Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990

CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp. of
the Phils.), respondents.

Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually allowed
only in affairs of the heart where the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the case before
us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege in connection with
her work, where the rules are not as fickle.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development

Corporation of the Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and
unauthorized possession of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a
surprise inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within
ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with fun back wages to
be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to date of her actual
reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by public respondent NLRC
on August 29, 1980. 2

On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the executive
labor arbiter in an order dated June 26, 1989, which required payment to the petitioner
of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of implementing the balance of the judgment
amount" due from the private respondent.3 Pursuant thereto, the said amount was
garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On September 11, 1989, however,
the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order dated June 20,
1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice of
garnishment. 5
In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred,
having been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and
the Labor Code. It also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not been reinstated
on time and ruled as valid the two quitclaims she had signed waiving her right to
reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in full of her back wages and other
benefits. The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead.

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment

may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry
or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action.

A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz.

ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. — (a) The Secretary of

Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any
Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu
propio, or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a
judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and
executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or
enforce a final decision, order or award. ...

The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception
snowed in Lancita v. Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:

Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution
has been previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which
is in financial difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny motions for
leave to issue execution more than five years after the judgments are
entered. (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement
Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866)

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there
is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be
included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the
parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ
of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or
otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend
the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias.

xxx xxx xxx

 There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on
their rights to have the judgment executed by mere motions, within the
reglementary period. The statute of limitation has not been devised
against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their
central.

Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution
of the judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was
she who dilly-dallied.

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof
following its affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that
she demanded her reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was
rejected. What appears is that she entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP
where she waived her right to reinstatement and received from the CDCP the sum of
P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her dismissal to the date of
the agreement. 7

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually
reinstated only on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period
beginning November 28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until the date of her reinstatement.
She conveniently omits to mention several significant developments that transpired
during and after this period that seriously cast doubt on her candor and bona fides.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her
right to reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the petitioner secured employment
as kitchen dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked from October 1982
to March 1987. According to the certification issued by that business, 8 she received a
monthly compensation of P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP.

For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP
and was on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator with a basic
salary of P1,030.00 plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total of P1,491.33 monthly. 9

On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the
rights granted her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the
waiver she had signed was invalid. 10

On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now
Philippine National Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to the
petitioner of the sum of P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three
years at P654. 00 per month (minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11

On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed
another Quitclaim and Release reading as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87 Annapolis
St., Quezon City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS: NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00) Philippine
currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back wages due me under the
judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon Periquet vs. PNCC-
TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in full satisfaction of all my
claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily
waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I
sought and am satisfied with my present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in
the Central Office.

Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision dated
10 May 1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.

I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from money
and all claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay, company,
statutory and other benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection with the
above-entitled case. I hereby state further that I have no more claims or right of action
of whatever nature, whether past, present, future or contingent against said corporation
and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November 1988
at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12

The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum she
sent the PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in part:

Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others
who have helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay
with PNCC by way of granting an additional amount of P9,544.00 among
others ...

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now

occupying the position of xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently
receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00.

Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company
increases and other statutory benefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly
salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00 monthly.

Then the lull. Then the bombshell.

On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this
petition.
It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as
if she does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it;
then she signed another waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that she
had been deceived. In her first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the
judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after accepting additional
payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the same judgment. But now she is
singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier
payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid
before but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by
the past management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new management of the
PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new
management-for also tricking her into signing the second quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only
where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step
in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making
the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.

The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of
September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration of the
cash settlement she received? It must be remembered that on that date the decision
could still have been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was still the
possibility of its reversal. The petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth
two on the wing and so opted for the compromise agreement. The amount she was then
waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42
that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight years.

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases
that this should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during
which period (but not beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed unemployed without
the necessity of proof. 14 Hence, the petitioner's contention that she should be paid from
1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even without regard to the fact (that would
otherwise have been counted against her) that she was actually employed during most
of that period.

Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure
of the private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor
General correctly points out, the bond is required only when there is an appeal from the
decision with a monetary award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the case at
bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against
making untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have
only needlessly taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the
Government Corporate Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired
employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however
unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the pertinent
facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 10537, February 03, 2015 ]

REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-

MARGALLO, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:
When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and
ears of their clients. Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their
clients without need for reminders. The privilege of the office of attorney grants them
the ability to warrant to their client that they will manage the case as if it were their
own. The relationship between an attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be
disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the lawyer accepted the case only because he or
she was asked by an acquaintance. The professional relationship remains the same
regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by counsel and regardless of whether the
case is highly paying or pro bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo's (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal,

terminating the case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made
it appear that the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the
Appellant's Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review[1] filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B,
Section 12 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
In the Resolution[2] dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution[3] dated March 20,
2013. In its delegated capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it found that
respondent Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[4] Consequently, the Board of Governors
recommended that Atty. Margallo be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.[5]

In the Complaint[6] filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez)
alleged that he engaged Atty. Margallo's services as legal counsel in a civil case for
Quieting of Title entitled "Spouses Roque v. Ramirez."[7] The case was initiated before
the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.[8]

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a
referral from a friend of Ramirez's sister.[9] He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered
her legal services on the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the
controversy instead of attorney's fees.[10] It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would
pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court appearance.[11]

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to
Ramirez.[12] Atty. Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file
the Appeal before the Court of Appeals.[13]

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in
2008.[14] On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his
Appellant's Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one
prepared.[15]

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellant's

Brief. Atty. Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents
necessary for the brief.[16]

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that
there was still no word from the Court of Appeals.[17]

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been
denied.[18] She told him that the Court of Appeals' denial was due to Ramirez's failure to
establish his filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim.[19] She
also informed him that they could no longer appeal to this court since the Decision of
the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period for filing an
Appeal had already lapsed.[20]

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellant's Brief
was filed on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing
beyond the reglementary period.[21]
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[22] By way of defense, Atty.
Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense
of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez
and his mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the case.[23] She denied ever
having entered into an agreement regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value
of the land subject of the controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the
mother of Ramirez had begged her to do so.[24] She claimed that when she instructed
Ramirez to see her for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he
finally showed up on March 2009, he merely told her that he had been busy.[25] Her
failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of
Appeals was due to losing her client's number because her 8-year-old daughter played
with her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts.[26]

Mandatory conference and findings

of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010.[27] Only Ramirez
appeared despite Atty. Margallo having received notice.[28] The mandatory conference
was reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties then appeared and were directed to submit
their position papers.[29]

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be

reprimanded for her actions and be given a stern warning that her next infraction of a
similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.[30] This was based on his two key
findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing an Appellant's
Brief to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer wanted to pursue the case instead of
exhausting all means possible to protect the interest of her client.[31] Second, Atty.
Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss of Ramirez's
statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.[32]

In the Resolution[33] dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission
on Bar Discipline. The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of
reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a stern warning that repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.

Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.[34] In the
Resolution dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirez's Motion for
Reconsideration and increased the recommended penalty to suspension from practice of
law for two (2) years.[35]

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B,
Section 12 of the Rules of Court.[36] She alleged that the recommended penalty of
suspension was too severe considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in
defending the cause of her client. She also averred that this was the first time a
Complaint was filed against her.[37]

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration
previously filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty.
Margallo's Petition for Review.[38] In the Resolution[39] dated October 14, 2014, this
court granted Ramirez's Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her Reply[40] on October 6, 2014.

This court's ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is "imbued with utmost trust and
confidence."[41] Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and
competence in managing cases entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases
or give legal advice, but also to represent their clients to the best of their ability without
need to be reminded by either the client or the court. The expectation to maintain a
high degree of legal proficiency and attention remains the same whether the represented
party is a high-paying client or an indigent litigant.[42]

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly provide:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client's request for information.

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,[43] a lawyer was suspended after failing to
justify his absence in a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case
being submitted for resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyer's failure to inform his
client about the adverse ruling of the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant
from further pursuing an Appeal. This court found that these actions amounted to gross
negligence tantamount to breaching Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of
their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their
affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

....

Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not
merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice,
but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary

action. While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the
Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to perform the obligations
due his client is per se a violation.[44] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to
Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and
her client was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost
complainant Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal
cause was orphaned not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but
because a person privileged to act as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the
requisite diligence. Her assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer interested
to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was no proof that she exerted efforts to
communicate with her client. This is an admission that she abandoned her obligation as
counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all
possible means to protect complainant Ramirez's interest, which is contrary to what she
had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly
violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use
their authority or power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many
agencies, there is information assymetry between the principal and the entrusted
agent. That is, there are facts and events that the agent must attend to that may not be
known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client

relationship. Lawyers are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their
cases but also to see their relevance in relation to their causes of action or their
defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to the client. It can only be
seen through familiarity with the relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their
jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies of the legal procedure. It is
the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the
interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly
fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better
knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which
lawyer to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon
actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and
accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one, the
discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer
that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallo's position that a two-year suspension is too severe

considering that it is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De
Saldivar, we observed:

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held
liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were
suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of
the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six
(6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a
pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for
six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six
(6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it
proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly
suspends him for a period of six (6) months.[45] (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On
the other hand, respondent Atty. Margallo's neglect resulted in her client having no
further recourse in court to protect his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the
utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence as
counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that we communicate that lawyers must
actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be no more room for an inertia
of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.[46] Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can
only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory. Despite the
precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes that the severity of
the infraction is worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We read this as a showing of
its desire to increase the level of professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to
address a current need in the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to ensure a higher ethical standard for its members' conduct is
laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor
is reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and

Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated
March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes
Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

Adm. Case No. 9612 March 13, 2013

JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant,

vs.
MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong
information to his client regarding the matter subject of their professional relationship is
guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's
Oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby
violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he
is called upon to serve his client with competence and diligence.

