MARCH 2016

HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN SECURITY
A CIVIL-MILITARY-POLICE CURRICULUM

Key Themes
Conflict Prevention & Peacebuilding
Peace Operations & Peacekeeping
Human Aspects of Military Operations
Security Sector Reform & Development
Restorative Justice & Community Policing
Civil-Military-Police Dialogue & Coordination

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 1

Published by:
The Alliance for Peacebuilding
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
The Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame

©2015 Creative Commons - Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) except for
those Lessons adapted directly from other materials, as cited, in which case all rights reserved with
original holder

Suggested Citation:
Schirch, Lisa (editor). Handbook on Human Security: A Civil-Military-Police Curriculum. The Hague, The
Netherlands: Alliance for Peacebuilding, GPPAC, Kroc Institute, March 2016.

Companion set of case studies: This publication has a companion publication entitled Local Ownership
in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches. Both publications can be found on the web at our
on-line community at the peaceportal.org.

Cover Photo: CC/Flickr AU-UN IST Photo AMISOM/Stuart Price

Background on the Handbook on Human Security

The Alliance for Peacebuilding, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), and
the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies received three year funding
from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 2012 to advance civil society engagement in policymaking relating
to peace, security and development. This Handbook links to the security stream of this project. This
publication is a collaborative product drawing on the expertise of people from forty countries and over
one hundred organisations that worked together over a span of three years. Three roundtables
conferences in Geneva, Washington DC and The Hague created opportunities for civil society and security
sector leaders to share their case studies of joint capacity building to support human security. The project
set up an online community for Security Sector and Civil Society Engagement on Human Security on
GPPAC’s Peace Portal to communicate about the project, collect resources and engage a broader group of
stakeholders. In 2013-2014, the project staff conducted 18 separate trainings and discussions with 12
different military training centres to gather their feedback and input into the curriculum. A pilot Training
of Trainers using this draft curriculum took place in June 2015 at Eastern Mennonite University’s Summer
Peacebuilding Institute. A conference to launch this Handbook took place in December 2015 at the Civil-
Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) in The Hague.

Acknowledgments
Coordinating Author and Editor: Lisa Schirch, Alliance for Peacebuilding
Military Advisor: Col Chris Holshek (retired), Alliance for Peacebuilding
Copy Editor: Deborah Mancini-Griffoli, Alliance for Peacebuilding

Content Contributors
Thiago Rodrigues, Universidade Federal Fluminense (Module 1)
Jenny Aulin, GPPAC (Module 3)
Deborah Mancini-Griffoli (Lesson 10)
Michelle Barsa and Angelic Young, Institute for Inclusive Security (Lessons 6 and 7)
Thammy Evans, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (Lesson 16)
Dean Piedmont (Lesson 19)
David Campt (Lesson 21)
Katrina Gehman (Lesson 26)
Marla Keenan, Center for Civilians in Conflict (Lesson 28)
Koila Costello-Olsson, Pacific Centre for Peacebuilding (Module 9)
Eastern Mennonite University’s STAR program (Module 9)
Maja Vitas Majstorovic, Nansen Dialogue Centre Serbia, and Gesa Bent, GPPAC (Module 9)
Aly Lyons, Teresa Crawford, Hugh O’Donnell, Partners Global (Module 10)
Laura Wells contributed editing as well as content on the Scenarios
Justin Richmond inspired the Scenarios
Christopher Kolenda’s book The Counterinsurgency Challenge inspired the Scenarios

Project Reference Group and Special Advisers

Bernardo Arevalo de Leon and Ana Glenda Tager, Interpeace Guatemala

2 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Claudia Croci, UN Institute for Training and Research - UNITAR
Deng Giguiento, Catholic Relief Services (The Philippines)
Gavin Cawthra, African Security Sector Network (South Africa)
Lesley Connolly, African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes - ACCORD, (South Africa)
Mallika Joseph (then-) Regional Centre for Strategic Studies – RCSS (Sri Lanka/South Asia)
Nicole Ball, Center for International Policy (Washington DC and Clingendael Institute, The Netherlands)
Noah Salameh, Centre for Conflict Resolution & Reconciliation – CCRR (Palestine)
Shafeek Siddiq, Afghanistan Justice Organisation (Afghanistan)
Thiago Rodrigues, Universidade Federal Fluminense (Brazil)
Vincent Azumah and Francis Acquah-Aikins, West African Network for Peacebuilding - WANEP,
(Ghana/West Africa)

The following organisations contributed to the project by taking part in consultation meetings
and/or pilot trainings on the Handbook:
American University (USA) Institute for Inclusive Security (USA)
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (USA) Institut Titian Perdamaian (Indonesia)
Center for Civilians in Conflict (USA) International Alert (UK)
Center for Conflict Resolution – CECORE International Center for Transitional Justice
(Uganda) (USA)
Centro de Colaboración Cívica (Mexico) Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (Kosovo)
Clingendael Institute (The Netherlands) Life & Peace Institute (Somalia/Sweden)
Conciliation Resources (UK) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs –
Cordaid (The Netherlands) NUPI (Norway)
Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Oxfam Novib (The Netherlands)
Económicas y Sociales – CRIES (Argentina) Partners Global [formerly Partners for
European Peacebuilding Liaison Office – EPLO Democratic Change] (USA)
(Brussels) PAX (The Netherlands)
Eastern Mennonite University (USA) Permanent Peace Movement (Egypt/Lebanon)
Folke Bernadotte Academy (Sweden) Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy (Ukraine)
Foundation for Tolerance International Saferworld (UK)
(Kyrgyzstan) Search for Common Ground (USA)
George Mason University (USA) Stimson Center (USA)
Global Public Policy Institute (Germany) Southern African Centre for the Constructive
Human Security & CSO Unit, London School of Resolution of Disputes – SACCORD (Zambia)
Economics, LSE (UK) Tufts University (USA)
Hurepi-Trust (Tanzania) University of San Diego (USA)
International Security Sector Advisory Team – University of Oslo (Norway)
ISSAT - of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic US Institute of Peace – USIP (USA)
Control of Armed Forces - DCAF UN Security Sector Reform Unit
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (USA)

Military/Police Reference Group and Pilot Trainings

Military and police officers from US, UK, France, Kenya, India, Mali, Pakistan and elsewhere served in their
individual capacity to provide feedback and advice. Pilot trainings using materials in this curriculum were
tested over a seven-year period from 2008-2015 at twelve different military training centres. The project
team also consulted with individuals at these centres about the project:
Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence
NATO-ACT
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute – US Army War College
Quantico Marine Center
US SOCOM
West Point Center for the Study of Civil Military Operations

This report was made possible with support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The opinions and views of
the authors do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Fund.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 3

Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................................... 6
AUDIENCE ............................................................................................................................................................................... 6
GOAL ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 6
THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED CIVIL-MILITARY-POLICE TRAINING .............................................................................. 7
TERMINOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................................................... 8
HANDBOOK USER’S GUIDE................................................................................................................................................ 12
SCENARIO-BASED ROLE-PLAYS ....................................................................................................................................... 16

MODULE 1 LEADERSHIP IN COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS .................................................................26

LESSON 1: MAPPING STAKEHOLDERS .............................................................................................................. 27
LESSON 2: ADAPTIVE LEADERSHIP .................................................................................................................. 34
LESSON 3: INTER-CULTURAL COMPETENCE ..................................................................................................... 39
LESSON 4: SELF-ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................................... 44

MODULE 2 STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS ...............................................................................................48

LESSON 5: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS ........................................................................................................... 49
LESSON 6: INTRODUCTION TO THE SECURITY SECTOR ................................................................................... 58
LESSON 7: INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL SOCIETY ................................................................................................. 65
LESSON 8: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CIVIL-MILITARY-POLICE RELATIONS ............................................... 75

MODULE 3 MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COORDINATION ........................................................................81

LESSON 9: APPROACHES TO MULTI-STAKEHOLDER COORDINATION ........................................................... 82
LESSON 10: LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT ................................................................ 91
LESSON 11: MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PROCESSES........................................................................................... 103

MODULE 4 COORDINATION ON CONFLICT ASSESSMENT ............................................................ 112

LESSON 12: CONFLICT ASSESSMENT RESEARCH .......................................................................................... 113
LESSON 13: CONFLICT ASSESSMENT TOOLS ................................................................................................. 125
LESSON 14: MOVING FROM CONFLICT ASSESSMENT TO PLANNING ........................................................... 133

MODULE 5 COMPARING APPROACHES TO SECURITY................................................................... 138

LESSON 15: HUMAN SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY.......................................................................... 139
LESSON 16: APPROACHES TO SECURITY ....................................................................................................... 145
LESSON 17: APPROACHES TO JUSTICE AND POLICING ................................................................................. 155
LESSON 18: APPROACHES TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) ............................................................. 164
LESSON 19: APPROACHES TO DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION......................... 171

MODULE 6 SKILLS IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING .................................... 179

LESSON 20: COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT SKILLS ................................................................................. 180
LESSON 21: DIALOGUE & FACILITATION SKILLS ......................................................................................... 190
LESSON 22: NEGOTIATION SKILLS ................................................................................................................ 197
LESSON 23: MEDIATION SKILLS .................................................................................................................... 204

MODULE 7 CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE ........................................................................................................ 212

LESSON 24: UNDERSTANDING CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE .................................................................................. 213
LESSON 25: COORDINATING CIVILIAN ASSISTANCE ..................................................................................... 221

4 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

MODULE 8 PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS ............................................................................................. 230
LESSON 26: MAINSTREAMING PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN ........................................................................... 231
LESSON 27: GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN SECURITY .................................................................................. 238
LESSON 28: MITIGATING CIVILIAN HARM .................................................................................................... 246

MODULE 9 TRAUMA AWARENESS, RESILIENCE AND MANAGING STRESS ............................. 254

LESSON 29: TRAUMA AWARENESS ................................................................................................................ 255
LESSON 30: RESILIENCE, SELF-CARE AND MANAGING STRESS ................................................................... 262

MODULE 10 SECURITY GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE ................ 267

LESSON 31: ASSESSING SECURITY GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY & PERFORMANCE........................... 268

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 5

Introduction
No one group can achieve human security on their own without working with others. Civil society,
military and police all have roles to play in achieving human security.

Human security depends on fruitful civil-military-police understanding and coordination. New

generations of security sector leaders recognise that civil society is an important stakeholder for
sustainable security. At the same time, many in civil society recognise the need to engage with the
security sector as key stakeholders necessary for sustainable peace. Human security requires local
ownership and active engagement between the security sector and civil society.

Integrated training for the security sector and civil society can help identify common ground and also
understand the areas where their approaches are different. This curriculum offers an innovative, first of
its kind integrated civil-military-police curriculum.

Audience
The Handbook on Human Security was designed for senior and mid-level leaders in international and
regional organisations, government, military, police and civil society are the primary audience for the
curriculum. Ideally, training and education centres for military, police, and civil society organisations
including NGOs, universities and religious organisations will use the curriculum in integrated civil-
military-police courses to enable joint learning and relationship building.

Goal
This first-of-its-kind integrated civil-military-police training curriculum aims to provide practical
guidance and a shared set of terms and concepts to enable civil-military-police coordination to support
human security.

1. Provide guidance for civil society-military-police coordination, by learning from and adapting
humanitarian guidance to a broader context that involves other types of civilians, other types of
contexts, and longer-term time frames. The aim of this curriculum is to enable security forces and
civil society to interact in a way that minimises harm and maximises potential for complementary
approaches to improve human security.

2. Create a shared set of terms and concepts to enable civil-military-police coordination through
knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs):
 Knowledge to improve awareness of the areas for civil-military-police coordination
 Skills in adaptive leadership, intercultural competence, coordination, conflict assessment,
negotiation, conflict prevention, stress management and
related issues relevant for security sector and civil
society in complex environments
 Abilities for strategic, operational, and tactical civil-
military-police coordination

3. Identify five areas for civil-military-police coordination

to support human security. These areas are illustrated
through the Handbook in the Coordination Wheel for Human
Security.
 Joint capacity building to support human security
 Joint assessment to identify security challenges
 Joint planning to identify security strategies
 Joint implementation to support human security
programmes
 Joint monitoring and evaluation of the security sector to
ensure local ownership and oversight

6 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

The Need for Integrated Civil-Military-Police Training
 International organisations call for community engagement and local ownership in development
assistance, security sector reform, countering violent extremism. This reflects the growing
recognition that the state-society relationship is fundamental to both security and development.
Security is a public good and local people – the consumers of security- need a voice.

 Easy access to weapons and media attention makes it easy for transnational non-state armed groups
and other illicit actors to multiply their psychological impact and mobilise communities and nations
to war. This “democratisation of violence” requires a “democratisation of peace and security”
that harnesses civil society’s capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding through mitigating
the drivers of conflict and instability.

 Military leaders recognise the need for new approaches to relating to civilians, as some refer to the
“human aspects of military operations.” They are adding courses in the social sciences, including
conflict prevention, negotiation, protection of civilians, and human security. This reflects growing
recognition on the limits of military solutions to problems that are fundamentally about political
and economic governance.

 Police training programmes are also focusing on community engagement, with some emphasising
community policing, problem-solving policing, and restorative justice. This reflects growing
recognition on the limits of the use of police force to prevent crime and violence and the need for
broader approaches to improving community security.

 A crowded civil-military space requires civil-military-police coordination beyond humanitarian

assistance. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) civil-military guidance and coordination
mechanisms for humanitarian assistance do not cover a growing number of non-humanitarian
sectors where civilians, military and police activities are overlapping and sometimes conflicting with
each other. There are not yet adequate coordination mechanisms in place, leading to tensions as
civilian, military and police efforts conflict with each other or duplicate programmes.

 Civil society organisations are rapidly growing in numbers, especially those that are working to
prevent violent conflict and build peace. Civil society organisations are increasingly moving from
“protest” to “proposal” on security issues; not only opposing security policies, but making concrete
policy proposals on how to improve security. Even as international organisations lament the lack of
local ownership, local civil society still faces significant challenges in asserting their expertise
and desire to take part in assessing security challenges, designing and implementing security
programmes and strategies, and monitoring and evaluating the security sector.

 Civil society’s capacities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding bring important skills and
processes for mitigating the drivers of conflict and instability. Effective civil-military-police
coordination requires peacebuilding skills and processes such as dialogue, negotiation, and
mediation.

 There is an increase in politically motivated attacks against NGOs, civil society organisations,
and civilians. Civil-military-police tensions increase along with the growing number of attacks on
civilians. With the increase in military forces participating in civilian assistance efforts, NGOs
and civil society express caution and concern about blurring the lines in provision of civilian
assistance. CSOs operational requirements for independence and impartiality are essential to their
access and trust with populations in need and the safety of their staff and beneficiaries, who may be
seen as “soft targets” by armed opposition groups if CSOs are seen as collaborating with military
forces.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 7

Terminology
This Handbook includes a variety of terms that may not be familiar to all readers. Civil-Military-Police
coordination requires that we become familiar with terminology used by other groups. Civilians need to
learn military and police terminology and vice versa. The first time this Handbook introduces a term that
may not be known by all readers, the term is underlined.

Acceptance Strategy is a security strategy used by civil society organisations to reduce or remove
threats to their staff and communities with whom they work by increasing the acceptance (the political
and social consent) of an organisation’s presence and its work, particularly with all armed groups within
the context.

Adaptive Leadership is a style of leadership that helps leaders to adapt to constantly changing dynamics
with diverse groups of other stakeholders.

Business sector includes groups that operate for profit, excluding the economic activities of government,
of private households, and of non-profit organisations.

Civilians are individuals who are not combatants. Government civilians work directly for the state. Non-
governmental civilians do not work for the state.

Civilian Government Agencies include diplomatic, development, transportation, economic, education,

health, and many other civilian government agencies may be involved in addressing violent conflict and
promoting human security.

Civil Society and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are non-governmental, voluntary groups that
organise themselves on behalf of individual citizens and local communities. An active civil society both
partners with government to fill public services and holds government to account, by pressing for
transparent and fair governance, with equal access to government services for all people. Civil society is
by definition, unarmed. Uncivil society refers to those individuals or groups that support violence by
actively fuelling hate and distrust between groups. There are diverse types of CSOs as well as other
organisations representing the interests of local communities. Traditional CSOs includes religious, tribal,
cultural, and informal organisations. Modern CSOs include universities, community-based organisations
(CBOs), professional and trade associations, media, charities, artists, and nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs) financed with national funds. Locally-based NGOs (LNGOs) are part of the local
civil society within a country but in some cases have foreign donors. Most LNGOs refer to themselves as
local CSOs. In this report, the term local CSO and local NGO are used interchangeably. Internationally-
based NGOs (INGOs) tend to have their headquarters outside of the country but they usually partner
closely with local CSOs. In complex environments, CSO operational requirements include empowerment,
independence, distinction, consent and acceptance, and access and freedom.

Civilian assistance is a broad term used to describe all efforts to help civilians. Disaster Assistance:
Civilian assistance given during a natural disaster. Military and police may take on civilian roles to assist
with the crisis. Foreign Disaster Assistance describes a situation where a foreign military assists
civilians in another country during a crisis. By definition, the primary objective of humanitarian
assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity through material or logistical
assistance in response to natural disasters and man-made disasters. Development Assistance, also
known as international aid, overseas aid, official development assistance (ODA), or foreign aid, supports
the economic, environmental, social, and political development of developing countries. Governance
Assistance is a specific type of development assistance related to how society makes decisions and
manages its resources.

Complex emergency, as defined by the United Nations, is a situation where there is both a humanitarian
crisis in a country, region or society and where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority
resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes
beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the on-going United Nations country
programme.

Complex Environments have greater numbers and greater diversity of stakeholders and issues than
“simple” environments where relatively few people and issues are involved.

8 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Conflict management is a limited approach to reduce the negative effects of conflict by lessening its
negative impact. Conflict resolution is an approach that resolves or settles the underlying issues that
cause conflict. Conflict transformation focuses on changing violent conflict into nonviolent conflict
where individuals use political and legal channels to address their interests. Conflict prevention refers
to efforts to prevent violent conflict. Conflict prevention efforts such as diplomacy and negotiation
attempt to stop violence from breaking out, since it is more difficult to stop violence once it has started.
Peacebuilding is an umbrella term used to describe all efforts to transform conflict into nonviolent forms
of political negotiation and dialogue that can address the root causes of conflict.

Civil-military-police coordination and multi-stakeholder coordination refer to the ability for

communication between military and police (security forces) with a range of different types of civilians to
avoid duplication or conflict between their efforts and maximise their ability to support human security.
The terms “Civil-Military Relations” and “Civil-Military Coordination” are often confused. Civil-military
relations refer to society-wide relationships between the public and the military; it often lacks attention
to the public’s relationship with police. Civil-military coordination is meant to refer to operational
coordination between civilian and military forces. But there are many different types of civilians
(government civilians, businesses, private contractors, civil society organisations or NGOs, and civilians in
the local population.) Humanitarian civil-military coordination is a subset of civil-military-police
coordination.

Conflict Sensitivity is an approach to programming and policymaking that recognises the potential
influence for any type of intervention to cause harm. It is also referred to as “Do No Harm.” Conflict-
sensitive policies, programmes and projects aim to minimise unintentional negative impacts that may
drive conflict and cause further social divisions while maximising positive impacts on the context that
mitigate conflict and bridge social divides. Conflict assessment and self-assessment research is central to
conflict sensitive policies, programmes and projects in human rights, humanitarian assistance,
development and related efforts.

Contractors, also known as private military corporations (PMC), private military firms (PMF), or private
military or security companies, work on behalf of and report to governments that hire them to provide
specific types of security assistance. Governments or private corporations may hire private security
companies to protect their personnel and assets. There are a non-state entity and operate for a profit,
making them part of the business sector.

Gender refers to social and cultural differences between males and females Gender inclusion refers to
males and females having equal opportunities to contribute to analysing security threats, identifying
security strategies and participating in implementing the work of the security sector, including security
forces. Gender-sensitivity requires paying attention to the different experiences and capacities of males
and females related to human security. Gender accountability in security refers women and people of
diverse gender identities being included in mechanisms for oversight of the security, to ensure security
assessment and strategies offer protection.

Governance to any type of governing structures; both formal and informal by state, business, or civil
society. It includes any tradition and institution that makes decisions and provides resources to manage
society's problems and affairs. In most societies today, informal, non-state governance structures
complement or exist outside of formal state governance.

Human security refers to the security of individuals and communities. The United Nations defines
human security as “people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented measures
that seek to reduce the likelihood of conflicts, help overcome the obstacles to development and promote
human rights for all.” At minimum, human security refers to safety from direct threats of violence. A
comprehensive approach to human security includes three components: freedom from fear, freedom
from want, and freedom to live in dignity. In some regions, the term “multi-dimensional security” is more
popular. The terms democratic security, multi-dimensional security, citizen security, or community
security refer to similar ideas.

Humanitarian Organisations are distinct from other stakeholders in their sole goal to relieve human
suffering and in their operational requirements for impartiality, neutrality and independence.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 9

Humiliation is an emotion or feeling. the opposite of respect. Punishment feels like humiliation.
Though the intent of punishment and humiliation is to defeat and deter others, the impact of
humiliation often leads to increased levels of conflict and violence.

Intercultural competence is a skillset that can be learned and developed to build effective working
relationships with people from different cultural backgrounds. A monocultural approach – the
opposite of intercultural competence - understands the world from only one cultural point of view.
Likewise, without intercultural competence, people often use unfair stereotypes as a simple way to
group people together according to their culture and generalise about the way all of them think and act.
Stereotyping wrongly assumes that all people within a cultural group are similar.

International Organisation refers to organisations with an international membership, scope, or

presence, such as the United Nations or the World Bank.

Intercultural competence is a skillset that can be learned and developed to build effective working
relationships with people from different cultural backgrounds.

Local Ownership engages local communities in a set of processes to identify security challenges, jointly
develop and implement security strategies, and monitor and evaluate the security sector to ensure it
works to improve the safety of every man, woman, girl and boy. The security sector tends to speak about
community engagement instead of local ownership when they refer to their efforts to have local
communities participate in their policies and programmes, e.g. in community policing projects. Civil
society uses the term “civil society oversight” to describe their ability to monitor and contribute to
security sector policies and programmes. All of these terms refer to joint meetings between civil society
and the security sector where local people have the ability to participate in security sector programmes
and policies.

Mediation is a process for handling conflict with the help of a third party or “mediator” who facilitates a
discussion between people in conflict with each other to identify the issues and develop options for
addressing the challenges.

National Security refers to security of the national interests of the state. States define their national
interests in different ways. In most states, these include protection of territory, citizens, a legal order and
economic, geopolitical and ideological interests.

Non-state Armed Groups, according to a working definition at the UN, are groups that have the potential
to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; are not within
the formal military structures of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental organisations; and are not
under the control of the State(s) in which they operate.

Peacebuilding includes a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the
community, national, and international levels to address the immediate impacts and root causes of
conflict before, during, and after violent conflict occurs. Peacebuilding values, skills and processes such as
dialogue, negotiation, and mediation support human security. Peacebuilding includes activities designed
to prevent conflict through addressing structural and proximate causes of violence, promoting
sustainable peace, delegitimising violence as a dispute resolution strategy, building capacity within
society to peacefully manage disputes, and reducing vulnerability to triggers that may spark violence.

Protection of civilians, according to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, are “activities aimed at
obtaining full respect for the rights of all individuals in accordance with international law – international
humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law – regardless of their age, gender, social ethnic, national,
religious, or other background.”

Security Sector, according to the United Nations, is “a broad term used to describe the structures,
institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a
country.” This Handbook uses the term “security sector” as an umbrella term including the state’s armed
forces (military, police, intelligence services); justice and rule of law institutions; state oversight and
management bodies such as national security advisory bodies, parliament; as well as non-state armed
groups who in some cases, play certain roles in protecting some population groups. Security forces include
a limited number of groups that hold the responsibility to protect public order and security, and the
power to arrest, detain, search, seize and use force and firearms.

10 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Security Sector Reform (SSR) as defined by the United Nations, is “a process of assessment, review and
implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities,
and that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its
peoples, without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law.” The OECD
defines SSR as “seeking to increase partner countries’ ability to meet the range of security needs within
their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance,
transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more
traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing.” SSR is often used by donors term to
refer to their assistance to a partner country to reform or improve upon legitimate state-society relations.

Self-assessment is a process to become more self-aware of one’s strengths, weaknesses, capacities and
lack of capacities.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) includes psychological or emotional violence such as sexual
harassment, rape and sexual abuse, child sexual abuse, child marriage, female genital cutting, marital
rape, dowry-related violence, female infanticide, killing of females because they are females, forced
prostitution, sex trafficking, and sexual violence used during war.

Society, local communities or local populations are interchangeable terms to refer to all the
individuals and groups of people outside of government and the security sector.

Stakeholders are individuals and groups that have a “stake” or an interest in some issue or process.

State-society relations refer to the quality of relationship between state institutions and the public
State-building aims to improve the technical apparatus of the state’s institutions to provide public
services. State formation aims to improve the state-society relationship, to improve the social contract
between people and a representative government to ensure there is accountability, perceived legitimacy,
and a system of checks and balances on state powers. 1

Transitional justice refers to society-wide efforts to address past human rights violations in order to do
acknowledge the past, end impunity and hold perpetrators accountable, reaffirm the rule of law and
provide justice services, and help the country heal and achieve social reconciliation

Traumatic stress refers to an emotional wound that results from experiencing or witnessing a traumatic
event or events: a highly stressful, horrifying event or series of events where one feels a lack of control,
powerlessness, and threat of injury or death.

Wicked problems are difficult to define or complicated issues that resist easy solutions. Wicked
problems take place in complex environments and affect every level of society, often lasting for
generations.

1Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, (Paris, France:
Organisation for Economic and Development Cooperation (OECD), 2008), 8.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 11

Handbook User’s Guide
I hear, I forget.
I see, I remember.
I do, I understand.
-Chinese proverb

Education research finds that learners remember very little from lecture-format training and education.
This Handbook lays out a learner-centred curriculum where participants use and add onto the knowledge
and experience they already possess. Adults learn best through a "dialogue" that takes place in an
atmosphere of mutual respect and safety. Learning happens most when it is directly relevant to the
learner’s lives. This training emphasizes participatory learning through one of three scenarios that offer
examples of the civil-military-police challenges in real-to-life complex environments.

Transfer Learning vs. Participatory Learning

Participatory learning is a method of adult education that allows for direct involvement and creates an
atmosphere for sharing experiences. It involves adults practicing new skills and applying new knowledge
and attitudes during workshop activities. Participatory learning is different from the type of “transfer”
learning practiced in most formal education, where the teacher knows everything and transfers the
knowledge to the students.

In many learning environments, a “banking” method of education is used where the trainer “transfers”
knowledge and skills to the participants. The following table gives examples of the roles in this traditional
transfer model of education.
The “Transfer” Trainer The Participant

 is very big and important  is small and unimportant

 is full of knowledge  has little knowledge about the topic
 ignores participants' experience  must keep quiet during lecture
 has no experience to share

This is often not an effective training model for adults for two reasons.
1) It does not use a very important resource - the participants' knowledge and experience.

2) Studies show that people learn better and remember what they learned when they:
 Hear information
 See demonstrations and illustrations
 Discuss information and ideas
 Practice techniques

The participatory learning model of education is quite different. Characteristics of this model include:
The “Facilitative” Trainer The Participants

 is a facilitator  are members of a communication network

 is a good communicator  feel at ease
 works at the same level as the participants  participate actively
 respects participants' ideas and experiences  share experiences
 is supportive of the learning process  ask questions, make mistakes, and take
 is an organiser of learning experiences risks as part of the training process
 use the trainer as a resource, guide, and
mentor

12 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Principles of Adult Education
Adults tend to learn in different ways from teenagers and children. These ways are more dependent on the
experience, maturity, and motivation of a later life stage. Knowing some of the important aspects of the adult’s
approach to learning will be of assistance to you in the task of creating the best possible learning environment.

Adult Education Principle Implications for Training

 Adults learn best when they perceive  Provide "real life" situations and emphasise the
learning as relevant to their needs application of learning to real problems.
 Identify learners' needs and what is important to
them.

 Adults learn by doing and by being  Provide activities that require active participation of
actively involved in the learning learners.
process.  Provide activities that involve the learners as whole
people: their ideas, attitudes, feelings, and physical
being.

 Adults have unique learning styles.  Use a variety of training techniques.

They learn in different ways, at  Establish an atmosphere of respect and
different rates, and from different understanding of differences.
experiences.

 Participants bring relevant and  Provide opportunities for sharing information.

important knowledge and experiences  Discuss and analyse participants' experiences.
to the workshop.  Use participants as a resource and encourage them
to participate and share their experiences.

By using adult education principles and practices, the trainer can expect active participation by persons
attending the workshop. Personnel trained using these methods learn quickly and retain new knowledge
and skills.

Participants
This Handbook can be used with different types of participants.

Joint Civil-Military-Police Training: The ideal use of the Handbook is with a diverse group of military,
police, civilian government and civil society. Because these are key stakeholders necessary to achieve
human security, joint training is much more likely to be effective in improving coordination. The
accompanying volume on Local Ownership in Security provides case studies that illustrate how
universities and training programmes have already begun conducting joint training and capacity building
programmes.

Training for Specific Groups or Units: In some cases, it may not be feasible to conduct joint training.
This Handbook can also be used within police or military training centres, or in a university or civil
society training centre where there are mostly civil society and a few government, police or military
personnel.

Handbook Format
This Handbook provides an orientation to the curriculum to allow diverse users from identified key
audiences working in a variety of contexts to identify relevant parts of the modules provided. Each lesson
takes approximately 1 hour and includes:
 Specific learning objectives
 Clear and concise content kept to minimum
 Recognition of cultural and contextual differences in terminology and challenges
 A learning sequence that emphasizes scenario-based learning exercises
 Boxes that point learners to relevant case studies in the companion book of “Local
Ownership in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches”
 Links to on-line videos or downloadable power point presentations, and further
resources

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 13

Using All or Some of the Lessons
Taken as a whole, there are 31 lessons in the Handbook. While each lesson requires a minimum of
approximately 1 hour, trainers may decide to spend more time on some lessons and less time on other
lessons.

 Use all of the lessons: Each of the lessons fits in a sequence delivered in a 5-day seminar
workshop, or each lesson may also stand on its own.
 Select relevant lessons and/or re-sequence lessons for a particular group.
 Combine lesson exercises. Each lesson may be taught in different ways. In some cases, trainers
may decide not to use the APPLY stage for some of the lessons or to combine some of the APPLY
exercises and give a longer amount of time for the scenario exercises after covering several of the
lessons.

Organisers and trainers may make decisions on how to use this Handbook based on several factors:
 The unique challenges of a specific group of people may lead organisers to choose specific
lessons relevant to that group of people or that context.
 The amount of time available may lead organisers to choose specific lessons that are most urgent
for their group to learn.
 The funding available

14 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

The “Four A” Learning Sequence
A learning curriculum for using this Handbook follows each lesson. The learning curriculum uses the “Four A”
Learning Sequence developed by Global Learning Partners2 based on decades of adult education for senior level
executive leaders as well as the lower level and even illiterate learners. The Four A Learning Sequence first
“anchors” a topic within the learner’s own experience and knowledge. Next it “adds” new information and
concepts to what the learner already knows. Then it involves the learner in “applying” new ideas in an active
exercise or scenario. Finally, the learner reflects on what they would like to take “away” from the lesson to apply
in the future.

ANCHOR
Reflect and share your existing knowledge or experience about the topic.

ADD
Add new information, definitions, concepts, skills or new content to your existing knowledge through reading, or
a short 10-15 minute presentation that summarises material visually, such as a diagram or power point
presentation.

APPLY
Practice using the new content in a scenario-based role-play or activity where you have to do something with
the new content.

AWAY
Decide what part of the lesson is important to take away for future use. For example, at the end of each lesson,
you can reflect on the following.

 I learned that . . .
 I re-learned that . . .
 I noted that . . .
 I discovered that . . .
 I realised that . . .
 I was surprised that . . .
 I was glad that . . .
 I was disappointed that . . .

Citation

2Global Learning Partners hosts a website which explains the Four A Learning Process and hosts other learning
resources. http://www.globallearningpartners.com, accessed 15 October 2015.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 15

Scenario-based Role-Plays
The “Apply” section of the Learning Exercise after each lesson refers to a scenario-based role-play that
allows participants to practice new attitudes, skills, and knowledge.

Choose a Scenario: Three scenarios cover three different contexts, with different types of security
challenges. Choose a scenario that best fits your learning goals. Stick with the same scenario all the way
through the curriculum or use a different scenario for different lessons.

Apply the Curriculum: The scenarios are described in full here at the beginning of the Handbook.
Participants can either complete the scenario by following the sequence of the lessons ordered in the
Handbook, or you can pick and choose which lessons you would like to do. Each lesson and scenario-
based role–play can stand alone. The scenario may be used even if a group is only covering one lesson in
the Handbook.

Scenario Facilitators: The trainer or trainers are the scenario facilitators. They should decide how much
time to allot to each part of the scenario exercise in the APPLY section of the Learning Exercises. The
facilitator’s main job is time-management. The facilitator should decide ahead of time how much time to
give to each lesson and how to manage the time in that lesson, including the scenario-based role-play. The
facilitator will also coordinate with the stakeholder teams to add additional facts related to the scenario
that teams would like to include in the scenario. For example, a team might propose to the facilitator a
fact about the size of their budget or their access to the media. . The facilitator can then decide whether to
allow this fact and announce it to other teams if necessary.

Scenario Stakeholder Teams: Each participant in the training should choose or be assigned to a
stakeholder team. Participants will stay in these teams throughout all of the lessons.

Location and Room Set Up

The setup of the training space is important to the quality of learning. The scenario stakeholder teams will
need their own space to meet. A classroom with tables set up in the following diagram works best to
enable participants to take part in large group discussions and presentations while also allowing
stakeholder teams to meet individually. Each table can hold 5 participants, with two on each side and one
at the far end. Other similar room sets ups in a semi-circle can also work. Also make sure the room has
adequate light and oxygen.

16 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Scenario A ADAMA
Security Challenges:
 Interreligious violence
 Violence between state and non-state armed groups
 Extractive industry
 Environmental degradation
 Loss of livelihoods
 Widespread access to weapons

Participants: Divide participants into teams of no less than 2 people.

Teams:
Ministry of Interior
National Military
Local Police
Ministry of Women’s Affairs
Local Human Rights NGOs and civil society groups
Farm Workers Association
Interreligious Task Force
Optional: International security assistance police training mission

Background on Adama
The country of Adama is one of the wealthiest countries in the region. Yet Adama experiences mass
violence in both the north and south, though for different reasons. There are over two dozen militia
groups across the country.

Armed conflict impacts oil corporations operating in the northern region of the country that suffer from
damage to their equipment and pipelines. Local communities have seen an increase in youth gangs. Some
of these armed groups attack oil pipelines.

In the southern region of Adama, widespread availability of cheap weapons makes it easy for youth to
form militias. These youth militias identify by religion and tribe. Some militias carry out rape as a weapon
of war against girls who attend school as they belong to a religious ideology that rejects all forms of
Western education.

Local communities in the north are divided between those that profit from the oil extraction, and those
who have lost their livelihoods because of oil extraction. Oil spills degrade the environment, making it
impossible for farmers and fishers to live off of the land or water and thus increasing poverty and
economic desperation. The local farm worker’s association is demanding the government take action to
push for the environmental clean up of the region.

People from the middle to southern part of the country dominate the government. Government workers
frequently take bribes and citizens accuse them of corruption. Human rights organisations document
widespread violations, including arrest without cause, torture, and disappearance. One militia is carrying
out raids on government offices in remote parts of the country.

Adama is also facing a drought from climate change. Farmer’s crops have failed for the last 10 years.
Farmers have left their land and moved to the city to find work, which is straining their already limited
resources and social services. Urban militias are joining forces with rural militias. Some even join
transnational militant networks.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 15: A peace agreement is reached between one of the main
militia groups and the government. The peace agreement contains provisions calling for Security Sector
Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of the militia groups.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 17

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 17: An earthquake occurs, killing over 30,000 people and
destroying several major towns.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 20: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) whose homes and
towns were destroyed in the earthquake are now in the process of relocating. These IDPs are especially
vulnerable to kidnapping and recruitment into militia groups.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 21: There are reports of increasing sexual and gender-based
violence (SGBV) following the earthquake. There are reports of sexual abuse of women, girls and boys
occurring in the IDP camps. Militia groups abduct 300 girls from their school. IDP girls who have lost
their parents are being trafficked.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 22: The media announces that militia units are hiding
amidst IDPs in the camps set up after an earthquake in the country. The police raid the IDP camp.
Eighteen IDPs are killed in the gunfire between national police and militias. Human rights groups
announce that they believe the attack inside the IDP camp is a violation of human rights law. The police
refute this claim, and insist the attack was justified and proportional to the threat.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 23: A town meeting is occurring in the village closest to the
IDP camp where civilians were killed in the raid. At the town meeting, one person in the community
becomes angry and begins yelling and threatening the others in the room.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 25: Given the rising tensions following the earthquake and
the killing of eighteen civilians in the IDP camp, each of the stakeholders in this scenario decides to renew
efforts to negotiate an end to the crisis by building a common national vision.

Each team may need to make up specific “facts” about the scenario context that are not included in the
background. Teams that would like to assert a fact should check with the facilitator, who can decide whether
to allow contradictory assertions of fact or whether teams can come to some agreements about particular
features of the scenario context.

Team Descriptions for Adama

Ministry of Interior
Your job is to guide the country toward the conditions necessary to achieve its national interests. Adama’s
political leadership has identified three national interests. First, you want to make sure that foreign
corporations continue to invest in your country, as oil revenues are your main source of income. Second,
you want to defeat militia groups plaguing your country. Third, you want to stop the interreligious
warfare between tribal groups.

National Military
Your job is to secure the country’s borders and pursue the country’s national interests. The minister of
the Interior gives you directions on how to contribute.

National Police
Your job is to be the front lines of Adama’s war against militia groups, to protect oil interests, and to
prevent interreligious violence. Militia groups sometimes attack local police stations. Your police move
around the country and are able to respond swiftly.

Ministry of Women’s Affairs

Your job is to address the safety and interests of women and girls in Adama. Your number one priority is
preventing further attacks against female students and reducing sexual and gender-based violence in
your country.

Local Human Rights NGOs and Civil Society Organizations

Your job is to document human rights violations and develop proposals for how to improve human
security. You attempt to carefully document attacks on civilians by both state and non-state armed
groups. The government does not like your reports on human rights abuses by the national military and
local police. You also have received threats from militia groups.

18 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Farm Workers Association
Your worker’s union is pressing the government to address environmental threats. You believe the
corporations bribe the government to ignore the destruction of farmland and water sources. Women
make up half of your union. They also share concerns about violence against women.

Interreligious Task Force

Muslim and Christian leaders have formed an Interreligious Task Force to address violence between
Muslims and Christians. Your job is to condemn violence by militia groups as well as violence against
civilians by state security forces. You are concerned about the cycle of violence. Your Interreligious Task
Force is highly skilled in negotiation and mediation and looks for attempts to use these skills.

Optional: International security assistance training mission

Your job is to improve Adama’s police and military forces to achieve your national interests, which
overlap with Adama’s national interests. The President of Adama has signed a security agreement with
the international coalition. Your mission mandate is to improve the overall security situation in Adama
and secure the oil extraction industry, the to improve the Adama security forces reputation with the
public.

DD IHL

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 19

Scenario B BENDORA
Security Challenges:
 Criminal and gang networks
 Tense community-police relations
 Drug trafficking
 Climate change
 Police corruption
 Civilian militias
 Lack of citizen security

Participants: Divide participants into teams of no less than 2 people.

Teams:
Ministry of Interior
Local Police
National Military
Ministry of Women’s Affairs
Local Human Rights NGOs and Youth Advocacy Groups
Religious Actors
Hospitality Service Workers Labour Union
Optional: International security assistance police training mission

Background on Bendora
The country of Bendora is a tourist destination for 25 million people per year. Bendora is an agricultural
hub for the region, producing vegetables and fruits. Climate change has greatly affected crop yields. Free
trade agreements have favoured large corporations and put small and local farmers at a disadvantage. As
family farms collapse, there is a large population shift from rural areas to large urban cities.

The government tends to ignore human rights violations committed by foreign corporations.
Corporations were able to push civilians out of their homes and farms and take over large amounts of
land. Civilian government and security leaders looked the other way in exchange for large bribes from the
corporations.

Growing and trafficking of drugs is widespread. Rival drug traffickers often commit gruesome violence
against each other. Some government officials, including prominent members of the police, seem to be
involved in the drug trade or at least receive payments for permitting drug traffickers to operate. Drug
traffickers have assassinated some government figures and civil society actors that have spoken out
against drug trafficking and violence associated with it.

Large numbers of unemployed youth have no prospects for the future. Many young men and some
women join criminal networks and gangs. Their initiation rites terrorise civilians, as new recruits commit
brutal crimes to earn their reputations. Other youth advocacy groups denounce violence on all sides.

The Bendora Ministry of Travel and Tourism, along with the Hospitality Service Worker’s Labour Union,
is pressuring the Ministry of the Interior to address the drug violence because of its impact on tourism.
Tourists have been kidnapped in the last several years.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 16: A peace agreement is reached between one of the main
militia groups and the government. The peace agreement contains provisions calling for Security Sector
Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of the militia group.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 17: An earthquake occurs, killing over 30,000 people and
destroying several major towns.

20 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 20: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) whose homes and
towns were destroyed in the earthquake are now in the process of relocating. These IDPs are especially
vulnerable to kidnapping and recruitment into militia groups.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 21: There are reports of increasing sexual and gender-based
violence following the earthquake. IDP girls who have lost their parents are being trafficked. There are
reports of sexual abuse of women, girls and boys occurring in the IDP camps. A group of twenty female
college students protesting against violence disappear. The parents of the girls believe the police know
what happened to their daughters and even looked the other way as criminal gangs carried out the
abduction.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 22: The media announces that militia units are hiding
amidst IDPs in the camps set up after an earthquake in the country. The police raid the IDP camp.
Eighteen IDPs are killed in the gunfire between national military and militias. Human rights groups
announce the attack inside the IDP camp is a violation of international law. The military refutes this claim,
insisting the attack was justified and proportional to the threat.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 23: A town meeting is occurring in the village closest to the
IDP camp where civilians were killed in the raid. At the town meeting, one person in the community
becomes angry and begins yelling and threatening the others in the room.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 28: Given the rising tensions following the earthquake and
the killing of eighteen civilians in the IDP camp, each of the stakeholders in this scenario decides to renew
efforts to negotiate an end to the crisis by building a common national vision.

Each team may need to make up specific “facts” about the scenario context that are not included in the
background. Teams that would like to assert a fact should check with the facilitator, who can decide whether
to allow contradictory assertions of fact or whether teams can come to some agreements about particular
features of the scenario context.

Team Descriptions for Bendora

Ministry of Interior and Staff
Your job is to guide the country toward the conditions necessary to achieve its national interests.
Bendora’s political leadership has identified three national interests. First, you want to make sure that
foreign corporations continue to invest in your country. Second, you want to make sure that tourists will
continue to vacation in your country. Third, you want to stop the drug trafficking that causes violence in
your country.

Local Police
The local police department in the capital city of Bammo is under tremendous pressure. Low salaries
create difficult conditions. Some police are involved in drug trafficking. Other police are not corrupt, but
have to work on the side as hired militia groups to protect wealthy families and neighbourhoods that can
pay for protection. The local police view the National Army as elitist and accuse them of interfering in
their affairs.

