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100% found this document useful (19 votes)
11K views362 pagesRestatement of The Law On Local Government, J.E. Angeles
Scanned copy of the book
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© © All Rights Reserved
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/ 362
RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW ON LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
DR. JOSEPH EMMANUEL L. ANGELES
4 REX Book Store
i
—— REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991
BOOKI
General Provisions
TITLE!
Basic Principles
CHAPTER I
‘The Code: Policy and Application
SECTION 1. Title. — This Act shall be known and cited as the
“Local Government Code of 1991".
§1.1 “Local Government” defined.
A local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or
state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local
affairs.”
“Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v, Bel-Air Village Associa
Ine., 328 SCRA 696 (2000). uae Local
OF THE LAW ON’
RESTATE ET ERNMENT
nment Unit” defined.
‘9f 1991 defines a local government
eo eee endowed with powers as
12 “Local Gover
‘The Local Government
ie and corporate” a
poem “ody pole the National Government and as 8 corporate
1 pokitieal subd
‘entity representing the inhabit ry.? Local government
inhabitants of its territo ;
nity Tre composed of the provinces, cities, Hct cipalities and
2s. SThey are also the territorial and polities! subdivisions
barangays.
ofthe state
1.8 Development of local governments in the Philippines.
i {J administration
the Spanish occupation, the unit of local | adeninitratin
was: eet whieh ordinarily se eS Sc eae
mi contained numerous “barr we beginning
aeeaaiarda continued the native barangays, confi i ra fs
chiefs in authority under the title of cabeza di re ne ae h
‘he towne were organized with a native official called the
pebernadorctlo (literally “tle governor”), with the popular ttle
areupitan, or the head. He was the representative of the provincial
caer the arbiter of local questions except those assuming a
severe Tegal aspect, was responsible for the collection of the taxes,
serio veund to assist the parish priest, and entertained all visiting
Officials. Assisting the gobernadorcillo were tenientes (deputies),
Slguetles (eubordinate employees), and chiefs of police, fields and
cattle. Elections for municipal offices were held annually by the
‘outgoing gobernadorcillo and twelve cabezas de barangay, chosen
by lot, and presided over by the provincial governor with the parish
priest permitted to be present. For the office of gobernadorcillo, the
names of the three candidates were nominated by plurality vote and
‘sent to the Governor-General, or in outlying provinces to the governor,
‘who selected one for the position. Other municipal offices were chosen
directly by the convention.
“Republic Act No. 7160, Section 15 (1992); Metropolitan Manila Developmen!
‘Authority. Bel-Air Village Association, Ine, 328 SCRA 836 (2000),
‘Const Article X, Setion 1 (1987); Metropolitan Manila Development Authst?
‘BeAr Village Association, Ine, 328 SCRA 896 (2000)
‘Cons. Article X, Section 1 (1887); Republic Act No, 7160, Section 15 (192
‘Metroplitan Marila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Villa tion, Inc. 28
rua Maria Development Authority . Bel Air Village Associa
See. BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS 3
‘Title — Basie Principles
‘The municipality was divided into barangays (barrios or wards)
of about fifty families. For their administration, there were cabezas
de barangay shorn of much of their previous powers, whose principal
duties were to act as agents for the collection of taxes for the payment
of which they were held responsible. They paid no tribute of their
own account and became members of the principalia (principal men),
the voting and privileged class. Originally hereditary, breaks in the
family line were filled by appointments by the Spanish officials;
eventually the position became generally elective with service
compulsory.
In the year 1893, there was promulgated the Maura Law taking
its name from its author, the then Minister of the Colonies. It applied
to the towns of Luzon and the Visayan Islands in which more than
one thousand cedulas were paid. A municipal council of five, the
captain and four lieutenants, was constituted and performed certain
specified duties. It was given charge of the active work or governing
the municipality, such as administration of public works, etc., and the
details of taxation. In addition, each of its members was required to
have special qualifications. These positions were honorary. The term
of office was four years. The officers, together with two substitutes
were elected by twelve delegates of the principalia. The latter was
composed of all persons who had held certain positions or who had
paid a land tax of 50 pesos. The Governor-General and the provincial
governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the council and its
individual members; the provincial council also had supervision
of the municipal council. An exception to the general plan was the
organization of the City of Manila, and up to the time of the Maura
Law, of the other principal cities, such as Moilo and Cebu, whose
government followed quite closely that which prevailed in Spanish-
America, which in turn was derived from Spain, Founded in 1571 by
Legazpi as a Spanish City, Manila was speedily given recognition
and entitled like so many Spanish cities of the peninsula “very
Loyal and Noble City.” These corporation had the usual Spanish
officials, including two alcaldes (mayor) and regidores (councilors)
who virtually became self-perpetuating bodies.*
Under the American occupation, the government of
municipalities was first provided for in General Order No. 43 (1899),
‘This was superseded by General Order No. 40 (1900) promulgated
"Martin, The Revised Administrative Code with Annotations, pp. 313-815 (1963)
iting Malcolm, Government ofthe Philippine Islands, pp. 69-70.
ili estATEMENT OF THELAW ON LOCAL. See
“ GOVERNMENT
by the Military Governor in accordance with the report oe a ‘
ief Justice Cayetano 7
ead Chie Jute Coan Pape Commision fy
7, 1900 urged and directed that body “to aor their attention int
rst instance te sbeent of municipal corporations in whic
Fete sland, both in the cites and rural COmmUnitis,
Shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their ov local affairs
sfushich they are capable, and subject to the
tothe fullest extent of which he tre ea ot thee
degree of supervision and cont
capactse or observation of the workings of native controls show
carer vonsistent with the maintenance of Iaw, order, and loyalty. In
establishment of municipal governments, the Commission wi
a yr ofthe work the govemments established bythe
Military Governor, under the order of August 8, 1900, to formulate
‘and report a plan of municipal government, of which his Honor,
Cayetano Arellano, President of the Audencia, was Chairman,
‘and they will give to the conclusions of that Board the weight and
‘consideration which the high character and distinguished abilities of
its members justify.” Accordingly, the Philippine Commission passed
‘Act No. 82 on January 31, 1901, providing for the organization and
government of municipalities, and Act No. 83 on February 5, 1901,
for the organization of provinces. These Acts were subsequently
‘embodied with modifications in the Administrative Code of 1916° as,
Chapters 56, 87, 64 and 67."
