WARRANT OF ARREST:

5. PLACER vs VILLANUEVA

FACTS: Following receipt of several information from petitioners that

probable cause has been established which necessitates the issuance of
warrants of arrest, respondent judge issued an order the hearing of said
criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the
questioned orders requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of
the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the
informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the
findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners contended that under
P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a
probable cause in a preliminary examination/investigation, and that their
findings as to the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the issuance
of warrants of arrest by the court.

ISSUE/S: 1.) Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the

information as to the existence of probable cause obligates respondent City
Judge to issue a warrant of arrest

2.) Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of
issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the
supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation

RULING:

1. NO. There is no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscals
certification of the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest but such certification does not bind the judge
to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere
ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the
part of the issuing magistrate. Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the
 information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a
probable cause.

2. YES. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other

evidence which, as a matter of long standing practice had been attached
to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations
inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause. Section 9,
par. 2 of Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases prescribes that
the complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of
the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there
are defendants plus 2 copies for the courts files. The obvious purpose
of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his
witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the
case outright or to require further proceedings.

10. LEVISTE vs ALAMEDA

FACTS: Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas
before the RTC of Makati. The branch, presided by Judge Alameda, issued a
commitment order against petitioner who was placed under police custody
while confined at the Makatid Medical Center. Leviste posted a cash bond
which was approved. The private complaints-heirs of de las Alas filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow
the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued
the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other
order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before
the CA. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to plead which led the trial court
to enter the plea of not guilty for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an
Urgent Motion Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which
the trial court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of crime of
murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the
Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of
homicide. From the trial courts decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The
petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: 1.) In cases when an accused is arrested without warrant, is the

remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused?

RULING: No. In Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is
that a preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least 4
years, 2 months and 1 day without regard to the fine. As an exception the rules
provide that there is no need for preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful
arrest without a warrant involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest,
where available has been conducted. The Court holds that the private
complainant can move for reinvestigation. All criminal actions commenced by
a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal case is
merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the
reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the
proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the
prosecution of the case. Thus, in cases where the private complainant is
allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the
authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the
conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation. In
such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by
the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured.
If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw
the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed
course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for
reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the
prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the
drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and
far reaching regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial courts
approval of the resulting proposed course of action.

WARRANTLESS ARREST:

15. PEOPLE vs MENDEZ

FACTS: A crime of rape with homicide was charged against Renante Mendez
and Rene Baby Cabagtong. The prosecution presented SPO2 Cernio as a
rebuttal witness. According to him, the Chief of Police had ordered the arrest
of accused-appellants on the basis of information given by Aurea Cabagtong.
On cross examination, SPO2 Cernio told the Court that the arrest of accused
appellant Renante Mendez without a warrant was based on their knowledge
of their guilt. On the other hand, Magno Mejica arrested Rene Baby
Cabagtong, also without warrant, based on the citizens arrest law. Mejica
knew about the case because he was from Barangay Burabud and a member of
the Citizens Crime Watch. The trial court found the evidence for the
prosecution, particularly the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother,
credible and rendered judgment for the prosecution.

ISSUE/S: 1.) Whether or not the trial court erred in giving full credence to the
inconsistent testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ronnie Cabagtong and
Aurea Cabagtong?

2.) Whether or not the warrantless arrest of accused Renante Mendez

and Baby Cabagtong are justified?

RULING:

1. YES. First, as already noted, the prosecution is anchored mainly on the

testmonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother, Aurea Cabagtong. Upon
closer examination, however, certain circumstances make these
testimonies suspicious. It is doubtful whether Ronnie really saw
accused-appellant Renante Mendez raping Candy, with the latters
hands being held by the other accused-appellant Baby Cabagtong.
Ronnie admitted that it was raining that evening and that it was dark as
there was no moonlight. He claimed, however, that he was nevertheless
able to recognize accused-appellant Renante Mendez and Baby
Cabagtong because of a light from a lantern hanging about five meters
away from the trail where the crime had been committed. His testimony
is contrary to the testimony of another prosecution witness, Zosimo
Mejica, who categorically stated that there were no houses near the area
where Candys body was found and that it was surrounded by trees. If
there were no houses near the crime scene, it is cause for wonder how
the parol, where the light allegedly came from, could have been hanged
within a distance of a distance of 5 meters from the place where Ronnie
claimed he witnessed the incident. Even if the crime was committed
near the trail, and not on the exact spot where Candys body was found,
the nearest house would have to be at least 50 meters away. Ronnie
even embellished his story by claiming that the patrol was made of
wood with a wick, inside a bottle. Second. Ronnies behaviour after
allegedly witnessing the incident belied his pretension. He was
supposed to have witnesses a crime. Yet he went home, took his supper
and went to sleep as if nothing had happened. When accused appellants
went to his house, Ronnie did not show any apprehension but matter of
factly asked his mother to let them in. This is not the normal reaction of
a person who supposedly has just seen a crime committed Ronnies
claim that the victim was his cousin all the more makes his story
incredible. Thus, SPO2 Cernio took at the face value Ronnies word that
he was innocent. Ronnie and his mother were only too willing to testify
against accused-appellans in exchange for his liberty. From the time of
Ronnies release until the time he gave his statement, Ronnie and his
mother had sufficient time to iron out the details of their testimonies. It
has been held time and again that to be credible, testimonial evidence
should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it should
 itself be also credible, reasonable and in accord with human experience.
The testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother Aurea simply do
not meet these standards. If for any reason that there is a possibility
that a witness might have been prompted to testify falsely, court should
be on guard in assessing the witness credibility.

