The Powers of The Oireachtas Referendum Timeline
The Powers of The Oireachtas Referendum Timeline
referendum timeline
The Oireachtas is the National Parliament of Ireland. It consists of the President and two Houses the
Dil and the Seanad.
Under Article 15 of the Constitution, the Oireachtas already has a range of powers, the most important
of which are the sole and exclusive power to make laws for the State and the power to raise and
maintain military or armed forces. The Constitution does not, in Article 15 or anywhere else, give the
Oireachtas a general power to conduct inquiries. However, that does not necessarily mean that the
Oireachtas cannot hold inquiries and/or be authorised to do so by legislation. There is no doubt that
each House of the Oireachtas has the power to inquire into the conduct of its own members and to
impose sanctions on those members in certain cases.
The Houses of the Oireachtas also have a specific constitutional role in inquiring into the conduct of the
President and of judges if specified circumstances require this. It is also generally accepted that the
Houses of the Oireachtas may conduct inquiries in connection with their legislative functions, provided
that such inquiries do not involve the making of findings of fact which are adverse to the good name of
people who are not members of the Oireachtas.
In what is generally known as the Abbeylara decision, the Supreme Court decided that the Houses of
the Oireachtas did not have the power to conduct an inquiry where the inquiry could lead to findings of
fact and conclusions which could affect the good name of any person who was not a member of either
House of the Oireachtas.
his referendum proposes to give the Houses of the Oireachtas (the Dil and Seanad) express power to
conduct inquiries into matters of general public importance and, in doing so, to make findings of fact
about any persons conduct.
At present, the Constitution does not give power to the Houses of the Oireachtas to conduct such
inquiries. The proposed change to the Constitution would mean that
When conducting any such inquiry, either or both Houses would have the power to inquire into
2. the conduct of any person and the power to make relevant findings about that persons conduct.
The Dil and/or the Seanad would have the power to determine the appropriate balance
between the rights of people involved in any such inquiry and the requirements of the public
interest. When doing so, they would be obliged to have regard to the principles of fair
3. procedures. These principles have been established by the Constitution and by the Courts.
The judgments in Abbeylara are lengthy and complex. In essence, the Supreme Court held that the
Houses of the Oireachtas do not have an inherent power to conduct inquiries which involve requiring
witnesses to attend to give evidence and to produce documents and which may make findings which
adversely affect the good name of any person (other than a member of the Dil or Seanad). An
inherent power is a power that does not need to be expressly stated but is an integral feature of the
nature and functions of either House.
As they do not have inherent power, power must be conferred on them by the Constitution or by
legislation before they can conduct such an inquiry. There is no specific power granted by the
Constitution. Whether such a power to conduct an inquiry could be conferred on the Houses of the
Oireachtas by legislation was left open by the Supreme Court.
The right to an unbiased hearing for example, a decision-maker cannot have a personal interest in
the subject-matter of the inquiry. There are a number of decisions of the Courts, including the Abbeylara
decision itself, which confirm that people appearing before an Oireachtas inquiry are entitled to fair
procedures.
In the case of inquiries being conducted by the Houses of the Oireachtas, it would be for the House or
Houses to decide how those rights would be applied in particular cases. When making that decision, the
House or Houses would have to have due regard to the principles of fair procedures.
This means that the House or Houses would have discretion as to the procedures to be applied in any
given case. The balance struck in any given case may have important implications for people affected
by an inquiry. It is not possible to state definitively what role, if any, the courts would have in reviewing
the procedures adopted by the Houses.
On October 27th, the day of the Presidential election, you will be asked to
vote in two referendums on proposals to change the Constitution. One is
about whether the pay of judges can be reduced in certain circumstances; the
other is about the powers of the Houses of the Oireachtas to conduct inquiries
into matters of general public importance.
1. The Dil and the Seanad, either separately or together, would have the power power to inquire into
the conduct of any person, whether a member of either House or not, and the power to make relevant
findings about that persons conduct. The conduct of any person, whether a public servant or not, could
be the subject of inquiry and findings about that conduct could be made if relevant to the matter to which
the inquiry relates.
2. When conducting any such inquiry, either or both Houses would have both the power to inquire into
the conduct of any person, whether a member of either House or not, and the power to make relevant
findings about that persons conduct. The conduct of any person, whether a public servant or not, could
be the subject of inquiry and findings about that conduct could be made if relevant to the matter to which
the inquiry relates.
3. The Dil and/or the Seanad would have the power to determine the appropriate balance between the
rights of people involved in any such inquiry and the requirements of the public interest for the purpose
of ensuring an effective inquiry. When doing so, they would be obliged to have due regard to the
principles of fair procedures. These principles have been established by the Constitution and by the
Courts over many years.
http://cdn.thejournal.ie/media/2011/09/20110912headsofbill.pdf
1
Dearbhail McDonald
May 24 2017
As former legal editor and a veteran of various 'Anglo trials', I was disappointed but not surprised
yesterday when the trial of the former Anglo chairman - acquitted three years ago in a separate jury
trial - collapsed.
That was when Circuit Court judge John Aylmer ruled that the jury in what was the third trial of Mr
FitzPatrick, would not get to decide for themselves - and by extension, us - whether he was guilty or
innocent of failing to disclose loans by giving false or misleading information to Anglo's auditors Ernst
& Young (now known as EY
http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysi
s/dearbhail-mcdonald-we-will-never-know-
how-the-jury-would-have-called-it-
35749472.html
Taxpayer hit for tens of
millions as FitzPatrick
trial collapses
Judge condemns ODCE investigation for
its 'inappropriately biased and partisan
approach'
Power
house: The Dail's plans for a private police force expands it's power yet further
The plans are contained in the draft Bill that will be enacted if the country
votes 'yes' to the 30th Amendment in Thursday's referendum. And a high-
profile Labour member has warned that the investigators could be used as
theprivate police forces of powerful political figures.
Labour election candidate Oisn Quinn, a nephew of Education Minister Ruairi
Quinn and a campaigner against the planned change, warned: 'You could
have an Oireachtas committee pursuing a line of inquiry that suited the
government of the day and these investigators would be reporting to a
political person.
'They could go into the office of a newspaper and take laptops and what could
be done about it? They don't need a warrant, your permission or the
permission of the person at the front desk.
'We have had in the past a government that deliberately tapped the phones of
journalists. We have had TDs who have gone to prison for corruption.
'It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that in the future there would be a
configuration of government whereby an inquiry would be used to try to
damage an opponent. The great fear is that these would be used as a political
weapon.'
The new powers are contained in the General Scheme Of The Houses Of The
Oireachtas (Powers Of Inquiry) Bill 2011, which has been put together in draft
form ahead of the referendum this Thursday.
Secret police? Critics say the powers could be abused by dangerously ambitious TDs or senators"
class="
Secret police? Critics say the powers could be abused by dangerously ambitious TDs or
senators
Major concerns are now being raised about the proposed inquiries. Former
minister Mary O'Rourke said there were too many 'sweeping powers' that
could be abused by dangerously ambitious TDs or senators.
She said: 'I can see some politicians imagining themselves as starring in their
own detective stories and carrying out these major investigations.
'It is much too far-ranging without any precautions, and is fraught with
potential danger. There are too many sweeping powers and far too little
thought has gone in to it.'
Under the proposed legislation, Oireachtas inquiries would be able to appoint
the own private detectives to carry out investigations into whatever they
wanted.
Former minister Mary O'Rourke said there were
too many 'sweeping powers' that could be abused
Former minister Mary O'Rourke said there were too many 'sweeping powers' that could be
abused
On arrival at a business premises, the investigators would simply be obliged
to supply their personal Oireachtas warrant, which would grant extensive
search powers.
They would require no evidence: merely 'reasonable grounds to believe there
are any documents, or there is information in any form, relating to any matter
within the terms of reference for the inquiry'.
The draft Bill states that the investigators could then 'inspect any documents,
or information in any form, on the premises'. These could be made 'secure' to
ensure they could be examined at a later date.
The investigators could also order 'any person on the premises' to 'produce
any documents or information in any form kept on the premises'.
The investigators would be able to copy any information they deemed relevant
and even remove some documents if they considered it 'reasonable'.
They could compel employees to turn over anything that they decided was
needed which would almost certainly include passwords and keys or
anything locked or protected.
The draft Bill states that investigators must obtain a warrant from the District
Court before they can enter a person's private home without consent.
However, once a warrant is secured, they could then use 'such reasonable
force as is necessary' to gain entry. If a person refused to co-operate with the
inquiry either by obstructing the investigators or refusing to follow their
orders they would be deemed 'guilty of an offence'.
Independent TD Stephen Donnelly said that while the current Government
might not abuse the new powers, that was no guarantee of what might
happen in the future.
<img src="http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2011/10/23/article-2052382-0E7D6D4C00000578-
910_468x614.jpg" height="614" width="468" alt="Roo the day: Campaigner Oisin Quinn calls for a
No vote" class="blkBorder"/>
Roo the day: Campaigner Oisin Quinn calls for a No vote
He said: 'The people are free to elect governments that are corrupt, populist
or extremist the Constitution and the courts are there to protect us against
their excesses.
'This amendment will make it more difficult to seek that protection. I believe
that is dangerous.'
The timing of the referendum has also come in for criticism with many feeling
it has slipped under the radar because of the Presidential election and has
been denied the coverage such an important issue deserves.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2052382/Irish-Assembly-plans-
police-force-investigators-raid-homes-businesses.html
Houses of the Oireachtas (2011) Thirtieth Amendment of the Constitution (Houses of
the Oireachtas Inquiries) Bill 2011: Second Stage
Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (Deputy Brendan
Howlin:
I move: That the Bill be now read a Second Time
This Bill is the first important step towards ensuring that the Houses of the
Oireachtas can undertake full parliamentary inquiries. It will enable the constitutional
amendment to permit the Houses to undertake full inquiries into matters of general
public importance in an effective and cost-effective way. As set out in the programme
for Government, the proposed constitutional amendment contained in the
referendum Bill is a key element of the broader parliamentary reform programme to
which the Government is strongly committed. These reforms are underscored by a
conviction regarding the potential of our Parliament and its Members on all sides of
the House to lead change, govern effectively and hold the Government to account.
The successful discharge of these roles by the Houses of the Oireachtas is
imperative if we are to restore the trust and confidence of the public in the institutions
that serve them
It is integral to the effective functioning and modernisation of parliamentary
democracy that the Houses of the Oireachtas have express legal capacity to initiate
and undertake full inquiries into issues of general public importance where the
Oireachtas has a clear legislative, oversight or public policy role in making findings
and recommendations firmly underpinned by extensive fact-finding. In order to
achieve this objective, the legal and constitutional issues identified in the Supreme
Courts judgment in the Abbeylara case must be addressed. The constraints and
restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court on the ability of the Houses to conduct
inquiries will be well known to all Members of the House.
The work of the all-party joint Oireachtas committee leading to the publication of its
Fifth Report on Article 15 of the Constitution and the parliamentary power of inquiry
in January of this year was particularly valuable, drawing on the advice of external
experts and important work of the Law Reform Commission in this area. I pay tribute
to the chairmanship of former Deputy Sen Ardagh, whom I was delighted to see this
week in good health again. He played a sterling role in steering that committee
towards producing its final report. It analysed in some detail the main findings of the
judgment and made specific recommendations on how the limits and restrictions
created by it could be resolved through constitutional change. The proposed wording
of the referendum and the policy approach the Government is adopting is, in fact,
closely in line with the recommendations of the all-party committee, which spent
almost a year examining these matters
A vigorously active and independent parliament with powers to investigate into
particular matters of general public importance should have the objective of ensuring
that the type of systemic failures we have seen take place, for example, in our
banking system as documented in the reports by Regling and Watson, Professor
Honohan and the Nyberg commission will be much less likely to occur in the
future. There are significant public policy benefits from the operation of an effective
system of parliamentary inquiry. This is evidenced by the broader international
experience, and by our own specific national experience in the case of the successful
DIRT inquiry carried out by the Committee of Public Accounts. We need to ensure
that we, as a parliament, use this power carefully and appropriately and only in
circumstances that is clearly warranted in line with the objectives of the constitutional
amendment
In essence, a power of inquiry consistent with the constraints identified in the
Abbeylara case would not facilitate meaningful inquiries leading to substantive
recommendations and findings where it is essential to inquire into individual conduct
and potentially make findings regarding the actions of individuals
In order to facilitate comprehensive discussion of and inform debate on the issues
involved, I published detailed and advanced draft heads of the Houses of the
Oireachtas (Powers of Inquiry) Bill earlier this week. As I outlined to the Joint
Committee on Investigations, Oversight and Petitions yesterday, this legislation will
underpin the proposed constitutional amendment, and will provide a comprehensive
governing legal framework for the establishment and operation of an Oireachtas
inquiry system. The legislation details the proposed structure and operation of the
proposed new system of Oireachtas inquiry. It requires, in particular, the
establishment of a framework through rules approved by the Houses to secure
procedural fairness. I really want to underscore that. This legislation will be enacted if
the proposed constitutional change is approved by the electorate. I welcome any
views or suggestions on the legislation to help define the final shape of the system.
My mind is not closed on it. If individuals make submissions on the published heads,
I will be very happy to incorporate them in the legislation if they contain good ideas.
As I stated to the committee yesterday, it will be necessary to tweak the legislation as
the committee system undertakes inquiries, provided, as I hope, that the people will
support the amendment.
Inherent in this legislation is the constitutional imperative under Article 40.3 of the
Constitution that the proposed powers of inquiry of the Houses of the Oireachtas
must be used in a manner consistent with the rules of natural justice but also taking
into account the public interest in ensuring the Oireachtas inquiries are effective. This
is the key balancing exercise to be determined in the design and implementation of
the system. This balancing will be governed by rules established under the enabling
legislation.
I will outline in detail some of the provisions of the Bill. Section 1 provides for the
amendment of Article 15.10 of the Constitution by the insertion of the text set out in
the Schedule to the Bill. Section 2 is a standard provision specifying how the
amendment and the Act shall be referred to. The Schedule contains the proposed
text of the Constitutional amendment, in both Irish and English. The proposed
amendment, if approved by the electorate, will insert the three new subsections, as
set out in the Schedule, into Article 15 of the Constitution.
The need for an explicit, express and unambiguous statement granting a power of
inquiry to the Oireachtas is addressed by subsection 2 contained in the Schedule of
the Bill. Its wording reflects the finding of the Joint Committee on the Constitution that
a constitutional amendment is required to avoid any doubt that the Oireachtas has an
inherent power to inquire into matters of general public importance. It minimises the
risk that the Houses of the Oireachtas might be found by the courts to be precluded
from carrying out such inquiries on the basis of institutional or structural bias.
Subsection 2 does not and cannot discharge the members of an Oireachtas
committee of inquiry from the requirement not to pre-judge the outcome of an inquiry.
Members of Oireachtas committees of inquiry would be required to behave
impartially in respect of the matters subject to an inquiry. The subsection also
provides that the inquiry must be into a matter stated by the House or Houses
concerned to be of general public importance. The draft heads of the Houses of the
Oireachtas (Powers of Inquiry) Bill contain the proposed process to be undertaken
and the evidence to be provided to allow the Houses to make the assessment that a
particular matter is of general public importance and, therefore, warrants an inquiry.
Subsection 2 also provides that the manner in which an inquiry is conducted would
be in line with provisions laid down in legislation. The draft heads of the Houses of
the Oireachtas (Powers of Inquiry) Bill, as published, provide a framework within
which the Houses of the Oireachtas can formulate rules and guidelines governing the
conduct of such inquiries.
Subsection 3 of the Schedule seeks to address two of the major concerns identified
by the Supreme Court in the Abbeylara judgment by granting a power to the
Oireachtas to investigate the conduct of individuals and make findings. This would be
done in the context and with the objective of making and rationalising
recommendations for changes. Such recommendations could, for example, relate to
legislative or regulatory frameworks or the role, structure, governance and
management systems of any public body.
Subsection 3 of the Schedule ensures that the Oireachtas could not be inhibited by
the likelihood of any civil or criminal liability being inferred from its deliberations in
regard to its powers of inquiry. This subsection explicitly provides that an
investigation can be carried out into the activities of any person or persons,
irrespective of whether they are Members of either House.
A key requirement for the proposed new system of Oireachtas inquiry will be
adherence to the rules of natural justice consistent with the very well-defined
constitutional principles and Irelands obligations under international law. Subsection
4 in the Schedule is designed to meet this requirement. This is a very significant
element of the proposed new system of Oireachtas inquiry. I have discussed
subsection 4 with some Members already. It is not intended to change the fact that
fair procedures and the normal, well-established rules of natural justice must be
respected in any form of inquiry that puts good name or reputation at risk.
The proposed approach is consistent with judicial decisions that have noted a
tailored approach is appropriate to the rights to fair procedures. The established
constitutional rights of particular individuals will vary according to the position in
which they are placed; ones rights, such as to ones good name, must be at risk.
This has been borne out in the field of tribunals where these matters have already
been rehearsed before the courts.
What the proposed constitutional amendment does is reflect the need for the
Oireachtas to implement in a pragmatic way fair procedures in its inquiry process,
and the need to implement them in a manner that is balanced against the public
interest.
This is done to ensure that inquiries are effective, cost-efficient and completed within
a reasonable timeframe. It cannot be that the power would not be with the House
itself to make judgments on an ongoing basis. Otherwise, every inquiry would be
subject to constant interruption as matters are weighed and balanced elsewhere.
The manner in which the Oireachtas strikes this balance must be reviewable by the
courts. If the courts believe the balance has not been properly determined, they can
overturn the decision made by the inquiry. In assessing this issue, the courts would
take account of the proposed constitutional provision that the Oireachtas is
empowered to strike this balance.
Under present constitutional arrangements the courts in determining these issues
would review exclusively in this context the provision of fair procedures. I do not need
to set out for the House how in such circumstances it could be expected that any
Oireachtas inquiry would be rendered ineffective and impotent by constant recourse
to the courts by parties to an investigation and by the introduction of tribunal-like
procedures into the Oireachtas inquiry system which would totally torpedo the
purpose this amendment seeks to achieve. It is almost certain [587]that the inquiry
process would be ineffective in such circumstances, the public interest would not be
served and we would still have an impotent parliament where inquiries are
concerned.
However, let me make it clear that the amendment to the Constitution contained in
the referendum Bill does not disregard the rights of witnesses to fair procedures.
Indeed, as set out in the proposed underpinning legislation high hurdles have been
set to ensure that fair procedures are adopted, and that inquiries are carefully and
correctly conducted.
In making its determination a committee of inquiry would be expected to have regard
to certain factors. These could include whether specific facts are in dispute between
witnesses and the extent to which the reputation of witnesses becomes or is an
issue. An overarching concern for an Oireachtas committee of inquiry would be to
ensure the level of rights is commensurate to the risk to an individuals good name
against whom allegations may be or have been made. Every citizen in our
democracy has a right to his or her good name but this right needs to be balanced
with the undeniable public interest that is realised by effective investigation into
matters of serious public concern
It is highly desirable that Oireachtas inquiries should be carried out in an efficient and
cost-effective manner and conclude their work within a reasonable period. Citizens
would expect that the Houses would carry out such inquiries as expeditiously as
possible, and it is important that such inquiries are perceived as such. These
inquiries need to inspire public confidence in our parliamentary system. People must
have confidence again that we can do the peoples business and not be frustrated by
those with either deep pockets or the capacity to frustrate proper inquiry. It must not
be diminished through delay, cost or ineffectiveness.
I ask the House to support and approve the Bill and in doing so provide for the
Houses of the Oireachtas the power to conduct full inquiries. The Bill is important in
the strengthening of our parliamentary democracy. It provides for a political ethos in
which there is a true sense of accountability. I commend the Bill to the House.
Deputy Sean Fleming: I welcome the opportunity to speak
on the Thirtieth Amendment of the Constitution (Houses of the
Oireachtas Inquiries) Bill 2011. I welcome the proposed
referendum being discussed today and the accompanying draft
legislation which was published by the Minister earlier this week. I
appreciate he stated he is open to suggestions for improving the
legislation prior to the final draft being published. I ask people to
vote in favour of the amendment, after which we will be able to
work on passing the legislation
I have not seen the question that will be put on the ballot paper but I ask the Minister
to ensure that anyone in favour of making the change should vote Yes.
Deputy Brendan Howlin: Yes.
Deputy Sean Fleming: Often, to vote in favour of an
amendment to introduce a constitutional ban one had to vote No
to delete a provision. However it is drafted, I ask the Minister to
ensure that people voting for the amendment do so by voting
Yes. People will recall the immense confusion caused in the past.
I take it that this is under control.