Antecedents

In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty.
Marcelito M. Millo with conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his
client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence and negligence in the
performance of his duty as a lawyer.

Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of
Atty. Millo to handle the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the
adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon;1 that Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the
amounts of ₱14,000.00 for the transfer of title2 and ₱10,000.00 for the adoption
case;3that Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly gave them false information and numerous
excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer of title; that Atty. Millo likewise
made them believe that the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way back in
1991, but they found out upon their return to the country in February 1995 that he had
not yet paid the tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had
already paid the same, but he could not produce any receipt for the supposed payment;
that Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of ₱14,000.00 only after he
stormed out of Atty. Millo’s office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that Atty.
Millo then further promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties. 4

Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed
by the Tarlac office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (Tarlac
DSWD) due to two years of inaction. He stated that Atty. Millo made him and his wife
believe that an interview with the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on February 14,
1995, but when they arrived at the Tarlac DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no
such interview had been scheduled; that adding to their dismay, Atty. Millo could not be
reached at all; that it was only upon reaching home in Quezon City when he received
word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again been scheduled on February 23, 1995 at
10:00 a.m.; that when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be found; and that
they learned after an hour of waiting in the courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo had
requested the hearing to be moved to the afternoon without their knowledge. 5

Exasperated by Atty. Millo’s neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative
complaint in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14, 1995, praying for
disciplinary action to be taken against Atty. Millo, and seeking the refund of ₱15,643.75
representing the penalties for the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of the
₱10,000.00 given for the adoption case. Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one
Tita Lomotan as his attorney-in-fact to represent him during his and his wife’s absence
from the country.
On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his answer. 6 Although an extension
of the period to file was granted at his instance,7 he filed no answer in the end.8 He did
not also appear at the hearings despite due notice.9

In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The
proceedings were held in abeyance to await the appropriate motion from Johnny’s
counsel.10

The administrative matter did not move for several years. The long delay prompted
Johnny to write to the President of the IBP on October 28, 1998. 11 It was only on April 2,
2001, however, that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) scheduled
another hearing on June 29, 2001.12 At that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared through a
representative, and presented a manifestation/motion,13 whereby he claimed that
Johnny had meanwhile died, and that Abella would be withdrawing the complaint
against him.

On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los
Reyes, deemed the case submitted for resolution.14

On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the

case had been meanwhile transferred, submitted a report and recommendation,
whereby he found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six
months.15

In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November 19, 2011,16 the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but lowered
the suspension to two months; and ordered Atty. Millo to return the amount of
₱16,000.00, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A" and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and finding respondent guilty of the charges level(led) against
him, Atty. Marcelito Millo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) months and is ordered to return the amount of ₱16,000.00 to complainant.

On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration, stating that he had honestly
believed that Abella had already caused the withdrawal of the complaint prior to her own
death; that he had already caused the preparation of the documents necessary for the
transfer of the certificate of title, and had also returned the ₱14,000.00 paid by Johnny;
that the adoption case had been finally granted by the trial court; that he had lost
contact with Johnny and Abella who resided in Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abella’s
brother, could have confirmed that the charge had arisen from a simple
misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause the withdrawal of the complaint, except
that Daquis had meanwhile died in November 2011.17

On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Millo’s motion for
reconsideration.18

Ruling

We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the penalty.

Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients.1âwphi1 He must
be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to
safeguard the clients’ interests commences from his engagement as such, and lasts
until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every
reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients’ interests may require. 19

Atty. Millo’s acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to
attend to the transfer of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client
relationship between them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to
render competent and efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed
to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the
professional service he had assumed required him to do. He concealed his inefficiency
and neglect by giving false information to his clients about having already paid the
capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients
liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.

Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and
diligence. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly
so demanded of him, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly
by any respondent attorney. Yet, Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny
seriously enough, and even ignored it for a long period of time. Despite being given
several opportunities to do so, Atty. Millo did not file any written answer. He thereby
forfeited his right and chance to reasonably explain the circumstances behind the
charges against him. Had the complaint been untrue and unfair, it would have been
quite easy for him to refute it quickly and seasonably. Indeed, a refutation was the
requisite response from any worthy and blameless respondent lawyer. His belated and
terse characterization of the charge by claiming that the charge had emanated from a
mere "misunderstanding" was not sufficient. He did not thereby refute the charge
against him, which omission indicated that the complaint had substance. It mattered
little now that he had in the meantime returned the amount of ₱14,000.00 to the clients,
and that the application for adoption had been eventually granted by the trial court.
Such events, being not only post facto, but also inevitable from sheer passage of time,
did not obliterate his liability based on the neglect and ineptitude he had inflicted on his
clients. The severe lesson that he must now learn is that he could not ignore without
consequences the liberal opportunity the Court and the IBP allowed him to justify his
neglect and ineptitude in serving his clients’ concerns. Towards him the Court now stays
its hand of leniency, lest the Court be unfairly seen as too willing to forego the exaction
of responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful and inept as he had been towards his
clients.

It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely disregarded the opportunity to
answer the charges granted to him out of a desire to delay the investigation of the
complaint until both Johnny and Abella, being residents in Canada, would have already
lost interest in prosecuting it, or, as happened here, would have already departed this
world and be no longer able to rebut whatever refutations he would ultimately make,
whether true or not. But the Court is not about to condone such selfish disregard. Let it
be emphasized to him and to others similarly disposed that an attorney who is made a
respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an explanation, and should meet
the issue and overcome the evidence against him.20 The obvious reason for the
requirement is that an attorney thus charged must thereby prove that he still maintained
that degree of morality and integrity expected of him at all times.

Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the
scheduled hearings the IBP had set for his benefit. His disregard of the IBP’s orders
requiring his attendance in the hearings was not only irresponsible, but also constituted
utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was absolutely
unbecoming of a lawyer, because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court
orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with orders from
the duly constituted authorities.21Moreover, in Espiritu v. Ulep,22 the Court saw the
respondent attorney’s odious practice of repeatedly and apparently deliberately not
appearing in the scheduled hearings as his means of wiggling out from the duty to
explain his side. A similar treatment of Atty. Millo’s disregard is justified. Indeed, he
thereby manifested evasion, a bad trait that no worthy member of the Legal profession
should nurture in himself.

Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the
assurances of Abella that she would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court
disbelieves him, however, and treats his claim as nothing but a belated attempt to save
the day for himself. He ought to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative
charge for suspension or disbarment based on an attorney’s professional misconduct or
negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss the charge. Suspension or disbarment
proceedings that are warranted will still proceed regardless of the lack or loss of interest
on the part of the complainant. The Court may even entirely ignore the withdrawal of the
complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally determine whether the charge
of professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the record.23 This approach
bespeaks the Court’s consistent view that the Legal Profession is not only a lofty and
noble calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only for the deserving.

Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the
complainants are the plaintiffs and the respondent attorneys are the defendants. They
neither involve private interests nor afford redress for private grievances. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, for the purpose of preserving
the courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law before
them. Every attorney is called to answer for every misconduct he commits as an officer
of the Court. The complainant or any other person who has brought the attorney’s
misconduct to the attention of the Court is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.24

The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from the practice of law for two
months as the penalty to be imposed. The recommended penalty is not well taken. We
modify the penalty, because Atty. Millo displayed no remorse as to his misconduct, and
could not be given a soft treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a longer
suspension from the practice of law because he had caused material prejudice to the
clients’ interest.25 He should somehow be taught to be more ethical and professional in
dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and Abella, who were innocently too willing to
repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and in his trustworthiness as a legal
professional. He should remember that misconduct has no place in the heart and mind
of a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice, and to
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.
Under the circumstances, suspension from the practice of law for six months is the
condign and commensurate penalty for him.

The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the ₱14,000.00 received for the
transfer of title. Although he ought also to refund the amount of ₱15,643.75 representing
the penalty for the late payment of the capital gains tax, the Court cannot order him to
refund that amount because it is not a collection agency.26 The Court may only direct
the repayment of attorneys fees received on the basis that a respondent attorney did
not render efficient service to the client. Consequently, Atty. Millo should refund the
₱10,000.00 given in connection with the adoption case, plus interest of 6% per annum,
reckoned from the finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of
violating Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Lawyer’s Oath; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from notice, with the STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future
will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS him to return to the heirs of Johnny and
Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the sum of ₱10,000.00, plus legal interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
DIRECTS him to promptly submit to this Court written proof of his compliance within
thirty days from notice of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to Atty. Marcelito M. Millo's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 4945 October 8, 2013

MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, Complainant,

vs.
EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit1 filed by Ma. Jennifer

Tria-Samonte (complainant) against Epifania "Fanny"Obias (respondent) charging her
for grave misconduct and/or gross malpractice.

