[go: up one dir, main page]

0% found this document useful (0 votes)
717 views1 page

Pilipinas Loan Company Vs SEC

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1/ 1

Pilipinas Loan Company vs SEC G.R. No.

104720
April 4, 2001

FACTS:

Private respondent Filipinas Pawnshop, Inc. is a duly organized corporation


registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 9, 1959. The
articles of incorporation of private respondent states that its primary purpose is to
extend loans at legal interest on the security of either personal properties or on the
security of real properties, and to finance installment sales of motor vehicles, home
appliances and other chattels.

Petitioner is a lending corporation duly registered with the SEC on July 27, 1989.
Based on its articles of incorporation, the primary purpose of petitioner is to act as
a lending investor or, otherwise, to engage in the practice of lending money or
extending loans on the security of real or personal, tangible or intangible properties
whether as pledge, real or chattel mortgage or otherwise, xxx without however,
engaging in pawnbroking as defined under PD 114."

Private respondent filed a complaint with the Prosecution and Enforcement


Department (PED) of the SEC and alleged that: (1) petitioner, contrary to the
restriction set by the Commission, has been operating and doing business as a
pawnbroker, pawnshop or "sanglaan" in the same neighborhood where private
respondent has had its own pawnshop for 30 years in violation of its primary
purpose and without the imprimatur of the Central Bank to engage in the pawnshop
business thereby causing unjust and unfair competition with private respondent.
Petitioner denied that it is engaged in the pawnshop business, alleging that it is a
lending investor duly registered with the Central Bank.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner violated its primary franchise.

RULING:

A corporation, under the Corporation Code, has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law and by its articles of incorporation, those which may be
incidental to such conferred powers, those reasonably necessary to accomplish its
purposes and those which may be incident to its existence.

In the case at bar, the limit of the powers of petitioner as a corporation is very clear,
it is categorically prohibited from "engaging in pawnbroking as defined under PD
114". Hence, in determining what constitutes pawnbrokerage, the relevant law to
consider is PD 114.

Indispensable therefore to the determination of whether or not petitioner had


violated its articles of incorporation, was an inquiry by the SEC if petitioner was
holding out itself to the public as a pawnshop. It must be stressed that the
determination of whether petitioner violated PD 114 was merely incidental to the
regulatory powers of the SEC, to see to it that a corporation does not go beyond the
powers granted to it by its articles of incorporation.

You might also like