‘The Administrative Code was replaced by the Revised
‘Administrative Code of 1917" and the Assessment Law.” Afterwards,
the 1985 Constitution came into force. The 1935 Constitution had no
‘specific article on local autonomy. However, in distinguishing between
presidential control and supervision, the Constitution clearly limited
the executive power over local governments to “general supervision
+» a may be provided by law.” Pursuant to this principle under
the 1886 Constitution eislation implementing local autonomy
‘was enacted. The legislature passed Local Autonomy Act of 1959,"
Barrio Charter of 1959," and Decentralization Act of 1967! “which
FER Ran
SE gg tt 8
meee. 0 (9
Republic Act No. 2264 (19659), a
Rep Ne ne
fh Hash
(GENERAL PROVISIONS 5
See. BOOK 1
‘Basic Principles
Tile
ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local
autonomy in the country.
‘The 1973 Constitution incorporated a state policy to guarantee
and promote the autonomy of local government units" and an
entire article on local government." It called for the passage of local
government code defining more responsive and accountable local
government structures, The creation, merger, abolition, or substantial
boundary alteration could only be done in accordance with the local
government code and upon approval by a plebiscite. Moreover, the
power to create sources of revenue and to levy taxes was specifically
delegated to local governments. Pursuant thereto, the Batasang
Pambansa enacted the Local Tax Code," Real Property Tax Code,"”
and Local Government Code of 1983."*
Despite these legislative initiatives, the shackles of dependence
on national government remained. Local government units were
faced with the same problems that hampered their capabilities to
participate effectively in the national development efforts, among
which were: a) inadequate tax base, b) lack of fiscal control over
‘external sources of income, c) limited authority to prioritize and
approve development projects, d) heavy dependence on external
sources of income, and ¢) limited supervisory control over personnel
of national line agencies.”
‘The 1987 Constitution adopted the constitutional guarantee
of local autonomy and delegation of taxing authority in the
1973 Constitution’” and limited the President's power over local
governments and autonomous regions to general supervision.” It
‘also added the following: 1) a directive to Congress enact a new local
‘government code” and organic acts for autonomous regions in Muslim
‘Mindanao and the Cordilleras;® 2) entitlement of local governments
to just shares in national taxes which shall be automatically released
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, 181 SCRA 495 (2990);
[National Power Corporation v. Cy of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259 (2003),
"Const, Article Il, Section 10 (1973); Cons, Article XI, Setion 2 and 6 (1973).
Const. Article XI (1873.
Presidential Decree No, 21 (1973).
"presidential Deeree No. 64 (1974)
"™Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (1983); This law took effect on February 10, 1983.
‘National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 268 (2003).
Const, Arle X, Section Zand 4 (1987).
"Canst, Artile X, Section 4 and 16 (1987)
"Const, Artile X, Section 3 (1987),
"Const, Article X, ection 15 and 19 (1980).
_ il LOCAL Bee,
EMENT OF THE LAW ONL. 1
é SESTATEMENT OF THE A
governments to an equitable
to them nd 3) en anton and EVLOMEDE of
saersaat wealth within ceit respective areas ns
Inline with this Constitutional directive, Congress drafted the
Local Gavernment Codeof 1991, Considered asthe mest roraiitiontry
piece of legislation on local autonomy, the Code ly dealt with
ent units. It widened
the fiscal constraints faced by local Cie include taxes which wore
local government unit lv
th a aa fe ua the mpion of AX. or
Products, forest concessonaires, mineral products, mining operations
End the like, The Code likewise provided flesibilty to impose tax
sites in accordance with their needs and capabilities. Tt did not
preceribe graduated fixed rates but merely specified the minimum
eee ayaniu tax rates and let the determination ofthe actual rates
to the respeetive sanggunian™
(On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras granted political autonomy
‘and not mere administrative autonomy. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic
structure consisting of an exccutive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction in each ofthe autonomous regions.””
§1.4 Applicabili
Since our law on municipal corporations is, in principle,
patterned after that of the United States, the rules therein should
’be considered a part of our legal system.
of US. jurisprudence.
$1.5 Effectivity date of the Code.
‘The Local Government Code of 1991 took eff 1
1992alter pblation na newspaper of general eeulation
Gin ArideX, Scion 6156
Gist Arie X Section 7 s8 7)
‘Netonal Power Corporation ¥ City of Caba
"Candies Beet ent natuan, 401 SCRA 259 (2003).
Comte alae 0 Audi, 181 SCRA 496 (1900
Mani, 24 SCRA S56 (L060) ngs Philippines v. Municipal Board of Cty of
a. cna aan eng SY Muncpaly of Unset, Pocono
‘Ae No. 7160, Section 536 (1962),
ae
See 2 BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS
‘Title I — Basie Principles
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. —
(0) It Is hereby declared the policy of the State that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain
their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure instituted through a
‘system of decentralization whereby local government units shall
be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources.
The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units.
{b) tis also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability
of local government units through the institution of effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum.
(c) _Itis likewise the policy of the State to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions.
$2.1 Importance of policy sec
The policy section like the preamble is available for the
clarification of ambiguous provisions of the statute, but may not be
used to create ambiguity.”’ The declaration of policy is not part of the
substantive portion of the statute.”*
§2.2 “Decentralization” defined.
Decentralization is the process by which local government units
are given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources bi
the national government.” In this sense, itis substantially similes
to “devolution.” Decentralization means devolution of national
administration — but not power — to the local levels."
Et tte mt tan
“ace hy tte.
cralrieane cena
Se ES an RESTATEMENT OF THELAW ON LOCAL: Se
GOVERNMENT
§2.3 “Recall” defined. :
Recall is a mode wal of a public officer by the peopie
in a mode of rey office.” The people's prerogative y,
peident oftheir sovereign Power an
onal restraint, the power is impliej
ia all absence of ) MeQuillin, The Lav of Municipal Corporations, §7.02 (8rd ed), Duluth v.
