LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 1E

SAN BEDA COLLEGE MANILA

COLLEGE OF LAW
638 Mendiola St, San Miguel, Manila, Metro Manila

LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING

Assignment on Discussion, Narration and Description of Cases and Laws

Submitted to
Dean Ulan Sarmiento III

Submitted by
1E

Submitted on
25 August 2016
LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 1E

LIST OF STUDENTS

1. DEANG, James Bryan Suarez

2. CUBIAS, Gladys Marie
3. DELA CRUZ, Alyssa Christine C.
4. VILLAROMAN, Carlota
5. RAMOS, Raymond F.
6. GAMENG, Maria Regina
7. JAVALERA, Shalom Evangeliz C.
8. REYES, Mariz Kriztel A
9. GAYONA, Cristel
10. USMAN, Mariam
11. VERGARA, Jean Colleen M.
12. KIONG, Shaira Kasey L.
13. GADDUANG, Francheska
14. TEJADA, Princess
15. BUENAVENTURA, Mylin
16. APOSTOLES, Jasmin
17. CRISOSTOMO, Camille
18. TORIO, Christelle
19. MADAMBA, Elaine
20. TORRES, Joanne
21. PENA, Donna Jean I.
22. OCCIANO, Mishael R.
23. PATRICIO, Aira Joyce
24. MACATANGAY, Camille
25. BLANCO, Bruce
26. BACUNGAN, Viro
27. QUIZON, Kaye Antonette
28. GAERLAN, Joscel
29. ALMAJOSE, Lilia
30. DILLA, Colleen
31. SULIT, Jed
32. TRINCHERA, Mario Geneston Jr.
 LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 1E

1. SYKES v. FRANCISCO, NO. 551479

(SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA SUP. CT. 1970)

The case of Sykes v. San Francisco deals about an appeal for the prescription. The hearing of the
respondent, City of and County of San Francisco, about the veracity her declared residence was
dismissed when her claim of being a resident of the County of San Mateo, California was seen to
be of no diversity or another jurisdiction. Six (6) months and 28 days have lapsed when the plaintiff
decided to file for a motion of reconsideration for the hearing of the case but it was denied. Both
the petitioners and the appellants in this appeal are unknown to the court. The other defendants
either claim they are employees of the United States or of the City and County of San Francisco.
The main issue of the case is whether or not Rule 14 of the district court should apply. The
mentioned Rule 14 states that all civil case pending for 6 months already shall be dismissed if none
of the parties appear

Although excuses provided by the parties for not processing the case were not acceptable, intention
to abandon the case was not evident as well. It was shown that the trial court erred in dismissing
the case especially only 28 days have lapsed from the 6-month period. It is the policy of the law is
to try cases on their merits. The court decided that the case was to be reconsidered with a condition
that it can still be dismissed upon any proof of prejudice suffered during the intervening six months
and 28 days in question.

2. PARSON v. HOLIDAY SPA

NO. 173686 (ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA SUP. CT.

The case of Parson v. Holiday Spa with No. 173686 was not found in the internet, rather with the
said number, the case of People v. Fisher was instead discovered. The story found in this case is
that Fisher was a passenger of a car that was stopped by police officers early morning of June 1,
1994 as the car was suspected to be part of an auto-burglary. The officer approached the driver,
wherein, the driver was discovered later to be under the influence of a stimulant. His eyes were
glassy and bloodshot. He had a blank stare. He said he had no identification. His speech was
slurred. The officer thought he smelled alcohol. When the driver was out of the car and standing
near the curb, the officer pat-searched him and found no weapons. The officer also observed that
the driver's pupils were constricted and unresponsive to light. His eyelids fluttered when his eyes
were closed. His pulse was elevated and his skin felt warm. The driver even admitted as to having
a bundle of drugs in his car. And so when the police went to search for it, he had to also ask the
passenger, Fisher, to step out of the car and found that Fisher was also under the influence of drugs
as he had similar symptoms as those of the driver. Fisher also admitted to having some drugs inside
the car. And indeed, the police was able to find and gather the said methamphetamine drug in the
car.
In this case, Scott Fisher was convicted of the possession of methamphetamine, a controlled
substance and the misdemeanour of being under the influence of methamphetamine. Interestingly,
defendant contends on appeal that the police had no basis to detain him, since he was the passenger
in a car stopped for a traffic violation. Defendant, herein, seeks suppression of the officer's
observations of him and his admission, but he does not deny of the methamphetamine subsequently
found in the car. However, the court states that as the driver had given Tomlin consent to search
the car, it would be unreasonable and unsafe to require the officer to search the car while the
passenger remained seated inside. It was reasonable to ask defendant to step out of the car and to
detain defendant to ascertain his connection to the illegal drug. While defendant's mere presence
in the car may not furnish probable cause to arrest him, it did furnish an objective manifestation
that he may have been involved in possessing or transporting methamphetamine.
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3. STATE v. WOODLEY
306 OREGON 458, 760 P. 2d 884 (1988)