I join the Minister in complimenting the work of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on
the Constitution in the previous Dil, which produced a report prior to the general
election under its Chairman, Sen Ardagh. The referendum is necessary to ensure
elected representatives of the people have appropriate power to investigate matters
of public interest and such inquiries have been prohibited in the past because of the
Abbeylara judgment. I support the amendment but I have a number of concerns of
which I ask the Minister to take note and deal with because they will lead to doubt
during the referendum campaign. If I do not deal with all of my points [588]during the
15 minutes I have to speak, I will put them in a note to the Minister in the coming
days.
I welcome the helpful explanatory documentation and other correspondence I
received from the Minister during the summer and the briefing from his officials. It is
all appreciated and I want to put this on the public record. Much of the background to
this amendment emanates from the Abbeylara judgment and I believe the Minister
did not deal adequately with what I consider to be a very significant aspect of that
judgment.
A question had been raised about institutional bias and that a specific body by its
nature might be inherently biased and therefore could not be relied on to assess
evidence from judgments in an objective and unbiased fashion. The Supreme Court
ruled this was not the case with regard to the Oireachtas and that it is not inherently
biased. However, far more important, the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of
objective bias but the Minister has not dealt with this. He spoke about procedural
fairness, institutional bias and structural bias but he did not deal with objective bias.
According to information provided to me by the Department on objective bias and the
Abbeylara judgment, the Supreme Court found it was not compatible with
constitutional justice for a person to sit in a quasi-judicial capacity as a member of a
committee making determinations of fact while at the same time making comments in
the media which indicated strong prior views or fixed opinions on the matters being
inquired into. Such an approach was found to be incompatible with fair and balanced
hearings and assessment of evidence being presented to the inquiry. According to
the Department, this means that strong and robust procedures and protocols for the
conduct of inquiries need to be put in place by the Houses of the Oireachtas under
the proposed new approach to safeguard the inquiry process against the risk of
objective bias such as public comments by committee members which are reported
in the media.
The commitment has been made to hold an inquiry into banking. If the Minister can
find one Member of the Oireachtas who has not made definitive statements in the
media or made public comments on his or her views on what happens to Irish
banking I will salute him. I would be amazed if anybody got elected to the House
without having a view on this matter. Objective bias is the elephant in the room which
the Minister ignored. I accept we have fair procedures, that it will be free from
structural bias, which I will discuss shortly, and that the institution itself will be free
but membership is an issue. If the Minister can show me that the members of any
proposed inquiry have not made public comments to indicate their views on the issue
involved I will be happy for such people to sit on the inquiry.
This issue will be relevant and let us not beat around the bush; no matter what
inquiry the Minister tried to establish on any issue the first thing anybody worth his or
her salt would do would be to google the proposed members and every comment
they made on the topic. Despite the Ministers best intentions and our support for the
principle of what he is doing, unless this issue is adequately dealt with to the
satisfaction of the Supreme Court there may be challenges with regard to the
particular people sitting on the inquiry.
The amendment will establish a mechanism for an investigation procedure to take
place. With the DIRT inquiry, the Comptroller and Auditor General produced a report.
Some people are hung up about the investigation happening in private; I am not as
otherwise the investigation would not be completed. The Garda Sochna conducts
its investigations in private but the file must be placed in front of a judge in open court
which is where the inquiry and the judgment takes place.
see nothing wrong with the committee assembling its facts in private because they
still have to be accepted in the public arena and through public hearings
2 oclock
The Government will have to deal satisfactorily with the problem of members of such
an inquiry dealing with a particular topic on which they have been mute in the past. I
envisage many cases in which the Oireachtas could conduct inquiries into general
matters and the committee members would be free from bias. For example, the DIRT
inquiry concerned a matter of public importance but was an issue on which the
majority of Members may not have pontificated before the inquiry. I accept when the
DIRT inquiry was established, one member of the committee was discovered to have
had an Ansbacher account and had to stand down because he did not disclose it.
The issue of public comments by committee members prior to an inquiry must be
addressed in detail. Otherwise, it will become an issue during the course of the
referendum campaign.
accept the rules of natural and constitutional justice will apply to Oireachtas inquiries
and remain a safeguard for every citizen. Some may claim politicians should not be
doing such inquiries as they are a matter for the courts. The Law Library and those
on that side of the Liffey will oppose this Bill because they see it as taking some of
their potential income earning from future tribunals of inquiry. They are the very
reason we are passing this legislation. The legal profession was allowed to conduct
several tribunals up to now. It took ten years to conduct inquiries that were in the
public interest which the Supreme Court even pointed out were urgent. The failure of
the legal profession to conduct these inquiries in time is the specific reason the
Oireachtas is taking the powers back to do such inquiries itself. When the Oireachtas
wanted an inquiry, it outsourced it to the legal profession. This arrangement did not
work, cost a fortune and took too long. It is now being brought back in-house. While
some may not appreciate this move, that is the basic position democrats are entitled
to take.
There will be no question of a committee making a judgment on criminal culpability or
a finding of civil liability which would encroach on the constitutionally protected role of
the courts in the administration of justice. Like a tribunal inquiry, files presented to a
committee inquiry will not be presentable in a court of law.
I take this opportunity to remark on the upcoming presidential election. The right to
vote in that election should be extended to citizens in the Six Counties and to Irish
citizens living and working abroad. It should not be in the gift of politicians to
nominate presidential candidates and that responsibility should be returned to the
people.
For many people our political institutions are considered exclusive and
unaccountable, and that is what makes constitutional and political reform all the more
urgent. It is in that context that we must view the proposed amendment to the
Constitution. The message from Sinn Fin Deputies is that we support the
amendment to the Constitution but we ask that the Government accepts an
additional subsection (5) to ensure that there should be procedural fairness and that
the rights of people are in no way damaged. There should be no public question
mark over the integrity and fairness of the inquiry process
An Leas-Cheann Comhairle: Deputy Catherine Murphy is
sharing time with Deputies Shane Ross and Maureen OSullivan
Deputy Catherine Murphy: I bought my first copy of the Irish
Constitution in the 1970s and had a look at it this morning. It cost
20p and contained a leaf detailing the consequences of what was
then the most recent referendum, which reduced voting age from
21 to 18. I bought it out of curiosity as I had voted for the first time,
and I had become aware of the difference between being a citizen
and a subject. The written Constitution espouses that and we must
be [593]very careful in deciding to change it; the change must be
required and good. The parts of the Constitution containing solid
principles will stand the test of time.
I have a serious concern about the speed with which we are dealing with this Bill,
although not necessarily the principle of affording ourselves inquiries. There is a
large number of new Deputies in this Dil, as well as people such as myself having
been on an enforced sabbatical for four years. They may not be as clued in on the
debate from the past five years leading to this proposal. It is offensive that this
debate is taking place only on the first week back, with a debate on democracy
wedged in the middle. A democrat could only judge the guillotine on such debates as
wrong.
A number of us attended a briefing yesterday in the Department and I thank the
officials for that. We asked plenty of questions. We are looking for checks and
balances in this legislation and further legislation, of which we saw the heads. The
Oireachtas will technically have responsibility but we all know that will not be how it
will work; the Government will hold the responsibility because of its significant
majority. I would like to see some checks and balances in the legislation but they do
not exist. The point was already made regarding Oireachtas committees not being
inclusive, with Sinn Fin and Technical Group Members not being adequately
represented. This, along with consistent guillotining of legislation, is a sign that we
should be concerned about the process. The Government is asking us to trust that it
is made up of the good guys. We must find a greater balance in the legislation and I
will make my views known to the Minister in that regard.
It is our job not only to consider the positives, but also how this power could be
abused. For example, a well-resourced interest group may seek an inquiry and
although it may be of general importance, we as politicians would have to judge
whether the matter is in the general interest. It is not always the same.
I am concerned that we will see a low turnout as people may be confused about the
lack of checks and balances. This lack is the main concern and I am less concerned
about the principle of the Oireachtas holding inquiries. My big concern is not with this
legislation, which facilitates a referendum, but rather the second piece of legislation.
The problem is that if we pass this legislation and the matter is approved by the
people in a referendum, the process will become inevitable
Deputy Shane Ross: I find myself agreeing with many of
Deputy Catherine Murphys comments. The more I think about this
Bill and the potential change to the Constitution, the more critical I
am of it. In principle it is a good idea that Oireachtas committees
should have powers and teeth, with the ability to uncover facts.
Many of us have suffered from the fact that Oireachtas committees
have tended to be theatre without any powers at all in recent
times. Deputy Donohoe and I were on the last transport
committee, which began an unofficial inquiry into activities at
Iarnrd ireann. We came up against a brick wall because various
witnesses refused to come before the committee and co-operate,
while others came in but refused to answer certain questions.
Ultimately we got absolutely nowhere and the committee, although
good theatre, was ineffective in getting a conclusion to the
investigation. That would indicate there is a need, if we are to have
Oireachtas inquiries, for different powers and methods, as well as
compellability.
Often, witnesses who tend be vulnerable or subject to court cases plead that they
cannot come before committees because an issue is sub judice. I do not buy that
argument as a witness would add to the evidence in a court case rather than
contradict it; if the witness contradicts the evidence, the matter would be exposed. All
kinds of excuses have been successfully used in this respect but most of the time
people just do not come before a committee, which is utterly unacceptable as no
inquiry can come to a conclusion under such circumstances.
There have been two high-profile Oireachtas inquiries, one which was very
successful and one which was a complete flop. The successful one was obviously
the DIRT inquiry which started in 1997, when the bankers were brought before the
committee. The committee came to quick conclusions and was operationally
successful. Its conclusions were also extremely useful. It exposed something in a
useful manner, which public representatives should have the power to do. The
committee had huge powers to do that.
The second one makes me very uncomfortable about what is happening in this
legislation. It was the investigation conducted in 1994. This is where Deputy
Catherine Murphy is absolutely correct about the need for checks and balances. The
investigation in 1994 was established by the coalition Government comprising Fine
Gael and the Labour Party to examine the events surrounding the collapse of the
previous Government under former Deputy Albert Reynolds. At the time and even
now, and I have no sympathy for Fianna Fil, I had an extraordinarily uneasy feeling
about politicians investigating the activities of their predecessors under oath. There
was no question of independence. It looked like a political grouping saying: We do
not like what happened in that collapse, we want to find out what happened and we
will use it, one way or the other, to criticise and crucify our political opponents. I feel
uncomfortable about that, and I do not have a solution as I have not considered it
enough.
The problem is that if politicians carry out an investigation and make findings,
judgments or statements, they are coming from a particularly biased and political
background. There is no point even pretending that politicians are independent or
that a committee which has a huge Government majority can reach independent
conclusions. Regardless of what side of the House they are on, the committee
members will not do so. They will reach conclusions or judgments on matters or
findings of fact which are undoubtedly very strongly tempered by a political
background. There will also be a temptation for all governments to set up inquiries
with compellability powers whose conclusions will inevitably be embarrassing to their
political opponents.
This is a really serious difficulty. Superficially, this measure is right, as is the impetus
and motivation behind it, but the practice behind it could be extremely dangerous.
Anybody who looks at that 1994 report and at the proceedings of that committee will
find that it was a deeply political inquiry into the activities of the Governments
predecessors. That was wrong and I hope a measure such as this will not be used
for that purpose, but I am not confident that will be the case.
Deputy Maureen OSullivan: I hope that the Minister,
Deputy Brendan Howlin, and the Minister of State, Deputy Brian
Hayes, will be the good guys and will do what is right to strengthen
parliamentary democracy. However, I have grave misgivings about
the proposed 30th amendment of the Constitution and the more I
read about it, the more those misgivings intensify. I believe we are
moving too quickly, without sufficient regard for what is involved
and further time to examine the implications.
I have a number of questions. Does this Parliament have an unfettered right to
inquire into any matter? Who decides which matter is to be subject to such inquiry
and who decides what is of general public importance? Who decides which persons
conduct will be investigated and, importantly, how will the House or Houses
determine the appropriate balance between the rights of the person and the public
interest to ensure that the inquiry is effective?
While not questioning the integrity of any Member of this House or the Seanad, my
essential misgiving is how we can ensure an unbiased approach in an inquiry when
the composition of our committees is determined by the political parties in
Government. Members of parties have the party agenda and I fear that will be
brought to the committees of inquiry. We are told that [595]members of Oireachtas
committees of inquiry would be required to behave impartially in respect of the
matters which are the subject of the inquiry. How can that be assured, and what will
happen if they do not behave impartially? Will that lead to another committee of
inquiry or to a legal case and costs?
On the notion of no bias, be it institutional bias or objective bias, we are told that
strong and robust procedures and protocols for the conduct of inquiries will have to
be put in place. If a member of the committee of inquiry is known to have particularly
strong views on the matter or individual being investigated, if they have written in the
media, spoken to the media or are on record in that regard, how can that person be
expected to approach the matter or the individual being investigated in an unbiased
way? They would have to be particularly strong-minded and have tons of integrity to
bring a clear, unbiased mind and approach to the investigations. The majority of
Supreme Court judges rejected the assertion in the Abbeylara case that an inquiry by
the Oireachtas must, by its nature, be biased, but I do not share their confidence.
The concept of a matter of general public importance is rather vague and could be
open to abuse. Who will decide what warrants individual investigation? How can this
be protected from vested interests either in deciding to investigate or deciding not to
investigate? To ensure an unbiased approach, perhaps when a committee of inquiry
is to be established the members of the committee should be drawn at random from
among the Members of both Houses of the Oireachtas, or there could be a very
clearly defined system of declarations of interest, with the possibility of a person
recusing themselves or somebody having the authority to have that person recused.
Turning to the adjudicatory findings of fact, in the Abbeylara case the Supreme
Courts concern was that the committee of inquiry was empowered under its terms of
reference to make findings of fact which potentially impacted on the reputation and
good name of individuals. The findings would be considered adjudicatory, meaning
that although the findings had no legal effect, they could impugn the good name and
reputation of an individual. The dilemma is clear: why set up a committee of inquiry if
it cannot lead somewhere other than to establish facts yet if we want it to lead
somewhere, it is almost approaching a court of law? Is there a danger that these
committees could interfere with what should be matters for the courts? Instead of a
Dil committee investigating an individual or matter, this should be addressed
through the legal system.
I listened to the proceedings yesterday of the committee dealing with the banking
sector. What exactly was achieved, and will anything more be achieved under the
new system? There are two significant examples from history and literature of
committees which totally over-stepped the mark, Salem and the McCarthy
committee. The House Committee on Un-American Activities established by the US
House of Representatives certainly showed the flaws of this type of inquiry and the
abuse of power it could entail, leading to many personal tragedies. In the Salem
Witch Trials, rather tellingly, John Proctor chose death rather than lose his good
name. In his final speech in that play he said that his good name was all that he had
left.
I accept what is proposed sounds fine in theory Oireachtas inquiries held in a
manner respecting fair procedures with well defined and tightly framed terms of
reference and so forth. However, if we are to conduct such inquiries, they must make
a difference and bring about change in a fair and unbiased way. I am not convinced
that what is proposed in this legislation will achieve that.
Deputy Paschal Donohoe: I am struck by the contributions
of my colleagues. They illustrate a caution about this Bill, but if
Members of the Oireachtas continue to say that they need more
[596]power to do their job properly, they cannot on the other hand
say they do not trust themselves to discharge that power properly.
With regard to the points made by Deputy Maureen OSullivan, I
do not see many Senator McCarthys in the House. There might be
a few in the making if granted this power, but the Oireachtas
cannot say, on the one hand, that it wants the power to perform a
particular role and do it well, and then say it does not trust itself to
perform that role properly. We have seen the alternatives. We
have seen what happened when this investigating role was
outsourced to other people in the tribunals of inquiry. That mode of
investigation was insulated from the Oireachtas and we have seen
how long it took and its cost. Politicians cannot say that they want
the ability to fulfil this new role well and then say they do not want
it because they do not trust themselves to be able to do it properly.
There are three subsections in the measure we propose to put to the people, and I
will comment on each of them. With regard to the first subsection, the point has
already been covered regarding how the ability to perform would be undermined by
the perception of bias in any member of a potential committee. This is a crucial point.
The last investigative committee established by a House of the Oireachtas to
oversee the conduct of a Member, in the last Seanad, saw members having to depart
from the committee because they did not either have the intention or the discipline to
refrain from commenting on it in public. That is an essential point which must be kept
in mind when forming any new committee.
In regard to the second subsection, the comment has been made that we must
ensure the operation of that does not veer into the way the criminal justice system
works. It is essential in the operation of this that we do not look back and say that
happened. We should have a process in place which ensures it does not happen and
that if there is a risk of it happening, it is stopped or curtailed.
There is a danger in the third subsection, which was touched on by Deputy Catherine
Murphy, in regard to how one determines the appropriate rights of the individual and
of the public or national interest. That appears to be a minefield through which we
need to very carefully tread. It will be very challenging for an Oireachtas looking to
investigate a particular matter to be the same body charged with determining the
manner in which that will be done. That is a very delicate line which needs to be very
carefully walked.
That leads on to my final point which is the creation of what will be called
investigators to support an Oireachtas committee in the operation of this work.
These individuals will have a huge amount of power and will have some new
capacities granted to them under this Bill. We need to ensure the people who will do
this work have the ability to do so and that they will also be accountable to the
Oireachtas at all times.
There is a danger that as the Oireachtas is granted new powers, Members will say
they do not trust their ability to discharge those powers properly. As I said, we have
seen the cost of the alternative. Now is the time for the Oireachtas to take a more
prominent role in doing work the people want us to do.
Deputy Patrick ODonovan: I acknowledge the presence of
the Minister of State, Deputy Ring. I am delighted to speak on what
is important legislation. I refer to some of the comments made a
while ago. I often wonder what planet some people inhabit. It is not
that long since we were in the House discussing the report of a
tribunal of investigation and the same people from the same side
of the House lampooned and lacerated the previous Government
and the current one for not bringing forward legislation to amend
the Constitution in order that the Houses of the Oireachtas could
carry out investigations. Now the same people are saying we are
rushing into this. Yesterday, someone from the same group said
we were not amending the Constitution quickly enough. It just
smacks of opposition for oppositions sake
Since 1994 it has been proved that the Houses of the Oireachtas has had its hands
tied in regard to investigating issues of public importance. This is something the
public and politicians on all sides want. The only group of people who might have any
degree of opposition to it are people in the Law Library; they currently benefit to a
huge degree when it comes to investigating issues of public importance because the
only recourse the Oireachtas has at present is the establishment of expensive
tribunals. The challenge to certain elements of the Opposition is to come into the
House and spell out what they want because I do not believe they know what they
want.
I concur with some of the comments made by Deputy Sean Fleming on the
importance of the need for the referendum to be framed in such a way that there is a
Yes vote because as he rightly said, referenda have been presented to the people
in a very convoluted way.
I take issue with what Deputy Catherine Murphy said. Just because I am a new
Deputy does not mean that I was, in some way, cocooned from what was going on in
this country for the past seven or eight years. It is a bit of an insult to newer Members
of the Oireachtas that we are somehow not competent to or capable of asking
probing questions, in particular in regard to how this country has wound up in the
mess it is in today with a banking system which has collapsed and a public which has
been left to shoulder the burden of billions of euro of debt. From that point of view,
the newer Members of the Oireachtas may well be even more qualified to get stuck
into this than some people who may be regarded in Deputy Catherine Murphys own
words as having skipped a generation.
I agree with Deputy Mary Lou McDonald that these cannot be seen as quasi courts.
She is quite correct that the only place justice can be administered in this Republic is
in the courts. Unfortunately, in the recent history of this country, some people
decided they would administer their own sort of justice, so I welcome her comments
that there is only one court system in the country and that it and the Constitution it is
governed by are respected.
There is a huge departure here in regard to non-officeholders being held
accountable. As a previous speaker rightly said, up to now people could refuse to
appear. The reality was that committees of investigation basically went nowhere and
if one wanted to establish fact, one had to go to Dublin Castle and employ expensive
lawyers. Deputy Paschal Donohoe is right that there are no Senator McCarthys here
but people who are genuinely concerned about the people who elected them, to
establish fact and to get to the bottom of things of significant national public
importance.
There is an issue in regard to bias, at which the Minister is looking, and that people
would declare an interest. We have a Oireachtas Joint Committee on Investigations,
Oversight and Petitions, of which Deputy Peadar Tibn is Chairman, so the
establishment of these investigations will not be done with a wink and a nod.
Rigorous procedure will have to be gone through and a resolution of the Houses of
Oireachtas will have to be passed also.
