car used in any criminal activity, it could not be
searched.
• As such, the arms found and seized could not be used as admissible evidence by the courts because it was obtained in violation of Article 3, Section 2.
Caballes v. CA

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the officers a. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits certain exceptions:
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search i. Incidental searches (incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Rule 126 section 12 of the ROC)
warrant and when samples of the wires and references to them were ii. Plain view
admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction. iii. Search of moving vehicles
iv. Consented warrantless search
v. Customs search
vi. Stop and frisk (terry frisk)
vii. Exigent and emergency circumstances
b. In these exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search/seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search/seizure is purely a judicial question determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved
(including the purpose of the search, presence of probable cause manner in which the search was made, place or thing to be
searched and character of articles procured)
c. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged or the circumstances could lead to a reasonably discreet man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the items sought in connection with said offense is in the place to be searched.
d. The routine inspections that are normally permissible in the instance of moving vehicles are limited to:
i. Where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle parked on public grounds
ii. Simple peering into a vehicle
iii. Flashing of lights without opening the car doors
iv. The occupants are NOT subjected to a physical or body search
v. Where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search
vi. Where the check is conducted in a fixed area
e. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious because it was covered in leaves does NOT constitute probable cause as to justify
the conduct of a search without warrant.
f. The objects seized were neither available and plainly exposed to sight. The seized objects were placed in sacks and covered in
leaves.
g. Neither was the search consented. At most there was only an implied acquiescence which is no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee. The question as to whether a search was consented is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
h. In case of consented searches, the waiver must appear that
i. The right exists
ii. That the person involved had knowledge of the existence of such right
iii. The said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Ganaan v. CA

Issue: Ratio:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the • The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording
term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
No. 4200. - NO order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
• An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No.
4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the
true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
• The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their
very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
• An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to
the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party
he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party
line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.
• Lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone
users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or
others of similar nature. An extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

Ramirez v. CA

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the act of recording through a tape • The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL
constitutes an offense? - YES PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
• The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
the qualifier "any".
• The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
• Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are
shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."
• These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely
to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
• In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."
• In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law (Dictaphone, Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape
recorder).Therefore, the act of recording through the tape constitutes an offense.
• The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity,
and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts
punishable.
Ople v. Torres

Issue: Ratio:
Does AO 308 unduly infringe on the right to privacy • AO 308 is not an Administrative Order; It is an invalid legislative act.
and thus constitutionally infirm. - YES • Court rejects the argument that AO 308 was implementing the policy of the Admin. Code of 1987. AO establishes for the first time a National
ID System; it redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry (the forced gathering of private information, biometric data; a
permanent “unforgettable dossier on each citizen.)
• Facially AO 308 violates the right to privacy. The right to be left alone.
• Not narrowly drawn intrusion. With undefined data to be collected and used.
• Violates a zone of privacy that the government may not force him to surrender.
• Biometric Data Gathering is very intrusive and is permanently in a system whose security is not well accounted for in the AO.

Ayer Productions v. Capulong

Issue 1: Ratio:
WON JPE’s right to privacy was violated. NO - Right to privacy (“right to be let alone”) is not an absolute right. A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy is permissible where that person
is a public figure and the information wanted from him constitute of a public character. In short, the right to privacy cannot be invoked to
resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest
- What right to privacy protects is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from wrongful publicizing of private affairs and activities of
an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern
- The events of EDSA I is not only of public interest and concern but also of international interest. The event relates to a highly critical state in
the history of the country.
- The film to be produced is not about the life of JPE, as the extent of the intrusion upon his life would be limited in character. To omit JPE
would make the film not historical.
- JPE is considered a public figure because of his participation as a principal actor in the events of EDSA I. Also, he has not retired into the
seclusion of a private citizen, running for public office and winning as Senator.
- Line of equilibrium between freedom of speech and right of privacy requires that the film must be fairly truthful and historical in its
presentation of events. It must not enter matters of essentially private concern like intimate or embarrassing personal facts.