2. NO. The record shows that the accused appellants were arrested
without any warrants from the courts. Contrary to his claim, SPO2
Cornio did not have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime
so as to justify the warrantless arrest of Renante Mendez. Personal
knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5(b) of
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief of reasonable grounds of
suspicion. Accused Baby Cabagtong, on the other hand was arrested by
Zosimo Mejica on the basis of the citizens arrest law. Mejica was neither
a police officer nor a witness to the incident. He was not a member of
the investigating team. He did not have any personal knowledge of the
incident. He admitted during cross-examination that he merely based
his arrest on the information supplied by Aurea Cabagtong to the police.
This does not constitute personal knowledge to warrant a citizens
arrest. Finally, the records do not show that accused-appellants were
assisted by counsel in the course of the investigation. During their
questioning at the headquarters, only the police investigators were
present. Nowhere in the records was it shown that they were apprised
of their rights under the Constitution. While no confession was obtained
from them, their interrogation at that time could nonetheless have given
the police valuable leads into the unsolved crime. Accused appellants
also insist that they did not receive a copy of the order requiring them
to submit counter-affidavits. The Clerk of Court of the MCTC of Gamay
merely testified as to the issuance of said order, but testimony does not
confirm that such it was received by accused-appellants. The fact that
these irregularities were never raised before arraignment, and were
therefore considered waived when accused-appellants entered their
pleas, does not justify the short cuts. These procedural lapses clearly
 indicate that the police had shut its mind off to the possibility that other
parties might have committed the crime.

20. ANTIQUERA vs PEOPLE

FACTS: Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City
when they saw two unidentified men rush out of a house and boarded a jeep.
Believing that there was a crime, the police officers approached the house
from where the two rushed out. When they peeked through the partially
opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz engaged in a pot session. They
then pushed the door, entered the house, introduced themselves and arrested
Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a
wooden jewellery box which contained shabu and unused paraphernalia.

ISSUE: Was there a valid warrantless arrest?

RULING: NO. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The circumstances in the case at bar do
not make a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto. First, the public officers
claim that they were alerted when they saw 2 unidentified men suddenly rush
out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Running after the fleeing suspects was the
more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when
they heard no cry for help from it. Second, the police officers did not notice
anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no
activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crim was plainly exposed
to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that
his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers
allegedly found in the house seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from
an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit
the accused. Lastly, the failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his
arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

INVITATION:

25. PEOPLE vs SEQUIO

FACTS: Godinez withdrew a certain amount of money at Medellin Rural Bank.

Serafin and Broniola accompanied him in going home; the 3 of them were
riding a motorcycle. As they were nearing the hacienda, accused, armed with
guns blocked their path and ordered them to stop, with the intent of robbing
the money that Godinez withdrew. However, the victims did not stop and
thereafter heard a gunshot hitting Broniola in the hand. In the scene of the
crime, SPO2 found a piece of paper with the name of Nenito Melvida written
on it. Thus, after finding the accused, Luna asked Melvida to go with him to the
barangay captains house. However, the barangay captain was not at home so
the police officer took Melvida to the police station where he an investigation
was conducted by Luna and his fellow policemen. He was allowed to go home
but only after a criminal charge was filed against him by the police. During the
investigation, Melvida was not assisted by a counsel. Lunas investigation was
also not reduced into writing. The defense interposed alibi and denial. The
trial court sided with the prosecutions evidence and found the accused guilty
of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE:

1.) Was there an invalid arrest of the accused?

2.) Are the admissions made during the investigations valid?

RULING:
 1. YES. Regardless of Lunas claim to the contrary, accused Nenito Melvida
was arrested. An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense and it
is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Melvidas
voluntarily going with the Luna upon the latters invitation was a
submission to Lunas custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a
suspect in the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being held to
answer for the commission of the said offense. Luna had no personal
knowdege of facts indicating Melvidas guilty; at best, he had an
unreasonable suspicion. Thus, Melvidas arrest was illegal.

2. NO. After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial

investigation. The custodial investigation began when the police
pinpointed Melvida as one of the authors of the crime or had focused on
him as a suspect thereof. Article 3, Section 12 (1) of the 1987
Constitution guarantees the accuseds rights to remain silent and to
counsel, and his right to be informed of these rights. There was no
showing that Melvida was ever informed of these rights and Luna
admitted that Melvida was not assisted by a counsel during the
investigation. Indisputably, the police officers violated the constitutional
rights of Melvida; they also disregarded the rule regarding the
investigators duties prior to and during custodial investigation laid
down in Morales vs Enrile.