Amending the Constitution for something like this is not something into which a
government would just walk with its eyes closed. This is only the 30th amendment of
the Constitution since 1937, so it is being taken very seriously. That said, the public
appetite is for Members of the Oireachtas to do the job they were elected to do. In
comparison to colleagues in other parliaments around the world, we are not doing
that currently. We are not able to do so because we do not have the powers and the
Constitution is silent on us being able to compel people to appear.
I welcome the Bill and hope it will be carried with a resounding Yes vote. However,
there is a challenge for all Members of the Oireachtas to spell out clearly whether
they are in favour of the current system or a system which is less bureaucratic, less
cumbersome, cheaper, more [598]effective and delivers a faster result to the public
and can enhance democracy. If they do not want that, perhaps they should put
forward their alternative.
Deputy Dara Calleary: I welcome the chance to speak on
this important Bill and acknowledge the presence of the Minister of
State, Deputy Ring, and the contribution made by our former
colleagues, Sean Ardagh, and Jim OKeeffe, in preparing much of
the groundwork for the Minister, Deputy Howlin. Yesterday, the
Oireachtas Joint Committee on Investigations, Oversight and
Petitions met the Minister and, as I did then, it is only fair to
acknowledge the work he has done and the great personal
sacrifices he has made in going down this road over the years.
Both the Minister and former Deputy Jim Higgins were the subject
of many court actions which, at one stage, threatened to make
them personally liable. Their work has evolved through various
constitutional committees to get us here
Our spokesman has already said we will support the Bill and the referendum but that
does not mean we do not have quite considerable concerns about the framing of the
legislation. I acknowledge the fact the Minister made himself available over the
summer and that his officials made themselves available to brief us. However, I have
an issue, which I raised yesterday in regard to the remuneration of judges
referendum. We are rushing through a referendum Bill. Given the powers we are
giving ourselves, rushing this Bill through in less than one week is not appropriate. It
will be one of the things thrown at us by, as everybody said, the well-resourced
opponents of this referendum. If the Oireachtas cannot have respect for Bunreacht
na hireann, we cannot expect others to have it.
The Minister did not deal particularly well with the issue of partisan investigations,
which may be initiated for party political motivation rather than anything else. The
Government has a strong majority in this House and on every committee. There is
nothing to stop an investigation going through its requesting committee and then
going to the IOP committee where the Government has a majority. The Minister is at
pains to say, and he is right, that there has been a tradition of bipartisanship in
committee rooms, which still continues. However, a future Oireachtas may comprise
very different people who may have no regard for the way things were done
previously. They could thus use the powers we are conferring on them to pursue
purely partisan ends.
When this matter was initially discussed, the House of Commons model was cited,
including the investigation into telephone hacking. I have heard the name of the late
US Senator Eugene McCarthy coming into the debate, although I do not know if he is
a relation of Deputy Michael McCarthy. We must ensure that it will not happen here,
but in fairness the people who opposed this kind of system have been living off him
for 50 years.
In addition, there are many examples of successful parliamentary inquiries around
the world. Deputy ODonovan is right that we in the Oireachtas cannot take ourselves
seriously without being granted the proper powers and resources to implement this
system. If the people accept the referendum on 27 October, we must show them that
this system will work and make a difference to their daily lives. It will change things
that require change. If we have the necessary powers, as a result of the referendum
being passed, yet do not use them, then we will have no right to seek re-election.
We will have a difficult super Thursday on 27 October given the referendums and
presidential election. Voters in Dublin West will probably need a trolley for all the
ballot papers. There is a danger, however, that discussion on this referendum will
become lost. There is no doubt that a powerful and well-resourced lobby will oppose
it for reasons not connected to parliamentary integrity and democracy, but to protect
the status quo and cartels that benefit from the lack of power in the Oireachtas. We
all have a role in fighting for this referendum and it should not just be the
Government that is doing the heavy lifting. If we take our positions seriously as
Members of the Oireachtas and want to make a difference to those whom we serve,
it is incumbent on us to do so.
While we require clarification from the Government on various issues, the Oireachtas
must do the heavy lifting collectively. We must treat the powers we are being given
with respect and integrity. The 31st Dil should lay down the templates for future
Dla to follow in terms of how these powers are to be used.
Deputy Michael McCarthy: I welcome the opportunity to
speak on this important legislation. From the outset, I wish to
acknowledge the sterling work of former Deputies Sen Ardagh
and Jim OKeeffe in this area. I also want to remind the House of
the risks taken by the current Minister, Deputy Brendan Howlin,
and the former Deputy and current MEP, Jim Higgins, in
challenging powerful lobbies. They put their reputations on the line
in order to provide accountability and represent people effectively
on this island as parliamentarians. This is a culmination not just of
a very important part of the programme for Government, but also a
[600]vindication of a long-held objective of Deputy Howlins. I
congratulate him on bringing it forward with such speed so early in
the new Governments term.
It is hoped that the investigations, oversight and petitions committee will be effective
in investigating various issues and making findings. We know the genesis of the
referendum was the Supreme Courts judgment on Abbeylara. I cannot foresee any
difficulty with the referendum being passed. We should bear in mind the good work
done by the Committee of Public Accounts and its non-partisan approach. We should
also be mindful of the great work that was done by the DIRT inquiry. It is an
indication of the achievements that hopefully we will be able to obtain through the
IOP committee.
This Bill seeks to correct the weakened parliamentary system of inquiry brought
about by the Supreme Courts Abbeylara judgment, which stated that the Oireachtas
could not conduct inquiries that impinged on the reputation of individuals. Ensuring
that the Oireachtas has an effective system of inquiry which can secure effective and
cost-efficient parliamentary scrutiny of issues of significant public importance is
essential in facilitating more open, transparent and better government, as promised
in the new programme for Government. This is a key element of the Governments
ambitious political reform agenda. We are all aware of the length of time taken by
tribunals of inquiry to conclude their investigations and we are aware of the
obstruction of those tribunals by certain individuals and organisations and also of the
huge costs borne by the taxpayer for the tribunals. It was never envisaged that
tribunals would continue for as long as they have done nor that they would cost so
much.
There has been some confusion today relating to the process. It is important that
people are made aware that the prior investigation carried out by the investigator to
establish the facts will be carried out in private. In any event, as the Minister, Deputy
Howlin, has rightly pointed out, we do not want to go down a route whereby inquiries
are held in public, so-called, star [601]chambers. This would disrespect the
parliamentary process and serve to Americanise the process of parliamentary
scrutiny whereby witnesses would become unwitting public figures who are unfairly
subjected to levels of comment and scrutiny. The approach will be consistent with the
DIRT inquiry model. It will help to control legal costs and it will reflect the approach
taken by commissions of investigation. Above all, it will avoid a situation where an
Oireachtas committee of inquiry committee might find itself in a potentially very long
drawn-out process of establishing the facts, which a committee will not be equipped
to do, rather than assessing and reviewing those facts through its examination of
witnesses with a view to making findings and recommendations.
There has been some criticism from the legal industry today that the proposed
amendment goes too far and could restrict the rights of citizens to fair procedures. It
is easy to assume why such people would make this point but the current system has
restricted the right of ordinary citizens to an effective inquiry system in the national
Parliament. This is the only reasonable view with regard to this aspect. Powerful
vested interests will not wish to see this system being successful.
The Law Reform Commission consultation paper in 2003 emphasised that the
fundamental character of public inquiries is that they do not settle legal rights. They
are intended to make an authoritative finding of the facts in regard to a matter of
public interest. The consultation paper gives examples such as the cause of
accidents, natural disasters or the performance of a public authority or big business.
According to the Constitution, public inquiries do not administer justice, which is a
function left solely to the courts of law.
The passage of this Bill and the subsequent approval of the constitutional
amendment would be of immense benefit to the Joint Committee on Investigations,
Oversight and Petitions as it will allow the committee to hold bankers to account for
the collapse of the Irish economy. The people are entitled to see the architects of the
current crisis held up to scrutiny by those who are elected to represent them. They
want a parliamentary system with this power and authority, without the fear of
recourse to the courts by those wishing to obstruct the inquiries.
Yesterday at the committee meeting I asked the Minister, Deputy Howlin, about the
application of the Whip at the committee. I am pleased to say he informed me there
will not be a Whip on the committee members. This will allow members of the
committee the independence to adjudicate on matters in the public interest and the
Government of the day will not have an undue influence on its deliberations. The
committee needs that autonomy and independence.
I hope the Minister will be able to inform us of the budget for the committee. The
Minister informed us that this committee would have a filtering role and would act as
a gateway committee. However, we need to be certain that the committee will be
empowered to initiate its own inquiry when needed. This is a very important function.
I hope these views can be accommodated by the Government during the passage of
this Bill
Deputy Peadar Tibn: Much of the frustration that has been
generated in Irish society over the past number of years has been
caused by the instances where Irish people have been cheated of
justice. Elite individuals and organisations who have done wrong
have got off scot-free and have not been held to account. The fate
of these elites is in sharp contrast to the fate of average citizen
who more often than not undergoes the full rigours of the law if he
or she transgresses the law in even a minor way.
With regard to the banking crisis, justice has been denied and those responsible
have not been held to account. In other instances, such as the Moriarty, Morris and
Mahon tribunals, justice has been very costly in some cases, with a total of 0.5
billion at the last count. In some cases they have been toothless while others have
been very slow in their deliberations.
[602]The Oireachtas has been seen to be ineffectual in the case of Abbeylara. The
elected representatives of the day found themselves hamstrung by the Supreme
Court findings that the Oireachtas does not have an inherent power to conduct
inquiries. During current committees investigations, requests for information are often
to no avail, and information volunteered is not always accurate or complete. In such
circumstances, the Oireachtas is left without the necessary information it requires to
carry out effectively its legislative and accountability function. This situation
necessitates a means of compelling disclosure.
The proposal that the Oireachtas should have express constitutional power to
undertake in-depth inquiries, exercised through its committee system, is the most
significant Oireachtas reform in modern times. The power to require a person to
attend before the committee of inquiry to answer questions and the power to compel
disclosure of relevant information and production of documents, as necessary, for the
purpose of the inquiry, will radically change the balance of rights between the citizens
and the State. As such, this constitutional amendment and the associated legislation
demands serious and detailed consideration by this Oireachtas and by the people.
As Cathaoirleach of the newly created Joint Committee on Investigations, Oversight
and Petitions, I believe that adequate reform in this area can radically improve the
democratic function of the Oireachtas. There can be significant benefits to public
policy from the operation of an effective system of parliamentary inquiry. This
proposal could radically empower the Oireachtas to hold individuals to account. The
investigation of strategic and systemic problems can lead to improved legislation in
the future. However, in situations where the rights to natural justice of an individual
are being rebalanced in order to provide for effective and timely justice for the State,
it is of the utmost importance that everything is done in advance to provide the
necessary individual safeguards.
Under this legislation, the Committee on Investigations, Oversight and Petitions will
play an important role in Oireachtas inquiries if the constitutional amendment is
approved by the electorate in the forthcoming referendum. We will have to give
careful consideration to such questions as what Oireachtas inquiries are meant for,
which type of matters should be inquired into, how the public interest test will be
applied and how the constitutional rights of witnesses and others affected by
parliamentary inquiries can be safeguarded in the exercise of the new powers.
As with most constitutional issues, the debate revolves around the balance of
conflicting rights and the devil is often in the detail. I have misgivings about the fact
that the rights which will be afforded to citizens will not be determined by the text of
the constitutional amendment but by legislation which could change over time. There
is not enough of a brake on the potential erosion of rights contained within the text of
the amendment. I understand there is a view that Article 43 of the Constitution will
safeguard these rights but we need to copperfasten citizens rights. I second the
amendment proposed by my colleague, Deputy McDonald, to strengthen the
constitutional amendment from the perspective of the rights of the individual.
Serious risks are inherent to the proposed process, including the potential loss of a
persons right to cross-examine someone who has made allegations concerning him
or her, risks of prejudicing subsequent criminal proceedings and risks of the quasi-
judicial process being contaminated by political bias. If these issues are not resolved
before the amendment is passed, they will lead to multiple High Court challenges
and the possibility that the issue will have to be revisited with another constitutional
amendment, thereby incurring additional costs and exacerbating the ineffectiveness
of the Oireachtas in the interim.
[603]It is important that we consider providing Oireachtas Members with a level of
indemnification against the legal costs that may arise in the event of High Court
challenges. Certain Deputies have in the past been required to meet legal costs out
of their own pockets or else ask their parties to indemnify them.
It is pivotal to the proposed investigation system that it be public by default. Certain
investigations, such as the Cloynes inquiry, are undoubtedly best undertaken in
private but technical investigations should be held in public where an individuals
right to a good name is not under threat. If necessary, the relevant committee could
decide to hold its investigation in private but transparency is the default mode to
which all democratic functions should aspire.
The legislation envisages establishing the Committee on Investigations, Oversight
and Petitions as a clearing house for investigations which does not, however,
possess the power to carry out investigations in its own right. This is a mistake. A
number of my colleagues from both sides of the House were shocked to learn that
the committee would not have a role in investigating itself. The committee should
follow the example of the Committee on European Scrutiny. Most investigations
could probably be forwarded to relevant committees where the competency exists to
deal with the issues arising. However, investigations which are cross-departmental in
nature or are of systemic importance to society should be the responsibility of the
Committee on Investigation, Oversight and Petitions. I urge the Minister to reconsider
this aspect and develop the requisite infrastructure. I acknowledge that he does not
believe it is possible under current legislation for the committee to set the criteria for
inquiries as well as conduct an investigation, but there are precedents for such a
system both internationally and in the Houses of the Oireachtas. Clarification is also
needed on the powers given to the new committee to compel other committees to
stay within their terms of reference. If another committee operates outside of its
terms of reference, a mechanism must be available to compel it to change its
behaviour.
The proposed constitutional amendment has the potential to provide radical and
valuable reform but it must also respect the rights of citizens. The Houses of the
Oireachtas and the people of Ireland need to focus on the latter as their primary
concern when they debate the proposed measures. No previous constitutional
amendment has gone as far in terms of rebalancing citizens rights and I urge the
Government to accept the amendment proposed by Sinn Fin
Deputy Jerry Buttimer: I commend this Bill to the House
and acknowledge Deputy Tibns insightful contribution. This
proposed amendment to the Constitution forms part of the
Governments package of reforms. Yesterday we debated the
Judiciary, while todays deliberations were necessitated by certain
litigious lawyers who have made their fortunes from taxpayers
money spent on tribunals of inquiry. What was intended as an
effective mechanism for investigating matters has become a
cumbersome gravy train. A certain coterie of people have
benefited from our tribunals, and that has to stop.
The ability of the Oireachtas to inquire into matters of fact and make determinations
has developed in an ad hocmanner and at significant cost to the taxpayer. The
Committee of Public Accounts has demonstrated through its DIRT inquiry that it can
investigate matters in a fair and balanced manner. Its reports into the procurement of
legal services by the State have revealed that three tribunals of inquiry cost 366
million. The Comptroller and Auditor General reported that the Moriarty tribunal alone
will cost in excess of 113 million. Clearly, the State has paid out an inordinate
amount on tribunals of inquiry.
The proposed amendment to the Constitution aims at providing a much needed
alternative to the current expensive model. The Oireachtas and, more importantly,
the people need a [604]system of inquiry which is efficient, based on facts and permits
the development of necessary policies in a timely manner.
In November 2009, Cork was ravaged by floods. Quay walls collapsed, bedrooms
were flooded and cars were carried along the citys streets. Water supply to half the
city was interrupted. However, we lacked an efficient system of inquiry to investigate
the causes of and responses to this devastation. The Oireachtas Committee on the
Environment, Heritage and Local Government issued a report on the flooding but
instead of setting out the causes of the disaster it merely called for a second legally
binding inquiry. The Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government
reviewed the issue and Cork City Council received a report from its city manager.
Despite all these investigations, the people of Cork have not yet received a proper
answer. The committee subsequently conducted a review of the response to the
severe weather events of 2009 and 2010 and published another massive tome which
offered little by way of answers to those affected.
The State clearly lacks a proper system of inquiry which would not incur hefty legal
expenses. The constitutional reforms proposed by the Minister would provide the
basis for implementing such a system. The people, and their parliamentary
representatives, must be able to get answers. I welcome this proposal and, in
particular, the Ministers comments regarding change, effective governance and
holding Government to account. If the proposal is accepted by the people by way of
referendum, Members on all sides of the House will have an opportunity to
participate in meaningful inquiries into matters of genuine public importance. With
that power will come a responsibility to uphold constitutional principles. Those
participating in any inquiry must be unbiased in their approach and devoid of a desire
to grab headlines. If investigations are to be thorough, there may be a need to
reconsider the operation of the party Whip system in respect of inquiries. In that
context, I urge the Minister to consider the Committee of Public Accounts as a model
of operation for parliamentary inquiries under this proposal. I commend the Bill to the
House.
Deputy Billy Timmins: The genesis of this Bill is the
judgment of the Supreme Court following the attempts by the
Oireachtas to investigate the shooting of John Carty at Abbeylara.
I take this opportunity to extend my sympathy to the Carty family
on this sad and tragic affair.
Deputy Jerry Buttimer referred to the cost of various ongoing tribunals. Several
months after I was first elected to the Dil in 1997, the Flood tribunal was
established. Fourteen years later, its successor, the Mahon tribunal has not yet
completed its investigations. If I were to propose today that we set up a tribunal
which might issue its final report in 2025, Members would advise that the issue be
parked. It is important that the Mahon tribunal should bring its final report into the
public domain without delay. There were recent reports in the media that it would be
held off until after the presidential election and by-election. There will always be a
reason to delay publication of such reports, but they should be issued regardless of
the political consequences. I call on the chairman of the Mahon tribunal to publish the
report as soon as it is ready.
While I support the concept of the proposal before us today, I urge caution. I recall
listening to the contributions at the initial stages of the Oireachtas inquiry into the
events at Abbeylara and being somewhat concerned at the tenor and approach of
some of the questioning. While I am supportive of the Bill, I have slight reservations
regarding the concept of turning this House into a quasi-judicial chamber. We must
have expertise at committee level. Notwithstanding the Governments attempts to
reform the Oireachtas committee system, I am not heartened by what I have seen in
recent weeks. The system remains cumbersome and individual committees have too
many members. For example, representatives of one of the banks appeared before
a [605]meeting of the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform
yesterday. I did not contribute at the meeting, which went on for four or five hours,
and I am not sure whether any valuable information was elicited. As politicians, we
sometimes strive to get the soundbite and associated publicity and, in so doing, fail
to get to the kernel of the matter. We must ensure the investigative bodies arising
from this proposal can work effectively.
Another example that causes me concern is the recent inquiry into certain activities
of the former Senator, Mr. Ivor Callely. While one would at first glance have to say
that what he did was wrong, it was not edifying to see members of the committee out
on the plinth posing for the cameras. One can not simultaneously be judge, jury and
self-publicist. All Members must take their investigative function seriously; it is not
about publicity but about ensuring fair play. I was concerned at the approach of that
committee to what was a very serious matter with serious consequences for a fellow
Oireachtas Member.
As a member of the Army I served on several occasions on the boards of courts
martial. I often felt on such occasions that we did not have the expertise to do what
we were supposed to do and that the rights of the individual being tried by court
martial were not properly defended. That has changed in recent years and the
system has greatly improved. In the case of parliamentary investigations, if we bring
an individual, organisation or Member before an inquiry, we must ensure it is done
right. We do not want a charter for the legal profession where everyone and anyone
will have legal representation.
The Abbeylara investigation was succeeded by the Barr tribunal which produced a
very good report within a short timeframe. It is important to realise that parliamentary
inquiries are not the be all and end all. If the referendum is passed, we must take the
time to consider in detail the committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (powers of
inquiry) Bill. Before that, the referendum commission must explain in a clear manner
the pros and cons of this proposal. I am not entirely sure the public wants to go down
the road that we in the Oireachtas do in this regard. The public must be fully aware of
what it is being asked to vote for. What is proposed may seem, prima facie, like a
simple, straightforward solution, but we must bear in mind that as well as successes
such as the late Jim Mitchells oversight of the DIRT inquiry, there have also been
many failures. We must not have a situation where citizens or organisations suffer as
a result of such failures
Deputy Mattie McGrath: I propose to share time with Deputy
Thomas Pringle.
An Ceann Comhairle: That is agreed.
Deputy Mattie McGrath: I am pleased to have an
opportunity to contribute to the debate on this proposal. I take this
opportunity to express my sympathy to the family of the late John
Carty. There has long been a demand for an effective system of
parliamentary inquiry to deal with such matters as the tragedy that
occurred at Abbeylara. However, like Deputy Billy Timmins, I urge
that we tread with care. I was particularly interested in Deputy
Timminss comments regarding his experience of Army courts
martial. It is unfortunate that this proposal is being rushed through
the House because of the election deadline. We must get this right
because if we fail to do so, we may deny justice to somebody.