National Army
The National Army gets involved in internal affairs of the country that the Ministry of Interior deems are
threats to the national interest. Unlike the police, the army trains and prepares together and maintains
clear discipline and unity. The National Army has a difficult relationship with the police, who they see as
corrupt and incompetent at stopping drug trafficking.

Ministry of Women’s Affairs

The Secretary for Women’s Affairs is a family member of a prominent family in Bendora. She has
connections with the Ministry of Interior. Violence against women is increasing. Police generally do not
respond to domestic violence. Public acts of violence against women receive less attention than gang
violence.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 21

Local Human Rights NGOs and Youth Advocacy Groups
The capital city of Bammo has a vibrant civil society including universities, religious organisations,
indigenous community-based groups, labour unions, and NGOs including human rights groups, women’s
groups, and peacebuilding organisations. Youth groups, especially on university campuses, are active in
speaking out against violence. Citizens are angry about criminal violence, especially high levels of violence
against women. Wealthy citizens are protected from crime by hiring off-duty police officers to protect
them. Middle class and poor families are vulnerable to violence. The police do not seem to be able to
protect citizens or stop drug-related crimes. Some police seem to be complicit with violence against
civilians.

Religious Actors
Religious actors are respected and active at the community level in every village and city across the
country. They work to support local development and peace. You are concerned about the cycle of
violence. You condemn violence by militia groups as well as violence against civilians by state security
forces. You have a task force of religious actors who are highly skilled in negotiation and mediation and
look for attempts to use these skills.

Hospitality Service Workers Labour Union

Your members’ jobs are tied to tourism. When violence in the country increases, your members lose their
jobs or have reduced wages. You pressure the Ministry of Interior to stop the violence.

Optional: International security assistance police training mission

The President of Bendora and his Minister of Interior has invited the international community to attend a
police training mission. The goal of the international security assistance police training mission is to
support local police in carrying out their jobs effectively and efficiently.

22 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Scenario C CAPRITA
Security Challenges:
 Civil war between Western-backed elites and non-state armed groups
 High numbers of civilian casualties, frequent attacks on major roads
 Tribal and religious actors that support non-state armed groups
 Drug cultivation and trafficking
 Unemployment
 Climate change induced drought
 Weak state-society relationship with few government services
 Widespread illiteracy, including the police
 Private security contractors

Participants: Divide participants into teams of no less than 2 people.

Teams:
Darwar Provincial Governor and his office, including judges and legal staff
National Police in Darwar Province
Community Development Councils in Darwar Province
Local tribal leaders
Private security contractors
Chamber of Commerce
International military forces in Darwar Province
Civilian assistance mission from donor countries

Background on Caprita
The country of Caprita is facing an all-out civil war. International military forces helped to drive the
Cortaras out of government and the capital city, but they still control many rural areas. In Darwar
Province, the Cortaras are determined to take over the provincial capital. The Provincial Governor
balances his personal interests with the interests of the International Military Forces operating in his
province. While he needs their help to push out the Cortaras, he resents their efforts to control the way he
governs the province.

Some tribal leaders support the Cortaras, while others oppose them. Tribal leaders retain authority to
govern a parallel justice system in every community, transportation networks, agricultural production
including the growing of illegal drugs, and markets. Some tribal leaders involved in the drug trade oppose
the International Military Forces who destroy their crops. Other tribal leaders who oppose the drug trade
openly oppose the Provincial Governor for his involvement in the drug trade.

Unemployment in rural areas is thought to fuel young men to join the Cortara movement. Local analysts
say the presence of foreign troops and civilian casualties are the primary factors driving Cortara
recruitment. The Chamber of Commerce is working with the civilian assistance mission to look for new
business opportunities.

Human rights groups accuse the Provincial Governor of corruption, torture of Cortara sympathisers, and
refusing to stop the stoning of women in public squares. Community Development Councils (CDCs) are
the main programme connecting villages to the state government.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 16: A peace agreement is reached between one of the main
militia groups and the government. The peace agreement contains provisions calling for Security Sector
Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of the militia group.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 17: An earthquake occurs, killing over 30,000 people and
destroying several major towns.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 23

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 20: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) whose homes and
towns were destroyed in the earthquake are now in the process of relocating. These IDPs are especially
vulnerable to kidnapping and recruitment into militia groups.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 21: There are reports of increasing sexual and gender-based
violence following the earthquake. IDP girls who have lost their parents are being trafficked. There are
reports of sexual abuse of women, girls and boys occurring in the IDP camps. Media report that two
women, a mother and her daughter, are stoned to death in one of the IDP camps.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 22: In each of the scenario groups, the media announces
that militia units are hiding amidst IDPs in the camps set up after an earthquake in the country. The police
raid the IDP camp. Eighteen IDPs are killed in the gunfire between international military forces and
militias. Human rights groups announce the attack inside the IDP camp is a violation of international law.
The military refutes this claim, insisting the attack was justified and proportional to the threat.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 23: A town meeting is occurring in the village closest to the
IDP camp where civilians were killed in the raid. At the town meeting, one person in the community
becomes angry and begins yelling and threatening the others in the room.

Special Instructions beginning with Lesson 25: Given the rising tensions following the earthquake and
the killing of eighteen civilians in the IDP camp, each of the stakeholders in this scenario decides to renew
efforts to negotiate an end to the crisis by building a common national vision.

Each team may need to make up specific “facts” about the scenario context that are not included in the
background. Teams that would like to assert a fact should check with the facilitator, who can decide whether
to allow contradictory assertions of fact or whether teams can come to some agreements about particular
features of the scenario context.

Team Descriptions for Caprita

Darwar Provincial Governor and his office, including judges and legal staff
Your work is to maintain a government presence in Darwar Province as a representative of the
government of Caprita. You were previously the leader of a militia in the northern region of the country
that fought for many years against the Cortara government, when it was still in power. You have a deep
personal antagonism for the Cortara leader in your province. You and your staff benefit from payoffs by
drug traffickers that you permit to work in your province.

National Police in Darwar Province

You work for the Provincial Governor and report to his office. His main priority for your police team is to
push out the Cortaras from Darwar Province. Military trainers from the international military forces have
trained your team and work with you in improving your performance. Local civilians report some crimes
to your team, but many distrust your team.

Community Development Councils in Darwar Province

You were elected to be leaders of the Community Development Councils (CDC), the Caprita government’s
most successful nation-wide programme. Local community members are elected to the CDC in a
democratic process that requires at least 30 percent of the members be female. CDC members help
communities identify development priorities. The state government, through the provincial governor’s
office, gives small grants of up to $15,000 to communities to work on their development priorities.

Local Tribal Leaders

You are part of a provincial shura, a council of tribal elders that makes decisions by consensus through a
long process of dialogue and debate that draws on both tribal codes and religious laws. For centuries, the
shura has been making decisions that govern transportation, agriculture and every aspect of daily life for
people in surrounding villages. Far removed from the capital city, you have almost no respect or
interaction with the foreigners or what you see as their puppet government.

Chamber of Commerce
You are a group of business leaders with investments across Darwar Province. The International Civilian
Assistance Mission requested your support in developing new business opportunities. Foreign investors
are less likely to invest if there are reports of violence on civilians.

24 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Private security contractors
You work for the international military forces in Darwar Province. Your job is to protect supply shipments
to the military bases, especially along Highway 1. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks from
the Cortara armed groups are common on this road. Civilians in the area have reported to the local police
that your personnel have killed children and other innocents and have stolen goods from local farmers.

International military forces in Darwar Province

The Caprita national government has invited an international coalition of military forces to help their
government fight against the former Cortara soldiers left over from the deposed regime ousted by
international forces. Your work is to simultaneously push out or defeat the Cortara forces in Darwar
Province and build public support for the Caprita national and provincial government.

Civilian assistance mission from donor countries

Your work is to partner with international military forces to build public support for the Caprita national
and provincial government.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 25

CC Flickr Photo: Ernie
Peraredondo

Module
Leadership in 1
Complex Environments

Module 1 Leadership in Complex Environments

This module provides an introduction to the most important foundational ideas in this
Handbook. It creates a foundation for understanding why it is important for civil society,
civilians in government, military and police to coordinate their approaches to human security.

Lesson 1: Understanding Complex Environments & Mapping Stakeholders identifies the

diverse stakeholders that may be working to address some aspect of human security.

Lesson 2: Adaptive Leadership identifies the common set of leadership challenges facing
civilians, military and police as they attempt to share a common space or environment.

Lesson 3: Inter-cultural Competence and Trust-Building identifies the basic skills for
communicating and building trust across cultures with diverse stakeholders.

Lesson 4: Self-Assessment identifies the necessity of self-assessment to recognise one’s own

capacities and limitations.

26 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 CC Flickr/ Photo: Maksymenko
Oleksandr/NurPhoto

Lesson 1
Mapping Stakeholders in
Complex Environments

Learning Objectives
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify key characteristics of complex environments
 Identify the benefits of multi-stakeholder coordination
 Construct a stakeholder map of a complex environment

This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders with a method of mapping stakeholders in
“complex environments.” This lesson provides an introduction to the different stakeholders working in
complex environments. It also explains what makes “complex environments” distinct from other
settings. “Stakeholder mapping” is a tool used to identify the relationships between different
individuals and groups. It helps to highlight how our cultural perceptions shape how we see and
understand complex environments.

Lesson 1: Mapping Stakeholders

1. What is a complex environment?

The term complex environment refers to the real world challenges of living and working in a context
where there are many different groups with diverse interests. No one group can control or dominate the
space. Attempts by any one group to solve an issue are likely to cause new, unexpected issues. Complex
environments require extensive understanding, analysis and conflict assessment to determine the
economic, political, social, religious, and other interests of diverse groups (see Module 4 on Conflict
Assessment). Solutions to complex problems require coordination between different groups of
stakeholders in order to achieve a successful and lasting outcome (see Module 3 on Multi-Stakeholder
Coordination).3 Complex environments have greater numbers and greater diversity of groups and issues
than “simple” environments.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 27

2. Complex environments have many stakeholders.
Stakeholders are individuals and groups that have a “stake” or an interest in some issue or process. This
Handbook is about stakeholders that have an interest in human security. They may be affected by actions
other groups take. Or they make take actions that affect others.

The media often portray armed conflict as between two or more groups. For example, there may be a
violent conflict between state and non-state armed groups. But there are many other stakeholders who
affect and are affected by armed conflict. Within any country, there are many different stakeholders who
have a stake in peace and security. These include security policymakers, military, police, and people who
work in the criminal justice system. Many different types of civilians also care about peace and security,
including government civilian personnel, religious actors, business sector, media and civil society.

3. In a complex environment, all stakeholders are interdependent.

Many different stakeholders play roles and hold responsibilities for achieving sustainable peace and
human security. The military and police alone cannot create human security. Civil society alone cannot
build peace. No one stakeholder can achieve their
goals without coordinating with others.

4. National Stakeholders
Many countries manage these tasks on their own,
without outside, international intervention. The
term “complex environment” does not require
the intervention of international actors.
However, the more actors involved or affected by
a crisis, the more complex the environment will
be. The following graph illustrates the
multiplicity of national stakeholders that need to
coordinate or collaborate in terms of crisis.

 Civilian Government Agencies: Health,

transportation, education, and many other
civilian government agencies may be
involved in addressing violent conflict and
promoting human security.
Figure 1: National-level Stakeholders
 Security Sector: The UN defines the security
sector as “a broad term used to describe the
structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of
security in a country.” This Handbook uses the term “security sector” as an umbrella term including
the state’s armed forces (military, police, intelligence services); justice and rule of law institutions;
state oversight and management bodies such as national security advisory bodies, parliament; as well
as non-state armed groups who in some cases, play certain roles in protecting some population
groups. Security forces include a limited number of groups that hold the responsibility to protect
public order and security, and the power to arrest, detain, search, seize and use force and firearms.

 Non-state Armed Groups: The UN working definition of this term includes groups that have the
potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives;
are not within the formal military structures of States, State-alliances or intergovernmental
organisations; and are not under the control of the State(s) in which they operate.

 Business Sector: This sector includes all organisations that operate for a profit, excluding the
economic activities of government, of private households, and of non-profit organisations.

 Civil Society and Media: This sector includes a wide variety of organisations that do not operate for a
profit and are independent from government. Civil society includes local religious institutions, local
universities, community based organisations, labour unions, industry associations, tribal and
traditional leaders, sports clubs and all other groups that represent the interests of a country’s
citizens and that provide services to specific groups within its society. Non-governmental
Organisations (NGOs) are also considered a type of civil society organisation. The media may be
considered part of civil society.

28 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

5. International Stakeholders and “Complex Emergencies”
Environments become even more complex when international stakeholders become involved due to a
breakdown of state authority. When a government can no longer carry out its basic functions and provide
for its citizens because it is facing international or non-international armed conflict, the United Nations,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), international NGOs, private contractors, and other
foreign governments, including their military forces, start operating within the boundaries of that “host”
nation to help re-establish peace and security. The response required from these actors often exceeds the
mandate and capacity of a single organisation, which is why the involvement of many is necessary.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a forum for UN and non-UN humanitarian organisations,
has issued the following definition of complex emergencies: “A complex emergency is a situation where
there is both a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society and where there is total or considerable
breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international
response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the on-going United
Nations country programme.”

This definition also makes clear that the term “complex emergency” is usually associated with situations
of political instability and conflict rather than those of natural disasters. But earthquakes, famines or
other natural disasters may occur in a country experiencing war. This will further aggravate the
complexity of the situation, because even more national and international stakeholders will become
involved. The graph below illustrates the types of international stakeholders that may interact with the
national stakeholders illustrated here.

Figure 2: International Stakeholders

When international organisations, armed opposition groups, humanitarian organisations, private

contractors, and other foreign governments and military forces become involved in the peace and
security issues in a “host nation”, the environment becomes even more complex.

International Organisation: An organisation with an international membership, scope, or presence. The

United Nations is the most prominent international organisation. In addition to the UN, there are other

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 29

intergovernmental bodies that play important roles in complex environments. They include for example
international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund that
provide financial support and advice to national authorities or the International Organisation for
Migration that supports countries when dealing with problems related to refugees, displaced persons or
migrants.

Intervening States: Individual countries may intervene in other countries through diplomatic,
development or military assistance, if they feel that this serves their national interest. Global and regional
powers as well as neighbouring countries often decide to intervene in complex environments.

Contractors: Contractors, also known as private military corporations (PMC), private military firms
(PMF), or private military or security companies, work on behalf of and report to governments that hire
them to provide specific types of security assistance. Governments or private corporations may hire
private security companies to protect their personnel and assets. There are a non-state entity and operate
for a profit, making them part of the business sector.

Humanitarian Organisations: Humanitarian organisations are distinct from other stakeholders in their
sole goal to relieve human suffering and in their operational requirements for impartiality, neutrality and
independence. There are four broad types of humanitarian organisations: UN humanitarian agencies, the
Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional humanitarian organisations such as
the International Organisation for Migration, and humanitarian nongovernment organisations (NGOs)
such as Medecin Sans Frontier.

International Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs): NGOs are legally constituted private

organisations that operate independently from any government. They are “self-mandated” – meaning
their mandates do not come from any government or inter-governmental body but, rather, from the
initiative of the individuals forming the organisation. Some NGOs only hold humanitarian mandates while
most NGOs – such as Oxfam, and World Vision - are “multi-mandate” meaning they may participate in
humanitarian activities as well as development, human rights, peacebuilding or other activities. The term
NGO typically also means that the organisations are non-profit.

Transnational Non-State Armed Groups: These non-state armed groups operate in multiple different
countries. They may recruit in one country, train in another, and carry out violent attacks in other
countries.

6. Complex environments often arise out of “wicked problems.”

Social scientists have used the term wicked problems to refer difficult to define or complex issues that
resist easy solutions. Wicked problems take place in complex environments and affect every level of
society, often lasting for generations.

Problems that stakeholders in complex environments have to address may be “wicked” and thus
intractable for three main reasons:
 Stakeholders’ views on what the problem at hand may be irreconcilable and the solutions they
propose will therefore be incompatible.
 Stakeholders may not have enough knowledge about a given problem and thus propose
inadequate solutions.
 The problem is connected to many other problems and every effort to solve it may create new,
unintended problems.
For example, peace negotiations aim to end violence. But negotiation processes can create more violence
as opposing groups attempt to win more territory. Negotiation processes also can make those armed
groups who are less radical and want to make peace a target for more radical armed groups who do not
want a negotiated settlement.

7. Complex environments are difficult to predict.

In complex environments, there is no simple “cause” and “effect” reaction chain where an action leads to
predictable results. Both action and inaction can bring changes in systems but it is difficult to anticipate
the impact of any choice. For example, a humanitarian organisation may provide food to a population in
need, but it may unintentionally create a disincentive for local farmers to continue growing crops, and
therefore may contribute more to food insecurity in the long term Here is another example. A choice to
use military or police force to intimidate a non-state armed group using violence against civilians can

30 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

have the unintended effect of increasing the non-state armed group’s ability to recruit more young men to
their cause.

Each of the scenario exercises in the beginning of this Handbook illustrates the security challenges found
in complex environments. Complex environments often have internal political conflicts, economic
pressures, business interests, drug profits, climate change-induced droughts, easy access to weapons and
multiple divisions within society between religious and ethnic groups. Any effort to address one of these
security challenges will likely have impacts on other challenges. The issues are tangled together like a
knotted string. Improving human security requires careful attempts to take actions recognising the
interdependence of the stakeholders and the issues.

8. Planning is more difficult in complex environments.

When only a few stakeholders are involved, it is easier to anticipate and predict their reactions. In
complex environments where so many different actors influence each other, a decision or action can lead
to many unintended impacts. It is more difficult to determine the impact of an action in complex
environments because many other stakeholders will also make decisions. Complex environments are
dynamic; they are always changing. What might have been a good decision yesterday could bring disaster
tomorrow given the shifting alliances and issues.

9. Stakeholder mapping is a tool for understanding complex environments.

A stakeholder map creates a visual image of the main stakeholders and how they relate to each other in a
complex environment. Also known as “conflict mapping,” a stakeholder map illustrates four things:

 Identifies relevant stakeholders

 Illustrates the relationships of different stakeholders have to each other
 Prioritises the importance of stakeholders
 Creates awareness of different stakeholder’s cultural perceptions, to highlight how different
groups perceive the conflict in different ways

10. How to draw a stakeholder map

People see conflict differently and thus create different stakeholder maps of the same conflict. If people
with different viewpoints map their situation together, they may learn about each other's experiences and
perceptions. The process of creating a map is more important than the outcome – as every map will be
unique. The dialogue and discussion can help a group identify the key stakeholders and relationships that
they perceive as most important to address.

Stakeholder maps illustrate the entire system of individuals or groups involved in a complex
environment. It may include those stakeholders that use violence, those that support violence, those that
work to prevent violence, and those impacted by conflict and violence.

a. Make a list of all the stakeholders in a conflict. If it is a small conflict, you may want to list
individuals. In large conflicts, list groups that share key worldviews, interests and grievances. In
total, there should be no more than 10-12 stakeholders in order to make a map clear enough to
understand. Create a separate stakeholder map for each sub-group if needed. For each
stakeholder, think about how important they are to the key drivers of the conflict. Which key
people or individuals have maximum motivation to drive the conflict? Which key people are
attempting to prevent conflict or to use dialogue and negotiation? What groups are marginalized?
Why might it be important to engage with them?

b. Create a circle for each stakeholder, with the largest circles for the most influential stakeholders.
Be careful how you place the circles, as you will want to plan out your space so that you can show
all the relevant stakeholders. If there is a decision-making hierarchy involved, place those with
the most decision-making power at the top of the map and those with the least amount of power
at the bottom of the map.

c. Draw lines of relationship between the circles representing stakeholders. If they are close allies,
use a thick or double line. If they are in conflict with each other use a dotted line or a zigzag line.
If one stakeholder is exercising influence or controlling another, use an arrow at the end of the
line to illustrate the direction of control. For stakeholders not directly involved, distance them on
the map to illustrate their level of influence.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 31

 d. Identify where you are situated on the stakeholder map. Every national and international
stakeholder has a particular understanding of a complex environment based on his or her
culture, education, media and experiences. Neutrality is rarely possible. How do others map the
conflict? How do others view your relationships with key stakeholders?

e. OPTIONAL: Score the strength of the relationship on each of the lines of relationship between
stakeholders on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the strongest relationship. This provides a
quantitative measure of the social capital between groups, with 10 being the strongest
relationship. If there are multiple groups mapping the same conflict, the values can be averaged
between focus groups.

Figure 3: Sample Stakeholder Map

International
Iran Pakistan
Community

Afghan Civil
Government Society
Insurgents

Tribal
Leaders

Al Qaeda

REVIEW
This lesson introduced the concepts of “stakeholders” and “complex environments.” The practical tool of
“stakeholder mapping” creates a visual representation of how different stakeholders relate to each other
in a complex environment. This Handbook expands on the use of stakeholder mapping in Module 4 on
Conflict Assessment.

Citations

3 See also the following resources on complex environments:

Samir Rihani. Complex Systems Theory and Development Practice: Understanding Non-Linear Realities, (London: Zed
Books, 2002).
John Urry, Global Complexity, (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 2003).
Brian Ganson, editor, Management in Complex Environments: Questions for Leaders, (Sweden: International Council of
Swedish Industry, 2013).

32 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 1 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with a series of questions:
 Who are the stakeholders related to human security in the area (community, region, state)
where you work? Write down the list of stakeholders in large print at the front. This will be
used later for the learning exercise.
 What are the challenges of working in a complex environment where there are many different
individuals or groups working?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to learn how to draw a stakeholder map and to recognise how culture
shapes perceptions of reality. Divide into scenario stakeholder teams. In each group, draw a
stakeholder map based on what you know about the scenario and how you are likely to view the
situation based on your interests and goals. After twenty minutes of teamwork, each team should
present their stakeholder map to the other teams. In a large group, discuss the following questions:

 How are the stakeholder maps similar?

 How are they different?
 How do the stakeholder maps reflect the perceptions and blind spots of each stakeholder
team?
 What did you learn from this exercise about the need to listen to diverse stakeholders?

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

 If I could go back in time, what would I do differently in a past work experience where there
were other stakeholders present?
 What will I do differently given what we have learned in this lesson?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 33

CC Flickr/US Army Louisiana Hurricane Rita

When we
commit to a
vision to do
something that
has never been
done before,
there is no way
to know how to
get there. We
simply have to
build the bridge
as we walk on it.

Lesson 2 -Robert E. Quinn in

Building the Bridge as
Adaptive Leadership you Walk on It: A
Guide for Leading
Change

Lesson 2: Adaptive Leadership

Learning Objectives
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify three characteristics of adaptive leadership
 Identify the difference between a win/lose versus a win/win approach to conflict

This lesson provides civilian, military, and police leaders with an understanding of adaptive leadership.
Adaptive leadership is a specific type of leadership useful for working in complex environments.
Complex environments are difficult to predict. Diverse stakeholders do not fall within a “chain of
command” in a complex environment. No one stakeholder is in control. This lesson describes why using
adaptive leadership, taking smart risks, and listening to diverse stakeholders makes sense in a complex
environment.

1. What is Leadership?
Leadership is a process of guiding or facilitating a group of people toward some goal. Basic leadership
requires an array of skills, including the following:
 A vision and an ability to develop a strategy
 Courage and an ability to make difficult and even risky decisions
 Communication skills to deliver clear messages to mobilise followers
This type of leadership is sufficient to handle most technical problems. But most leadership models are
not adequate for managing complex environments with many different stakeholders. It is not possible to
“command and control” all the stakeholders operating in a complex environment.

2. Complex environments demand adaptive leadership.

Adaptive leadership helps leaders to adapt to constantly changing dynamics with diverse groups of other
stakeholders.4 Military and police training academies as well as government, business executives, and
civil society are turning to adaptive leadership, recognising that it is more effective in complex

34 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

environments. Adaptive leaders accept chaos and ambiguity in complex environments. Despite new and
chaotic information, adaptive leaders find a way to understand the motivations and patterns of behaviour
in other stakeholders. Adaptive leaders can accept ambiguity; a situation which is unclear. 5

3. Adaptive leaders listen and share information.

No single person or group can understand a complex environment alone. Adaptive leaders do not try to
force a simple “good versus evil” analysis onto a context where there are a lot of people in the middle of a
conflict where all sides have legitimate grievances. Adaptive leaders listen to many different points of
view to understand how different stakeholders might react or respond and to learn to know their
interests and needs. Information is a form of power. While not all information can or should be shared, an
adaptive leader recognises that other stakeholders in a complex environment will be better poised to
contribute to peace and security if they have information necessary for their work and decision-making.
When new challenges appear, adaptive leaders accept the chaos and unpredictability of complex
environments. Adaptive leaders continue to listen, learn and share information, in an attempt to learn
more about new challenges or threats. Adaptive leaders continue improvising and innovating new
approaches instead of repeating the mistakes of the past, hoping for a different outcome.

4. Adaptive leaders communicate, coordinate, and build relationships with all stakeholders, even
across the lines of conflict.
No one stakeholder can create peace and security in a complex environment alone. Adaptive leaders
foster participation in decision-making. Peace and security require the work of many different
stakeholders, usually government, security sector, civil society, and the business sector. Adaptive leaders
recognise that these diverse stakeholders need forums for communicating and coordinating their efforts;
first to reduce any conflicts or duplication between them, but also to find areas for cooperation.

5. Adaptive leaders foster innovation, creativity, and improvisation.

Since a complex environment is difficult to predict, normal decision-making processes often fail to
provide effective solutions. An adaptive leader recognises the need for on-going improvisation, trial and
error. Adaptive leaders see the need for continuous learning and evaluation. Listening and learning from
others helps develop a common vision. Adaptive leaders think outside the box. They create opportunities
for others to criticise an idea and to develop innovative solutions to problems. Adaptive leaders recognise
that mistakes are opportunities for learning.6

6. Adaptive leaders respond according to their assessment of the context, not according to their
individual personality preferences.
Since complex environments are always shifting, leaders cannot use a fixed plan and hope that it works in
the changing environment. Daily analysis of stakeholder interests and relationships may be necessary.
Individuals and groups have preferred styles for how they will interact with other individuals in a
system’s process. These preferred patterns help set the way change happens in a complex environment.
Broadly defined, there are five different styles of dealing with conflict: avoidance, accommodation,
compromise, collaboration, and competition. These patterned responses to conflict are preferred ways of
relating in systems. For example, social cohesion requires using compromise and collaboration patterns
to build relationship across the lines of division between people and groups. Although every leader may
have a personal preference for one of these styles, adaptive leaders in complex environments learn how
and when to use each of these different styles to the benefit of the whole. Their approach adapts to the
context.

7. Adaptive leaders take “smart” risks.

Since complex environments are unpredictable, any action carries a risk of unintended consequences.
Adaptive leaders do not take all risks. Anticipating potential unintended impacts and weighing costs to
benefits help leaders make decisions about which risks are worth taking. Listening and sharing
information help determine which risks are smart risks and which are not.

8. Adaptive leaders set an example.

Adaptive leaders illustrate and model how they would like others to act. This means adaptive leaders
have to stick to their principles, and only make compromises when it does not violate their integrity.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 35

 Adaptive Leadership in the Philippines
Filipino Brigadier General Raymundo Ferrer used adaptive leadership skills to address violence.
Reaching out to peacebuilding NGOs and the Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, together the Filipino
security sector and civil society are training together, analysing conflict together, implementing
peacebuilding projects together and evaluating the effectiveness of security strategies together.

The Philippine case study is an illustration of innovative and adaptive leadership. Ferrer recognised
that civil society peacebuilding experts had valid ideas for transforming the conflict. Both civil
society and military leaders improvised a way for joint learning to happen, something that had not
happened previously.

Both military and civil society leaders took “smart” risks as they decided the benefit of having
military leaders train with civil society leaders in the same classroom outweighed the risks of
continuing patterns of avoidance.

Ferrer is a leader who led by example. His willingness to show humility and listen carefully to civil
society leaders earned him trust with community leaders. His ability to solve difficult conflicts and
deescalate tensions in areas under his command earned him respect and career advancement.

*Read more about the innovation and collaboration between civil society, military and police in The Philippines
in Local Ownership in Security, the companion report to this Handbook.

9. Adaptive leaders seek win-win solutions.

Adaptive leaders recognise that the best solution to a problem is not that one group wins while another
group loses. Winning refers to meeting the group’s interests. The best solution to any problem is a
solution that will last. When there are winners and losers, the losers may simply take time to regroup and
begin fighting again. Adaptive leaders look for “win-win” solutions where stakeholders develop a solution
that satisfies or addresses their main interests.

The chart below illustrates a simplified outcome of a conflict between two individuals or groups. There
are four possible outcomes. Group A can win and Group B can win or both Group A and B can lose. Many
violent conflicts result in an outcome where neither group wins or achieves their interests. The number of
violent conflicts that result in one side
Group A
winning and another side losing are very
Group B Win/Win Win/Lose
small.
Lose/Win Lose/Lose
10. Women and Men in Leadership
Complex environments require leadership from both men and women. In many places, women’s leadership is
restricted to raising children, providing education for children, running the household, and possibly engaging in
selling and shopping for household goods. Males, on the other hand, are given leadership responsibilities for
politics, security, and other public issues. When women show leadership or aspire to be leaders in their
workplaces, communities, or nations, they often meet resistance from other women and men who think they are
either ‘too feminine’ or ‘too masculine’ to be a good leader. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 2242 both
affirm the positive contributions women make to peace and security and mandate the inclusion of women in
these areas.7

There is a growing awareness that when women and men share leadership, especially when there is a “critical
mass” of 30-35%, there is more attention to human rights, indigenous and national self-determination for
minority groups, greater economic justice and environmental protection, broader ideas of security, and more
attention to reproductive issues and population-planning policies. In other words, when women join men in
leading their communities, regions, and countries, everyone benefits and real changes take place that support a
just peace. Lesson 27 expands on the necessity of “Gender Mainstreaming in Security.”

REVIEW
This lesson identified the characteristics of adaptive leadership. In complex environments, a leader cannot
possibly command and control other stakeholders. Adaptive leadership takes a distinct approach. Listening and
learning from other stakeholders allows an adaptive leader to respond to new situations, take smart risks, and
develop innovative solutions to challenges.

36 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Citations

4 Ronald A. Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, Marty Linsky, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for
Changing Your Organisation and the World, (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School’s Cambridge Leadership
Associates, 2009).
5 Wheatley, Margaret J. 2006. Leadership and the New Science (3rd Edition), (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, Inc., 2006).
6 Robert E. Quinn in Building the Bridge as you Walk on It: A Guide for Leading Change, (San Francisco, California:
Jossey-Bass, 2004).
7
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Adopted by the Security Council on 30 October 2000. United
Nations Security Council Resolution 2242. Adopted by the Security Council on 13 October 2015.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 37

Lesson 2 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content with a series of questions. Think of a time when you were in
a leadership role in a complex environment.
 What were your most significant challenges?
 How did you respond to these challenges?
 Did your responses work?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast leadership styles and their impact on others.
Each scenario stakeholder team will identify two options for leadership and test how these
approaches would interact with other stakeholders’ perceptions and actions. Stakeholder teams
have twenty minutes to design two specific ideas for exercising leadership in your scenarios. First,
what specific step you would you take using a “command and control” approach to leadership in this
situation? Second, what would it look like for you to take an “adaptive leadership” approach in this
situation? After twenty minutes of discussion, each stakeholder teams first announces to the group
their first action, using a “command and control” style of leadership. After each group shares their
plan of action, the group can step out of role and respond with how their stakeholder team would
perceive the actions taken by other teams. What types of responses does a “command and control”
style of leadership inspire in others? Next, each stakeholder team shares their “adaptive leadership”
approach to the situation. Then debrief this round in the same way. How would other teams likely
perceive and respond to the team’s adaptive leadership?

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

 If I could go back in time, what would I do differently in a past work experience if I could use
adaptive leadership skills?
 What will I do differently given what we have learned in this lesson?

38 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 CC Flickr Photo: AMISOM Tobin Jones

Lesson 3
Inter-Cultural Competence

Learning Objectives
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Define culture
 Identify the characteristics of inter-cultural competence
 Identify how to improve understanding between people with different cultures
 Recognise the challenges and opportunities of building trust between diverse cultural groups

This lesson provides civilian, military, and police leaders with an understanding of culture and
characteristics of inter-cultural competence. Building trust between diverse stakeholders requires
cross-cultural communication. Improving skills in inter-cultural competence can in turn improve civil-
military-police coordination.

Lesson 3: Inter-cultural Competence

1. What is intercultural competence?

Intercultural competence is a skillset that can be learned and developed to build effective working
relationships with people from different cultural backgrounds. 8 Complex environments include people
with many different cultures. Complex environments require each stakeholder to relate to other
stakeholders who belong to different cultural groups. This requires specific skills in cross-cultural
communication and trust building. Culture cannot be summarised in a short list of rules. Lists of
cultural dos and don’ts cannot provide the critical thinking skills necessary to build trusting
relationships.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 39

Intercultural competence is a way of “seeing” the world, to identify both
the common ground and the differences between groups of people.
Intercultural competence is like putting on a pair of glasses or binoculars
that bring the world into sharper focus.

Without cultural competence, leaders are not able to find common

ground and communicate effectively with other stakeholders in the “I’ve learned
environment. They remain isolated and unable to understand the
context. They take actions that are more likely to result in unintended that people
impacts. Cross-cultural competence is an essential element of adaptive
leadership in complex environments. will forget
2. Culture is a pattern of learned behaviour. what you
All human beings are very similar in terms of our genes. There are no
groups of people that are better than others. Intelligence is not higher in
said,
some cultural groups than in others. people will
Culture includes the values and behaviours learned and shared within a forget what
group. Families, communities, schools, religious organisations and other
institutions create and educate people in cultural ways of being. Each you did,
person views the world through a “cultural lens.” Each person’s cultural
lens limit their perceptions, or the way we view the world. Every but people
person’s “worldview” is incomplete, as we each understand only part of
the world around us.
will never
forget how
Cultural practices have a history. All traditions, rituals and cultural ways
of doing things have a history and began at a certain point in time when you made
someone created them for a certain purpose
them feel.”
Every culture has practices that seems strange to others. But we know
the history of this cultural practice, so it makes sense to us within its
context. But when communicating with people in other cultures, we may -Maya Angelou
not know the origin of all of their cultural practices.

3. Cultural groups are similar and different.

People in different cultures can find commonalities, but must also acknowledge their differences.
Intercultural competence is not a glossing over of the real differences between cultures. Instead,
intercultural competence both identifies the differences and builds on the commonalities. Some
cultures value beauty and art while others place more value on technology and economic wealth.
Intercultural competence requires skills to detect and respect the values and symbols that are
important to other cultural groups.

4. Intercultural competence begins with recognising our own cultures.

Every individual belongs to different identity groups. Each identity group has its own culture. We can
only begin to understand and communicate with people who belong to other cultures when we have a
good understanding of how we learned the values and behaviours in our own culture. The diagram in
Figure 4 illustrates the many different cultural groups to
which any one person may belong.

Each person already holds some level of intercultural

competence as they move between different identity
groups in their own life. Identity groups are the same
thing as “cultures.” Identity is a way we define ourselves
and a way others see us.9

People of the same age – also known as “age mates” –

often share a culture. People of the same religion, of the
same ethnicity, or the same language or class may also
share some aspects of culture. Each of these circles in the
diagram here represents an “identity.” Everyone belongs
to multiple cultural identity groups.
Figure 4: Identity Groups

40 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

For example, an individual might show respect to his or her grandmother
in one cultural way and to his or her neighbour or work colleague in
another way depending on their identity. Understanding identity and
culture begins with self-assessment. Each person can draw a map of their
identity and the cultural groups to whom they belong. Some people use
5. Showing respect to others is a key intercultural competency. the word “respect”
While some ethics and values are different across cultures, the values of to mean “treating
honour, dignity, and belonging to a group are found across all cultures. All someone like a
people in every culture want to feel respected by others. person.”
Demonstrating respect for other people is a skill. It is communicated in
different ways, in different cultures. Learning how to show respect to Other people use
people in different cultures is essential to cross-cultural communication the word “respect”
and trust building. Module 6 in this Handbook provides an introduction to to mean “treating
the communication skills necessary for building relationships with someone like an
respect and trust. authority.”
Respecting a person’s humanity and treating people with dignity does not
require agreeing with them. It does require learning to express Sometimes people
disagreement in a respectful way. Respect is a currency; it is a resource. who are used to
The most important skill any leader can exercise is showing respect to being treated like
others. It costs nothing. But it can greatly improve relationships. an authority say “if
Humiliation is the opposite of respect. Punishment feels like humiliation. you won’t respect
Though the intent of punishment and humiliation is to defeat and deter me I won’t respect
others, the impact of humiliation often leads to increased levels of conflict you” and they
and violence. mean “if you won’t
treat me like an
6. “Monoculturalism” prevents cross-cultural understanding.
Many people are monocultural meaning they understand the world only authority I won’t
from their own cultural point of view and they cannot see the world from treat you like a
other points of view. Without intercultural competence to understand the person.”
world from different cultural points of view, people of all different
cultures often resort to stereotyping.

7. Stereotyping decreases trust.

Stereotyping is a simple way to group people together according to their
culture and generalise about the way all of them think and act.
Stereotyping assumes that all people within a cultural group are similar.

We know from our own cultures that even within a cultural group, there is wide variation between
individuals. All young people are not the same. All people of ___ race or culture are not all the same. It is
not possible to meaningfully guess whether a person is smart or not so smart depending on their
culture.

Intercultural competence helps people to see that there is wide variation between individuals in every
culture. Stereotyping generally decreases trust between groups. People who feel “pre-judged” by others
may feel frustrated. Even if the stereotype of a group is positive, people feel unfairly obliged to live into
a stereotype that simply is not true for every individual.

Intercultural competence requires us to judge people based on the individual character, not on the
basis of a stereotype of other people in their culture. Judging each person as a individual, rather than
prejudging them based on often negative stereotypes can prevent civil-military-police coordination and
obstruct human security.

8. “Ethnocentrism” means that people believe their own culture is better than others.
It is common for people to grow up being taught to think of life as a competition between groups. Some
people refer to this as an “us” versus “them” mentality. People tend to see their own culture as evolved
and civilised, while they often see other cultures as morally inferior and uncivilised. It may be easier to

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 41

point fingers at the problems in other people’s culture rather than examine the challenges in our own
cultures. For example, different cultures have different ideas of sexuality. One culture may encourage
women to cover their heads. Another may encourage women to wear high heels. Women in each
culture may look at the other as oppressed, but feel their own culture is superior.
A fundamental idea in intercultural competence is learning that there is no “normal.” “Normal” is only
normal to you and your identity group. Cross-cultural communication begins with humility, to
recognise there are common challenges in each culture, and no culture is superior to others.
Intercultural competence requires a critical eye on one’s
own culture.
“Search for Common Ground” is the name
of one of the world’s largest peacebuilding
9. Trust building requires smart risks.
NGOs. Their approach is to “identify the
Trusting others is always a risk. But without trust, there
differences and build on the common
would be no civilisation, no rule of law, no community
ground” - a core principle of all conflict
or religion. Human beings rely on trust in order to live
prevention and peacebuilding processes.
together. Building trust across cultural divides requires
smart risks. There are also risks and costs of not having
* Read case studies of Search for Common
trust with others. These costs can outweigh the risk of
Ground’s approach to building
building trust across cultural groups. While distrusting
relationships between civil society,
other groups and relying only on those in your own unit
military and police in Local Ownership in
or organisation may seem safe, it will be impossible to
Security, the companion report to this
solve difficult challenges driving violent conflict, or
Handbook.
design a future that protects the needs and interests of
all groups. Leaders who take smart risks to build cross-
cultural trust will find that the benefits of building relationships often create unanticipated rewards in
terms of improved understanding of and planning for working in a complex environment.

10. Building trust requires understanding the values, interests and perspectives of other people.
Learning to actively listen to other people and to affirm that you have heard and understood their point
of view, even if you disagree with it, is one of the most important aspects of trust building. People who
feel listened to have more trust in the person who has understood them.

11. Building trust across cultures requires humility and transparency.

Humility is the acknowledgement that we are not better than others and that we make mistakes.
Transparency is the openness to recognise our positive capacities and interests, but also our
shortcomings and the negative effects that our actions may have on others. Leaders with intercultural
competence build trust by demonstrating transparency and humility in their relationships with others.
Self-assessment, the focus of the next lesson, is important to intercultural competence.

12. Building trust across cultural divides requires finding common ground.
Finding common ground can open a door to building the trust that is required to address differences
and conflicts between groups. Finding common ground happens by determining the areas in which
cultural groups overlap. They may share values and experiences. For example, young people around the
world hold many different religions and ethnicities, but many share an interest in music, sports, and
popular culture. These commonalities can provide an opportunity to bring people together across the
lines of conflict to address problems.

REVIEW
This lesson introduced the concept of intercultural competence as a key skill for building trust between
diverse stakeholders working in a complex environment. Each person holds many different identities and
belongs to different cultures. We can learn most about how to move between cultures by examining our
own lives and how we already do this. Intercultural competence is ultimately about finding common
ground and learning how to show respect to people from other cultural groups.

Citations

8 Myron W. Lustig and Jolene Koester. Intercultural Competence: Interpersonal Communication Across Cultures, (New
York: Pearson, 2009).
9 Jay Rothman. From Identity-Based Conflict to Identity-Based Cooperation: The ARIA Approach in Theory and Practice,
(New York: Springer, 2012).

42 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 3 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with a series of questions:
 What are some of the challenges of communicating with someone different from yourself?
 What factors make people different? What influences how people think and act?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice intercultural competence skills of showing respect to other
stakeholders. Showing respect to other stakeholders is a way to build trust between groups with
different cultures. Each scenario stakeholder team has ten minutes to identify a culturally
appropriate symbol for showing respect to three of the other stakeholder teams with whom they
would most want to build trust. Then the scenario facilitator will begin the role-play. Each team will
have twenty minutes to attempt to build trust with other teams by making a gesture of respect.
Debrief this experience.
 How would the teams likely perceive and respond to the other team’s gestures of respect?
 What did you learn about adaptive leadership in this role play?

Alternate Exercise:
This exercise aims to help participants reflect on the cultural geography of any city. It emphasises
that culture is not just something that other people have in other countries. Seeing the cultural
elements in one’s own community provides a foundation for identifying cultural elements in
complex environments where violent conflict may be occurring.
Ask participants or small groups of participants from the same cultural background to imagine
walking down the main street of the town or city where they live.
Draw a map or make a list of what you see that informs you about:
-the role of religion
-the ethics and values
-the roles of men and women
-the value of children and elders
-the rules for acting in public

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

What will I take away from this lesson on the security sector that might impact the way I do my work
in the future?
 If I could go back in time, what would I do differently in a past work experience if I could use
cross-cultural communication and trust-building skills?
 What will I do differently in the future given the ideas in this lesson?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 43

 CC/Flickr Photo: Rick
Scavetta, U.S. Army Africa

Lesson 4
Self-Assessment

Learning Objectives
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Define the relevance of self-assessment for working in complex environments
 Identify four questions used in self-assessment
 Identify how self-assessment relates to perception management

This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders with an understanding of their capacities and
lack of capacities, and how others perceive them. Self-awareness is an important element of adaptive
leadership and cross-cultural communication in complex environments. Self-awareness enables civilian,
military, and police leaders to coordinate effectively to support human security.