SJS v. DDB

Issue 1: Ratio:
Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and  Pimentel Petition: Pimentels contention is well-taken. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. The unconstitutionality is rooted on its having infringed the
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
impose an additional qualification for  It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. Legislative power remains
candidates for senator? Corollarily, limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable
can Congress enact a law prescribing subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
qualifications for candidates for Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators. Also, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
senator in addition to those laid down promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g).
by the Constitution? NO both.
Issue 2: Ratio:
Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of  SJS Petition: The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The Court rules otherwise, Sec 36(c) and (f) are constitutional. In the case of students, the constitutional
NO: c and d; YES: f and g (for g, already viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
answered in issue 1). they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
 The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
 School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of
the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate. Based on US
jurisprudence, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al.
both held that:
1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students;
2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;
3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and
4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
 The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people, particularly the youth and
school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.
 Also, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.
The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable,
an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy, has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
 The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or
from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement
as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights
of the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.
 As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government
search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on
the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature
of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the
office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s work policies. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
 The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to
the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department
of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access
to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis; that the drug test result and the records shall be kept confidential subject to the usual accepted practices
to protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information
or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
 intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.
 Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met
by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged
drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and constitutional.
 Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.
 ADDITIONAL: Re. undue delegation of power, the Court disagrees. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and
tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. The participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall
always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165.
 Laserna Petition: The Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes, Sec36(f) is unconstitutional.
 In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will, for they do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.

Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College

Issue: Ratio:
WO/ there was indeed an actual or  Right to Informational Privacy on Facebook
threatened violation of the right to o The Right to Informational Privacy
privacy in the life, liberty or security of  Justice Puno: There are three strands of the right to privacy: (1) locational or situational privacy; (2) informational privacy; (3) decisional
the minors. - NO privacy
 Right to informational privacy: right to control information about themselves
 Due to millions of subscribers to Online Social Networks, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectation, but rather in some
theoretical protocol known as wishful thinking.
 Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information, yet
the very purpose of OSN is socializing – sharing a myriad of information, some of which would have otherwise remained personal
o Facebook’s privacy tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
 Purpose of OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members
 Facebook connections are established through the process of “friending” another user, so that they can view any and all “Public” and
“Friends Only” posts of the other  “Friending” gives the “Facebook friend” access to his or her profile and shares certain information
to the latter
 STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
o Petitioners argued that the privacy settings on Facebook limit who can see what information  gives users a subjective expectation of privacy.
COURT AGREED. HOWEVER, the Court also ruled that before one can have an expectation of privacy on her Facebook information, he or she
must manifest an intention to keep that information private by utilizing privacy tools.
o The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed
the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was
for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school. The photos in the case at hand were all viewable
by the friends of the girls or by the general public.
 Petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to
respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted
to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary
to petitioners’ assertion.
  In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof
that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
 Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest
and palpable.

Chavez v. Gonzales

Issue 1: Ratio:
Will a purported violation of law such as  A purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A
the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
of speech and of the press? – NO broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the
clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option
but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the
national security of the State.
 Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1)
freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of
circulation.
Issue 2: Ratio:
Did the mere press statements of  The mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is
constitute a form of content-based prior sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered,
restraint that has transgressed the for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts
Constitution? – YES already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.

New York Times v. Sullivan

Issue: Ratio:
W/N the First Amendment protects  If allegedly libelous statements criticizing official conduct of public officers would otherwise be constitutionally protected from state court judgment awarding
false publications - YES damages, protection is not forfeited because they were published in the form of a paid advertisement, where the advertisement was not a “commercial”
advertisement but was an “editorial” advertisement which communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives were matters of the highest public interest and concern.
 Libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations; it must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
 Freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment.
 The constitutional protections for speech and press were fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about political and social changes
desired by the people.
 The maintenance of opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to will of people and that changes may be
obtained by lawful means is a fundamental principle of the constitutional system.
 There is a national commitment to principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
  The constitutional protections for speech and press do not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered; there is
no exception for any test of truth, whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials, and especially not one that puts the burden of proving
truth on the speaker.
 Factual error affords no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free; the same is true of injury to official reputation.
 Criticism of official conduct of government officials, such as elected city commissioners, does not lose its constitutional protections for speech and press
merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations.
 If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements
is no less inadequate.
 The Alabama rule of law that words published of and concerning a person are libelous per se if they tend to injure a person in his reputation and that this
standard is met if words injure him in his public office or impute misconduct to him in such office and that public officer's reputation is affected by statements
that reflect on agency of which he is in charge is inconsistent with First and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the rule allows defense of truth.
 The constitutional protections for speech and press require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice,” that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
 A conditional privilege immunizing honest mistakes of fact in publication concerning official conduct is required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
 The Constitution delimits a state's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. In this case,
the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable.
 The Alabama rule that malice is presumed where general damages are concerned in libel action by public official against critics of his official conduct is
inconsistent with federal rule prohibiting public official from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that statement was made with actual malice.
 Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Constitution) in
a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.
 Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space that the need to
survive.
 The failure of New York Times to retract the advertisement upon the Sullivan’s demand is not adequate evidence of malice for constitutional purposes.
Likewise, it is not adequate evidence of malice that the publishing company failed to check the advertisements accuracy against the news stories in their own
files.