The case at bar is with regard to a crime to subject another person to unconsented sexual contact.
Defendant was indicted for "touching the thigh area and between the victim's breasts" without her
consent. He was convicted of attempted sexual abuse. On appeal, he argued that the indictment
did not charge a crime and that the court erred in instructing the jury. The difficulty is how the
phrase "intimate parts" should be applied. In protecting "intimate areas" of the human body, the
statute invokes individual and cultural standards, and perhaps group decision by a jury asked to
agree on what is "intimate" while reacting to the circumstances of one case. The object of the
statute is to protect persons from unwanted intimacies, the part must be regarded as "intimate" by
the person touched. This is a subjective test. If an accused touched this part knowing that the
touched person regarded it as intimate and did not consent, the accused violates the statute if the
requisite sexual purpose is proved. If the accused, regardless of his or her private purpose, did not
know that the part was "intimate" to the person touched, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused should have recognized it to be an "intimate part." The latter is an objective
test.
"Intimate parts of a person includes genitalia, breasts, and whatever anatomical areas the jury
deems intimate under the community sense of decency, propriety and morality. This instruction
did not meet the foregoing test. The conviction therefore must be reversed. The indictment,
however, suffices to present the issue whether defendant touched an area that the person he touched
subjectively considered intimate and that defendant knew this or should have recognized the area
to be one that would objectively be known to be an intimate part by any reasonable person. The
indictment therefore should not be dismissed.

4. OSBORN v. EMPORIUM VIDEOS

848 P. 2d 237 (WYOMING 1993)

The case at bar is with regard of the validity of dismissal of the prior case that Osborn (herein
plaintiff) has claims of relief from the Emporium Videos who sold him a "ripped off" adult video.
The plaintiff, argued that the description mentioned in the adult video box was inaccurate
characterization of "Busty Belle" as the star of the adult video entitled "Belle of the Ball" which
in the said video contained "Busty Belle" at only one and a half minutes screen time. Plaintiff
stated that there has been disparity of the title to the content of the video thereby, constituting to
deceptive trade practices under Wyo.Stat, thus plaintiff requests of damages that resulted from the
said video which cost him $29.95, and the cost of his medication of asthma attack because of the
stress and strain brought by "ripped off" video amounting to $55.79 and punitive damages of
$50,000.
Ron Sullivan, filed on behalf of Emporium Videos moved that the case may be dismiss which the
court decided, to dismiss due to lack of cause of action in the part of the defendant, therefore the
case was dismiss. However, upon closer review of the case, it was noted that the case at bar, should
have taken the Tingler approach because it had derived the plaintiff the right to be heard.
According to the approach there 4 reasons why a dismissal of the case is not favored. (1) this action
places the court as a proponent rather than a observer, (2) plaintiffs were prejudiced, because they
have not been given opportunity to make legal arguments against dismissal. (3) it is unfair to
defendants because sua ponte deprives participation in the litigation process of the defendants (4)
the action wastes judicial resources. In this junction, the case decision was reversed on the grounds
that it deprived the plaintiff to be heard or to make legal arguments for the case. And also places
the court in a unbridled discretionary power to which judiciary tends to avoid.
 LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 1E

5. NEVADA REVISED STATUTE, 207.030

The 2010 Nevada Code (or the Nevada Revised Statutes) Section 207.030 highlights the
miscellaneous crimes. Miscellaneous crimes are prohibited crimes appertaining to acts dissolute
in character to which the Nevada Revised Statute penalizes. The specific aforementioned section
curtails to the misdemeanours which subject the involved parties to a liability. The statute intends
to specify exactly what misdemeanour means, as for its usage in the context, such that it clearly
highlights unlawful acts which range from offering or agreeing to engage in lewd designs in public
places and/or pimping for such lewd designs to be concretized to unlawful acts eliciting carnal
knowledge, to encroaching upon someone elses dwelling without the owners knowledge. The
statute aims to terminate the proliferation of decadence of acts constituting lewd designs, and
disturbance through encroaching upon someone elses property unknown to the owner or with silly
motives. Seemingly, this statute gives due emphasis on aiming to suppress acts which assist in the
proliferation of prostitution.

