Manila Prince Hotel vs.
GSIS
267 SCRA 402
February 1997 En Banc
FACTS:
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS chose to award during bidding in September 1995
the 51% outstanding shares of the respondent Manila Hotel Corp. (MHC) to the Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm,
for the amount of Php 44.00 per share against herein petitioner which is a Filipino corporation who offered Php
41.58 per share. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC,
petitioner matched the formers bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a managers check worth Php
33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the managers check.
One day after the filing of the petition in October 1995, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from
perfecting and consummating the sale to the Renong Berhad. In September 1996, the Supreme Court En Banc
accepted the instant case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the GSIS violated Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the
MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how
much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and,
at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and
concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from
assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners
are qualified, too.
Taada v. Angara G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
Petitioners: Wigberto Tanada, et al.
Respondents: Edgardo Angara, et al.
Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World Trade Organization for
being violative of provisions which are supposed to give preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the
ground that it infringes legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on most favored nation and
national treatment, require that nationals and other member countries are placed in the same footing in terms of
products and services. However, the Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional.
Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) should be read in relation to Sections 1 and 13
(promoting the general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only to rights, privileges, and concessions
covering national economy and patrimony but not every aspect of trade and commerce. There are balancing
provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesnt rule
out foreign competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into treaties.
Facts:
This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of the World Trade Organization,
particularly when President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in
the said treaty.
Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss global
economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International Trade Organization.
However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs.
It was on the Uruguay Round of the GATT that the WTO was then established.
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and barriers.
Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give
preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods.
It is petitioners position that the national treatment and parity provisions of the WTO Agreement
place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in
contravention of the Filipino First policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the
phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Issue 1: Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? YES!
In seeking to nullify the Senates act as being unconstitutional, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. It becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute
Issue 2: Do the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19, Article II and Section 10 & 12, Artilce
XII of the 1987 Constitution? NO!
Petitioners Contentions:
Petitioners argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution mandating economic nationalism
are violated by the so-called parity provisions and national treatment clauses scattered in parts of WTO
Agreement
o This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of the TRIMS (trade-related investment
measures), TRIPS (Trade Related aspects of intellectual property rights), Trade in Services, and
par. 4 of Article III of GATT 1994.
o shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national
origin
Sec. 19, Art II:The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.
Ruling:
These provisions are not self-executing
o Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article,
especially Sec. 1 and 13:
o A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
o A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
o An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the
issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to
ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
o Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security
Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each members
vote equal in weight.
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
o Tariff reduction developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, developing 24% in
10 years
o Domestic subsidy developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, developing countries
at 13% in 10 years
o Export subsidy developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 10
years
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
o Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets
The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an economic
policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave
abuse of discretion
Issue 3: Does the text of the WTO and its Annexes limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by
Congress? NO!
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is
however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions
enter into the picture: limitations imposed by the nature of membership in the family of nations &
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
DOMINO VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 134015
FACTS:
The case is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998[1] of
the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino
(hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of
Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998[2] of the COMELEC en banc denying
DOMINOs motion for reconsideration.
On 25 March 1998, petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in that he had resided in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.
On March 30, 1998, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
against Domino.
According to respondents, Domino is not a resident nor a registered voter of the province of Sarangani.
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has
been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as
candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence
requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046,
ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that
the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory.
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers,
shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of
the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was
denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998.
Domino prayed: for Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main,
that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled
that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.
The candidate who gathered the second highest number of votes intervened in the case and said that she should be
declared as a winner since Domino was disqualified from running for the position.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner.
2. Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
May 1998 election
HELD:
1. Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code
over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It is within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to determine whether false representations as to the material facts were made in the certificate
of candidacy including the residence requirement.
2. No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and personal presence
in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioners domicile of origin was
Candon, Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City.
The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a house and
lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be indicative of
Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of permanency required to
prove abandonment of his original domicile.
Pamatong V. Comelec
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or
not nominated by a political party or are not supported by registered political party with a national
constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition for Writ of Certioari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates (he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organization under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in the other countries, and he has a platform of
government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the petitioners interpretation of the Constitutional provision under Section 26, Article II gives him a
constitutional right to run or hold for public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There
is nothing in the plain language of the provision, which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the
sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles
and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no
plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any
cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as
many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be
regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation
since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access,"
"opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent
impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous
foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates. As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the
limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there
is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not
evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities
for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election.
The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral
process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The
poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed
at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual
determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether
petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
YRASUEGUI vs. PAL
G.R. No. 168081; 17 October 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Armando Yrasuegui was a flight steward of respondent Philippine Airlines who was terminated
due to his failure to adhere to the latters mandated weight.
o According to respondents Cabin and Crew Administration Manual, petitioners ideal weight is
166lbs. However, he was unable to maintain the required weight.
o For 4 years, petitioner was removed from fight duty in order to meet the weight standards, and was
even offered the services of the company physician.
o Despite the leniency, petitioner still failed to comply with the company policy. Hence, respondent
was terminated for the violation of company standards on weight requirements.
LA ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed ruling. Both found the company
standards of respondent on weight requirements to be reasonable.
CA set aside the ruling of NLRC, and held that the failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous
case for the dismissal of an employee under Art. 282(e) of the Labor Code in relation to Art. 282(a). The
CA also held that the weight standards are a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), and if violated
justifies an employees separation from the service.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed by respondent.
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The SC held that petitioner failed to prove his allegations with particularity i.e., he merely mentioned the
names of other cabin crew members that were overweight. Furthermore, petitioner cannot invoke the equal
protection clause guaranty of the Constitution, since such liberty is only addressed to the State or those
acting under its authority. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
In addition, the SC also held that the company standards/BFOQ of the respondent is valid. Such
qualifications are reasonably related or essential to the operation of the job involved. As a common carrier,
respondent is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers. Hence, the dismissal
of petitioner is valid. His failure to comply with the weight requirement is a ground for dismissal, as
provided in Art. 282(e) of the Labor Code.