The public is yearning for an inquiry system that is effective and which also embodies
openness and transparency. The tribunals have been nothing short of a farce, sitting
for too long and at great financial cost with too little to show for it. Some have cost
hundreds of millions of euro but nobody can lift their reports let alone read them. The
DIRT inquiry was an example of an Oireachtas inquiry which did good work in an
efficient manner. Deputy Jerry Buttimer referred to the Whip system. I was a member
of a committee in the last Dil which sought to extend the remit of the lost at sea
scheme. Although I was outside the Whip by that time, it [606]was clear that members
of the Government parties were under great pressure to support Ministers no matter
what they did. Without casting aspersions on anybody, I am concerned that in a
situation where the Whip is applied in respect of parliamentary inquiries, this
Governments huge majority will mean we do not get a fair and unbiased result.
The recent changes to the committee system are silly, leaving us with individual
committees whose membership is too large and structure too unwieldy. I was a
member of both the agriculture and communications committees in the last Dil,
which have now been amalgamated into one. That type of cumbersome structure
makes it more difficult to conduct effective inquiries. There is an obligation on the
State to be accountable to the public in these matters.
I hope we get it right. The public wants to see Oireachtas committees doing their job.
As other Deputies stated, it is unthinkable in this day and age that when a serious
matter arises in this country in respect of which we want to examine the costs in
terms of damage and so on, we cannot hold a short, fast inquiry. The very mention of
the word tribunal is an anathema to most people because of the abuse of tribunals
by barristers and others, who hijacked them, and because of the high rates allowed
by the taxing master, which were untenable. I am sure we are being watched with
envy by members of the Law Library in regard to our debate on this legislation.
Yesterday, I along with other Independent colleagues, attended a briefing on this
legislation which left me unsure about it. With no disrespect to the official concerned,
what I learned from that briefing is that officials draft Bills and that politicians who
must vote and enact them have little input into them. The official had to correct
himself a number of times in terms of assumptions and belief that the Cabinet would
pass the Bill and so on. I knew from his body language and statements that it is
officials who draft Bills. They are not accountable to anyone. We are accountable to
the public and rightly so. We must make haste slowly.
Deputy Thomas Pringle: I welcome the opportunity to speak
on the Thirtieth Amendment of the Constitution (Houses of the
Oireachtas Inquiries) Bill 2011. This Bill is an attempt to overcome
the Abbeylara judgment which prevented the Oireachtas from
carrying out effective investigations into matters of general public
importance. There is no doubt but that all Members of this House
want Oireachtas Committees to have the ability to carry out
inquiries. The public expect we should be able to do so. I believe it
is a vital part of a functioning democracy that the Oireachtas
should carry out investigations.
We are now three years on from the collapse of the banking system in respect of
which investigations are dragging on and on. The people do not believe anyone will
ever be held to account for the destruction of our economy. The Supreme Court
judgment in the Abbeylara case ensured that the Oireachtas could not inquire into
matters it wished to investigate. The wording of the amendment deals largely with the
issues in the Supreme Court judgment. However, I am concerned about the issue of
bias. The judgment deals with the issue of institutional bias. That is where the
Houses of the Oireachtas are in themselves inherently biased. I can foresee a
situation whereby a Government with a large majority could commence inquiries for
political ends, in respect of which institutional bias could again arise.
Question put.
T
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Tellers: T, Deputies John Lyons and Paul Kehoe; Nl, Deputies Catherine Murphy and Mattie
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http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.
nsf/takes/dail2011091500008?opendocument
Details revealed of constitutional amendment to
help investigate banks
Sept 12th 2011
"2 Each House shall have the power to conduct an inquiry, or an inquiry
with the other House, in a manner provided for by law, into any matter
stated by the House or Houses concerned to be of general public
importance.
"3 In the course of any such inquiry the conduct of any person (whether
or not a member of either House) may be investigated and the House or
Houses concerned may make findings in respect of the conduct of that
person concerning the matter to which the inquiry relates.
https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/02106-
IBC-Report-Volume-2.pdf
Inquiry Costs
In the current economic climate, parliamentary inquiries must be seen to be cost-effective
in comparison to other forms of inquiry. The Committee considered the question of costs
directly attributable to the inquiry and was committed to ensuring that the costs were kept
to an absolute minimum. In the interests of transparency, the Committee published the
inquiry running costs on a quarterly basis.
Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Project update Issue 1- June
2014 March 2015
https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/BI-first-
progress-report-Web-version-April-2015.pdf
Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis Ad hoc Advisory Group Final
Report to the Joint Committee September 2014
https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Final-
report-to-the-Joint-Committee-170914.pdf
https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Act2013.pdf
List-of-Persons-Notice-of-Intention-Non-Appearing-24092015
https://inquiries.oireachtas.ie/banking/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/List-of-
Persons-Notice-of-Intention-Non-Appearing-24092015.pdf
Overseas parliamentary news January 2011 - New Zealand Parliament
2011/Fifth_Report.pdf ... Oireachtas JointCommittee on the Constitution ...
Overseas parliamentary news 2011
Judgment: High Court, Callely v Moylan & Ors, [2011] IEHC 2, 14 Jan.
2011 http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/09859e7a3f34669680256ef3004a27de/c0968f9a2c7cd2
0d80257818004a06d6?OpenDocument
Media article: High Court quashes Callely's suspension, The Irish Times, 15 Jan.
2011 http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2011/0115/1224287577372.html
Committee inquiries
In 2002 the Supreme Court ruled that it was not within the inherent powers of the Oireachtas to
conduct an inquiry capable of leading to adverse findings of fact and conclusions as to the
personal culpability of an individual. An Oireachtas committee has recommended that the
constitution should be amended expressly to provide the Oireachtas with the power to carry out
inquiries into matters of great public concern. Committees should be able to investigate the actions
of individuals and make findings of wrongdoing, but not apply sanctions. A list of rights enjoyed
by witnesses should be incorporated into the Standing Orders.
Report: Joint Committee on the Constitution, Article 15 of the Constitution, review of the
parliamentary power of inquiry, 28 Jan.
2011 http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees30thdail/j-constitution/reports-
2011/Fifth_Report.pdf
Press release: Oireachtas Joint Committee on the Constitution proposes an amendment to the
constitution to strengthen the Oireachtas power of inquiry, 31 Jan.
2011 http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/mediazone/pressreleases/name-2087-en.html
Marshall Islands
Members' allowances
In addition to their salary, each member receives a session allowance of $5,000 per annum. The
allowance is not paid for any sitting day that the member is absent without the Speakers
permission, or is suspended. The Vice Speaker has introduced a bill to eliminate this session
allowance. The summary to the bill notes that members attendance should not be enforced by the
imposition of a monetary penalty. Members are legally bound to attend the Nitijela and failure to
do so is a violation of the intent of the constitution.
Media article: Alik: Get rid of Nitijela allowance, Marshall Islands Journal, 21 Jan.
2011 http://www.marshallislandsjournal.com/Archive%201-21-11-page.html
Norway
Former members convicted of pension fraud
Two former members have been convicted of serious fraud through gross negligence for receiving
pensions from the Storting to which they were not entitled. They were sentenced to prison terms
of six months and 60 days respectively The court said that their incomes had exceeded the amount
permitted under the rules, and that they should have informed the Storting of their other sources of
income and checked their interpretation of the rules. The court noted that the pension system had
been based on trust, and that fairly basic checks would most likely have prevented such
circumstances arising. The President of the Storting commented that the pension system had since
been changed.
Judgment: Oslo tingrett, Dom, den offentlige ptalemyndighet mot Anders Talleraas, Magnus
Stangeland, 7 Jan. 2011 http://www.domstol.no/upload/OBYR/Internett/Nyheter/10-099305MED-
OTIR%20Grovt%20bedrageri%20%20271%20a_2011.01.07.pdf
Press releases: Tidligere stortingsrepresentanter dmt til fengsel, Oslo tingrett, 7 Jan.
2011 http://www.domstol.no/no/Enkelt-domstol/Oslo--tingrett/Nyheter/Tidligere-
stortingsrepresentanter-domt-til-fengsel; Dom i pensjonssaken, Stortinget, 7 Jan.
2011 http://www.stortinget.no/no/Hva-skjer-pa-Stortinget/Nyhetsarkiv/Forsidenyheter/2010-
2011/Pensjonssaken
Scotland
Treatment of committee witnesses
In a letter to Parliament's Presiding Officer, two professors complained of being ambushed when
they appeared as witnesses before a committee, and of being treated impolitely and
discourteously. They considered their reputations had been damaged. The Presiding Officer
replied that the conduct of committee meetings is solely the responsibility of their convenors, and
commented that the scrutiny process quite properly involves the testing of all available evidence
in order to achieve robust conclusions. The committee convenor said she would invite the two
complainants to meet the committee clerk to discuss any procedural issues. The two have now
made a formal complaint to the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner.
Media articles: 'Academic ambush' row intensifies as McLetchie claims profs 'can't stand the
heat', Newsnet Scotland, 17 Jan. 2011 http://www.newsnetscotland.com/politics/1446-academic-
ambush-row-intensifies-as-mcletchie-claims-profs-cant-stand-the-heat; Academic pair in formal
complaint at rudeness, The Scotsman, 22 Jan.
2011 http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/education/Academic-pair-in-formal-complaint.6698825.jp
Report: Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee, Financial resolutions and
scrutiny of revised financial memoranda, 21 Jan.
2011 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/stanproc/reports-11/stprr11-01.htm
Solomon Islands
Convicted member retains seat for now
A member jailed for 33 months for unlawfully wounding and assaulting a police officer in 2007
has been given time to appeal his sentence. If a member is sentenced to a prison term of more than
six months, their seat becomes vacant after 30 days, unless the Speaker, at the member's request,
extends that period to enable the member to appeal their conviction or sentence. The Speaker has
granted the member an extension of 30 days to pursue his appeal, as the Court of Appeal will not
sit until March. There is provision for the Speaker to grant further extensions, up to a maximum of
150 days. Any extension beyond that must be approved by a resolution of Parliament.
Media article: Speaker: Lusibaea can still perform his duty, Solomon Star, 25 Jan.
2011 http://www.solomonstarnews.com/news/national/9946-speaker-lusibaea-can-still-perform-
his-duty
Spain
Contract appeals board
As provided for in the Public Sector Contracts Act of 2007, the Bureaus of the Congress of
Deputies and the Senate have established a contract appeals board to hear appeals relating to
contracts let by the Cortes Generales, either of its Houses, the Central Electoral Commission or
the Ombudsman. The board's membership will comprise a deputy, a senator and a designated
official of the Cortes. The board mirrors the tribunal established to hear appeals relating to public
sector contracts, but its separate creation respects the autonomy of Parliament.
Resolution: Resolucin de 21 de diciembre de 2010, adoptada por las Mesas del Congreso de los
Diputados y del Senado en reunin conjunta, por la que se crea el Tribunal de Recursos
Contractuales de la Cortes Generales, Boletn oficial de las Cortes Generales, Seccin Cortes
Generales, IX Legislatura, Serie A, Nm. 385, 13 Jan.
2011 http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CORT/BOCG/A/CG_A385.PDF
Rules: Reforma del Reglamento del Senado sobre el uso de las lenguas oficiales en las
Comunidades Autnomas en la actividad de la cmara, Boletn Oficial del Estado, Nm. 181, 27
July 2011 http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2010/07/27/pdfs/BOE-A-2010-12005.pdf
Letter: [Jos Bono to the leaders of the party groups], [25 Jan.
2011] http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201101/25/espana/20110125elpepuna
c_4_Pes_PDF.doc
Media article: Rojo y Bono se replantean los 'privilegios' de diputados y senadores, El Pas, 25
Jan.
2011 http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/Rojo/Bono/replantean/privilegios/diputados/senadore
s/elpepuesp/20110125elpepunac_2/Tes
Tonga
Parliaments accounts
When the Speaker presented an audited report on the financial status of the Legislative Assembly
for the period July to December 2010, the first such report since 1999, members complimented
him for doing so, but also raised questions about irregularities in the accounts.
Article: First Tonga Parliament audit opens can of worms, Pacific Islands Report, 24 Jan.
2011 http://pidp.org/pireport/2011/January/01-24-02.htm
United Kingdom
Review of members expenses scheme
The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority has released the consultation document for its
first annual review of the members expenses scheme. Among the issues arising is that of the
proper balance between IPSAs role as an independent regulator of MPs expenses, and its role as
a provider of services to MPs. IPSAs chairman emphasises that public confidence in the payment
of expenses is the key outcome to which the Authority is aspiring. The Speaker has announced the
establishment of an informal liaison group to provide a forum for MPs and IPSA officials to raise
matters of interest or concern.
Review: Annual review of the MPs expenses scheme: consultation, Independent Parliamentary
Standards Authority, 5 Jan. 2011 http://www.ipsa-
home.org.uk/docs/Annual_Review_Jan2011_Consultation.pdf
Criminal conviction
A former MP who pleaded guilty to three charges of false accounting, while an MP, has been
sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. In his sentencing remarks the judge said that MPs hold an
important position in the constitution. They legislate for what the public can and cannot do and it
is necessary that their behaviour should be entirely honest if public confidence in the
parliamentary system and the rule of law is to be maintained. The public is entitled to expect they
will be honest in their dealings with the State and in particular with their use of public funds
which are paid for out of taxation.
Report: House of Lords Leader's Group on Members Leaving the House, Members leaving the
House, HL Paper 83, 13 Jan.
2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldleader/83/83.pdf
Statement: Leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal, Post legislative assessment of
the Parliament (Joint Departments) Act 2007, 13 Jan.
2011 http://www.commonsleader.gov.uk/output/page3046.asp
Report: Leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal, Post-legislative assessment of the
Parliament (Joint Departments) Act 2007, Cm 7998, 13 Jan. 2011 http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm79/7998/7998.pdf
Report: House of Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges, Registration of income from
employment, HC 749, 20 Jan.
2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmstnprv/749/749.pdf
Statement: Leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal, Members' salaries, 20 Jan.
2011 http://www.commonsleader.gov.uk/output/page3047.asp
Member's resignation
There is no provision for an MP to resign, but they may instead apply for the stewardship of the
Chiltern Hundreds or the Manor of Northstead. Holders of these offices are disqualified from
being MPs. The leader of Sinn Fin, Gerry Adams, sent a letter of resignation to the Speaker.
When the Prime Minister remarked that Adams had accepted an office for profit under the Crown,
Adams said this was untrue, that he had not been asked to accept such an office and he had no
truck with these antiquated and bizarre aspects of the British parliamentary system. The Speaker
announced in the House that the Chancellor of the Exchequer had notified him of Mr Adams'
appointment to the stewardship of the Manor of Northstead, and that the latter was therefore
disqualified from membership of the House.
Hansard: [Point of order] House of Commons official report, Parliamentary debates (Hansard),
26 Jan. 2011, p. 404 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/chan106.pdf
Media article: Gerry Adams appointed to Crown Office 'against his will', The Telegraph, 26 Jan.
2011 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northernireland/8285373/Gerry-Adams-appointed-
to-Crown-Office-against-his-will.html
Formation of government
Among the issues arising in a review of the 2010 formation of government process were the
merits of an investiture vote, and the implications of the status of a coalition agreement. An
investiture vote, in which MPs formally voted on whom should be invited to form a new
government, would provide a transparent link with the election result and demonstrate that the
new government had the confidence of Parliament, but would not be able to be held until almost
two weeks after the election. The importance of pre-legislative scrutiny of and consultation on
coalition policies was emphasised, as a coalition agreement, by its nature, does not have the same
popular endorsement as individual party manifestos.
Report: House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Lessons from the
process of government formation after the 2010 general election, HC 528, 28 Jan.
2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpolcon/528/528.pdf
Report: House of Lords Administration and Works Committee, Use of electronic devices in the
House, HL Paper 92, 31 Jan.
2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldaccwks/92/92.pdf
Wales
Induction for new and returning members
Planning is underway for the induction of new and returning members after the election in May
this year. A draft outline includes sessions on proceedings in the Chamber and committees,
allowances, staff management, research services and media handling.
Report: Committee on Standards of Conduct, Report 01-11 to the Assembly under Standing Order
16.8 and paragraph 7.12 of the procedure for dealing with complaints against Assembly members,
Jan. 2011 http://www.assemblywales.org/cr-ld8372-e.pdf
Pleasance Purser
Research Analyst
Parliamentary Library
https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/research-papers/document/00PlibOPN11011/overseas-
parliamentary-news-january-2011
Report: House of Commons Committee on Standards and Privileges, Registration of income from
employment, HC 749, 20 Jan. 2011
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmfaff
/697/697.pdf
We are all familiar with media reports of a government minister who is forced to resign or dismissed
for behaviour which is or is perceived to be inappropriate or for incompetence in the performance of
his or her duties. There are also many press headlines which condemn a judge or magistrate, for
example for handing down a soft sentence, but there are almost none which announce that the judge
in question has resigned or has been dismissed as a result of that criticism. Many may wonder why
steps are not taken to dismiss such judges or to force them to resign. Why is it that judges and
magistrates appear to be unaccountable in the face of such criticism? Why is it that the way they are
treated appears to be different to the treatment of many others, from government ministers and public
officials, to the directors and employees of companies?
The truth is that the judiciary is accountable, but in a different manner. The reason for this difference is
a fundamental feature of our constitution going to the very heart of our democracy. The difference
stems from the need to ensure that judges are impartial and independent of central and local
government and from pressures from the media, companies, and pressure groups while exercising their
judicial functions. That need is also reflected in the constitutions of all democratic countries.
The extent to which the judiciary in England and Wales are accountable, how they are accountable, and
why there is a need for judges to be completely independent from Government and other powerful
groups, are difficult questions.
With some 35,000 men and women holding judicial office in England and Wales, the answers to these
questions have a significant impact on our daily lives. They may affect the confidence people have in
the ability of judges to uphold the rule of law. It is a complex area, but we hope that an understanding
of some of the issues involved will help to put into perspective the way in which the courts deliver
justice.
We aim to explain why judicial independence is a vital element of our democracy and the effect that
has on the notion of judicial accountability. This section of the website also looks at the constraints
placed on the judiciary by legislation enacted by Parliament, and the ways in which individual judges
are accountable.
It considers accountability to more senior judges through the system enabling appeal to a higher court
and accountability to the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor through the complaints system. It
looks at accountability to the public through open access to justice and the publication of the vast
majority of judicial decisions. Scrutiny of judges and the judicial system by the media, executive and
legislative branches of the state is also considered.
There is a huge amount of information on this subject. The information we give in this part of the
judiciarys website can only be a summary. For those who wish to explore a particular subject in more
depth we give references and links to some of the helpful statements of the relevant principles by
international bodies, by our judges, and by academics and politicians in lectures, speeches and papers.
Constitutional reform
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005
The Lord Chancellors role changed dramatically on 3 April 2006, as a result of the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005.
For the first time in almost 900 years, judicial independence is now officially enshrined in law.
What has not changed is the way judgments are made or given; after all, judges have been independent
in the way they work for centuries.
The real differences are in the day-to-day management of the judiciary, the way judges are appointed
and the way complaints are dealt with. These are now truly independent, to enhance accountability,
public confidence and effectiveness.
Tribunals reform
The Tribunals Service was created on 3 April 2006, and brought together the administration of a large
number of individual tribunals, resulting in a more common and consistent approach for users.
On November 3, 2008, the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act came into force.
This created a new two-tier Tribunal system: a Firsttier Tribunal and an Upper Tribunal, both of
which are split into Chambers. Each Chamber comprises similar jurisdictions or bring together similar
types of experts to hear appeals.
These new super tribunals absorbed over 20 existing smaller tribunals as well as providing a structure
to which new appeal rights could be assigned.
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/contents/data.pdf
Article 15 of the Constitution - Review of Parliamentary Power of Inquiry:
Discussion
Wednesday, 1 December 2010
Chairman: I welcome Mr. ODowd. I thank him for coming in to visit us today and am glad he got
here despite the snow and sleet.
Mr. John ODowd: I allowed myself an hour to get here from Stillorgan.
Chairman: Information on Sen Ardagh Zoom on Sen Ardagh Very good. The committee is
continuing its hearings on the review of the parliamentary power of inquiry. Today we will hear
from Mr. John ODowd, lecturer in the school of law at UCD. I thank him for the paper he submitted
which has been circulated to members. We thought it would be helpful to the committee to get Mr.
ODowds insight into this matter, as he has written persuasively on this subject in the past.