SWS v. COMELEC

Issue: Ratio:
W/N §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006  The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is
constitutes an unconstitutional within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is
abridgment of freedom of speech, unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press]
expression, and the press. - YES is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content neutral
regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such laws."
 First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such
interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such
publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers.
 Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only
incidental, §5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the
governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak
or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas."
 Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be
more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speechbecause of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils To
summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
GMA Network v. COMELEC

Issue: Ratio:
W/N Section 9 (a) of COMELEC  The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of
Resolution No. 9615 on airtime candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits –
limits violates freedom of leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
expression, of speech and of the political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis
press. - YES for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
 It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate
to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the
ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC

Issue: Ratio:
W/N COMELEC’s notice to COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens.
remove election materials ● COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a noncandidate in this case
amounted to an infringement ○ They considered the tarp as a campaign material; but the provisions only apply to candidates and political parties
of the petitioner’s freedom of ○ Election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with the candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination
expression. with the candidates and the political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political parties
maintain within authorized expense limitation
○ Tarp was not paid for by any candidate or political party; NO ALLEGATION THEY COORDINATED WITH ANY OF THE PERSONS NAMED IN THE TARP
■ Diocese: as part of their advocacy against RH Law
● COMELEC: its regulatory power under the Constitution, set a limit on the right to free speech during election period (National Press Club v. COMELEC - sale and
donation of space & time for political advertisements)
○ Misplaced position because the petitioners in the cited case were electoral candidates
● In the case at bar, COMELEC’S notice and letter caused the petitioners to lose their ability to give a commentary on the 2013 electoral candidates
○ It was not merely a regulation on the campaigns of candidates vying for public office
○ Sec 79, BP 881: election campaign: an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
■ No mention w/n election campaign is limited only to the cand/pol parties themselves
■ Focus of the definition is that the act must be “designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public
office”
● The tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern → statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH Law
On the violation of Art III, Sec 4, Constitution
● While provision mentions “no law” → the assailed act is a COMELEC opinion, the Court has applied the Article even to governmental acts
● All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression.
○ The prohibition against the abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental burden on
speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in the Constitution.
○ The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our Constitution.
● “Of expression”
○ Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as “the right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because speech is the beginning of thought”
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech
● Communication exists when:
○ (1) A speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because he/she reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in
the manner intended
○ (2) Audience so takes the actions
 ○ ** In communicative action, the hearer may respond to the claims by either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or requests
for justification
● Speech is not limited to vocal communication
○ Conduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to symbolic speech such that when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the
same course of conduct, the communicative element of the conduct may be sufficient to bring into play the right to freedom of expression
○ Right to freedom of expression applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a
symbolic manner of communication
○ Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools to Cebu
■ Justice Cruz: Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent.
■ The democratic system provides for the accomodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The
will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of
unorthodox or unpopular views
Size does matter
● The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression
(1) It enhances the efficiency in communication
(a) Larger → easier for passengers to read its context
(b) Greater probability that it will catch the attention → understand its message
(2) Size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader
(a) Perceived importance
(b) Effectivity of communication relies on the emphasis put by the speakers + credibility
(c) Larger segments of public may tend to be more convinced of the point made by authoritative figures when they make the effort to emphasize their
messages
(3) Larger spaces allow for more messages
(a) More opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to communicate
(b) Can allow for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates’ platforms for governance
(c) More precise inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies and contribute more to a more educated and reasoned electorate → increase
possibilities of both good governance and accountability in govt
● Large tarps are not analogous to time and place
○ Fundamentally part of expression protected under Art III, Sec 4, Consti
The Regulation is Content-Based
● The right to freedom and expression is not absolute. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content - based or content - neutral.
● SC agreed with the petitioner by saying that a commercial speech would not have been regulated. Moreover, the content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced
from the size of its medium. Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom
of expression Lastly, the COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non - candidates will be adjudged as election paraphernalia. No
bright lines to categorize speech as election - related and those are not.
● Content based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule
○ The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. In the
instant case, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non - candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced
from the size of its medium.
Disini v. Sec. of Justice