(my 115 Minn 267, 132 NW 265,
"8p MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 7.02 (8rd ed); Geod Deal
of uy Hill Ine. v, Newark, 32 NJ 263, 160 A2l 620.
9 MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 7.02 (3ed ed)
49 MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 7.02 (rd ed), People v.
Oakland, 92 Cal 611, 28 P 807; State v. Owens, $2 Fla 356, 109 So 428,
TIA) MeQQillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 3.15.60 (Grd ed); In re
Incorporation of Village to be Known as Village of Mitchell, 316 Il. App. 34 284, 743
N-E.24 871 (2000) WON LOCAL
pesTATEMENTOF THE LAW
RESTATEN GOVERNMENT
$7.5 “Petition” requirement. sae vides then
.e Implementing Rules prov Petition,
vain ol ng es ei
the ease maybe However, the Code doesnot require petition
relations except where barangays are sought tobe created through
The sungguniang panlalawigan.*" Senator Pimentel believes tha;
tne petition requirement is directory but may facilitate the work g
ion, division, merger, abolition
Congress in the matter ofthe creati al io
alteration of the boundaries of local government units.
{§76 Voters of sub-province should not be excluded from
voting for provincial officials.
It is incorrect for the Commission on Elections to exclude the
voters ofa sub-provinee from voting forthe positions of the Governor,
Vice-Governor, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Under Section 462 ofthe Local Government Code, itis only when the
voters ratify the conversion of the sub: province to a regular province
thatthe President is empowered to appoint the officials of the newly
created province." .
§7.7 Law permitting creation of province or city by ARMM is
unconstitutional,
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution, For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000
She nire cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus,
locentea lepslave digit gy tently involves the power
Been
Rate 9412, (40, (eK) and AD) eting the Local Government Code of 1991.
Dow
ment 3
met 3 999) al
mrt “moment Code of 1961: The Key to Nati
“on on Elections 219 SCRA 672 1909,
oO
See. BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS 2
‘Title — Basie Principles
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions,
the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress. x x x
‘To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office isto allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's
territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional
Assembly's legislative powers “[wJithin its territorial jurisdiction x
(Petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a
province is created by statute, the corresponding representative
district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute
— which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment. but.
by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.” The
contention has no merit. xx x
(The Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because
()it validly created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special
law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of
the logislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum
number of legislative districts provided under the 1985 Constitution.
Felwa does not apply to the present ease because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself
Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted
by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative
district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power
to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power
to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative
district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is
created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution
provides that “each province shall have at least one representative”
in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the
‘constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts
belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other
legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because
for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must
have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of
Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation
of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or
trigger the creation of, a legislative district. 181008 a
_snareMT oF THE LAW .
wee ‘GOVERNMENT
Article VI of RA 90;
we rule that Section 18, i
_ Mional Assembly the power 1,
An Hei grey Stn
kof the Constitution, as wel
In sammary.
insofar as i grants to the
treate provinees and cites. is
as Section 3 ofthe Onintitge and cts because the ereation of
Ginn a es 7 ce het MB
provinces and cities nee ae centon of late
power only Congres can exer
te regan and Scion re rene he
AE tom sembly cannot create a province
Fanaa ee chal uve a lepslatvedistret. Moreover, the
Can ee ver sembly cannot enact a AW creating @ national
aaa ee ae fice ofa district representative of Congress because
arias powers ofthe ARNDM Regional Assembly operate only
sat ern justin as provided a Section 2, Aree
ofthe Constitution, Thus, we rule that Mi enacted by
J TERND Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shari
Kebunsvan is void ™
SECTION 8. Division and Merger. — Division and merger
of existing local government units shall comply with the same
, requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in
this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the
‘original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current
lacks Faw Diewonary, p 525.6% ed)
Hers of Allert Suuitan Cx of Mandaluyong, 828 SCRA 137 (2000); €
, 2 ong, 32 37 20003; City
‘of Manila v, Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349 (1919) ¥ ue Law ON OCA, See
te nestaTEMENT OTHE
cise of eminent doma;
irements before exercise in
19.3 Requirement
me omer.
local government unit can exerci.
Tae reguicements We) enactent of ordinance
2 ov egaative council authorizing the local chief ‘exscttie
{he led ef eminent domain; 2) power must be exercise
a rurpose or welfare: 3) payment of just compensation
for i Et definite offer made to the owner and offer wa ny
and ai a opration cannot be made pursuant tO a resohition
ae mance is different from a resolution. An ordinane
ao nae pata resolution is merely a declaration of the sentimen,
ie resign gen ela
on Meneral and permanent character, but a resolution
pneeeary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differentiy
i ined reading is necessary for an ordinance, but net for a resolution
tinless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sangguniay
members.
$193.1 “Public use” defined.
Public use means public advantage, convenience or benefi,
which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperts
of the whole community."
‘The right to take private property for public purposes
necessarily originates from “the necessity” and the taking must be
limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Commun
of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to excrcix
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be
of public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessit
‘must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land
In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we ruled that “necess
within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated mus
be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable ur
Practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit tu the
public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning
party and the property owner consistent with such benefit."
ae stats Carporton 222 SCRA 6781898)
aranague y. VM Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 674 (198), Hers
‘ibtie Supuitan v. City of Mandaluyong. $28 SCRA 197 (2000); Belusn of a
Mesias of Pany (Cap) GR. No 153974 Angus 7, 2006
mel nto® of Camarines Surv, Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173 (1983)
“Manip. The City of Pasig eta, GR No. 196349, Janoary 23,2005
sec 19 BOOK 1 — GENERAL PROVISIONS 8
‘Tule 1— Base Principles
§19.3.1.1 “Public use" applied.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of
Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of the records shows
that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Couneil dated
November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No, 42.
. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended
beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association,
a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan, It
can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous
of having their own private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
therefore, not clearly and categorically publie. The necessity has not
been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative
facility for sports development and community recreation in the area,
‘which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan
‘The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a road, The respondent is not mandated to comply with
the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the
New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative
restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may
determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation,
is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine
necessity of public character. Government may not eapriciously
choose what private property should be taken,
‘The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing
a road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses,
who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there
‘were other ways through which one can enter the vieinity, no vehicle,
however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through,
the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient.
to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction
ofa road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required,
only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. Nonetheless,
the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road
Particularly in the petitioner's property and not elsewhere, x xx
WMaskop v. The City of Pasig et al ,G R No, 136349, January 2: LAW ON LOCAL
MENT OF "
* FET ME OVERNMENT Bee 1g
cayscorretly pointe out by the petitioner, therein show ng
inthe eon! that an cular inspection was conducted during the ty
J eourt conducted an ocular inspection of the subjeq
trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof Thy
prrtioner wes, therefore, deprived af its right to due proress. I bean
Pressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence i
ae veeived and the parties ate entitled to be present at an,
tinge ofthe trial Consequently, where, asin this ense, the petition,
vas not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factua)
Fring of the court based on the said inspection has no probative
findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the
therefore. be rejected.”
If at all the trial
property during the
‘weight. The
‘ocular inspection must,
19.3.2 “Just compensation” defined.
Just compensation” means the market value which shoulg
be paid or “that sum of money which a person, desirous but not
compelled to buy. and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell
Would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." To
determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain
the market value of the properly, to which should be added the
consequential damages after deducting therefrom the consequentis]
benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the consequentil
benefits exceed the consequential damages, these items should be
disregarded altogether as the basic value of the property should be
paid in every case. Furthermore, not only should the correet amount
to be paid (o the owner of the land but the payment of the land must
‘be made within @ reasonable time from its taking.” If property is
taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interests on its just value to be computed from the time the proper
is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited
with the court, In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner
in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was ia
before the taking occurred."
“Jesus Ts Lard Chnstian School Foun i
wo 1g eter Contin Shon Foundation, Ie Manicpalts of ang G8
‘SEsiaban, Jr. De Onori, 360 SCRA 230 (2
ie wri, 36 (2001)
Te Petkonkatter& Co. v. Court of Appeals. 216 SCRA 884 (1992),
I-v. De Onoris, 369 SCRA 20 (2001)
“Republic of the
Hue of the Phppines x. Court of Appeals, ef a, 343 SCRA 611 (20
Sec 19 BOOK GENERAL PROVISIONS °
Title T — Basic Principles
While Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that
just compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over Republic
‘Ret No, 7160, which is a substantive law. Therefore, the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
Pourt, based on the fur market value at the time of the taking of the
property."
$19.3.2.1 “Taking” defined.
‘There is a “taking” when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction
or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he
is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a “taking” in this
sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for
‘a momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the
purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as
tooust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
For ownership, after all, “is nothing without the inherent rights of
possession, control and enjoyment, Where the owner is deprived of
the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its value by its
being diverted to public use, there is taking within the Constitutional
sense.
§19.3.3 “Valid and definite offer” defined.
‘The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory
requirement of a valid and definite offer to the owner of the property
before filing its complaint and the rejection thereof by the latter. It
is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to
obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance
with the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the
complaint.
[An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes
to the other for the celebration of a contract. [t creates a power of
acceptance permitting the offerce, by accepting the offer, to transform
the offeror’s promise into a contractual obligation. Corollarily, the
offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind
of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of
the proposed contract. An offer would require, among other things,
TeCity of Cebu v. Spouses Apolomo, et a, 981 SCRA 754 (2002)
"RA 300 (1990) [ENT OF THE LAW ON LOCAL, ery
rest
RESTATE GOVERNMENT
srainty on both theobject and the cause or consideration of
yroertainty 0°
ancleat
the envisioned contract,
‘The purpose of the requiremet
wnt of a valid and definite offer ty
a eto encourage settlements and voluntary
befirst made 0 ey nee for public purposes in order to avo
acquisition of PrP ofa court action. The law is desigmed to give
the expense te apportunity to sell his land without the expenge
to the owney ence of a protracted and expensive litigation. Ti.
ar oectantal right which should be protected in every instance
Tranvourages acquisition without litigation and spares not only
ae coeromer but also the eondemnor, the expenses and delays of
Treetticn Ie permits the landowner to receive fall compensation, and
eeenty acquiring the property. immediate use ancl enjoyment of
ths propery, reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory
pepho forma offer. to acquire the property fora reasonable price must
evmade to the owner or his privy. A single bone fide offer that i
rejected by the oxner will suffice
‘The exproprating authority is burdened to make known its
definite and valid offer to all the owners of the property. However, it
hhasa right to rely on what appears inthe certificate of title covering
the and tobe expropriated. Hence, itis required to make its offer onl
to the registored owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled
that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate
of tithe are not required to go beyond what appears on its face
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before
it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and valid offer to
acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only
evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with
Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter
purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of
the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. xx x
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the
letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of
the property for a price certain. It is merely an invitation for only one
of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss the
project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties.
There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of
petitioner's TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial compliance with the
Fequisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole world
fees ROOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Tale! Basic Principles
of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real
property and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the
property do so at their own risk and that they gamble on the result
of the litigation over it. Moreover, the lis pendens was annotated at
the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993, long after
the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos.
Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the
ordinance that “the property owners were already notified by the
municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as
a municipal road,” a substantial compliance with the requirement
of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise
that the letter of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property.
In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the respondent
made a definite and valid offer to all the co-owners of the property,
aside from the letter of Engr, Reyes, the declaration in the ordinance
is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160."
§19.4 Purpose of deposit.
‘The City insists that it made a deposit of P1.5 million with the
RTC by way of advance payment on the lots it sought to expropriate.
By withdrawing this deposit, respondents may be assumed to have
given their consent to the expropriation.