Before we commence, I must inform Mr. ODowd that by virtue of section 17(2)(l) of the
Defamation Act 2009, witnesses are protected by absolute privilege in respect of the evidence they
give this committee. If witnesses are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence on a
particular matter and they continue to do so, they are entitled thereafter only to a qualified privilege
in respect of their evidence. Witnesses are directed that only evidence connected with the subject
matter of these proceedings is to be given and are asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the
effect that, where possible, they should not criticise or make charges against any person, persons or
entity by name or in such a way as to make him, her or it identifiable. I invite Mr. ODowd to
commence his presentation.
Mr. John ODowd: I thank the members of the committee for the invitation to address them today.
As I indicated in the paper I circulated, the main focus of my remarks will be on what form a
constitutional amendment might take to deal with the decision in the Maguire v. Ardagh case. I have
summarised in the paper some of the main features of the decision as I understand them, the salient
issues that arise, and I will talk a little about those. However, my remarks are mainly directed
towards the concept of an amendment, namely, what sort of constitutional amendment might
appropriately be introduced to reverse - although reverse is a rather strong term - or, as one might
say, to qualify or clarify as much as reverse what the Supreme Court had decided in the Abbeylara
case.
I want to refer briefly to a decision in the courts in Hong Kong. I met Lord Lester, QC last week at
an ICCL fund-raising function. He had kindly pointed out to me that the decision in Maguire v.
Ardagh has been considered by the courts in Hong Kong in a case dealing with an inquiry by a
committee of the legislative council there. I draw it to the committees attention because, perhaps not
inappropriately, it involves a failed property development in Hong Kong. A number of property
developers had entered into a public private partnership with the housing department of the
Government of Hong Kong and as a result of the difficulties they encountered, the two property
developers negotiated an agreement with the head of the housing department in Hong Kong. That
would have been quite unexceptional except that on retirement the same civil servant was appointed
to the board of directors of the company. Naturally this caused a degree of public controversy in
Hong Kong, as a result of which he had to step down.
The relevant committee of the legislative council in Hong Kong sought to investigate this and, in the
course of that investigation, counsel for the two developers laid considerable stress on the Supreme
Court decision in Maguire v. Ardagh as indicating that a parliamentary committee could not
investigate the specific circumstances in which a former civil servant had taken up a position on the
board of directors of such a company because it would be outside the proper functioning of a
parliamentary committee. Lord Lester, who appeared for the legislative committee, was quite
pleased that the Court of First Instance in Hong Kong was not persuaded by Maguire v. Ardagh that
the committees powers were limited in that way and the challenge by the developers was effectively
rejected.
One could exaggerate the extent to which the Hong Kong court was directly rejecting Maguire v.
Ardagh because the issues in that case were somewhat different. The main issue was whether the
legislative council as a whole could delegate its power to investigate to a committee. It is not
surprising that the court held that it could delegate such a power because the Dil or the Seanad as a
Chamber could not really exercise the power to call witnesses and conduct an examination of those
witnesses. That was a quite straightforward point.
Deputy Jim OKeeffe: Information on Jim O'Keeffe Zoom on Jim O'Keeffe Did the court look
further into the issue of the rights of the people who were being investigated and how they might
best be protected before such a committee?
Mr. John ODowd: There was no detailed discussion of that aspect of the procedure to be adopted. In
fact, the court emphasised that there was a major distinction between Ireland and Hong Kong. The
judge in Hong Kong did not think there was any equivalent there of the strong guarantee of the right
to good name which exists in our Constitution. That distinction was drawn.
Another point that should be made is that the judge held that although the courts did have a
jurisdiction to judicially review a parliamentary committee, it was not generally appropriate for them
to exercise it except in the most clear cut cases, so there was a degree of judicial restraint employed.
The judge, Mr. Justice Chung, held that Maguire v. Ardagh reflected a different balance between the
right to good name and the right of parliament to investigate, but he did so on the basis that there
was no equivalent provision such as exists in Article 40.3.2 of our Constitution, which guarantees a
good name, in the basic law of Hong Kong. I have noted in the paper that one could quibble with
that, perhaps, in that the basic law in Hong Kong incorporates the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights into the constitutional law of Hong Kong. Article 17 of the covenant, and
Ireland is a party to that covenant, contains a protection to the right to reputation, so it is an
international human right which should be recognised in Irish law.
The other main issue in the paper is the scope of Maguire v. Ardagh and what exactly that case
decided. I have indicated in the paper that a variety of views were expressed in the majority
judgments. In Mr. Justice Geoghegans and Ms Justice McGuinnesss judgments they discuss
hypothetically the scope a parliamentary committee, conducting an investigation involving the use of
the powers given by the 1997 Act, would have to make findings which might incidentally reflect
adversely on the good name of an individual. It is important to note that the declaration given by the
Supreme Court was quite narrow. It was much narrower than the declaration given by the High
Court in that it was limited specifically to the type of inquiry that the sub-committee was seeking to
undertake in that case which might lead to findings that named individuals had been responsible for
an unlawful killing.
The Chief Justice in Maguire v. Ardagh makes it clear that the declaration has been limited carefully
so as not to prejudge the wider issues as to how far a parliamentary committee might incidentally
conduct an inquiry which could adversely affect a persons good name. Some of the examples Mr.
Justice Geoghegan and Ms Justice McGuinness give, of course, are inquiries into systems of
management in the public service that might lead to implied blame, at least, being attached to the
chief executive of a public body, for example, or a particular civil servant. Generally, however, the
scope of that is somewhat limited in that the majority of judges in Maguire v. Ardagh emphasised
that such an inquiry would have to have a clear relationship to the legislative function which the
Oireachtas has, and I believe they understand that legislative function in a quite narrow sense of
being connected with the consideration of whether a particular legislative measure or proposal that is
before the Oireachtas would be desirable.
As I say in the paper, perhaps that overlooks the fact that a national parliament has a somewhat
wider function than that - to be a forum for debate on issues of public concern even if there is no
specific legislation. I have also noted in the paper that Mr. Justice Geoghegan takes a realist view,
one could say, of the legislative function of the Oireachtas. He says that basically the Oireachtas
does not originate its legislation but merely considers the legislation the Government has thought fit
to bring forward. Therefore, he did not think there was much reality in the suggestion that a
parliamentary committee needed the power to investigate the facts on which legislation ought to be
based.
With regard to the main concern of the judges in Maguire v. Ardagh, which was whether Deputies
and Senators could be fair in their dealings with people who appeared before them, I have included a
picture of Senator Joe McCarthy because he is specifically mentioned in Mr. Justice Hardimans
judgment in Maguire v. Ardagh. The general concern of the majority was that, not wishing to cast
aspersions on individual Deputies or Senators in any way, the nature of an elected public
representatives position means that he or she may be more anxious to make a public statement and
to ventilate the quite legitimate concerns, fears and anger that his or her constituents might have, but
in a way that is not really consistent with a proper observance of fair procedures.
All the judges agreed, at least those who commented on the matter, that there was no question of
institutional bias, meaning that Deputies and Senators could not possibly carry out a fair inquiry
because of their position as elected representatives. They all emphasised, however, that the rule
against bias in particular and the need not to make statements that might prejudge the outcome of an
investigation or inquiry could be difficult in practice for Deputies and Senators to adhere to while at
the same time zealously representing their constituents and putting forward their own political views
or those their constituents have communicated to them.
There are difficulties there and, as I say in the paper, in re Haughey poses a separate set of
difficulties. It is arguable that in re Haughey is too court-centred a view of what fair procedures
involve and is based on the assumption that the only way one can guarantee fair procedures is to
mimic what happens in a court of law. Even then, there is something slightly anomalous about in re
Haughey because an ordinary witness appearing in civil or criminal proceedings does not have the
same protections for his or her good name that someone who is the target of a parliamentary inquiry
would have in re Haughey.
One could mitigate that by a constitutional amendment, which I will return to in a moment. I have
also indicated in the paper that one could mitigate it by following the model of the Commissions of
Investigation Act 2004. A large part of the constraint that in re Haughey imposes is with regard to
public hearings, where allegations are put to witnesses and considered before any view is formed by
the investigating body as to whether they are true, because the investigating body should have
filtered them out before letting them go to a public hearing. The commissions of investigation
successfully avoid many of the restrictions that in re Haughey imposes by having hearings otherwise
than in public and generally merely publishing a final report in which the investigation presents its
conclusions. A Dil committee could function in that way, quite clearly, but it might not be very
satisfactory to Deputies and Senators that an investigation would be conducted behind closed doors
and that the publicity that hearings would involve would not be available.
A point I passed over but which I should have commented on is that Maguire v. Ardagh holds that
there is no inherent power to conduct that particular type of inquiry. The judges leave open the
question of whether legislation could be passed which would give the Oireachtas, or a committee of
the Oireachtas, the power to conduct that type of inquiry. One can gather, from the majority
judgment certainly, that the judges as citizens perhaps would not think it was very desirable to have
such legislation, that it would not serve any useful purpose. However, that is not the same thing as
saying that those judges, or other judges, would hold it to be invalid, having regard to the provisions
of the Constitution. I think that is unlikely because of the presumption of constitutionality - that one
would have to show that such a parliamentary investigation must inevitably be conducted in a way
that would violate the rights of persons appearing before it, before one could really say that the
legislation was invalid.
One major difference that a constitutional amendment would make - and I have set out in the paper
what kind of constitutional amendment it might be - is that one might say explicitly that the Houses
of the Oireachtas and any committee to which that power is delegated, has the power to conduct an
investigation or inquiry into a matter that is deemed to be of public interest by resolution of the
House. One might say that not only can the Oireachtas do so, but also that it can cause it to be
investigated, for example, to give the kind of flexibility one has in relation to removing the President
from office.
One might also say that the procedures to be followed in that inquiry are to be laid out in Standing
Orders. If one did that, my own view, as I made clear in the paper, is that it would be unwise to go
further and try specifically to exclude a judicial review of how that inquiry is conducted, or to
exclude specific fundamental rights, such as the right to ones good name. In a way, it would be
disproportionate and also unnecessary. Let us consider cases where the Oireachtas does clearly have
the power to conduct investigations which would reflect on the good name of individuals, the Curtin
case springs to mind. In Curtin v. Dil ireann the Supreme Court indicated that a high level of
judicial restraint was required when dealing with procedure before the Houses of the Oireachtas
considering whether a particular judge ought to be removed from office. Even though in re Haughey
the other procedural guarantees were applicable, the Supreme Court made it clear that this was a
power that was unequivocally and exclusively given to the Dil and Seanad to consider whether they
should pass resolutions calling for the removal of a particular judge.
If one had a constitutional amendment to insert an express power for the Houses of the Oireachtas to
investigate matters of public interest, and also that the procedures for the way in which those
investigations should be conducted would be specified in Standing Orders, then one would see a
similar degree of deference from the courts. Albeit that the fundamental rights guarantees would
remain and the judicial review would still be there, one would trust that the courts would recognise
that particular constitutional change, and exercise a degree of restraint. One might say that that is
leaving too much open to the courts. It is possible that the courts would just take whatever
constitutional amendment was passed, and because they would still retain judicial review and would
still be the ultimate guarantors of fair procedures, in particular under the Constitution, they would
hamstring parliamentary investigations just as much as might be the case at the moment.
It is useful to think about European models because in the paper I published in 2003, I surveyed the
then member states of the European Union; it was before the recent major enlargement. As I
concluded and set out in the paper, most of them have an express constitutional provision which
allows their parliament or a parliamentary committee to conduct an inquiry into matters of public
interest. It is somewhat ironic that those provisions were put into constitutions, generally starting in
the 19th century, on the understanding that it was giving to the Belgian Parliament, the German
Bundestag or any other such bodies, powers which the Parliament at Westminster historically had.
Most European constitutions are based on their idea of what the Westminster constitution was like. It
is ironic therefore, as is documented in Maguire v. Ardagh, that that power is no longer exercised by
the House of Commons or the House of Lords, but the Europeans took that as their inspiration. Just
as in relation to parliamentary immunity, in many European countries Deputies and Senators cannot
be criminally prosecuted unless their immunity is lifted by the House of which they are a member.
That was adopted on the understanding that it was parallel to the English position. In fact, it was
never the English position because MPs and Members of the House of Lords could be prosecuted.
However, in their understanding of what British parliamentary tradition involved, the Europeans
created a quite different system.
It is useful to look at European models and the model which seems most attractive to me is the
German one. Article 44 of the basic law of the Federal Republic of Germany clearly gives the
Bundestag, the Lower House, the power to establish an inquiry. It also, significantly, gives one
quarter of the members of the Bundestag the right to demand an inquiry.
As I have said in the paper, one of the points that Mr. Justice Geoghegan makes is that if one gives a
power of inquiry to the Dil, Seanad or an Oireachtas committee, one could raise the question as to
what the point of that is, if the Dil and Seanad are not truly independent of the Government. To
some extent, one could say that - although, of course, they are completely independent in their
operation - tribunals of public inquiry are established and their terms of reference are set up very
much for the convenience of the Government of the day, or the Government of the day can block or
prevent inquiries from taking place that it fundamentally objects to.
Similarly, if one gives a power of inquiry to a parliamentary committee and both Houses of
Parliament are still firmly controlled by the Government, Mr. Justice Geoghegan makes the
suggestion that that power, in fact, will only be exercised so that the Government can have an
inquiry carried out at arms length. It can have the kind of inquiry it wants to see take place, but not
take direct responsibility for how it is being conducted. Therefore, there is a case to be made for a
minority right to demand an inquiry. One of the salient points about the German system, however, is
that although there is this express constitutional provision and although the findings of the inquiry
cannot be questioned by judicial review, the German courts, and the constitutional court in
particular, can interfere or restrict the way in which the inquiry can be carried on. For example, if a
parliamentary inquiry asks somebody to produce documents, the courts will review whether the
requirements of the doctrine of proportionality were satisfied so as to protect the fundamental rights
of the persons who are affected. This is not a theoretical power, it is a power which committees of
the Bundestag have exercised on several occasions concerning important, controversial matters.
It is also something which the French Parliament, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate,
increasingly does. In France, the constitution of the Fifth Republic subordinated Parliament to the
Government. Gradually, over the last 50 years the powers of Parliament are being reasserted and
expanded accordingly.
The last point I wish to make concerns human rights. It might be attractive to say that we will have a
constitutional amendment simply to exclude judicial review stating, for example, that Nothing in
this Constitution shall be invoked to prevent a parliamentary inquiry taking place. That would, at
least, have the benefit of certainty, although it might not be particularly fair or just to the persons
whose reputation or good name could be adversely affected.
There is a strong reason for not doing that because, as I pointed out in the paper, in the last five years
or so, the European Court of Human Rights has come to hold fairly clearly that some aspects of the
right to personal reputation is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The latter article says that states such as Ireland must respect the right to private life. There is a
disagreement among members of the court and among academic commentators about whether that is
a good development and also, even if it is a good development in principle, about what aspects of
reputation are protected as an aspect of private life. Although submissions by media lawyers and
others urged the court to change its mind about that, I think that is unlikely. It is clear that some
aspects of personal reputation are protected as a convention right. Therefore, if we had a
constitutional amendment and it allowed a parliamentary inquiry to conduct an investigation without
any judicial review that could reach conclusions that were adverse to the good name of an
individual, it is quite conceivable that Ireland could be found to be in violation of Article 8 in a
sufficiently clear-cut or egregious case.
One must remember that the European Court of Human Rights is not just dealing with Ireland; it is
also dealing with Azerbaijan, the Ukraine and the Russian Federation, although it is not yet dealing
with Belarus. It is very much at the back of the judges minds in Strasbourg that if they allow
something to take place, such as a parliamentary inquiry, how might that be abused by an
authoritarian regime somewhere in the Council of Europe. How might an authoritarian government
use the form of a parliamentary inquiry to victimise its political opponents, for example, to whip up
public anger or hostility towards them?
As I point out in the paper, it has been held that if an individual Member of Parliament makes a
statement in Parliament which is defamatory of somebody, and they have an absolute immunity or
privilege for doing so, that is not a violation of the convention. The court has held that. The
distinction which Mr. Justice Hardiman makes between the individual making a defamatory
statement in the Chamber, and the committee investigating something and coming to a formal
conclusion - a finding of fact - is a persuasive distinction, even though it is not as persuasive as he
perhaps thought. In addition, if coercive powers are exercised to force people to testify before a
committee, or force them to produce documents, that engages the convention.
Article 13 of the convention requires that an individual has an effective judicial remedy in regard to
alleged violations of his or her fundamental rights. The protection of personal reputation in some
form of judicial review is necessary. Even if it is not necessary under the European Convention on
Human Rights, as I said, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
quite clear that as well as home, correspondence, private and family life, the reputation of the
individual is protected under the international covenant. If the protection of the reputation of
individuals is completely excluded, then it is quite possible that an individual could take a complaint
to the United Nations human rights committee and be successful in asserting that Article 17 had
been violated.
I should have said in regard to the paper that I have benefited from the views of my colleagues on
the constitutional studies group in the school of law in University College Dublin and elsewhere.
However, any of the recommendations or suggestions for a possible constitutional amendment are
purely my own and do not necessarily reflect their views.
Chairman: Information on Sen Ardagh Zoom on Sen Ardagh I thank Mr. ODowd. That was very
helpful. There is much very thoughtful material here. We want to finish before 10.30 a.m. in order to
attend Leaders Questions. I will ask members to make comments and ask questions and when all of
them have so done, Mr. ODowd will respond.
Deputy Jim OKeeffe: Information on Jim O'Keeffe Zoom on Jim O'Keeffe That was a fascinating
lecture. The analysis was great and the presentation showed the hand of a practised lecturer. I wish
to focus on one area. Mr. ODowd said that fair procedures would not necessarily imply that what
transpires in a civil or a criminal court must inevitably be followed before a parliamentary
committee. Could we investigate that a little more? I appreciate the suggestion that if something is
held in private, like a commission of investigation, it would possibly obviate many of the difficulties
but, as Mr. ODowd rightly and realistically pointed out, for many reasons that might not be a very
attractive situation for politicians.
I soldiered through the Curtin inquiry where the person in question never appeared before the
committee, although there were lawyers there on his behalf all the time. One is into a situation of
huge cost which would not be very attractive if pushing out the boat in this regard from the point of
view of general parliamentary committees. Is there some middle ground where parliamentary
committees could sit in public, due deference could, in some way, be paid to the need to protect the
reputation of individuals and that such a committee could be in a position to come to a finding which
might adversely affect the name of an individual? That is the area where I would be interested in
further exposition.
Deputy Brendan Howlin: Information on Brendan Howlin Zoom on Brendan Howlin I thank Mr.
ODowd and apologise for my late arrival. I look forward to reading the documentation provided.
For those of us involved in the Abbeylara inquiry, one of the things which struck me reading the
judgment was a peculiarity on which I would be interested to hear Mr. ODowds take. The issue
was not that anybodys rights were transgressed but that the committee was capable of doing that.
The Americans developed the doctrine of preventative action. It seems the courts struck down
something that might happen rather than at a point when it was happening, that is, somebody saying
the committee had now crossed the line. In terms of the separation of powers, I thought that was
pushing the boundaries too far. It is almost like the Oireachtas impeaching a judge because he or she
is capable of doing something unconstitutional. I would be interested to hear Mr. ODowds take on
that.
The second question is related and is about mere politicians getting a sense of the attitude of the
courts to the basic issue of bias. Mr. ODowd said the issue of institutional bias was one on which
the Supreme Court did not find in regard to the Oireachtas. However, if one reads the judgment in
detail, there was the implication that Deputies might have said something previously. It always
amazes me that no matter what a judge has done in his or her past life, including being a politician,
that is all wiped clean and suddenly he or she transcends into a state of perfect balance and
objectivity. Apparently, no such allowance is made for any other mortal. I am interested in the
general issue of bias and if we can construct anything which would pass muster with our judicial
brethren.
I wish to make a general point on which I do not know if Mr. ODowd can comment but we should
put it into the mix. There is significant frustration, which is greatly amplified by the current financial
crisis, at the lack of accountability of individuals who do harm to the public good and who have
access to endless recourse to protect their individual rights which the shoplifter or the ordinary
decent criminal does not have. Society sets up its norms there and if one transgresses, one is publicly
and relatively speedily punished. However, if one has sufficiently good legal advice and the issue is
complicated enough, the public good seems to come very much second place to the individuals
rights all the way, as Mr. ODowd said, to the European Court of Human Rights. That is a very
serious problem not only for parliamentarians but for public discourse in terms of how we will
restore confidence in the administration of justice and public business in this State.