The facts

In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias),through respondent,

offered for sale a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
597 (subject property) to the late Nestor Tria (Nestor) and Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a
consideration of ₱2,800,000.00 and payable in installments. 2 Respondent, who was to
receive the payment from Sps. Tria and transmit the same to Sps. Jeremias, undertook
to deliver the deed of sale and owner’s copy of the title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon
full payment of the purchase price.3 She further undertook to cause the conversion of
the subject property from agricultural to residential, and the transfer of the title to the
names of Sps. Tria as part of the package agreement.4 Respondent received all the
installment payments made by Sps. Tria and issued receipts therefor.5 After full
payment of the purchase price on July 11, 1997,6 and after giving an additional
₱115,000.00for capital gains tax and other expenses,7 Sps. Tria requested from
respondent the delivery of the deed of sale and the owner’s copy of the title to them but
respondent failed to comply explaining that the Department of Agrarian Reform
clearance for conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential was
taking time.8 Despite several subsequent demands, respondent still failed to fulfill her
undertakings under the package agreement.9

On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died.10 Thereafter, complainant, daughter
of Sps. Tria, again demanded from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the
deed of sale and the certificate of title of the subject property to them, but to no avail.
For their part, Sps. Jeremias informed complainant that they had received the
consideration of ₱2,200,000.00 and they had executed and turned-over the sale
documents to respondent.11

Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was
executed by Sps. Jeremias and notarized by respondent favor of someone else, a
certain Dennis Tan, on May 26, 1998 for a consideration of ₱200,000.00. 12

In defense, respondent, in her Comment,13 claimed that Nestor instructed her in

November 1997 not to proceed with the processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to
just look for another buyer.14 She further averred that Nestor also demanded from her
the return of the purchase price, and that she complied with the said demand and
returned the ₱2,800,000.00 in cash to Nestor sometime during the latter part of January
1998.15 However, she did not ask for a written receipt therefor. In fact, Nestor told her
not to return the ₱115,000.00 intended for capital gains taxes and other expenses, and
to just apply the said sum as attorney’s fees for the other legal services that she
rendered for him.16

In the Court’s Resolution17 dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
After numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of respondent, 18 only the
complainant and her witnesses testified before the IBP. Eventually, respondent’s right to
present evidence was considered waived.19

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes
(Investigating Commissioner), issued his Report and Recommendation,20 finding
respondent to have violated her oath as a lawyer due to her participation in the second
sale of the subject property despite the lack of any lawful termination of the prior sale of
the same property to Sps.Tria. The Investigating Commissioner observed that
respondent received, and admitted to have received, from Sps. Tria the ₱2,800,000.00
purchase price and the amount of ₱115,000.00 for expenses. He further found the
second sale of the same property to Dennis Tan as a clear indication that respondent:
(a) employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps. Tria and their family; (b) violated their
proprietary rights; and (c) violated the trust and confidence reposed in her. 21 On the
other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not give credence to respondent’s
defense that she returned the ₱2,800,000.00 purchase price given by Sps. Tria and that
the latter caused the cancellation of the sale of the subject property in their favor,
absent any receipt or documentation to prove the same.22 As counsel for Sps. Tria,
respondent failed in her obligation to observe honesty and diligence in their transaction
and, as such, she was found guilty of grave misconduct and gross malpractice in
violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code).23 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.24

Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18
of the Code, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-18525 dated
October 19,2007 but reduced the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
from five years to one year.

Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for

reconsideration26 which were, however, denied in the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated March 10, 2012.27

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should beheld
administratively liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent,
in her Comment, already admitted that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria, 28 which
necessarily gave rise to a lawyer-client relationship between them. The complete
turnaround made by respondent in her motion for reconsideration from the IBP Board of
Governors’ Resolution No. XX-2012-109, where she contended that there was no
lawyer-client relationship between her and Sps. Tria,29 cannot thus be given any
credence.

Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned
the hat of a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the
legal profession. In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she
offered and/or rendered regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should
not be deemed removed from the category of legal services. 30 Case law instructs that if
a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits
or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional employment is
established.31 Thus, in view of the fact that Sps. Tria knew respondent to be, and
transacted with her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral classification of her own acts
as being limited to those of a real estate broker cannot be upheld. In any case, the
lawyer-client relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was confirmed by the
latter’s admission that she rendered legal services to the former. With this relationship
having been established, the Court proceeds to apply the ethical principles pertinent to
this case.

It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients’ cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.32 They are duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their
clients.33 Irrefragably, the legal profession demands of attorneys an absolute abdication
of every personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the
interests of their clients.34 As enshrined in Canons 17 and 18 of the Code:

Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.1âwphi1

In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her
actions were evidently prejudicial to her clients’ interests. Records disclose that instead
of delivering the deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she willfully
notarized a deed of sale over the same property in favor of another person. Accordingly,
far removed from protecting the interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in fact,
already fully paid the purchase price of the subject property, respondent participated
and was even instrumental in bringing about the defeat of their rights over the said
property. Hence, respondent grossly violated the trust and confidence reposed in her by
her clients, in contravention of Canons 17and 18 of the Code. To add, by turning
against her own clients, respondent also violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct. Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. 35 These
unyielding standards respondent evidently failed to adhere to.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was
decreased from a period of five years to just one year by the IBP Board of Governors in
Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is
bereft of any explanation showing the bases for such modification in contravention of
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which mandates that "the decision of
the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the reasons on which it is based." Verily, the Court frowns on the unexplained
change made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended penalty. Be that as it
may, the Court proceeds to correct the same.

Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and
confidence reposed in them by their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest,
and immoral or deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court found them guilty of gross
misconduct and disbarred them. In Chuav. Mesina, Jr.,36 the Court disbarred the lawyer
who, upon his misrepresentations, breached his promise to his clients to transfer to
them the property subject of that case, but instead, offered the same for sale to the
public. Also, in Tabang v. Gacott,37 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the
lawyer who, among others, actively sought to sell the properties subject of that case
contrary to the interests of his own clients. As the infractions in the foregoing cases are
akin to those committed by respondent in the case at bar, the Court deems that the
same penalty of disbarment be imposed against her. Clearly, as herein discussed,
respondent committed deliberate violations of the Code as she dishonestly dealt with
her own clients and advanced the interests of another against them resulting to their
loss. For such violations, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment
consistent with existing jurisprudence.

As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not-as it should not -
include an order for the return of the ₱2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of
₱115,000.00 for expenses allegedly received by respondent, albeit the Investigating
Commissioner's findings on the same. In Roa v. Moreno,38 it has been held that
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not
the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and
that the only concern is his administrative liability.39Thus, the Court's findings during
administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties
involved which are purely civil in nature -meaning, those liabilities which have no
intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement40 – as the same should be
threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature.

WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct

and is accordingly DISBARRED.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 5239 November 18, 2013

SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.
 RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the administrative Complaint1 filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-
spouses George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R. Warriner against respondent
Atty. Reni M. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.

In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court,
complainants alleged that they secured the services of respondent in the filing of a
Complaint for damages captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-Warriner and her spouse-
husband George Arthur Warriner, plaintiffs, versus E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and
docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao
City, Branch 16; that during the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23,396-95, respondent
requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested period, respondent did
not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent did not file any
comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare complainants to have
waived their right to file Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent
belatedly filed a Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that
respondent did not oppose or file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.’s
move to dismiss the Complaint; and that the RTC eventually dismissed Civil Case No.
23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. In a Resolution2 dated June 26,
2000, we directed respondent to file his Comment to this administrative Complaint.
Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24, 2000,3 respondent requested for an
extension of 30 days which was granted.4

However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not
yet filed his Comment. Thus, we resolved to require respondent to "show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply
with the resolution requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days from
notice."5 Respondent received our directive but chose to ignore the same. 6 In another
Resolution7 dated August 4, 2003, we imposed a fine of ₱1,000.00 on respondent and
reiterated our directives requiring him to file his Comment and to submit an explanation
on his failure to file the same. However, respondent again ignored this Court’s directive.
Thus, on February 15, 2006, we increased the fine to ₱2,000.00 but respondent
continued to ignore our Resolutions.8 Consequently, on March 10, 2008, we resolved to
order respondent’s arrest and detention until he complies with our Resolutions. 9

This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance10 and
Comment.11 Respondent claimed that he failed to file his Comment to the instant
administrative case because he lost the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and that he
tried to get a copy from the RTC to no avail.

In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent
averred that complainant Warriner is an Australian national who married his Filipino
spouse as a convenient scheme to stay in the country; that he rendered his services in
Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of charge; that he accepted the case because he was
challenged by Warriner’s criticism of the Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the
veracity of Warriner’s claim that the construction being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil towards his property; that
Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of other witnesses to
testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion of the veracity of Warriner’s claim; that
upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits of evidence presented by Warriner were
fabricated; that the barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme
of Warriner; that he visited Warriner’s property and saw that Warriner authored the
damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B.
Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which
the latter threatened him with a disbarment suit; that based on his discovery,
respondent did not wish to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that
complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the status of the case; that he did not
withdraw from the case because complainants no longer visited him at his law office;
that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to perpetrate his fraudulent
scheme; and that he could not be held administratively liable for filing a belated Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence as he only did the same to protect the legal profession
and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.

In a Resolution12 dated July 16, 2008, we found respondent’s explanation for failing to
comply with our directives not fully satisfactory hence, we admonished him to be more
circumspect in his dealings with the Court. At the same time, we referred the Complaint
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline.

In their Position Paper,13 complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case
before the RTC by filing a motion to admit the formal exhibits almost three months after
the prescribed period; that respondent did not present complainants’ Marriage Contract
and General Power of Attorney that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife
while the latter is out of the country; that complainants’ marriage is not for convenience;
that complainants have a son out of said marriage; that respondent was paid for his
services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the construction; that Warriner was
not the sole witness for the prosecution; that the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95
would show that a representative from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these
witnesses proved that Warriner’s claim was not a fabrication.