On the other hand, the statute also posits the corresponding penalties for the prohibited and
unlawful acts the statute enlists. The penalty specifically underlies that such act should have been
occurring for more than three years to classify an involved party as liable. It is very particular to
the acts listed specifically appertaining to unlawful sexual relations and/or the pimping for such
acts to be pursued. One shall be penalized when the specified act of lewd designs or prostitution
are carried out for more than three years within the prohibited premises. As such, the statute
penalizes the prohibited acts aforementioned based upon the number of violations. The more the
violations (3rd or subsequent violations), the heavier the penalty becomes and such penalty is
inclusive of the fine determined by the statute itself. It is clear in this statute as well that it gives
more emphasis on the acts which constitute prostitution, as the penalties are more blatant for acts
that constitute prostitution.

6. REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON, 75.12.090

Section 75.12.090, Chapter 75.12 (UNLAWFUL ACTS) of the Title 75 (FOOD FISH AND
SHELLFISH) of the Revised Code of Washington provides for the Theft of food fish or shellfish
Molestation of fishing gear. Molesting encompasses harassment, disturbance or interfering with
fish by any means which include the use of missile or any object not established as a legal gear.
Moreover, molesting includes actions that abuse a fish intended to be released such as dragging,
kicking, throwing and striking. This is likewise stated in the WAC220-20-010 (5) General Rules
on Fish of the Washington Administrative Code which provides that [I]t is unlawful to take, fish
for, possess, injure, kill, or molest fish in any fishway, fish ladder, fish screen, holding pond,
rearing pond, or other fish protective device, or to interfere with the proper operation of a fish
protective device in any way. Violation of this subsection is punishable under RCW 77.15.370 or
77.15.380, depending on the circumstances of the violation.

It is also illegal to molest a fish by using a firearm or pellet gun as to constitute shooting, striking
with the use of a club, hands, rocks, or other objects, building obstructions for catching a fish or
by chasing fish up or downstream in any manner. Such act is punishable under the statutes of
Washington. It is as well recognized by some states which have the same prohibition for the
protection of fish and shellfish.
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7. MINNESOTA STATUTES, 609.294

For the general background of these statutes, the Minnesota statutes are composed of the anti-
cruelty laws in the state. This section initially allows the formation of private prevention of cruelty
to animal societies and humane societies and sets forth their obligations by law. In this section,
"Animal" is defined by this as every living creature except members of the human race. No person
shall overdrive, overload, torture, cruelly beat, neglect, or unjustifiably injure, maim, mutilate, or
kill any animal, or cruelly work any animal when it is unfit for labor. Under the neglect component,
the statute states that no person shall deprive any animal over which the person has charge or
control of necessary food, water, or shelter, and others.

Falling under Chapter 6 of these statutes is the Bestiality Provision 609.294 which states that
Whoever carnally knows a dead body or an animal or bird is guilty of bestiality, which is a
misdemeanor. If knowingly done in the presence of another the person may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000 or both.
Minn.St. 617.14 has been superseded by this provision insofar as it covers animals and corpses.
Unnatural intercourse with a human being is covered by the proposed sodomy provision, 609.30.
Also noticeably, there has been a substantial reduction in the penalty imposed as Minn.St. 617.14
authorizes imprisonment to a maximum of 20 years. The excessive penalty is believed to be more
the product of revulsion to this type of crime than to the social harm in fact committed. The
American Law Institute Model Penal Code recommends that the offense be made a misdemeanor.
The recent Illinois revision contains no provision on the subject. Wisconsin St. 944.17, on the
other hand, permits imprisonment up to five years. The recommended section increases the penalty
where the act occurs in the presence of another. This, it is believed, meets more directly the purpose
of the criminal law in penalizing these reprehensible acts.

8. ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, 13-1411

Statute 13-1411 of the Arizona Revised Statutes pertains to Bestiality. Bestiality falls under Title
13 which is the Criminal Code. According to the statute, a person is said to be committing bestiality
by either engaging in oral sexual contact, sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an animal or
causing another person to engage in oral sexual contact, sexual contact or sexual intercourse with
an animal. For the purpose of this law, an animal means a nonhuman mammal, bird, reptile or
amphibian, either dead or alive. Bestiality is considered a class 6 felony. The presumptive term for
a class 6 felony is one year in prison and the aggravated term is two years in prison. In addition to
the penalty, the court may order the convicted person to undergo a psychological assessment and
participate in appropriate counseling at the convicted persons expense and reimburse an animal
shelter for any reasonable costs incurred for the care and maintenance of any animal that was taken
to the shelter as a result of the convicted persons conduct.

This particular statute does not apply to accept veterinary medical purposes performed by a
licensed veterinarian or veterinary technician, insemination of animals by the same species, bred
for commercial purposes and accepted animal husbandry practices that provide necessary care for
animals bred for commercial purposes.
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9. NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES, 14-186

Minnesota General Statues 14-186 of 1994 reads, Any man and woman found occupying the
same bedroom in any hotel, public inn or boardinghouse for any immoral purpose, or any man and
woman falsely registering as, or otherwise representing themselves to be, husband and wife in any
hotel, public inn or boardinghouse, shall be deemed guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor. It is one of
the provisions related to the offenses against public morality and decency.

The statute seeks to extinguish the gross misconduct of two heterosexual people involved
intimately and who employ the deceit of matrimony for the purposes of such. It is against the
customs and social policy of Minnesota. It is also an action to limit incidents of infidelity by
married people, unwanted pregnancy, outburst of sexually transmitted diseases, and social conflict.
Any man and woman found to be guilty of acting indecently as described by the statute, they are
respectively punishable by up to 90 days in jail, or a fine up to $1,000, or both. The aforementioned
offense is classified as misdemeanor, which is defined in Minnesota Law as crime less serious than
a felony. It is distinguished from felonies by seriousness of injury caused to another person. The
offense is not as grave as in a felony and is imposed by Minnesota to avoid minor offenses from
resulting to greater damages.

10. ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, 25-101-B

Section 25-101 of the Arizona Revised Statutes speaks of void and prohibited marriages.
Furthermore, subsection B provides that notwithstanding subsection A, first cousins may marry
if both are sixty-five years of age or older or if one or both first cousins are under sixty-five years
of age, upon approval of any superior court judge in the state if proof has been presented to the
judge that one of the cousins is unable to reproduce. Moreover, to fully understand the subsection,
subsection A states that marriage between parents and children, including grandparents and
grandchildren of every degree, between brothers and sisters of the one-half as well as the whole
blood, and between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews and between first cousins, is prohibited
and void.

The state of Arizona has some strange marriage laws, including those with regard to marriages
between first cousins. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, marriage
between first cousins is allowed in the Grand Canyon state provided that both spouses are age 65
or older or are unable to reproduce. However, the state of Arizona prohibits marriages between
parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, brothers and sisters, half-sisters and half-
brothers, aunts and nephews, and uncles and nieces. The same with other U.S states, Arizona
allows a marriage between half cousins or marriage between second cousins (Fishman, 2010)
 LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 1E

11. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 16-15-50

This provision talks about one of the sex-related offenses against persons. Seduction is defined as
the act of a man inducing a woman to commit sexual intercourse with him by means of enticement,
persuasion, solicitations, bribes other means without the employment of force, therefore
overcoming her reluctance and scruples. The Code of Laws of South Carolina continued to
recognize seduction as a crime but restricted its coverage. This provision applies to a male who
induce a female to participate to sexual intercourse by reason of by a promise of marriage which
the actor does not mean to perform. It does not cover other types of deception that may give rise
to liability. The elements of seduction under common law include the inducement that overcomes
the females scruples and reluctance and unlawful sexual intercourse.

Under old statutes, consent of women seduced at contract of marriage between the woman and the
man were not considered valid defenses. However, under this recent provision a defendant accused
of seducing a woman with a promise to marriage cannot be convicted on the testimony of the
woman only or if the woman was, at the time of the offense, lewd and unchaste. If the defendant
in any action brought under this provision contracts marriage with the woman, either before or
after the conviction, further proceedings of this provision are put on hold. The crime of seduction
is an example of how the law reflects societal stereotypes.