Deputy Jimmy Devins: Information on Jimmy Devins Zoom on Jimmy Devins I thank Mr. ODowd
for his presentation. I am sorry I missed some of it but I had to attend another committee. As a non-
lawyer, I like to keep things very simple. Does Mr. ODowd believe it is possible for the Oireachtas
to set up a committee of inquiry? If it is possible, is a constitutional amendment required? Can the
wording of a suitable amendment be arrived at?
Senator Dan Boyle: Information on Dan Boyle Zoom on Dan Boyle I thank Mr. ODowd for his
presentation. The papers are very detailed and there is plenty to re-examine. I was interested in what
Mr. ODowd said about the German experience. I am not too sure if there is a constitutional code or
a basic law. I presume membership of the committees is restricted to the Bundestag as opposed to
the Bundesrat. Is that distinction made because the Upper House, like ours, is indirectly elected and
greater power is given to the Bundestag as a result?
Given that the German constitutional code specifies that the findings of such committees should not
be judged by judicial review subsequently, does that not fall foul of a possible judgment in the
European Court of Human Rights? Are they able to go so far and row back? If we were to have a
constitutional amendment, would it have to be couched in such terminology which would mean we
would have exactly the same couching of powers?
Chairman: Information on Sen Ardagh Zoom on Sen Ardagh The Bundestag has the right, and on
the motion of one quarter of its members the duty, to establish an investigative committee. Does that
mean that any quarter of the members can establish a committee even though two thirds of the
membership of the Bundestag may not be in favour of it? Could a committee be seen as an extension
of the Dil rather than as a committee of inquiry? Just as the Order of Business provides that there
shall be a motion tabled to agree a tax agreement, a motion would be tabled that the Dil shall
examine the affairs of the Law Library. Could it be that a number of Members would then come
together to perform that function as an extension of the Dil rather than as a committee that needs
Standing Orders and various orders from the Dil?
I thank Mr. ODowd for an incisive contribution that has, as he will have seen, raised a number of
questions and has interested the members to a great extent.
Before returning to Mr. ODowd, I welcome Mr. Paul Anthony McDermott who as kindly agreed to
act as an adviser to the Joint Committee on the Constitution. Mr. Gerald Hogan, as the committee
will be aware, has been appointed to the High Court and is not in a position to continue with us. We
were very grateful to Mr. Hogan for his work with us. Mr. McDermott is sitting in that chair and he
will continue in that position. We are grateful to him for agreeing to come to assist us, to advise and
to contribute where appropriate. Has Mr. McDermott anything to say on this matter before Mr.
ODowd responds so that he might be able to respond to that also?
Mr. Paul Anthony McDermott: Three points occurred to me and if Mr. ODowd does not have time
to deal with them when he is dealing with the members questions, he could respond in writing. The
first one that occurred to me was that the Supreme Court seemed to draw a distinction between what
the Oireachtas can do to its own Members in terms of investigation and what it can do to a member
of the public walking down Kildare Street, in effect, by pulling him or her in. Is there any way to
find a middle ground by stating it applies if a person is a public servant, for example, if one works
for a public bank or any body in State ownership? Could one put such persons in a similar position
to Deputies and Senators and state that because they get a wage from the public purse, they are not in
the position of an ordinary citizen and they are more like a Deputy or Senator and, therefore, perhaps
their rights are different? Such a person is not an ordinary citizen. If such persons want the benefit of
getting 60,000 or 100,000 from the State each year, then maybe the quid pro quo is that they can
be pulled in and can be impugned in a way that a citizen could not be. Is there any scope for dealing
with that?
Second, in terms of a proposed amendment, should there be any limitations on its scope? Would Mr.
ODowd envisage the Constitution simply stating that the Oireachtas can investigate? If so, for
example, if something like Abbeylara happened again, could that now be dealt with by an Oireachtas
committee, or is it possible if the amendment did not have a limitation, even though one has
amended the Constitution, the courts might look at other articles and state that the amendment
cannot mean that the Oireachtas can investigate unlawful killing?
Finally, in terms of the current law, assuming the Oireachtas needs to decide in the morning that it
wants to hold another committee, what is the scope of Abbeylara or what could the Oireachtas do so
as to avoid itself being dragged into the Supreme Court again at great expense? For example, if there
was another hostage situation tomorrow and, instead of somebody being shot dead, a gun goes off
and somebody is slightly wounded in the arm, could an Oireachtas committee investigate the Garda
tomorrow and state it wants to find out why somebody was shot in the arm, or would that still fall
foul of what the court stated in Abbeylara?
Chairman: Information on Sen Ardagh Zoom on Sen Ardagh I would very much appreciate Mr.
ODowds response to those comments and questions.
Mr. John ODowd: I will go through the members questions more or less in the order that they were
asked and then, if there is time, I will deal with Mr. McDermotts questions.
On fair procedures, I will take that question from Deputy Jim OKeeffe with Deputy Howlins third
question because they are fairly closely related. I have expressed my own dissatisfaction with in re
Haughey in that, as I say in the paper, there is a distinction between somebody being on trial and
facing possible fine or imprisonment, and simply facing the prospect that a group of Deputies and
Senators will record their opinion as to what happened in a particular situation. It is true, on the other
hand, that the judges are correct that it is somewhat unrealistic to state that that is just sterile of legal
effect and that it is just somebodys statement of opinion, but it is not as serious an inroad on the
rights of the individual for Deputies and Senators to make a statement. Partly, it is related to the
strong weight that a good name is given in the Constitution, which is reflected in the law of
defamation as well and which has been the subject of some adverse criticism, that we protect good
name as strongly as we protect somebodys right to personal liberty or his or her right not to be
subject to a criminal punishment. Whether one can persuade the Supreme Court that inre Haughey is
inappropriately decided, one can contrast it with the way that inquiries are conducted in the United
Kingdom, for example, even judicial inquiries where the same kind of court-like procedures are not
required.
I take the point about the cost and delay that is involved in relation to legal representation. I suppose
one point to make is that the standard of protection of reputation that the European Court of Human
Rights would require is not as exacting, I would imagine, as the requirements of inre Haughey or the
approach that the Supreme Court might take here. Therefore, what would be objectionable to the
Supreme Court on the basis of inre Haughey and the constitutional right to good name might not
necessarily pose the same problems for the European Court of Human Rights. All the European
Court of Human Rights would require is that there would be some system of judicial review and
some protection through some sort of fair procedures of the rights to reputation. However, they
would not necessarily require the right to be represented by counsel, the right of the persons
concerned to call their own witnesses, for example, and their right to cross-examine the particular
individuals concerned.
Even if one has a constitutional amendment, I must concede that if one really wants to exclude the
possibility of teams of lawyers representing well-funded, well-connected clients hampering the work
of a committee, the only way one could really guarantee that would be to state in the constitutional
amendment that the right to good name was inapplicable and other constitutional rights were
inapplicable, otherwise one is still leaving it in the hands of the Supreme Court.
Deputy Jim OKeeffe: Information on Jim O'Keeffe Zoom on Jim O'Keeffe Is there no half-way
house?
Mr. John ODowd: It is difficult to see. One could partly disapply the right to good name because I
suppose one could put internally into the constitutional amendment some kind of standard of
protection of reputation. One could refer, perhaps, to the international human rights standards and
state that provided an inquiry conformed with the international human rights standards on protecting
reputation, that was sufficient. That might be a possible half-way house. Of course, one would still
depend on the courts to interpret that and decide for themselves. For example, there is very little
interpretation of Article 17 of the covenant and different views could be taken as to what that
requires.
In terms of a half-way house, maybe that is related to Mr. McDermotts question about whether one
could class public servants as being more similar to Deputies and Senators than to ordinary citizens.
In relation to Members, of course, we must await the High Courts decision in a certain challenge,
and I will not say anything about that. However, the difficulty for that argument is that it runs up
against the Abbeylara decision itself because the committee was dealing with members of the Garda
Sochna and the majority judges were not at all impressed by the argument that because they were
members of the Garda Sochna there was some special accountability that allowed the sub-
committee to conduct the investigation it proposed to conduct.
What is more promising there are the lines that Mr. Justice Geoghegan and Ms Justice McGuinness
suggest that one can frame an inquiry in terms of accountability. One can try to reason more
rigorously from the general matters with which the Dil and Seanad are legitimately concerned to a
particular kind of inquiry rather than making a leap from saying that the Dil and Seanad are entitled
to investigate the circumstances under which lethal force is used to saying, for example, that they are
entitled to investigate who fired the fatal shot and whether he or she was culpable for doing so. With
a little more finesse in drafting the terms of reference, one might be able to push out the boundaries
of a legitimate inquiry in that way.
Regarding Deputy Howlins point about the fact that the Supreme Court was making a pre-emptive
decision in Maguire and Ardagh, to be fair, the court found, and the Chief Justice joined in this
finding, that inre Haughey rights had been violated or would be violated by what the sub-committee
proposed to do. It was not a purely speculative or theoretical exercise. In addition, the court was not
really deciding that the committee could not investigate because it would violate rights, the court
was deciding there was no inherent power to conduct the investigation and it found persuasive the
fear that peoples rights might be violated but the actual decision is that there is no power to conduct
this investigation so the Supreme Court was not pre-empting in that way.
As to what Deputy Howlin said about bias and the contrast with the Judiciary, it is true that a fairly
clear principle is applied that whatever clients one has represented in the past, for instance, does not
preclude one from being a judge. To be fair, one could point to the example of Mella Carroll and the
Dublin Well Woman decision because Ms Justice Carroll was chairperson of the Second
Commission on the Status of Women, she made certain statements about the need for two
constitutional amendments following the Attorney General v. X case, the Supreme Court
subsequently decided she was disqualified on the basis of objective bias from sitting in any case that
involves interpreting those amendments subsequently. It is therefore a little unfair on the Judiciary to
say it does not apply to some extent at least, the same standards it would demand of politicians.
In answer to Deputy Devinss question, I agree a committee of inquiry of some court is possible and
ordinary legislation would give some scope for its introduction because, as I have said, the Supreme
Court does not pronounce any view on that. Although there is a certain degree of scepticism, even
hostility, perhaps, in the view of some of the Supreme Court judges towards such an investigation, as
Deputy Howlin mentioned, there is a presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, if the Oireachtas
passes legislation to say that it, the two Houses or their committees, can conduct an investigation,
then the courts cannot simply declare that legislation to be invalid because then they would be saying
an investigation must inevitably be carried on in a way. At the same time, they might say that any
particular investigation was a violation of somebodys fundamental rights.
Deputy Jimmy Devins: Information on Jimmy Devins Zoom on Jimmy Devins Are they not
constantly saying that legislation passed in these Houses is invalid?
Mr. John ODowd: One could exaggerate that. A lot more legislation challenged as being invalid is
upheld than is struck down.
Deputy Jimmy Devins: Information on Jimmy Devins Zoom on Jimmy Devins However, they have
that option.
Mr. John ODowd: Yes, they do. However, it is difficult to see why they would be able to say that
legislation was invalid because it would involve saying that Members of the Oireachtas must
inevitably end up violating peoples rights which even the majority of judges in Maguire and Ardagh
would find it difficult to say.
An amendment is probably necessary to bring some kind of clarity to the law and also, as I have
suggested, to put it to the courts in a way, if there was an express power of investigation or inquiry,
the courts would have to think much more carefully about what degree of restraint they should
exercise and what degree of deference they should show to the way in which such an inquiry or
investigation was carried on.
Senator Boyle asked about the German example. The reason the Bundesrat does not have a similar
power is that the Bundesrat is really a little like the Council of Ministers of the European Union in
that it consists of representatives of the government of the states of the Lnder so it would be a bit
strange to give that quasi-diplomatic body the right to investigate since it just consists of state
government delegations casting a block vote. It is not really a deliberative parliamentary assembly in
quite the same way.
With regard to immunity from judicial review, the findings of the inquiry are immune from judicial
review but it is also provided that they are not binding on the courts or another administrative
authority. They just represent purely the opinion of the members of the Bundestag who have
conducted an inquiry and the other branches of government are not bound by them in any way and
have to investigate the matter independently if their functions are called into question. I think the
European Court of Human Rights would find that acceptable because there is judicial review of the
way in which the investigation is carried on so if powers have been disproportionately exercised to
demand documents or to invade individual privacy, the German courts can and do intervene to
prevent this taking place.
Perhaps that is related to Deputy Ardaghs point about one quarter of the Members. It is true that a
minority of the Bundestag can demand an investigation and this goes back to the Weimar
Constitution in 1919 when the figure was one fifth. There have been cases where the minority in the
Bundestag has gone to court to force the Bundestag to conduct an inquiry. They have a legal right to
have the investigation conducted so the courts will intervene to assist the minority in having the
investigation carried on according to the terms of reference they want the inquiry to follow.
Unless there is a very radical change in the relationship between the Dil and the Seanad, which
would involve far-reaching constitutional amendments, it is difficult to see the Dil and the Seanad
acting in a way that is systematically contrary to the wishes of the Government of the day. Unless
one gives a minority of the Dil or the Seanad the right to demand an inquiry, one could question
what is the value of giving the Dil and the Seanad a power of inquiry which will just be a proxy for
the Government in a way.
I do not think looking at a committee as an extension of the Dil would advance matters much
because the majority in Maguire and Ardagh were clear that neither the Dil nor the Seanad had this
power of inquiry. Therefore, if the plenary body does not have the power to conduct the inquiry,
there is no point trying to recast a group of Deputies or Senators just as being an extension of the
plenary rather than a committee. The reason the sub-committee did not have the power was because
the committee did not have the power and this was because the Dil and Seanad did not have the
power. If one wants that power to exist then a constitutional amendment of some kind would be
necessary.
I will respond to Mr. McDermotts remarks or comments. I think I have covered the distinction
between Members and non-Members. The case of Maguire and Ardagh involved members of the
Garda Sochna and the majority of judges were not impressed by that argument at all, that there was
some special accountability involved in being a public servant.
As regards the proposed amendment, it could involve limitations on scope. Some European
countries specifically exclude any finding with regard to the culpability or fault of an individual
from the scope of the inquiry, for example.
Deputy Brendan Howlin: Information on Brendan Howlin Zoom on Brendan Howlin Is there a
precedent?
Deputy Brendan Howlin: Information on Brendan Howlin Zoom on Brendan Howlin Mr. ODowd
could revert to the committee on that point.
Mr. John ODowd: It is contained in the original article I wrote in 2003 but I can certainly provide
an example of that. It depends on the kind of formula one would use as to how widely such an
investigation was defined.
Deputy Jim OKeeffe: Information on Jim O'Keeffe Zoom on Jim O'Keeffe On that last point, was
there a difference between a restriction on finding people culpable as opposed to coming to a finding
that would or might adversely affect their good name? I think that is crucial.
Mr. John ODowd: In Maguire v. Ardagh the Supreme Court thought that was a distinction without a
difference because if one said that an individual garda fired the fatal shot, then that was tantamount
to saying he or she was guilty of unlawful killing. That is the view taken by the majority, that this
would only be a verbal distinction, in the circumstances of that particular case. It might make a
difference in some other kind of case.
Sweden is the conspicuous exception in the European Union in that in Sweden these kinds of
investigations are specifically ruled out by the Swedish constitution. This is interesting because the
Swedish Parliament has one of the strongest and most developed and influential committee systems
anywhere in the European Union but they do not find it necessary in Sweden to have investigations
that deal with the culpability - or could be seen as dealing with the culpability or responsibility of
individuals for particular acts or conduct.
Finally, on the question of the scope of the decision under current law, I do not quite recall the
question.
Mr. Paul Anthony McDermott: If in the morning the Oireachtas or the members of this committee
would like to establish an investigation, what could they safely do without being judicially reviewed
again? For example, if somebody is shot in the arm, could one say that is a relatively minor thing,
compared with shooting somebody dead? Would this be something one could investigate? What
does it mean to impugn somebodys good name? What level of attack is required?
Mr. John ODowd: I think I have probably covered that point already. It is a question of starting with
whatever the legitimate policy or legislative concerns that the Oireachtas or the committee might
have and then tries to define the terms of reference of the inquiry to adhere to these as far as
possible. Another point is to follow the example suggested by the High Court in Ahern v. Mahon,
where the judges said that Article 15.13 of the Constitution meant that the tribunal could not come to
any finding as to whether the former Taoiseach had misrepresented his personal finances to the Dil.
However, they did say that they could make a finding as a result of which a reasonable reader of the
report might form for himself or herself the conclusion that such a misrepresentation had taken
place. They could make the findings of fact but they could not spell out the conclusion; this had to be
left to the reader of the report because otherwise they would be making the Deputy amenable to the
tribunal for statements he had made to Dil ireann.
Chairman: Information on Sen Ardagh Zoom on Sen Ardagh I thank Mr. ODowd for his
presentation and for his responses to the questions and comments.
The joint committee adjourned at 10.30 a.m. until Wednesday, 15 December 2010.
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/De
batesWebPack.nsf/committeetakes/CNJ2010120100004?opendo
cument
http://opac.oireachtas.ie/AWData/Library3/Library2/DL025472.
pdf
DIRT Inquiry 1999
Dil Committee of Public Accounts
Sub-Committee on Certain Revenue Matters 1999
Chairman: Jim Mitchell T.D
http://opac.oireachtas.ie/AWData/Library3/Library2/DL047077.
pdf
Convention votes to lower
voting age, rejects reduction of
presidential term
Delegates at the Constitutional Conventions first full meeting this
weekend also backed a proposal for ordinary citizens to be able to
nominate a candidate for the president.
Jan 27th 2013, 3:14 PM 6,356 Views 38 Comments
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on-constitutional-convention-362423-Feb2012
http://www.thejournal.ie/constitutional-convention-voting-age-
presidential-term-771334-Jan2013/
Government to hold
referendum on lowering voting
age to 16
The referendum is likely to be held on the same day as a number of
other votes designed to modernise the Constitution.
Jul 10th 2013, 12:01 PM 5,618 Views 71 Comments
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986599-Jul2013/
http://www.thejournal.ie/formal-recommendation-lower-voting-
age-16-845803-Mar2013/
Ireland is the only country in the EU which by law Voting Age [ACCEPTED] *5th ... *3rd: Accession to
the European Communities [ACCEPTED] 16 October 1968 illegal invalid
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31968R1612&from=EN
Ireland | freedom of movement in the EU
eumovement.wordpress.com/eu-countries/info-ireland
... Main Laws Statutory Instrument S.I. No. 226 of 2006 European Communities (Free ...
in Irelandare illegal
CASE NOTE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ... Conditionality in the European Communitys GSP ...
Basic Documents, 789, UN Doc UNCTAD/LEG/1 (Octobe
Ireland
Patents (Amendment) Act 2012
The Patents (Amendment) Act 2012 (No. 1 of 2012) is Oireachtas Copyright Material and
is reproduced with the permission of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Government of
Ireland).
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ie/ie201en.pdf
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ie/ie200en.pdf
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ie/ie135en.pdf
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ie/ie156en.pdf
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/fr/ie/ie070fr.pdf
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ie/ie027en.pdf
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ie/ie187en.pdf
Childrens Constitutional Rights
recommended the lower voting age of 16 means that the ... Childrens Constitutional Rights,
... Government to hold a referendum to amend the Constitution
http://www.childrensrights.ie/sites/default/files/submissions_rep
orts/files/1ChildrensConstitutionalRights.pdf
On 19 November 2012, relying in part on the McCrystal ruling, the High Court granted
leave for a legal challenge to the referendum result. Mr Justice McDermott handed down judgment
on 18 October 2013 in the case taken by Dublin homemaker Joanna Jordan. She argued that the
breaches of the McKenna judgment as found in the McCrystal case were so egregious and serious
that they were likely to have had a material e ect on the outcome
of the referendum. She also contended that proceeding with the referendum two days
after the McCrystal ruling exacerbated the e ect of the unconstitutional conduct, which in turn
further interfered with the democratic process. However, the High Court held that Ms Jordan had not
succeeded in proving, on the balance of probabilities, that the Governments information booklet,
website and advertising had a material e ect on the referendum result. The Judge highlighted that the
McCrystal judgment was a short, focused and de nitive condemnation of the unconstitutional
manner in which public funds were spent. The extensive coverage of the McCrystal ruling was
considered by the Court to have been re ective of this and also to have given rise to public debate
and discussion on the matter.
On 24 October 2013, an appeal was led with the Supreme Court along with an application for a
priority hearing which will take place in 2014.7 A stay has been placed on the Order
to con rm the provisional referendum certi cate which means that the Amendment Bill containing
the text of the Amendment passed by the People of Ireland continues to be frozen until the case is
decided upon.
