Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37471 January 28, 1980

DULCISIMO TONGCO JANDAYAN, petitioner,

FERNANDO, C.J.:

A resort to a habeas corpus proceeding would not have been necessary had there been
a little more attention paid to the authoritative doctrine. Petitioner, Dulcisimo Tongco
Jandayan, had to be confined in the Bohol provincial jail on July 16, 1973 when
respondent Judge Fernando S. Ruiz of the court of the First Instance of Bohol 1
promulgated the sentence in the accordance with a decision of the then judge Paulino
Marquez, dated June 22, 1973, notwithstanding the undeniable fact that such judge had
retired by reason of age as far back as June 27, 1973. This, then is essentially a proper
case for the invocation of the great writ of liberty, although counsel for petitioner did
likewise label his pleading as one for certiorari and mandamus. It is regrettable that
respondent judge failed to yield deference to the authoritative controlling doctrine as to
the competence of a judge to continue discharging the functions of his office after
retirement. It is commendable of Solicitor General E Estelito P. Mendoza 2 then, that
when required to comment, he made clear that he was in agreement with petitioner and
that the promulgation of the sentence made on July 16, 1973 by respondent Judge on
the basis of what purportedly was a decision of the retired Judge Paulino Marquez
should be set aside and that petitioner should be released from confinement without
prejudice to the proceedings being continued according to law. That, in the opinion of
the Court, is likewise the proper disposition of this case.

The facts, as succinctly set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General follows: "On
May 10, 1973 petitioner was convicted of Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence by the Municipal Court of Loay, Bohol and sentenced to suffer three (3)
months of Arrests Mayor. On appeal, the case (Crim. Case No. 706) was raffled to the
CFI of Bohol, Branch 1, presided over by the Honorable Paulino Marquez. On June 26,
1973, an order was served on petitioner that the promulgation of the decision would
take place on July 6, 1973. On June 27, 1973, Judge Paulino Marquez retired from
service. ... Upon motion of counsel for petitioner, the promulgation of decision was
postponed from July 6 to July 12. Finally on July 16, 1973, the decision dated June 22,
1973 as prepared and signed by Judge Marquez was promulgated by respondent
Judge." 3

What other conclusion, then. could such facts lead to except the following, as set forth
in the above comment of the Solicitor General: "In the light of ... settled rulings, the
promulgation made by respondent judge on July 16, 1973 of the decision dated June
22, 1973, signed and prepared by Judge Marquez who retired on June 27, 1973 is
submitted to be null and void." 4 We are in agreement, as earlier noted, and we grant
the petition.

There are areas in the juristic sphere where the dividing line is obscure, but certainly not
this one, except, it would seem. for respondent Judge. There is no real need to plot it on
the legal map for those whose knowledge of the terrain of the law rises above the
superficial. As so tersely put by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Cesar Bengzon:
"We have then that, legally, the decisions of Judge Mañalac were promulgated on July
3, 1954. Wherefore, because he had left the Bench before that date, his decisions have
no binding effect."5 Such a doctrine goes back to a 1917 decision, Lino Luna v.
Rodriguez. 6 It did cite in support thereof several leading American Supreme Court
decisions. 7 A recent case, Jimenez v. Republic, 8 applies with even more pertinence.
The antecedent facts, as set forth in the opinion of Justice Angeles, follow: "Eduardo
Jimenez, herein petitioner, together with others, was charged with homicide in an
information, dated May 13, 1960, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, criminal
case No. 9531, of said court. The case was heard and tried before Judge Eulogio
Mencias, presiding one of the branches of the court. Admittedly, the decision prepared
and signed by Judge Mencias was delivered to the clerk of court on January 16, 1965,
On the same date, the clerk of court issued and served notice on the petitioner to
appear in court on January 21, 1965 for the promulgation of the sentence. In view that
January 21, was declared by the President a special holiday, the promulgation of the
decision could not be carried out on that day. On January 21, 1965, Judge Eulogio
Mencias had reached the age of 70 and was retired on that day from the bench.
Respondent Judge Pedro Navarro was immediately designated to take the place of
Judge Mencias The former judge ordered that the sentence be promulgated on January
29, 1965, but for some reason, it was postponed to March 1, 1965." 9 Petitioner
Jimenez filed a motion to set aside the decision as well as. its promulgation an the
ground of Judge Mencias having retired. Respondent Judge, however, denied the
motion, necessitating the filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The concluding
paragraph of the opinion reads: "We hold that the decision rendered by the retired
Judge Eulogio Mencias cannot be validly promulgated and acquire a binding effect for
the same has become null and void under the circumstances." 10

The latest case in point is Vera v. People, 11 where it was noted by this Court that a
decision of a judge promulgated after his retirement could have been set aside on the
authority of the above two cases of People v. Court of Appeals 12 and Jimenez v.
Republic,13 except for their non-applicability in view of the failure to raise such an
objection in the lower court as well as in the Court of Appeals. There was no thought,
however, of deviating from the principle that a judge who had retired had no legal
authority to promulgate a decision. 14

That is all then that this case presents, and it is quite obvious that there was no
justification not even a plausible explanation, for the unwarranted action taken by
respondent Judge in the face of such compelling juristic norm.

This Court did not feel the need for deciding the petition earlier considering the
comment filed by the respondent Chief of Police of Anda, Bohol, in the light of its last
two paragraphs. Thus: "That as a municipal prisoner, petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco
Jandayan had served the rest of his sentence in the municipal jail of Anda Bohol from
August 14, 1973 to October 5, 1973 when the undersigned respondent in his capacity
as and Chief of Police of Anda Bohol released prisoner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan for
having fully served out his sentence; and that the undersigned only knew of petitioner's
present petition and received the different copies of the pleadings and, resolutions from
the Honorable Supreme Court [only after] the undersigned has already released
petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan who had already fully served his sentence as
said above." 15 Hence the habeas corpus aspect was rendered t and academic.
Nonetheless, this opinion is handed down to remove any doubt that this Court adheres
to the well-settled doctrine on the matter at issue.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed for being moot and academic, petitioner having
been released in the meanwhile. No costs.