But the advance deposit required under Section 19 of the Local
Government Code constitutes an advance payment only in the event
the expropriation prospers. Such deposit also has a dual purpose:
as pre-payment if the expropriation succeeds and as indemnity for
damages if it is dismissed. ‘This advance payment, a prerequisite
for the issuance of a writ of possession, should not be confused with
Payment of just compensation for the taking of property even if it
could be a factor in eventually determining just compensation. If the
proceedings fail. the money could be used to indemnify the owner
for damages.
Here, therefore, the owners’ withdrawal of the deposit that the
City made does not amount to a waiver of the defenses they raised
against the expropriation. With the dismissal of the complaint, the
amount or a portion of it could be awarded to the owners as indemnity
to cover the expenses they incurred in defending their right."
Jeaus TsTond Chritian School Foundatwon, Ine v, Muniapality of Pasig GR,
No 152280, August 09, 200
‘City of Manila v. Alegar Corporation, etal, GR. No. 187604, June 25, 2012 jr OF THE LAW ONLOCAL se
- nestarot GOVERNMENT cy
vas. Property subject power of eminent domain,
, Forme, the tendency was toconfne the meat ofthe yy
Former ung itsll At presen. private property forbidden,
tothe a aged by the constitution for the public use withoy,
be taken oF Cirion isnot limited to the tangible subject matter g,
Just compa property, but includes the right of user and enjoymey,
corpus nat when such Fights are destroyed or taken for public ys,
the owner is entitled to compensation.
ci ration cannot condemn lands outside its
san i Sits une the power has been delegated
Tegolatre Likewise, private property already devoted to publicus
ee eangrens eannt be expropriated by a municipal corporation acting
der a general grant of authority," unless expressly authorized in
do so by statute.”
{196 No approval required from Department of Agrarian
Reform prior to expropriation.
Inis true that local government units have no inherent power
‘eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized
by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power t
cexpropriate, the legislature may retain certain control o impose
certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments
‘While such delegated power may be a limited authority, itis complete
within its limits. The limitations on the exercise of the delegated
ower must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the
power or in other legislations as statutes conferring the power sf
‘eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication, Restrictive statutes, no matter how
broad their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the
sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto. The Republics
the Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders
of delegated sovereign powers, eannot be bound by provisions of law
‘couched in general terms. Therefore. loeal government units do 1st
need to secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform ft
The Law of Municipal Coporations,§ $2 13 (Grd ed).
suas uot sae
PAI Mun The Law o Manip! Craton. 32
«Superior Cour of Amada Ca 80. rat Oe
‘City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Mama. 40 Phil 349 (2919)
deat Mtn. The La of Sicpal Corporations. 93274 edd) Cait?
v Deseret Water, Onl & Trrgation Co, 249 US. 416,611 Ed 821,27 8c 19
6
fee 19 OOK [ — GENERAL PROVISE
Title 1 — Basie Paocaplew
the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use,
before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings."
$19.7 Effect of alleging “negotiations” instead of “offer” in
expropriation complaint.
‘An allegation of “negotiations” instead of “offer” in a complaint
for expropriation filed by a municipal corporation is not a ground
for a motion to dismiss but merely a ground for a motion for bill of
particulars."
$19.8 Priority in expropriation for socialized housing.
Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279 specifically provide that:
‘See. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land. — Lands for
socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidianes;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(©) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(@ Those within the declared Areas of Priority
Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and Slum Improvement
and Resettlement Program sites which have nut yet been
acquired:
(©) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or
BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(. Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in
this section shall not apply. The Jocal government units shall
five bugetars prion to on-site development of government
lands.
Sec. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition, — The modes of
‘acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among
TPrownce af Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173 (1998),
City of Cebu v- Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 175 (1996) ————
sue LAWON LOCAL
sstnTEMETOPTHELAW © .
“ Rese ‘GOVERNMENT is
and swapping. land assemby
community mortgage ; cst
oeelidntion and banking, donation to the Government, jin,
= Mont, negotiated purchase, and XPropriatg,
Provider pnodesof quisition have been exhausted Provide
erat where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of ing
— aoa property owners shall be exempted for purposs,
Of this Act: Provided, finally, that abandoned property, a,
Tecin defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State
‘a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 9,
of the Rules of Court.
‘These provisions are limitations to the exercise of the powiy
ofeminent domain, specially with respect to the order of priority ig
requiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceeing,
tea means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order
of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein
fexpropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of
‘ftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of
‘due process when their property is forcibly taken from them for publi:
use. Failure to comply wath these requirements results in dismissal
of the complaint for expropriation.”
Section 10 of R.A. 7279 also prefers the acquisition of private
property by “negotiated sale” over the filing of an expropriation suit
It provides that such suit may be resorted to only when the other
‘modes of acquisitions have been exhausted. Thus:
Sec. 10, Modes of Land Acquisition —The modes of
acquiring land for purposes of this Act shall include, among
others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint
venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation
Proulded, however, That expropriation shall be resorted tool
‘when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided
further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of lant
‘owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purpose
of this Act. xx x be eatin em
itate or Heise ie
hte ded BL eyes C19 Ma
CRA 551 (2004) _ om
se 19 BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS 65
Title — Basie Principles
‘There isa sensible reason for the above. Litigation is costly and
protracted. The government should also lead in avoiding litigations
nd overburdening its courts
Indeed, the Court has held that when the property owner
rejects the offer but hints for a better price, the government
‘Should renegotiate by calling the property owner to a conference.
‘The government must exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain by
agreement the land it desires. Its failure to comply will warrant the
dismissal of the complaint, Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code provides for this
procedure, Thus
Article 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale — (a) The
offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be
in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired,
the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered. x x x x
(©) Ifthe owner or owners are willing to sell their property
but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief
executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of
reaching an agreement on the selling price, The chairman of
the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or
in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen as
its representative, shall participate in the conference, When an
agreement 1s reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be
drawn and executed.