Constitutional Convention: On 1 December 2012, the inaugural meeting of the Constitutional
Convention was held. It comprises 100 members: 66 citizens drawn from the electoral register, 29
members of the Oireachtas and four from the Northern Ireland Assembly. To date, the Convention
has considered eight possible amendments: reducing the Presidential term from seven to ve years;
lowering the voting age from 18 to 17 years; a review of the
Dil electoral system; giving Irish citizens resident outside the State the right to vote in Presidential
elections; a provision for same-sex marriage; amending the clause on the role of women in the
home; increasing the participation of women in politics; and the removal of the o ence of blasphemy
from the Constitution. The Convention held a series of public meetings in Cork, Galway, Waterford,
Dublin, Sligo, Athlone and Monaghan to collect the views of the public on the next phase of the
Conventions work.8 The Convention has also completed reports on six issues to date9 and has
decided to examine two additional issues in February 2014: Dil reform and the inclusion of
economic, social and cultural rights in the Constitution.10
In March 2013, the Convention considered the issue of a constitutional amendment to lower the
voting age from 18 years. The majority, 52% of members decided in favour of reducing the voting
age for all elections while 47% of members voted against the proposal. Members also indicated their
preference for the new voting age: 48% favoured 16 years, 38% supported 17 years while 14% had
no opinion. In terms of reducing the minimum age required of
a candidate standing for election, the majority voted against reducing the age which is currently 21
years.11 Youth representatives from the National Youth Council of Ireland were invited to make a
presentation to the Convention on this issue.
In April 2013, Youth Work Ireland and its Voices of Youth Group facilitated a Children and Young
Peoples Constitutional Convention which assembled 50 young people from around the country to
discuss constitutional reform, along the lines of that under deliberation by the Convention. The
Chairman of the Constitutional Convention, Tom Arnold, was invited to chair the proceedings.12 In
addition to the issues under review by the Convention, the young people made a number of
recommendations for the Convention to consider including making the right to free education e
ective and real, making the separation between Church and State clearer and changing the Preamble.
The Convention considered the issue of a constitutional amendment
to lower the voting
age from 18 years. The majority, 52% of members decided in favour
of reducing the voting age for
all elections while 47% of members voted against
the proposal. Members also indicated their preference for the new
voting age: 48% favoured 16 years,
38% supported 17 years while 14% had no opinion.
Childrens Constitutional Rights gets a B grade in Report Card 2014, a fall from last years
A grade. This is due to the fact that the positive result of the referendum cannot yet be
implemented and has been delayed. It also re ects the fact that some decisions have been made
which will hopefully improve childrens constitutional rights through the Constitutional Convention,
for example the examination of the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights. However, it is
regrettable that children and young people have not had a formal mechanism to feed into the
Convention itself.
Childrens Rights Referendum: The judicial challenge to the Thirty-First Amendment Bill
has e ectively frozen the process of implementing the referendum result as it can only become law if
the Court declares the petition before it to be null and void.13 The appeal to the Supreme Court,
which will be heard in 2014, means that no law reform can take place to implement the referendum
result until the case is decided.
The new article, Article 42A, will necessitate the introduction of speci c legislation to ensure its
implementation. Under Article 42A.2.2 the Oireachtas will have to legislate to allow for
the adoption of a child in circumstances where the level of parental failure towards the child has
reached an unacceptable threshold. Article 42A.4.1 also commits the Oireachtas to legislate to
ensure that the best interests of the child will be the paramount consideration
in certain instances of decision-making a ecting a child including child care proceedings brought by
the State, adoption proceedings and in relation to guardianship, custody or access proceedings.
Article 42A.4.2 requires legislation to be put in place to ensure that the views of the child are taken
into account in relation to individual proceedings listed in Article 42A.4.1.
The General Scheme and Heads of Bill of the proposed Adoption (Amendment) Bill were published
in September 2012, prior to the referendum. The provisions of the proposed Adoption (Amendment)
Bill 2012 will change the criteria under which the High Court may authorise the making of an
adoption order without parental consent. This will be in the case of a child where his or her parents
have failed in their parental duty and where that child
is in long term care with prospective adopters. The Bill will also provide for the voluntary placement
for adoption of any child irrespective of the marital status of his or her parents.14 The Minister for
Children and Youth A airs, Frances Fitzgerald TD has expressed her intention to progress this
legislation through the houses of the Oireachtas once the Referendum Bill is signed into law.15 It is
not clear what other steps have been taken towards the preparation of the legislation necessitated by
Article 42A.4.1 and Article 42A.4.2.
Eighth Amendment, was included within the ... United States, the Constitution protected habeas
corpus in Article 1, 9,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-
CONAN-2002-9-9.pdf
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1983/ca/8/enacted/en/print
CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND
visions of the Nineteenth Amendment of the Constitution Act, ... Eighth Amendment of the Consti-
tution Act, ... in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands
https://www.ucc.ie/archive/hdsp/Irish_Constitution_english.pdf
The Twenty-eighth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland permitted the state to ratify the
Lisbon Treaty of the European Union. It was effected by the Twenty-eighth .
http://www.irisoifigiuil.ie/archive/2009/october/Ir061009.PD
F#page=7
Results received at the Central Count Centre for the Referendum on The
Lisbon Treaty
https://web.archive.org/web/20080619215420/http://www.refere
ndum.ie/current/index.asp?ballotid=78
Twenty-Eighth Amendment of the Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Bill 2009
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2009/4909/B4
909D.english.pdf
The damage done by
Lisbon re-run will not be
easily fixed
Taoiseach Brian Cowen and his wife Mary cast their votes in the
Lisbon II referendum yesterday
October 3 2009
An event of lasting political significance has taken place with the vote on the second Lisbon Treaty
referendum. Whatever the outcome, those who have voted 'No' did so having been disenfranchised.
The act of doing this took place more than a year ago, when the Government -- without any guarantees
at all for what they did -- broke trust with a national democratic decision, one that is enshrined in our
Constitution and should have an absolute value, as referendums have had in the past.
Ignoring this was a government act, pursued immediately and energetically by Brian Cowen, without
debate, and aggressively backed by Micheal Martin. After initial prevarication by the leaders of the two
main parties, with Eamon Gilmore saying first that the Lisbon Treaty was dead and then changing his
mind, Fine Gael and Labour completed the process of disenfranchisement of those who had voted 'No'.
With the exception of a small number of them, who were Sinn Fein supporters, more than 800,000
people, representing close to one-third of registered voters, found themselves without a voice in the
Dail.
http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/the-damage-done-
by-lisbon-rerun-will-not-be-easily-fixed-26570848.html
Poll Results:
http://www.thejournal.ie/poll-voting-age-16-986381-Jul2013/
Ireland to vote on retention of 8th Amendment in summer of
2018
26/09/2017
Update 7pm: A referendum on abortion rights will likely be
held next summer, Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has said.
The vote on the Eighth Amendment to the Republic's
Constitution - which states that the right to life of the mother
and the unborn child are equal - is due in May or June.
The amendment has long been the source of contention in
Ireland with pro-choice supporters demanding its abolition and
pro-life advocates insisting it should be retained with
the debate and decision certain to attract global media
attention.
Follow
@AFP
#BREAKING Ireland says will hold abortion referendum in
2018
3:52 PM - Sep 26, 2017
25 25 Replies 454 454 Retweets 428 428 likes
Twitter Ads info and privacy
Follow
Chris Donoghue
@chrisrdonoghue
In 8 or 9 months Ireland will go to the people for a
referendum on abortion. Here are the 6 referendums just
confirmed by the government:
3:06 PM - Sep 26, 2017
9 9 Replies 161 161 Retweets 246 246 likes
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https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/press/ireland-
blasphemy-amendment-contrary-to-free-speech.pdf
amendments and reforms to local government, arising from the work of the Citizens Assembly, the Convention on the
Referendums on Blasphemy (Article 40.6.1) and Woman's life within the home (Article 41.2.1) October 2018
Each referendum will be subject to passage of Bills by the Houses of the Oireachtas and formal confirmation of the polling date.
Any amendment to our Constitution requires careful consideration by the people. They should
be given ample time to consider the issues and to take part in well-informed public debate.
Setting a timetable for the referendums to be held over the next two years will allow all involved
in campaigning on the issues to plan ahead and to facilitate that public debate.
The Citizens' Assembly report on the on the Eighth amendment of the Constitution is currently being considered by the Joint
Oireachtas Committee which is expected to report before the end of the year. A Bill to amend the Constitution will be prepared
in light of the Committees report, and subject to its passage by the Houses of the Oireachtas, a referendum will be held in May
or June of 2018.
The Government is committed to holding constitutional referendums on Article 41.2.1, regarding a womans life within the
home, and Article 40.6.1, on the offence of blasphemy both arising from recommendations made by the Convention on the
In March 2017 the Government approved in principle the holding of a referendum to give citizens resident outside the State the
right to vote in Presidential elections also on foot of a recommendation from the Convention on the Constitution. The
Reforms to local government including the direct election of city Mayors arise from the Programme for Government.
The Government decided on 4 April 2017 to support a Private Members Bill from Deputy Josepha Madigan to reduce the length
of the period or periods for which a couple must live apart before they can obtain a divorce.
The Government has deferred making a decision on the timing of a referendum on Irelands participation in the Unified Patent
Court.
The Government is also still considering the holding of a referendum on keeping Irish Water in public ownership.
The referendums to be held in October 2018 could be held on the same date as a presidential election if one is held.
It is proposed that the June 2019 referendums would be held on the same day as the local and European elections.
The Taoiseach will meet the leaders of the main parties to discuss the plans for referendums.
I will be writing about this over the coming months. This first
article covers the history of blasphemy law in Ireland
Overview
Blasphemy was a common law offence under Irish law when the
1937 Constitution explicitly made it an offence punishable by law.
The Defamation of Act of 1961 also made it a statutory crime, but
did not define what blasphemy was.
The 1996 Constitution Review Group called for the deletion of the
crime of blasphemy from the Irish Constitution, along with other
references to the Christian God, religion and religious oaths. Two
other All-Party Committees have also called for the removal of
religious references in the Constitution.
In 1999, the Supreme Court found the Irish law against blasphemy
to be unenforceable. In 2008, the UK abolished its blasphemy law
from which ours evolved. And the 2008 Irish All-Party Committee
on the Constitution repeated the call to remove the blasphemy
reference from our Constitution.
In 1921, Bradford man John Gott was the last person in Britain to
be sent to prison for blasphemy when he published pamphlets
satirising the Bible, in which he compared Jesus to a circus clown.
Gott was sentenced to nine months hard labour and, being of ill
health, he died shortly after his release.
The Preamble begins with the words: In the Name of the Most
Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our
final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,
we, the people of Eire, humbly acknowledging all our
obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ
Article 40.6.1 guarantees the right of citizens to express freely
their convictions and opinions subject to public order and
morality. It then restricts this right by saying that says that The
publication or utterance of blasphemous, seditious, or indecent
matter is an offence which shall be punishable in accordance
with law.
Article 44.1 says that The State acknowledges that the homage
of public worship is due to Almighty God. It shall hold His
Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour religion.
Note that this article does not enshrine the rights of citizens to
worship this imagined character. Instead, it enshrines the rights
of this imagined character to be worshipped.
1961 Dail Debate on Defamation Bill
In July 1961 the Dail debated a Defamation Bill which included a
reference to blasphemous libel. During the debate, Justice Minister
Charles Haughey was questioned by Patrick McGilligan, a TD who
was also a professor of constitutional law at UCD.
Arising from this cartoon, Dublin man John Corway applied to the
High Court for an order allowing him to take a blasphemy
prosecution against the Sunday Independent. In October 1996, the
High Court ruled that the cartoon did not provide a clear prima
facie case for a blasphemy prosecution, and that, even if it had
done so, the public interest would not be served by instituting a
prosecution.
The Supreme Court also said that, under the Irish Constitution,
the State is not placed in the position of an arbiter of religious
truth.
In effect, the Supreme Court found that the common law crime of
blasphemy was inconsistent with the religious equality provisions
of the Constitution, and thus had not survived the enactment of the
Constitution.
The Committee was chaired by Sean Ardagh and the vice-chair was
Jim OKeeffe. The members were TDs Thomas Byrne, Michael
DArcy, Tom Hayes, Brendan Howlin, Michael Kennedy, Denis
Naughten, Ned OKeeffe, Mary ORourke and Michael Woods; and
Senators Dan Boyle, Denis ODonovan, Eugene Regan and Alex
White.
Ireland voted with the other EU states that there should not be
such a crime as defamation of religion. The Minister for Foreign
affairs, Micheal Martin, later explained why Ireland had taken this
position. He told the Dail that:
During the Oireachtas debate, the fine was reduced from 100,000
to 25,000, allowing people to blaspheme four times as often for
the same price. Also, some defences were introduced, but not with
sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his conduct.
-oOo-
On June 12th 2008, the fate of nearly 500 million people will be
decided by a country whose population totals only 4.2 million. The
people of the Republic Of Ireland will be the only 'citizens' of the
European Union given the opportunity to have their say on what is
potentially the most fundamental piece of legislation in the history
of the 'Old Continent'. All the other member states have simply
ignored the wishes of their people and left ratification to be 'rubber
stamped' by their respective parliaments. However, it is necessary for
all twenty seven member states to complete ratification before the
'Treaty' becomes legally binding.
So, if the Irish vote is 'NO' then the treaty will not be able to be
implemented, at least for the present. But, if the Irish people
swallow the massive 'Pro Treaty' propaganda and vote 'Yes', then the
fate of, and inevitable demise of the Nation States of Europe will be
sealed. There will be no more serious obstacles left to
Federalisation. The long dreamed of (by the Federalists that is)
United States Of Europe will become a reality.
Many, if not the majority of people on both sides of the Atlantic have
been 'duped' for decades into believing that the EEC/EU is about a
'free trade' zone. This is not at all the case, as the above quote by
Monsieur Monet illustrates very clearly. So what are the ramifications
of a 'Yes' vote by the Irish.
The European Union was founded on lies and deceit at the very highest
levels of government. This trail of deception has continued since, and
on Thursday 13th December 2007 stopped momentarily in Lisbon Portugal,
where the 'dignitaries' of the member states of this 'trading bloc'
signed the 'EU Reform Treaty'.
The Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen has decided against
any referendum on the Treaty, leaving it's ratification to Danish MPs.
He told reporters that the 'Treaty' was 'Good For Denmark'. Denmark
had planned to hold a referendum on the Constitution back in 2005, but
following the 'NO' votes in France and Holland, the vote was dropped.
The Danish Justice Ministry have concluded that the 'Treaty' does not
threaten Danish Sovereignty. Mr Rasmussen is quoted as saying " When
sovereignty is relinquished, a referendum is needed, but when no
sovereignty is relinquished, Parliament will ratify the text'. He also
confirmed plans to hold another referendum on the 'Single
Currency' (EURO) and whether to end the 'opt outs' agreed at
Maastricht relating to defence, justice and home affairs.
The Political and Financial Elite of Europe have been working towards
this moment since the end of World War Two. In every member state, the
personalities might differ, but the rhetoric is always the same; 'No
Loss Of Sovereignty, good for the people, good for the economy and so
on'.
This sixth and final 'Treaty' is the 'death knell' for the sovereignty
of the member states of the EU. Do not be mistaken about this, and no
matter what your 'elected' leaders are telling you to the contrary,
this is it. This is the culmination of years of plotting, deception
and conspiring against the people of Europe. So what's the big deal
many will ask ? Read on and find out.
This 'Treaty' is the EU's most secret and quickest drafted document
yet. Opposition to and recognition that the EU is a Police State in
the making is growing and they (the conspirators) know that speed is
vital. Tony Blair agreed to it in June 2007 as his final 'Stab in
Britains Back'. Foreign Ministers agreed it's terms in September 2007
and on 13th December two months later, the representatives of each
member state signed the document, and now, all that remains is
ratification, and the deed will be done.
So, if the result of the Irish vote is a 'Yes'and all other member
states do as indicated, ratify this treasonous piece of infamy, how
will our lives be affected ?
Our National Parliaments will become redundant as all power that still
remains will transfer to Brussels. It will mean the formal end of
those Historic Nations of Europe who are member states of the EU.
National Embassies around the world will come under the auspicies of
EU bureaucrats. The ancient counties and provinces will be merged and
combined into 'EU Administrative Regions'. (The recent amalgamations
of Kommunes in Denmark is a premptive example of this, along with the
'devolved' parliaments of Scotland and Wales, to be soon joined by the
eradication of 'England' and the setting up of similar regional
assemblies there).
The future well being of a whole continent lies in the hands of the
Irish people. They need our support. They need to know they are not
alone. It's time to start writing to your 'elected' representatives,
time to find the time to research what this EU thing is really about.
Time to switch off the TV and pick up a book about the EU, or check
out the many internet sites relating to this 'Superstate in the
making'. Do something, speak to your friends, neighbours, family. Just
do something. Before it is too late, and it almost is.
Philip Jones
-oOo-
The June 12 vote on the Lisbon Treaty now seems less certain, as
opposition groups, some businessmen and farmers raise concerns about
sovereignty.
By Kim Murphy
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
June 1, 2008
NENAGH, IRELAND The "Yes on the EU" bus rolled into town blaring a
foot-stomping "Galway Girl" from its megaphone one afternoon last
week, but what it got was a whole lot of no.
An Irishman has always been a hard sell, and never more so than when
issues of sovereignty are at stake.
"People died for your freedom," declares one of the signs that have
popped up in this agricultural town as Ireland prepares to vote June
12 on the European Union's new constitution. "Don't throw it away."
Farmer Ida McLoughlin isn't sold on the other posters plastered around
town: "Vote yes for jobs, the economy and Ireland's future."
"Since the EU, all you see are 4x4s going down the street and big
buildings going up. The thatched cottages are gone," McLoughlin said.
"You have all these Johnny-come-lately people who were poor and got
rich, and they're dreadful people. We've lost our Irish values."
"It would put us in the very tortured position of going back to the
drawing board," said Marc Coleman, a Dublin-based economic analyst.
The treaty would broaden and establish a legal basis for the EU's
lawmaking powers in some areas while making them subject much more
directly to national parliaments and citizens initiatives. It would
set out voting weights between large and small countries, improve
cross-border cooperation in areas such as crime fighting and climate
change and streamline the European Commission to a manageable decision-
making body of 18.
Under the treaty, member nations still would retain their historic
veto power in crucial areas such as defense, foreign policy, taxation
and social security, but not on issues like immigration and energy
policy.
Here in County Tipperary, the "Yes on the EU" bus was stopping in
front of village cafes and bakeries; young activists from the majority
Fianna Fail party trailed out in yellow T-shirts. They smiled and
passed out leaflets touting EU membership as a bonanza for Ireland --
the country received 58 billion euros in European funds for
agriculture, infrastructure and other programs from 1973 to 2003. Its
exports to other EU states increased from 45 billion euros in 1997 to
87 billion in 2006.
Irish farmers say the trade proposals could put 50,000 cattle farmers
in Ireland out of business by easing importation of Brazilian and
Argentine beef and driving down prices. The Irish Farmers Assn. says
it will urge its members to vote "no" on the EU treaty if Ireland
doesn't exercise its EU veto to block the trade proposals.
The other main source of opposition has come from a group called
Libertas, fronted by two wealthy businessmen who have had extensive
contracts with the U.S. military. This has caused some in the Irish
media to speculate that the group is advancing the agenda of U.S.
conservatives, some of whom worry that a stronger, united Europe would
undermine U.S. interests on the continent.
"Europe hasn't let us down yet," said Mick Connell, a member of the
local council in Templemore, not far from Nenagh. "That should be good
enough."
Source: http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/itsonlyfair/latimes0315.html
-oOo-
"This is a great victory for the courageous men and women who have
come
to Canada because they refuse to take part in the illegal, immoral
Iraq War,
and for the many organizations and individuals who have supported this
campaign over the past four years," said Lee Zaslofsky, Coordinator of
the War
Resisters Support Campaign and a Vietnam War deserter who came to
Canada in
1970.
Source: http://www.newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/June2008/03/c7865.html
See also:
All this, and more, at 'Chemtrails: Are They For Climate Control,
Weather Modification, 'Black Ops' Or For Biological Warfare
And Mass Vaccine Testing?'
http://www.mimico-by-the-lake.com/BLACK-OP.HTM
- o O o-
Check frequently for new free online ClassicTravel and History Book
titles at
http://www.mimico-by-the-lake.com/freetrav.htm
http://www.mimico-by-the-lake.com/freehist.htm
And for free online Classic Christian Books and Writings
http://www.mimico-by-the-lake.com/SERMONS.HTM
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/soc.culture.magyar/y8I
A-eEy36w
https://www.lawscot.org.uk/media/1198987/the-european-
union-withdrawal-bill-briefing-summary-for-second-reading.pdf
After the election, three super Juniors were appointed all of whom should have
been entitled to an extra 15,829-a-year for attending Cabinet meetings.