12. CODE OF MARYLAND, 2-202

Maryland Family Law Section 2-202 prohibits and declares void marriages performed in the State
which are contracted by a man and his grandmother, mother, daughter, sister or granddaughter, or
by a woman and her grandfather, father, son, brother or grandson. Any individual who violates
and contracts such prohibited marriages is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to
a fine of $1,500. In the same manner, this Section prohibits and declares void marriages contracted
between a man and his grandfathers wife, wifes grandmother, fathers sister, mothers sister,
stepmother, wifes mother, wifes daughter, sons wife, grandsons wife, wifes granddaughter,
brothers daughter or, sisters daughter. Similarly, a woman may not marry her grandmothers
husband, husbands grandfather, fathers brother, mothers brother, stepfather, husbands father,
husbands son, daughters husband, husbands grandson, brothers son, sisters son, or
granddaughters husband. Any individual found to be in violation of these provisions is guilty of
misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine of $500.

The first part of the above provision refers to incestuous marriages between brothers and sisters,
and between ascendants and descendants of any degree and are void from the beginning.
Incestuous marriages have been universally condemned as grossly indecent, immoral, and inimical
to the purity and happiness of the family and welfare of future generations. The latter part of the
provision refers to marriages between collateral blood relatives and relatives by affinity which are
likewise void on the ground that they may likely result in confusion, danger and disturbance of
public policy. To emphasize the dissent of the State of Maryland on these marriages, fine of $500
or $1,500 is imposed upon violators who will also be found guilty of misdemeanor.
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13. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE, 30-101

30-101 states that (a) [I] f a hotel, motel, or similar establishment in the District of Columbia
which provides lodging to transient guests: (1) provides a suitable depository (other than a
checkroom) for the safekeeping of personal property (other than a motor vehicle); and (2) displays
conspicuously in the guest and public rooms of that establishment a printed copy of this section
(or summary thereof); that establishment shall not be liable for the loss or destruction of, or damage
to, any personal property of a guest or patron not deposited for safekeeping, except that this
sentence shall not apply with respect to the liability of that establishment for loss or destruction of,
or damage to, any personal property retained by a guest in his room if the property is such property
as is usual, common, or prudent for a guest to retain in his room. In the case of any personal
property of a guest or patron deposited in such a depository for safekeeping, that establishment
shall be liable for the loss or destruction of, or damage to, that property to the extent of the lesser
of $ 1,000 or the fair market value of the property at the time of its loss, destruction, or damage.;
and (b) If a hotel, motel, or similar establishment in the District of Columbia which provides
lodging to transient guests maintains a checkroom (conspicuously designated as such) where
guests and patrons may deposit personal property, that establishment shall, if it conspicuously
posts a printed copy of this section (or summary thereof), be liable for the loss or destruction of,
or damage to, that property only to the extent of the lesser of $ 200 or the fair market value of the
property at the time of its loss, destruction, or damage unless the destruction or damage is caused
by its agent or servant.

Section 30-101 of the District of Columbia Code falls under the Fifth Division of the District of
Columbia Code specifically that of the Rights and Liabilities of Hotel and Lodging Houses,
centering mainly on the liability for loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal property of
guests. It enumerates and concretely specifies the scope and limitation as to when a hotel, motel
or of similar establishment is held liable for loss or destruction of, or damage to the personal
property of guests. In the said provision it also highlights the importance of having a conspicuously
displayed copy of the provision at hand or a notice indicating the same thought as to the
establishments declaration of non-liability to the objects placed under their safekeeping at the
time of deposit onwards; as this plays a vital instrument in the determination of liability. In
summary, this provision draws the boundaries and recognized scenarios as to how and when a
hotel, motel or of the same establishment be made liable over the personal properties of its guests.

14. NEVADA REVISED STATUTES, 122.090

122.090 states that [M]arriage solemnized by unauthorized person: When valid. No marriage
solemnized before any person professing to be a judge, justice, minister or other church or religious
official authorized to solemnize a marriage, notary public to whom a certificate of permission to
perform marriages has been issued, commissioner of civil marriages or deputy commissioner of
civil marriages shall be deemed or adjudged to be void, nor shall the validity thereof be in any way
affected on account of any want of jurisdiction or authority, provided it be consummated with a
full belief on the part of the persons so married, or either of them, that they have been lawfully
joined in marriage.