In his Position Paper,14 respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment
filed before the Court that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 by
claiming this time that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former
barangay official and a representative from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not
prove that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. did not institute corrective measures to
prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses such as Warriner’s. He
insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the soil erosion
which again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment before this Court that it
was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by destroying the ditches constructed by the
developer. Moreover, he alleged that the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s
Garden which he offered as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as
there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City.

In their Supplemental Position Paper,15 complainants argued, among others, that since
more than eight years have lapsed, it is possible that Bening’s Garden relocated to
another address but it does not mean that it never existed.

In his Report and Recommendation,16 the Investigating Commissioner17 found

respondent guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and thus recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six months.

The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-44218 dated August 28, 2010,
approved with modification the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case
of complainants, respondent also showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court,
thus it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.

Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBP’s Resolution is not
supported by facts. He maintained that his actuations did not amount to a violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the filing of the Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence, although belated, exculpated him from any liability. He asserted
that the exhibits were fabricated thus he deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence in the hope that the same would be refused admission by the
RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of the RTC or this Court. He insisted that defiance
of lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute refusal and not mere belated filing.
He argued that he did not oppose or file comment to the Motion to Dismiss as he
deemed the same proper considering the fabricated allegations of his clients.
Respondent argued that the penalty recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to
his infractions. He alleged that the records of this case would show that he did not
utterly disregard the orders or processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this
Court should have deemed his failure to timely file a Comment as a waiver on his part to
file the same, and not as defiance of this Court’s orders. Besides, he insisted that the
only issue to be resolved by the IBP was the alleged mishandling of Civil Case No.
23,396-95; the IBP should not have delved on whether he disregarded or was
disrespectful of the Court’s orders because he was not given any opportunity to rebut
the same.
Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and
disproportionate. He argued that with his suspension, the other cases he is handling
would be affected.

Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent
should be disbarred or suspended for five years from the practice of law. To this,
respondent filed his Comment asserting that the Investigating Commissioner erred and
was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had
a heated argument with the complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal
Offer of Documentary Evidence and until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he
had no occasion to meet the complainants. He maintained that he had nothing to be
remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence that would justify his
suspension. He maintained that "being basic and elementary in any legal procedure, a
failure or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and puts the
controversy submitted for resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not consider respondent’s failure or omission as
having such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a contemptuous act x x
x."

The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a
Motion for Reconsideration)19insisting that his failure to timely file comment on the
administrative case does not constitute defiance of the Court’s directives but is only "a
natural human expression of frustration, distraught and disappointment" when this Court
and the IBP entertained a clearly unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that
on April 12, 2013, the IBP Davao City Chapter presented him with a Certificate of
Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local chapter. He claims that –

x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical
that the [IBP] National Office condemns undersigned for his acts allegedly inimical to
the profession but will be ‘praised to the heavens’, so to speak, by the local chapter of
the same organization for his invaluable support to that same organization whose
object, among others, is to discipline its members to be respectful and [subservient] to
the rule of law by serving justice in an orderly and dignified manner. Weight and
credence must be accorded the recognition and appreciation by this local chapter being
logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus, the personal
knowledge of undersigned’s personal character, integrity, uprightness, reputation and
sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.

As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and
setting aside of that resolution adopted by the Honorable Board of Governors
suspending him from the practice of law for one (1) year, erroneous, disproportionate
and harsh as it may be. Undersigned only prays that, by way of protecting the
prestigious image of the [IBP], measures be adopted to prevent it from becoming a
laughing stock of professional organizations in the Philippines worthy for the books of
wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory stance of disciplining its
members exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant proceeding on
the one hand but on the other hand is extolled by its local chapter to high heavens for
his "invaluable support" of the tenets and foundation of that very same organization that
condemns him. THIS IS HILARIOUSLY COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.

Our Ruling

Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show
that the 10-day period given to respondent to submit his formal offer of documentary
evidence pursuant to the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997 lapsed without any
compliance from the respondent.

Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have
waived the submission of his formal offer of exhibits. Instead of asking the RTC to set
aside the above Order, respondent filed on February 3, 1998 a Motion to Admit the
Belated Formal Exhibits in Evidence. As to be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At
the same time, it directed E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss
by way of Demurrer to Evidence. Again, respondent failed to comment or oppose the
Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by the RTC. As a result, Civil Case No.
23,396-95 was dismissed.

Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon

18 and Rule 18.03 which provide:

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to
the prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the pleadings respondent submitted
before this Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely
file a formal offer of exhibits because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and
was hoping that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If
respondent truly believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients
were fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a
lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as "[w]hen the client pursues an
illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is handling" 20 or "[w]hen the
client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and
rules."21 Respondent adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Bening’s Garden
as a fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately,
respondent anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim
of Rudolph C. Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-time gardener. Complainants
refuted this allegation by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its
business considering that more than eight years have passed since the estimate was
secured. Complainants also pointed out that since the filing of this case, respondent has
thrice relocated his office but this does not mean that his practice has ceased to exist.

We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect
court orders and processes.1âwphi1 Note that we required respondent to submit his
Comment to this administrative Complaint as early as year 2000. However, he was only
able to file his Comment eight years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his
arrest. "As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of
this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly
and completely.22

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to
contradictions in his effort to exculpate himself. In his Comment filed before this Court,
respondent claimed that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95.
However, in his Position Paper filed before the IBP, he admitted that aside from
Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a
representative from DENR. Next, he claimed in his Comment filed before this Court that
he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a
disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into account when he
submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly, respondent claimed in his
Comment to complainant's Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the
Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and
Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the complainants.
Moreover, respondent claimed in his Comment before this Court that Warriner authored
the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he again contradicted himself when he
claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of the place was the cause of
the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a lawyer and an
officer of the Court, he "owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court." 23 He "shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."24

Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent
and had him arrested for his adamant refusal to obey our directives, we find the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for six months, as recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner, and as we similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla 25 and
Pesto v. Millo,26 commensurate to respondent’s infractions. Besides, we wish to
emphasize that "suspension is not primarily intended as a punishment but a means to
protect the public and the legal profession."27

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six months effective upon receipt of this Resolution with a WARNING that a similar
violation will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the
date of his receipt of this Resolution to enable this Court to determine when his
suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a
member of the Bar and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,

vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated February
1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S.
Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a spurious court
order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.

The Facts

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late

Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of
property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After
accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint 3 before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25,
2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence. 5 While respondent was
notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the
same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. 7 On such occasion,
respondent allegedly asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal
fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as
payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. 8 On
September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on
even date, filed a notice of appeal9 before the RTC.10

In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent,
however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order 12 dated
November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing
the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan,
within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for
such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension
of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9,
2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also
found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment
against respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it

was complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the
appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed
complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in
pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money or
malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the court’s unfavorable
decision.16

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively
liable, and accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one
(1) year be meted out against him.18

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to

be well-founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely,
particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case,
respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the
issues at hand.19

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s

accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant,
ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover
up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it
appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan.20

In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted
and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.21
 The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client
constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the
latter’s confidence, to wit:

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify
his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an
appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case
will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The
lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client’s
interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions,
omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer
is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client
who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional
learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew
of the dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he
never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the
same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury,
respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only on September
12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright
dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men
of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment.24

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by

fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to
make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the
same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary
expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, 25 failing in which
whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his
practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s interests with
utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and
thus, administratively sanctioned.

In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful

scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the
use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should
not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard, the
Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:

Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s
relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith,
fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not
mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep
inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of
good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to the admission
to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether
in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of
law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their
clients of the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of
six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same
period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their
petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the
lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of the status of his cases,
notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct
by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred
them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special
power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also, in Embido v.
Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in
existent court decision for a fee.

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to

misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his
case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an
appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are
so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral
unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode
rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of
the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client,
respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross

Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the
roll of attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this
Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6484 June 16, 2015

ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit1 that Adelita B.
Llunar (complainant) filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and
inexcusable negligence and serious misconduct.

Antecedents

In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bañez, hired the

respondent to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for
the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Bañez family but was
fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.

The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, was the
subject of foreclosure proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The
respondent received from the complainant the following afuounts: (a) ₱70,000.00 as
partial payment of the redemption price of the property; (b) ₱19,000.00 to cover the
filing fees; and (c) ₱6,500.00 as attorney's fees.

Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property
was ever filed by the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City.
Thus, the complainant demanded that the respondent return to her the amount of
₱95,000.00.

The respondent refused to return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00 to the

complainant.1awp++i1 He argued that a complaint2for annulment of title against Ard
Cervantes had actually been filed in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer,
Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return only what was left of the
₱95,000.00 after deducting therefrom the ₱50,000.00 that he paid to Atty. Abitria as
acceptance fee for handling the case.

The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by Atty.
Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as
counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years late and the property could no
longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the
respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law since May 29,
2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative Case No. 5054, 3 which the
complainant suspected was the reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed
the complaint for annulment of title in court.

In a resolution4 dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a report5 dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva
found the respondent to have been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's case
and to have gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by the
complainant, thereby, violating Canons 156 and 17,7 and Rules
1.01,8 16.03,918.03,10 and 18.0411 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have erred in not
informing his client that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Due to these infractions, Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the respondent
remain suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
agreed with the Investigating Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but
modified the recommended penalty from indefinite suspension to disbarment.12 It also
ordered the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of ₱95,000.00 within
thirty (30) days from notice. The respondent moved for reconsideration.