METHOD OF ARREST

30. PEOPLE vs NUESTRO

FACTS: Accused Reneo Nuestro was indicted for the murder of one Ludovico
Dabi on May 24, 1991 in Iloilo City. The daughter of the victim recounted that
shortly after arriving at their residence and while his father was trying to
open the lock of the gate, appellant suddenly appeared and without any
provocation, stabbed Dabi. Victim died on the spot. SPO3 Vallar, Jr. undertook
the post-incident investigation and notice that there were bloodstains on the
fence of Dabis house. After being informed that accused ran to his house after
the incident, Vallar went there and found a knife with bloodstains. Accused
denied the allegations and claimed that he was acting in self-defense as it was
in fact the deceased who first attacked him. Present in the incident was Elias
Franco who saw Nuestro stab Dabi several times. He immediately got a piece
of wood to prevent Nuestro from doing any further harm. At about the same
time, Ernesto Pe Benito was informed that Nuestro stabbed Dabi. He
immediately went out to investigate and saw Franco holding Nuestro by the
shoulder. Franco then asked for his help in bringing Nuestro to the police
station. In a pre-trial conference, Nuestro admitted that he killed the victim
but asked that he be allowed to plead to the lesser offense of homicide and
that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender be
appreciated in his favour.

ISSUE: Was there a voluntary surrender on the part of Nuestro?

RULING: NO. Appellants asseverations that he voluntarily surrendered, and

that Franco merely accompanied him to the police station after a chance
meeting, were rendered worthless by the testimony of SPO Pedro Contreras.
This policeman stated that a civilian, obviously referring to Franco, brought
appellant to the police station and did not merely accompany the latter.
Credence is generally accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
who are enforcers of the law as they are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner. In addition, the police blotter clearly shows that
Nuestro was placed under citizens arrest by Elias Franco and Ernesto Pe
Benito and was turned over to the officers of Jaro Police Station. The Court
cannot grant appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
which he claims.
PROBABLE CAUSE

35. COMERCIANTE vs PEOPLE

FACTS: On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging
Comerciante of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. According to the
prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent
Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag
II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their
way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City.
Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as
Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla. Standing and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the
other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped
and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance ofaround five (5)
meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante
and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed
that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. After
the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which
was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's
failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do
so waived and ordered him to present his evidence. In his defense,
Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who
was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who
were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and
taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated
illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release.
When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another
police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged
with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: Was there a probable cause to justify the warrantless arrest of

Comerciante's for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING: NO. The Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even
assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts
of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that
the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over
something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact,
even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and
unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been
sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

REMEDIES:

40. MONCUPA vs ENRILE

FACTS: Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they
were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the
petitioner was temporarily release from detention on the ground that the
petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the
petitioner is free and no longer under the respondents custody. Petitioner
argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and
academic because attached to the petitioners temporary release are
restrictions imposed on him such as: his freedom of movement is curtailed by
the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel
outside Manila, his liberty of abode is restricted because of prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of
residence, his freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should
not participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media
representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to
the interest of national security and lastly, he is required to report regularly to
respondents or their representatives. These restrictions imposed by the
respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant
petition moot and academic but that it merely shifted the inquiry from the
legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot
and academic in view of the detained persons release with restrictions

RULING: NO. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person

warrant the Supreme Courts inquiry into the nature of the involuntary
restraint and relieving him of such restraints may be illegal. Reservation of the
military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainees temporary
release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical
restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. Temporary
release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not
render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is
available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. The person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the
privilege of writ.

45. IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO

FACTS: Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre,

had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People vs
Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the police
officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his name. Salibo presented
to the police pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in
Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. The authorities, however,
apprehended and detained him. He questioned the legality of his detention via
Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, maintaining that he is not
the accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the writ, making it returnable to
the judge of RTC Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court granted
Salibos petition and ordered his immediate release from detention. On appeal
by the Warden, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. The CA held that even
assuming Salibo was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of
Arrest, orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked. Salibos proper
remedy, according to the CA, should have been a motion to quash information
and/or warrant of arrest. On the other hand, Salibo believes that the Warden
erred in appealing the RTC decision before the CA. Salibo argued that although
the CA delegated to the RTC the authority to hear the Wardens Return, the
RTCs ruling should be deemed as the CA ruling, and hence, it should have
been appealed directly before the SC.

ISSUE/S:

1.) Did Salibo properly avail the remedy of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus?
2.) Is a motion to quash information and/or warrant of arrest the proper
remedy in cases where a person with a mistaken identity is detained?

RULING:

1.) YES. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person deprived of liberty due
to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful
process and is continuously being illegaly detained. First, it was
Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo, who was charged and accused in the
Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of People vs
Ampatuan. Based on the pieces of evidence present, Salibo sufficiently
established that he could not have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore,
Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an
 offense, not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court.
Second, Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. When he was
in the presence of authorities, he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Salibo was also
not an escape prisoner. He was deprived of his liberty without due
process of law. Therefore, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition
for Habeas Corpus.

2.) NO. The CAs contention is not correct. Salibos proper remedy is not a
Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the
grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged could not
have been cured by mere amendment of the Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from Butukan S. Malang to
Datukan Malang Salibo will not cure the lack of preliminary
investigation in this case. Likewise, a motion for reinvestigation will not
cure the defect of lack of preliminary investigation.