Chapter 122 of the Nevada Revised Statutes covers the aspects of the law with regard to marriage.
Basically, 122.090 refers to the instance when marriage is valid even though solemnized by an
unauthorized person. This provision requires that for the marriage to be valid, it must have been
consummated with a full belief on the part of the parties so married, or even one of them, that they
have been lawfully joined in marriage. In other words, the parties or either of them must be in good
faith that their marriage was legally solemnized.
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15. ALABAMA STATUTES, 30-4-3

Separate property of wife - Wearing apparel of wife.

The wearing apparel of the wife, however acquired, is her separate property.
The Alabama Code is a codification of all the laws in the state of Alabama. It is composed of forty-
five titles ranging from agriculture to state government. Each title is composed of chapters which,
in turn, are composed of articles. Each of these articles is further divided into sections. Title 30
covers Marital and Domestic Relations and Chapter 4 of Title 30 is about the Husband and Wife.
The first article of Chapter 4 talks about the Property Rights of the husband and wife as well as
their Tort and Contract Rights and Liabilities.

Chapter 4 enumerates the separate properties of the wife during the subsistence of the marriage.
Specifically, Section 3 of Chapter 4 states that the wifes clothes and apparel are her separate
property regardless of how she acquired it. This is in addition to property held prior to marriage,
earnings of the wife and damages recovered for injuries to person or reputation which were all
indicated by the law as the separate property of the wife.

16. MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS, 750.532

PunishmentAny man who shall seduce and debauch any unmarried woman shall be guilty of a
felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years or by fine of not more
than 2,500 dollars; but no prosecution shall be commenced under this section after 1 year from the
time of committing the offense.

The Michigan Compiled Laws is a collection of all laws in effect at the state of Michigan. It is
composed of 830 chapters which covers everything, from the State Constitution of Michigan to
State Building Programs. Chapter 750 of the Michigan Compiled Laws is penal in nature and is
known as the Michigan Penal Code. Section 532 of Chapter 750 penalizes the seduction and
corruption of an unmarried woman. Only men are liable under this provision, and married women
are not within the scope of this provision. The Section provides for a fine or imprisonment as its
penalty. It fixes the prescription period from which to file the case of seduction. The filing of the
case should be within one year after the crime was committed.
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17. MAIN v. MAIN

168 IOWA 353, 150 N.W. 590 (1915)

Main vs. Main involves an action for divorce for cruel and inhuman treatment of s husband to his
wife. In this case, the court ruled that strategy and management in securing an eligible matrimonial
partner are not the exclusive privilege of the man, and the game law of the state provides no closed
season against the kind of "trapping" of which appellant complains. But also, the wife was known
to be strong, not easily brought down by vulgar words used against her. The wife states that her
husband verbally abused her. However, the court does not believe that these acts endangered her
life. Some of the utterances may have been brutal, it may be said that the wife took no regard for
the feelings of her husband. This supports the nature of the wife to be harsh, as opposed to her
perceived sensitivity. The failure of consideration is not a ground for divorce, but good faith to
attempt to reestablish a marriage should not be discouraged because of a wife's knowledge of her
husband's faults. Since the wife tried to reestablish the marriage, the court held the allowance of
suit money to a wife who is a defendant in a divorce action rests in the discretion of the trial court.

18. KMICZ v. KMICZ

50 PA. C.C. 588 (1920) (COUNTY COURT, LUZERNE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA)

John Kmicz, aged 40, of Dupont petitioned a divorce from Victoria Kmicz, aged 45, of Avoca.
The parties were married on November 13, 1911 and lived together in Dupont, until May 20, 1920.
The husband asked a divorce on the ground of cruel treatment. Judge Fuller refused said petition
and rendered a decision, in shorthand form: Libel in divorce by husband against wife. Answer by
wife. Issue on cruel and barbarous treatment. Trial by Judge without jury. She his second. He her
second. Her dowry to him five ready-made children. His contribution to her the same number.
None added since. She, without a vestige of feminine loveliness. He without a mark of masculine
attraction. From start to finish a perfectly inexplicable and hopeless connubial absurdity. One
averred ground of divorce, her cruel and barbarous treatment Another, indignities to his person.
Only proved specific Instance of former his nose broken by her use of a stove lifter. Only proved
specific Instance of latter her unladylike behavior in the privacy of nuptial privilege. Nose possibly
broken in self-defense as testified. Unladylike behavior possibly by his own lack of good manners.
No course of bad treatment on one side more than on the other. Mutually mean. He mean enough
to seek divorce. She mean enough to resist, Parties too much alike ever to have been joined in
marriage. Also too much alike to be separated by divorce. Having made their own bed must lie in
it. Lying out of it, no standing in court Decree refused with allowance to respondent of $25 for
counsel fees to be paid by the libellant.
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19. BONDARCHUK v. BARBER