Lesson 4: Self-Assessment

1. What is self-assessment?
Self-assessment10 is a process to become more self-aware of one’s strengths, weaknesses, capacities and
lack of capacities. Self-assessment is a key element of adaptive leadership and cross-cultural
communication and trust building. Adaptive leaders who are able to respond to new and challenging
circumstances in a complex environment know their capacities and also their limits. They are confident to
describe who they are, but they also recognise that others may view them differently. Lack of self-
awareness is a characteristic of unpopular and ineffective leaders. In surveys of the effectiveness of
leaders, the number one complaint against leaders is “lack of self-awareness.” Civilians, military and
police often hold stereotypes of each other. Self-assessment can help each individual and each group to

44 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

become more aware of how others view them and what they can do to reduce or overcome these negative
stereotypes to improve civil-military-police relations.

2. Self-assessment is also necessary for multi-stakeholder coordination.

No one group can do everything. Groups are most able to coordinate when each group is clear on what it
can do and what it cannot do. This requires each group do a self-assessment.

3. Self-assessment requires identifying the gaps in

your knowledge.
How well do you understand the local context,
language, cultures, religions, etc.? Do you know and
recognise the limits of your knowledge of the local
cultures, languages, and systems? Do you know what
you don't know?

Identify the limits of your understanding of the local

context. List types of information on the local context
you do not have access to and describe how you will
continue to gather information about the context.

4. Map your capacities as well as your lack of

capacities.
No one group is capable of doing all the different types
of activities required to support peace and security in Figure 5: Self-Assessment
a complex environment. Governments, security forces, Knowledge Map
the business sector, and civil society each have a role
to play. Assessing the capacities and lack of capacities of each group is a necessary step in recognising the
need to build respectful, trusting relationships with other groups.

Self-Assessment Capacity Chart: What you Can and Cannot Do

Your Capacity: Your Extended Capacity: Your Lack of Capacity:

What you can do if you need to, What you do not know how to do
What you can do well but you would prefer to have
someone else do it

5. Assessing the impact of your actions.

Most people view themselves positively and believe they are motivated by good intentions. But often the
gap between “intent” and “impact” is large. Even when people set out to do good, they inadvertently harm
others.

For example, an NGO may arrive in a village to provide healthcare. They may not be aware that three
other groups are already in the village and the village feels obligated to host and feed the visiting NGO,
which creates a stress on community resources. In
another example, a military representative may
come to visit an NGO office with the good intention
to start a dialogue, but he does not realise that his
mere physical presence may put the NGO at risk of
being seen as taking sides in the conflict.

Analysing the potential harm your activities may

cause helps to avoid such negative impact. All too
often, groups examine the problems and capacities
of others in the conflict without looking inward at
their own problems or limits.

6. Understanding how others perceive you.

When others see you, what aspect of your identity
do they see? Lesson 3 on Intercultural Competence
introduced the diagram of identity and cultural Figure 6: Identity Groups

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 45

groups. How do other stakeholders perceive your identity? How do key stakeholders view your
organisation based on their perceptions and experiences? Have public figures or media outlets
commented on your motivations? How will these perceptions shape their interest and support for your
efforts in a complex environment?

You may need to carry out research to determine how stakeholders perceive your group. Useful questions
to ask are:

a. Which other stakeholders do you relate to?

b. Who else might be affected by your presence? This may include individuals who inadvertently
benefit from your presence such as hotels, drivers, food providers, etc, and those that may feel
threatened by your efforts or goals.
c. How do your interests connect with other stakeholders’ needs and interests?
d. How do other stakeholders perceive your interests and objectives?
e. How are you managing other stakeholder’s perceptions of you by explaining your motivations and
addressing criticisms or suspicions of your motives by others?

7. Perception management first requires self-assessment.

Adaptive leaders in complex environments want to influence and control how other groups perceive
them. This is called perception management. Leaders manage perceptions by how they behave, as actions
speak louder than words. Rather than asking “what can we do to change them” adaptive leaders ask “what
can we do differently so that they can better understand our role in the conflict?”

REVIEW
This lesson identified the importance for stakeholders to do a self-assessment of both their capacities and
lack of capacities. This is necessary for him or her to be able to build trust and coordinate with each other
so that each stakeholder contributes where they have the most capacity.

Citations

10Stephen Robbins. Self-Assessment Library 3.4, (New York, New York: Prentice Hall, 2008). See online-self-
assessment tools at http://www.pearsonhighered.com/sal_v3_demo/ accessed January 2016.

46 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 4 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to these questions:
 What choices do you make that shape how others perceive you?
 What do you wear or how do you travel that impacts how others view you?
 Do others view you positively or negatively? How do you know how they perceive you?
 What impact do other stakeholder’s perceptions of you have on your work?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using self-assessment tools. The president of the country in
your scenario is coming to visit to assess the capacity of different groups. Each scenario stakeholder
team will have two minutes to answer the following three questions the president has sent out to all
of the stakeholders. Based on point three in this lesson, do a self-assessment of your scenario group.
 What can your group do well?
 What is your “extended capacity?”
 What is your lack of capacity?

The president then asks the groups to refute or challenge each other. The president is looking for
honesty and humility, as well as capacity to respond. Which of the stakeholder teams can best
demonstrate an accurate self-assessment of their capacities that other groups do not challenge?

Alternate Exercise:
This exercise aims to help security personnel and civilian leaders identify how other groups perceive
them so that they can make choices that better influence and build positive perceptions.

A carload of NGO workers drives up to a checkpoint where security forces meet them.
What choices could each of the NGO workers make in terms of their appearance and their
behaviour? What will increase trust? What will decrease trust in what they say, what they do, and
how they look?
What choices do security forces make in terms of their appearance and their behaviour? What will
increase trust? What will decrease trust in what they say, what they do, and how they look?
What might the use of sunglasses, smoking, cursing, or loud music communicate to the other group?

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss these questions:

 What is the gap between how you see yourself and how those outside of your group see you?
 What would you do differently to manage perceptions of you and your group?
 How will you explain your motivations and address criticisms or suspicions of your motives by
others?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 47

 Photo: Karin Orr, 2010 Peace Fellow

Module
2
State-Society Relations

Module 2 State-Society Relations

This module introduces the definitions of the state-society relationship, the security sector, civil
society. This module provides a conceptual foundation for analysis of the roles and
responsibilities of each of these stakeholders.

Lesson 5: Introduction to State-Society Relations in Diverse Contexts identifies patterns of

state-society relationships that support or undermine human security.

Lesson 6: Introduction to the Security Sector identifies the components and characteristics of
the security sector.

Lesson 7: Introduction to Civilians and Civil Society identifies the components and
characteristics of civil society.

Lesson 8: Legal Frameworks on Civil-Military-Police Relations identifies legal frameworks

relevant to state-society relations and human security.

48 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 CC Flickr Photo: Vikalpa/CPA

Lesson 5
State-Society Relations

Learning Objectives
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Define state-society relations
 Identify three approaches to state legitimacy
 Identify elements of good governance
 Compare and contrast different models of state-society relations

Every society has a unique relationship between the government and the broader society. A variety of
factors shape these relations. This lesson explores different types of relationships between the state
and the people who live within a state. Some models of state-society relations enable civil-military-
police coordination to support human security. Other models make it coordination impossible. This
lesson identifies the conditions for state-society coordination to support human security.

Lesson 5: State-Society Relations

1. What are state-society relations?

State-society relations refer to the quality of relationship between state institutions and the public. 11 The
state derives legitimacy from a social contract that defines what states will do to protect public interests
and rights and what freedoms the public will give up in return. For example, in a democratic state, the
state agrees to integrate the public in its decision-making processes and provide public services. Society
agrees to give up some of its freedoms to follow the state’s rule of law. The state exerts its authority and
exercises its rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the people who make up society.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 49

2. Each state has a unique history.
A state is an organised political community. A government is a group of people who manage the state.
States evolved in different ways. Some emerged from tribal kingdoms. Others emerged from colonialism.
A state’s history and evolution impacts the way a state relates to society - the local population – today.

Some see the role of the state as a service provider to society. This understanding sees state legitimacy as
coming from the services that the state provides to society. Society supports the state because it sees the
state as a public servant.

Others see society as a service provider to the state. This understanding sees state legitimacy as coming
from a monopoly of force and its ability to coerce society to provide goods to elites in control of the state.
Society may challenge the state because it is seen as illegitimate.

3. State-building is distinct from state formation.

State-building aims to improve the technical apparatus of the state’s institutions to provide public
services. State formation aims to improve the state-society relationship, to improve the social contract
between people and a representative government to ensure there is accountability, perceived legitimacy,
and a system of checks and balances on state powers.12

4. There are different approaches to the state legitimacy.

Historically, a group earned the right to rule a state by virtue of their “monopoly of legitimate force.”
Today, the issue of state legitimacy is more complex.

a. Legal Authority: Some argue state legitimacy comes through legal authority, such as through
a legal election, a royal bloodline, or other rule for how governments are chosen.

b. Monopoly of Force: Others assert that states legal legitimacy comes through their monopoly
of force, the ability to physically dominate territory. A monopoly of force is thought to be
essential to upholding the state’s rule of law. In some states, the monopoly of force is a
competition, with the group with most military power earning the right to govern. With the
widespread availability of weapons to private individuals and non-state groups, today some
governments take part in violent competitions with their own citizens and other states to
earn legitimacy to govern.

c. Public Support: A third approach sees states earning legitimacy through public engagement.
Citizens support their government when they have opportunities to participate in decision
making, when leaders make decisions that benefit all groups and do not disadvantage or
persecute parts of the population. States win public support when they work to protect the
human security of the whole population and not just the security of elite groups. A
government’s public legitimacy is a reflection of public perception of government
performance in providing public goods. Elite-captured governments, especially those that
use repression on civilians, are widely seen as illegitimate and unstable. Government
legitimacy is thought to come through democratic reforms that enable civil society to both
hold government to account and partner with government to provide public goods.

5. Governance
Government is not the same thing as governance. Governance refers to any type of governing structures;
both formal and informal by state, business, or civil society. It includes any tradition and institution that
makes decisions and provides resources to manage society's problems and affairs. Official state structures
such help to manage a country’s environmental, economic, political, and social affairs. No government can
fill all of the social roles needed to ensure human security.

In most societies today, informal, non-state governance structures pre-date the existence of the state
continue to complement formal state governance. Informal governance exists in every country. Many
different groups outside of government help to manage resources, address social problems and meet
human needs. For example, religious and community-based organisations in every country play a role in
caring for people’s basic needs. Tribal leaders carry out informal justice. For example, in Ghana,
traditional leaders still play a major role in the resolution of land disputes or the provision of health care
or education. And non-state armed groups such as private security contractors and militia groups protect
private property and specific communities.

50 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Non-state or informal governance can be abusive and corrupt, or it can be functional and cost-effective. In
some countries, public concerns about government taxation lead to public attempts to limit government
that in turn expands the role of non-state actors in governance. Even countries with strong central
governments have robust forms of non-state governance. In some sectors, such as the environment, civil
society, businesses, and the state collaborate to manage and build sustainable environmental systems.
Watershed management boards are an example of such public-private partnerships.

6. Improving state-society relations requires coordinating formal and informal governance

structures.
Governments too often assume that their mission to improve state-society relations should be to “extend”
the state into so-called “ungoverned spaces” rather than to coordinate governance approaches between
the capital city and the informal governance structures already working at the provincial, district, and
sub-district levels.

Judging the degree of functional or “good” governance requires assessment of the degree to which people
participate in decisions that affect their lives and the degree to which governance institutions serve all
people.

7. People can measure and perceive governance in different ways.

There are general categories of governance that signal the quality of state-society relations.13

 Procedural fairness refers to whether people perceive public institutions operating in an impartial
and transparent way. For example, people look at media coverage and ask whether it treats all
groups fairly and provides information relevant to each of their interests.
 Decision-making access refers to whether people perceive that their interests and perspectives are
reflected in public policies.
 Resource allocation refers to a perception of sharing or distribution of public resources, funds, and
services.
 Quality standards refer to a perception that everyone receives the same quality of public goods and
services.

Human security involves improving governance to make it more fair and responsive to all groups.
Citizens can start this process by identifying shared values and collective interests to improve their lives
and then working together to advocate for change. This can include implementing reforms to foster equal
treatment of identity groups, setting minimum levels for participation and access to public institutions,
using redistributive or preferential treatment to redress historic grievances, and ensuring that
institutions have mechanisms for setting standards of quality assurance for the public.

8. State-society relations can also be measured by public perceptions in each of the following
sectors.14
Governance can be divided into five sectors.

Politically stable democracy. Do local people perceive they have political security to protect and
promote human rights and processes to foster peaceful discussion and negotiation? What institutions
address these needs? How legitimate, transparent, and effective is the government? Does it allow political
parties and elections? Is there an independent legislature?

Sustainable economy. Do local people perceive that they have basic economic security to earn and
access a basic income? What institutions address these needs? How well do government and
nongovernmental service institutions meet citizen needs for water, education, health care, electricity,
roads, markets, and so on? How well does the economic system work in terms of rewarding
entrepreneurship, managing sustainable use of resources, reducing the gap between rich and poor, and
fostering economic stability for all people?

Safe and secure environment. Do local people perceive that they have community security, freedom of
movement, and freedom from fear? How well do security forces protect all civilians, regardless of their
identity? Do institutions protect ethnic, religious, and cultural groups—particularly women, children, and
minorities—from violence? What institutions address these needs?

Justice and rule of law. Do local people perceive that they have predictable social relations and a
justice system that is coherent and legitimate, and that uses just legal frameworks to monitor and protect

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 51

human rights? What institutions address these needs? How fair and consistent are the police, courts, and
corrections institutions to all people?

Social and cultural well-being. Do local people perceive that they have a sense of meaning and social
order in their lives along with respect, dignity, identity, and a sense of belonging with others? Do people
have freedom to practice their religious beliefs and cultural traditions? How independent, fair, and
professional are the news media that are providing information to people about their context? What is the
quantity and quality of civil society organisations and their ability to monitor human rights, hold
government accountable to its functions, mediate public disputes, and so on? What institutions address
these needs? Do people have access to programmes to aid psychosocial recovery and trauma healing?

9. Citizen-oriented versus elite-captured governments.

So-called “elite-captured” governments serve the interests of elite groups within society. Such
governments are similar to oligarchies because their leaders are usually self-appointed and tolerate little
representation of society at large. In contrast, “citizen-oriented” governments – which in most cases are
democracies - serve the interests of a state’s entire population. The population at large has elected their
government and decisions are made by representative structures such as parliaments.

10. A “citizen-oriented state” enjoys public legitimacy.

A state that orients its power and resources toward the needs and interests of its population is most likely
seen as legitimate. A citizen-oriented state that works with socially responsible businesses is also more
likely to enjoy human security. In a citizen-
oriented state, an active civil society both
partners with government to fill public
services and to hold government to
account, to press for accountability and for
equal access to government services for all
people.

11. Most “elite-captured states” lack

public legitimacy.
An elite-captured state serves elite
interests, often those of a relatively small
political, economic class, ethnic, cultural or Figure 7: Legitimate State-Society
Relations
religious group. Other groups do not
receive fair treatment or access to
government services, such as protection,
justice, or access to healthcare, education,
housing, or jobs. Elite-captured states often use state security forces to pacify and repress civil society’s
demands for human rights, democracy and freedom. Armed insurgencies and/or nonviolent social
movements often develop in response to elite-captured governments.

Figure 8: Repressive State-Society Relations

52 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

12. The nature of state-society relations impacts the mandate of security forces and their
relationship with civil society.
Elite-captured governments may direct security forces to pacify or repress civil society in an attempt to
quiet their public demands on government for accountability and equal access to public goods. Non-state
armed groups often take root where they have public support, because the public distrusts the
government. Authoritarian approaches to security rely on military and police force to repress civil society
efforts to bring attention to the root causes of public violence. There are at least five distinct approaches
or stages in security sector relationships with society. Figure 9 illustrates these approaches with the goal
of enabling an analysis of why civil society-military-police coordination and local ownership of security is
possible in some contexts but not others.

Figure 9: Security Sector Approaches to Civil Society

Historically, states have taken an adversarial and exploitative approach to civilians. Colonial governments
predominantly viewed civilians either as potential enemies or cheap labour and waged atrocious wars
against them to keep them subdued. Such “pacification” campaigns induced fear and terror in local
populations as a means of control. Some governments today continue to repress civil society, executing
and torturing civil society leaders and using scorched earth policies, including mass atrocities, against
local populations to ensure that they will not press governing authorities for any public services,
freedoms, or rights. Thanks to the work of courageous journalists, such forms of violence by security
actors have been increasingly documented and as a consequence, international pressure has been
building to expose and prevent violent pacification tactics – sometimes referred to as “state-based
terrorism.”15 However, the legacy of this approach continues to influence security actors’ attitude towards
civil society, including security forces’ distrust of NGOs and other civil society organisations, and civil
society’s distrust of security forces.

Today, civil society widely views counterterrorism laws to restrict civil society as a continuation of the
pacification mind-set.16 In this approach, counterterrorism legislation restricts civil society from contact
with non-state armed groups identified as “terrorists” even if they have a legitimate set of political
grievances and self-determination aims protected by international law. In many countries,
counterterrorism laws also restrict funding for civil society, especially outside funding to support civil
society’s support for democratic freedoms. Counterterrorism “lawfare” (warfare by legal means) makes it
impossible for civil society to offer humanitarian assistance, development assistance or engage in
peacebuilding programmes that might have a moderating effect on non-state armed groups.17

But over the last fifteen years, security actors have been adopting less repressive approaches towards
civil society. Some aspects of the concept of pacification continue to be found in counterinsurgency
literature, which takes a cautious approach toward civilians, viewing them as potential allies or potential
enemies. Rather than intimidating civil society, counterinsurgency aims to pacify local populations by

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 53

winning the hearts and minds through establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and
involving the participation of the people. 18 Rather than attacking civilians, military forces provide civilian
assistance to local villages to gain acceptance and prevent local populations from supporting hostile non-
state armed actors.

A fourth approach emphasises a new era prioritising civilian safety in security sector-civil society
relations where states, regional organisations like the Africa Union, or the United Nations, mandate
security actors with the task of “protection of civilians.” New military doctrine and training emphasises
military and police roles in protection of civilians as well as avoiding civilian casualties and mitigating
harm against civilians during military or police operations. New frameworks for international action such
as the Responsibility to Protect 19 call governments to refrain from violent repression of civilians
themselves, and to protect civilians from violence from non-state armed actors.

A fifth approach views civil society as service providers, contributing to peace and stability. States,
regional organisations and international organisations view civil society organisations as contractors or
“implementing partners.” They fund CSOs to provide healthcare, food, water and shelter to vulnerable
populations such as the young, old, veterans and disabled members of society, to building the capacity of
communities to govern effectively to maintain the rule of law, community safety, and economic
development, to countering violent extremism. Many CSOs are wary of government funding, noting they
lose their independence; their ability to respond to locally identified needs, and the trust and legitimacy
they have with local communities when they are seen as for-profit contractors working on behalf of
governments. Civil society specifically opposes the use of the term “implementing partners,” as it implies
that CSOs do not have their own assessment or plans to address local needs. 20

This Handbook illustrates a sixth approach where security forces and an empowered and independent
civil society build understanding and coordinate with each other to address the root causes of insecurity
and coordinate efforts to support human security. In a “coordination for human security” approach,
conflict prevention and peacebuilding skills, values, and processes enable less antagonistic relationship
capable of joint problem solving. It is important to recognise how this multi-stakeholder coordination for
human security approach contrasts with other approaches. Unlike other approaches, a human security
approach does not manipulate civil society as security assets. Instead it emphasises the empowerment of
civil society to participate in identifying security challenges, designing and implementing human security
programmes and overseeing the security sector’s performance.

In some contexts, different security actors may each be using a different approach simultaneously. Some
national or international military and police units may focus on protection of civilians while others are
actively using violent pacification. A government’s development agency may be funding programmes to
support civil-military-police coordination on human security while other government agencies use legal
frameworks to prevent CSOs from talking to armed groups, or keep CSOs busy with lucrative contracts to
provide public services.

13. The case for armed forces supporting democracy.

In his book Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions, US Admiral
Dennis Blair outlines an “elevator speech” for convincing armed forces to support society’s move toward
democracy.21

 Democracy is spreading throughout the world. We are in the midst of the fourth wave of
democratic transitions. Democracy in different forms is the aspiration of people on all continents:
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East and South America.
 No regime can remain in power if citizens do not support it. Dictatorships will one day call upon
their armed forces to betray their oaths and will order them to use force against their own
citizens.
 The loyalty of the armed forces should be to the people and their chosen representatives, not some
self-chosen person or party. Armed forces in democracies serve only to defend their people and
will never be required to use force against them.
 Service members in democracies are respected, adequately compensated, fairly promoted, and
retire with honour. Democracies field the most capable armed forces in the world.
 The military heroes that history remembers have acted not to oppress their people but to defend
them.

54 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

14. The relationship between the government and the security forces is a critical factor in state-
society relations.
The following diagram illustrates the different models of relationship between governments and national
security forces. A military-led government will have a different state-society relationship than a civilian
government that has authority over the military.

Model 1 – Military-led Model 2: Parallel Government and Model 3: Civilian-Led

Government Military and Police Authority Government
In some countries there is In some countries the government Civilian authority over the military
very little gap between the and military work closely to define is touted by advocates of
government and the security national interests and develop democracy as representing the
forces. Military leaders may national strategies. They may do this best model for ensuring that the
be in charge of the separately, civilians and military military works on behalf of broadly
government. keeping in separate silos. defined interests of all people in
the nation.

Figure 10: Government Relations with Security Forces

REVIEW
This lesson compared and contrasted different types of relationships between the state and society. The
type of state-society relationship is a critical factor in determining whether civil society sees government
and security forces as legitimate or illegitimate. It also determines whether the state views civil society as
a menace or an asset for human security. This in turn influences all stakeholders’ willingness and ability
to coordinate in pursuing human security.

Citations

11 Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Kathryn Hochstetler, Ann Marie Clark, Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global Civil Society:
State-Society Relations at UN World Conferences (New York: SUNY Press, 2005).
12 OECD 2008. Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience. P. 8.
13 Mark Rogers, Aaron Chassy, and Tom Bamat, “Integrating Peacebuilding into Humanitarian and Development

Programming: Practical Guidance on Designing Effective, Holistic Peacebuilding Projects,” Baltimore, Catholic Relief
Services, 2010, 15.
14 Adapted from Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson, “A Framework for Success: International Intervention in

Societies Emerging from Conflict,” in Leashing the Dogs of War, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela
Aall (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 369–87. It also draws on Luc Reychler and
Thania Paffenholz, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Dan Smith,
“Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: The Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding”
(Oslo: PRIO, 2003); Thania Paffenholz, Civil Society and Peacebuilding (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 2009); Lisa
Schirch, Strategic Peacebuilding (Intercourse, Pennsylvania.: Good Books, 2004); and Cooperation for Peace and
Unity, Human Security Indicators (Kabul, 2010).
See also: Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA; World Bank), Crisis Watch (International Crisis Group), Failed States Index (Fund for Peace), Global Peace
Index, Human Development Index (HDI) . Human Security Index, Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger (University of
Maryland), Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Uppsala Conflict Data Program, World Bank’s Institutional and
Governance Reviews.
15 For a complete set of correlates of attacks by non-state armed groups. Global Terrorism Index 2014, (New York,

New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014).

http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf
accessed January 2016.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 55

16 See, for example, Boon-Kuo, L., Hayes, B., Sentas, V and Sullivan, G.Building Peace in Permanent War: Terrorist
Listing & Conflict Transformation, (London; Amsterdam: International State Crime Initiative- Transnational Institute.
2015).
17 John Paul Lederach “Addressing terrorism: A theory of change approach” in Somalia: Creating space for fresh

approaches to peacebuilding, John Paul Lederach, et al editors, (Uppsala, Sweden: Life & Peace Institute, 2011).
18 Major Louis J. Ruscetta. Education for Philippine Pacification: How the U.S. Used Education as Part of its

Counterinsurgency Strategy in the Philippines from 1898 to 1909, (Damascus, MD: Pennyhill Press. October 14, 2013).
19 The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org
20 Brian Pratt, “Legitimacy and transparency for NGOs.” (Oxford, UK: International NGO Training and Research

Centre. 2009).
21 Dennis Blair. Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces to Support Democratic Transitions, (Washington DC:

Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

56 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 5 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to these questions:

 How does the state relate to society in my home community?

 What does the state do for citizens?
 What do citizens do to support the community?
 Is there a relationship of trust or suspicion? Why or why not?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast different approaches to legitimate state-society
relations. Each scenario stakeholder team will have fifteen minutes to prepare their analysis of the
state-society relationship to present to other teams. Each team should draw on the content of the
lesson. For example, each team may want to consider the following questions:
 From where does the state derive its legitimacy?
 What is your assessment of how well governance works in each of the five categories
identified in point seven in this lesson?
 Which figure best illustrates state-society relations in your country – Figure 7 illustrating
legitimate state-society relations or Figure 8 illustrating repressive state-society relations?
 In your scenario, who provides governance, for what purpose and by what process, with what
resources?
Note the scenario instructions if teams want to assert something about the context that is not
provided in the background. The facilitator invites each team to characterise state-society relations
in the scenario. Is there common ground in the analysis or do teams perceive the legitimacy of the
state in different ways? Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-
play.

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

 What will I take away from this lesson on state-society relations that might impact the way I
do my work in the future?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 57

 CC Flickr Photo Credit: U.S. Army Africa

Lesson 6
Introduction to the Security Sector

Learning Objectives
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
1. Identify at least four parts of the security sector
2. Identify the roles and responsibilities of the security sector
3. Compare and contrast different types of military forces
4. Compare and contrast different types of police forces

This lesson provides an introduction to the security sector. While this Handbook focuses on the military
and police, these security institutions sit within a wider system of other related organisations and
institutions. This lesson provides an introduction to how parts of the security sector or “system”
interact with each other, and the roles and responsibilities of each group in the security system.

Lesson 6: Introduction to the Security Sector

Most of this lesson is adapted from the Institute for Inclusive Security and the Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces Women’s Guide to SSR.22

1. Security Sector
The security sector includes security forces, state oversight and management bodies, non-state armed
groups that play a role in protection of civilians, independent oversight bodies, the justice and rule of law
institutions. Since each part of the security sector is dependent on other parts, some refer to it as the
security system.

2. State Armed and Security Forces

Security forces have responsibilities for protecting public order and security; preventing and responding
to crime, providing assistance to people in need; and securing national interests. Security forces also have

58 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

certain powers that belong only to them. These include the legal power to arrest, detain, search and seize,
and the use of force and firearms.

Armed  The military’s primary function is to protect and defend the state and its
forces/Military/ population from foreign aggression. Some armed forces also participate in
Defence forces international peace operations.
(may include  The military should be used for other internal security purposes only when
gendarmerie) civilian forces cannot respond effectively alone (emergency situations).
 The military should be equipped to deal with a wide range of threats,
capable of cooperating with different state and non-state groups, and
respectful of human rights.
 Civilian authorities should oversee the military’s activities, expenditures,
and processes.

Border  This agency focuses on the rules and procedures regulating activities and
management traffic across defined border areas.
agency  Their task is the prevention of unlawful cross-border activities, the detection
of national security threats, and the control of persons and vehicles at
designated border-crossing points.
 Border guards are usually under the authority of a civilian or paramilitary
law enforcement service.

Immigration and  This agency is responsible for enforcing entry and exit restrictions, ensuring
customs agency the legality of travel documents, identifying and investigating criminality,
and assisting those in need of protection.
 Ideally, it should also improve the prevention and detection of human
trafficking and smuggling, strengthen the protection and promotion of
human rights, and enhance local ownership, oversight, and collaboration.

Police  The primary function of the police is to provide local law enforcement.
 The police focus on prevention and detection of crime, the maintenance of
public order, and protection of property and the population.
 Civilian leadership should oversee their activities, expenditures, and
processes.

3. State Oversight and Management Bodies

These include the executive branch, national security advisory bodies, parliament; ministries of defence,
internal affairs, foreign affairs; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial
audit and planning units); civilian review boards; public complaints commissions and (some)
ombudspersons.

Head of Government  This head can be a prime minister, president, or a monarch. The role, as it
relates to the security sector, can vary from a ceremonial function, to chief
of the army, to supreme commander in wartime.
 Along with other agencies within the executive branch of government, he
or she determines the budget, general guidelines, and priorities of the
armed and security services.

Members of  Parliamentarians, or members of parliament, are responsible for initiating,

legislatures/ debating, and approving or opposing laws.
parliament  They exercise oversight of policies, approve budgets, and can launch
investigations.
 Parliamentarians can hold public hearings, provide CSOs with pertinent
information, and use town hall meetings to discuss government policy on
security.
Ministry of Defence  This ministry is responsible for managing and overseeing the armed forces,
as well as setting and implementing defence policy.
 The Minister of Defence is typically the principal defence advisor to the

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 59

 head of government.
 The Ministry of Defence is distinct from the armed forces themselves,
which are more operational.
Ministry of the  This ministry is generally responsible for policy, funding, and oversight of
Interior civilian law enforcement organisations, including police, border security,
and special investigation units.
 In some countries, the Ministry of the Interior can be responsible for
prisons, immigration, and local governance, including provincial, municipal,
and district administration.
Ministry of Gender/  This ministry is responsible for providing guidance so that all government
Women’s Affairs policies, structures, and programmes meet both men’s and women’s needs.
 It often focuses on integrating gender issues across government agencies as
well as empowering women, in particular through dedicated programmes
and funding.
 It can play a role in ensuring that SSR processes and security sector
institutions are inclusive of women, and meet the needs of women and
girls.
National security  This body is responsible for reviewing the national security policy, a
council framework for how the country provides security for the state and its
citizens.
 This group can be the permanent cabinet or an ad hoc committee that
advises the head of government.
 The national security council usually consults widely with governmental
security actors and may also consult with non-governmental actors.
Parliamentary  These committees have the final say on the budgets of all security sector
finance/ budget institutions (in addition to possibly the public accounts committee, which
committee reviews the audit reports of the entire national budget, including the
defence budget).
Parliamentary  This committee gives advice and makes recommendations to the
defence and parliament concerning laws or decisions pertaining to national defence and
intelligence intelligence.
committee  It should focus on matters related to the size, structure, organisation,
procurement, financing, and functioning of the state actors mandated to
use force and of civil management bodies that make decisions about the
use of force.
 All parliamentary committees should exercise broad oversight powers to
investigate major public policy issues, defective administration, accusations
of corruption, or scandals.

4. Independent Oversight Bodies

These include civil society organisations (CSOs), including media, think tanks, and professional
associations; human rights commissions; (some) ombudspersons.
National human  These are established by law or in the constitution. They are permanent
rights institutions, bodies, independent from government, but usually reporting to the
ombudspersons, and parliament.
specialised oversight  National human rights institutions and ombudspersons exist in order to
bodies review the activities of government authorities, including the security
sector (although the armed forces are often excluded from their
jurisdiction).
 Other specialised oversight bodies may have a mandate to oversee either
specific agencies or sectors (e.g., police, prisons) or thematic issues (e.g.,
corruption).
 In some countries, there are also specialised defence ombudspersons that
are not independent from the armed forces. Likewise, police, prisons, and
other security sector institutions may have internal oversight bodies (e.g.,
inspectors) that are not independent of the institution.

60 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

CSOs (e.g., human  CSOs may monitor the security sector, conduct research, advocate for
rights organisations, policy change, and provide services to the population around security
victims’ assistance issues.
organisations,  They often have strong networks in the population and among other CSOs.
women’s
organisations)

Media  The media can play a role in overseeing the public authorities and
informing citizens about security risks.
 It can help raise public awareness and create support for SSR. It can have
a negative influence if it is not independent from the state.

Think tanks  Think tanks and public policy research institutes are a type of CSO that
can influence policy through the provision of information, analysis, and
advice.
 These security research and policy institutes can also help to inform the
media and the broader public on policy issues.

5. Justice and Rule of Law Institutions

These include judiciary and justice ministries; prisons; probation services; criminal investigation and
prosecution services; customary and traditional justice systems (such as elders, chiefs, traditional
councils).

Ministry of Justice  This ministry is responsible for organising the justice system, overseeing
the public prosecutor, and maintaining the legal system and public order.
It normally has responsibility for the penal system, including prisons.
 Some ministries also have additional responsibilities in related policy
areas, overseeing elections, directing the police, and law reform.

Judicial system  The judicial system includes the courts that administer justice and
constitute the judicial branch of government.
 Judiciaries, prosecution services, and other dispute resolution
mechanisms should be impartial and accountable.
 The judicial system plays a role in overseeing other parts of the security
sector, when cases involving security sector personnel or institutions are
brought before the courts.

Penal system  The penal system is responsible for executing the punishments or other
measures ordered by the courts. The penal system includes prisons, but
also alternatives to custody, such as systems for bail and community
service orders, as well as (where existing) parole boards, probationary
services and inspectorates, and traditional and informal sanctions
systems.
 A functioning penal system should have sufficient staff that is trained and
properly paid to avoid corruption; respect human rights and the different
needs of women, men, boys, and girls; and provide rehabilitative and
educational activities.
 Prisons should be monitored by independent groups/civil society to
prevent abuse.

Traditional  Customary, local authorities (such as village heads, chiefs, elders, and
authorities councils) can wield important influence over local attitudes, customs, and
behaviours.
 They may play a significant role in dispute resolution.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 61

6. Non-state Security Sector Actors
Private military and security companies can also be considered part of the security sector. Governments,
businesses and even civil society organisations may hire private military and security companies to
address their specific safety and security interests. In some places, insurgents, rebels, non-state militia,
mafias and gangs provide security services to certain groups. While not part of the official security sector,
these groups are included as being part of the broad security sector.

Private military  These are for-profit companies that provide military and security services to
and security a state.
companies  They perform duties typically similar to those of military or police forces, but
often on a smaller scale. They may consist of foreign or local staff. They are
often involved in running detention facilities and training security sector
personnel.
 Notably, they are often not subject to the same degree of oversight and
accountability as state armed and security forces.

Paramilitaries and  Armed groups whose organisational structure, training, subculture, and
Civilian Defence (often) function are similar to those of a professional military, and which is
Forces not included as part of a state's formal armed forces.

7. International armed forces can also be considered part of the security system if they are
present within a country.
This may include multinational forces, regional forces, bilateral forces, peacekeeping forces and forces
that are re-hatted to be a peacekeeping mission.

8. There are four widely accepted principles guiding the security sector.

• Civilian control: of all security sector institutions. This means ultimate responsibility for a
country’s strategic decision making is in the hands of the civilian political leadership rather than
professional military or police;

• Accountability: so that security sector institutions are held responsible for the actions they take
and subject to the oversight of the judiciary, the media, and civil society organisations;

• Transparency: so that parliament, civil society, and the population understand how and why
decisions are made and actions are taken; and

• Rule of law: so that no security sector institution can abuse its power or restrict the rights of
individuals.
Module 10 in this Handbook provides more detail on security sector governance, accountability and
transparency.

9. Comparison of different types of military roles

Not all military and police forces are the same. Military and police forces have different goals, different
types of training, and different types of relationships with civilians in government and civil society.
Different types of military and police personnel hold a range of stances in relation to direct use of force.
Perceptions of the legitimacy of military and police forces and their acceptance by local communities and
non-state armed groups vary widely from context to context, even within different provinces or districts
in the same country. Military and police forces also hold a diversity of national experience and doctrine.
UN peacekeeping forces come from many different countries. Likewise, individual national NATO
members also have their own unique histories and experiences that shape their approach.

Civil affairs officers facilitate relationships between military forces or peacekeepers and the local
government and civil society. The UN, NATO and individual states define the roles of civil affairs officers
in different ways. Civil affairs conduct civil-military cooperation or “CIMIC” types of activities.

The level of acceptance and legitimacy of a military and police forces or a non-state armed group has
direct implications for civil-military-police coordination. UN Security Council mandated peacekeeping
forces may enjoy greater political legitimacy and public acceptance than military forces without this
explicit multi-lateral support. Where there is widespread legitimacy and acceptance of military and police

62 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

forces, civil-military-police coordination may be easier as civilians have less need to maintain their
distinction from armed parties to the conflict. Where the public disputes the legitimacy of police, military
or peacekeeping forces, and public acceptance is low, civil-military-police coordination will be more
difficult as civilians will need to be more careful of how local populations and opposing armed groups
view their coordination with military and police forces.

Spectrum of Military Stance

Figure 11: Spectrum

of Military Stance

10. Comparison of different types of police

Policing also takes diverse forms. Some policing looks similar to war fighting. Military-style policing uses
military-style weapons and tanks to protect property and state interests. This approach aims to project an
intimidating force within communities in an attempt to dissuade individuals and groups of committing
crimes or acts of violence. This approach to policing is often found when police officers come from a
different racial, ethnic, religious, or class background than the people in the communities where they
serve. This approach may not hesitate to use lethal force against community members. Training for this
approach to policing may place emphasis on getting around laws or the constitution.

At the other end of the spectrum, community policing aims primarily to protect citizens and communities.
This approach to policing favours developing close relationships and trust with communities in order to
identify potential problems and prevent crime by addressing root causes and conditions that lead to
criminal behaviour. This approach favours the use of non-lethal weapons and justice processes that can
affirm the rule of law by addressing harms done to people and communities by holding offenders
accountable to victims for their crimes. Lesson 13 details these different approaches to policing and
justice in more detail.

Figure 12: Spectrum of Police Stance

REVIEW
This lesson provides a foundation for understanding the components of the security system and their
roles and responsibilities. The security sector must address the different needs, perceptions, and
experiences of men and women in all parts of society. Module 5 builds on this lesson by exploring
different definitions of and approaches to security in more depth.

Citations

22 Megan Bastick and Tobie Whitman, A Woman’s Guide to Security Sector Reform, (Washington, DC: Institute for
Inclusive Security and Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2013).

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 63

Lesson 6 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to these questions:

 Which parts of the security sector work well?

 Which parts of the security sector are not working well?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice a basic assessment to understand the security sector in a
specific context. Each scenario stakeholder team will have fifteen minutes to prepare their
characterisation of the security sector to other teams. Each team should draw on the content of the
lesson. For example, each team may want to consider the following questions:

 Which parts of the security sector work well?

 Which parts of the security sector are not working well?
 Based on point seven in the lesson, are all four of the principles for the security sector
evident? Does your community or country struggle with any of these principles?
 On the “Spectrum of Police Stance” where would you put the police in your scenario on the
spectrum?

The facilitator invites each team to characterise state-society relations in the scenario. Is there
common ground in the analysis or do teams perceive the legitimacy of the state in different ways?
Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-play.

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

 What will I take away from this lesson on the security sector that might impact the way I do
my work in the future?

64 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Flickr CC Photo: Juan Manuel Herrera/OAS

Lesson 7
Introduction to Civil Society

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify diverse types of civilians that may be working in complex environments
 Identify the two main functions of civil society
 Identify at least five functions of civil society in human security
 Identify women’s distinct contributions to civil society and human security
 Identify at least three ways of measuring local ownership and community engagement
 Identify three NGO and CSO security strategies

This lesson defines civil society and includes the roles and responsibilities of civil society organisations
and social movements in supporting human security. Like the last lesson, this lesson examines,
compares, and contrasts different types of civil society organisations and the way they operate.

Lesson 7: Introduction to Civil Society

1. What is civil society?
The term civil society refers to non-governmental, voluntary groups of people that organise themselves on
behalf of interest groups or local communities. By definition, civil society takes collective action for
shared interests. Civil society is non-profit and independent from government. Civil society is by
definition, unarmed. Civil society has two basic functions:
 To partner with the state to complement and supplement its capacity
 To hold the state to account for its responsibilities and transparent governance

Civil society is neither all good nor all bad. Like governments and security forces, civil society has the
potential to contribute to or detract from human security. While civil society faces challenges such as

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 65

corruption and lack of capacity in some cases, overall human security correlates with an active civil
society. An active local civil society is a clear indicator of a functioning, stable and citizen-oriented state.
Governments are increasingly recognising the need to support civil society and social movements to
increase democracy and stability and to reduce corruption and violence. 23

2. Defining Terms
Just as there is a spectrum of types of military and police, there is also a spectrum of different types of
civil society organisations and purposes.

Social movements are large, informal groups of individuals or civil society organisations that work
together to advocate for change on specific political or social issues. Examples include the “Arab Spring,”
decolonisation movements in India, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, or the civil rights
movement in the US. NGOs sometimes play a powerful role in preparing, training, and developing a
strategy for social movements so they are nonviolent. Social movements may use the term “civic
resistance” or “nonviolent resistance” to describe their goals and methods of increasing civic
participation, human rights, and freedoms. Social movements hold the state to account for its
responsibilities.

Uncivil society refers to civilians outside of government that use violence against others.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) are non-governmental, voluntary groups of citizens that organise
themselves on behalf of some public interest. There are diverse types of CSOs.

Traditional civil society includes religious, tribal, cultural, and informal organisations.

Modern civil society includes universities, community-based organisations (CBOs), professional and trade
associations, media, charities, artists, and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs).

More people in government and the security sector are familiar with the acronym “NGO.” This Handbook
uses the acronym CSO as an umbrella term, but sometimes includes the acronym NGO for the sake of
familiarity and clarity.

3. Accountability
CSOs (and all NGOs) have both formal and informal mechanisms for accountability, legality and structure.

CSOs are not-for-profit entities. If they begin operating to make a profit, they become a business entity, a
private contractor.

CSOs are “self-mandated.” This means that they work on behalf of the public good, according to their own
public needs assessments. CSOs are accountable to the people whom they serve and to the donors who
fund their work.

CSOs are independent, meaning they make their own decisions, within legal frameworks, of what work
they will do. They are not contractors for hire. CSOs may choose to work with governments. If they
receive government funding, they are accountable to this government.

Government laws regulate all civil society organisations. Governments monitor CSOs and NGOs and close
them down if they are found to be corrupt or not obeying the country’s laws. All CSOs must meet specific
legal requirements for organisational oversight and accountability.

CSOs often relate to NGO networks and professional associations to identify best practices and lessons
learned. CSOs are also accountable to each other.

Private contractors are not part of civil society. But NGOs are often confused with private contractors.
Contractors are for-profit organisations that work directly for a government or military. Contractors take
orders from those that pay them. NGOs are non-profit and independent from a government or military.
Some NGOs will take a specific contract with the government, but most retain their independence. NGOs
that rely on government grants are sometimes referred to as “project society” instead of “civil society”
because they are seen to focus on getting government grants and this tends to shift their accountability to
governments rather than to the local populations whom they serve and attempt to represent.

66 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

4. Types of NGOs
NGOs vary in a number of ways:
 Size and budget
 Faith-based and secular
 Level of independence and willingness to work with governments and military
 Locally based and international
 Humanitarian and multi-mandate

Locally based and international NGOs

 Locally-based NGOs are also known as “LNGOs” or “civil society organisations”(CSOs) as they are
part of the local civil society within a country but in some cases have foreign donors
 Internationally-based NGOs or “INGOs” tend to have their headquarters outside of the country but
they usually partner closely with local organisations
 Most NGOs, be they local or international, strive to be closely connected and accountable to local
communities

International NGOs and local NGOs often work in partnership. Local NGO staff often has far more access,
networks, relationships, language skills and cultural knowledge than international NGO staff. These
capacities enable them to travel more freely to access communities even in the middle of armed conflict.

Humanitarian and Multi-Mandate NGOs

 Humanitarian NGOs aim to relieve immediate suffering following a crisis. There are relatively few
NGOs that are strictly focused on humanitarian aid, such as Médecins Sans Frontières.
 Multi-mandate NGOs may conduct humanitarian assistance as well as long term development work
to address root causes of conflict or human suffering. Most NGOs and CSOs are multi-mandate.