Here, the City of Manila initially offered P1,500.00 per sq m
to the owners for their lots. But after the latter rejected the offer,
claiming that the offered price was even lower than their current
zonal value, the City did not bother to renegotiate or improve its
offer. The intent of the law is for the State or the local government
to make a reasonable offer in good faith, not merely a pro forma offer
to acquire the propert
‘The Court cannot treat the requirements of Sections 9 and 10
of RA. 7279 bightly. It held im state or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice
Jose B.L. Reyes v. City of Mantla, that these requirements are strict
limitations on the local government's exercise of the power of eminent.
domain, They are the only safeguards of property owners against
the exercise of that power. The burden is on the local government to
prove that it satisfied the requirements mentioned or that they do
not apply in the particular case.**
FGiy Manav, Alegar Corporation, etal. GR. No. 187604, June 25, 2012, op tH LAWON LOCA. Se
PSA VERNMENT
rt with proper jurisdiction.
cithin the jurisdiction of the Regi
vation action within Ce sina
ain esan The value of the property to be expropriated is estimateg
just compensation for it, This, however, 18 merely incident t th,
expropriation suit.”
g19.9 Cour
§19.10 Effect of previously decided case.
e le of res judicata, which finds application in general),
anee a pee ings, cannot bar the right of the State or i,
agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminen:
demain, av an inherent power of the State, dictates that the righ,
to exervise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior
judgment or res judicata, The scope of eminent domain is plenary
‘and, like police power, can reach every form of property which the
State might need for public use All separate interests of individual,
in property are held of the government under this tacit agreement
or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals,
the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of proper
remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the peopie
in their soveresgn capacity, and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it
‘Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred fru
‘exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with
any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right
of the State to exercise eminent domain, 1t does apply to specific
issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgmest
dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground that there was no
prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot.
however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying
with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequentls
exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property
By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its
delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will
not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied
with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also
Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, 334 SCRA 127 (200)
eeaah OOK L— GENERAL, PROVISIONS #
“Tile I — Basie Prnerplos
true of the principle of “law of the case.” In Republic v. De Knecht,
the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final
judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law
of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent ma
still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property,
once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will
not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also
clearly defeat social justice.”
§19.11 When special civil action of prohibi appropriate.
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby
the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings
may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure
the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the
owner. This har against prohibition comes from the nature of the
power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land
intended for public use. and the interest of the affected landowner
is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State
decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of
judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left
to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid
to the affected landowners, Only when the landowners are not given
their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there
has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the
remedy of prohibition become available
Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for,
considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’ property
‘was issued, As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount,
any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be
exercised hy the City only through the filing of a verified complaint,
1m the proper court Before the City as the expropriating authority
filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be
said to exist, Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also
be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.»
"Paranaque v VM Reslty Corporation, 282 SCRA G78 (190); Filstream
International, Ine + Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 716 (1898).
sSpouues Yusay ¥. Court of Appeals, GR No. 156884, April 06, 2012, ON LOCH,
Frollan v. Pan Onental Shipping. 9 Phil 905 (1950),
US. ¥ Ruiz, 156 SCRA 487 (1985)
"Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme, 195 SCRA 692 (1991); Guillergan,
ct al v. Ganzon, etal. 121 Phil. 1102 (1966), Department of Public Services Labor
Union v- Court of Industral Relations, etal, 110 Phil 927 (196). Bernas, The 1987
Constitution ofthe Republic ofthe Philippines. A Commentary, pp. 1
However, see 17 MeQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 4
City of Lang Beach v. Metcalf, 103 F 24 48% whch state that “the st
from suit usually does not extend to municipal curporations
"S'Repubhe Act No. 7160, Section 22,24 (1992), Sew Guillergan, etal. v. Ganzon,
‘et al, 125 Phil. 1102 (1986)
5517 MeQuilln, The Law of Municipal Corporations, §49:2 (3rd ed ), Ashton v.
‘Town of Lantana, 146 Fla 671, 1 So. 2d 639 (1941)
‘1907 Rules of Covi Procedure, Rule 14, Section 15
J imaunity oF THE LAW ON LOCAL Se a
mse
; are artificial creatures of state, nd hayg
3 the state This lack of capacity to sue the
‘no inherent
fei a necessary OM e separation of powers doctrj
ith of the separation of ine
es
state i 5
226 Enforcement of judgment:
‘ually. the proper procedure for enforcement of judgmen
ually, the
era municipal corporation is by mandamus to require
against 9 mul
ny ofa tax, oF by contempt Proceedings
payment orto compel eI Faved vatuin a laneaee,
against muni property used for municipal purposes*” nor may
be enforced upof Pr collect by execution against the property of g
a Juco Hiebron v. Reves, 104 Phil 175 (195
»°104 Phat. 175 (1958),
| Const, Articlo X, Section 4 (1987)
aac 3 BOOK I GENERAL PROVISIONS 45
5 Tule 1 Basie Prineples
the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188
to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court noted that the
‘President has no"inherent power to remove or suspend” Jocal elective
officials, and can only do so where the power is expressly given or
frises by necessary implication under the Constitution or statutes.
it also declared that laws governing the suspension and removal of
public officers, especially those chosen by direct vote of the people,
Fauat be strictly construed in their favor and when the procedure for
the suspension of an officer is specified by law, the same must be
deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly in the absence of express
or clear provision to the contrary. The Court likewise held that the
Constitutional provision limiting the authority of the President over
Jocal governments to general supervision applies to all powers of
municipal corporations; corporate or political.
The 1935 Constitution limited the executive power over local
governments to “general supervision ...as may be provided by law.""*
‘The counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution omitted the phrase
“as may be provided by law.”*"" Despite this amendment, the Court
has held that the omission of “as may be provided by law” signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from
Congress and to break its “contro!” over local government affairs. The
Constitution cid not intend to divest the legislature of its right — or
the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation
to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. The change
in constitutional language did not exempt local governments from
legislative regulation provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy. Since local governments remain
accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and
in the manner set forth, impose disciplinary action against local
officials, “Supervision” and “investigation” are not inconsistent terms;
“investigation” does not signify “control.”
§25.2.1 Applied.
Supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority
and that the determination of the constitutionality or legality of an
ordinance is an act of supervision, not control.