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent argued that his referral of the
complainant's case to Atty. Abitria was actually with the complainant's knowledge and
consent; and that he paid Atty. Abitria ₱50,000.00 for accepting the case. These facts
were confirmed by Atty. Abitria in an affidavit14 dated November 17, 2004, but were
alleged to have been overlooked by Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP
Board . of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the
respondent's motion for reconsideration.15

Our Ruling

We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and in
engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose upon
him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave
misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the
complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the complainant's property
within the period of redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a
complaint to recover the property was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly
dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and wasted precious time and opportunity that
were then readily available to recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the
respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the
complainant for handling the latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent
received from the complainant the amounts of ₱19,000.00, ₱70,000.00, and ₱6,500.00
for purposes of redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing the
necessary civil easels against Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the
respondent several times thereafter to follow up on the easels to be filed supposedly by
the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions on her case had been taken.

After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any
case in court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of ₱95,000.00, but
her demand was left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until
now, no payment of any amount has been made. These facts confirm that the
respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR, which mandates every lawyer to "hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession" 16 and to
"account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client." 17 In
addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he holds for his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or property for
his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.18

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant
that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should
have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his
services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients." The respondent lacked the
candor expected of him as a member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant's
case despite knowing that he could not and should not practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite
suspension imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he
committed. Based on the above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years
from the practice of law would have been justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary
violator of the profession's ethical rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules. In Nunez
v. Atty. Ricafort,19we had adjudged the respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing
to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a property owned by his client and in issuing
bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution issued by the court in the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against him by his client. We then suspended
him indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of disbarment. Under his
current liability - which is no different in character from his previous offense - we have
no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become completely
unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.

With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we agree with the IBP
that the respondent should return the whole amount of ₱95,000.00, without deductions,
regardless of whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with the
complainant's knowledge and consent.

In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the
respondent been honest and diligent in handling the complainant's case from the start.
The complainant should not be burdened with the expense of hiring another lawyer to
perform the services that the respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where
there was an inexcusable non-delivery of such services.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from the

practice of law and his name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the
amount of ₱95,000.00 to complainant Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from
notice of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal record and
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. This Decision
should likewise be posted on the Supreme Court website for the information of the
general public.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10138 (Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1876), June 16, 2015

ROBERTO P. NONATO, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN,

JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

We resolve the administrative complaint1 filed by Roberto P. Nonato

(complainant) charging Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. (respondent) with gross
neglect of duty.

Factual Background

In a verified complaint dated October 18, 2006, the complainant alleged that
his father, the late Restituto Nonato (Restituto), was the duly registered
owner of a 479-sq.m. real property (property) at Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental. The property became the subject of ejectment proceedings filed
by Restituto against Anselmo Tubongbanua (Anselmo), before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Hinigaran, Province of Negros Occidental, docketed as
Civil Case No. MTC-282. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was
represented by Atty. Felino Garcia (Atty. Garcia). However, at the pre-trial
stage, Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin, the respondent in the
present case.

The complainant alleged that although his father Restituto paid the
respondent his acceptance fees, no formal retainer agreement was executed.
The respondent also did not issue any receipts for the acceptance fees paid.

The respondent, on the other hand, averred that Restituto, and not the
complainant, engaged his services on Restituto's representation that they
were relatives. For this reason, he accepted the case on a minimal
acceptance fee of P20,000.00 and appearance fee of P1,000.00, and did not
execute any formal retainer agreement.

The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment

proceedings before the MTC, the respondent failed to fully inform his father
Restituto of the status and developments in the case. Restituto could not
contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent also
failed to furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other
documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the complainant were
completely left in the dark regarding the status of their case.

After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment proceedings, the MTC

ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Since neither
party complied with the court's directive, the MTC dismissed the complaint
as well as the counterclaim on May 26, 2005.

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of

dismissal. He justified his failure to file the position paper by arguing that he
misplaced the case records, adding that he was also burdened with
numerous other cases. The MTC denied the motion.

The respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, this time alleging
that the ejectment case was a meritorious one such that its dismissal would
cause injustice to Restituto (the plaintiff). He also filed a supplemental
motion, but the court denied both motions.

On September 15, 2005, Restituto died and all his properties passed on to
his heirs, the complainant among them.

The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not know of the
ejectment suit's dismissal as the respondent had failed to furnish them a
copy of the MTC's dismissal order. The complainant also asserts that the
respondent did not inform them about the filing of the motion for
reconsideration or of its denial by the MTC. The complainant claims that he
only found out that the case had been dismissed when he personally went to
the Office of the MTC Clerk of Court and was informed of the dismissal.

Because of the patent negligence, the complainant informed the respondent

that his failure to file the position paper could be a ground for his
disbarment. Furthermore, the complainant, without the respondent's
intervention, entered into an oral extrajudicial compromise with the
daughter of defendant Anselmo.
On August 17, 2007, the respondent wrote the complainant and apologized
for his repeated failure to communicate with him. He reasoned out that he
failed to file the position paper due to his poor health. He also claimed that
he had suffered a stroke and had become partially blind, which caused the
delay in the preparation of the pleadings in the ejectment
case.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In his Answer3 dated December 22, 2006, the respondent asserted that at
the time he received the MTC's directive to submit a position paper, he was
already suffering from "Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial
Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II." The respondent also
alleged that further consultations confirmed that he had an undetected
stroke and arterial obstruction during the previous months. His health
condition led to his loss of concentration in his cases and the loss of some of
the case folders, among them the records of the ejectment case. The
respondent also claimed that he focused on his health for self-preservation,
and underwent vascular laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to
communicate with the late Restituto and the complainant.

The respondent further averred that his failure to file the position paper in
the ejectment proceedings was not due to willful negligence but to his
undetected stroke. He never revealed the gravity of his illness to his clients
or to the court out of fear that his disclosure would affect his private
practice.

Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suit's dismissal, he
exerted all efforts, to the point of risking his poor health, by filing successive
pleadings to convince the court to reconsider its dismissal order. Because
the dismissal was purely based on a technical ground, he maintained that his
failure to file the position paper did not amount to the abandonment of his
client's case.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

IBP Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco issued his Report and

Recommendation, finding the respondent guilty of both negligence and
betrayal of his client's confidence. The Investigating Commissioner found
that the respondent's failure to file the position paper in the ejectment
proceedings and to apprise the client of the status of the case demonstrated
his negligence and lack of prudence in dealing with his clients.

The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that the respondent's failure

to promptly inform his clients, including the complainant, of his medical
condition deprived them of the opportunity to seek the services of other
lawyers. Had he notified the complainant's father of his illness before the
case was dismissed, the latter could have engaged the services of another
lawyer, and the case would not have been dismissed on a mere technical
ground.

The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondent's suspension

for one (1) month from the practice of law.

In a Resolution4 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation after finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and by the applicable laws and rules.

The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of
Governors denied his motion in a resolution5 dated June 21, 2013.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the respondent could be held
administratively liable for negligence in the performance of duty.

The Court's Ruling

Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.

A lawyer is bound to protect his client's interests to the best of his ability
and with utmost diligence.6 He should serve his client in a conscientious,
diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least
equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a
similar situation. By consenting to be his client's counsel, a lawyer impliedly
represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree
of care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably
expect him to perform his obligations diligently.7 The failure to meet these
standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

In this case, the record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in
the performance of his duties as Restituto's counsel. His inaction on the
matters entrusted to his care is plainly obvious. He failed to file his position
paper despite notice from the MTC requiring him to do so. His omission
greatly prejudiced his client as the Court in fact dismissed the ejectment
suit.

In addition, the respondent failed to inform Restituto and the complainant of

the status of the case. His failure to file the position paper, and to inform his
client of the status of the case, not only constituted inexcusable negligence;
but it also amounted to evasion of duty.8 All these acts violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility warranting the court's imposition of disciplinary
action. The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provide:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon,9 we considered a lawyer's

failure to file a brief for his client to be inexcusable negligence. We held that
the lawyer's omission amounted to a serious lapse in the duty he owed his
client and in his professional obligation not to delay litigation and to aid the
courts in the speedy administration of justice.

Similarly in Uy v. Tansinsin,10 we ruled that a lawyer's failure to file the

required pleadings and to inform his client about the developments in her
case fell below the standard and amounted to a violation of Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. We emphasized the importance of
the lawyers' duty to keep their clients adequately and fully informed about
the developments in their cases, and held that a client should never be left
in the dark, for to do so would be to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence
reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal profession as a whole.

We also emphasized in Villaflores v. Limos11 that the trust and confidence

reposed by a client in his lawyer impose a high standard that includes the
appreciation of the lawyer's duty to his clients, to the profession, to the
courts, and to the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a

need for the client to be adequately and fully informed about the
developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark;
to allow this situation is to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in
the retained lawyer and in the legal profession in
general.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The respondent has apparently failed to measure up to these required

standards. He neglected to file the required position paper, and did not give
his full commitment to maintain and defend his client's interests. Aside from
failing to file the required pleading, the respondent never exerted any effort
to inform his client of the dismissal of the ejectment case.

We also find the respondent's excuse - that he had an undetected stroke and
was suffering from other illnesses - unsatisfactory and merely an
afterthought. Even assuming that he was then suffering from numerous
health problems (as evidenced by the medical certificates he attached), his
medical condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to
file the necessary court pleadings. The respondent could have requested an
extension of time to file the required position paper, or at the very least,
informed his client of his medical condition; all these, the respondent failed
to do.