Depending on their mandate, some CSOs are more open to collaborating with government forces and
private contractors than others. Humanitarian NGOs may coordinate with military forces to achieve their
goal of humanitarian relief of suffering. But humanitarian organisations are reluctant or opposed to
collaborate with military forces as it may undermine their operational requirements. Their objective is to
provide temporary and immediate relief to populations affected by conflict. In order to access and assist
victims on all sides of the conflict without being perceived as serving one side more than the other, these
agencies must remain at distance to political and military stakeholders.

In contrast, multi-mandate NGOs have broader and more long-term objectives. They may deliver
humanitarian assistance but they will also carry out development programmes focused on changing
political, social and economic structures of societies. Multi-mandate NGOs may work to address root
causes of poverty or improve governance and social justice via projects in education, capacity-building,
micro-finance, agriculture or water systems. These objectives may overlap with those of foreign
governments, which is why some governments fund NGOs. But even if multi-mandate NGOs share some
government goals and accept grants from them, they may disagree with aspects of government policy. For
example, a multi-mandate NGO may share the government’s objective that there should be programmes
on girls’ education, but they may not share the strategic and political objectives of a government.

5. Civil Society Roles in Human Security

Civil society organisations lay the foundation for human security via their work in economic
development, human rights promotion, prevention of environmental degradation, strengthening
governance, addressing tensions between groups by facilitating dialogue and promoting tolerance. For
most CSOs, HOW work is done is as important as WHAT is done. Many CSOs strive follow best practices
widely identified in international guidance. Civil society roles that support human security include the
following:

• Advocacy for Good Governance and Human Rights: Seek the creation and strengthening of a citizen-
focused, functioning state that can protect and provide for its population through policy advocacy
and dialogue.
• Early Warning and Conflict Analysis: Monitor and document human rights abuses, map key
stakeholders driving and mitigating conflict, analyse and communicate a conflict analysis of the
factors and then mobilise the political will for conflict prevention.
• Protection of Civilians and Violence Mitigation: Create “peace zones” to protect civilians and
humanitarian aid corridors, deliver humanitarian relief to war-affected communities.
• Track II Diplomacy: Facilitate unofficial communication and dialogue between armed groups or

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 67

 opponents and their supporters in civil society both during and after armed conflict.
• Facilitation and Mediation: Work with groups in conflict to develop shared analysis, negotiation
agendas, identify common ground, develop confidence-building measures (CBMs), and build
political agreements.
• Social cohesion: Building relationships between individuals and groups across the lines of conflict.
• Conflict-Sensitive Journalism: Collect and share information about the costs and consequences of
violence and the details or options for peace agreements.
• Capacity-Building and Education: Train local and national leaders in principled negotiation and
problem-solving techniques, rule of law, civil resistance, human rights, protection of civilians, and
training armed groups in civilian harm mitigation (to prevent, count, & respond to civilian
casualties).
• Civil resistance: Build social movements pursuing democracy.
• Psycho-social trauma healing and support: Address the psychological wounds of those who have
been affected by conflict and foster resilience.
• Transitional Justice: Facilitate post-conflict reconciliation, trauma healing, and restorative justice
processes in war-affected communities.
• Security Sector Reform: Participate in the design of improved security infrastructure to protect both
human and national security.

6. Civil Society Stance to Security Sector: From Protest to Proposal

In some citizen-oriented states, civil society widely supports and accepts the security sector. They view
military and police as legitimate representatives of society and may also decide to voluntarily sign up for
service. In such countries, a growing number of civil society organisations are also working as
implementing partners providing public services to contribute to the security agenda of governments,
regional organisations and international organisations.

In countries where there is forced recruitment into the military or police, or recruitment excludes certain
racial, ethnic or religious groups, there may be wide public opposition to security forces. This is also true
in countries where security forces repress or violate human rights. Given the prevalence of this problem
in the security sector, in many countries, CSOs – especially human rights organisations - adopt an
adversarial approach to the security sector. Some groups document human rights violations and publish
reports to denounce and protest against abuses committed by security forces and seek accountability.
Human rights organisations play an important role in holding governments to account for their duties to
protect civilians. The “protest” approach relies mostly on “naming, blaming, and shaming” state security
forces and non-state armed groups for human rights abuses. Civil society protests play an important role
in drawing attention to and disrupting corruption and injustice.24 Social movements have helped
unstable, authoritarian countries move to democratic systems all over the world. 25

Figure 13 illustrates that some civil society organisations are shifting from protesting to making proposals
to improve human security. While sharing the same human rights concerns that protesters denounce,
these peacebuilding CSOs use a persuasive theory of change to build relationships with the security sector
through direct dialogue, negotiation, and problem solving to address human rights abuses. As illustrated
below, peacebuilding skills and processes help civil society to move from a sole reliance on “protest” to
also include their ability to make “proposals.” While sharing concerns about human rights violations and
firmly supporting human security, civil society leaders in diverse corners of the world have come to the
conclusion that they must go beyond protesting security policies. Civil society’s interest in “coordination
for human security” developed as civil society reached out to build relationships with the security
sector, engaged in joint problem solving, and articulated security policy alternatives. Peacebuilding skills
and processes such as conflict analysis, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue often inspired this
coordination to support human security. This report documents case studies illustrating how
peacebuilding CSOs have coordinated with the military and police to support human security.

Figure 13: Civil Society

Move from Reliance on
Protest to include
Proposals on Security

68 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

7. Civil Society’s Operational Requirements
Civil society, including NGOs, operates the most effectively when the following conditions can be
established within a complex environment. In contexts of political conflict, civil society must navigate
between state and non-state armed groups to maintain their legitimacy among their constituents and
their safety amidst these armed groups. This requires the adherence to operational requirements that
guarantee its independence. The more empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free civil society
organisations are, the better they can contribute to improve human security. Disempowered civil society
organisations that are dependent on government funding, indistinguishable from security forces, and
lacking operational freedom, will likely be rejected by local communities. The text box below describes
the key operational requirements for civil society working in contexts of political conflict.

Operational Requirements for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

in Complex Environments

Empowerment: CSOs need to have the power to influence public decisions. To acquire this power,
they need to be able to organise, mobilise and inspire communities to work together; gain access to
information, education and training; receive funding or invitations (voluntary or donor-mandated) to
participate in public decision-making processes.

Independence: While CSOs share common goals to support human rights, CSOs need to be viewed as
independent of explicit political and security interests tied to political parties or regimes.
Independence enables CSOs to be accepted by all communities and armed groups that might
otherwise threaten or attack them if they are viewed as a proxy for state interests. CSOs need to be
able to independently assess the needs of local populations to identify local human security priorities
rather than government or donor interests that might target specific groups to achieve specific
political goals.

Distinction: CSOs depend on the distinction of unarmed civilians and armed groups encoded in
International Humanitarian Law. This is to prevent attacks on the civilians they represent or on their
own staff. Distinction can be achieved through clearly identifiable clothing, separate transportation,
and housing of civilians and security forces in different locations.

Consent and Acceptance: CSOs depend on the consent and acceptance of local citizens and all state
and non-state actors controlling the territory on which they want to operate. In order to secure
consent to facilitate dialogue or mediation, CSOs negotiate with a variety of actors including
governments and non-state armed groups, informal traditional governing bodies such as tribal elders
or religious authorities, local authorities, or armed actors at checkpoints, airports, ports or regions.

Access and Freedom: CSOs need to be able to speak and move around freely, unhindered by legal
constrictions or security threats. In many countries, counterterrorism laws are restricting civil
society’s ability to contribute to human security by limiting their access to communities or
organisations involved in armed conflict.

Figure 14: CSO Operational Requirements

8. Range of independent stance of different civilian agencies

A wide range of civilian actors working for international organisations, state civilian agencies, private
contractors, humanitarian organisations, multi-mandate NGOs and local civil society organisations all
share operational environments and conduct diverse civilian tasks in multilateral interventions, as
illustrated below.

Like UN diplomats and civilian peacekeepers, humanitarians require similar principles of neutrality,
impartiality and independence (see left side of spectrum). These principles relate directly to operational
requirements:

 To be accepted by armed groups and local communities which allows have access to people in need
 To not be perceived as a threat which makes it easier to be accepted in a region
 To not be targeted, so that civil society staff and beneficiaries are safe and have the consent of
armed groups to work in an area.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 69

Figure 15: Spectrum of Civilian Stance

There is a debate within the NGO community about how closely NGOs can affiliate with governments
while maintaining the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Likewise,
NGOs and aid agencies fall into a spectrum, with some observing these more closely than others. The
diagram above illustrates that the concepts of impartiality, neutrality, and independence are relative, not
absolute. In the middle of the spectrum, other types of civilian agencies and multi-mandate NGOs may
work on behalf of general political goals like human rights or democracy, but they do not take political
sides in terms of supporting specific political parties or regimes. They are sometimes perceived as having
a general political goal, but they do not support specific political parties or regimes, and they conduct
independent needs assessments irrespective of political goals or allies. These groups practice a form of
political impartiality with the local groups they support.

Unlike government civilians who work on behalf of the state, civil society organisations are independent
and accountable to the communities where they work. On the other end of the spectrum, civilian
government agencies and private contractors usually develop explicit political goals that may include
support for a specific political party or regime.

9. Civil society does not take part in armed groups or activities.

Civilians are not combatants and should never be treated as combatants. The formal definition of a
combatant set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 194926 is a person who:
 is a member of a national army or an irregular military; or
 is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or
 is involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or
 holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organisation; or
 arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or
 having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows
determination to assume, any of the above attributes.
In the middle of hostilities, some civilians may sympathise with the grievances of one side or another
particularly if they themselves are experiencing repression or harm from one of the sides. In some places,
civil society receives violent repression from both the state and armed opposition groups. Any attempt to
use civilians as military “assets” or “informants” may make them a target for armed opposition groups.

70 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

10. Strengths and challenges of CSOs and NGOs
Like all organisations including those representing government, military, and police, civil society
organisations have strengths and challenges. Just as there are some military or police units charged with
corruption or abuse, so too are some civil society organisations charged with illegal activities. The great
diversity among types of CSOs and NGOs means that some are very effective and responsible, and some
are not. Understanding CSOs and NGOs makes it easier for security forces to distinguish between those
that contribute to peace and human security, and those that do not. 27

Civil Society’s Strengths Civil Society’s Challenges

Commitment: Long term commitment and Diversity: Missions, capacities and strength of ties
responsibility in local context to local constituencies varies greatly among
different CSOs
Local Knowledge and Analysis: Many local CSOs
have a high capacity to understand local languages, Capacity: Staff, funding, and skills are sometimes
cultures, religious, political, social and economic lacking in CSOs
issues
Tensions with Government: Mistrust between
Technical Skills: Many CSOs have highly trained government and civil society in many countries
staff with graduate degrees means that governments will not work with or
support civil society
Access: Some CSOs are capable of working in areas
where government cannot reach Security: Some CSOs are unable to work in times of
great civil violence because of personal risks to
Trust: Some CSOs has long term legitimacy and their staff
trust with local populations
Substitution: Some CSOs may compete with the
Flexible: Many CSOs are able to quickly adapt to state by delivering public services in parallel ways
changes in the local context that may weaken rather than complement the state

Corruption: Some CSOs are prone to corruption. If

money or power is the primary motivation of an
CSO, it has lost its credibility as a non-profit
organisation dedicated to addressing human
suffering and need
Figure 16: Civil Society's Strengths and Challenges

11. Indicators of Local Ownership

Local Ownership engages local communities in a set of processes to identify security challenges, jointly
develop and implement security strategies, and monitor and evaluate the security sector to ensure it
works to improve the safety of every man, woman, girl and boy. The security sector tends to speak about
community engagement instead of local ownership when they refer to their efforts to have local
communities participate in their policies and programmes, e.g. in community policing projects. Civil
society uses the term “civil society oversight” to describe their ability to monitor and contribute to security
sector policies and programmes. All of these terms refer to joint meetings between civil society and the
security sector where local people have the ability to participate in security sector programmes and
policies.

Local ownership is not a process of checking donor boxes or of finding a handful of local political leaders
to run a project. Local ownership is also not about having just a handful of elite local civil society leaders
who run a project. By definition, local ownership requires participatory strategies that include gathering
input from dozens, hundreds or even thousands of local people including both men and women
representing diverse cultural identity groups in the context. Diverse local people (insiders) work in
partnership with external donors and experts (outsiders) to identify security challenges, plan and
implement security strategies, and monitor and evaluate the performance of the security sector.

Lesson 10 in Module 3 describes the concept of local ownership in more detail. The companion to this
Handbook, Local Ownership in Security, provides case studies of civil-military-police coordination.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 71

12. Women in Civil Society
Communities that use all the talents, experience, and wisdom of both men and women are more able to meet all
of their member’s needs. If women are excluded from participating in community decisions and leadership, or
are so busy with household responsibilities that they do not have time to go to community meetings, then the
talents, experiences, and wisdom of half of the population will not contribute to community life and human
security. Men and women both suffer from war and have ideas about how to build peace. However, the
differences between male and female experiences during war and their capacities for peacebuilding are
significant enough to make the case that men cannot represent women’s interests and needs when building
peace. With the advent of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in UN Security Resolution 1325 in 2000, the
attention to the gendered experience of violence and a commitment for the equitable inclusion of women into
peace processes and post-conflict institution building became priorities for gender mainstreaming in security.

13. Civil Society Security Strategies

The International NGO Safety & Security Organisation, the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO),
and The Aid Worker Security Database all keep track of attacks against aid workers and provide
resources to support NGO security. The number of civil society leaders targeted and killed each year is
increasing.28 Researchers argue that this is due to several reasons: an increase in the number of CSOs
working in complex environments, decreasing respect for International Humanitarian Law, an increase in
military-led development activities targeted at stabilisation or counterinsurgency that leads to public
confusion about the distinction between military and civil society staff, and decreasing ability for
humanitarian and civil society to maintain an independent stance apart from governments. All of these
factors may contribute to making CSOs in general “soft targets” for armed opposition groups.

CSOs are responsible for their own security. As a general rule, they do not ask military forces or use
armed guards for their security - except in extreme circumstances. CSOs prefer “area security” as opposed
to personal escorts, as area security allows CSOs to maintain the independence necessary to maintain
trust with local populations and the neutrality and impartiality that may prevent attacks on them and
their beneficiaries by armed opposition groups. NGOs seek to mitigate security risks by striking a balance
between three approaches:29

 Acceptance: CSOs reduce or remove threats to their staff and communities with whom they
work by increasing the acceptance (the political and social consent) of an agency’s presence
and its work, particularly with all armed groups within the context.
 Protection: CSOs use protective devices and procedures to reduce their vulnerability to the
threat, without directly affecting the threat itself. In security terms, this is called hardening
the target.
 Deterrence: CSOs deter threats with counter-threats such as the use of legal, economic or
political sanctions or use of force, usually by private guards.

The majority of CSOs rely primarily on the acceptance strategy to ensure their own staff security.
Acceptance is generally acknowledged to be the best method of gaining and maintaining access and
security for staff, beneficiaries and programming over the long-term. Protection or deterrence-heavy
strategies, which are more often used for short-term activities, tend to reduce trust and engagement with
the beneficiary community.

An acceptance strategy refers to how NGOs gain and maintain consent for their activities from
beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders. When all stakeholders accept the
presence and work of aid agencies, NGOs are not perceived as a threat and not targeted by armed groups.

14. CSO Coordination with Armed Groups

In complex operational environments, all types of NGOs (especially humanitarian NGOs, but also other
civil society organisations) may need to negotiate directly with armed groups -- both state and non-state
armed actors (e.g. insurgents, local power-brokers, criminal groups) -- to ensure their access to affected
communities and the safety of their beneficiaries and staff.30 Negotiations with armed groups sometimes
take place formally (e.g. a memorandum of understanding with governments) or informally (e.g. verbal
agreements), directly (in-person) or indirectly (via a third party, such as a community leader). 31

REVIEW
This lesson provides a common understanding of the types, roles, capacities, strengths and challenges of
civil society. The lesson helps civilian, military, and police personnel to hold a shared understanding of
civil society. The lesson also details the operational requirements of civil society organisations as it

72 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

relates to civil-military-police coordination on conflict assessment, approaches to security, civilian
assistance, protection of civilians, and trauma.

Citations
23
Jeremy Kinsman and Kurt Bassuener, A Diplomats Handbook for Democracy Development Support, (Waterloo,
Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2013).
24 Erin McCandless, Polarisation and Transformation in Zimbabwe: Social Movements, Strategy Dilemmas and Change,
(South Africa: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2011).
25 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, August 2011). See also Dennis Blair. Military Engagement: Influencing Armed
Forces to Support Democratic Transitions, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).
26 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts
27
Catherine Barnes, Agents for Change: Civil Society Roles in Preventing War & Building Peace, (Den Haag
The Netherlands, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2006).
28 See for example the websites of the following organisations:

 International NGO Safety & Security Organisation

 International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO)
 The Aid Worker Security Database
29 Good Practice Review: Operational security management in violent environments. 8 ed. (London: Humanitarian

Practice Network, Overseas Development Institute, 2010,) 55.

30 Larissa Fast, Faith Freeman, Michael O’Neill, and Elizabeth Rowley. The Acceptance White Paper. (Washington, D.C.:

Save the Children, 2011), 4.

31
Gerard Mc Hugh and Manuel Bessler, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners,
(Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in collaboration
with members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), 2006).

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 73

Lesson 7 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to these questions:

 What are examples of civil society in my home community?

 What are examples of “uncivil society” in my home community?
 What roles does civil society play?
 What would happen if civil society did not perform these roles in my community?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice a basic assessment to understand civil society in a specific
context. Each scenario stakeholder team receives a request from the president of the country to
help them understand local civil society and “map local capacity.” Each team will design a plan to
research civil society. Each team shares their plan with the large group. Debrief with open questions
about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-play. What were the differences between groups?
What insights or ideas were surprising?

Away 5 minutes
In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

 What will I take away from this lesson on the security sector that might impact the way I do
my work in the future?

74 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 CC Flickr Photo by Albert Gonzalez Farran,
UNAMID

Lesson 8
Legal Frameworks for
Civil-Military-Police Relations

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify five relevant legal frameworks guiding civil-military-police relations:
National constitution, International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law/Law
of Armed Conflict, International Refugee Law and International Criminal Law
 Define the central content of these five legal frameworks; including definitions and principles
 Identify three principles of the Law of Armed Conflict and International Humanitarian Law
(LOAC/IHL)
 Identify the relevance of LOAC/IHL to civil-military-police coordination

This lesson provides a concise overview of legal frameworks that are relevant to civil-military-police
relations. This lesson provides a foundation for other lessons in this Handbook that explore civil-
military-police coordination.

Lesson 8: Legal Frameworks for Civil-Military-Police Relations

1. National Legal Frameworks
Every country has its own national security framework that describes how security forces relate to
civilians and civil society organisations. Each country’s constitution lays out the legal responsibilities of
the security forces toward civilians, and civilians’ responsibilities to the security sector. (Training Note: If
conducting this training course within a specific country, a guest speaker with a background in the
specific legal frameworks of the country can provide a one-hour lecture here).

National legal frameworks usually contain the following:

 A description of the relationship between civilian government agencies and institutions with the
security sector. This often includes an outline of civilian government oversight.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 75

  A description of the relationship between civil society and the security sector. In most cases, legal
frameworks uphold international legal standards that include the prioritisation of the protection of
civilians. In most countries, security forces have an explicit mission to protect the state’s territory
and its citizens. Some countries also include a provision for civil society’s rights and capacity to
provide oversight to the security sector.

2. Both national and international legal frameworks provide guidance for how civilians (both
governmental and civil society) relate to the military and police.

This chart compares five relevant legal frameworks that shape civil-military-police relations.32 The chart
compares the purpose of the legal framework, the stakeholders responsible for upholding the legal
framework, and the time period in which the legal framework is relevant.

Legal Framework Purpose Responsible Relevant Time

Stakeholders
National Identifies responsibilities and All national At all times
constitution and obligations stakeholders
other legal
frameworks
International Identifies responsibilities of the state to All stakeholders At all times
Human Rights Law protect basic human rights of
(IHRL) individuals in their jurisdiction
International Identifies responsibilities of all parties All stakeholders During
Humanitarian Law to a conflict to protect persons and international
(IHL)/ property not participating in the armed conflict
Law of Armed conflict and that may be affected by an and, in part, duing
Conflict (LOAC) armed conflict; to balance military non-international
necessity with humanitarian concerns armed conflict
International Identifies state responsibilities toward States At all times;
Refugee Law protection of individuals at risk of peacetime and
persecution and who have crossed an during armed
international border conflict
International Identifies state responsibilities to All stakeholders During armed
Criminal Law prosecute individual perpetrators of conflict; both
crimes against humanity internal and
international
Figure 17: Comparison of Legal Frameworks

3. International Human Rights Law (IHRL)

International human rights law (IHRL) details the obligations and duties of states to respect, to protect,
and to fulfil human rights of those persons under their jurisdiction. All stakeholders are responsible for
upholding human rights law. IHRL enables individuals and groups to claim benefits from a state authority
in times of peace and in times of armed conflict, crisis and disaster.

4. IHRL includes a variety of treaties and legal guidance including:

 Treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
 Conventions such as
o Prevention and Punishment of Genocide
o Rights of the Child
o Rights of Persons with Disabilities
o Elimination of Discrimination against Women
o Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination
o Against Torture
o Protection of Persons from Forced Disappearance
o Protection of Migrant Workers and their families
 International Customary Law
 Judicial decisions from human rights bodies such as the International Court of Justice
 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (non-binding)

76 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

5. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)/ Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) also known as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies to state
and non-state parties during situations of armed conflict and contains certain key principles that inform
and guide civil-military relations. IHL/LOAC comprises the customs, conventions, laws, and regulations
that regulate the conduct of armed conflict. IHL/LOAC consists primarily of four Geneva Conventions
(1949) and two Additional Protocols (1977).

IHL/LOAC seeks to balance military necessity with considerations of humanity through rules to
protect people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and by restricting the methods and
means of warfare. While most of IHL/LOAC addresses the conduct and responsibilities of parties to
conflict, neutral states and individuals engaged in hostilities – in relation to each other and to “protected
persons” -- it also importantly addresses the role of impartial humanitarian organisations and how they
relate to the military forces involved in the armed conflict.

IHL/LOAC applies to both state and non-state parties to conflict. In addition to seeking to limit undue
suffering on the part of soldiers, for example, through the prohibition on the use of certain weapons,
IHL/LOAC establishes the notion of “protected persons”, namely those not participating in hostilities
(“civilians” in the sense of those who have never taken part in fighting) and those no longer participating
in hostilities (those who have been wounded, captured or have laid down their arms). Under IHL/LOAC,
protected persons must, at all times, be treated humanely whereby violence to their life or person,
humiliating or degrading treatment and hostage taking are strictly prohibited. In particular, parties to
conflict are obliged to take all necessary measures to refrain from causing harm to civilian populations
and must ensure that the civilian population remains well supplied with basic necessities.

LOAC represents minimum standards of civilisation agreed upon by nations to prevent unnecessary
suffering and destruction while not impeding the effective waging of war. For example, the requirements
of uniforms and markings exist not only to assure combatants that enemy targets, and not their own, are
being attacked, but to reinforce the protection afforded to civilian populations and civilian objects. Non-
state armed groups are similarly obliged to offer protections for prisoners of war, wounded and sick, and
the civilian population to the maximum extent possible.

To avoid violations of the LOAC, military commanders must ensure that its principles and requirements
are known and understood by all subordinate personnel. The military commander’s servicing Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA) is the appropriate person to arrange for or provide training in IHL/LOAC for all personnel.

6. Origins of IHL/LOAC
Customary laws developed over time prescribed basic moral and ethical standards for the conduct of war,
particularly concerning the treatment of civilian populations. The codification of these norms emerged in
the latter half of the 19th century, forged primarily in the context of the U.S. Civil War and a variety of
European wars.. Florence Nightingale brought attention to the needs of wounded soldiers during the
Crimean War. During the U.S. Civil War, the Lieber Code established a code of conduct for the humane
treatment of civilian populations by the Union Army. Europeans used the Lieber Code as the basis for
negotiations that ultimately resulted in The Hague Convention of 1899, the principles of which are still
evident in the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols.

Early humanitarians, such as Henri Dunant who began the Red Cross Movement, and Clara Barton, who
later started the American Red Cross, argued that in order to help people on all sides of the conflict, those
offering humanitarian assistance should be considered neutral, independent and allowed safe passage to
relieve human suffering in an impartial manner without becoming targets themselves.

7. Three Principles of IHL/LOAC

Distinction: Distinction obliges parties to a conflict to distinguish principally between the armed forces
and the civilian population, and between unprotected and protected objects. Only combatants and
military objects are legitimate targets under IHL. The principle of distinction obliges parties to a conflict to
take certain measures, in offence or defence, to help ensure that military forces and civilians can be
visually distinguished from one another.

Proportion: Parties to conflict are further required to adhere to the principle of proportion, whereby any
use of force which may be expected to cause some civilian harm, must be proportional and not excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack on a military objective.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 77

Precaution: Furthermore, parties to conflict are required to exercise precaution in their use of force,
whereby all feasible precautions must be taken to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other protected
persons and objects.

8. IHL and humanitarian assistance

During armed conflict, civilians commonly suffer displacement and destruction of their homes and
property, are killed and injured during hostilities, and are subject to various forms of unlawful violence,
coercion and deprivation. While the state and non-state parties to a conflict are obliged to refrain from
harm to civilians, and have the primary responsibility for the protection and wellbeing of the civilian
population under their control, they may be unable or unwilling to do so. In such cases, an impartial
humanitarian body may offer their services to prevent and alleviate human suffering of the civilian
affected population. In order to proceed with humanitarian aid, this offer of services must have the
consent of the parties to the conflict. However, this consent must not be arbitrarily withheld and the
parties to the conflict are then obliged to facilitate and allow rapid and unimpeded passage of
humanitarian relief for civilians in need.

These rules regarding the wellbeing of the civilian population, and the role of humanitarian organisations,
provide the basic framework for international humanitarian action. Not only must the services offered be
strictly humanitarian in character, they must be provided on a solely impartial basis. In other words, the
aid provided must be based on need alone and make no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race,
religious beliefs, class or political opinions.

In addition, in order for humanitarian actors to obtain consent from the parties to conflict, these parties
must have confidence in the neutrality of the humanitarian organisation offering its services. If there is
reason to believe that the entity offering its services favours one party to the conflict over another, or has
a political purpose underpinning its motivations, this may serve as a reason to deny consent on the
grounds of national sovereignty and military necessity. In order to provide an assurance of their
neutrality, the strictly humanitarian character of their services provided on a solely impartial basis,
humanitarian organisations additionally need to maintain their independence and autonomy from other
actors present in the operational context.

This is the origin of the four humanitarian principles detailed in Module 7 on Civilian Assistance. While
IHL/LOAC does not specify neutrality and independence explicitly, the principles of neutrality and
independence are operational requirements to adhere to the principles of humanity and impartiality in
highly complex environments. These principles provide a foundation for how humanitarian actors
conduct themselves, how they relate to parties to conflict, and how military forces should understand the
role of humanitarian organisations.

9. Applicable law in situations other than armed conflict

LOAC only applies in situations of armed conflict. However, humanitarian action – and sometimes military
deployments to support civilian assistance – takes place in situations other than armed conflict, including
other situations of violence and civil unrest, and in natural or environmental disaster. In these contexts,
the national law of the affected state applies. Where a humanitarian crisis exceeds their capacity to
respond, other states, multi-lateral organisations such as UN entities and international NGOs, may offer
assistance. These and other principles relating to the use of foreign military assets in disaster relief are
discussed in Module 7 on Civilian Assistance related to civil-military-police guidance.

10. International Refugee Law

International Refugee Law is a set of rules and procedures that aims to protect and assist individuals who
have crossed an international border and are at risk or have already suffered from persecution in their
country of origin. International Refugee Law applies to states in both peacetime and during armed
conflict.

11. Refugees are defined by three basic characteristics:

 they are outside their country of origin or outside the country of their former habitual residence;
 they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted; and
 the persecution feared is based on at least one of five grounds: race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.

78 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

It is important to stress that the term “asylum seekers” refers to persons who have applied for asylum but
whose refugee status has not yet been determined. .

12. The principle of “non-refoulement”

The obligation exists under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention not to return a refugee to a country
of territory where he/she would be at risk of persecution: “No Contracting State shall expel or return
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion.”

13. Internally displaced persons

The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines IDP as “persons or groups of persons who
have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as
a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations
of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally
recognised State border.”

IDPs and refugees are distinct in several ways. IDPs do not leave their state. The definition of an IDP is
wider than that of a refugee, who by definition fear persecution. An international treaty does not guide
treatment of IDPs.

14. International Criminal Law

International Criminal Law seeks to hold individual perpetrators accountable for crimes such as war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. States have primary responsibility to prosecute crimes.
The International Criminal Court includes a list of war crimes under both internal and international
armed conflict. Attacks against humanitarian personnel vehicles, buildings and materials are considered
serious violations, since civilians are entitled to protection and humanitarian assistance.

15. Responsibility to Protect

International norms and legal framework continue to evolve. For example, in response to an escalating
sense of urgency for humanitarian interventions in situations involving mass atrocities toward
civilians, the UN General Assembly endorsed a political framework of states’ “Responsibility to Protect”
(R2P). R2P is not a mandate for intervention to establish democracy or to remove a government. Its
purpose is to guide states in terms of their obligations to protect their citizens and to guide
international action in specific situations of mass atrocities where states are unable or unwilling to offer
such protection. R2P relates to the responsibility of states and the international community to prevent
crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. R2P puts victims’ rights to
survival above national sovereignty. The 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) that outlined the following R2P principles:33

 A State has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and ethnic cleansing (mass atrocities).
 If the State is unable to protect its population, the international community has a responsibility to
help build state capacity for early warning, mediating conflicts, security sector reform, and many
other actions.
 If a State fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities or commits these acts against its own
citizens, the international community has the responsibility to intervene at first diplomatically
using a wide array of peaceful measures, then more coercively through various forms of sanctions,
and using force as a last resort.

REVIEW
Legal frameworks outlined in this lesson create a foundation for guidance and coordination on conflict
assessment, civilian assistance, and protection of civilians detailed in Modules 3-8.

Citations

32 See also Huma Haider. International Legal Frameworks for Humanitarian Action: Topic Guide. (Birmingham, UK:
GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2013).
33 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:
IDRC, 2001).

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 79

Lesson 8 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to these questions:

 What legal frameworks guide the relationship between security forces and civilians?
 How have these legal frameworks impacted you positively or negatively in the past?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using legal frameworks in a specific context. Each scenario
stakeholder team has fifteen minutes to determine which legal frameworks are relevant to the
scenario. In each scenario, the national constitution asserts that the role of the state’s security
forces is to protect citizens and to pursue national interests. Each stakeholder team can interpret
this point and draw on relevant international legal frameworks to make their case. A national
television station will host a live debate on national security with one representative from each
stakeholder team. The scenario facilitator will moderate the televised debate, giving each
representative two minutes to make their case on relevant legal frameworks. Debrief with open
questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-play.

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

 What will I take away from this lesson on the security sector that might impact the way I do
my work in the future?

80 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

CC Flickr Photo: Juan Manuel Herrera/OAS

Module
3
Multi-Stakeholder
Coordination

Module 3 Multi-Stakeholder Coordination

This module identifies a range of approaches to civil-military-police coordination. It explores

how coordination relates to local ownership and the use of multi-stakeholder processes. Both
technical and conceptual, the module aims to identify different types of coordination forums to
increase local ownership in security.

Lesson 9: Approaches to Multi-Stakeholder Coordination identifies a range of approaches to

civil-military-police coordination.

Lesson 10: Local Ownership and Community Engagement identifies ways of broadening and
deepening local ownership.

Lesson 11: Organising Multi-Stakeholder Processes provides detailed guidance in

developing a multi-stakeholder process to improve coordination and local ownership.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 81

 CC Flickr Photo: Capt. Andrew J.
Czaplicki, Virginia Guard Public
Affairs

Lesson 9
Approaches to
Multi-Stakeholder Coordination

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify at least three sectors where civil-military-police coordination may be relevant
 Identify at least three reasons why coordination is necessary
 Identify at least three similarities and distinctions between civil society and security forces
 Recognise the differences between coexistence, coordination, and cooperation
 Recognise the types of information security forces can share with civil society and vice versa
 Identify at least three different types of civil-military-police coordination forums
 Identify at least three steps to prepare for civil-military-police coordination

This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders with guidance about how they can coordinate
to better support human security. It describes the purpose of coordination, different forms of
coordination, and necessary steps to support civil-military-police coordination.

Lesson 9: Approaches to Multi-Stakeholder Coordination

1. Multi-stakeholder coordination is necessary.
No one group can achieve human security on their own. Individuals and groups affected by insecurity
have a “stake” in human security and are “stakeholders.” Different stakeholders need to coordinate with
each other through joint processes that enable them to work together. Civil society, civilian government,
military and police are key stakeholders that need to coordinate to support human security. Coordination
improves coherence and effectiveness. Multi-stakeholder coordination is necessary for sevaral reasons.

 No single organisation can address all the complex tasks of supporting peace and human security
in a complex environment. Many different types of organisations (including military, police, and
civil society) are necessary to address diverse challenges.

 All stakeholders working in the same complex environment need a basic awareness of who else is
working in the same space in order to do the following:
o Avoid duplication of effort or unintentional harm to other groups

82 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 o Communicate with each other on shared goals
o Use resources more efficiently
o Enable other stakeholders to add value
o Achieve better outcomes through timely action
o Identify appropriate complementary roles for different stakeholders

2. Military, police and civil society are increasingly working in the same complex environments to
address the same challenges.
This Handbook covers many of the challenges that require diverse stakeholders to work together. These
include:
 Conflict assessment
 Civilian assistance
o Humanitarian assistance (such as emergency food, water, and housing)
o Development assistance (such as building schools and health clinics)
o Governance (such as supporting rule of law and participatory decision making)
o Healthcare
o Education
o Water management
 Demining and mining action
 Election monitoring
 Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR)
 Security and justice sector reform (SSR and JSSR)
 Dialogue, negotiation, and mediation between groups to promote reconciliation

3. Coordination avoids potential unintended impacts

At minimum, better coordination could prevent unintended consequences harmful to other stakeholders’
interests.
 De-conflict activities to ensure that each group’s goals and activities do not undermine other
groups. For example, if a military is building a school in a community using military personnel,
this may undermine a civilian organisation’s efforts to do community-based development with
community volunteers and local ownership of school-building and other activities.
 Determine how to maintain a distinction between civilians and combatants, and preserve the
autonomy and independence necessary for all stakeholders. This is necessary since in some
contexts, non-state armed groups may view civilian organisations as soft targets, easier to attack
than security forces. If civilians are cooperating with military or police, they may be seen as
symbolic extensions of the security sector and may be wrongly perceived as legitimate targets.

4. Coordination builds on common ground.

Civilian government and civil society organisations are both similar to and distinct from military and
police forces. Recognising differences as well as shared interests and principles can help all groups
working in the same space to improve awareness of each other. Individuals working within civilian
organisations, military or police may be motivated by a similar desire for service to others, make personal
sacrifices, take risks, and share a sense of professionalism and commitment. The illustration below
includes some of the common characteristics of people who work in complex environments.

5. Recognising differences is important to

coordination.
There are significant internal differences
between different types of military or police
forces in different cities and countries. There
are also vast differences on how civilians in
government work and how different civil
society organisations work. Yet there are
broad general differences between civilian
and security sector organisations that are
worth mentioning, as they pose challenges to
coordination. They have different
terminology, different missions and distinct
organisational cultures, strategic narratives, Figure 18: Shared Characteristics
and operational requirements.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 83

 Civilians Security Sector
Terminology Civilian terminology on civilian Military and/or police terminology on
activities security activities
Organisational Less structured, less formal More structured, more formal
Culture
Assessment & Participatory research with local Often classified intelligence and internal
Planning communities; shared analysis analysis
Goals and Human security National security with less emphasis on
Objectives human security for citizens or civilians in
other countries
Theories of Based mostly on social science Based mostly on military science, though
Change/Strategic increasing interest in the “human aspects
Narrative of operational environments”
Operational Independence, Empowerment, Coordination should be comprehensive
Requirements for Distinction, Freedom, Access (see and integrated (see definitions below)
Coordination Lesson 7)
Figure 19: Differences between Civilians and the Security Forces

6. Civil-military-police cooperation, coordination, and coexistence are distinct.

 Cooperation is a term refering to stakeholders with overlapping but distinct missions identifying
specific objectives where they can assist each other. For example, after the earthquake in Haiti,
stakeholders cooperated in emergency humanitarian assistance. “Cooperation” represents civilian
organisations and security forces actively working together to achieve shared goals. Cooperation is
more likely in peace-time. In peaceful contexts, civil society may coordinate with military and police
to improve their human security efforts.

 Coordination is a term meaning basic communication to share information and avoid duplication
or conflict with other stakeholders. For example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the work of humanitarian NGOs and military forces in disaster relief and
complex emergencies. The term “coordination” is used as an umbrella term for any type of
communication exchange between security forces and all types of civilian agencies (UN,
governmental and CSOs). Coordination is more likely where security forces’ mandate includes
support for humanitarian assistance or to work with civilians to support broader human security
goals. The political context and the mission of security forces impact the level of civil-military-police
interaction.

 Coexistence is a term that means operating in the same space without interfering in the other
stakeholder’s activities and with minimal communication. For example, in Iraq, most NGOs took a
stance of coexistence with foreign military forces because any perceived relationship seemed to
correlate with the levels of violence against their staff and beneficiaries. “Coexistence” is at one end of
the spectrum representing civilian organisations and security forces interacting at the most minimal
level. Coexistence is more likely where security forces take sides in an armed conflict and are
primarily engaged in enemy-centric approaches to security, with little emphasis on protection of
civilians or other population-centric approaches. In the worst-case scenario, civil society groups,
particularly humanitarian agencies, may curtail their presence if it is impossible for them to access
affected populations without risking the security for their staff and communities in need.

There may also be other motivations or constraints that influence civil-military-police interaction. Some
military forces reward military leaders for their achievements in civil-military coordination and
cooperation. While coordination may allow agencies to achieve the overall mission, it may decrease the
recognition of individual contributions made by distinct agencies. Competition among agencies for
funding creates disincentives for coordination with others. Organisations want to be able to take credit
for successes, and coordination may be seen as decreasing their ownership of success. Agencies are
funded by their measurable programme outputs (short-term) and not for their programme impacts (long-
term). Yet impacts are naturally a result of the sum of many agencies working together, thus making a
causal effect impossible to determine precisely.34

84 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

7. Civil-Military-Police Information Sharing
Sharing information is the most minimal form of coordination, as detailed in the next lesson. From a
human security point of view, the purpose of information sharing between security forces and civil
society (both individual civilians and civil society organisations) should always and only be to support
human security. All stakeholders should share information to support efforts aimed at the protection of
civilians and civilian assistance.

Civil society may look to military or police forces to share information about basic area security to help
determine their programming. However, on the military side, the internal organisational clearance to
provide information to civil society is a challenge. Many CSOs attempt to be transparent about their
programmes but prefer not to share all the information about their programmes, particularly information
that may be used for intelligence gathering or targeting attacks.

Civilians outside of government should never be asked to share information that would enable others to
identify and kill a target or that would make civilians themselves more of a target for armed groups.
Armed groups frequently accuse NGOs of collecting intelligence, and the increase in political attacks
against NGOs may be related to the assumptions that they exchange information about the locations of
non-state armed groups with military and police. For this reason, many civil society groups are resistant
to all forms of information sharing and coordination as a basic matter of their staff security and the safety
of their beneficiaries. For example, many NGOs balance their commitment to transparency and
accountability to local populations with the principle that they should never share information that may
endanger human lives or compromise their impartiality and neutrality.

The most basic forms of information sharing between civilians, military, and police relate to the following
issues: 35

 Security information: Information that may affect the security of civilians and/or aid workers
should be shared with appropriate entities.
 Locations of aid workers and facilities: Information on the location of humanitarian staff and
facilities that are operating where there is a military presence.
 Civil society activities: Information on civil society activities, especially humanitarian plans, routes,
timing of convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations and avoid accidental
military strikes in an area where civil society organisations are operating.
 Mine-action activities: Information relevant to mine action.
 Population movements: Information on major movements of civilians.
 Military Civilian Assistance: Information on relief efforts undertaken by the military.
 Post-strike information: Information on military strike locations and explosive munitions used
during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian assistance
and mine-action activities.

8. Five Areas for Coordination of Human Security

In addition to basic information sharing, there are five main
areas for civil-military-coordination for human security.
The next lesson details these five areas that form a
“Coordination Wheel.”

 Joint capacity building

 Jointly identify human security challenges:
 Jointly designing human security strategies
 Jointly implement human security strategies
 Jointly monitor and evaluate impact

Ideally civil society and the security coordinate with each

other in each of these activities. The coordination wheel of
activities produces a vision for what local ownership looks
like at its most robust.
Figure 20: Coordination Wheel for Human Security
9. Mapping Potential Civil-Military-Police Relationships
The chart below maps varied levels of relationship between
diverse types of stakeholders.36 Coordination mechanisms will vary depending on the type of civilians and
the type of military involved.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 85

The following table illustrates a more complex matrix of relationships
 Within an agency or ‘intra-agency’ such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
peacekeepers coordinating with DPKO civil affairs staff),
 At a ‘whole of government’ level such as a government’s military coordinating with its
development agencies
 Between agencies such as DPKO peacekeepers coordinating with UN Development Programme
(UNDP) or the European Union relating to NATO
 At the external-internal level such as DPKO peacekeepers coordinating with a country’s National
Development Plan or a foreign military coordinating with a local NGO.

In general, the levels of consistency and coherence are greater in the darker shaded areas. There is more
conflict between the goals of different stakeholders in the lighter shaded areas, as relationships become
competitive.37

Intra-Agency Whole of Inter-State or External-

Government International Internal
Stakeholder are united,
under one command
Stakeholders are
integrated
Stakeholders cooperate
Stakeholders
Coordinate
Stakeholder Coexist
Stakeholder Compete
Figure 21: Adapted from the Comprehensive Approach Matrix that compares levels of coherence and types of
relationships (see citation de Coning and Friis, 2011).

10. UN, NATO, and Government Approaches to Coordination

The UN, NATO, and some governments use the following terminology to refer to their civil-military-police
coordination goals and approaches.

 Unity of Command is a term describing a single commanding authority who makes decisions that
others implement.

 Unity of Effort is a term refering to multiple organisations working toward the same objective, but
under different command or decisionmaking structures. Ideally, military forces would like to
have a “unity of effort” with civilian organisations that are not under their command.

 Integration is a term refering to stakeholders conducting joint assessment, planning, and

monitoring and evaluation with each other, while implementing the actual programme activities
separately. The UN has taken several steps toward civil-military integration, including the
establishment of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) and an Integrated Mission Planning
Process (IMPP), an Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy (IAP) and an IAP Handbook to
ensure coherency in the UN system and relevant external partners.

 Comprehensive Approach refers to the coordination between different stakeholders. There are
different interpretations of the concept of the “comprehensive approach.” Some interpret it to
mean that civilian and the security sector are brought together under one command structure.
Others understand the “comprehensive approach” as a set of communication and coordination
mechanisms on more neutral ground, without a command and control structure and allowing
civilians to maintain an independent status.

11. Military-based Coordination Structures

The UN, NATO and intervening states use different terminology for their civil-military coordination
structures. These terms refer to military-based coordination structures that attempt to coordinate with
civilian agencies (UN, governmental, and civil society organisations).

86 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) is a NATO concept for efforts to foster coordination and
cooperation between military and civilians.