135 NEW JERSEY EQ. 334, 38 A. 2d 872 (1994)

In this case, the defendant, Mr. Barber contracted an obligation to convey a parcel of his land to
the petitioner, Mr. Bondarchuk. For the contract of lease to be in effect, Mrs. Barber must join her
husband in executing the contract as it is needed for the former to waive her rights over inchoate
dower, in an instance her husband dies, as provided in New Jersey laws. However, Mrs. Barber
persistently refuses to waive her right over the dower. The complainant then sought a decree from
the court to constrict Mr. Barber to perform his specific obligation.

In its ruling, the court held that a decree for the performance of a specific performance has been
consistently denied unless in cases of collusion, deception, and imposture. It is said that the wife
should exercise, by her own will, the decision to waive right to inchoate dower. Her refusal could
only be considered a ground for a decree of specific action if it was found that such refusal was
induced by the husband from her wife, of which the complainant failed to produce evidence for.
Moreover, the court took notice of the vehemence of exasperation in the actions of the petitioner
regarding the pertinacious rejection of his wife to be co-executor of the lease.

20. AKERS v. SELLERS

54 N.E. 2d 779 (INDIANA APP. 1944)

This case is about ownership and possession of a Boston Bull Terrier Dog. The case is approached
not according to any possible monetary value of the dog but according to the sentimental value (or
personal value) the dog may afford so as to fully justify the ownership of its rightful owner. This
fact can be gleaned on the turn of events upon divorce. Thus, the dog was given by a veterinarian
to the husband John Akers. During their divorce, there were no arrangements as to who would take
possession of the dog. It was just so that the wife Stella Stellers had been awarded the conjugal
house which, incidental to being home of the dog, that the dog came into the wifes possession
upon divorce. Appellate court opined: The court expresses no opinion as to whether ownership
may be granted according to the interests of parties [of the divorce] or on the basis of a legal title.
It is worth recognizing the tragedy however that if the dogs love, affection and loyalty are for the
husband that it is currently (at time of present appeal) in possession of the wife. Id. The court
ultimately held the trial courts decision was based on the fact that the husband had given the dog
during marriage to the wife and that such fact was supported by record and as such not subject to
attack on appeal. The lower courts decision was affirmed.

The lower court in its own Solomonic treatment of the case proved that the wife was the rightful
owner of the dog. The higher court thereafter sees insufficiency on claims of the husband for
replevin of the dog.
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21. HENDERSON v. WEISS

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, TRIAL TERM (1935)

This case was an action for assault filed by the plaintiff for the injuries he sustained during a
baseball game. The alleged incident happened out of mere disagreement between the plaintiff and
the defendant, wherein the latter, out of anger, asked if he was ever punched in the nose. The
plaintiff, despite his small built compared to the defendant, seemed up for the challenge which
provoked the latter to slap the same, resulting to the plaintiffs fractured jaw. The Court then ruled
that despite the provocation made by the plaintiff, it did not give the defendant any right to slap
the former down like a troublesome mosquito. The Court also required the defendant to indemnify
the plaintiff $150 for the injuries it costed the latter.

22. LEONARD TOSE v. GREAT BAY HOTEL AND CASINO

819 F. SUPP. 1312 (D. NEW JERSEY 1993)

Leonard Tose, lost millions of dollars over a course of several trips to the Greate Bay Hotel and
Casino. Upon failing to make an installment payment on his $1.3 million dollar debt, the casinos
parent company, Sands Corporation, sued Tose. Tose filed a counterclaim, stating the casino
served him drinks while he was clearly intoxicated. The casino sought the jury instruction of
contributory negligence, claiming Mr. Tose contributed to his own losses. The court ruled against
Mr. Tose, drawing distinctions from the GNOC v. Aboud case they had decided on. The question
before the court was whether the Aboud analogy applied to the case at bar.