Const. Article VII, Section 10(1) (1935)
Const , Artiele X, Section 4 (987)
=Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 271 (1991),
2d,
™Dealon Lim, 236 8
A 135 (1989) —_——
sw oN LOCA Sey
coarenEsT OF THELA 4
Fa SS ERNMENT
ent of provincial budget officers, the
Wi eR OO agement is nt fe
Head ofthe Departine™™ © that the Governor recommends 3
to appoint anyone in ert makes the appointments fom the
unqualified person, The Peso she cannot reject all the nominee
list of amines umean whom she fels is better qualified.»
aan endoen ofthe guidelines promulgated Py {he Nation
Jen Boar coma whith the President does rot bave, Thy
Presidents power aver the liga ng mga barangay 1s Timited to genera)
supervision." —
o entity exercising supervis
anes author oer he ag mie 10 sein
Baran Pals ae followed, but tcannot ly down such rules its,
iether heave the discretion to modify or replace them. In thi
ne ealarcae, the rox that the DILG could do was review the act
Parca aent officers ofthe Liga inthe conduct ofthe elections w
es mine if they committed any violation of the Liga’s Constitution
ser Belews and sts implementing rues. If the National Liga Boare
‘and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered
dhe Ligntoconduct another election mn accordance with the Liga’sowr
tulee but notin obeisance to DILG: dictated guidelines. Neither haé
the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga
tnd replace them. even temporarily, with unelected Liga offices *
mn over the Liga ng mga
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the
Maintenance of Ecological Balance. — It shall be the duty of every
national ageney or government-owned or controlled corporation
authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of
‘any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change,
‘depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland,
‘or forest cover, and extinction of animal er plant species, to consul
‘withthe local government units, nongovernmental organizations
and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives
of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and
the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the
adverse effects thereof.
nua Cl Sere Commins, 98 SCRA G9 (198
=“Bito-Onon v. Judge Fernandez, 350 SCRA 732 (2001). »
{The National Liga Ne Mg Barangay, et al. v. Hon, Paredes, et al..G.R No
130775, September 27, 2004. ance. Ha Pesce eal.
BOOK I~ GENERAL PROVISIONS 7
“Title 1 — Baste Prineples
g
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. — No project or
program shall be implemented by government authorities unless
fhe consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are
‘complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
Sbtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects
f to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate
felocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution,
g27.1 When consultation required.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with
Section 26 thereof Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in
Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs
whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to
wit, those that: 1) may cause pollution; 2) may bring about climatic
change; 3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; 4)
may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, 5) may
eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet;
and 6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will
be implemented.°*
§27.1.1 Consultation requirement, applied,
In thecase before us, the national agency involved is respondent
PRA. Even if the project proponent is the local government of Aklat
it is respondent PRA which authorized the reclamation, being
the exclusive agency of the government to undertake reclamation
nationwide. Hence, it was necessary for respondent Province to go
through respondent PRA and to execute a MOA. wherein respondent
PRA's authority to reclaim was delegated to respondent Province
Respondent DENR-EMB RVI, regional office of the DENR, is also a
national government institution whieh is tasked with the issuance of
the ECC that is prerequisite to projects covered by environmental
laws such as the one at bar.
‘This project can be classified as a national project that affects
the environmental and ecological balance of local communities, x x x
Banga Pry Piaherfolk, ea v, Judge Lanzanas, er af, 405 SCRA 530 (2009),
Lana, eal Paso, 38 SCRA 76 2001) 5 g LAW ON LOCAL.
MENT OF THE LA\
* RESTATEME VERNMENT
pove, therefore. prior consultations and
ave been conducted and seeureyi!
ly, the information dissem ing,
C had already been issued y.
Based on the above. thers
approval are required by law
the rea aie fe the
jucted months after uireme ler
conducted money with this reauirement under the Ly
Government
‘The lack
corrected by th
by the Sangguniang
“f prior public consultation and approval is ny
z ubsequent endorsement of the reclamation prijay
Barangay ofCaticlanon February 13,201,
ona yan of the Municipality of Malay’ on Februay
the Sangrah were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging any
ance “of respondent Province. As we have established above, h,
‘Rapective resolutions issued by the LGUs concerned did not rend
this petition moot and academie.*”
4272. Effect of failure to comply with consultation an¢
approval requirement.
(wo requisites must be met before a national project tha
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities
can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected loca
communities, and prior approval of the project by the approprat
sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the
project's implementation is illegal. "™
It is submitted that the duty to consult does not require
adherence tothe opinions submitted during the consultation proc.
Consultation is merely the act of seeking advice or information
of seeking guidance. Neither can the courts require authorities
concerned to decide in « particular manner as the decision to proceel
with @ particular project and the manner of its implementation
‘constitutes a discretionary power *® However, the duty to consult may
be enforced by petition for probibition and mandamus against the
offending parties under conditions provided in the Rules of Court”
‘Boracay Foundation, Inc v. The Province of Aklan, of al, CLR, No 196s%t
Sain Provnce of Aklan, ef al, GR
ZRrovince of Rizal v, Execuave Secretary, GR. No. 129548, December 13,208
Webster's Eneyl Boe 4 8:
318 (1989), cylopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Laveuaee
Lamb v. Pupps, 2 Phil. 456 1912),
Lamb ¥. Phipps 22 7 Rules
= #PPS 22 Phu. 456 (1912): 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rul
bec 28 BOOK I — GENERAL PROVISIONS ”
‘Title !— asic Principles
‘The failure to comply with the consultation requirement may also
be w ground for disciplinary action against the erring government
officials and employees under Civil Service laws
ARTICLE I
onal Police
Relations with the Philippine Na
SECTION 28. Powers of Local Chiof Executives over the Units
of the Philippine National Police. — The extent of operational
supervision and control of local chief executives over the police
force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned
in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions
of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A.
No. 6975), otherwise known as “The Department of the Interior
nd Local Government Act of 1990", and the rules and regulations
issued pursuant thereto.