 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a military concept. It is defined in different ways by different

countries and organisations. For example:

o NATO CIMIC refers to the coordination and cooperation, in support of a mission,

between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-
governmental civilian groups).

o UN CIMIC refers to the interface between the military component of a UN peace

operation and the political, humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and rule-of-law
components of the mission, as well as many other external partners in the larger
peacebuilding system.

Some countries like the US establish Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOC) for coordinating civil-
military operations in an area of operations. The CMOC usually serves as a meeting place for military and
non-military entities involved in governance, stabilisation, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction
activities or for interaction between the entities involved in these activities and the civilian population.

12. Civil Society Approaches to Coordination

Many civil society organisations (CSOs) oppose or distance themselves from civil-military integration, the
comprehensive approach or CIMIC. Some CSOs believe these approaches are contradictory to the Geneva
Conventions’ call for a clear distinction between civilians and combatants. They argue the “technical”
focus on joint planning and operations is a conceptual jump over the fundamental differences in goals and
values held by different military and civilian agencies.

Yet civil society shares the conviction that coordination and communication mechanisms are essential
when there are diverse stakeholders working in the same environment. Acceptable terminology and
mechanisms for coordination include the following:

 Humanitarian civil-military coordination is more established and institutionalised than any other
form of civil-military-police coordination. The UN defines humanitarian civil-military
coordination as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in
humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid
competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals.” UN
Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCOORD) establishes coordination centres to
achieve strictly humanitarian goals.38 Module 5 on Coordination on Civilian Assistance provides
more details on this topic.

 Whole of Society refers to the need for diverse stakeholders at all levels of society to work
together, as no one stakeholder can solve all of the problems in a complex environment and all
must contribute according to their roles and responsibilities.

 Multi-Stakeholder Coordination is a term to describe meetings or mechanisms that facilitate

dialogue between diverse groups.

 Coordination by Sector describes how organisations working on the same “sector” (such as Rule of
Law, Gender, or Reconciliation) can coordinate their work.

 Infrastructures for Peace refers to agreements and platforms developed between governments,
security forces, and civil society to coordinate their efforts to prevent, manage and transform
violent conflict. With the support of the UN, civil society has helped to create “infrastructures for
peace,” also known as “National Peace Councils” in Kenya, Ghana and elsewhere. These written
agreements between government, security forces, and civil society outline the specific roles and
responsibilities and coordination mechanisms.

The next lesson goes into more detail about the link between these coordination structures and the
broader concept of local ownership and civilian oversight. Each of these terms refers to a similar principle
that “local” people who are affected by security challenges need to be involved. Governments, security
forces and civil society can coordinate their efforts to engage local communities. Or these groups can

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 87

create forums to broaden and deepen local “ownership” in security strategies and “oversight” of the
security sector.

13. Local Perspectives on Civil-Military Coordination

Most civil-military-police coordination takes place among international NGOs with international security
forces. National governments, security forces and donors often assume there is “no local capacity.” In
reality, there are often local civil society groups that work to prevent conflict and support human security.
In particular, there is a false assumption that local civil society lacks capacity to address security issues.
There are local civil society organisations in every context. Over the last thirty years, civil society groups
have built their capacity in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In many countries, there are more
people in civil society with advanced graduate degrees and years of experience using mediation and
reconciliation skills than there are in government. Local civil society’s expertise in human security is a
critical asset.

In most situations, only a portion of civil society personnel belongs to NGOs who wear logos on their
vehicles or clothing. Security forces will only be able to identify those with logos, or those whom they
meet in coordination forums. While military forces and international humanitarian organisations may
establish some sort of communication platform for information sharing, smaller organisations or informal
local humanitarian responders may be left out of the coordination forums.

Local civil society emphasises the need to first and foremost coordinate among internal stakeholders –
the national government, national security forces and local civil society. These groups may be in conflict
over how to prioritise security challenges or interests. Most countries lack forums for national dialogue or
coordination to identify shared goals.

Even if information is shared, military forces can never assume they have all the information on civil
society. Small, local CSOs may not know how to contact military forces and inform them about their
presence. Coordination mechanisms between national and international military forces and local civil
society group are largely absent. External interveners often do not have an adequate stakeholder map or
skill set to understand how to identify diverse local voices inside and outside of the national government.

External interveners are usually accountable to their home offices headquartered in their country of
origin without direct accountability to local populations or local governments. Furthermore, external
interveners often wrongly assume they know what is best for local people and base their assistance
programmes on theories of change learned in other countries. External assistance may even “undermine
or destroy the capacity that exists in a society and replace it with a weak and dysfunctional new
capacity.”39 External interveners are often oblivious to local perceptions of their legitimacy or presence in
the country. While outsiders tend to see themselves as benevolent or even making sacrifices to help local
populations, insiders are often suspicious of the motivations of these interveners operating in their
country, assuming they are working on behalf of foreign national interests and intelligence gathering
rather than truly assisting and respecting the local context.

Coordinating external military and civilian actors with those inside of the host country is difficult for
several reasons. In integrated UN missions and whole of government interventions, civilians and military
may also be so busy coordinating with themselves that they may exclude others and overlook internal
stakeholders. Emphasis on external cohesion among foreign agencies may undermine coherence with
internal stakeholders, including the national government, national security forces. Local civil society is
often the last on the list of coordination priorities. Yet in reality, they may the most important
stakeholders for building sustainable human security.

14. Ad-Hoc Coordination

In the absence of adequate formal mechanisms, civil- Military forces observed a Toyota pickup
military-police coordination may happen informally truck following the same route every
through ad hoc meetings at restaurants or other sites. day. They stopped the truck at a
Where there is no coordinating body, groups may checkpoint, suspecting armed gunmen.
coordinate informally when working in the same area as Instead they found a family operating a
individual people build relationships in informal settings. makeshift ambulance to take people to
In some situations, military, police and civilian actors meet the closest medical facility in the
informally driven by the personality of their leaders and provincial capital. The military learned
individual relationship building and trust building. that local humanitarian efforts exist
without a formal NGO logo or status.

88 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Informal coordination is better than no coordination. However, ad hoc coordination can leave out
important stakeholders. Although it may be impossible to include all stakeholder groups in any type of
coordination meetings, a stronger effort should be made to find out who else is working in the same
complex environment.

During military operations in armed hostilities, it can be dangerous for any type of civilians to meet with
military personnel. Sometimes a meetinghouse is set up outside of a military perimeter. But often civil
society staff are not able to safely travel to a neutral location or no neutral location exists. Given the
security risks that in-person meetings with military staff may pose to CSOs, phone or email are often the
most effective means of communication. In some contexts where civilian actors may want to avoid direct
communication with security forces altogether, the use of social media could also be an unofficial way to
share information, as a proxy platform without direct contact among the participants. Any of these more
indirect mechanisms will enable civilian actors to maintain independence.

15. Preparatory Coordination Tasks

Effective coordination requires preparation. Here is a list of key tasks that all stakeholders should
undertake before entering their first common meeting:

Before a Crisis:
 Create organisational incentives for coordination
-Mandate the requirement for staff to write an “After Action Report” on coordination
meetings
-Create promotion and reward mechanisms that recognise the value of civil-military-police
coordination
 Involve diverse types of civilians in the planning and design of civil-military-police joint
training and joint exercises to address stereotypes, learn terminology, meet people who will
be in a shared operational environment, and learn about each other’s organisational culture,
goals, etc.
 Military forces should receive guidance on how to communicate with civilian organisations and
civilians without endangering their safety or access to beneficiaries and the need for talking
to other components of the mission or civilian actors outside the mission.

During a Crisis
 Identify other organisations working in the same environment by mapping all stakeholders,
especially local civil society organisations
 Identify existing coordination structures and find points of contact, including phone numbers
and emails to initiate communication.
 Military, police and civilian organisations should have a basic understanding of their own and
the other’s roles and responsibilities in the current conflict environment and be able to
identify liaison points to contact each other.
 CSOs should identify appropriate and complementary roles for the military.

REVIEW
This lesson identifies different approaches to coordination. Civilians, military and police share some
characteristics but also are distinct in important ways. This lesson identifies the reasons why
coordination is essential when different stakeholders are working in the same complex environment on
similar tasks to support human security.

Citations

34 Cedric De Coning and Karsten Friis, “Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach,”
Journal of International Peacekeeping. Volume 15. (2011): 257-259.
35 This section is adapted from the UN Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, (New York:

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008), 24.
36
De Coning and Friis, 254.
37 De Coning and Friis, 254
38 UN Civil Military Coordination (UN CMCOORD). See: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-

CMCoord/overview accessed October 2015.

39 Cedric De Coning, “Clarity, Coherence, and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding,”(Oslo, Norway:

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2010), 26.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 89

Lesson 9 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to these questions:

 Have you ever coordinated with someone from another organisation to respond to a crisis?
 What was the most difficult part of coordinating?
 What was the most successful benefit of coordinating?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to identify challenges and opportunities for coordinating with other
stakeholders in a complex environment. In each of the scenarios, one of the international aid groups
that has stayed after the earthquake is targeted by one of the militia groups. The military group kills
three of their female local staff and their compound in an urban area receives a bomb threat. The
militia group announces on the radio that they will keep targeting any aid group that works with the
government. Each group has thirty minutes to develop an initial response to this news and to
negotiate with other stakeholders to develop a coordination plan. Groups may continue to discuss
internally their own plan, or work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, each
stakeholder team or group of teams is allowed two minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose
the plans of other groups. Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this
role-play.

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

What will I take away from this lesson on the security sector that might impact the way I do my work
in the future?

90 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

CC Flickr Photo: WWV Views

Lesson 10
Local Ownership &
Community Engagement

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

 Define the concept of local ownership

 Identify at least three reasons why local ownership is important to human security
 Distinguish civilian government oversight from civil society oversight of security
 Distinguish between superficial local ownership and ownership that is both broad and deep
 Identify the distinction between joint analysis of security challenges, joint planning and
implementation of security strategies, and joint oversight of the security sector

This lesson is a guide for civilian, military and police leaders to determine the meaning of local
ownership of security. The lesson identifies the arguments supporting local ownership and describes
the difference between superficial ownership and local ownership that is both ‘broad’ and ‘deep.’

Part of this lesson is based on a more detailed Local Ownership in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding
Approaches,
Lesson 10: aLocal
companion to this
Ownership andHandbook,
Communityand Engagement
the Multi-stakeholder Processes for Conflict Prevention
and Peacebuilding: A Manual written by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
(GPPAC).
1. Meaningful local ownership asks critical questions
The International Network on Conflict and Fragility’s review of donor support to justice and security
concluded that, “‘ownership’ is often conflated with ‘buy-in’. Structures are meant to enhance local buy-in
to donor-conceived and -led activities, not to enable local actors to take the lead in programming
decisions.”40 Often this approach just causes further division within civil society.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 91

Meaningful local ownership asks critical questions listed in the figure below and requires the
participation of civil society in assessing human security challenges, planning human security strategies,
implement human security programmes, and monitoring and evaluating the security sector.

Figure 22: Local Ownership Questions

2. Successful multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) can bring a number of benefits

The idea or theory of change, behind multi-stakeholder processes is that groups with different positions,
mandates and backgrounds can go further working together than in isolation.

 Broader range of expertise and perspectives improves assessment by drawing different

viewpoints.
 More complex assessment leads to more comprehensive and sustainable strategy to address
security challenges.
 Greater understanding of different stakeholders’ capacities, roles and limitations contributes to
better coordination.
 Help organisations pool and share resources, including skills, funding, staff time, and logistical or
administrative resources.
 Conducive to public outreach and awareness raising at different levels
 Building trust among diverse stakeholders, and enable relationships that can outlast the process
itself.

3. The Logic of Local Ownership in the Security Sector

Every government makes decisions about how much power local civil society will have to participate in
the security sector. Elite-captured governments usually have little incentive to expand local ownership, as
this would lead them to lose control and possibly their elite status. But citizen-oriented governments see
increasing local ownership and community engagement as important aspects of their national security
plans.

Although some donor governments recognise the necessity of local ownership and push for greater
democratic governance, most foreign donors and interveners have a tendency to ignore it. Nearly every
international assistance framework - at the UN, World Bank, OECD, and the recent Busan Principles of
International Assistance and the New Deal for Fragile States – mandates the principle of “local ownership.”
But in reality, the political and economic interests of donor countries easily hijack the concept of “local
ownership.”

Local ownership of security needs a makeover. The implementation of local ownership needs to deepen
and broaden to engage whole populations. But first, national governments and international donors need
to recognise the clear strategic value of local ownership:

Time and Speed Implications

Donor governments who focus on train and equip programmes to meet the urgent security threats or
to support fragile peace agreements often argue that that this is the fastest way to remedy security
challenges. While it is true that local ownership takes time to construct, it is ultimately the faster
route. Train and equip programmes will ultimately fail or cause even more violence, unless they are
accompanied by programmes aimed at preventing human rights abuses by security forces. To build
legitimate state-society relationships with local ownership in security, “you have to go slow to go fast.”
There is no end-run around authentic local ownership.

Security Implications

92 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Local ownership improves state-society relationships. A public that perceives the security sector
protects human security is more likely to view their government as legitimate. Legitimate, citizen-
oriented states face fewer threats from non-state armed groups. Local perceptions of security and
justice may be very different than those of national elites or foreigners’. In countries where non-state
groups fulfil up to 80% of the security and justice roles in society, tribal, traditional, religious and
other citizen-based groups must be engaged in order to achieve human security for all.

Long-term Political Stability Implications

If outsiders take down a government and attempt to rebuild it themselves, local groups may never
have the incentive or the time to build coalitions among themselves. This can hamper the emergence
of stable and functional governance in the long run. Without outside intervention, insiders have
greater incentive to build broad coalitions between social groups to improve state-society relations.
This coalition building among local groups that negotiate with each other to identify common ground
proposals and platforms is essential to sustainable security.

Sustainability Implications
If insiders are not committed to changing the security sector, national elites or international donors
may just be wasting their time and effort attempting to force such changes. More research could help
to determine the conditions that warrant outside funding. Donors might be able to provide needed
funding in ways that foster local accountability and do less to discourage local ownership.

Gender Implications
Local ownership is especially important to ensure that security threats to both women and men are
taken into consideration in all efforts to improve security. Security needs to be gender sensitive to
ensure all men, women, girls and boys have equal access to justice and security, including their
protection from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The security sector needs to be gender
inclusive to involve all genders in planning and implementing security strategies. The security sector
also needs to be gender accountable so that all genders participates in overseeing the security sector.

4. Broadening Local Ownership

Local ownership should be broad, including as many stakeholders as possible. In order to broaden local
ownership, diverse stakeholders must participate in policy-making and programming in the security
sector. Involving just a handful of local elite men in a consultation cannot yield an accurate picture of the
interests or needs of all social groups in society. True local ownership includes mechanisms to engage
every individual in society, from children to elders, males and females, working in every sector of society,
with different levels of education, religious beliefs, economic status, and with diverse gender, ethnic,
racial and linguistic identities. Meaningful local ownership is not only about whom to engage but also
about how to engage, i.e. which oversight or engagement mechanism to use to create meaningful and
sustainable ties with local communities. Oversight and engagement mechanisms can be institutions or
activities that provide citizens the ability to contribute, influence and control security sector policies and
programming.

5. Civilian Government Ownership

The traditional mechanism to increase local ownership in the security sector is the civilian government.
The government‘s executive branch and representative bodies such as parliament or congress hold
effective oversight functions. They administer and control the security sectors authorities, mandates and
budget to ensure that all security sector policies and programmes represent and satisfy the needs of
citizens. However, civilian government oversight is not always able to guarantee the human security of all
citizens. If a parliament is made up mostly of men, it is not surprising that violence against women is not a
priority for them. If a congress is made up primarily of one racial group, it is not surprising that the
civilian government does not take action to ensure diversity within police departments or to stop police
violence when the police belong to one racial group and the community belongs to another. Even in states
with democratic electoral systems, an elite-captured government may make security decisions based
exclusively on its own political and economic Figure 23: Ownership and Oversight in Security
interests, such as making profits through weapons
manufacturing.

All states should provide additional participatory

mechanisms that offer opportunities for civil
society and the wider public to have an input into
security sector policies and programmes. These
mechanisms enable the full participation of all

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 93

sectors of society in security sector policies and programmes. They enable women, who represent half of
every community and nation, to be included and apply their distinct skillsets and perspectives on human
security, but also other gender groups such as LGBTI individuals or men who can be marginalised due to
their belonging to a particular ethnic, racial, religious, social, or age group.

Figure 23 illustrates the two types of local ownership in security sector policies and programmes: civilian
government, consisting of the executive branch of the government and the parliament or congress in an
elected representative system of government, and civil society, which also includes the media.

6. Civil Society Ownership

Local ownership must be expanded horizontally to include broader segments of civil society, as
illustrated in Figure 24 below. This requires moving from international NGO (INGO) and elite local
participation toward processes that involve large numbers of diverse segments of society. INGOS must
map local capacity and recognise the principle of “Local First.”41 They should provide entry to local civil
society in order to widen public involvement in dialogue on security priorities and strategies. Women and
men of different ages, regions, languages, religions, and ethnicities as a diverse set of representatives of
distinct civil society groups should all participate in security sector policy-making and programming.

Sometimes, international NGOs (INGOs) act as intermediaries between the security sector and local civil
society. They provide support structures such as forums and dialogues and capacity building to
strengthen the ability of civil society to oversee security sector policies and programs. In some cases,
INGOs engage and hand over functions to national “modern” civil society organisations, which in turn
draw in “traditional” civil society organisation such as tribal leaders. But this chain of engagement does
not always proceed without tensions. INGOs may be effective in applying models and lessons they have
learned elsewhere, as is evident in the work of international peacebuilding NGOs including Saferworld,
International Alert, Conciliation Resources, Search for Common Ground, and Partners for Democratic
Change. But some accuse other INGOs of holding onto neo-colonial attitudes toward local civil society,
underestimating their capacities and tending to speak for local people. 42 Local civil society sometimes
critiques INGOs for taking over the role and funding for local civil society. International NGOs and elite
local civil society representatives should not be gatekeepers, but instead step back and open doors to
more diverse individuals and groups that truly represent aspects of society.

Figure 24: Broadening Local Ownership

7. Deepening Local Ownership

While it is important to broaden local ownership by including more diverse segments of local civil society,
it is also important to deepen local ownership, so that civil society engagement evolves from isolated,
project-based efforts toward platforms for joint implementation and joint institutional oversight. There
are a great variety of institutions and activities that enable civil society to contribute to security sector
policies and programs. Not all of them are effective in creating sustainable relationships between civil
society and security forces. To strengthen their ties, civil society and security forces need to build long-
term relationships and trust. They need to come together, discuss their respective interests and find joint
solutions that optimise their respective outcomes.

94 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

8. Coordination Wheel for Human Security
Civil society and the security sector can
coordinate in five areas.

Joint capacity building: Joint training, coaching

and support can build relationships and develop
a common set of skills, concepts and processes
for working together to support human security.

Jointly assess human security challenges:

Joint conflict assessment can include jointly
designing research questions and data
collection methods and jointly analysing data to
identify factors driving conflict and supporting
peace. Module 4 describes coordination on
conflict assessment.

Jointly plan human security strategies:

Jointly determining appropriate programmes
and strategies to support human security, and
determine relevant theories of change. This can
include coordination to plan civilian assistance, protection Figure 25: Coordination Wheel for Human Security
of civilians, and conflict assessment and peacebuilding
efforts. Lesson 15 describes the challenges and methods of joint planning to support human security.

Jointly implement human security strategies: Jointly implement a project together, such as increasing
the gender sensitivity of police, developing a civilian harm
mitigation plan, or addressing trauma in local communities. In the Philippines, civil society and the
Modules 5-8 describe civil-military-police coordination in security sector coordinate in all five
approaches to security, conflict prevention, civilian areas of the Coordination Wheel. In
assistance, and protection of civilians many other countries, civil society and
the security sector are already
Jointly monitor and evaluate security sector coordinating in one or two areas of the
performance in oversight mechanisms: Joint institutional Coordination Wheel.
oversight mechanism to identify the baselines, benchmarks
and indicators for monitoring and evaluation of the security *Read more stories of the innovation and
sector and discussing the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of collaboration between civil society, military and
security strategies. Module 10 describes civil-military-police police in almost forty countries in Local Ownership
in Security, the companion report to this Handbook.
coordination to assess security governance, accountability
and performance.

9. Levels of Local Ownership

Exact measurements of the vertical “degrees” of local
ownership are difficult. However, some forms of coordination
and local ownership seem to be more robust than others.
Key Factors
Levels of local ownership relate to at least two factors: the
number of joint activities that civil society and the security  Local ownership is most
sector perform together, and the level of civil society robust where civil society
empowerment within those activities. and the security sector are
coordinating with each
For example, sharing information with civil society or setting other in all five elements
up a dialogue to listen to civil society indicates less local
ownership than setting up joint implementation of human of the Coordination Wheel.
security programming with civil society or institutionalising
a joint oversight mechanism. A community policing dialogue  Local ownership is most
where the police just listen to citizen complaints is less robust where civil society
robust than a community policing programme that involves
is empowered,
local neighbourhood watch committees where citizens work
with the police to manage community conflicts. And a independent, distinct,
permanent citizen-oversight committee where the accepted, and free.
community can assess threats to their human security, and

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 95

report and take action to address incidents of civilian harm illustrates even greater local ownership.
Institutionalised oversight forums that give civil society a seat at the table to monitor and evaluate the
security sector indicate that the state-society relationship is seen as legitimate, democratic and citizen-
oriented.

In order to deepen local ownership, it is important to increase and institutionalise the functions of civil
society in relation to the security sector. Figure 26 illustrates a rough framework for deepening the levels
of local ownership in the security sector. 43 The darkest blue colour illustrates the most robust levels of
local ownership, where civil society both is involved in multiple activities in the coordination wheel and
where civil society holds institutionalised power to monitor and evaluate the security sector’s
performance with government. Capacity building is a necessary pre-requisite to achieve any level of local
ownership, which is why it stands as a separate but permanent category.

Each of these levels of local ownership should build on the prior levels of engagement. However, the table
here does not necessary illustrate a linear path to local ownership. It is possible to innovate a programme
in “joint implementation” before there are dialogue processes. But the case studies in this volume
illustrate that often there is first dialogue to assess human security threats and/or an initial effort in
capacity building. Joint implementation and institutional oversight mechanisms are more likely to grow
out of these “lighter” forms of engagement. The table here shows an approximate progression from the
most superficial to the more meaningful types of engagement.

Level of Local Ownership

Capacity Information Sharing Governments identify human security

Building threats to civilians
Civil society identifies human security
threats to government
Training for Dialogue and Consultation Governments, security forces, and civilians
civil society identify human security threats and jointly
and the design potential human security strategies
security
sector to
support
human Joint Implementation Civil society and the security sector
security participate in joint problem-solving and
programming to implement human
security strategies

Joint Institutional Oversight Civil society representatives have

institutional capacity, and legal authority
at the local, regional, and national level to
participate in assessing threats, designing
and implementing security strategies and
monitoring impact.

Figure 26: Levels of Local Ownership

10. Information Sharing

Information sharing is a one-way channel of communication, where one party simply receives
information from the other. At a minimum, “local ownership” means governments should share basic
security information with the public. It also means civil society groups share information with the
government.

Governments may share information with the public or may encourage the public to share information
with them. Some governments may decide to publish their policies on a specific security issue to increase
transparency. Or they may encourage the public to provide information about security threats. Some
governments may request information from civilians through hotline phone numbers, a complaints desk,
or a web form that will allow individuals to report concerns related to security. These can be information
sharing portals where citizens share information about security problems or they can be grievance

96 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

mechanisms to report directly on the performance of a security officer. Some governments offer
grievance mechanisms that simply register private complaints. Others are more transparent, enabling
reporting to the public the pattern of complaints or grievances and how the government or security
sector are attempting to be accountable to the public by responding to the complaints. But these one-way
strategies prevent long-term relationship building and trust.

Civil society also uses information sharing channels when advocating for improvements to human
security, such as submitting reports on security or policy recommendations. Civil society organisations
play a “watchdog” role and serve as “an index of public contentment” 44 with the security sector to ensure
that it respects human rights and serves the public.

Until the last two decades, civil society relied mostly on these one-way information-sharing approaches
that often take an adversarial stance within a “protest” paradigm described earlier in this chapter.45
Independent human rights commissions; indigenous people’s rights groups, women’s rights advocates,
refugee advocates, and anti-nuclear advocates are some examples of the types of civil society groups and
movements that exist in most countries. These groups may denounce human rights abuses by security
forces publicly, push for internal complaint mechanisms such as phone hotlines, or external oversight
bodies such as or Ombudsman Offices, or work to strengthen legislation to protecting victims of abuses.

Watchdog mechanisms are important because they hold the security sector accountable. If they are
successful, they force police or military to change their policies or to apply punitive measures to
perpetrators of abuses, which certainly contributes to human security. But these mechanisms may entail
the sacrifice of long-term relationships and trust. Due to their one-way direction and adversarial nature,
advocacy efforts may make it more difficult for civil society to build the necessary relationships with
security stakeholders to reorient the security sector toward human security.

Civil society is moving from relying almost entirely on one-way information sharing and the “protest”
method of security oversight toward civil society’s ability to work directly in relationship with the
security sector on human security “proposals” that develop out of “two-way communication” settings
where people meet together. This does not mean suggest neglecting accountability, but achieving
accountability differently by creating meaningful and long-term institutional relationships and trust.
Permanent, institutionalised civil society-security sector coordination mechanisms on as many levels and
as many security issues as possible may provide the most effective guarantee for human security.

11. Dialogue and Consultation

The terms dialogue and consultation refer to a process during which civil society and the security sector
jointly assess threats to human security and jointly plan how to improve human security. These forums
are different from a mere information-exchange during which one party simply explains their point of
view. This approach by definition includes at least a two-way exchange of information.

Successful dialogue and consultation forums – like all coordination mechanisms - require professional
facilitation to foster effective cross-cultural communication. Stakeholders listen to each other’s interests
and perspectives. Without skilful facilitation, coordination meetings often break down as participants
engage in unproductive conflict or walk out of the meeting. Communication skills and knowledge of civic
responsibilities also contribute to improved outcomes.

In practice, many country’s security sectors are open to engaging in dialogue and consultations with civil
society because they recognise that civil society has information and insights needed to achieve national
security priorities. For example, many military forces receive training on humanitarian civil-military
coordination, given the likelihood that they will need to communicate with humanitarian organisations,
including civil society groups, operating in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Civil-military coordination
or cooperation (CIMIC) centres and other mechanisms to support a “comprehensive approach” that
includes civil society would also fall under this category. However, few military forces receive training on
interacting with local civil society or other types of CSOs that are involved in long-term development,
human rights or peacebuilding efforts. This limits their possibility to engage effectively, as many security
forces are not even aware that other civil society groups exist and are working to support human security.
Coordination is not possible where there is not first a mapping of this local capacity.

Where national security overlaps with civil society’s human security priorities, these dialogue,
consultation, and coordination forums may be productive. The local ownership platforms discussed in
this volume are examples of such civil-military-police coordination to support human security.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 97

Civil Society-Led Dialogues on the Local Level
CSO driven dialogues are forums that CSOs initiate and In Yemen and Guinea, for example,
organise at the local level to foster exchange and Partners for Democratic Change helped
understanding between security forces and civil society to facilitate a series of national dialogue
around a certain topic related to security. forums that enabled joint analysis of
human security challenges and
Consultations to Define Security Policy strategies. In Nepal, civil society
National Consultations are mechanisms that enable civil conducted comprehensive joint security
society to take a permanent seat at the table to defining a assessments on the district level
country’s national security agenda. including 80 focus groups with more
than 800 individuals altogether to
Dialogue and consultation has its limits unless it is develop an approach to community
institutionalised and accompanied by accountability policing. In Tanzania, Search for
mechanisms. Governments may seek to understand and Common Ground gathered security
review the community’s point of view on an ad hoc basis forces, civil society and representatives
only when the political climate makes it necessary. They of private companies to discuss the
may credit and acknowledge civil society perspectives security of mining operations. These
anytime without having to commit to actually include them dialogues usually happen ad hoc, i.e.
in their strategies and programmes. only for a particular purpose and
duration and rarely include national
12. Joint Implementation leadership.
A step beyond dialogue and consultation, ‘joint
implementation’ involves civil society participating with *Read more about civil-military-police in Local
the security sector in the development and/or the Ownership in Security, the companion report to
this Handbook.
implementation of human security strategies. Civil society
not only provides input but may also take on certain
programmatic functions, such as participating in neighbourhood patrols Civil society and the security
sector can carry out joint implementation in a wide range of efforts in diverse sectors, including
community policing, restorative justice, criminal justice reform, transitional justice, security sector
reform and development, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, demining, preventing sexual
and gender-based violence, mitigating civilian harm, protecting civilians, and many more sectors. It can
also mean civil society plays a role in mediating with non-state armed groups.

There can be two kinds of joint implementation:

Joint Programming at the Local Level

This report provides examples of joint programming such as a community policing projects in Pakistan, in
which local populations work with the police to report threats and hold perpetrators to account or DDR
programmes in Mozambique, DRC, and Afghanistan, in which civil society innovated new models of joint
implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration of ex-combatants. The case study on The National Peace Councils in Ghana
private companies and community-based security in provide a good example for such an
Tanzania also shows how, members of local ‘infrastructure for peace.’ They show how
communities, police and business representatives local peace committees work to provide
developed and implemented a security strategy at a early warning and address local tensions.
mining site. In the case of escalation, the
infrastructure provides recourse
National Peace Infrastructures mechanisms at the regional, national and
National Peace Infrastructures are permanent also military level. The National Peace
institutionalised mechanisms that enable civil society Council in Kenya is another example of a
and security sector on all levels to prevent and respond peace infrastructure that has also
to violence. successfully stopped the escalation of
election-related violence.

*Read more about Infrastructures for Peace in Local

Ownership in Security, the companion report to this
Handbook.

98 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

13. Joint Institutional Oversight In Guatemala for example, the UN-brokered
Joint institutional oversight provides institutional peace plan enshrines accountability
mechanisms for accountability, monitoring and mechanisms for civil society to provide
evaluation of the security sector including official, oversight to all areas of the security sector,
institutional platforms for civil society involvement. including intelligence, military, police,
They represent a new generation of oversight criminal justice and national security policy
mechanisms that complement the watchdog and formulation.
protest functions mentioned earlier by enabling civil
society and security forces to build long-term In the Philippines, a new permanent civil
institutional relationships and trust. society oversight platform allows civil
society to meet monthly with security
Most states are still reluctant to set up permanent sector at the national and regional level to
institutional structures to enable civil society identify security challenges, formulate joint
oversight. Dialogue and coordination and joint strategies and monitor and evaluate the
implementation are thus second-best options that performance of the security sector. This
enable civil society to contribute to security sector permanent institutional engagement
policies and programmes and complement civilian between civil society and security sectors is
government oversight in order to ensure local the ultimate guarantee of an accountable,
ownership in the security sector and thus human democratic state response to violence and a
security for all citizens. “whole of society” approach to human
security.
14. Capacity Building
Capacity building for both the security sector and civil In Burundi, two civil society representatives
society is necessary to enable them to reach each of participated in the National Defence
these levels of local ownership. A lack of capacity can Review, serving as official representatives
often represent a major obstacle to building an to help monitor and evaluate the reform
effective working relationship. When civil society process.
representatives and security sectors are gathered in
the same classroom, they may often experience the *Read more about Infrastructures for Peace in Local
very first institutional opportunity to meet. Interactive Ownership in Security, the companion report to this
training curricula that favour discussions and Handbook.
interactive exercises will enable the participants to
already start building common ground and increase
their understanding and appreciation for each other,
before their formal joint problem-solving process
starts.

15. Criteria for Choosing Civil Society Organisations to Fund

In some cases, civil society will initiate efforts to coordinate with governments, including police and
military, on their own. In other cases, governments or other donors will look for civil society
organisations to fund. This list describes some of the criteria that may help in choosing civil society
organisations (CSOs) to fund in order to maximise effectiveness and minimise divisiveness.

Legitimacy: Do other CSOs and local community members view the CSO as legitimate? (National CSO
networks, religious leaders and community leaders may be able to answer this question)

Representation: Civil society is as diverse as the local population. There are international NGOs and local
civil society organizations. There are ethnic, religious, tribal, race, geography, language, age, gender and
other differences among civil society. CSOs may represent one of these groups, with most of their staff
sharing some key identity. In some contexts, especially post-colonial countries, one ethnic or tribal group
may hold more power than others. There may be a disproportionate number of civil society organizations
representing these groups. It is important for government, military and police to ensure they work with
diverse CSOs that represent diverse constituencies, including CSOs that represent women, youth,
different ethnic, religious or tribal groups, and with minority groups.

Access: Does the CSO have access to local communities? Do local people have relationships with the CSO
and will they accept the CSO’s presence? Does the CSO have access to travel security either by gaining
acceptance and consent of all armed groups?

Security: CSOs primarily use an unarmed “acceptance strategy” for their security, meaning they seek
acceptance of their presence from local populations and all armed groups. Local communities may

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 99

perceive CSO legitimacy based on their independence and distinction from government. Would working
with these groups compromise this form of security?

Capacity: There are many types of capacity: capacity in language, capacity of relationships and networks,
capacity for specific skills such as negotiation or mediation, capacity in political analysis or broader
context assessment, capacity for programme and financial management, and capacity in research for
monitoring and evaluating programs. CSOs tend to specialise in different areas, such as humanitarian
assistance, education, human rights, peace, governance, water management, etc. All CSOs have some
capacity. No government unit or civil society organization has capacity in every area. Governments,
military and police often look to CSOs for specific types of capacity in language, relationships, network,
and analysis. A large number of local CSOs are highly skilled in programme management and monitoring
and evaluation, but some are not. Identify the type of capacity you need. Do you need cultural insights,
language capacity, ethnic, gender or age balance to bring new insights? Choose a CSO that provides the
capacity that you are missing. Identify a consortium of CSOs who can work together and provide capacity
across all the required areas.

16. Providing Funding for Civil Society Organisations

Direct funding for CSOs may be possible in some contexts. But in most politically sensitive and potential
violent contexts, direct funding for CSOs may reduce their legitimacy and access. In turn, this means that
direct funding may decrease the capacity of the CSO, making their work less effective.

Donor pools are funding mechanisms to identify appropriate civil society organisations, provide financial
oversight, and oversee monitoring and evaluation of funds. Groups of organisations or countries agree to
contribute money toward a fund. Donor pools may be run through an existing agency such as the UK
Department for International Development’s “Conflict Prevention Pool”, through international
organisations such as the World Bank’s “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund,” or through a separate
organisation, such as the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).

17. Criteria for Civil Society to Determine Benefits and Challenges of Working with Government,
Military, or Police.

Shared Goals: Does the CSO share a goal with government, military or police that makes coordination or
collaboration necessarily or helpful? Are all goals transparent with no hidden agenda?

Legitimacy: Do local communities perceive the government, military or police as a legitimate entity,
having legitimate goals and using legitimate power to achieve those goals?

Trust: Will working with the government, military, or police organisation reduce the public trust or
weaken relationships with important local stakeholders that you work with?

Consent and Access: Will working with government reduce the consent from other armed groups for CSO
travel and access?

Security: Will working with government, military or police organisations bring greater security threats to
the CSO staff or communities where they work?

Funding: Does the government, military or police tie funding to political goals? Does the CSO share these
political goals? Are there possibilities of obtaining funding from other sources, that may not tied funding
to political goals? Does the CSO have capacity to absorb funding and deal with added reporting and
accountability requirements?

REVIEW
This lesson describes levels of local ownership. Local ownership must be both broad to include diverse
stakeholders and deep to include diverse stakeholders in many different activities, such as conflict
assessment, jointly implementing security strategies in protection of civilians, civilian assistance, or
conflict prevention, and jointly monitor and evaluate security governance, accountability, and
performance.

100 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Citations

40 Nicole Ball and van de Goor, The challenges of supporting effective security and justice programming, (Paris, France:
OECD, Development Cooperation Working Paper, 2013).
41 See the “Local First” website which outlines the principles of local ownership of development and peacebuilding.

http://actlocalfirst.org (Accessed 15 October 2015).

42 For a longer discussion of the tensions between international NGOs and local civil society groups see Lisa Schirch.

Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: Toward a Participatory Approach to Human Security, (Boulder:
Kumarian Press, 2013).
43 Adapted and inspired by Sarah Hlupekile Longwe, Gender Specialist, Zambia from the “Women’s Empowerment

Framework” found in A New Weave of People, Power, Politics: The Action Guide for Advocacy and Civic Participation,
Lisa VeneKlasen and Valerie Miller, editors, (Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing, 2007), 55.
44 Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, and Katrin Kinzelbach, Editors. Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for

Civil Society Organisations. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Development Programme and Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Force (DCAF), 2008), 19.
45 Several exceptions are notable. Civil society research projects on security issues may create an opportunity for

individual civil society members to build relationships with people in the security sector. Civil society has become
adept at facilitating public dialogue on security issues, but often these are solely for communities themselves and
have not until recently included the security sector in dialogue with civil society and communities. See Duncan
Hiscock, “Research and Information” in Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society
Organisations, editors Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert and Katrin Kinzelbach, (G Valeur, Slovak Republic: UN Development
Programme, 2008), 49.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 101

Lesson 10 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 In the town or city where you grew up, how much “local ownership” of security is evident? Do
police meet with the community? Does the community trust the police?
 What are the benefits of local ownership of security, where security is seen as a public good
and security forces work closely with communities?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to identify the possibilities of involving more people, involving them in
more joint activities, and increasing the power they have to influence and contribute. Each
stakeholder team can make their case for whether or not to increase local ownership. Some
stakeholder teams may want to assess how they might appear to be supporting local ownership to
appease the public, while actually restricting local ownership in practice. Other stakeholder teams
may want to anticipate other team’s moves and develop options for local ownership that might get
around this opposition or that might create entry points or opportunities for increasing local
ownership over time. Each group has 15 minutes to develop an initial plan to increase local
ownership. Then, teams may negotiate with each other to attempt to develop their plans. After 20
minutes of negotiations between teams, debrief the exercise.
 Was there any common ground between teams?
 What are the biggest obstacles to local ownership?
 What seem to be the most hopeful entry points or designs of activities that could improve
local ownership?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

102 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 CC Flickr Photo Credit USIP/ Yemen
National Dialogue

Lesson 11
Organising Multi-Stakeholder Processes

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify the stages of organising a multi-stakeholder process
 Identify three considerations in choosing which stakeholders to include in the process
 Identify key principles of holding a multi-stakeholder security dialogue.

This lesson provides civil society, military and police leaders with practical advice on how to design and
carry out a multi-stakeholder security dialogue at the local, regional or national level. The security
sector and/or civil society can use a multi-stakeholder process (MSP) to conduct a joint conflict
assessment process to identify security challenges; to jointly plan and implement a programme to
improve human security; or to jointly monitor and evaluate security governance, accountability and
performance.

Lesson 11: Multi-Stakeholder Processes

This lesson is based on a more detailed manual titled Multi-stakeholder Processes for Conflict Prevention
and Peacebuilding written by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). 46

1. Deciding to Use a Multi-Stakeholder Process (MSP)

This lesson outlines some key steps and phases for deliberately designing and implementing a multi-
stakeholder security dialogue at the local, regional or national level. At the local level, a multi-stakeholder
security dialogue could take place between police, local government, and male and female community
members (making sure to include women’s unique perspective and experience of safety concerns). At the
regional level, military, police, regional government and regional civil society organisations, including
women’s organisations, might be included in a security dialogue focused on border security or a regional
security issue. At the national level, a security dialogue might include all major stakeholders and identify
diverse definitions and approaches to national security.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 103

When considering these steps, it should be noted that, in reality, these steps are never linear. Even in a
planned and deliberate process, participants may need to take a step back to re-strategise or redefine
roles—for example, when some participants leave and new ones join. The context itself might change
drastically during the course of the process, requiring participants to go back to the drawing board. The
different steps presented on designing and implementing an MSP can respectively take weeks, months or
years, and do not refer to a set number of meetings or events. Rather, they describe the general
progression of a process that can take many shapes depending on the situation.

It is a rare luxury to have all the conducive conditions line up for a multi-stakeholder process. It can
therefore be more useful to be clear on your own position, and what the parameters and non-negotiables
are for your organisation. In deciding to initiate or join an MSP, bear in mind the opportunities, timing,
resources, competencies and support structures available for the task ahead.

Key questions for initiators47

 Is a multi-stakeholder approach necessary, or would other approaches such as advocacy and
lobbying strategies, be less risky and equally (or possibly more) effective?
 Are there good reasons to believe stakeholders of substantial influence will join in a collective
approach?
 What factors could make the process unmanageable and ultimately unproductive, and could they
be mitigated?
 Is sufficient funding available to sustain the process? Do people view the funding source as biased,
neutral, with/without an agenda? Will the resources still be available once the process has taken
off (for example to implement planned joint activities)? If not, are there fundraising capacities or
connections within the group?
 How might the MSP cause unintended negative consequences, especially with respect to conflict
dynamics? How might these effects be prevented or minimised?

Key questions for potential participants

 How might the multi-stakeholder process meet your organisational interests and goals?
 Does the process have institutional support from your organisation?
 What will be your exit strategy—when will your organisation consider the MSP to have fulfilled its
objectives and when will it be seen to be underperforming or failing and what does it mean for
your participation?
 Does the process encompass the personal needs of the individuals directly involved, taking into
account personal capacities, skill development, support and encouragement?
 What are the benefits of joining, as compared to an alternative outsider strategy?

2. Initiating the Process

There are various options for getting an MSP started, depending on the context and opportunities at
hand. The first step in initiating a process is getting a core group of committed individuals and
organisations involved in considering the process design and feasibility.

Process champions: CSOs can approach their respective networks to get an MSP started, and take
advantage of established relationships with other key stakeholders. It helps to identify counterparts in
other agencies that can champion the idea of an MSP, for example within a local UN agency or other
international/multilateral organisations, a regional organisation, a government department or
mechanism, and other key CSOs.

Initiator, convener, host: The convener is the official face of the process, and should be seen as
impartial and have enough authority in the context to convince the right parties to get involved. Where
CSOs do not enjoy such a position, they can instigate the process by convincing a key agency to play
this role, and can partner with them as co-initiators, supporting the process through their
organisation’s skills and networks. Another way of involving additional partners can be to get them to
co-host meetings and to rotate the host function among different agencies, to appeal to different
groups.

Core group: Ideally, the core group of initiators is already multi-stakeholder in composition. CSOs and
their identified counterparts should start by comparing objectives and expectations, and clarify the
level of investment (time, capacities, and other resources) they are prepared to contribute, as well as
discussing potential roles. A Memorandum of Understanding between the key partners can help
formalise this commitment.

104 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Facilitation resources: A skilled facilitator or facilitation
team, who may or may not be the convener, is necessary to Participant Selection
provide careful process design and guidance. Facilitation is
a specific set of skills, and requires specialised training, as Criteria
described in Lesson 21.
 What balance and diversity do you need
Reality check: start calculating the cost of the process and to consider in the composition of the
to explore whether sufficient funding, institutional group, including gender, age, social or
resources and competencies can realistically be secured to geographic considerations?
see the process through. Make contingency plans for how
to proceed should expected resources fall short. The  Which constituency groups are
resource considerations can also be explored through indispensable to the process?
consultations with potential participants as described in
the steps below.  What would motivate those groups to
participate or to stay away?
Legitimacy: Legitimacy is usually linked to the credibility
of the convener, the participants and the process itself.
 What are the implications for not
One of the most important ingredients in an MSP, from the
engaging certain groups?
moment that it is first convened and throughout, is the
sense of trust that people have in the fairness of the
process, and in the intentions of the conveners and  How does the purpose relate to
participants. hardliners and potential spoilers? Are
there other ways to engage them
3. Designing and Preparing the Process outside of the MSP?
The process design must rely on sound knowledge about
the context and the various stakeholders. Self-awareness
and sensitivity to conflict dynamics are also important before taking the steps of approaching process
participants. Perhaps the most challenging and most important part of this phase is identifying and
approaching the potential participants. This phase focuses on mapping, analysis and consultation that can
gradually help build trust in the lead up to the official start of the process.

