G.R. No.
L-60323 April 17, 1990
MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., RICARDO CHUNG, JOSE ESTRELLA, LEONCIO PALANCA,
NORBERTO ROBLEZA, J.S. VALBUENA, GREGORIO CANCIO FRANCISCO BUENCAMINO, and JESUS
TOMACRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., QUEZON CITY, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
FACTS:
Magdalena Estate, Inc. (MEI) located at New Manila, Quezon City owned a subdivision with a
total area of 355,490 square meters. The lot in question was Lot 15, measuring 7,100 sq.m, which is a
part of Lot 15 Block 18 had initially been set aside as the subdivision's "open space," i.e., reserved for
use as a park, playground or recreational zone.
Subsequently, the subdivision plan was amended by substituting the earlier designated open
space with another lot covering the same area and was approved by QC City Council. The Council
authorized the subdivision to alienate Lot 15 thereafter. MEI then had the original open space (a
portion of Lot 15, Block 18) result resurveyed and subdivided into several lots. The new plan, (LRC) Pcs-
2299, was approved in due course by the Land Registration Commission.
MEI donated to the City Government certain lots in its subdivision for use as parks and
playgrounds; and the donation was ratified by the Council. After the donation of the parks and
playgrounds, MEI disposed of the entire Lot 15, Block 18 including that part thereof or originally
designated as open space (measuring 7,100 square meters). A part of Lot 15, was sold to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) by way of dacion en pago and the remaining part were sold
to third parties who thereafter constructed houses thereon.
The Magdalena homeowners association brought a suit to recover the original open space and
alleged that the Quezon City (QC) Government has no authority substituting the open space. They have
caused a notice of lis pendens be recorded at the Registry of Deeds.
The lower court rendered a favorable decision for petitioner but was appealed to CA to obtain
favorable modifications. While the case was pending, MEI and DBP filed in separate motions praying for
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles of the lots in Block 12 of the
subdivision. These motions were favorably granted. Hence, the petition at bar, for nullification of the
resolutions.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grant the motion to cancel notice of lis
pendens since no motion had ever been filed in court a quo.
HELD:
Under Rule 14 sec 24 of the Rules of Court and Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens is
proper in the following cases: a) an action to recover possession of real estate; b) an action to quiet title
thereto; c) an action to remove clouds thereon; d) an action for partition; and e) any other proceedings
of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon.
The notice of lis pendens- that the real property is involved in an action- is ordinarily recorded w/o the
intervention of the court where it is pending. The notice is an incident in an action and merely a warning
to all who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they
may acquire in the property in any voluntary transactions are subject to the results of the action, and
may be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The
cancellation of such precautionary notice therefore is also a mere incident and may be ordered by the
Court having jurisdiction over it at any time. Its continuance or removal - like the continuance or
removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction is not a contingent on the existence of a final
judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits.
In the case at bar, CA has jurisdiction by virtue of the perfection of the petitioners appeal. The rule
that no questions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those affecting the
merits of the action, and not to mere incidents, e.g., cancellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat,
the grant or dissolution of provisional remedies.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the case had dragged on and had been unnecessarily
prolonged by repeated amendments of the complaints by the plaintiffs, and that the circumstances on
record justified the conclusion that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens was intended to molest
and harass the defendants.
That determination, and the conclusion that Presidential Decree No. 1529 "authorizes the cancellation
of notices of lis pendens before final judgment upon order of the Court, upon the grounds previously
mentioned," are not whimsical or capricious, despotic, arbitrary or oppressive in the premises so as to
call for correction by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