Issue: Ratio:
W/N Cybercrime law is  Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.
constitutional.  Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications, commonly known as spam, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer for
sale of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for service or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, or “when the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source; (bb) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.”
 The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the enjoyment
of using online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain without prior permission.
 spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression ,”but
is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications “would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.
 Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes the origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication,
but not its content nor the identity of users.
 The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They also claimed
that this provision violates the right to privacy and protection from the government’s intrusion into online communications.
 According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications, it must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly
tailored towards serving a government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the government did have a compelling interest in preventing cyber crimes
by monitoring real-time traffic data.
 As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the right
not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is entitled
to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the
communication, and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.
 The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not find
the expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office)
of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.”
 Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough
data may reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law as
“virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication they want.”
 Struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
 Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this
section also violated the right to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the
Philippines’ Constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form of expression.
Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Issue: Ratio:
W/N local statute of New Defendants admit their indebtedness, only in the sum of P5,106.00
Hampshire is invalid under  Right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances
Fourteenth Amendment  There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech – lewd and obscene, profane, libelous, insulting or “fighting” words, those which by their
(freedom of speech) – NO very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, and not essential to any exposition of ideas
 State court: statute’s purpose was to preserve public peace, no words being forbidden except such as have a “direct tendency to cause acts of violence to whom,
individually, the remark is addressed”
 Test of “offensiveness” of words is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight
 “damned racketeer” and “damned Fascist” are epithets likely to provoke average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace

MVRS v. Islamic Da’wah Council

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N private respondents have a  There was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private
cause of action and have the right respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.
to institute a class suit – NO  An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community.
o Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and profession;
each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view — some may be conservative, others liberal.
o There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each
reputation is personal in character to every person.
o Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.
 Principle: As the size of these groups increases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortuous libel becomes elusive.
 The Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as
indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do.

Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N an “emotional distress” tort  An "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to
is applicable in this case. - NO personal attacks on his character.
 It is not applicable in the present case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar.
 Also, the purported damage caused by the article falls under the principle of relational harm (harm to social relationships in the community in the form of
defamation) as distinguished from reactive harm (infliction of emotional distress).
o Respondents asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community.
Miller v. California

Issue: Ratio:
WON the State may regulate  This Court has recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination
obscene material particularly in carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.
which sexually explicit materials  The 1st and 14th Amendments have never been treated as absolute. However, the court acknowledges that the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any
have been thrust by aggressive sales form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited.
action upon unwilling recipients,  As a result, the court now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to work which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically
without infringing the First defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.
Amendment rights. - YES  A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
BASIC GUIDELINES TO TEST OBSCENITY:
1. Whether the average person applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest

2. Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law

3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic political or scientific values.
Examples:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
 Sex and nudity may not be exploited without limit by films or pictures exhibited or sold in places of public accommodation any more than live sex and nudity can
be exhibited or sold without limit in such public places.
 At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First
Amendment protection. (eg. medical books for the education of physicians and related personnel necessarily use graphic illustrations and descriptions of human
anatomy.)
 In the Court’s view, to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand
conception of the First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom. It is a ‘misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free press
...
 The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or
a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent. ‘The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people
 One can concede that the ‘sexual revolution’ of recent years may have had useful byproducts in striking layers of prudery from a subject long irrationally kept from
needed ventilation. But it does not follow that no regulation of patently offensive ‘hard core’ materials is needed or permissible; civilized people do not allow
unregulated access to heroin because it is a derivative of medicinal morphine.

Pita v. CA

Issue 1: Ratio:
Whether or Not the seizure  Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as
violative of the freedom of indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here
expression of the petitioner. in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the
Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the
question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not
shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding
the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court providAes that the
authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action;
 2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound
discretion;

Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N seizure is constitutional?  It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a judicial warrant , otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge
 There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case
involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because speech is speech, whether political or "obscene". The authorities must
apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from the judge , if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that the materials
sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action. The judge must
determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound discretion. If probable cause
exist, a search warrant will issue.