§28.1 Constitutionality of R.A. 6975.
Republic Act No. 6975 does not transgress the Constitution. The
circumstance that the National Police Commission and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) are placed under the reorganized Department
of the Interior and Local Government is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry. local executives and the integrated
law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under
R.A. No. 6975. the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized
by the national government. Such organizational set-up does not
detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national
police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police
commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately
provides for administration and control at the commission level
The police force is not part of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes
within and is subject to. the exercise by the President of the power
of executive control. Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute
abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would
Executive Onder No 202, Back V, Tithe I. Subtitle A. Chapter 6, Section 48
1387) WON LOCAL
stent OF THE LAN
RESTATE EN MENT
Sey
‘ding thy
civilian function of safeguarding the ine,
gradually fi rem ae National Police Commission inna
secur ent eonaittional commission Hike the C¥vil Sey,
‘Commission or Commission on Elections:
282 Extent of authority of supervision and control og
police. “bona
re a no usurpation of the power of control of the Nati
Polos pemmiscion under Section 51 of R.A No, 6975 tea a
ie cous merely act as representatives of the National Pol,
ce Berroco
father actions in the exercise of their functions, Thus, unle,
for Mrermanded by the Commission ther acts are valid and bing
as the acts of the Commission.”
$28. Extent of mayor's power to recommend,
yor cannot request that his choice be included in the ig
of 5 Uses ‘to be recommended by the Regional Police Directo,
to the mayor from which the latter shall choose the chief of police
Under Section 51 of R.A. No. 6975, the mayor shalll be deputized 1s
representative of the National Police Commission in bis terrtora]
jurisdiction and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose he
Chief of police from a list of 5 eligibles recommended by the Poli
Regional Director. Then, the Police Regional Director appoins
the officer selected by the mayor as the City Director, City Pole
Command, It is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director i
name the 5 eligibles from a pool of eligible officers screened by tke
Senior Officers Promotion and Selection Board of the Philippe
‘ational Police without interference from loeal executives. Incase
disagreement between the Regional Police Director and the Mayor
the question shall be elevated to the Regional Director, National
Police Commission, who shall resolve the issue within 5 working
days from receipt and whose decision on the choice of the Chit
Police shall be final and exeeutory. As deputy of the Commission. th
‘authority of the mayor 1s very limited. In reality, he has no power
of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one fa
‘among the lst of five eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actual
the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu City is vested
Carpi. Executive Secretary, 206 1992
Ra ary, 206 SCRA 230 (1692)
se BOOK I ~ GENERAL PROVISIONS 01
Tile ~ Basie Principles
the Police Regional Director. Much less may the mayor require the
Regional Director, Regional Police Command, to include the name of
‘any officer, no matter how qualified, in the ist of five to be submitted
to the mayor. The purpose is to enhance police professionalism and
to isolate the police service from political domination =
§284 Constitutionality of R.A. 8551
Sections 4 and 8 of R.A. No. $551 are unconstitutional because
they violate the security of tenure of the National Police Commission
members. These members are covered by the civil service and where
‘one office is abolished and replaced with another vested with similar
funetions, the abolition is void.
ARTICLE IIL
Inter-Local Government Relations
SECTION 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and
‘Municipalities. — The province, through the governor, shall ensure
that every component city and municipality within its territorial
jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and
functions. Highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities shall be independent of the province.
§29.1 “Control” as distinguished from “Supervision.”
“Control” means the power of an official to alter, modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his dutios and substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter. “Supervision” means the power of an officer to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties."
§29.2 Governor possesses supervisory power.
‘The power of the governor appears to be similar to the President.
Wvernors merely have supervisory power and cannot substitute the
judgment of component cities and municipalities with their own,™*
TAndaya v Regional Trl Court. 19 SCRA 896 1990)
™Canonizado v- Aguire. 323 SCRA 312 (2000),
Hebron w Reyes 1 Ph 175 (1958)
Republic Act No, 7160, Section 29992) _—_
_ v LOCAL,
ent OF THE LAW ON L
eSTATEMENT OF TENT
we
State and n
g29.3 Relations between the Sta nigig
corporations:
she stat, local governments are generally yp,
the etre is a corresponding PFeSUmption
tate agency preempts local governne,
creat at, in the absence of contrary staty
a Tee stato ieqialature intended the state agency ur
language, the eine from local restrictions merely because the sy,
pee ve an arm of the state and as such it occupies a super,
weition S thin the governmental hierarchy."
Ascreatures of
tothe control of the state.
state legislation creating 3
SECTION 30. Review of Executive Orders. —
(a). Except as otherwise provided under the Constitity
and special statutes, the governor shall review all executive ori,
sromulgated by the component city or municipal mayor within;
urisdiction. The city or municipal mayor shall roview all executy
sigers promulgated by the puniong barangay within his jurisdic,
Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or the ci
cor municipal mayor, as the case may be, within three (3) days for
their issuance. In all instances of review, the local chief executw.
concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are within ty
powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, ci
‘municipal ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails «
act on said executive orders within thirty (30) days after the:
‘submission, the same shall be deemed consistent with law art
therefore valid.
§30.1 Nature of governor's power.
As earlier stated, governors and mayors merely have supervises
power and cannot substitute the judgment of component citi
municipalities or barangays with their own." The governor or the
city or municipal mayor may rule that an executive order is bevio!
the power of the pertinent local chief executive or not in conforms
with provincial, city or municipal ordinances. This shall cause thy
subject executive order to
subject executive order to be invalidated and to have no force a
"=I MeQuillin, The Law of Mu
“Republic Act No. 7160, Set
nil Corirmons,§ 4.19
tion 29 (1992), ———
EC
ROOK 1 — GENERAL PROVISIONS 103,
Sees 382
Title | — Basic Principles
30.2 Judicial review of governor or mayor's actions.
‘The Supreme Court has ruled that the disapproval by the
provincial sanggunian ofa resolution of the municipal sanggunian for
peine ultra vires is a quasi-judicial function." Similarly, a governor,
thy oF municipal mayor performs a quasi-judicial function where