However, the government discovered that legislation allowed for only two of them
to be paid to the additional money.
The allowance was allocated to Minister Paul Kehoe and Minister Finian
McGrath, which would have left Regina Doherty without the extra payment.
But instead of cutting her out of the loop, the government came up with a brand
new allowance for the Chief Whip which is valued at the exact same amount.
The allowance did not exist during the last government when Paul Kehoe filled
the position of Chief Whip, and he was instead paid the bonus for ministers of
state attending Cabinet.
Documents obtained under FOI reveal that plans to pay the normal allowance to
three different ministers were underway but had to be halted suddenly.
An email from the Department of the Taoiseach last summer explained: [We
can] confirm that the number of Ministers of State who attend Cabinet Meetings
under the current Government has increased to three.
However, days later the plan ran into difficulties when it was discovered only two
could get the extra payment.
Sent from the Department of Public Expenditure, an email said: The sanction [to
pay all three] is withdrawn with immediate effect as weve run into a problem
there are now three Super Juniors in this government.
But the relevant legislation only provides for payment of the allowance to no
more than two. So this will need to be addressed. In the meantime, please
do notpay it, or cancel it if you have already started and recoup any amounts
already paid please.
A month later, the allowances were still not being paid to any of the three super-
junior ministers as attempts were made to resolve the problem.
A briefing note said: We are awaiting clarification from the Department of the
Taoiseach on the second Minister of State to be paid the allowance.
In November, it was finally confirmed that the second minister to get the
allowance would be Paul Kehoe. And to get around the problem of excluding one
of them, a brand new position had been added to the list of allowances.
It was Government Whip, and the allowance payable for the role was 15,829
exactly what would have been payable to the others.
This reflects the fact that under the legislation, only two Ministers of State may
be paid the allowance for attending Cabinet meetings.
That meant all three were paid the 15,829 annual payment, along with their
standard TD salary of 87,258 and a ministerial allowance of 34,381 it makes
their annual packages worth 137,468 each.
A few other small changes were made to allowances with increases for both the
whip and assistant whip of Sinn Fin.
The Sinn Fin whip position rose from 5,520 to 9,200 with an increase to
4,600 from 2,760 for the assistant position, to reflect the partys larger size.
Similarly, Labours assistant whip position was cut in half to 2,760.
Payment of almost all the allowances ended up being delayed until Christmas
with documents suggesting some politicians were querying why it was taking so
long.
One email said: I believe some Members have been wondering when payment
can be expected.
Minister Paschal Donohoe even ended up involved asking if the allowances could
be paid by Christmas, according to records.
Mr Donohoe signed off on a final submission with only one change ensuring that
assistant whips for Fianna Fil and Fine Gael would be paid at the same level of
8,740.
Thankfully, all payments except one did end up going through in the December
payroll. Thank you all for doing this much appreciated, wrote Minister
Donohoe.
FOI documents below there is a lot of material so if you want to have a dig
around, youll need some spare time.
http://www.kenfoxe.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Allowances-FOI.pdf
The judiciary told Minister Paschal Donohoe that no other group of people had
been hit with as many different pay cuts and other budgetary measures during the
financial crisis.
In a series of letters, the Association of Judges in Ireland (AJI) expressed concern
that they were going to be penalised again, this time for their accelerated
pensions.
Like soldiers and gardai, the pensions of members of the judiciary build up much
more quickly than is the case with other public servants.
Under government public pay plans, these fast-track pensions are to be hit with
far higher levies to reflect the fact they can become lucrative faster.
However, judges complained they should not be lumped in with other groups in
receipt of accelerated pensions and that their circumstances were unique.
In the cases of gardai and the Defence Forces, this happens because they are
required to retire early. The position of judges, on the other hand, is quite
different in that, far from having an early retirement age, most judges retire at
70.
The letter said it was difficult for a judge to accumulate extremely long service
because they normally had to practice as a solicitor or a barrister for so long first.
The judges also insisted that because many solicitors and barristers had invested
in private pensions before joining the judiciary, they were often hit on the double
by tax.
He wrote: The effect of all this is that the pension regime for judges is far less
attractive than might appear at first sight.
The Association said that excluding judges from public pay provisions planned to
reduce the impact of the pension levy on wages would be quite unfair.
The judges also pointed out that most of the judiciary had been appointed at a
time when there was an unqualified constitutional guarantee that their pay
could not be cut.
However, that provision had been removed in the referendum in 2011 when an
overwhelming majority of the public voted to allow government reduce their
salaries.
In their letter, the judges said: That [decision] simply provides for a derogation
from the general and as the country emerges from the financial emergency judges
look to see a restoration of their terms and conditions of service.
The association had asked to meet directly with Paschal Donohoe to discuss their
concerns.
The minister did not make himself available to meet him and asked officials to
attend instead. He did promise however, to keep himself fully apprised of
developments.
In an earlier letter, the association pleaded their case saying no other group of
workers in state service had been impacted by quite the same range of
measures.
They said their members had been impacted upon in a very severe way indeed
and that excluding them from mooted changes to the pension levy would be
greeted with dismay.
A third letter said judges who had both a public and private pension were being
hit with punitive, confiscatory taxation.
Asked about the letters, the association said: The AJI does not wish to comment
on the matters that you raise save to say that we have no issue with the level of
engagement with us by Minister Donohoe or his department.
They said: The Agreement has yet to be ratified by the Irish Congress of Trade
Unions.
The Minister was not available to meet with the AJI on the occasion in question,
and as is normal practice in such circumstances, requested his officials to arrange
a meeting to address any relevant matters.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xATRNeMkdvOHJnRvK
ZWeKuAGyRovgMy_EJFEsh0C7r4/edit
Department warns over serious danger of
fraud in annual spending of 340-a-million
on childcare schemes
http://www.kenfoxe.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/08/Childcare-Memo.pdf
http://www.kenfoxe.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/P138-
2017-AJI-Records-07-15.pdf
Pressure mounts on
Creed over ID cards for
farmers
1
Minister Michael Creed
Cormac McQuinn
August 30 2017
Agriculture Minister Michael Creed is coming under massive pressure to
clarify whether farmers will require controversial Public Services Cards (PSCs)
to access EU payments.
"The department should not be fudging the position on this. Farmers deserve
clarity in relation to what the proposals are," he said.
"What we need is less red-tape rather than more in terms of how payments are
administered."
"If there's a double claim it's picked up straight away," he said about the
current system.
The Irish Farmers' Association (IFA) confirmed it is also seeking clarity from
the department on the matter.
But for the second day in a row, Mr Creed's department failed to rule out the
possibility that farmers will need a PSC to apply for EU funding.
Instead, when asked by the Irish Independent, it repeated the line that "no
decision" had been taken to change the existing application process.
Currently, 114,000 farmers make online applications under the BPS through
the agfood.ie website. EU rules mean all applications will have to be made
online from next year.
Access to the services on the agfood.ie website is to be enabled via the separate
MyGovID website by September 2018.
http://www.independent.ie/business/farming/agri-business/pressure-
mounts-on-creed-over-id-cards-for-farmers-36083215.html
State must justify
introduction of public
services card
Card project will fail unless mass harvesting of personal
data conforms to EU privacy laws
Thu, Sep 7, 2017, 07:00
Fred Logue
It appears that the public service card framework provides for the collection of
further information including PPSN, date of birth, fingerprint and iris scans.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pLHliE0xJ5FsqDqdwB2
NlhWchl62rylyfR8YhTBOzEs/edit
One
In 2006, Gardasil was given Fast-Track approval, despite failing to meet (and still fails to meet) even
one of the four conditions for priority approval [1].
Two
The risk of dying of cervical cancer is approximately 1.7/100,000 women in Australia [2], or
2.4/100,000 women in the US [3] bearing in mind that Gardasil only claims to protect against the
strains thought to be responsible for approximately 70% of all cervical cancers [4]. Compare this with
the rate of serious adverse reactions for Gardasil an estimated 3.34/100,000 doses [5]. Serious
reactions are classified as those that lead to hospitalization, permanent disability or death. Given that
only an estimated1-10% of vaccine adverse reactions are reported [6], the real numbers of adverse
reactions may be many, many times higher. In other words, it appears the vaccine may be more
dangerous than the condition it is claimed to prevent
Three
We still have no evidence that Gardasil can actually prevent cervical cancer, let alone cervical cancer
deaths. This is because the clinical trials followed up participants for 5 years [7], yet cervical cancer
can take 20-40 years to develop [8]. Instead, they based their decision to approve the vaccine on its
purported ability to prevent so-called pre-cancerous lesions the vast majority of which resolve on
their own, without ever progressing to cancer, anyway [4].
Four
The placebo used in Gardasil clinical trials, was actually an injection of aluminum [9] a known
neurotoxin [10-11], that induces DNA damage [12], suppresses the immune system [13-14], and
mimics the hormone estrogen in the human body [15]. It is also suspected of playing a role in the
development of some cancers, including breast cancer [16], and.wait for it.cervical cancer [17].
Five
Merck the makers of Gardasil helped the vaccine to be included in school mandates and
compulsory vaccination programs via clever marketing campaigns and lobbying legislators. They even
helped to draft legislation that made Gardasil vaccination mandatory to attend school [18]. They also
provided funding to professional associations, including the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,, who began heavily promoting the vaccine, via ready-made presentations, emails and
letterseven before the clinical trial results were published [19-20].
Six
In 2012, it was reported that Gardasil alone was associated with 61% of all serious adverse reactions
reported to VAERS (Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System), including 63% of all deaths, and 81%
of permanent disability in females younger than 30 [21].
Seven
Mercks own pre-licensure data shows that vaccination of young women already infected by HPV
strains 16 and 18 may actually exacerbate pre-existing infections or pre-cancerous lesions, and increase
their risk of cervical cancer by 44% [22]. Unfortunately, there is no screening for such infections
offered to teenage girls, before vaccination of Gardasil.
Eight
HPV16 virus (one of the strains included in the vaccine), is so closely related to the human proteome,
that forcing the body to create antibodies against it (what the Gardasil vaccine is designed to do),
almost certainly results in making antibodies against our own self [23]. Perhaps this is why auto-
immune conditions are one of the most commonly reported side effects of Gardasil [24-26].
Nine
Gardasil contains an ingredient called Polysorbate 80 (also known as Tween 80), a non-ionic
detergent that is used to prevent individual ingredients in the vaccine from separating. Polysorbate has
been linked to reproductive problems and infertility in animal studies [27]. Also disturbing is the fact
that Polysorbate 80 is used in drugs and biomedical research, for its ability to transport medications
across the blood-brain barrier, thereby accessing the central nervous system [28]. This means that the
presence of polysorbate 80 could make other ingredients, such as aluminum, even more dangerous,
however, no studies have been performed, on humans or animals, to evaluate potential synergistic
toxicity.
Ten
Over the past four decades, cervical cancer incidence and mortality rates in Western countries have
decreased by 74%, largely through pap smear campaigns [4]. It is unlikely that vaccination will have
much effect in decreasing the already small cancer rate. In fact, if vaccinated women stop having pap
smears, the cancer rate will likely increase [29].
Eleven
The vast majority of sexually-active women will have at least one HPV infection at some point in their
lives, usually without any symptoms. Ninety percent of infections will clear without any treatment
within 2 years [30-31], and only 1% of infections will persist and eventually become cervical cancer
[32], although there are usually other risk factors involved, including cigarette smoking, and long-term
use of oral contraceptive pill [33].
Sois the so-called cervical cancer vaccine worth it? You be the judge
PS. This article is a small preview of the the book Im currently writing. If you would like to be kept
up-to-date on its progress, plus other interesting information I discover in the meantime,
please sign up for the newsletter . As a bonus, youll get a free PDF I created 99 Reasons I Choose
Not To Vaccinate.
Sources:
[1] Tomljenovic L, Shaw CA. Too fast or not too fast: the FDAs approval of Mercks HPV vaccine
Gardasil. J Law Med Ethics, 2012, 40(3): 673-681.
[2] Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2017. Australian Cancer Incidence and Mortality
(ACIM) books: Cervical cancer. Canberra: AIHW. www.aihw.gov.au/acim-books. Accessed 5th June,
2017.
[3] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Cervical Cancer Rates by Race and Ethnicity,
http://www.cdc.gov/features/dscervicalcancer/. Accessed 5th June, 2017.
[5] Slade BA, Leidel L, Vellozzi C, Woo EJ, Hua W, Sutherland A, et al. Postlicensure safety
surveillance for quadrivalent human papillomavirus recombinant vaccine. JAMA 2009;302(7):750-7.
[6] National Vaccine Information Center (NVIC). An Analysis by the National Vaccine Information
Center of Gardasil & Menactra Adverse Event Reports to the Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting
System (VAERS), February 2009.
http://www.nvic.org/Downloads/NVICGardasilvsMenactraVAERSReportFeb-2009u.aspx
[7] Mello MM, Abiola S, Colgrove J. Pharmaceutical companies role in state vaccination
policymaking: the case of human papillomavirus vaccination. Am J Public Health, 2012, 102(5): 893-
898.
[8] Tomljenovic and A. E. Shaw. Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccine Policy and Evidence-Based
Medicine: Are They at Odds? Annals of Medicine, 2013, 45(2): 182-193.
[9] D. M. Harper, P. Nieminen, J. Paavonen, and M. Lehtinen,Cervical Cancer Incidence Can Increase
Despite HPV Vaccination,Lancet Infect Dis 10, 2010, 9: 594-595; author reply 95.
[10] Petrik, M.S.; Wong, M.C.; Tabata, R.C.; Garry, R.F.; Shaw, C.A. Aluminium adjuvant lunked to
Guld War illness induces motor neuron death in mice. Neuromolecular Med. 2007, 9(1), 83-100.
[11] Struys-Ponsar, C.; Guillard, O,; van den Bosch de Aguilar, P. Effects of aluminum exposure on
glutamate metabolism: a possible explanation for its toxicity. Exp Neurol. 2000, 163(1), 157-164.
[12] Banasik A, Lankoff A, Piskulak A et al. Aluminum-induced micronuclei and apoptosis in human
peripheral-blood lymphocytes treated during different phases of the cell cycle. Environ Toxicol, 2005,
20(4): 401-406.
[13] She Y, Want N et al. Effects of aluminum on immune functions of cultured splenic T and B
lymphocytes in rats. Biol Tr Elem Res, 2012, 147(1): 246-250.
[14] Zhu Y, Li X, Chen C et al. Effects of aluminum trichloride on the trace elements and cytokines in
the spleen of rats. Food Chem Toxicol, 2012, 50(8): 2911-2915.
[15] Darbre PD. Metalloestrogens: an emerging class of inorganic xenoestrogens with potential to add
to the oestrogenic burden of the human breast. J Appl Toxicol, 2006, 26(3): 191-197.
[16] Mannello F, Tonti GA, Medda V, Simmone P, Darbre PD. Analysis of aluminium content and
iron homeostasis in nipple aspirate fluids from healthy women and breast cancer-affected patients. J
Appl Toxicol, 2011, 31(3): 262-269.
[17] Brake T, Lambert PF. Estrogen contributes to the onset, Persistence, and malignant Progression of
cervical cancer in a human PaPillomavirus-transgenic rat model, Proc Nat Acad Sci USA, 2005,
102(7):2490-2494.
[18] Mello MM, Abiola S, Colgrove J. Pharmaceutical companies role in state vaccination
policymaking: the case of human papillomavirus vaccination. Am J Public Health, 2012, 102(5): 893-
898.
[19] Rothman SM, Rothman DJ. Marketing HPV vaccine: implications for adolescent health and
medical professionalism. JAMA 2009;302(7):781-6.
[20] Haug C. The risks and benefits of HPV vaccination. JAMA 2009;302(7):795-6
[21] Tomljenovic L, Shaw CA. Too fast or not too fast: the FDAs approval of Mercks HPV vaccine
Gardasil. J Law Med Ethics, 2012, 40(3): 673-681.
[22] ] Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory
Committee (VRBPAC), May 18, 2006 VRBPAC Meeting, Background Document: Gardasil, HPV
Quadrivalent Vaccine.
[23] Kanduc D. Quantifying the possible cross-reactivity risk of an HPV16 vaccine, J Exp Ther Oncol,
2009, 8(1): 65-76.
[28] Gulyaev AE, Gelperina SE, Skidan IN, et al. Significant transport of doxorubicin into the brain
with polysorbate 80-coated nanoparticles, pharm Res, 1999, 16(10):1564-1569.
[29] Chustecka Z. HPV Vaccine: Debate Over Benefits, Marketing, and New Adverse Event Data.
Medscape Med News 2009. http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/707634. Accessed 6th May, 2017.
[30] Franco EL, Villa LL, Sobrinho JP, et al. Epidemiology of acquisition and clearance of cervical
human papillomavirus infection in women from a high-risk area for cervical cancer, J Infect Dis, 1999,
180: 1415-1423.
[31] Ho GY, Burk RD, Klein S, et al. Persistent genital human PaPillomavirus infection as a risk factor
for Persistent cervical dysPlasia, J Natl Canc Inst, 1995, 87: 1365-1371.
[32] Ostor AG. Natural history of cervical intraepithelial neoplasia: a critical review. Int J Gynecol
Pathol 1993;12(2):186-92.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xATRNeMkdvOHJnRvK
ZWeKuAGyRovgMy_EJFEsh0C7r4/edit
http://www.kenfoxe.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Fingal-
Records.pdf
http://www.kenfoxe.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/Ambassadorial-Residences.pdf
http://www.kenfoxe.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/Discontinuance-160177-1.pdf
September 28th 2017 2:30 AM -
Sinn Fin shows no sign of moving beyond Gerry Adams but it's clear
now that Taoiseach Leo Varadkar is.
Two days in a row, he has launched targeted and stinging attacks on
Mary Lou McDonald that carried a very clear undertone.
By sarcastically praising her for "a flawless delivery of her script", Mr
Varadkar was actually saying 'is that what Gerry and those shadowy
men told you to say'.
Comparing her to Marine Le Pen was no accident either. Ms McDonald
is one of Leinster House's best performers but what is actually behind
the rhetoric and disruptive behaviour?
The Sinn Fin deputy leader rose to her feet on Tuesday to scold the
Government over its record on childcare. There's no doubt families are
struggling and the forthcoming Budget needs to cut them some slack.
But Ms McDonald's credibility falls flat when people think back to her
defence of Mr Adams over the years. Like when he was severely
criticised at the time for not informing authorities about child abuse
claims against his brother Liam despite knowing for several years. At
the time Ms McDonald said his critics were being "malicious". "Gerry at
every stage did the best that he could in the context of that scenario."
On another occasion, Ms McDonald jumped to her boss's defence after
he was arrested in connection with the murder of mother-of-10 Jean
McConville.
She cried political policing and agreed with Mr Adams's summation that
the brutal killing was something that "happens in war".
They are just two examples of incidents where Ms McDonald has
undermined her own political capital in order to stick to the party script.
It's those kind of scenarios that Mr Varadkar will seek to remind the
public of as Sinn Fin pushes Ms McDonald centre-stage ahead of the
next election.
Marine Le Pen and scripts aside, the Taoiseach also took her to task
over the lack of progress on re-establishing the Northern Assembly.
"It is because this is the attitude of Sinn Fin. They are constantly
hectoring and making smart-aleck remarks. There is a lack of
temperance, a lack of respect for other people and an inability to listen
or to compromise," Mr Varadkar told an unruly Dil.
This was the feisty, battle-ready Leo Varadkar that Fine Gael TDs have
yearned for since his election as leader in June.
In an unprecedented scene, Ms McDonald marched across the chamber
floor to tell him that she wanted him to write her a letter outlining what
issues he believes Sinn Fin should compromise on.
Mr Varadkar would never write such a letter. It would inevitably find its
way into Sinn Fin's 'An Phoblacht' and be used as propaganda to drive
a wedge between Dublin and the people of Northern Ireland.
Instead the Taoiseach said it was up to Sinn Fin to make compromises
because that's what it takes to form a coalition.
Therein lies the source of this row. Having run away from the possibility
of governing after the last election in the Republic, Sinn Fin now wants
to be in a coalition. Part of the strategy is creating an impression Gerry
Adams is going away. Mr Varadkar clearly believes he won't. Just
because Ms McDonald is the respectable face of Sinn Fin doesn't mean
she can get a free pass from the sins of those she defends.
Fine Gael finally gets the battle-ready Varadkar it
has yearned for as he takes aim at McDonald
Sinn Fin shows no sign of moving beyond Gerry Adams but it's clear now that
Taoiseach Leo Varadkar is.
INDEPENDENT.IE