New York v. Ferber

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N a State has somewhat more  Roth v. United States: "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." The Court recognized that "rejection of obscenity as
freedom in proscribing works utterly without redeeming social importance" was implicit in the history of the First Amendment: the original States provided for the prosecution of libel,
which portray sexual acts or lewd blasphemy, and profanity, and the "universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained [is] reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in
exhibitions of genitalia by the obscenity laws of all of the 48 states, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by Congress from 1842 to 1956."
children. - YES  Roth was followed by 15 years during which this Court struggled with "the intractable obscenity problem. The difficulty was not only to assure that statutes
designed to regulate obscene materials sufficiently defined what was prohibited, but also to devise substantive limits on what fell within the permissible scope
of regulation.
 In Miller v. California, supra, a majority of the Court agreed that a "state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient
interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value."
 an accommodation between the State's interests in protecting the "sensibilities of unwilling recipients" from exposure to pornographic material and the
dangers of censorship inherent in unabashedly content-based laws. Like obscenity statutes, laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run
the risk of suppressing protected expression by allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy.
 For the following reasons, however, the Court is persuaded that the States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of
children.
1. It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor is compelling. A
democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens. The prevention of
sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance. The legislative findings accompanying passage
of the New York laws reflect this concern:
"[T]here has been a proliferation of exploitation of children as subjects in sexual performances. The care of children is a sacred trust and should not be
abused by those who seek to profit through a commercial network based upon the exploitation of children. The public policy of the state demands the
protection of children from exploitation through sexual performances."
2. The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways.
First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second,
the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be
effectively controlled.
The most expeditious, if not the only practical, method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal
penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product. Thirty-five States and Congress have concluded that restraints on the
distribution of pornographic materials are required in order to effectively combat the problem, and there is a body of literature and testimony to support
these legislative conclusions.
Respondent argues that it is enough for the State to prohibit the distribution of materials that are legally obscene under the Miller test. While some
States may find that this approach properly accommodates its interests, it does not follow that the First Amendment prohibits a State from going further.
The Miller standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect the State's particular and more compelling interest
in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children. Thus, the question under the Miller test of whether a work, taken as a whole,
 appeals to the prurient interest of the average person bears no connection to the issue of whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed
in the production of the work.
3. The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for, and are thus an integral part of, the production of such materials, an
activity illegal throughout the Nation.
4. The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis. We consider it unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an
important and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educational work. If it were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over
the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized. Simulation outside of the prohibition of the statute could provide another alternative.
5. Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with the
Court’s earlier decisions. The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech. Thus,
it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of the
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case
adjudication is required. When a definable class of material, such as that covered by § 263.15, bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children
engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck, and that it is permissible to consider these materials as without
the protection of the First Amendment.

Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N Section 263.15 is  There are limits on the category of child pornography which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment. As with all legislation in this sensitive area,
underinclusive and overbroad. - the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. Here the nature of the harm to
NO be combated requires that the state offense be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age. The category of "sexual
conduct" proscribed must also be suitably limited and described. The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller
but may be compared to it for the purpose of clarity. The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: a trier of fact need not find that the material
appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the
material at issue need not be considered as a whole. We note that the distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene,
which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment protection.
 Section 263.15's prohibition incorporates a definition of sexual conduct that comports with the above-stated principles. The forbidden acts to be depicted are
listed with sufficient precision and represent the kind of conduct that, if it were the theme of a work, could render it legally obscene. § 263.15 sufficiently
describes a category of material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection. It is therefore clear that there is nothing
unconstitutionally "underinclusive" about a statute that singles out this category of material for proscription.
 First Amendment overbreadth doctrine (exception to the principal rule that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that
statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the court): "persons whose expression is
constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected
expression."
 The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to established principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in
which facial invalidation of a statute is truly warranted. Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face at the request of one
whose own conduct may be punished despite the First Amendment, the Court has recognized that the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," and
have employed it with hesitation, and then "only as a last resort." The overbreadth involved be "substantial" before the statute involved will be
invalidated on its face.
 The requirement of substantial overbreadth is directly derived from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a sweeping statute, or one incapable
of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech
can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of the regulation.
 This observation is applicable to a publisher or bookseller in doubt as to the reach of New York's child pornography law. § 263.15 is not substantially
overbroad. The Court considered this the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications.
How often, if ever, it may be necessary to employ children to engage in conduct clearly within the reach of § 263.15 in order to produce educational,
medical, or artistic works cannot be known with certainty.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union