In Aboud, the gambler was given high-level narcotics and alcohol with a requirement to gamble
to receive his complimentary services. Mr. Tose voluntarily consumed the beverages and was
playing for leisure, unlike Mr. Aboud. Dram Shop was enacted largely due to public policy.
Drunken driving accidents are a plague on society. The investigation and prosecution of drunken
driving offenses requires significant state resources; additionally, innocent people often suffer
harm. Accidents also result in destruction of both state and private property. The court failed to
see the same concerns in preventing drunken gamblers. They actually went, as far to point out that
the state encourages gambling and intoxication, there is no such encouragement for drinking and
driving. The court examined the harm being redressed in drawing the distinctions. In Dram Shop
drunk driving cases, the harm is usually substantial physical and property damage. The harm in a
casino intoxication case comes in the form of financial injury. While there is little doubt that the
harm can be substantial, when engaging in gambling some financial risk is reasonable. There is no
reasonable property or personal injury damage associated with drinking and driving. Thus,
public policy does not support expanding Dram Shop to intoxicated gamblers. Someone who
causes his or her own intoxication still can be a menace to society. His actions can be far reaching,
hurting innocent third parties and causing property destruction. For the most part, the harm caused
by intoxicated gamblers is only caused on themselves. Accordingly, the court held that Mr. Toses
Dram Shop analogy was not applicable.
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23. SCHILD v. RUBIN

233 CL. APP. 3d 775 (CALIFORNIA CT. APP. 1991)

Michael Rubin complained that the noise coming from his neighbor, Kenneth Schild and his son,
Jonathan Schild, while playing basketball in their backyard interfered with their ability to rest and
relax in their own home. Rubin then filed with the trial court a permanent injunction to prohibit
his neighbor and any other person from playing basketball on the Schilds' property except during
specified hours of the day. The trial court issued the injunction pursuant to the statute authorizing
injunctive relief from unlawful harassment.

The elements of unlawful harassment, as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 are
as follows: (1) a knowing and willful course of conduct entailing a pattern of a series of acts over
a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose; (2) directed at a specific
person; (3) which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person; (4) which serves no legitimate
purpose; (5) which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and
actually causes substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff; and (6) which is not a constitutionally
protected activity. In this case, the evidences presented by the respondent failed to establish all the
requisite elements of unlawful harassment hence, the court reversed and dissolved the injunction
issued against the Schilds. The noise from a ball and the verbal chatter by several people engaged
in recreational basketball play in the residential backyard described herein, playing at reasonable
times of the day for less than 30 minutes at a time and no more than five times per week, does not
constitute unlawful harassment under section 527.6.

24. MICHIGAN COMPILED LAWS, 750.173

Michigan Penal Code Section 750.173 punishes any person who shall post or advertise another in
writing or print through the use of reproachful or contemptuous language to or concerning another
for the reason that the other person does not accept the challenge to a duel. For the said act, the
person is guilty of misdemeanor which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 6months
or affine of not more than $750.00. However, this section is repealed by Act 210 of 2015 which
took effect on March 14, 2016.

A duel is an arranged engagement in combat between two individuals with matched weapons in
accordance with the rules agreed upon. Dueling was prescribed to protect the honor of both parties.
It was done with flintlock pistols, which were known to be not only inaccurate but also unreliable.
Many duels ended in missed shots or other probable malfunctions but others went home with their
honor restored. Duels were held with the intent of settling an altercation. Hence, turning down a
duel generally labels the person who does not accept the challenge as a coward.
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15. ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, 26-1114

Dueling as defined by most legal dictionaries is a fight between two persons, one against the other,
at an appointed time and place, due to an earlier quarrel. It also connotes a situation wherein two
people or two groups argue or compete with each other to settle a point of honor. A provision in
the Revised Statutes of Arizona, 26-1114 contains dueling under the title, Military Affairs and
Emergency Management. It provides that any person who is subject to this chapter and who
fights or promotes, or is concerned in or connives at fighting a duel, or who, having knowledge of
a challenge sent or about to be sent, fails to report the fact promptly to the proper authority, shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct.

The first instance contains that whoever engage in acts of dueling shall be punished according to
what authorities administer. It is reiterated that it pertains to any person who take part or tolerate
the occurrence of duels. Any person who happens to know about duels, could also be held liable
as given in the second instance. Whether or not the duel had already materialized it is their
responsibility to notify the officials regarding the information that they hold. Thus, acts committed
or omitted with the two instances provided in the statute could held a person liable under the law.