Preliminary context analysis: The initiators should have sufficient knowledge about the context to
recognise possible signs or triggers of conflict. Based on this, initiators can formulate their own
preliminary objectives of what they are seeking to achieve.

Stakeholder mapping: To start identifying potential participants, initiators should consider power
dynamics, interests and relationships of the groups and individuals that play a role in either exacerbating
or deterring the conflict. (See Lesson 1)

Criteria for selecting participant stakeholders: The context and stakeholder analysis can help define a set
of criteria for selecting the participant institutions and individuals. Whether this is done in a formal
process or not, documenting such criteria can strengthen the legitimacy of the process, as it may be
questioned or examined by other stakeholders at any stage during the process. In politically sensitive
situations, it can be prudent to involve the potential stakeholders in formulating the criteria in a phased
process.

Do No Harm and self-assessment: Initiators should consider their own capacity to facilitate the intended
process, and assess the possibility of the process affecting the participants or the conflict dynamics
negatively.

Formulating the idea: As a basis for future internal and external communications, it can be useful to
document the key points of the analyses and the preliminary purpose and objectives of the process in an
accessible format, such as a summary sheet or concept note. This document should also make the
initiators’ intentions and role explicit. This can form part of a process proposal that participants can
validate or revise in initial meetings.

Approaching potential participants: preliminary consultations form part of the initial convening process
to get a sense of whether there is sufficient interest in the MSP, any concerns potential participants have
and initial process proposals. These consultations can help identify opportunities, and risks, as well as
gaps in the analysis and other key stakeholders to approach. It is also a good time to discuss the scope and
size of the group. All of this can provide input for a draft charter, or terms of reference.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 105

 Sample Ground Rules
Observing protocol: In cases where the process aims to
involve high-level state or intergovernmental
participation, it may be necessary to seek official  Listen to each other
endorsement in this phase of the process. The role of
officials or government will vary, depending on the  Stay open to learning and new
political dynamics and the degree to which government is perspectives
enmeshed in conflict dynamics.
 Respectful behaviour
Administrative and practical preparations: organisers
must have dedicated people in charge of preparing the  Avoid disruptions or distractions (e.g.
practicalities for launching the process. This can include mobile phones, laptops, side-talk,
outlining the programme, sending out invitations, securing interrupting each other)
an appropriate venue and time for the first meetings and
handling all other logistics relevant to start the MSP. Note  Ask questions whenever something
that the administrative functions and timely is not clear or unresolved
communications will be important and recurring tasks
throughout the process, which has implications for  Commit to staying involved in the
funding/budget considerations. process
4. Getting Acquainted
 Find common ground, while respecting
The first group meetings and the acquaintance phase must
and understanding differences
be considered carefully, as they can set the tone for the
rest of the process. The acquaintance phase can involve a
degree of disagreement and contestation about the issues
at stake. This is a natural part of the process, and should be allowed to play out, where the facilitator
helps to unpack the key issues and barriers present in the group to start building confidence. For this
reason, it is useful for the group to agree on how to work together from the outset.

Facilitating interaction: Pay attention to practical arrangements, facilitation and space that can encourage
interaction among the participants. For example, seating arrangements, icebreakers and allowing time for
social spaces, learning and networking can make for more productive and open group discussions. Note
that MSPs involving high-level officials from formal institutions will need to take into account official
protocol, which may be a pre-condition for meeting. In this case, breaks, outings and other activities can
be important to make space for relationship building.

Stating expectations: It is the role of the convener to present the anticipated intentions and purpose of the
initiative in the first meeting. Introductions are made to acknowledge those present while taking note of
who is not present and whose absence may affect the process. It is important that participants get the
opportunity to express their expectations to start identifying commonalities or areas of contention. The
role of the participants should be clear: are they there to give advice, to make recommendations, to take
decisions, to reach consensus? Do they have a specific function in the MSP because of their expertise or
background? Who is responsible for follow up? The decision making process should be explicitly agreed:
are decisions made by the group, and how?

Ground Rules: Having collective agreement on how to interact and participate in the process gives a clear
mandate to the facilitator to intervene when the group dynamics are not respectful or productive. This
can be done in several ways (described in detail in Lesson 21), for example:

o Presenting a draft text for discussion, amendment and approval.

o Developing them as part of, or in follow up to, preparatory bilateral meetings.
o Engaging the participants in formulating ground rules from scratch in the first meetings.
o Organising a joint training session on dialogue and listening skills, where the participants can
learn about each other’s ways of working, values, and constraints.

Rules of engagement and procedures: Protocol helps the participants to assess and state their level of
commitment, roles and responsibilities. Involving the participants in setting out and agreeing to the
proceedings is necessary to avoid or minimise misunderstandings once the process is underway. They
help the facilitator to ensure a fair and appropriate process. (See Box on next page)

106 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Accountability and transparency of MSP processes: To whom are participants accountable? How will they
seek input from and report back to broader constituencies? It is important to be clear on expectations and
limitations in this regard, especially where there are no formal feedback mechanisms. Stakeholders can
draft an accountability map in which they are explicit to whom they are accountable and how they will
communicate with their respective institutions and constituencies.

Grievance resolution mechanisms need to be in place and clear to all participants, where expectations
within and outside the group are clearly agreed, and where there is a procedure that spells out how
disagreements or complaints are handled in the group. It can also be useful to have an agreed procedure
for dealing with inactive participants or those whose behaviour (whether in the meeting or externally)
can undermine the process.

Agreement on internal and external communication and confidentiality in relation to what can or cannot
be disclosed outside the meeting is key to maintaining a level of trust between the participants and in the
process. Depending on the nature of the MSP, it may be useful to agree to apply the Chatham House Rule,
which allows participants to disclose the content of discussions but not to attribute that content to
anyone. In cases where the Chatham House Rule is not considered sufficiently strict, an event can also be
held entirely off the record.

The degree of formality required ultimately depends on the culture and the stakeholders involved, and on
the conditions of where and how the dialogue is conducted. Some cultures (including sub-cultures within
a specific context) function more through spoken word rather than through documents. Where formal
institutions are part of the process, formal charters and reports may be necessary for institutional
endorsement.

Developing Terms of Reference

The written terms of reference for the convening process are sometimes called a charter. The charter
names the stakeholder groups and their representatives and outlines how they will work together and
what they will discuss. The facilitator can create the draft in collaboration with the stakeholders during
the preparatory/bilateral meetings and submit it to the group for discussion and approval. The charter
can include some or all of the following components:

Goal:
Statement of purpose and the group's mandate (relationship to other initiatives as relevant).
List of Stakeholders:
- Stakeholder groups and their representatives (can include organisational or individual
representation; alternates; gender balance; geographic or thematic spread).
Roles:
- Roles and responsibilities for MSP participants.
- Role of the third party facilitator.
- Role and mandate of coordinator/organiser/secretariat.
Procedures:
- Procedure for changing or selecting new participants.
- Guidelines for communicating with the press/media.
- Observer guidelines.
- Expectations for stakeholders to communicate with and report feedback from their constituencies.
- Decision-making procedures for the dialogue and within stakeholder groups (consensus, straw
polls, voting, etc.)
- Dispute/grievance resolution mechanism.
- Conflict of interest.
- Procedures for documenting meetings and process for tracking agreements.
- Moments or timeline for reviewing or adapting the charter/Terms of Reference.
Schedule:
- Schedule of meetings and proposed tasks.
Adapted from: Convening: Organizing Multiparty Stakeholder Negotiations (CDR Associates, 1998) and Protocol for Developing
Multi-Stakeholder Group Terms of Reference and Internal Governance Rules and Procedures (Institute for Multi-Stakeholder
Initiative Integrity, February 2015.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 107

5. Agreeing To Go Forward
To be able to function together, the group eventually needs to find a degree of consensus on several
levels: the purpose of the process; the problem definition; a shared vision; and a shared plan of what the
group will do together. This is not likely to be achieved in one sitting, but is usually the result of a longer
process and regular interactions. The sequence of the steps described may take different forms depending
on what suits the group dynamics.

Framing the issue(s): By jointly defining and exploring the scope of the problem to be addressed, the
group can reach a shared problem formulation. This exercise should be well prepared and can be
informed by the preliminary engagement with participants.

Finding common ground for a vision: While a vision for what the group would ideally like to achieve
should be inspiring and ambitious, it is useful to prepare a visioning exercise that can get as detailed as
possible. Participants will have different starting points, assumptions, and institutional interests, so a
vision may need to be unpacked and described in concrete terms from different perspectives to avoid
different interpretations of the ideal scenario.

Action Plans: Following from the logic of a conflict assessment, planning should address key who, what,
how and when questions about follow up actions the participants will take, whether individually or
together.

Goals and milestones: An important part of the action plan is the formulation of what changes and
achievements are expected as a result of the actions. It supports motivation and credibility of the process
to have some milestones or progress indicators already spelled out from the beginning, and to include
some intermediary achievements and quick wins along the way.

Costing the plan: Once there are clear ideas about follow up actions, assess resources needed to
implement the plans, and agree on how they will be secured. Fundraising or pooling of resources may be
necessary as part of the follow up steps; this may also be the moment to mobilise any donors or donor
connections involved in the process.

Sample Dialogue Questions for Exploring the Diversity of Experiences

 How does public safety impact you personally?
 When do you feel most unsafe?
 How are you coping with insecurity?
 What is your greatest concern about security now?
 When do you feel most safe?
 How is security affecting our community?
 What changes to public safety are we seeing?
 How have security issues affected how we work together? Are there new tensions among us?
 What are 3 main challenges that keeps us from improving security?
 What values in our community can we draw on to address this problem?
 What are the causes of or history the issues?
 Do we have different understandings of the history of security challenges?

Suggested Caucus Questions

 What do we need to know from an opposing point of view in order to address this issue?
 How does our group benefit from and suffer from the status quo?

108 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

6. Implementing Action Plans
To achieve results beyond the individual level, a crucial part of the Sample Questions for
process is in the follow up outside the meeting room. Flexibility is
needed to be able to go back to re-assert and adjust the process as it
Action Planning
moves along and where the need to change plans arises. Internal and
external communication throughout this phase is crucial, both for the  What should we do about this
sake of keeping up momentum and for the purpose of accountability issue now that we have built
and trust in the process. relationships with each other,
shared our experiences and
Getting organised: With plans of action and definition of roles, the deepened our understanding
group considers how to work together in the follow up phase, for of the issues?
example by forming working groups, delegations, advisory groups,
contact persons/liaisons or action-oriented task forces. The tasks can  Of all the ideas shared, which 2
include activities to support and strengthen the platform itself, such as or 3 ideas seem most
mobilisation of extra resources as well as public and political support. practical for us to work on
Constant or emerging issues in this phase may lead to new ways of together?
getting things done. This stage is an opportunity to broaden the
engagement in the process, by involving additional groups in the
 What resources do we already
proposed actions.
have available to us?
Feedback loop: Make a point of scheduling regular report back
sessions of participants to the group and of the group to broader
constituencies. There are many ways of doing this, either using existing channels, or using media, online
tools, or arranging for workshops or conferences for a broader range of participants to validate or
respond to the activities of the group. Feedback loops are relevant both for the sake of accountability and
in order to manage expectations. It is essential that participants have a common base of information.
Provide well-organised, concise, accurate and jargon-free information

Keeping up the momentum: The MSP is most effective when it is results-driven: when each participant
begins their tasks with the end result in mind and then deliberately plans how to achieve this with
milestones and set timelines that they can report back on. It is just as important that the process inspires
and motivates participants to follow these actions through. Extra support, capacity building, buddying
schemes or coaching may be needed for a stakeholder to achieve some results.

Adapting: New issues that emerge may require the inclusion of new stakeholders. Some participants may
have dropped out causing a gap in the composition of the group. The procedures and rules of engagement
may need to be reviewed to be more suitable for the group.

7. Exit strategies
A multi-stakeholder dialogue may be an on-going effort and there is not necessarily an end to such
processes. Nevertheless, the time may come when the MSP will either wind down or move to the next
level of institutionalisation. In this phase, the process should not simply fade out without notice, explicit
agreement or exit strategy, as this can cause disillusionment that can discourage future initiatives.

Closure: The participants may reach consensus about closure for various reasons. Key outputs/objectives
may have been reached, or the agreed time period for the initiative is coming to a close. Lack of resources
or motivation, or external factors or risks in the context can also directly affect this decision.

Exit strategy: An exit strategy can range from gradually winding down a process, to handing it over to
continuous, institutionalised mechanisms. Either way, it is important to communicate the next steps not
only to participants but also to key partners, target groups and broader constituencies. It may also involve
ensuring that some of the collaboration achieved and relationships built are safeguarded through some
other form of engagement or contact.

Lessons learned: For future reference and broader learning, it is useful to document and share not only
the outcomes of the process, but also the learning points about the process itself. Some conventional ways
of doing this might include reports or presentations (workshops, conferences), but other means can
include videos, interviews or blogs.

Institutionalisation: in the best-case scenario, the process evolves into permanent structures, so-called
standing mechanisms for different local stakeholders. Dedicated resources allocated by local

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 109

authorities/government, or institutional or policy frameworks underpinning the multi-stakeholder
collaboration as well as capacity building exemplify this.

REVIEW
This lesson provided a detailed guide for designing a multi-stakeholder process. Civil society or the
security sector can initiate a multi-stakeholder process to help communities identify security challenges
through a process of conflict assessment, or to design and implement a security project together. Multi-
stakeholder processes may also be used to design a forum for joint monitoring and evaluation of the
security sector. Module 10 provides a conceptual framework to assess security governance,
accountability and performance to use in a multi-stakeholder process.

Citations

46 Jenny Aulin, Multi-stakeholder Processes for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: A Manual, (The Hague, The
Netherlands: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), 2015).
47 GPPAC Preventive Action Working Group discussions, adapting from (amongst others): Convening: Organizing
Multiparty Stakeholder Negotiations (CDR Associates, 1998); Mariette van Huijstee, Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives: A
Strategic Guide for Civil Society Organisations (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 12 March 2012);
Bernard S. Mayer and others, Constructive Engagement Resource Guide: Practical Advice for Dialogue among Workers,
Communities and Regulators (US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, NSCEP,
1999), 23.

110 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 11 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 Are there places in society where military, police, government and civil society sit together to
discuss security issues?
 What makes these spaces challenging? What makes them effective?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The President has announced the formation of a National Security Dialogue including government,
security force, and civil society representatives beginning in two months. Each of the stakeholder
teams to be part of the planning team.

In scenario stakeholder teams, discuss the following questions:

 What would it take for your stakeholder team and other groups in society to consider a multi-
stakeholder security dialogue legitimate, credible and accountable?
 What factors would influence your decision not to participate?
 Who are the relevant stakeholders to include in a security dialogue? Which key leaders will be
important to invite first, to assure their buy-in?
 What key messages can be used to appeal to the interests of different stakeholders to take
part in your security dialogue?
 What is the best location for your security dialogue to take place?

After 20 minutes of team discussion, each team shares their strategy with the other teams. The
facilitator asks the entire group for their observations.

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 111

 CC Flickr Photo:
Khalfan Said, U.S.
Embassy, Dar es
Salaam, Tanzania

Module
Coordination
4
on Conflict Assessment

Module 4 Coordination on Conflict Assessment

This module provides security forces, security policymakers and civil society with shared tools
for researching and carrying out a conflict assessment and designing a basic intervention plan. A
multi-stakeholder process can bring together diverse stakeholders to undertake a conflict
assessment process together. Coordination on conflict assessment can improve the ability for
coordination to plan and implement joint human security programmes. Without a shared
understanding of the particular challenges of a given conflict, there can be no comprehensive
strategy or coordination to support human security.

Lesson 12: Conflict Assessment Research identifies the importance of civil-military-police

coordination on conflict assessment.

Lesson 13: Conflict Assessment Tools provides practical tools for carrying out a conflict
assessment.

Lesson 14: Moving from Conflict Assessment to Planning provides tools for improving joint
civil-military-police planning to support human security

112 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Research in Somaliland
CC/Flickr Photo:
ILRI:Nadhem Mtimet

Lesson 12
Conflict Assessment Research

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify the purpose of conflict assessment
 Compare and contrast different types of assessment
 Identify different methods of data collection
 Describe how to design participatory research
 Identify characteristics of conflict-sensitive assessments
 Identify how to identify data quality

This lesson identifies the purpose of conflict assessment and the problems that often accompany
conflict assessment processes. This lesson identifies different types of data collection methods and
describes how to design participatory research.

Lesson 12: Conflict Assessment Research

This lesson is adapted from the book Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning. 48

1. What causes conflict and violence?

People often believe in “cause-effect” explanations for violence that sound like this: “Bad guys cause
conflict. Good guys kill the bad guys.” Often people point fingers at some group of people who they think
are simply “evil.” In reality, what one person describes as evil or terror may look differently to another
person. Groups that use violence almost always have a complex set of grievances and motivations.
Stopping violence is not so much a matter of “killing all the bad guys” if there are grievances and
motivations that spur more people to use violence. Conflict assessment attempts to understand the
broader factors that influence conflict and violence.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 113

2. What is conflict assessment?
A conflict assessment is a systematic research process to understand a range of factors including context,
stakeholders, motivations, and means and timeline that are driving or mitigating conflict.

You can compare doing a conflict assessment to a visit at the eye doctor. The doctor provides corrective
lenses to obtain a better vision of a range of characters. In conflict assessment you use different types of
lenses to obtain a clearer and more profound understanding of the dynamics of the conflict – although
unfortunately – unlike eye glasses, your conflict assessment glasses will never enable you to see perfectly
sharp. This lesson includes a variety of conflict analysis “tools” or “lenses” that provide clarity on who,
what, why, when, where and how conflict takes place.

WHERE Where is the conflict taking place?

WHO Who is driving the conflict and who is supporting peace?
WHY Why are the key stakeholders motivated to drive conflict or support peace?
WHAT What are the factors driving and mitigating conflict? What are the threats and
vulnerabilities facing civilians?
HOW How are key stakeholders using power to drive or mitigate conflict? What are their
capacities and sources of power?
WHEN When is conflict likely to get worse or when might the chances for peace improve?
When are their “windows of vulnerability” or “windows of opportunity?”
Figure 27: Conflict Assessment Questions

3. What is the key purpose of a conflict assessment?

Conflict assessment is important to human security in several ways.

a) Conflict assessment is necessary to prevent violence through the development of “conflict

prevention” strategies. Conflict Prevention aims to prevent violence from starting by addressing
key immediate and long-term factors driving conflict toward violence and mass atrocities.
Operational prevention focuses on short-term crisis response, including preventive diplomacy.
Structural prevention focuses on long-term efforts to address root causes such as economic,
social and political exclusion of some groups.

b) Conflict assessment improves the success of “peacebuilding” interventions in a conflict aimed at

improving human security. Peacebuilding refers to a range of activities at any stage of conflict to
prevent, mitigate, or transform conflict.

c) Conflict assessment improves “conflict sensitivity” to prevent second and third order unintended
impacts. Conflict Sensitivity is an approach to programming and policymaking that recognises the
potential influence for any type of intervention to cause harm. Conflict-sensitive policies,
programmes and projects aim to minimise unintentional negative impacts that may drive conflict
and cause further social divisions while maximising positive impacts on the context that mitigate
conflict and bridge social divides. Conflict assessment and self-assessment research is central to
conflict sensitive policies, programmes and projects in human rights, humanitarian assistance,
development and related efforts.

4. There are important differences between intelligence gathering, context assessment and
conflict assessment.
Most states conduct both intelligence analysis to identify potential threats and conflict assessment to
understand the context where threats develop. Intelligence often identifies individuals and groups that
may cause harm to state interests. Conflict assessment is a broader research process. It maps a broader
array of both stakeholders driving conflict as well as those mitigating conflict. It also seeks to understand
broader social, political, economic and other factors that may be contributing to violence or the threat of
violence. Complex environments require research-based assessment to discover and understand the
stakeholders and the conflict dynamics. Conflict assessment can increase the effectiveness of
interventions and reduce the chance that an intervention will cause harm or be counterproductive.

The chart below compares and contrasts intelligence analysis with conflict assessment. These methods
differ regarding their objectives and their levels of secrecy. The security sector has traditionally focused
on intelligence to identify information and locations for stakeholders considered to be enemies. Military
and police leaders are increasingly identifying a need for better conflict assessment processes.

114 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Governments and militaries conduct assessments to understand complex environments. Military
assessment tools such as ASCOPE (assesses the Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organisations, People, and
Events) and PMESII (assesses the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information)
are context assessments, not conflict assessments. Conflict assessment is more specific than context
assessment. Advanced research on theories of conflict bring more specific insights on key actors,
motivations, positive factors or resiliencies, and insights from local voices that makes conflict assessment
a distinct form of research. Many governments have their own conflict assessment frameworks. Most of
these are very similar.

The chart here compares and contrasts intelligence and conflict assessment research processes.

Figure 28: Comparison of Intelligence, Context Assessment and Conflict Assessment

Intelligence Context Assessment Conflict Assessment

All aim to understand complex environments

Focus on threats to national Focus on understanding the Focus on threats to human

security context to achieve security goals security

Emphasis on identifying enemy Emphasis on understanding social, Emphasis on understanding

targets political, economic and social, political, economic and
environmental context environmental root causes to
violence

Secretive process and product, Closed processes and product, Open and public process and
with information private and information not shared product, with information shared
classified

5. There are two main types of lenses for conflict assessment.

Conflict assessment is a research process to map out those factors that drive conflict and those that
support peace.

Conflict Drivers are people, institutions, or forces that increase divisions and threaten political, economic,
security, justice and social factors related to human security. Factors driving conflict include a range of
lenses to map stakeholders and their means, motivations, and core grievances; to map issues and driving
factors; and to identify issues arising from the local context and windows of vulnerability given the
historic legacy of the conflict. A conflict driver can be something like a famine, unemployment, easy access
to weapons or religious extremism that motivates individuals or groups to engage in conflict. Conflict
drivers tap into and mobilise grievances related to the root causes of conflict in existing political,
economic, and social relations.

Conflict Mitigators are people, institutions, or forces that support political, economic, security, justice and
social factors related to human security. Factors mitigating conflict include a range of lenses to map
stakeholders supporting peace; to identify local traditions, values, and institutions supporting peace,
resiliency, and social capital; and to assess possible windows of opportunity. The terms resilience and
local capacity for peace refers to the capacity of a system to survive, adapt, absorb or respond to a crisis
or severe change. An individual, community and institutional is resilient in as much as they can adapt, be
agile, learn quickly and improvise new survival methods in a changed environment.

6. Conflict Assessment is necessary for conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes to

improve human security.
Conflict prevention and peacebuilding have three components:

a) Address the immediate drivers of violence (eg operational efforts such as preventive and crisis
diplomacy, intergroup dialogue, media strategies, economic sanctions, observer missions or
rapid response forces).

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 115

 b) Transform the structural root causes of violence (eg economic and political reforms, developing
infrastructures to support peace and manage conflict, justice and security sector reform and
development.)
c) Support mitigating factors that foster resilient responses to conflict (eg supporting voices of
moderate religious actors, women, youth, and other civil society actors) and recognise that cycles
of violence can cause widespread societal trauma that decrease a community’s resilience.

7. Too often well-meaning efforts to foster peace and security result in unintended and
counterproductive impacts.
The gap between intent and impact is a challenge facing all organisations who make assumptions about
how they can intervene to support peace and security. These assumptions develop from personal
experiences, media narratives, or academic training. Organisations tend to see the problem that their
organisation can fix. Rigorous research can test organisational assumptions underlying the design of their
projects, programmes, or policies. Theories of Change, introduced later in the next lesson, help to make
underlying assumptions more explicit, so they can be tested with research.

8. Different assessment goals, frameworks and research methods lead to different understanding
of conflict.

 Different stakeholders use different data collection methods. Governments, including military
and police, tend to use large data sets. Civil society organisations conducting conflict assessments
tend to use local interviews, local focus groups and town meetings.

 Different stakeholders collect different or even contradictory data. Even groups using the same
conflict assessment frameworks can populate the framework with different data leading to
different understanding of the drivers and mitigators of conflict.

 Different stakeholders have different levels of acceptance and access to conduct research. Civil
society organisations usually have a long-term relationship and trust in the communities where
they are conducting research. Government, military and police may not have these relationships
to facilitate research.

 Data quality depends on the perception of those being assessed and whether they provide
accurate information or information that supports their interests to researchers. People being
interviewed may tell a researcher what they think that researcher wants to hear. If they are
fearful of the military or police, they may be especially prone to providing information that will
not affect their safety. This may mean they are unwilling to provide information if they think
either an armed opposition group will retaliate against them or if providing information about a
security threat will lead to an attack on their own towns or villages.

 Different security protocols limit access of some researchers. Military and police may be
restricted by rules of engagement, force protection, diplomatic security protocols. CSOs may also
be restricted by security threats that could impact their researchers. Limits on government-
affiliated researchers may be different than the limits on civil society researchers. They each may
be able to reach different groups to carry out their research.

9. Shared conflict assessment is essential to civil-military-police coordination

Conflict assessment is essential to designing strategies to achieve human security. A shared
understanding of conflict assessment is an important foundation for civil-military-police cooperation.
Without a shared understanding, there can be no civil-military-police coordination to support human
security.

Figure 29: Shared

Assessment and Planning
for Coordinated Action

If one unit in a government identifies terrorist groups as the root cause of the problem, they will attempt
to kill and contain these groups and send military weapons to support the national government. If
another unit in a government identifies government corruption and economic inequality as the root cause

116 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

of the problem, they will develop a completely different intervention to hold corrupt governments to
account and reform the political system. These interventions may not complement each other. Two units
in the same government that hold different assumptions about the root causes of conflict may actually
work against each other. The same is also true of civil society, military and police. If they do not share a
similar understanding of conflict, they cannot plan or coordinate to support human security.

10. There are six common problems with conflict assessment research in complex environments.

Figure 30: Problems with Conflict Assessment

Framework vs. Data Quality: Conflict assessment frameworks offer helpful set of questions and tools for
analysing conflict. While researchers may ask the right questions using these frameworks, the framework
alone does not guarantee good data. Early conflict assessment processes emphasised the quality of the
framework and not the quality of the data used to answer the questions or tools in a framework. In a rush
to action, many groups would simply fill in a conflict assessment framework themselves, without
conducting any rigorous, on the ground research. Aid agencies would sit in capital cities and fill out a
conflict assessment framework based on their own guesses of what was happening in a far off country. An
accurate conflict assessment is not possible with data that lacks validity, triangulation, or that is biased
toward a small set of experiences or media reports.

Data Overload: Research shows that when people have too much information or too many choices, they
tend to psychologically freeze up and suffer from “analysis paralysis” that makes them unable to make
decisions.49 Research finds that most business leaders suffer for lack of a way to make sense of the data
they have, not necessarily for having too little data. 50 Groups may analyse a situation so much that the
complexity becomes overwhelming, paralyzing them from taking any action. All conflict assessment
processes face time and resource constraints, but skimping on conflict assessment wastes time and
resources. A conflict assessment framework can help to organise data, to improve decision-makers ability
to make sense out of it.

Organisational Interests: Most people see the problem they can fix. Development specialists are more
likely to see unequal development as driving conflict, while political scientists are more likely to see
political power plays doing so. Military forces are more likely to see a military solution to the conflict and
so on. People who do not stand to gain any organisational interest in the outcome are more likely to
produce an accurate conflict assessment.

Intent vs. Impact: Good intentions do not always lead to good impacts. Conflict assessment is necessary
to make sure the logic behind an intervention to improve human security will actually accomplish that
goal. Many times, people with good intentions unintentionally cause harm. Module 7 on Civilian
Assistance goes into more depth on the “Do No Harm” approach, also known as “conflict sensitivity,” that
urges all groups working in complex environments to conduct an extensive conflict assessment so they

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 117

can better translate the good intentions of their programmes or efforts and avoid unintended impacts
that often occur because people overestimate their understanding of the local context.

Overconfidence: A can-do, eager-to-get-to-work attitude leads people to want to spend less time on
research and more time actually doing something to foster change. People tend to be overconfident about
what they know and underestimate what they do not know about a conflict. For example, overconfidence
that unemployment is driving insurgent recruitment - without verifying this through independent
research - can lead to designing programmes that may in fact have little to do with local people joining or
supporting insurgents because of their frustration with government corruption or their anger at foreign
troops in their country. Researchers should recognise the dangers of overconfidence, and the benefits of
humility about what they do not know.

Faulty Assumptions: A misinformed conflict assessment leads to ineffective, wasteful, and even harmful
policies and programmes. Government agencies sometimes use “red-teaming”—also known as a “sceptics
core”—to address the problem of groupthink and tunnel vision. When gathered to discuss an issue, a
designated group identifies and challenges the dominant themes and assumptions. The red team provides
different points of view.51 However, red teaming cannot replace how someone from another culture or
another side of a conflict actually thinks. Without having people of diverse backgrounds involved, red
teams are an inadequate substitute for people with different life experiences and different perceptions of
the conflict.

11. Data Collection Research Methodologies

There are many research methods of collecting data for use in a conflict assessment. Data is raw material
gathered from primary sources (e.g., interviews, focus groups, and surveys) and secondary sources (e.g.,
newspapers, blogs, publications) through qualitative (data that is descriptive) and quantitative (data that
can be counted) methods.

Figure 31: Data Collection Methods

Interviews ask key research questions of a wide range of diverse local stakeholders from different
identity groups, including religious, ethnic, class, education, region, sex, language, age, and other identity
groups.

Community consultations and workshops ask diverse groups to participate in both generating and sorting
data into categories for the conflict assessment, monitoring, and evaluation frameworks. These
community workshops can take various cultural models. For example, in Central Asia, community shuras
or jirgas are a familiar way of organising discussions at the local level. Some groups use these traditional
forums as their community consultations or focus groups. 52 In the United States, a methodology called
Listening Projects53 uses trained facilitators to ask open-ended questions that help people in communities
express their fears, hopes, needs, and solutions. Such workshops are effective ways to gather information
for a conflict assessment, while at the same time they can also serve as a first step to transforming
difficult relationships. As participants begin to better understand their own and other’s points of view

118 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

through the discussions, they may open their minds to new ideas and possibilities that may make them
more likely to find common ground with opponents.

Focus groups can include people from the same region or cultural group (women, youth) to help generate,
sort, and prioritise data into categories. Data from focus groups can help shape questions for larger
surveys and polls. After collecting survey and polling data, focus groups can help interpret this data as
well. But the effectiveness of focus groups is highly dependent on the culture of their participants. People
of some cultures feel safe to share different points of view in a focus group. Other cultural groups may feel
a certain pressure to conform and prefer not to share their dissent within the group. This is especially
common in places with active violence, where people may be silent and too traumatised to talk. In some
regions where identity conflicts play an important role, narrowing the focus even further and having a so-
called “identity caucus focus group” may be helpful so that members who may feel impeded to speak
freely in a mixed setting are encouraged to express themselves. For example, in a focus group that
includes men and women, a separate women’s caucus may help women share more freely their insights
into conflict. Or in a women’s focus group that includes representatives of ethnic majorities and
minorities, it may make sense to have a minority caucus group. Rapidly changing events impact how focus
groups respond. On the day before a marketplace bombing, a group of elders may feel hopeful and
positive about the future. On the day after a bombing, another similar group of elders may share different
perspectives.

Video documentaries can be helpful research methods for documenting a range of diverse opinions and
perspectives. They can create a mirror or self-portrait of a conflict-affected region, helping researchers,
local people, and donors listen to diverse points of view. Videos can be shown later to the same focus
group to reflect on changes over time, or to invite them to build on their analytical discussion. Or the
video can be taken to new focus groups to invite them to respond or to feel empowered and comfortable
to take part in a difficult conversation. Researchers can show a video to large audiences to invite them to
reflect on the conflict-affected context. A facilitator can ask large groups of people to reflect on whether
the video is an accurate mirror or portrait of their context, or whether something is missing in the
analysis. Videos then serve as a way of checking on the accuracy and reliability of the data.

Opinion polls and surveys ask a limited number of exact questions to large numbers of people to develop
quantitative data. Pilot testing carefully formulated questions with focus groups can help ensure that the
survey questions do not contain any biases.

Desk research can find conflict assessments carried out by other organisations in a conflict-affected
region. Many different groups carry out conflict assessments without ever knowing about other
researcher’s efforts. International and local universities, NGOs, and think tanks publish conflict
assessment reports or research that contains data that support conflict assessments.

Internet and mobile phone technologies allow individuals to write SMS text messages, tweets, and blogs
that provide eyewitness accounts and analysis of conflicts. New technologies allow data sources to come
from satellites, computer-generated information collection, or crowdsourcing when people use their
mobile phones or the Internet to share their perspectives on conflict. Mobile phone technologies allow
researchers to conduct surveys more easily and cheaply with populations that may otherwise be difficult
to reach. Mobile phones allow individuals to share their photos and videos that illustrate their account of
conflict dynamics. These technologies also allow people to make visual geographic maps of where crowds
are gathering, where attacks have happened or where violence is happening, and where humanitarian
crises are unfolding.

For example, FrontlineSMS collects and shares reports on incidents of conflict collected from people who
text message information. Kenyans used a crowdsourcing technology called Ushahidi during the 2008
electoral violence to gather data from citizens who texted information on where violence was occurring
from their mobile phones to a central location. Ushahidi 54 now works in many other places using
geospatial mapping to inform early warning and conflict assessment. This type of data can help to indicate
if violence is spreading.

12. Data quality impacts the quality of conflict assessments.

The research process for conducting a conflict assessment requires a methodology that is reliable,
accurate, and triangulated.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 119

Reliable: Data is reliable if it comes from dependable, respected sources. Data is most reliable when it
comes from a primary source (directly accessing the source on location) and the researcher identifies all
information as coming from primary, secondary, or tertiary sources. Data is least reliable when it relies
on secondary or tertiary sources (more than one or two degrees of separation from the source or source
material) and researchers fail to identify the source’s reliability.

Accurate: Data is accurate if it can be gathered repeatedly with the same results. Data is most accurate if
the research methodology clearly identifies the data providers (interviewers, pollsters, and collectors)
and they can be reached for queries. Data is least accurate if no information is available about the data
providers. Accuracy also relates to the sampling frame. At best, researchers are transparent, clear, and
logical about whom they choose to interview in the sampling frame. At worst, researchers interview only
a small sample and are not explicit about reasons for choosing that group. The quality of a conflict
assessment relates to the diversity and accuracy of the sources of the information. Do the researchers or
participants completing a conflict assessment speak the local languages? Do they read local daily
newspapers? Do they spend time with diverse stakeholders from within the context to learn more about
their perspectives?

Triangulation: Researchers triangulate data by comparing data from three or more reliable sources.
Researchers fact-check data by comparing it to other data sources and then having it peer reviewed by
internal and external reviewers. Ideally, data from quantitative sources can provide a numerical scale on
how large numbers of people think about some aspect of the conflict. Qualitative sources can examine
how smaller numbers of people provide their own, more personal perspectives about conflict.

Triangulation of data sources increases the quality of the conflict assessment. Conflict assessment can
easily become an exercise in futility if relatively uninformed participants with a limited range of opinions
and experiences use these exercises to make decisions about programming. Too often, conflict
assessments include a single person’s opinion as evidence that ultimately guides policy or programmes.

13. Conflict assessment can never be completely accurate or objective:

The parable of the five blind people and the elephant holds true for conflict assessment. Each blind man
describes the elephant differently. The one holding the trunk, the tail, the leg, or the side of the elephant
describe it as a water hose, a rope, a tree, or a wall, respectively. In the same way, five different conflict
assessment teams could all research the same conflict and easily come up with five different conclusions.

Contradictions are inevitable. People on different sides of a conflict have different perceptions of what is
driving the conflict or what is supporting peace. A conflict assessment process aims to capture not the one
truth about the conflict, but rather to map and describe all the different perceptions of diverse
stakeholders.

In conflict-affected contexts, people differ in their perceptions of what is driving a conflict. There is not
one truth but rather many different truths for different stakeholders. No one is without bias, although
some perspectives are more biased than others. Identifying key issues where disagreement persists can
be an important part of conflict assessment. These issues may be important for learning more about the
experiences, values, and beliefs that lead groups to hold to different perspectives. Identifying common
ground and points of difference is also an important step in developing the curriculum for a dialogue or
setting out the issues for a formal negotiation. In this case, triangulated data should support the different
perceptions to determine each one’s validity or coherency.

14. The identity of the group collecting the data impacts the quality of the data.
In many cultures, people tell data collectors what they think the researchers want to hear. Respondents
may do this to be polite, to ensure that aid money continues coming to their community regardless of
whether it is resulting in effective programmes or not, or because they fear for their safety or position if
they explain their true feelings about what is driving the local conflict. Many donors still use a model of
outsider teams of experts who go into a community to interview local people. This model does not fully
consider the possibility that locals will not provide accurate and complete information to outsiders. Given
that local people perceive that many donor countries and outsiders have their own political and economic
interests in a conflict, the probability that local people will not give accurate information is high. Outside
assessment teams regularly collect distorted data that in turn leads to programmes and policies that are
not effective in preventing, managing, reducing or transforming violent conflict.

120 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Second, data distortion also comes through translation. Conflict assessment questions themselves may be
politically charged or offensive to interviewees. A translator may misinterpret the question, or may not be
able to fully translate a response to a question. The translator may even come from a particular ethnic or
ideological group and intentionally misinterpret a response so as to shape the data.

15. People tend to hear and see what they expect or want to believe.
People’s worldviews shape and filter the world that they see. Research on conflict is particularly
challenging, as people with an interest in a conflict tend to filter data to fit into their current worldview.
Everyone participating in a conflict assessment is subjective—including researchers and research
subjects. No one person or group can conduct an accurate conflict assessment. These expert outsider
teams often fail to conduct a self-assessment of their own biases shaped by what they have read in media
reports about the conflict and their own political assumptions and perceptions of their interests in the
conflict. Without a clear self-assessment, researchers are often blind to their own biases and are more
likely to hear what they want to hear. Assessment teams on tight budgets and with tight timelines may
look for shortcuts to quickly articulate a concise statement of what they see as key drivers of a local
conflict. By necessity, conflict assessment is a process involving a wide variety of diverse voices and
perspectives. At every step of conflict assessment and planning, an important question to keep in mind is
“Whose perspectives are shaping the discussion?”

People desire cognitive consistency or a steady, predictable understanding of the world. Second, when
people perceive something that is inconsistent with their past experiences or beliefs, they seek to hide or
deny it from existence. Contradictions or new information that goes against one’s current worldview is
stressful. If individuals perceive the world in a way that is incongruent with their worldview, they
experience cognitive dissonance; they have anxiety and discomfort about a new experience or idea that
does not fit with their current understanding.

People maintain cognitive consistency and avoid cognitive dissonance in two ways:

a. Filter the world

People filter their experiences with the world in a way that only retains the information consistent with
their current way of viewing a complex environment. People reinforce pre-existing views of what the
conflict is about based on personal experience or professional expertise. Humans selectively perceive
information by either discarding dissonant information or distorting it to fit into current understandings.
For example, conflict assessment teams may discard information suggesting that their own identity group
is driving conflict. A person from the conflict may discard or distort information that appears to show
positive qualities of an adversary. A person from the conflict may repress memories of growing up
peacefully beside their adversary. People may see only the bad things others do and disregard the good.

b. Shape the world

People actively shape a complex environment in the way they expect and want it to be. People jump to
conclusions about what is best to do in a conflict based on the programmes or resources already available
or what one’s own organisation would like to do. People create their own sense of reality by projecting
their current beliefs and values onto the world. People may project their biases and stereotypes of other
groups onto others. For example, researchers may project untrustworthiness on illiterate people,
depending on their biases. People in conflict may project untrustworthiness onto their adversaries. The
more distrustful people are of others, the less likely an adversary is to actually attempt building trust. In
conflict, the psychological process of projection may become a self-fulfilling prophecy as groups labelled
as “terrorists” become more committed to using violent strategies if others exclude them from political
processes.

Another factor to consider is groupthink, which happens as people within a group start to reinforce each
other’s’ points of view. Researchers may start to think alike, reinforce false assumptions, and fail to see
alternatives. Group members may minimise conflict with each other by not asking critical questions about
a dominant point of view, by permitting “mind guards” to censor anyone who veers from unanimity, or by
promoting self-censoring of views that deviate from the group consensus. In groupthink, people become
overly optimistic with a sense of invulnerability and an inherent belief in their morality. Foreign policy
analysts detail how groupthink is responsible for failure to predict major international crises because
policymakers were too likeminded and failed to ask critical questions of each other’s’ assumptions.55

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 121

All of these psychological processes are at work in each person on a research team, in the organisations
they work for, and in all research subjects. Skilled researchers recognise the psychological tendencies and
seek out dissonant information that can challenge their own perceptions.

16. Research Ethics

Research processes are an intervention that changes conflict dynamics. While the final outcome of any
conflict assessment will never be perfect, the discussion and learning that happen in the research process
can either produce better intergroup understanding or it can bring harms by fuelling further conflict.
Some basic ethics of research processes include the following:

Participation: Invite people to participate in owning and shaping research about the environment where
they live. Every conflict has people who bridge different communities. These insiders are often best
placed to help design the research process so that it accurately gathers information from all sides of the
conflict. Outsiders may inadvertently bias the design of the research process itself and entirely miss the
diversity of perspectives necessary for understanding the context. A research team’s choice of location
and interview subjects creates perceptions about the fairness of the process as well as the political
interests behind those carrying out the research.

Accountability: How are researchers and their organisations accountable to local people in sharing their
assessment? Researchers should be aware of elements of power and coercion in collecting data. Who will
benefit from the research? What are possible political and economic interests in the outcome of the
research? Those who participate in an assessment process may do so because of their hope that it will
bring financial or political rewards to their community.

Confidentiality: People participating in an assessment want to know what happens with the information
they provide. Assessment teams should provide an explanation of what happens with the information.
Will the community see a public version of the assessment? Will the assessment team decide on which
communities receive funds for programmes? Will the assessment team give information to the military or
armed forces that may decide to use the information to target individuals in the community?

Transparency: Identify researcher’s obligations to subjects including transparency of the goals, methods
and motives of the research, the benefits to subjects, the ability of subjects to voice their perspectives
themselves, and recognition of potential harms that may come about through the research process.
Interviewees want to know who is carrying out a conflict assessment and what interests lay behind the
process. All research projects involving human subjects require an ethic of transparency.

Sensitivity to Trauma: Research questions can re-traumatise people or increase the conflict. Asking
questions of people experiencing trauma or having lived through traumatic experiences is delicate, if not
dangerous. Victims can feel re-victimised if researchers attempt to evoke an emotional response by
asking questions about how they feel about a tragic experience. Research questions can raise sensitivities
and even increase local conflict. If outsiders come into a community asking about ethnic divisions,
inequality, or gender relations, they may change the way local people view their own problems and
issues. Assessments can change the relationships between groups of people. If planned and managed as
an intervention itself, conflict assessment can be a valuable part of a larger peacebuilding effort. But if
assessment teams are not aware of the sensitivity of their questions, they can do harm to local people
without ever understanding or knowing what they have done.

The Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma advises researchers to ask questions like “What did you see?”
and “Who was there?” rather than “How do you feel?” Questions asking for facts are less likely to cause
harm and more likely to elicit an accurate story about what happened. The Dart Center suggests
journalists always asking a series of self-assessment questions before interviewing victims: Is it necessary
to immediately interview those who have suffered a traumatic event? Is there a value of intruding on
people when they are grieving, disoriented, shocked, and frightened that makes the interview worthwhile
to prevent future violence? If I were chronicling events directly affecting my family, would I alter the
wording of my question in any way? Is it necessary to include graphic descriptions or images in the
research? Could any of the research prove harmful to any of the people involved? 56 Their
recommendations also include:

 Be sensitive to the emotions and trauma of people providing information.

 Plan security measures to ensure the safety and anonymity of people talking to researchers,
 Ensure confidentiality of data. Protect their anonymity and safety.

122 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

REVIEW
This lesson identified research methods and principles to improve the quality of conflict assessments. In
includes ethnical guidance on conducting conflict research and detailed the dangers and traps that
organisations conducting conflict assessment can weaken the credibility of the research.

Citations

48 Lisa Schirch, Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: Toward a Participatory Approach to Human Security,
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014).
49 Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice: Why Less Is More (New York City: Harper Perennial, 2005).
50 Kathleen Sutcliffe and Klaus Weber, “The High Cost of Accuracy,” Harvard Business Review 81 (2003), 74–82.
51 “Red Team Handbook.” Vol. 5, no. 15. U.S. Army: University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, April 2011.
52 Duncan Hiscock and Teresa Dumasy, From Conflict Analysis to Peacebuilding Impact: Lessons Learned from People’s

Peacemaking Perspectives. (London: Conciliation Resources and SaferWorld, March 2012), 17.
53 See The Listening Project website at http://www.listeningproject.info, accessed January 2016.

54 See Ushahidi website at https://www.ushahidi.com, accessed January 2016.

55 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983).
56 Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma, “Self-Study Unit 2: Covering Terrorism”

http://www.dartcenter.org/training/selfstudy/2_terrorism/05.php

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 123

Lesson 12 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 Where do you get information to inform your opinions about what is fuelling conflict or
violence?
 Have you ever researched the factors driving conflict or violence?
 What is an example of a research methodology that led you to feel confident that you knew
the most important factors driving conflict or violence?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice designing a research methodology to carry out conflict
assessment. Create “mixed research teams” with one person from each stakeholder team. Each
team should design a research methodology plan to identify the three most significant drivers of
violence. How will you gather data? How will you interpret data? Have each research team present
their plan to the other mixed teams.

After 20 minutes of team discussion, each team shares their strategy with the other teams. The
facilitator asks the entire group for their observations. Ask the group to vote for which research
team’s methodology they think would achieve the highest quality data.

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

124 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Photo Credit: Lisa Schirch, Kabul University

Lesson 13
Conflict Assessment Tools

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify six tools for conflict assessment
 Determine which tool to use to answer six questions related to conflict.

This lesson provides a set of six tools or lenses useful in conflict assessment. These include the Where,
Who, Why, What, How, and When questions that journalists often use when investigating a story.
Illustrative tools and participatory processes outlined in the last lesson help to improve the quality of
conflict assessment research.

Lesson 13: Conflict Assessment Tools

This lesson is adapted from the book Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning. 57

1. Conflict assessment requires robust research

There are many different conflict assessment frameworks. The framework offered in this lesson is a
synthesis of the types of questions found in most conflict assessment frameworks. There are six
interrelated lines of inquiry related to understanding conflict.

Where is the conflict taking place - in what cultural, social, economic, justice, and political context or
system?
Who are the stakeholders – the people who have a stake or interest in the conflict?
Why are the stakeholders acting the way they do? What are their motivations?
What factors are driving or mitigating conflict?
How is conflict manifested? What are the stakeholders’ means and sources of power?
When does conflict take place? Are historical patterns or cycles of the conflict evident?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 125

The purpose in this lesson is to gain familiarity with the basic six questions that guide any conflict
assessment. There are many conflict analysis tools or conflict assessment “lenses” to help answer each
question. This lesson introduces only one lens for each question to provide an introduction to conflict
assessment.

2. Context Lens: Where is the conflict taking place?

In any complex environment, there are “dividers” and “connectors. 58 Connectors refer to everything that
links people across conflict lines, particularly those forces that meet human needs. Dividers are tensions
or fault lines that refer to those forces that alienate people or interrupt their human needs. Dividers
include sources of conflict, or the issues in conflict.

Connectors Dividers

List of Connectors that links Design programmes that decrease the List of Dividers or the tensions
people across conflict lines, dividers and increase the connectors or fault lines that divide people
particularly those forces that between groups or interrupt their human needs
meet human needs
Figure 32: Connectors and Dividers Analysis Tool

An intervention should be “conflict sensitive” and “do no harm” by reducing the possibility that it could
have unintended consequences or second order effects that would increase divisions between groups and
increase the likelihood of violence. An intervention also should foster resilience by increasing the
connectors between groups. The purpose of this lens is to examine the broad context of connectors and
dividers that exist within a society. There are five categories of connectors and dividers.

Systems and institutions: Systems and institutions—like markets, power lines, water pipes, bridges,
roads and communications systems—can connect people across conflict lines. If systems and institutions
serve some people and not others, they may increase divisions between groups. For example, if oil
pipelines travel through a community but the community does not benefit from the pipelines, the
pipelines are an example of a “divider.”

Attitudes and actions: Even in the midst of war and violence, some individuals behave in surprising
ways, such as adopting abandoned children from the opposing side in the conflict or continuing a
community soccer group across the lines of conflict. Attitudes and actions can be “connectors” helping
groups see the humanity of those on the other side of the conflict. Other people can display hateful
behaviours, write graffiti or call people names
on the other sides of a conflict. Attitudes and
actions can either divide or connect people.
CONNECTORS AND DIVIDERS
Shared values and interests: Shared EXERCISE
religious or moral values, such as a belief in
protecting children or the environment, can
1. Draw the table above and make a list of
connect people across the lines of conflict.
dividers and connectors in the local context.
UNICEF, for example, has negotiated days of
If some forces are listed as both connectors
tranquillity in conflict zones based upon the
and dividers, try to qualify them. For
shared value warring parties placed on
example, if “water” is listed in both
inoculating children against disease.
categories ask the group “Why? It could be
that wells are connectors, as communities
Common experiences: The experience and
share these public spaces. But lack of water
effects of war on individuals can provide
for farmers may be a divider, as community
linkages across conflict lines. Citing the
members involved in agriculture don’t have
experience of war and suffering as “common
enough water to irrigate their crops.
to all sides,” people traumatised by war
sometimes create new anti-war alliances
2. What projects support the connectors? Which
across conflict lines. In other situations, a
efforts increase the dividers?
common experience of trauma can divide
people, as each group is unable to function
3. If you work for an organisation, how would
emotionally.
you redesign or change the work to increase
connectors and reduce the dividers?
Symbols and occasions: National art, music,
historical anniversaries, national holidays,

126 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

monuments, and sporting events (e.g., the Olympics) can divide people by prompting memories of past
traumatic events, bring people together or link them across conflict lines, or some combination of the two.

3. Stakeholder Lens: Who is driving the conflict, and who is supporting peace?
In Lesson 1, this Handbook described the process of stakeholder mapping. This is an example of an
analytical tool to organise information related to the second question of “Who is driving conflict and who
is supporting peace.” Stakeholder mapping can also include categorising stakeholders according to their
characteristics. In the chart below, stakeholders can be rated on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being low level
and 10 being high level.

 Identify stakeholders that contribute to conflict and violence.

 Rate those that contribute to human security. Some stakeholders are simultaneously increasing
conflict or violence while also asserting a desire to improve human security.
 Rate stakeholders who have high or low levels of legitimacy with other stakeholders and a significant
or insignificant capacity to influence change.
 Rate stakeholder’s capacity to contribute (their expertise, funding, local knowledge, language
capacity)

Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholders Level of negative Level of positive Level of legitimacy on Capacity to
impact on impact on human other stakeholders contribute and
violence security and capacity to willingness to get
influence change involved in

Figure 33: Stakeholder Analysis Chart Tool

4. Motivation Lens: Why are the key actors motivated to drive violence or mitigate conflict?
People engage in conflict for various reasons. These motivations range from illegitimate greed to
legitimate grievances. People often decide to fight and die to protect their basic human needs for dignity,
respect, identity, and economic and physical safety.

Stakeholder mapping can help to analyse each stakeholder’s motivations, including their needs, interests
and positions.
Stakeholder Motivations
Stakeholders Needs or grievances Interests Positions

Figure 34: Stakeholder Motivation Analysis Tool

People’s motivations for engaging in peacebuilding efforts to mitigate

conflict are also diverse. In the “onion” diagram here, needs and interests
are often hidden underneath public positions.

Positions are what people say they want in public.

These can be political demands or conditions
under which they will stop fighting.

Interests are desires, concerns, and fears that

drive people to develop a public position.

Needs are the most basic material, social, and cultural

requirements for life that drive people’s behaviour and
their positions and interests. Figure 35: Onion Analysis Tool

There is no evidence of a hierarchy of needs 59 (some may remember Maslow’s pyramid of human needs).
Context seems to shape which of these takes precedence over others. Some people may be willing to give

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 127

up their need to eat, but not their need to exercise
their religion. Others may be willing to sacrifice their
lives, but not their identity and dignity. ONION ANALYSIS
The drive to satisfy core human needs shapes human
EXERCISE
behaviour. Conflict occurs when people perceive that
others are obstructing or threatening their needs and 1. Draw the table “stakeholder
rights. Depending on how threatened people feel, motivations” or the “onion” diagram.
they may be willing to fight, die, or harm others to
satisfy their needs. People fight to preserve their 2. Identify a list of key stakeholders
sense of identity just as much if not more than to based on the stakeholder analysis above.
obtain power or resources. Threats and punishments
are ineffective at changing the behaviour of people 3. What are the positions, interests, or
trying to satisfy what they perceive to be their basic underlying needs that motivate each of
human needs.60 Negotiation processes help people the key stakeholders?
identify underlying needs and rights to develop
creative solutions.

Human needs and human rights are similar. People have a “right” to what they “need”; including food,
water, shelter, education as well as dignity and respect for their right to life. 61 People may satisfy their
needs in different ways. People “need” and have a right to food and shelter. They may take a position that
they must have a certain type of food or shelter. Positions are not rights.

 Material needs and rights include basic physical safety, food, shelter, health care, and the necessary
resources to survive physically.
 Social needs and rights include a sense of dignity, respect, recognition from others, belonging to a
group while having a sense of participation, and self-determination in decisions that affect one’s life.
 Cultural needs and rights include finding meaning in one’s own identity, through cultural and
religious beliefs that help people make sense of the world.

Core grievances develop from a deep sense of frustration that emerges out of persistent social patterns
that obstruct human needs. Grievances emerge as people perceive a social pattern of discrimination or
exclusion of some groups in favour of an elite group. Grievances shape people’s perceptions of what they
see as just and fair. Sometimes these grievances look illegitimate to others. People experience justice as a
satisfaction of these basic human needs.

Greed is a term that refers to people who meet their own interests at the expense of others. For example,
some armed groups use violence to take resources away from other groups so that they can increase their
own personal wealth and finance further armed struggle. Sometimes people act in ways that harm others
in an effort to defend or achieve their needs. Greed may stem from material shortages, perceived
economic interests or “internalised superiority.” Some people perceive that their lives are worth more
than others, and therefore it is “just” for them to have more resources and power. This internalised
superiority develops from cultural values and is shaped by one’s sense of identity of self and other. Most
people view themselves as good and their own motivations as legitimate. People tend to avoid seeing
their own actions as greedy. Instead, they justify the reasons for their actions, describing them as
legitimate grievances.

5. Drivers Lens: What are the drivers of violence and what can be done to impact them?
Root causes are the broad institutional and structural factors that create an environment where violent
conflict is possible. Economic inequality, for example, is a root cause of many violent conflicts. “Conflict
drivers” are the immediate triggers that increase the possibility of violent conflict. Climate change or
environmental shocks such as droughts that destroy crops, the abundant supply of cheap weapons, or
violent extremists who use religion to gain recruits are each examples of conflict drivers.

In many cultures, there are types of trees or plants such as the cassava plant or the raspberry bush that
regenerate even after their tops are cut off. These plants are a metaphor to illustrate the ability for “roots”
to regenerate and spread, despite efforts to eliminate them.

128 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 The tree below illustrates this. Efforts to
address the presenting issues without
addressing the latent root causes will
have little effect on the system.
Sustainable peacebuilding requires
addressing root causes. For example,
Figure 35 illustrates social and
economic inequality and government
corruption as root causes of violent
elections. The branches of the tree are
symptoms of the root causes. These
symptoms also fuel more conflict and
violence. It is important to address the
conflict drivers of violent elections
include a high crime rate, youth gangs
and ethnic clashes. But addressing these
factors might not change the underlying
Figure 36: Tree Analysis Tool structural conditions or root causes of
election violence.

Another metaphor to understand the relationship between factors causing violent conflict is to think of
violent conflict as a fire. The firewood is the root cause, such as political exclusion of one group in society.
Gasoline and the match that lights the fire are the conflict drivers, the factors that cause a fire to erupt,
such as a drought that makes it difficult for people to feed their families. The smoke from the fire is the
violence that is seen. Some analysts, for example, see violent extremists as the “smoke” and not the “fire.”
They suggest addressing political governance and economic issues are essential to preventing violent
extremism.

When analysing the root causes and drivers of violence, it is also important to identify threats to and
vulnerabilities of civilians. Civilians themselves need to be part of any process to assess these risks and
vulnerabilities. Where do people feel unsafe? What will help them address these vulnerabilities?
Preventing mass atrocities requires using an “atrocity lens” to identify potential signs that a group is
preparing to carry out mass atrocities against civilian populations. A conflict assessment can identify the
context, stakeholders, motivations, means, and methods and timing of a potential atrocity (where, who,
why, how, what, and when). This assessment can provide an “early warning” that a crisis is impending
and requires preventive diplomacy or other intervention.

6. Power Lens: How are key actors using power to drive or mitigate conflict?
There are many sources of power. Stakeholders in a conflict can mobilise any of these sources as a means
to fight others, given they have access to them. People can also use or create these sources of power in
peacebuilding efforts.

 Physical or military strength

 Identity (gender, ethnic background, family of origin, position, or authority)
 Personal ability (such as communication skills or professional competency)
 Economic resources
 Information
 Education (knowledge and skills)
 Moral or spiritual power
 The personal power of charisma
 Social capital, including networking abilities, relationships with others, and the ability to mobilise
masses

Social capital refers to the quantity and quality of relationships between people and groups. It is based on
the idea that social networks have value.

Balanced and Unbalanced Power: People often have different levels of power in conflict-affected systems.
People can feel disempowered, as if they have no or little power, when they have a difficult time
influencing decisions that affect their lives. People tend to feel especially disempowered when they are
not consulted or included in a social process that affects their lives, when others devalue their right or

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 129

ability to participate in that process, or when they feel
that they can have no impact on the world and that
death is inevitable. POWER ANALYSIS
EXERCISE
Misperceptions of who has the “most” power are
frequent. People tend to become angry and threaten 1. What are the key stakeholder’s
others when they sense others have more power. different sources of power and social
Assessing the power each stakeholder has to influence capital?
other stakeholders requires a thorough understanding
of their degree of interdependence. The power of any 2. How are the stakeholders in the
stakeholder is related to how dependent others are on conflict dependent upon each other? Are
him or her. The power of A over B is equal to the they interdependent or does one side
dependence that B has on A and vice versa. have more influence on the others?
Domination and Control versus Sharing Power 3. How does power play into the
Power over is the destructive use of power to impact dynamics of the conflict? In what ways
and influence others’ lives without their consent. do stakeholders use power as a means to
Domination, control, submission, defiance, threats, and wage conflict with each other?
counter-threats are examples of “power over”
strategies. They suggest, “If you do not do what I want, I
will do something you do not want.” Attempts to dominate over others often are drivers of conflict. Most
human beings want to participate in decisions that affect their lives. This is why democratic governance is
considered the most stable form of government. When a dictator or armed force imposes and controls
other groups of people, those people almost always resist in a violent insurgency or nonviolent social
movement.

Power with is the constructive use of power to shape the environment with others’ consent and
participation. Productive power is the power to do and create things and the power with others based on
exchange relationships that suggest, “If you do something I want, I will do something you want,” or
integrative power to create something with others, such as “I will do something because I care about your
well-being.” These forms of power are conflict mitigators. When people work together to solve problems
with the goal of achieving a “win-win” solution that meets everyone’s underlying interests and needs,
sustainable peace is possible.

A government’s political power, for example, ultimately depends on the consent and cooperation of its
citizens. All governments depend upon the cooperation of others to participate and consent to
governance. The more citizens deny a government’s authority and legitimacy, the less power that
government can exercise.

7. Timeline Lens: When has the conflict been less or more challenging in the past? Will the
conflict be less or more challenging in the future?
In a complex environment, groups of people often have completely different experiences and perceptions
of history. Research on how different groups perceive history illustrates that different lived experiences
shape the worldviews of groups interpreting history. Not all groups remember historic facts the same
way. Some groups focus on chosen traumas where their group suffered and chosen glories where their
group prevailed.62

The timeline lens illustrates how different stakeholders understand the significant points in history. The
goal of using the timeline lens is not to detect the “correct” or “objective” version of history but to
understand people’s perceptions of past events. People generally remember the things that have affected
them, had an impact on their lives, or shaped their worldviews. People on opposing sides of the conflict
emphasise different events, describe history with different narratives or stories, and attach contrasting
emotions to events. This lens helps people understand how different stakeholders view history.
Developing a timeline of the history of the conflict enables stakeholders to identify those moments in the
conflict that created a sense of “trauma” or “glory” for a group. A “trauma” is an event or series of events
that caused significant disruption and pain. A “glory” is something that groups are proud of and are
important to the group. This process of analysing the emotional impact of past events may also help
stakeholders of opposing groups to understand more about the psychological impact particular memories
may have had on the other group and they may perhaps more readily be able to acknowledge and even
apologise.

130 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

This lens can also identify potential future “windows of vulnerability.” For example, if violence often
happens during elections, a timeline can highlight the potential danger for times in the future when
elections are held. The lens can also identify “windows of opportunity” when there may be opportunities
for peace, such as anniversaries or sports events that bring people together.

TIMELINE EXERCISE
Ideally a timeline is constructed in a large group made up of key stakeholders from different sides
of the conflict. This process brings the most insight into symbolic meaning attached to events by
different groups.

1. Divide the group according to the various “sides,” key actors, or identity groups in a conflict.

2. Ask people in each small group to share the major events that have shaped how they see the
conflict today. They can start as far back in history as they want to begin telling their story of
what has happened.

3. Write a brief, three- to five-word summary of each significant historical event, moment of
glory, or moment of trauma on a separate sheet of paper.

4. The facilitator will lay down a line of rope or tape on the floor to mark the line of history along
with sheets of paper to mark dates along the timeline. Each side of the conflict will lay down the
history in chronological order along the rope line. The historical dates need to be marked so that
each group’s chronology matches up along the line.

5. When each group is finished laying out their key historic dates, ask everyone to silently walk
along the line and read each side’s understanding of history. Note how each side remembers
different events and has a different interpretation of events as traumatic or as a glory.

6. After everyone finishes silently observing the timeline, reconfigure small groups made up of
different identity groups. Ask them to share with each other what they noticed in terms of
commonly perceived events versus differences in perceptions. Allow space for people to ask
questions of each other about their different perceptions.

7. Identify the key points in history where there are shared memories and key points where there
are disparate memories in which one side’s trauma may be the other side’s glory. How can these
memories create opportunities for transforming the current crisis by memorialising,
acknowledging and/or apologising for past events?

REVIEW
This lesson provided six tools or lenses for conducting a conflict assessment research process. The tools
help to identify the Where, Who, Why, What, How and When related to a specific conflict.

Citations

57 Lisa Schirch, Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: Toward a Participatory Approach to Human Security,
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014).
58
The “Do No Harm” Framework for Analyzing the Impact of Assistance on Conflict: A Handbook, (Boston,
Massachusetts: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2004).
59 John Burton, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
60 James Gilligan, Preventing Violence (New York: Thames and Hudson, 2001).
61 Lisa Schirch, “Linking Human Rights and Conflict Transformation: A Peacebuilding Perspective,” in Human Rights

and Conflict: Exploring the Links Between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding, edited by Julie Mertus and Jeffrey Helsing
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 63–95.
62 See Vamik D. Volcan, The Need for Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships

(Northvale, N.J.: Jason Aronson Publishers, 1988).

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 131

Lesson 13 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question:

 What are five different things you need to know about a conflict in order to understand it?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using conflict assessment tools to improve understanding of
conflict dynamics. Create “research teams” with one person from each stakeholder team. Each team
should choose one conflict assessment lens and practice it. For example, one group will do a lens to
explain the Where, Who, Why, What, How or When lens. If the group has not done stakeholder map
(see Lesson 1) then this should be included here. If there are not enough stakeholder teams, then
eliminate one of the lenses. If there are too many stakeholder teams, then two teams can do the
same lens and compare if they are similar or different. Each team can present their tool to the other
groups. This exercise potentially could use a full hour or more. Facilitators will either need to be
strict time keepers or shorten another lesson to allow for more time on this.

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

132 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Flickr CC Photo Credit:
Johannes Lundberg

Lesson 14
Moving from
Conflict Assessment to Planning

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify differences in civilian and military planning processes
 Define how theories of change inform the planning process
 Identify the components a planning cycle

This lesson compares and contrasts military, police and civilian planning processes. It introduces the
concept of “theories of change” – also known as “strategic narratives” - that detail the strategic
narrative that explains the purpose of a programme or activity. The lesson describes the link between
assessment and planning, and the utility of conducting assessment with a set of questions that link
directly to the planning phase.

Lesson 14: Moving from Conflict Assessment to Planning

This lesson is adapted from the book Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning.63

1. Distinctions between Military, Police, and Civilian Planning

Military and police planning is distinct from organisational cultures in government civilian agencies and
in civil society organisations. The chart below provides a general illustration of some of the planning
distinctions between some military and civilian organisations.

There is wide variety within military forces or police departments, some having access to much larger
budgets than other. There is also wide variety within government civilian agencies and civil society
organisations. Some have far more resources and predictable funding than others. Government and
military planning depends on both having resources and authorities to use the resources. Depending on

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 133

the level of civilian oversight of the security sector, the military may be told by civilian leaders to plan or
not plan for specific interventions.

In general, military, police, and government civilian agencies have large dedicated planning teams that
follow precise procedures for planning complex operations. Civil society organisations (CSO) rarely have
dedicated planning personnel. CSO staff at all levels may take part in planning.

A third distinction is that military and police planning tends to be hierarchical. Strategic leaders at the top
take information and intelligence and decide on strategic priorities and “lines of effort.” Military planning
flows from strategic level to operational level to tactical level planners on the ground. Each level of
planning responds to top-level leadership. On the other end of the spectrum, civil society organisations
tend to decentralise decision-making. In large CSOs with head offices, there may be strategic planning
processes and planning may be more hierarchical. But in smaller CSOs, information and planning is more
likely to flow up from the ground level to the top level, or planning may be a consensus-based process
involving all or most of the staff.

Military and Police Planning Government Civilian Planning Civil Society Planning
More predictable funding ----------------------------------------------------------------- Funding less unpredictable
Dedicated planning teams---------------------------------------------------------------No dedicated planning teams
Hierarchical decision making---------------------------------------------------------Decentralised decision making

2. Why link conflict assessment to planning

Too often, conflict assessment does not adequately inform planning. In agencies with separate planning
teams, these teams may know very little about a specific context. Planning should include self-assessment,
conflict assessment, identifying theories of change, designing and planning programmes, and monitoring
and evaluation.
A conflict assessment process ideally generates ideas that can aid in planning for what to do about a
conflict. A conflict assessment can help identify who and what are important factors driving or mitigating
conflict. As noted in lesson 12, research-based analysis, not untested assumptions, should shape planning.

If government leaders believe that there is an evil enemy that can only be stopped by violent threats, this
assumption about the conflict will shape the military and police mandates. If civil society leaders believe
government corruption is driving violence by non-state armed groups, this has a completely different set
of assumptions about how to respond to violence. Analysing conflict drivers and connects can lead to
different and often conflicting assumptions about how to improve human security. Here are examples of
how conflict assessment results can shape planning.

If unequal distribution of wealth is driving conflict, development efforts supporting marginalised populations
or advocating for policies for equal economic opportunities may be necessary.

If religious actors are mitigating conflict, interreligious education, reconciliation workshops and dialogues
may be an appropriate peacebuilding effort to expand their efforts.

If military raids and house searches are driving conflict, advocacy related to changing military strategies
may be an important peacebuilding effort.

If political power struggles by a repressive and corrupt elite class are driving conflict, a civil society
movement supporting democracy may be important.

If women’s markets are mitigating conflict between ethnic groups, strengthening the voices of women may
be important.

Without understanding who and what is driving and mitigating conflict, planning what to do about
conflict reflects the biases and limited perceptions of the group doing the planning.

3. Conflict Assessment builds on a self-assessment.

Self-assessment is a process of identifying one’s own cultural biases, perspectives, interests, and
assumptions about a conflict, and then identifying one’s own resources, capacities and networks to
prioritise planning on what is possible and pragmatic. Are we overconfident about what we think we
know? Do we know what we don’t know? Are we more afraid of not acting than of making mistakes
resulting in second order effects? How are we articulating and testing our assumptions about what is

134 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

driving conflict and our theories of change to reduce conflict? How are we ensuring that we are not
looking for problems that fit the solutions we already have available to offer?

4. “Theories of Change” or the “strategic narratives” refer to the logic of an effort.

Organisations work according to their own set of ideas about the nature of the challenge they are
addressing. Increasingly, civil society and governments are all using a conflict assessment research
process to identify security challenges – including the root causes and drivers of violence. Yet even when
using similar conflict assessment frameworks, groups still tend to understand security challenges
differently.

What are “Theories of Change”?

A “theory of change” (ToC) is a statement – a strategic narrative - about how to address a
particular challenge. Every organisation has an implicit or explicit theory of change that
articulates how some type of strategy or intervention will address the challenges they identify.

Theories of change have three parts. A theory of change is about how some driving or mitigating factor
identified in a CONFLICT ASSESSMENT can be changed with some INTERVENTION PLAN to achieve an IMPACT

Figure 37: Theory of Change Components

5. Integrated Programming
More than one cause or factor drives conflict and violence. Ideally, planners can develop programming
that addresses more than one factor. Integrated planning identifies programmes that will impact more
than one factor driving violence. This is sometimes referred to as “killing two birds with one stone.” For
example, if lack of employment, government corruption, and easy access to weapons are three factors
driving conflict, an integrated programming could train and employ people to monitor government
corruption and document weapons caches.

6. Principles of Moving from Conflict Assessment to Planning

 Ensure that the categories of conflict assessment research will directly feed into the planning process.
The chart on the next page illustrates this principle. The six questions on the left of this framework create
continuity from self-assessment (see lesson 4) through conflict assessment and planning. Consistent use
of the same conceptual frameworks creates an easier transition across each category.
 Identify evidence-based theories of change. Be explicit in naming how your theory of change is
influencing your programming or intervention.
 Identify SMART goals that are specific, measurable, attainable, realistic and timely.

Planning requires deciding whom you will work with, what you will do, and where and when you will do
it. Ultimately, if all stakeholders intending to improve human security coordinate with each other through
these stages of assessment and planning, the variety of their efforts are more likely to synchronise and
harmonise.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 135

7. Pocket guide to moving from conflict assessment to planning

Self- Conflict Theory of Change Planning

Assessment Assessment
WHERE How well do Where is the If x parts of the How will the context interact with
you understand conflict taking context are at the your efforts?
the local place - in what root of conflict and Given your self-assessment, identify
context, cultural, social, division or provide your capacity to impact the
language, economic, a foundation of elements of the context that drive
cultures, justice, and resilience and conflict and to foster institutional
religions, etc.? political connection and cultural resilience.
Where will you context or between people,
work? system? what will influence
these factors?
WHO Where are you Who are the If x individual or Who will you work with?
in the stakeholders – group is driving or Given your self-assessment, decide
stakeholder the people who mitigating conflict, whom to work with to improve
map? Where do have a stake or then what action relationships between key
you have social interest in the will incentivise stakeholders or support key actors
capital? To conflict? them to change? who could play a peacebuilding role
which key between key stakeholders.
actors do you
relate?
WHY How do Why are the If x group is Why will you work?
stakeholders stakeholders motivated to drive
perceive your acting the way or mitigate conflict, Given your self-assessment of your
motivations? they do? What what will change motivations and how stakeholders
are their or support their perceive your motivations, identify
motivations? motivations? how these align with the
motivations of key actors. What is
your goal?
WHAT What are you What factors If x power sources What will you do?
capable of doing are driving or are driving and
to address the mitigating mitigating conflict, Given your self-assessment, identify
key drivers and conflict? what actions will which driving and mitigating factors
mitigators of influence these you will address.
conflict? factors?
HOW What are your How is conflict If x power sources How will you shift power sources
resources, manifested? are driving conflict, in support of peace?
means, or What are the what will influence
sources of stakeholders’ these sources of Given your self-assessment, identify
power? How means and power? and prioritise your capacities to
will these shape sources of reduce dividers and to increase
your efforts? power? local capacities for peace.

WHEN Do you have an Are historical If x times are When is the best timing for your
ability to patterns or conducive to peacebuilding efforts?
respond quickly cycles of the violence or peace, Given historical patterns, identify
to windows of conflict what will influence possible windows of opportunity or
vulnerability or evident? these times? vulnerability and potential triggers
opportunity? and trends of future scenarios.

REVIEW
This lesson compared and contrasted military, police and civilian planning processes. It introduced the
concept of “theories of change” and the link between assessment and planning, highlighting the utility of
conducting assessment with a set of questions that link directly to the planning phase.

Citations

63Lisa Schirch, Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning: Toward a Participatory Approach to Human Security,
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014).

136 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 14 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 What is your most frequent response to conflict? Do you back away, do you get angry, do you
attempt to negotiate? Do you use another method to try to change the situation?
 How does your personal response to conflict shape how you think your organisation or even
your society should respond to conflict or violence?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using conflict assessment reports to develop theories of
change and to plan programmes and efforts. Each research team should identify a “theory of
change” based on their conflict assessment. How does the conflict assessment identification of three
drivers or root causes of violence translate into a hypothesis about what type of intervention might
address one or more of the drivers. Each team should present their theory of change and the
intervention design that stems from their conflict assessment.

In the large group, debrief by voting for which team’s theory of change and intervention design is
most likely to change the drivers or root causes of violence. Teams that create interventions that
address more than one driver or cause of violence through one programme may be given extra
points for creating ‘integrated programming.’

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 137

CC Flickr Photo/Albert
Gonzá lez Farran, UNAMID
women

Module
5
Comparing Approaches
to Security

Module 5 Comparing Approaches to Security

Lesson 15: Human Security and National Security compares and contrasts these two
overarching paradigms.

Lesson 16: Approaches to Violence compares and contrasts war, counterterrorism,

counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, stabilisation, countering violent extremism and conflict
prevention and peacebuilding.

Lesson 17: Approaches to Policing and Justice describes new approaches to policing and
justice based on the idea of community policing, problem-solving policing and restorative
justice.

Lesson 18: Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR) describes some of the fundamental
differences in how different countries go about developing and improving the security sector.

Lesson 19: Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR) describes

some of the fundamental components of programmes that address the challenges of ex-
combatants.

This Module compares and contrasts different approaches to security. Coordination on

approaches security is difficult. There are fundamental tensions between different approaches
to security. Understanding different points of view is essential to enable all stakeholders to
appreciate the different theories of change that underlie the strategic narrative in each
approach.

138 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Flickr CC Photo by Capt. Andrew J.
Czaplicki, Virginia Guard Public Affairs

Lesson 15
Human Security & National Security

Learning Objectives:
 Distinguish between the characteristics of national security and human security
 Identify components of three broad elements of comprehensive human security
 Identify principles of human security

This lesson provides a description and definition of national interests, national security and human
security. This lesson compares and contrasts human security and national security. Civil society-
military-police coordination on national security is often challenging because of different perceptions
and analysis of the causes of conflict. Civil society-military-police coordination on human security is
possible when all stakeholders share an analysis of security threats and participate in constructing
solutions to improve human security.

Lesson 15: Human Security and National Security

1. Contrasting National Security & Human

Security
Many states are moving toward a human security
approach. While national security and human
security approaches sometimes overlap, they are
often not the same. In some countries, there is very
little attention to human security and an exclusive
commitment to national security with an emphasis
on elite economic or geopolitical interests. In these
cases, there is a tension between civil society’s
Figure 38: National Security Overlaps with Human Security
interest in human security and state’s national

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 139

security interests. A dialogue between security policymakers, security forces, and civil society can help
identify common ground in national security and human security perspectives and also appreciate the
areas where their approaches are different. This can allow cooperation in overlapping areas while
appreciating the need for independence in areas that do not overlap.

The chart below contrasts national security and human security.

National Security----------------------------------------------------Human Security
Goal Focus on state interests Focus on safety of individuals and communities
Actors Primarily military and police Many different stakeholders, including civilian
government agencies, military, police and civil
society
Analysis Focus on specific individuals and groups Focus on wider political, economic, social
as threats structures that give rise to violence

An example illustrates the two approaches. An armed opposition movement is threatening to throw over
a government, which is widely known to endanger civilian lives through violations of human rights. A
national security strategy may understand the underlying security challenge as the state lacking a
monopoly of force. As a consequence, the national security actor may ask the international community for
more weapons and to provide training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to security forces. In
contrast, a human security strategy will understand the challenge as the state lacking public legitimacy. A
human security strategy might therefore focus on empowering civil society to hold their government to
account for the grievances that drive support for insurgents.

2. Human Security
Human security refers to the security of individuals and communities. Individuals and communities
measure their human security in different ways, depending on their context. Threats to human security
include violence caused by both state and non-state armed groups, poverty, economic inequality,
discrimination, environmental degradation and health and other factors that undermine individual and
community wellbeing. Comprehensive human security includes three components: freedom from fear,
freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. To address these problems, human security
emphasises the need for “whole of society” efforts including security forces but also government, civil
society, business, academic, religious, media and other stakeholders.

3. National Security and National Interests

National security refers to security of the national interests of the state. States define their national
interests in different ways. In most states, these include one or more of the following:
 Protection of territory
 Protection of citizens
 A legal order
 Economic interests
 Geopolitical interests based on how they view and relate to other countries
 Ideological values such as democracy, human rights, peace, religious values protection of civilians
in other countries, or ideas such as racial segregation

For many states, protection of territory and citizens takes priority over other interests. Some
governments identify national interests in dialogue with their own citizens. Other governments reflect the
interests of elite groups rather than citizens, tending to ignore the interests of minority groups. The less
the gap between government’s and civil society’s
identification of national interests, the more likely
civil society-military-police coordination to pursue A “theory of change” (ToC) is a
national interests is possible.
statement – a strategic narrative -
Different countries base their national security about how to address a particular
strategies on different theories of change about challenge. Every organisation has an
what will protect their interests. When devising implicit or explicit theory of change
their national security strategy, one, several or all of that articulates how some type of
these theories of change may influence countries. strategy or intervention will address
These different strategies rely on different theories the challenges they identify.
of change (ToC) or “strategic narratives” as
described in Lesson 14.

140 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  A “cooperative security” approach is based on a TOC assumption that countries that cooperate
militarily are stronger than those that rely only on their own state’s military capability.
 A “balance of power” approach is based on the belief that states should maintain a military
capability equal to other countries, to neither pose a threat to other states nor be an easy target
for other states.
 A “force dominance” ToC approach is based on the belief that a state must have superior military
force to other states in order to achieve its interests.
 An “all elements of national power” ToC is based on the belief that diplomatic, economic,
information, and military force are each forms of power useful for achieving national interests.
 A “conflict prevention and peacebuilding“ ToC is based on the belief that threats to human security
can be prevented by addressing root causes driving violence and instability.64

4. The emergence of a human security concept

A number of international trends gave birth to the concept of human security. At the end of the cold war,
the UN approach to human security emerged to articulate the need to focus on threats to individuals and
communities and not just states. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote that “we will not enjoy
development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy
either without respect for human rights.”65 The UN’s Millennial Development Goals set out expectations
that some of the sources of human insecurity – such as poverty, lack of education and healthcare – could
be addressed through concerted effort. The mass atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica brought attention
to the lack of political will to respond to mass violence against civilians. The concept of human security
began as a strategic narrative that to link human development, human dignity, state-society relations,
governance, and peace and security issues. The human security agenda began to highlight several
principles:
 The protection of individuals and communities is critical to national and global security.
 Many security threats, such as government corruption, cheap access to weapons, religiously
motivated violence, and climate change, do not have military solutions.
 The security of individual and communities depends on political, economic and social factors and
not just military approaches.
There are various approaches to human security. Some approaches emphasise immediate threats and an
operational approach to the protection of civilians (Module 8 details Civil-Military-Police Coordination on
the Protection of Civilians). The UN approach to human security is broader, representing a more
comprehensive approach to interdependent threats that endanger humans.

5. UN Approach to Human Security

The UN’s Human Security Unit defines human security as “protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms
that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread)
threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means
creating political, social,
environmental, economic, military
and cultural systems that together
give people the building blocks of
survival, livelihood and dignity.”66
Comprehensive human security
includes three components: freedom
from fear, freedom from want, and
freedom to live in dignity.

The UN Human Security Unit

emphasises that human security Figure 39: Components of Human Security
requires both protection of civilians
and empowerment of civil society. Neither of these can be dealt with in isolation as they are mutually
reinforcing. Protection refers to national and international norms, processes and institutions that
shield people from critical and pervasive threats and that address insecurities in ways that are
systematic not makeshift, comprehensive not compartmentalised, preventive not reactive. The concept of
“protection of civilians” has tended to emphasise a “top-down” approach, with states having the primary
responsibility. The concept of “empowerment” emphasises people as actors and participants in defining
and implementing their vital freedoms. It implies a “bottom-up” approach and it enables people to
develop their potential and their resilience to difficult conditions. People who are empowered can
become full participants in decision-making processes and demand respect for their dignity when it
is violated. An empowered civil society complements government programmes to advance human

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 141

security as well as holds governments to account for responsive governance. Civil society can mobilise
for the security of others by taking actions such as, publicising food shortages early, preventing
famines or protesting human rights violations.

The UN Human Security Unit defines five principles of human security.

a. Human security is people-centred, focusing on the safety and protection of individuals, communities,
and their global environment. A human security approach empowers local people to assess
vulnerabilities and threats and then identify and take part in strategies to build security rather than
imposing outside definitions. Strategies to achieve human security are successful in as much as they
protect the quantity and quality of life.
b. Human security is comprehensive. In practice, human security strategies range from a limited
operational “freedom from fear” to a more encompassing structural approach including “freedom
from want” and “freedom to live in dignity.”
c. Human security is multi-sectoral, addressing a range of interdependent global and local threats,
insecurities and vulnerabilities in security, development and human rights.
d. Human security is context-specific. Local dimensions of global threats are unique and require context-
specific assessment and planning.
e. Human security is prevention-oriented. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies aim for
sustainable solutions to address

6. A European Union Approach to Human Security

The 2003 Barcelona Report on European Security Capabilities identified human security as the most
appropriate conceptual framework for the EU security strategy to augment each EU member’s national
security policies. This human security approach draws on and expands existing EU capacities in crisis
management, civil-military cooperation, conflict prevention and reconstruction. The Madrid Report of the
EU’s Human Security Study Group identified six principles of a human security approach67:

The Primacy of Human Rights: The first principle is to ensure respect for human rights: to secure the safety,
dignity and welfare of individuals and the communities in which they live. Respect for human rights is
the main challenge—not military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. This implies that
civilian and military initiatives should prioritise the protection of civilians over the defeat of an enemy.

Legitimate Political Authority: A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for
law and order and respect of human rights. This principle means that any outside intervention must
strive to create a legitimate political authority provided by a state, an international body or a local
authority (a town or region).

A Bottom-Up Approach: Intensive consultation with local people is required, not only to ’win hearts and
minds’ and in order to gain better understanding of their needs, but to also enable vulnerable communities to
create the conditions for peace and stability themselves. This means involving civil society, women and young
people, and not only political leaders or those who wield guns. Outsiders cannot deliver human security; they
can only help.

Effective Multilateralism: This relates to legitimacy and entails a commitment toward the international law,
alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and non-state actors. Effective
multilateralism is one of the factors that distinguish a human security approach from neo-imperialism. It also
means a better division of tasks and greater coherence, solving problems through rules and cooperation, and
creating common policies and norms.

An Integrated Regional Approach: There is a tendency to focus on particular countries when dealing
with crisis. Yet insecurity spills over borders through refugees, transnational criminal networks and so on.
Regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies.

Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction: When the European Union intervenes externally; it must do
so with clear legal authorisation, transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. Where European
security units are deployed there should be close linkage between policy makers and those on the
ground, with former having ultimate control over operations. Civilians should lead all EU external
engagements.

142 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

7. Human security sectors
A comprehensive approach to human security includes a variety of sectors.
 Physical security is often referred to as “citizen security” or “community security”
 Economic security refers to the need for people to have opportunities to earn and access a basic
income. Research links high unemployment with crime and violence.
 Food security refers to people having physical and economic access to basic food. Research
suggests the distribution of food and lack of income to purchase food are the core problems.
 Health security refers to a minimum access to health services, clean water and other basic
necessities to prevent infectious diseases and lifestyle-related chronic diseases.
 Environmental security refers to threats from climate change such as drought, storms, floods,
rising sea waters, and pollution that harm the health of humans and other life.

8. Citizen Security
Other groups use the term “citizen security.” For example, the World Bank’s 2011 World Development
Report on Conflict, Security, and Development (WDR) emphasises “citizen security” as efforts that
assist people to prevent and recover from violence. Citizen security requires that all members of a
society experience both freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence in their
homes, workplaces and interactions with the state and society. The WDR calls for a paradigm shift in
the development community’s work in fragile and conflict-affected settings. It argues that fragility and
violence stem from the combination of exposure to economic, political or security stresses, and weak
institutional capability for coping with these stresses. Where states, markets and institutions fail to
provide basic social, justice and economic opportunities to citizens, and where they are unable to
manage the resulting tensions, conflict and instability can escalate. Successful transitions out of
violence require legitimate and effective institutions to provide ‘citizen security,’ ‘justice’ and ‘jobs’.

9. Democratic Security
The concept of “democratic security” reflects the idea that
Civil society groups in Guatemala
governments should consult with and listen to the security
worked with the security sector to find
interests of its own citizens. Democratic security also relates
ways of “democratic security” as part of
to how foreign governments listen to the interests of
the UN peace plan. Civil society argued
civilians in other countries to define how foreign military
that if the country was moving from a
forces relate to civilians. Democratic security requires an
dictatorship to a democracy and if
open, public debate and dialogue on national priorities,
security was a “public good” – then civil
strategies to achieve those interests, and determining the
society should be involved in defining
roles, authorities and budgets of government agencies in
the role and focus of the security sector
pursuing those strategies.
to improve protection of civilians.
REVIEW
Read more about the move toward “Democratic
This lesson defined concepts and strategies related to national Security” in Guatemala in Local Ownership in
security and human security. The distinction between national Security, the companion report to this Handbook.
security and human security is important for this Handbook. A
shared human security approach makes cooperation between
military, police, civilian government, and civil society possible. Where there is a big gap between a national
security approach and a human security approach, civil-military-police cooperation and even coordination
becomes both more difficult and more critical, as it leads to greater tension and conflict between the state and
society.