Issue: Ratio:
Whether the two CDA statutory  Under the CDA, neither parents’ consent nor their participation would avoid application of the statute. The CDA fails to provide any definition of “indecent”
provisions at issue are and omits any requirement that the “patently offensive material” lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Further, the CDA’s broad categorical
constitutional. - NO prohibitions are not limited to particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.
CDA applies to the entire universe of the cyberspace. Thus, the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as
a form of time, place and manner restriction. The CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment of the Constitution requires when a statute regulates the
content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the statute suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive. The CDA places an unacceptable burden on protected speech, thus, the statute is invalid as unconstitutional.
 The constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to which it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults. Because
the rights of adults are infringed only by the “display” provision and by the “indecency transmission” provision, the judge would invalidate the CDA only to
that extent.

United States v. Williams

Issue: Ratio:
Does the PROTECT Act abridge First  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a seven-Justice majority, held that the statute was not overly broad as written. Justice Scalia noted specifically that offers
Amendment freedom of speech by to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection, and he characterized the speech of an individual claiming to be
outlawing the pandering of material in possession of child pornography in this category of unprotected speech. He also stated that the law did not violate Due Process because its requirements
that is believed to be, or claimed to were clear and could be understood by courts, juries and potential violators. Justice David Souter filed the only dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader
be, illegal child pornography? - NO Ginsburg joined.

In re Emil Jurado

Issue 1: Ratio:
W/N Jurado can invoke the  Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
principles of press freedom to deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard
justify the published writings. - of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
NO  The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The provision is reflective
of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights,” “one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law.”
 Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public officials.
 Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more
stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept
appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage
all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges.
 The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate
interests is precisely found in the norm, which requires those, who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist
guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory
statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.
 Note: In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw intelligence or reports he received surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. Moreover, some
of his reports were completely untrue because he did not bother to make any further verification.
 Issue 2: Ratio:
W/N the court has the power to  The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including
cite him for contempt. - YES lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection
against improper interference with the due administration of justice." Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case.
 Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he
is being singled out, and, by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently than his other colleagues in media who were
only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee.
 The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which
tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an orderly
manner. Jurado has not been singled out. What has happened is that there have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course, sworn statements
branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of substantiating those reports or assuming responsibility for their publication.
 Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity — whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar — he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he
resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a lawyer for his statements as a
 journalist.
 This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused
press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of the
administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate
liability.
 Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he
might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote.
 They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By
doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive
at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

Reyes v. Bagatsing

Issue 1: Ratio:
Whether or not a treaty may  Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of
supersede provisions of the the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds
Constitution. - NO and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the
application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right.
Issue 2: Ratio:
Whether or not the rallyists  The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.
should be granted the permit. - If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in
YES time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is
given to applicants for the denial.
 The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does
not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance
cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the 500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or
not the mayor can prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this case).
Issue 3: Ratio:
Whether or Not the freedom of  The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is
expression and the right to settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the
peaceably assemble were permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice
violated. - YES of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.
 Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
  With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow
that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged.

Malabanan v. Ramento

Issue: Ratio:
Whether or not the suspension of  Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
students for one academic year was academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This
violative of the constitutional rights is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
of freedom of assembly and free others."
speech? - YES  The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters
affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear
and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent,
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit
must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may
be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however,
there be violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
 Non v. Dames: students do not shed their constitutionally guaranteed rights at the school gates.

Bayan v. Ermita

Issue: Ratio:
Whether or not the implementation  The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and
of B.P. No. 880 violated their rights of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity,
as organizations and individuals without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected
 Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not
contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution, particularly Sections 4 and
8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting
the people’s exercise of these rights
 It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies
 A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22 that would use public places. The reference to
"lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled
to protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally,
maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
 Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health
 The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It
merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional;
it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid
because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.
 In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within which to designate
specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If, after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section 15 of the law, all public
parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall be required to hold an
assembly therein. The only requirement will be written notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and orderly activities.