Furthermore, the respondent's subsequent filing of successive pleadings

(after the ejectment case had been dismissed) significantly weakens his
health-based excuse. His efforts not only contradict his explanation that his
physical predicament forced him to focus on his illnesses; they also indicate
that his illnesses (allegedly "Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial
Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II") were not at all
incapacitating.

All told, we find that the respondent violated Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We, however,
find the IBP's recommended penalty (one (1) month suspension from the
practice of law) to be a mere slap on the wrist considering the gravity of the
infractions committed. Thus, we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty
of two (2) years suspension, taking into account the respondent's acts and
omissions, as well as the consequence of his negligence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby SUSPEND Atty. Eutiquio M.

Fudolin, Jr. from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for violating
Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18, and Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We also WARN him that the commission of the
same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to this

Court, upon receipt of this Decision, the date of his receipt which shall be the
starting point of his suspension. He shall furnish a copy of this Manifestation
to all the courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his
appearance as counsel.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Fudolin's records with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and posted on the Supreme Court website as a
notice to the general public.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe,
and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Peralta, and Leonen, JJ., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7749 July 8, 2013

JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR., RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court’s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Josefina Caranza vda.
de Saldivar (complainant) against Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. (respondent), charging
him for gross negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 1972,2 filed by the heirs of one Benjamin Don (heirs) before the Municipal Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur (MTC), wherein she was represented by respondent. While
respondent duly filed an answer to the unlawful detainer complaint, he, however, failed
to submit a pre-trial brief as well as to attend the scheduled preliminary conference.
Consequently, the opposing counsel moved that the case be submitted for decision
which motion was granted in an Order3 dated November 27, 2003. When complainant
confronted respondent about the foregoing, the latter just apologized and told her not to
worry, assuring her that she will not lose the case since she had the title to the subject
property.

On December 30, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision4 (MTC Decision) against
complainant, ordering her to vacate and turn-over the possession of the subject
property to the heirs as well as to pay them damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC), reversed the MTC Decision and
dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint.5 Later however, the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the RTC’s ruling and reinstated the MTC Decision.6 Respondent received a
copy of the CA’s ruling on January 27, 2006. Yet, he failed to inform complainant about
the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact that the latter frequented his work place. Neither
did respondent pursue any further action.7 As such, complainant decided to engage the
services of another counsel for the purpose of seeking other available remedies. Due to
respondent’s failure to timely turn-over to her the papers and documents in the case,
such other remedies were, however, barred. Thus, based on these incidents,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, alleging that respondent’s acts
amounted to gross negligence which resulted in her loss.8

In a Resolution9 dated March 10, 2008, the Court directed respondent to comment on
the administrative complaint within ten (10) days from notice.

Accordingly, respondent filed a Manifestation with Compliance 10 dated May 19, 2008,
admitting to have agreed to represent complainant who claimed to be the tenant and
rightful occupant of the subject property owned by the late Pelagia Lascano (Pelagia).
He alleged that upon careful examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer complaint, he
noticed a discrepancy between the descriptions of the subject property as indicated in
the said pleading as opposed to that which complainant supplied to him. On the belief
that the parties may be contesting two (2) sets of properties which are distinct and
separate from one another, respondent, at the preliminary conference conducted on
October 28, 2003, moved for the suspension of further proceedings and proposed that a
commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determine the true
identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to
decide on the manner of the proposed re-survey, leading to the assignment of a
Department of Agrarian Reform Survey Engineer (DAR Engineer) for this purpose. In
relation, the heirs’ counsel agreed to turn-over to respondent in his office11 certain
documents which indicated the subject property’s description. Thus, pending the
conduct and results of the re-survey, the preliminary conference was tentatively reset to
November 27, 2003.12

As it turned out, the heirs’ counsel was unable to furnish respondent copies of the
above-stated documents, notwithstanding their agreement. This led the latter to believe
that the preliminary conference scheduled on November 27, 2003 would not push
through. Respondent averred that the aforesaid setting also happened to coincide with
an important provincial conference which he was required to attend. As such, he
inadvertently missed the hearing.13 Nonetheless, he proffered that he duly appealed the
adverse MTC Decision to the RTC,14 resulting to the dismissal of the unlawful detainer
complaint, albeit later reversed by the CA.

Thereafter, pending the heirs' appeal to the CA, respondent came upon the information
that the disputed property was subject of a petition for exemption from the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 2715 filed by Pelagia against complainant’s mother,
Placida Caranza (Placida). Based on several documents furnished to him by certain
DAR personnel, respondent was satisfied that Placida indeed held the subject property
for a long time and actually tilled the same in the name of Pelagia, thereby placing it
under PD 27 coverage. Due to such information, respondent was convinced that
Placida – and consequently, complainant (who took over the tilling) – was indeed
entitled to the subject property. Hence, he advised complainant that it would be best to
pursue remedies at the administrative level, instead of contesting the appeal filed by the
heirs before the CA. It was respondent’s calculated legal strategy that in the event the
CA reverses the decision of the RTC, an opposition to the issuance of a writ of
execution or a motion to quash such writ may be filed based on the afore-stated
reasons, especially if an approved plan and later, an emancipation patent covering the
subject property is issued.16

Meanwhile, the survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's
tillage extended to about 5,000 square meters of the subject property which was
determined to belong to the heirs, the rest being covered by the title of Pelagia.
Dissatisfied, complainant manifested her intention to secure the services of a private
surveyor of her own choice, and promised to furnish respondent a copy of the survey
results, which she, however, failed to do. Later, complainant accused respondent of
manipulating the DAR Survey Results which caused their lawyer-client relationship to
turn sour and eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the entire case folders and
retained the services of another lawyer.17

In a Resolution18 dated July 7, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the instant
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its evaluation,
report and recommendation.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April
15, 200919 and required the parties to submit their respective position papers.20

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On June 18, 2009, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala

(Investigating Commissioner), issued a Report and Recommendation (Commissioner’s
Report),21 finding respondent to have been negligent in failing to attend the preliminary
conference in Civil Case No. 1972 set on November 27, 2003 which resulted in the
immediate submission of the said case for decision and eventual loss of complainant’s
cause.
The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent could have exercised
ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the said preliminary
conference would push through, considering that the November 27, 2003 setting was
only tentative and the heirs’ counsel was not able to confer with him. Further, the fact
that respondent had to attend an important provincial conference which coincided with
the said setting hardly serves as an excuse since he should have sent a substitute
counsel on his behalf. Also, respondent never mentioned any legal remedy that he
undertook when the heirs elevated the decision of the RTC to the CA. In fact, he did not
file any comment or opposition to the heirs’ appeal. Finally, respondent’s enumerations
of his legal options to allegedly protect the complainant’s interests were found to be
thought only after the fact.22

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent
failed to exercise ordinary diligence in handling his client's cause, warranting his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.23

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioner’s Report in
Resolution No. XIX-2011-26624dated May 14, 2011, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and in accord with applicable laws and rules.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied, in

Resolution No. XX-2012-51726dated December 14, 2012.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of
their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their
affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. 27 Canon 17,
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code embody these quintessential
directives and thus, respectively state:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not
merely reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice,
but also consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal,
attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required
pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. 28

Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary

action.29 While such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the
Court has consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the obligations due
his client is per se a violation.30

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to
exercise the required diligence in handling complainant’s cause.

Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary
conference hearing in Civil Case No. 1972 which led the same to be immediately
submitted for decision. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to
whether the said hearing would push through, especially so since it was only tentatively
set and considering further that he was yet to confer with the opposing counsel. The fact
that respondent had an important commitment during that day hardly exculpates him
from his omission since the prudent course of action would have been for him to send a
substitute counsel to appear on his behalf. In fact, he should have been more
circumspect to ensure that the aforesaid hearing would not have been left unattended in
view of its adverse consequences, i.e., that the defendant’s failure to appear at the
preliminary conference already entitles the plaintiff to a judgment. 31 Indeed, second-
guessing the conduct of the proceedings, much less without any contingent measure,
exhibits respondent’s inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client’s
cause.1âwphi1

Equally compelling is the fact that respondent purposely failed to assail the heirs’ appeal
before the CA. Records disclose that he even failed to rebut complainant's allegation
that he neglected to inform her about the CA ruling which he had duly received, thereby
precluding her from availing of any further remedies. As regards respondent’s
suggested legal strategy to pursue the case at the administrative level, suffice it to state
that the same does not excuse him from failing to file a comment or an opposition to an
appeal, or even, inform his client of any adverse resolution, as in this case. Irrefragably,
these are basic courses of action which every diligent lawyer is expected to make.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent was guilty of gross negligence, in violation
of the above-cited provisions of the Code.
As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been
held liable for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were
suspended for a period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda,32 a lawyer who failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of
the case for decision was found guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six
(6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag,33 a lawyer who did not file a
pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-trial conference was likewise suspended for
six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino,34 a lawyer who neglected a legal matter entrusted
to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for
six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to
impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends him for a period
of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. is found guilty of gross

negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Mendoza,* JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014

STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. RONALD L. GUAREN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants)
filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren
for the titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty.
Guaren asked for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) including expenses
relative to its proceeding; that it was agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made
after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of One
Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent
documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax declaration,
original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan, and
original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional
payment of Six Thousand Pesos (₱6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997
to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say
that the titling was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the
case so they demanded the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed
to return the same provided that the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) be
deducted to answer for his professional fees.

Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship

between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case
pending before the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).

Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of

₱10,000.00, but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the
lot. He claimed, however, that he received the payment of ₱1,000.00 and ₱6,000.00;
that their agreement was that the case would be filed in court after the complainants
fully paid his acceptance fee; that he did not take the documents relative to the titling of
the lot except for the photocopy of the tax declaration; and that he did not commit
betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in a case filed against the
complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in behalf of Atty.
Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.

In the Report and Recommendation,1 dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility when he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot and despite the
acceptance of ₱7,000.00, he failed to perform his obligation and allowed 5 long years to
elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be
disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from
the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.

In its May 20, 2013 Resolution,2 the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved
with modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty.
Guaren from the practice of law for three (3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct
of Atty. Guaren, except as to the penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service,
not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.3

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000.00
as partial payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation
to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty.
Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when he
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from
receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters;
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE
S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO
CA G.R. SP No. 119461.

x---------------x

A.C. No.: 10300

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J

AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution1 dismissing the administrative complaint of

Tomas S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In
this same Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia’s counsel,
to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.

After considering Atty. Adaza’s explanation,2 we find his account insufficient, and find
him guilty of indirect contempt.

According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was
merely performing his duty as Merdegia’s counsel when he assisted him in preparing
the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he
and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments, but instead
of immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to
first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that
Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an
administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus,
Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially
when heal so believes in the merits of his client’s case.

Atty. Adaza’s explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to
convince us of his innocence from the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice
Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the
motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of
Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s case. The resolution dismissing
the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso’s bias.
While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice Veloso who penned the resolution
denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this under the 2009
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.3 Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the
legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for
certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that
administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal
and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. 4 While a lawyer has a
duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by
law.5 He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action
the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal
processes.6

A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint7 shows an apparent failure to

understand that cases are not always decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation of
bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and
the developments in the case.8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the
failure to impress upon his client the features of our adversarial system, the substance
of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own failure to heed what
his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of him in acting for
his client before our courts.

To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy

task.1âwphi1 We have to strike a balance between the need for accountability and
integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need to protect the independence
and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other.
Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into
inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we shut our
doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide
the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and
corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative
cases against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing sobya
wrong signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of
thecasethat,when read together with the administrative complaint heprepared,shows
that his complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note
Atty. Adaza’s penchantfor filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case:first, against
Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
who issued an order unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the justices of the
Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments
onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken together with the baseless administrative complaint
against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverseto Atty. Adaza’s client,
disclosethat there was more to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate
grievances against members of the Judiciary.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,9 we cited a litigant in indirect
contempt of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints
against members of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office,
interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes
indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty.
Adaza’s acts constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of
justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adaza’s contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary
sanction as a member of the bar.10 If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza
to discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process
rights. Our Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should
not be cited in contempt, and not why he should not be administratively penalized. To
our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty. Adaza through a contempt
proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is
independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an
offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the
nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side. 11

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, 12 a contempt
proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers,13 and vice
versa. There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt
proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and
purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings
spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in exercising its power of
contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general.14 Its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the
administration of justice;15 thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts
that constitute contempt of court.16 Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt
proceeding as penal and summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to
criminal proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the
charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner that
the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accused’s acquittal. 17

In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it

is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary
proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is
still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the
Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public
interest.18 Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a
disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of
the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res
judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.19

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different

procedures.1âwphi1 Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by
Rules138 and 139 thereof.20
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente
S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the
promulgation of this judgment, a fine of ₱5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED
that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of
disciplinary proceedings against him.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9149 September 4, 2013

JULIAN PENILLA, COMPLAINANT,

vs.
ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Quintin
P. Alcid, Jr. for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and for gross misconduct in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.

The antecedent facts follow:

Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn
Garin (the spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment,
the spouses defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for
breach of contract against the spouses where he engaged the services of respondent
as counsel.

Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of
complainant’s payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent
advised complainant that he would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses.
Respondent charged ₱30,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as filing fees.
Complainant turned over the relevant documents to respondent and paid the fees in
tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before Asst. City Prosecutor
Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent
attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the
hearing, complainant paid another ₱1,000 to respondent as appearance fee.
Henceforth, complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent
events and transactions that transpired.

Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told
him that they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno
to expedite a favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial
reservations, he later acceded to respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos
Primero I for ₱950 and delivered it to respondent’s office.

Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case
against the spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for
reconsideration was "needed to have [the resolution] reversed."2Respondent then
prepared the motion and promised complainant that he would fix the problem. On
February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit. Respondent then told
complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and presented
the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the
refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional ₱10,000 to
respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the
complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case.
Complainant claims that respondent never gave him any update thereafter.

Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up

the status of the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that
in one instance he was able to talk to respondent who told him that the case was not
progressing because the spouses could not be located. In the same meeting,
respondent asked complainant to determine the whereabouts of the spouses.
Complainant returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but because
respondent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s secretary a letter
regarding the possible location of the spouses.

Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters
conveying his disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the
documents in respondent’s possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the
radio program "Ito ang Batas with Atty. Aga" to solve his predicament. Following the
advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC). Complainant
learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6,
20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee was
only ₱2,440 and not ₱10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same
radio program also sent respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s
problem. The letter, like all of complainant’s previous letters, was unheeded.

On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that
respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be
imposed.

Respondent harps a different tale.

In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed
for lack of merit. He denied charging complainant ₱10,000 as filing fees for the estafa
case and claimed that he charged and received only ₱2,000. He also countered that the
payment of ₱30,000 made by the complainant was his acceptance fee for both the
estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise denied the following other allegations of
complainant: that he assured the success of the case before the prosecutor; that he
asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor; that he
promised to fix the case; and that he charged ₱10,000, as he only charged ₱5,000, as
filing fee for the civil case.

Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed
to inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money
and the documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating
with complainant was the fact that complainant would go to his office during days and
times that he would be attending his daily court hearings.

The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant
and his counsel attended.5The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006.
The parties were directed to file their verified position papers within 15 days, 6 to which
complainant and respondent complied.7

On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case for
lack of factual and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as
complainant’s counsel when he filed the criminal case before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before the RTC of Caloocan City. He
averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of both cases as his job was to
ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to
guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for
the client. He continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a
bottle of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled ₱20,000.
Respondent argued that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees that he had
allegedly collected exceeded ₱30,000 – the amount being claimed by complainant from
the spouses.

In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months "for
negligence within the meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility," viz:
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a
sore thumb rendering them difficult to escape notice.

One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract
for repair of the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission
emanates from a contract, oral or written, the consequent result is a breach of the
contract, hence, properly actionable in a civil suit for damages. As correctly pointed out
by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability of the respondent is purely civil in nature
because the complaint arose from a contract of services and the respondent (spouses
Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under the contract.

xxxx

Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after
the dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City where the actual damages claimed is ₱36,000.00.

It is also basic that the civil complaint for ₱36,000.00 should have been filed with the
MTC [which] has jurisdiction over the same. One of the "firsts" that a lawyer ascertains
in filing an action is the proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall be filed.
In June 2002 when the civil complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has
already expanded such that the jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already
₱400,000.00.

xxxx

Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the
letters marked as Exhibits "D", "E", "F", "G" and "H" which were all received by
complainant’s secretary, except for Exhibit "H" which was received by Atty. Asong, not
to mention Exhibit "M" which was sent by "Atty. Aga". These efforts of the complainant
were not reciprocated by the respondent with good faith. Respondent chose to ignore
them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with the complainant and return the
money and documents received by reason of the legal engagement, but omitted to
communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time and place for the meeting. This
failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which was done in bad faith on
the part of respondent.10

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
646, adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The
Resolution11 reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty of
suspension be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009,
respondent filed a "Motion to Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave
of Office."13 Respondent asserted that the failure to inform complainant of the status of
the cases should not be attributed to him alone. He stressed that complainant had
always been informed that he only had time to meet with his clients in the afternoon at
his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his office in
Tandang Sora. He admitted that though he committed lapses which would amount to
negligence in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and
without malice or bad faith. He also stressed that this was his first infraction.

In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.14 On August 15, 2011,
respondent filed a second Motion for Reconsideration15which was no longer acted upon
due to the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16,
2011.16

On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the aforementioned
Notices of Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14,
2011, it issued another Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of
Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration
dated August 15, 2011.

We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence
under Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a
modification that we also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of
the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard
of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no
time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his
entrance to the Bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein.19

The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and
the following provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

a)

Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client;

b)
Rule 15.[06, Canon 15 – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body;

c)

Rule 16.01[, Canon 16 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from his client;

d)

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him;

e)

Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;

f)

Rule 18.03[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; and

g)

Rule 18.04[, Canon 18 – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. 20

A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent
violated Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Complainant correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under
Canon 18 to "serve his client with competence and diligence" when respondent filed a
criminal case for estafa when the facts of the case would have warranted the filing of a
civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the complaint for estafa was
dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil case for
specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an
alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the
Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to
only ₱36,000. As correctly stated in the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April
15, 1994[,] vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil
cases where the amount of demand does not exceed ₱200,000.00 exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and
after five (5) years from the effectivity of the Act, the same shall be adjusted to
₱400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in
the criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and
could have been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role
as counsel for complainant. What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his
previous mistake in filing the estafa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious,
diligent and vigilant in handling the case of complainant. The civil case he subsequently
filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later turned out to be a basic
jurisdictional error.

That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly
negligent and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he
filed for the latter. He paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant’s
cause despite repeated follow-ups. Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of
incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of professionalism in dealing with
complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be a helpless attempt
to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a program in a
radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his
attention.

Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A
client pays his lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, "[e]very case
a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‘neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.’ He must
constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the
client’s cause."22 Similarly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client
of the status and developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto.
He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be
queries or requests for information from the client.

In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the
status of the cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse
proffered by respondent is too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself
admitted that he had notice that complainant had visited his office many times. Yet,
despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance exhibited by complainant, respondent
neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 to keep his
client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable time to the
client’s request for information.

Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that "[a] lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him." The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but
an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough groundwork and study must be
undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his
person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer’s Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration
of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only
satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the
interests of the client and the pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to
perform such duty and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s
Oath.

All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the
complainant who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence 23 the
allegations in the complaint. In the instant case, complainant was only able to prove
respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath. Complainant failed to substantiate
his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed him to give a bottle of Carlos
Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get a favorable decision. Similarly,
complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent indeed violated Rule
16.01 of Canon 16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required
filing fees.

As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s
Oath, we find the same to constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. –

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. x x x.

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving
the Decision of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a
MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of
gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer’s Oath. This Court hereby
imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling
the cases of his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be
disseminated to all courts throughout the country, to the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for its information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION

[Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]

ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

This is a disbarment[1] case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City,
against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig
City) found Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month
suspension from the practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand against
him.[2]
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant
received a demand-letter from the respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of
one Nemesia Garganian. The full text of respondents letter[3] reads:

Dear Mr. Ong:

This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you
for your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims
which Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have
abandoned your legal and moral obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia
Garganian) and up to this moment you have not given said financial support.

I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that
you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and
moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to
her house her television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and
without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be
constrained to file the proper action in court against you.

I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at
the above address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about
the preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.

I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your
intentional failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed
as your absolute refusal really.

Expecting you then.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City

WITH MY CONSENT:

NEMESIA GARGANIAN

A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno
(Agaw), an emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the
alleged additional financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and
discussed the courses of action that he would take against the complainant should the
latter fail to comply with his obligation to support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant
portion of the respondents second letter reads: [4]

These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):

1. P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of
P1,500.00 should be up to the completion of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is
subject to adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to his college
course).

2. P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her
planned business venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a teacher
in any government position because of her status, having a child without being lawfully wedded.
x x x.

3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian,
without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4. The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow
before noon in my Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.

Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr. Alex
Ong will be withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise agreements.

Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong
is too long a time.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO

Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian

It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants
brother and that the complainant merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms.
Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with
the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint [5] with the Office of the City Fiscal
(now Prosecutors Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim,
and one Albina Ong, for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the
Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the
complainant, Lim, Ong and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy
Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant
before the Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation,
and the Office of the Solicitor General.[6] According to the complainant, these cases were
subsequently denied due course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for
disbarment. Essentially, the complainant alleged that the respondent manufactured the
criminal and administrative cases against him to blackmail him or extort money from
him. He claimed that the respondent solicited for any information that could be used
against him in the aforementioned cases by offering any informer or would-be witness a
certain percentage of whatever amounts they could get from him. The complainant
branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral, unprofessional and unethical,
constitutingmalpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1)
the afore-quoted letters of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr.
Bueno; (2) Nemesia Garganians affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding the
demands listed in the letter addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly
prepared by the respondent for the complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging
that he sired Ms. Ganganians son illegitimate child; (4) the criminal complaints filed
against the complainant for alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and
the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a neighbor of the complainant
who claimed that a representative of the respondent had asked him to sign an affidavit
allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an offer to give any informer 20% and witness,
10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong. To further bolster the disbarment case
against the respondent, the complainant also included a Supplemental Affidavit, [7] citing
several cases previously filed against the respondent by other parties.[8]
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the
complaint lodged against him.[9] He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed
to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn,
the OSG forwarded the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros
Oriental, authorizing said office to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then
Provincial Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved
for postponement. After denying the respondents third request for postponement, Fiscal
Bautista proceeded with the reception of the complainants evidence. The respondent
was duly notified of the on-going investigation but he did not show up. When it was
the respondents turn to present evidence, notices of the preliminary investigation were
sent to his home address in Valenzuela, Negros Oriental, his law office
in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon City. The return cards showed
that he could not be located, although his wife received some of the notices sent to his
home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with
some of them inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2nd Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondents absence as
waiver of his right to present his evidence. Finding merit in the complainants cause, the
investigator recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
month, or, at the very least, be severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor
General.[10] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines in Manila, for proper disposition, conformably with adopted policies and
procedures.[11] The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline adopted Atty. Pinilis report and
recommendation in toto.[12]
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit
the importance of the legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly
discussed in Noriega vs. Sison.[13] We then held:

In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and
respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an
attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the
attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say,
however, that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social
prestige and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of
the fact that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity
of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or
capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability
of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.

The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[14] It mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the
bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good
faith required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the
records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by
threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed
his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative
cases against the complainant. We find the respondents action to be malicious as the
cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the
cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription
in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could
provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in
his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a
lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding [15] and he
shall not do any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. [16] In the case of Choa
vs. Chiongson,[17] we held:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end
view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions
or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to state, the lawyers
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice,
and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled
by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.

(emphases ours)

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest
standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer
may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity.[18] Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should
act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.[19]
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified
thereof as evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the
respondent chose not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance
does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers
who were assigned to investigate the case. He should be watchful of his conduct.[20] The
respondent should keep in mind the solemn oath[21] he took before this Court when he
sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not be reduced to mere recital of
empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of professional integrity
befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one
(1) month suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis--vis the
misconduct of the respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty
of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991

ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent.

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for
Malpractice, for stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate
of a will of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba as the
sole heir of all the properties.

The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975
by the Supreme Court, states:

xxx xxx xxx

The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa
Reyes, Mariano Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in 1946 for annulment of sale and was
docketed as Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This case was terminated
annulling the sale, as per decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620.

On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was
docketed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M. Luckily,
the said case was terminated on June 20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors
in this case who are the same persons mentioned above appealed this case to the
Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by the Hon. Supreme Court of the
Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662, affirming the
decision of the Lower Court;

That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties
filed on June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of
will; this case was filed through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno.

Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of
costs;
That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078
with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was
again dismissed by the Court on December 21, 1971;

That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo,
filed another case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of
the same property mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4151. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11,
1972;

That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty.
Montalvo, for specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4188-M. This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated
October 24,1973. On August 12, 1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of
Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan;

Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by
the same persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This case is still pending
before said court.

In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their
counsel, Atty. Montalvo, I am constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the
actuation of said lawyer who is a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of
non suit, which cause harassment on may part.

The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc.
No. 831 of the CFI, Bulacan. They can not be ejected from the land holdings because
they claim that the case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court.

In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit to this Honorable Court for appropriate
action.

xxx xxx xxx 1

In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975,
the respondent Montalvo was required to file an Answer within ten days from notice. 2

In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant were done.

xxx xxx xxx

 at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the pleadings filed by the undersigned
were and/or the result of a very painstaking, diligent, and careful study and evaluation of the facts and law involved therein
such that even before signing the same, the undersigned has always been of the honest and sincere belief that its filing is
for the interest of justice — certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties tenant could not be ejected
from their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 which
emancipated the farmers from their bondage and declared them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the
passage of the decree coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the complainant by filing this
instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to withdraw as counsel of his
clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the
estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes and could not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the deceased
but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned. 3

In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the
Supreme Court Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620. 4
As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case No. 3677-M, the plaintiffs are the
same parties-oppositors who opposed the petition for probate of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De Los
Reyes in Special Proceeding No. 831. The same case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on the ground that
the issue raised had been decided by the Court. 5

Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan presided by Judge
Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August 24, 1973 on the ground of res judicata.

xxx xxx xxx

But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases previously litigated between the
plaintiffs and the defendant and already settled by final judgment. 6

In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join
cause with the other plaintiffs in this case does no mean that there is no Identity
of parties between this case and Civil Case No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr.,
 is not alleged to be are party in interest in this case so that Ills inclusion herein as
a p plaintiff can not produce any legal significance. 7

This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes
of action were again the same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan
dismissed the cases.

On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the
resolution of disciplinary case against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report, and recommendation. 8

It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case
No. 1424 involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to the Clear of
Court of the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor Aurora P.
Cortes.

In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los
Reyes as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of
action:

1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted to
probate but was subsequently appealed.

2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831.
The decision was affirmed.

3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the
Supreme Court, upheld the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the due
execution the Will and the capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of the
complainant.

4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4,
1968, this was a petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.
 5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint
dated November 3, 1970 was again dismissed.

6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February l6, 1972, for the partition of the
property left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the
Will, was again dismissed for failure to prosecute.

7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the
collateral relatives of the deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba.
This case was dismissed.

8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting for
the outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974 which was
a complaint for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela
Dimagiba and the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the late Benedicta
de los Reyes.

Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms
involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to
rest by final judgment.

This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's
pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of
Court. 9

Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire
history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty.
Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will o the late Benedicta de los Reyes
has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs.
A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our
legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie
could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela
Dimagiba When court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our
judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had
take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.03 — A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.

On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his
oath not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable
profession, and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of
the Court. We have not countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our
lawyers. He deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT.

WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the
high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from
the practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Copies of this Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the
personal record of respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.