Citations

64 See the following resources for understanding peacebuilding as national security strategy:
 Christopher Holshek and Melanie Greenberg, “Toward a New Strategy of Peace” in Socio-Cultural Analysis with
the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm, Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger Editor,
 Volker C. Franke Robert H. Dorff Editors, Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American
Grand Strategy, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2013).
 Understand to Prevent: The military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict, (Multinational Capability
Development Campaign, 2015).
65 In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary General Kofi
Annan, UN doc. A/59/2005, (New York, New York: United Nations, 2005), 55.
66
Human Security in Theory and Practice: An Overview of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust
Fund for Human Security, (New York, New York: Human Security Unit, undated).
67 A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group, ( Madrid, Spain: Common

Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy, 2008).

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 143

Lesson 15 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 If you have $500 million dollars to improve security in your own country, where would you
invest this money? What organisation or programme would you most like to see improved?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast a national security and human security
approach. Facilitators provide each scenario stakeholder team with ten items (a coin, a stick, or a
piece of candy) that each represents $500 million dollars and ten small sheets of paper.

Ask the group to create a security budget for their scenario in twenty minutes. How would the group
invest funds to address the security threats in this environment? Each group should identify how
they would allocate their budget. For example, how much would they give to police, military, to
agriculture, education, employment generation or diplomatic activities? Use the items and the paper
to label and illustrate how the group decides to divide up the security budget for the country.

Allow each team to display their budgets for other teams on their table. Allow time for participants
to walk around the room to see how other teams allocated their budgets.

Debrief in the large group. What was challenging in the small group discussions? What was
surprising in the exercise? What did you learn from other groups?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

144 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 CC Flickr Photo by
Khalfan Said, U.S.
Embassy, Tanzania

Lesson 16
Approaches to Security

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Distinguish between different types of violent threats
 Identify how different analytical approaches to understanding violence lead to different choices
of how to address violence.
 Identify and compare the analysis and theories of change of counterterrorism,
counterinsurgency, countering violent extremism, peacekeeping, stabilisation and conflict
prevention/peacebuilding approaches to violent threats

There are many approaches to violence. This lesson describes the rationale or “strategic narrative”
underlying different approaches. This can help civilians understand military and police approaches to
security and it can help military, police and civilian political leaders understand conflict prevention and
peacebuilding options advocated by civil society to support human security.

Lesson 16: Approaches to Security

1. Terminology
 International and interstate violence occurs as states wage war against each other. This type of violence is
increasingly rare in today’s world. The majority of violent conflicts today are between states and non-
state actors. The terminology for this violence is controversial. What looks like “terrorism” to one group
may seem like a justified use of military force to another group.
 An armed rebellion against a state usually entails the use of guerrilla warfare and a significant military
asymmetry between the state and the armed opposition groups. Civil society tends to use the more
neutral term of “armed rebellion.” States tend to call these movements “insurgencies.”
 Terrorism is a tactic. Terrorism can be used by non-state armed groups or by states themselves.
Terrorism has four characteristics: (1) the threat or use of violence; (2) a political objective used to
justify violence; (3) the intention to spread fear by dramatic violent acts; (4) the intentional targeting of
civilians. All groups may refer people that use terrorism as “terrorists.” But the definition of this term is

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 145

 subjective. Some would view the actions of a repressive state or state violence and call that state a
“terrorist.” Others only use the term terrorist to refer to non-state armed groups.
 Violent Extremism is a term that refers to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to
achieve ideological, religious or political goals. The term also refer to a contagious, global movement.
Terminology for referring to the groups in conflict is also relative. Different stakeholders use different
terms. Military forces use the language of “enemy” and “adversary” to identify those groups that threaten
the security or interests of the state. Police may use the language of “criminals.” Civil society rarely uses
these terms: for them, and those involved in peace operations, the enemy is the conflict itself. Human
rights groups may refer to state and non-state armed groups as “perpetrators” if they use violence against
civilians. Other civil society groups use the term “stakeholders” to recognise that all groups that use
violence have a set of motivations or a “stake” in some issue.

Military Term Police Term Human Rights Term Civil Society Term
Enemy or Adversary Criminal Perpetrator Stakeholder

Civil society is often equally critical of state and non-state groups that use violence and intentionally or
unintentionally kill civilians in their attempts to kill their “enemies.” But calling a group an “enemy”
makes it difficult to solve problems through diplomacy or negotiation. Two countries may be in conflict or
even using armed force to threaten each other on one issue while collaborating and working together to
address a shared problem. The term “enemy” becomes problematic when shifting dynamics create a
situation where a group labelled as an enemy becomes an ally to fight against another enemy.

2. Different Conflict Assessment, Theories of Change, and Approaches to Civilians

This lesson compares and contrasts different approaches to violence according to their analysis, their
theories of change, and their approach to civilians. Module 4 introduced the concepts of conflict
assessment. Different analysis of the causes and dynamics of conflict and violence lead to different
theories of change, and this in turn leads to different approaches to security. The diagram below
illustrates the three main categories for comparison of different approaches to security. Different
approaches to security – including counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, conflict
prevention and peacebuilding are first described, and then they are compared and contrasted according
to their different analysis, theory of change and approach to civilians.

Figure 40: Categories for Comparing Approaches to Security

146 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

3. Counterterrorism
There is no common or agreed upon definition of counterterrorism. Each organisation and country
defines counterterrorism somewhat differently. In general, counterterrorism strategies aim to prevent
and respond to violent acts by non-state armed groups that threaten national interests.

The table below provides a strategic narrative to explain the rationale behind counterterrorism. In
counterterrorism, the causes of terrorism stem from specific individuals or groups that use violence to
attack state interests. There is often a second analysis that terrorism takes place where there is a lack of
state capacity to maintain a monopoly of force.

Analysis Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians

Counter- Terrorism is a caused by Prevent and stop terrorism through these efforts:
terrorism (CT) specific individuals or  Deter, destroy, and detain individuals and groups
groups that use violence to that use terror
attack state interests.  Increase the state’s capacity to prepare, prevent,
protect, and respond to terrorism, including
Terrorism results from a train and equip state security forces in other
lack of state capacity to countries
maintain a monopoly of  Pacify and prevent civil society from supporting
force. terrorist groups
Figure 41: Counterterrorism Strategic Narrative

The analysis of the causes of terrorism often frames the motivations of these groups as “evil.”
Counterterrorism rarely refers to structural root causes or drivers of violence. The assumption is that the
best way to prevent and respond to this type of violence is to deter, destroy or detain specific individuals
or groups that are seen as threats. Counterterrorism is “threats-based” and is usually enemy-centric.
States use “enemy targeting” through drone strikes to deter, destroy and isolate groups that use terror.
Counterterrorism can also include pre-emptive attacks including capturing, killing, or disabling suspected
terrorists before they can mount an attack.

Governments may also take a range of preventive measures to prepare for terrorism. This can include
“hardening targets” by putting out barriers to obstruct attacks and developing security protocols in order
to protect building, installations or other infrastructure against a possible attack. A “national response
plan” outlines the roles for different government agencies and lays out a command and control hierarchy
for use in the midst of a crisis. Police, fire, and emergency medical response organisations ready
themselves through training and roleplaying to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. The military,
police, and intelligence agencies may form special tactical units that prepare to handle a terrorist attack.
Some countries emphasise law enforcement and “intelligence-led policing;” using criminal justice system
to address terrorism.

4. Counterinsurgency
Like counterterrorism, there is no shared definition of counterinsurgency. In general, counterinsurgency
balances enemy centric and population centric approaches, meaning there are both efforts to “deter,
destroy, detain” insurgent groups as well as efforts to listen to, understand, protect, and win the support
of local populations.

In counterinsurgency, the causes of violence stem from two factors: groups that use violence to attack
state interests and a tension between the state-society relationship requiring a need for the state to “win
the hearts and minds” of the population. COIN assumes that insurgency threatens fragile states and cause
instability. COIN holds to an analysis that insurgents capitalise on societal problems, such as gaps in
governance. When governments lack capacity to govern, non-state armed groups can recruit new
members from the discontented local population. Counter-insurgency attempts to close the gaps by filling
in for key governance activities to marginalise insurgents politically, socially, and economically.

There is overlap between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency (COIN) has a long
history. Early attempts at counterinsurgency used violent repression against civilian populations and
looked similar to counterterrorism. Today, most counterinsurgency also emphasises non-military efforts.
While counterterrorism draws mostly on intelligence, police and military forces, counterinsurgency
involves a wider range of civilian efforts “to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its
root causes by improving the state-society relationship.

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 Analysis Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians
Counter- Non-state armed groups Defeat and contain insurgents through these efforts:
insurgency use violence to attack  Destroy, isolate, and undermine insurgents and
(COIN) state interests. their narratives
 Win over the hearts and minds of the population to
Insurgency is caused by a deny popular support for the insurgency,
problem in the state- including
society relationship o Limiting civilian casualties resulting
requiring a need for the from COIN attacks while protecting
state to “win the hearts civilians from insurgent attacks
and minds” of the o Increasing government legitimacy via
population. governance and development efforts
Figure 42: Counterinsurgency Strategic Narrative

There is also tension between security personnel who advocate counterterrorism with those who
advocate counterinsurgency. Counterterrorism is sometimes posed as the approach that is “tough” and
“ruthless” with the enemy while counterinsurgency is seen as more complex and using a mix of hard
power (violent force) and soft power (diplomacy and development) to address the underlying structural
conditions. Counterinsurgency can include house-to-house searches to locate insurgents or forced
relocation of local populations in an attempt to "drain the swamp" or the communities who may be
intentionally or unintentionally hosting insurgents. Counterinsurgency may attempt to win over the
hearts and minds of the population through civilian assistance projects. This type of effort aims to both
helps to bring legitimacy to the government while undermining the insurgents’ relationship with local
populations. Counterinsurgency often includes propaganda and psychological operations that attempt to
undermine the mind-set of the insurgents and local populations who may support them.

Since most insurgent groups have inferior military training and weapons, the goal of the insurgency is not
to defeat a state-based military force. Instead, insurgents attempt to inflict small but regular casualties
that aim to slowly demoralise the military and their civilian supporters. Counterinsurgency experts assert
that political, social, and economic programmes are usually more valuable than conventional military
operations in addressing the root causes of the conflict and undermining the insurgency.
Counterinsurgency guidance warns about the unintended impacts of the use of violence against
insurgents.

Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is. Any use of force produces many
effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the chance
of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity
for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using
force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be
established (FM 3-24: 1-27).68

This creates a tension, as the military is asked to achieve a mission without relying on the use of force,
which is the military’s primary capability. Stabilisation developed from these tensions implicit in
counterinsurgency.

5. Countering Violent Extremism

Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a relatively new concept. It is defined in a variety of ways. Many
countries are beginning CVE programmes as a new approach to security. In countering violent extremism,
the causes of violent extremism are seen as individual choices of individuals or groups to join others to
use violence to achieve political and/or religious goals.

Most frequently, CVE programmes aim to support local communities to resist recruitment into terrorist
organisations and assume civil society has an important role in preventing recruitment into groups that
use violence. CVE programs use a theory of change that emphasises addressing the “pull” and “push”
factors encouraging individuals and groups to commit acts of violent extremism.

148 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Analysis Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians
Countering Individuals and groups Improve human security through these efforts.
Violent use violence to achieve  Address the “Pull” factors that pull individuals to
Extremism political and/or join extremist groups. These include creating
religious goals jobs, developing positive narratives or “counter-
narratives” and supporting the voices of
religious moderation
 Address the “Push” factors that push individuals to
join extremist groups. These include addressing
political, economic, and social
disenfranchisement, government corruption, and
addressing economic hardships, such as climate-
change induced droughts
Figure 43: CVE Strategic Narrative

Stabilisation
There is no agreed upon definition of stabilisation, and different countries implement a stabilisation
approach in distinct ways. Stabilisation draws on an analysis that security requires supporting the
capacity of a government that is unable or unwilling to provide services to the population or is not viewed
as legitimate by the public. Key examples of stabilisation approaches to security include Iraq, Afghanistan
and Libya. Stabilisation approaches to security are often foreign-led with emphasis on externally defined
concepts of law and order. States decide to deploy a stabilisation force and accompanying civilian
programme to another country when their own national interests are at stake.

Analysis Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians

Stabilisation Non-state armed groups Improve human security through these efforts.
attack and destabilise  State-building to improve state capacity for
states. security, rule of law, sustainable economy, good
governance, social well-being
Violence is caused by a  Whole of government approach to coordinate
problem in the state- civilian government agencies and the military.
society relationship
requiring a need to build
state capacity.
Figure 44: Stabilisation Strategic Narrative

In stabilisation, the causes of conflict and violence stem from non-state armed groups that attack states
and a problem in the state-society relationship requiring a need to build state capacity. Stabilisation
emphasises a “state building” to improve state capacity for security, rule of law, sustainable economies,
good governance, and social well-being. Security sector reform, addressed in Lesson 18, is often part of a
stabilisation mission to improve state capacity. Stabilisation also emphasises the use of a “whole of
government” approach that coordinates government civilians and military forces. Some stabilisation
missions explicitly took on the human security paradigm, as it created a strategic narrative for linking
military, police, and civilian approaches to security. The basic idea of stabilisation is that foreign capacity
and leadership will transition to local “host nation” leadership. Stabilisation literature tends to emphasise
the need for “local ownership” though there is little evidence of successful practice in this area.

Some states seem to view stabilisation missions as an addition to their counterinsurgency or

counterterrorism approaches. These states tend to devote significantly greater resources for military
forces than civilian capacities. Other states lead stabilisation with greater emphasis on civilian capacity.
The stabilisation approach to security has brought new attention to the challenges of civil-military-police
coordination. However, as outlined in Lesson 9 on Approaches to Multi-Stakeholder Coordination, states
using a stabilisation approach tend to focus more attention to coordinating internally than with external
stakeholders.

6. Peacekeeping and Peace Operations

The UN and regional organisations like the African Union use peacekeeping and peace operations as their
primary approach to security. UN Peacekeeping is traditionally guided by three basic principles: consent

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 149

of the parties; impartiality; and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Unlike
military forces from just one country, peacekeeping forces bring added legitimacy as they represent a
consensus between multiple countries that are willing to share the financial burden of peacekeeping and
are able to sustain peacekeeping and police forces in an on-going multidimensional mission.

Since the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, which happened despite the presence of peacekeeping
troops, there has been a tendency to make the mandates of peacekeeping missions more robust and
comprehensive, sometimes including the use of offensive force. The 2015 UN High-Level Independent
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (aka the HIPPO Report) identified four areas of focus and
principles for future peace operations. These include the following:

Primacy of politics: Political solutions are necessary to achieve sustainable peace and human security.
Military and technical engagements are note sufficient to achieve security.

Responsive operations: A full spectrum of responses and approaches to security should be tailored to each,
specific context. The term “peace operations” reflects this idea.

Stronger partnerships: No one stakeholder can achieve security on their own. Coordination among diverse
stakeholders are necessary.

Field-focused and people-centred: Local ownership is necessary and protection of civilians is critical to the
success of all approaches to security.

In peacekeeping and peace operations, the causes of conflict and violence stem from political conflicts
that often result from problems in the state-society relationship. Peacekeeping and peace operations
emphasise a full spectrum of options for responding these challenges, with a special emphasis on conflict
prevention and peacebuilding.

Analysis Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians

Peace Violence results from Improve human security through these efforts.
Operations political conflicts.  Peacekeeping to offer protection of civilians and to
provide time for a political solution to the
conflict
 Conflict prevention and peacebuilding to develop
political, economic, and structural solutions to
the conflict
 Whole of society partnerships to coordinate
stakeholders to support human security

Figure 45: Peace Operations Strategic Narrative

7. Local Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
Local conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches to security are distinct from and pre-date the
more recent attention to large-scale peace operations. Due to perceived failure or slowness of state-based
institutions to prevent violence, universities, religious organisations, NGOs and other civil society
organisations developed new approaches to negotiation, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation. Local
conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts began in the 1980s in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America
in places where the state itself was perpetrating atrocities. 69 Civil society accumulated an impressive
track record of helping to end wars in countries like South Africa, Liberia, and Guatemala leading to
functional states with new democratic constitutions. Elsewhere, civil society prevented outbreaks of
violence at the subnational level through careful Track II diplomacy and mediation and developed their
own strategies for the protection of civilians in the midst of armed conflict.

Conflict prevention refers to activities that take place before violence begins and that aim to stop violence
from breaking out. Once significant violence begins, managing and transforming conflict becomes more
difficult.70 Conflict prevention is a component of the larger field of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding refers to
a range of activities at any stage of conflict to prevent, mitigate, or transform conflict.

150 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding have three components:

 Address the immediate drivers of violence (e.g. operational efforts such as preventive and crisis
diplomacy, intergroup dialogue, media strategies, economic sanctions, observer missions or
rapid response forces).
 Transform the structural root causes of violence (e.g. economic and political reforms, developing
infrastructures to support peace and manage conflict, justice and security sector reform and
development.)
 Support mitigating factors that foster resilient responses to conflict (e.g. supporting voices of
moderate religious actors, women, youth, and other civil society actors) and recognise that cycles
of violence can cause widespread societal trauma that decrease a community’s resilience.
Conflict prevention and peacebuilding make a distinction between direct violence and structural violence.

 Direct violence refers to physical harm committed by one person or group against another.
Structural violence refers to the disabilities, disparities, and even deaths that result from systems,
institutions, or policies that foster economic, social, political, educational and other disparities
between groups. These disparities create grievances. Insurgents exploit these grievances to gain
public support.

 Several of the approaches to security covered in this lesson acknowledge that the behaviour of
states impacts levels of violence. International and interstate violence occurs when the economic,
political, or security policies of one country challenge the interests of other countries.

Human security is the goal of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Unlike other approaches to security,
local conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts take a long-term approach. Local people take the
initiative to respond to security challenges where they live. There is no “exit strategy” since local people
will continue working to improve human security are not confined by mandates or project timelines.

Peacebuilding asserts that the relationship between levels of state structural violence and terrorist or
insurgent groups is often cyclical. Non-state armed groups often thrive where they are seen as an
alternative to government corruption and repression. Non-state armed groups typically develop within
states that have two characteristics:

 States that are elite-captured are more prone to corruption, discriminate against certain groups,
and are less citizen-oriented.

 States that do not observe human rights, particularly those that use military or police force to
repress political dissent.

Analysis Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians

Local conflict Violence results from Improve human security through these efforts.
prevention and a cycle state that are  Improve governance by building a citizen-oriented
peacebuilding elite-captured and do state and improving the state-society relationship
not observe human  Empower civil society to partner with the state and
rights, and non-state hold the state to account
armed groups that  Use dialogue, negotiation, and mediation to develop
challenge the state. political, economic, and structural solutions to
the conflict and to improve relationships between
social groups
 Whole of society partnerships to coordinate
stakeholders to support human security
Figure 46: Local Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategic Narrative

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 151

8. Comparing the Analysis and Theories of Change
Analysis of the causes of conflict influences the strategies for addressing violence. Some approaches to
security use violence to deter, destroy or defend against an adversary. A reliance primarily on the use of
military and police force assumes that individuals and groups that use violence “only understand the
language of violence.” They use the metaphor of “fighting fire with fire.” Individuals and groups that use
violence are themselves seen as the problem and response must thus target and eliminate them.

Some approaches to security take a wider view of security challenges. The “lenses” they use to view the
conflict not only include the individuals and groups that use violence but also the wider context where
these groups are able to recruit and mobilise others. Non-state armed groups are seen as the “smoke” or
symptoms and not the “fire” or root causes of the problems. State characteristics such as specific
international or national security, political and economic policies that exclude or repress certain groups
push individuals and groups away from using political methods to address their grievances and make it
more likely these groups will use violent methods. Global trends such as economic hardship, climate
change shocks, availability of weapons, and religious rifts are also seen as root causes contributing to
conflict. Instead of “fighting fire with fire” these other approaches advocate “fighting fire with water” or a
combination of “fighting fire with both water and fire.”

While counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, CVE, stabilisation, and peacekeeping focus on operational

and tactical approaches to disable immediate threats, conflict prevention and peacebuilding – both in
peace operations and local initiatives - focus on changing the broader context. Advocates of
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approaches view the underlying problem as the state’s lack of a
monopoly of force. Advocates of stabilisation view the problem as the lack of state capacity to provide for
society. Advocates of conflict prevention and peacebuilding perceive the underlying problem as the
state’s lack of legitimacy and poor state-society relations.

9. Comparing the State-Society Relationship

Lesson 5 outlined the history of relationships between state security forces and society. In many
countries, the state has historically viewed civil society as a threat or as passive wards of state security
strategies. The spectrum of approaches to security in this lesson also relate to the state-society
relationships.

Most of the approaches to security acknowledge a growing need to put more emphasis on protection of
civilians and empowering civil society. Leaders in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping are shifting both
training and doctrine to focus on protection of civilians. New approaches to stabilisation, CVE, conflict
prevention and peacebuilding approaches are placing more emphasis on empowering and supporting civil
society to support human security. This Handbook is a result of the new attention to the roles of civil
society and the need to improve coordination between security forces and civil society in any of these
approaches to security.

Counterterrorism approaches often use the term “pacification” to describe their efforts to keep civil
society from supporting non-state armed groups. Current counterterrorism laws and policies often
intentionally “pacify” or unintentionally have the effect of preventing civil society from its efforts to
address humanitarian needs, protect civilians, and use conflict prevention and peacebuilding methods. In
many countries, it is illegal for civil society to offer negotiation training to non-state armed groups or to
use mediation between state and non-state armed groups to achieve a political solution to conflicts. Given
that most peace agreements come about because of civil society-led mediation efforts, counterterrorism
legislation inhibits potential political solutions.

The Madrid Agenda arising from the 2005 Madrid Summit on Democracy and Terrorism emphasised the
need to treat terrorism as criminal acts to be handled through existing systems of law enforcement and
with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. This human rights-based approach to
counterterrorism emphasises (1) taking effective measures to make impunity impossible either for acts of
terrorism or for the abuse of human rights in counter-terrorism measures. (2) the incorporation of
human rights laws in all anti-terrorism programmes and policies of national governments as well as
international bodies."

10. Comparing the effectiveness of approaches to violence

There is little research that compares and contrasts the different approaches to security outlined in this lesson.
Researchers within each approach tend to cite research that supports the effectiveness of the approach they are

152 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

currently taking. Organisations tend to see problems as being caused by factors that their organisation can fix.
This is true for military, police and civil society.

The Human Security Report71 documents that overall, violence is decreasing and the main reason is the
coordinated efforts to support peacebuilding to address root
causes. Yet a number of researchers document that violent
extremism is on the rise, despite over a decade of investing
primarily in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. More than
90% of all terrorist attacks occur in countries with gross human
rights violations.72

The RAND Corporation, a military-affiliated think tank in the US

has produced some reports that compare the effectiveness of
different approaches to “How Terrorist Groups End.” 73 As
illustrated here, research affirms that most terrorist groups
terminate via political processes and policing, not by military force
or victory. More research is needed to compare and contrast the
effectiveness of different approaches to security and to compare
the financial costs and the intended and unintended impacts of
each approach to security. Figure 47: Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki,
How Terrorist Groups End (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND Corp. 2008), 19.
11. Coordination between different approaches to security
Ideally, all approaches to security would complement each
other; however, these approaches can conflict with and undermine each other in practice. There are
internal conflicts within and between countries about which approach to security is the best. Some
civilian leaders favour a hard, military response to punish and kill their adversaries. Other civilian leaders
advocate greater emphasis on addressing political conflicts and structural root causes. Likewise some
military and police leaders insist there is “no military solution” or “no police solution” to problems of
terrorism, criminal violence such as drug and arms trafficking, or non-state armed groups. They assert the
need to develop “non-kinetic” and nonlethal approaches to address governance, economic, and social
aspects driving violent conflict. Other military leaders demand a harsh military response to deter and
punish those who use violence, whether other states or non-state groups.

There are also tensions between governments and civil society over which approach to security is best.
Civil-military-coordination on security is essential precisely because different stakeholders hold a
different analysis of the problem, use different strategies to pursue security, and take a different stance on
the role of civil society. Civil-military-police dialogue and consultation is essential to improve
understanding of these differences, and to identify areas of common ground where diverse stakeholders
can coordinate their efforts.

REVIEW
This lesson compared and contrasted different approach to security including the different analysis each
approach uses to understand the causes of violence and the different theories of change in the
interventions each approach uses to attempt to prevent or stop violence.

Citation

68 Counterinsurgency: US Army Field Manual 3-24, (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 2006), 1-27.
69 See for example the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, ACCORD in South Africa, the West African Network for
Peacebuilding and various civil society peacebuilding initiatives that began in parts of Asia and Latin America in the
1980s.
70 Michael S. Lund, “Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice,” The Sage Handbook of Conflict

Resolution. Eds Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I William Zartman. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009).
71 Human Security Report 2014, (Vancouver, British Colombia: Human Security Research Report, 2014). See:

http://www.hsrgroup.org accessed October 2015.

72 Global Terrorism Index 2014, (New York, New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014).
73 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp. 2008), 19.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 153

Lesson 16 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 In your experience, what is the most effective approach or strategy to improve security in
your country?
 What experiences shape this belief? How do you judge whether an approach to security works
or does not work?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast different approaches to violence drawing on the
different analyses and theories of change outlined in this lesson. Create small mixed groups of 5-6
people with one person from each scenario stakeholder team. Within each group, each person can
make the case for one or more of the approaches to security they would advocate for use in the
scenario. You can use your own personal opinion and/or guess what the stakeholder role you are
playing would advocate.
 What are the dangers of other approaches?
 What are the benefits of the approach you advocate?

After 20 minutes of dialogue in mixed groups, the facilitator asks the entire group for their
observations.
 What did you notice about the different ways people talked about the causes of violence?
 What did you notice about the different theories of change people used?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

154 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

CC Flickr/Alberta Sheriffs’ Peace Officer
Exemplary Service and Long Service
Recognition Ceremony Photo credit-
Russell Hewitt

Lesson 17
Approaches to Justice & Policing

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Compare and contrast different approaches to justice
 Compare and contrast different approaches to policing
 Define restorative justice, community policing and problem-solving policing

Just as there are many broad approaches to security, there are also many different approaches to
policing and justice. This lesson helps civilian, military and police leaders to understand different
approaches to policing and justice. This lesson emphasises community policing, problem-solving police
and restorative justice approaches that allow for the most coordination between civil society and the
police and justice systems.

Lesson 17: Approaches to Justice and Policing

1. Justice Sector Goals
The justice sector can accomplish a number of goals to improve human security.
1. Uphold the rule of law
2. Maintain public order
3. Improve public safety
4. Resolve conflicts in society
5. Enable a democratic process for listening to public concerns

2. Justice Sector Institutions

Governments set up three types of institutions to support a justice system: Police, Courts and Corrections
or prisons
 Police maintain order, enforce criminal law, and provide services such as preventing crime. Police
gather evidence and support criminal investigations in the criminal justice process.
 Courts are bodies that attempt to apply laws in order to determine justice through a discussion

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 155

 between prosecutors, defence attorneys, and judges.
 Corrections institutions (such as prisons) and processes (such as probation) aim to punish,
rehabilitate, and/or improve public safety by removing people committing crimes from the
public.

3. Civil Society Roles in the Justice Sector

Civil society plays important roles in achieving the goals of the justice sector. Civil society can reinforce common
values, foster social cohesion, and support self-help, self-regulation, peer pressure for good behaviour, and
personal responsibility to contribute to public safety, the rule of law and public order. The public can contribute
to the common good and governance, or they can focus on their own personal safety and invest in gated
communities or private security guards.

4. Justice Sector Challenges

The problems within the justice sector differ from country to country.

 Resources and Capacity: In some places, there are too few financial and human resources
supporting the justice sector. Plagued by corruption or incompetence, courts and corrections do
not have enough capacity.
 Root Causes: Levels of crime correlate with structural problems such as income inequality,
corruption, and lack of opportunities. In some places, the justice sector does not work because
law enforcement processes (police, courts and corrections) cannot address the amount of crime
happening. The structural problems create a level of crime that is too high for any law
enforcement strategy to handle.
 Public Support: In some places, the justice sector does not work because it lacks public support and
cooperation. Victims and communities affected by crime are left out of the justice process. Their
frustration with law enforcement leads to apathy and a lack of involvement.

5. Justice sector reform

Justice sector reform aims to improve safety while maintaining democratic principles. It can include each
of the following:

Figure 48: Components of Justice Reform

156 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Justice sector reform and wider security sector reform overlap. Police reform connect the two sectors.
The security sector (including the police) is responsible for protecting the rule of law. The justice sector
(including the police) is responsible for making sure that the laws themselves and the process of justice
are fair. If people feel they cannot trust the justice sector to work fairly, they may use violence to pursue
justice and undermine public security. Security sector reform often requires simultaneous justice sector
reform to support the creation or improvement of institutions for the police, courts and prisons. Police
earn public legitimacy when they enforce legitimate laws. Police that attempt to enforce laws that the
public perceives as unfair or illegitimate may contribute to public support for non-state armed groups. If
there are improvements in policing, but not prisons, for example, the justice system will not work. More
people may be arrested for crimes, but there will be no prisons that can hold them or no possibility to
provide a fair trial.

6. Law Enforcement versus Community Justice

Community justice is an element of justice sector reform that supports human security. It differs from
traditional law enforcement in three ways:

 While law enforcement believes that state institutions are responsible for justice, community
justice is based on the idea that civil society shares responsibility with the state for implementing
justice.
 While law enforcement may repress civil society, community justice believes that civil society
needs to be empowered in order to fully contribute to the justice sector.
 While traditional law enforcement relies on punishment of crimes assuming that this deters future
crimes from happening, community justice takes a focus on prevention and a problem-solving
approach to crime to identify patterns and address root causes to prevent crimes from
happening.

7. Approaches to Crime
There are two broad approaches to how police and justice systems respond to crime.

 Traditional law enforcement approaches to crime focus on bad behaviours and broken laws.
Individuals are assumed to make decisions to commit crimes based on personal flaws or
individual corruption.

 Community justice and problem-solving policing focus on pattern analysis. They put a single
crime in context with similar crimes to understand the larger context in which the breeches are
occurring. Such an approach aims to identify the root causes that are motivating individuals or
groups to commit crimes. Community justice asks why crime is happening and what can be done
to prevent these root causes.

Community justice asserts that no one person or agency can analyse the deeper causes of crime alone. A
multi-stakeholder assessment is necessary to develop a full understanding of the causes of crime. There
are dozens of factors that contribute to crime, including racial segregation, home ownership, street
design, educational quality and opportunities, unemployment rates, levels of economic inequality, and the
size of the youth population between ages 16-24. A broad assessment and analysis of crime patterns will
identify social, political and economic factors that contribute to an environment where people commit
crimes.

Community justice is particularly well suited to address the problems of domestic violence, weapons-
based violence, gang violence, and violent extremism since these often are related to broader public
issues.

8. Restorative justice and criminal justice74

Restorative justice is an approach to justice based on a number of principles and ideas. The descriptions
below contrast a traditional law enforcement approach with a restorative justice approach.

Traditional Law Enforcement

• Defines crime as a violation of state laws
• Leaves out the victim and community in the justice process
• Process focuses on determining the guilt of an offender, not the reasons the crime occurred.
• Goal is to punish the offender.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 157

 Restorative Justice
• Defines crime as a violation or harm to people
• Prioritises the needs of the victim and community in the justice process
• Process focuses on understanding the context of the crime and why it happened.
• Goal is to determine what actions are needed to address the crime from the perspective of the
victim, including offender accountability.

Restorative justice focuses on the harms that crimes do to people, and how to repair the harms that
occurred. Harm is identified by more than just a legal definition. Victims and communities are at the
centre of identifying harms, which can include the loss of relationship and trust, the psychological trauma
and fear resulting from crime, or physical damage or material loss in addition to the violation of laws.
While criminal behaviour is condemned, the offender’s role as a member of his community is emphasised.

9. Restorative Justice Practices

There are several models of restorative justice practices. They include the following: 75

 Victim-offender mediation: Some victims want to directly confront offenders who harmed them. In
victim-offender mediation, victims are given the opportunity to explain the harm done to them
by the crime and can ask questions of offenders to better understand the rationale and context
for the crime. This type of process has been critical between the often randomly targeted civilian
victims of terrorist attacks and offenders who used terrorism. The experience has resulted in
individuals or members of violent extremist groups taking responsibility for their crimes and
apologising to victims.

 Family group conference: Victims, offenders and their friends and family or members of the
community meet together with a facilitator, who helps the group discuss the impact of crime on
them. The group negotiates a plan for repairing the damage and for the offender to take
responsibility for the crime.

 Sentencing and healing community justice circle processes: In this process, representatives from the
criminal justice system such as prosecutors and defence attorneys as well as the victim, the
offender, their friends and families and community members sit together to share their thoughts
on the impact of the crime and their ideas for sentencing that could adequately repair the damage
to the victim and community. They also the broader context of the crime and the responsibilities
that other state or community actors may have to prevent similar crimes in the future.

10. Crime prevention

Harvard psychologist James Gilligan’s research on crime prevention identifies three levels of inhibitive
action:76

 Address the root causes of crime, particularly economic inequality and poverty or class structures
that contribute to high crime rates.
 Address the individual needs of those who are at high-risk for committing crime such as treating drug
abuse, or healing trauma, especially in children so that they are less likely to become violent or
abusers of others.
 Work with people who have already engaged in crime, by addressing the major individual factors
that contributed to crime, including feelings of shame and humiliation, lack of skills in handling
conflict without violence, or lack of education.

11. Policing Reform and Development

Policing reform relates closely to security sector reform, justice sector reform and the adoption of
community justice and restorative justice principles and processes. All policing is about enforcing rules,
maintaining order and providing security. But policing has evolved in different ways.

Policing began in England nearly 200 years ago with an initial attempt at crime prevention and policing
with consent of the community. In France and Germany, authoritarian governments used policing for
surveillance over the public, to watch for revolutionary ideas discussed at the community level. Countries
that were formed during colonialism tended to develop police institutions that were designed to protect
colonial leaders, not communities. Drawing on military lines of authority and discipline, some police
began carrying guns and adopting a policy of “shoot first, ask questions later.” In many colonial and post-

158 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

colonial contexts, police were taught to use brute force on civilians in their attempts to “pacify”
communities from pressing for democratic reforms.

After colonialism, many police institutions attempted to reform and modernise police forces. In some
places, police corruption was seen to be coming from civilian political leaders who used the police for
their own interests. Some police institutions addressed this problem by distancing and isolating the police
from corrupt political leaders. These reforms may also have distanced the police from the communities
where they worked.

More recently, the concept of community policing is evolving to the relationship police have with
communities. Community policing often happens in the context of wider democratic reforms and security
sector reform processes. It is an important element in improving the state-society relationship. In other
places, community policing responds to a growing awareness that the quality of relationships between
communities and police can play a critical role in preventing crime and even terrorism.

Today even within the same country, some police departments use community policing while others are
evolving toward a more militarised approach, with military-style training, weapons, and tactics. While
some police work closely with the community to solve community problem, police in other places attend
mostly to the security concerns of elite groups.

12. Characteristics of Good Policing

Comparative research on police units around the world finds some similar themes.77

 Police officers that are mature and well-educated police better than those who are young and
inexperienced
 Police vetting that excludes police candidates with criminal records police better than those with a
record of misdemeanours
 Police who receive training in communication skills to defuse conflict and mediation skills to
manage conflict police better than those who only receive training in the use of enforcing laws
 Police officers who reflect the gender, ethnic, religion, race or identity diversity of the communities
that they serve
 Police training that emphasises protection of the constitution and the protection of all civilians –
including all genders

The quality of the police force in terms of the factors above is more important than the number of police.
A small, highly trained and credible police force can serve a much larger population than a large group of
young officers who have received little training

13. Defining Community Policing

Community policing is an approach that emphasises the relationship between the police and the
communities where they serve. Instead of an “us versus them” approach where police and the
communities view each other negatively, community policing brings the community and police together.
Community policing is implemented in different ways, but has some common characteristics. Some
community policing experts claim that police organisations that do take on community policing only
include a new unit or an additional bicycle patrol rather than make any of the following organisational
changes essential to community policing. Effective community policing requires a broader approach
including the following activities:

 Community relationships and partnerships: Building relationships between police and community
both individually and between police departments and community organisations.

 Communication and Problem solving: Setting up communication and problem-solving mechanisms

to jointly identify and develop responses to community safety concerns, including the concerns of
all genders in the community, including men, women, boys, girls and people with a same-sex
gender identity.

 Training to improve skills: Improving the capacity of the police and the community to address
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and to use dialogue, negotiation and mediation to
handle disputes as well as defuse angry people and tense situations.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 159

  Joint Programmes: Designing joint programmes such as police-community patrols (on foot, bicycle,
or car) and community outreach activities, such as gender-responsive policing to address SGBV.

 Organisational transformation: Building a culture of service orientation and protection of civilians;

improving mechanisms for civilian government and civil society to provide oversight to the
police, fostering accountability to the law and protecting the law rather than trying to get around
the law

Community policing can also provide an opportunity for civil society to engage the justice system in
restorative justice practices and to engage policymakers at the state level to articulate their definition and
approach to human security, defining threats and strategies.

14. Goals and Theories of Change

There are several theories of change or strategic narratives to describe how community policing works. 78

 Improving police-community relations translates into improved state-society relations

 Improving police-community relations will improve intelligence, allowing the police to prevent and
decrease crime, and improve public safety, including preventing sexual and gender-based
violence
 Improving police-community relations will increase police accountability and trust with
communities.
 Improving police-community relations will prevent crime, eg through mentoring school children or
providing advice to local businesses on improving their security
 Improving police-community relations will allow communities to take more responsibility for their
own security by becoming involved in solving community problems.

15. Stakeholder Interests

In most conflict-affected countries, third country government donors fund community policing
programmes. Research indicates that donors, police and government departments, and communities each
hold different interests in community policing. 79 Donors tend to have the most wide-ranging goals of
using community policing to improve state-society relations and accountability. Police and national and
local governments tend to see community policing as a way to do their job better. Communities tend to
see community policing as a way to improve their lives by improving their relationships and involvement
with police and improving police accountability.

Communities Police & Government Donors

Improving police Improving intelligence Improving state-society relations and
accountability, increasing collection, reducing crime, and police accountability
public involvement in security, improving police-community
and improving police- relations
community relations
Figure 49: Stakeholder Interests in Community Policing

16. Community policing is most effective at improving relationships

Of all the goals held by diverse stakeholders, the most successful aspect of community policing is
improving relationships between communities and police. In Timor-Leste, for example, The Asia
Foundation found that the general public’s view of the police improved from 48% in 2008 to 94% in 2014
as a result of community policing as well as other changes. In Sri Lanka, police bicycle patrols changed the
way communities interacted with police.80

Unlike other aspects of community policing, such as institutional reforms or accountability structures, the
actual physical behaviour changes of police relating directly to community members marks the most
significant change. This includes walking or riding bicycles through the community that allows for face-
to-face relationship building and information sharing about community problems.

17. Prevention requires community involvement.

Community policing cannot address all of the root causes of social problems such as unemployment, drug
or alcohol abuse or domestic violence. These problems require community involvement. But in many
cases, communities do not have information that can assist with crime prevention related to
unemployment, or economic inequality. Regular communication and coordination with community

160 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

stakeholders is essential to manage public expectations so that communities understand that community
policing cannot fix all community issues.

Community policing programmes begin and run in different ways. In some places, the state or police
department decides to start a community policing programme. In some places, communities themselves
take the initiative to do community policing and establish their own police force. And in other places,
communities and police begin programmes jointly.

In some cases, communities themselves can begin a community policing initiative. A “neighbourhood
watch” programme, for example, involves community members taking turns patrolling the streets. These
civilian patrols help identify community safety issues, both immediate crises and longer-term concerns. In
traditional societies, traditional security providers may carry out similar patrols. Community-based
dispute resolution processes can help to address minor conflicts within the community.

18. Contextual factors affecting community policing practices:

Many factors determine the course of community policing.81

State History: The history of the state, state formation (particularly for countries that experienced
colonialism) and the terms of a peace settlement or political transformation each play a significant role in
shaping community policing. For example, where there is strong central state, local police departments
may not have the freedom to institute new programmes.

Social Divisions: Some states have sharp social divisions between groups. In these places, the community
itself may be divided. Community policing may focus on resolving tensions between groups.

Level of insecurity: In countries experiencing insurgency or terrorism or other security crises, attention to
short-term threats may distract from longer-term processes of reform toward community policing. If
police forces are working in areas where insurgents or terrorist groups hide among the population, police
may be taught and learn to see all community members as potential threats. The lack of sufficient police
trainers in some international missions has led to military forces training police in paramilitary methods
rather than law enforcement. When foreign military forces conduct police training as part of a security
force assistance package, the training they receive is more likely to emphasise strong use of force rather
than community relations. In states with a long history of violence, both communities and police forces
may be deeply traumatised. This might make it difficult for them to build trust necessary for community
policing.

Local Culture: Some societies have a history of using mediation and dialogue to address social problems.
Community policing in these areas is more likely to adopt dispute resolution processes. In other societies,
harsh punishment is seen as a cultural norm. In these areas, community policing may look like and be
accepted as “street justice.” In some cultures, community policing is seen as an approach to help deal with
the widespread issues of sexual and gender-based violence as well as domestic violence. In other places,
these forms of violence are seen as normal and community policing does not attempt to address them.

19. Sample police department mission statement:

The following mission statements illustrate the different purposes community police units may try to
achieve
 To safeguard freedom by preserving life and property; protecting the constitutional rights of
individuals, maintaining order, and encouraging respect for the rule of law by the proper
enforcement.
 To earn the respect of all individuals, including minority and disadvantaged persons, by
maintaining a knowledgeable, responsive, well-trained, and accountable work force that
conducts policing with fairness, tolerance, and equality.
 To reduce criminal activity by implementing effective crime prevention strategies, fully
investigating crimes when they occur, and apprehending criminal offenders
 To identify, address and resolve the root causes of community problems and concerns in concert
with citizen groups and representatives through the use of community oriented policing
strategies.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 161

REVIEW
This lesson identified different approaches to policing and justice. It defined and described restorative justice,
community justice, problem solving policing and community policing. These alternative approaches to justice
and policing are providing new opportunities for multi-stakeholder coordination for human security. Improving
policing is essential to improving the quality of the state-society relationship.
Citations

74 Caroline G. Nicholl. Community Policing, Community Justice, and Restorative Justice: Exploring the Links for the
Delivery of a Balanced Approach to Public Safety, (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services, 1999).
75 See Caroline Nicholl, 1999.
76 James Gilligan. Preventing Violence: Prospects for Tomorrow, (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2001).
77 M. R. Haberfeld and Ibrahim Cerrah. Comparative Policing: The Struggle for Democratisation, (London: Sage

Publications, 2008).
78 Adapted from Lisa Denney. Securing Communities: Redefining Community Policing to Achieve Results, (London:

Overseas Development Institute, March 2015).

79 See Denney, 2015.
80 See Denney 2015 for other examples.
81 Adapted from Lisa Denney, 11-15.

162 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 17 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 What is one example of a positive interaction you have had with a police officer in your home
community?
 What is one example of a negative interaction you have had with a police officer in your home
community?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast different approaches to justice and policing. In
each scenario, the police have come under scrutiny for their low public approval ratings. In the
scenario stakeholder teams, each group has thirty minutes to develop an initial plan for improving
policing in their scenario and to negotiate with other stakeholders to develop a plan for improving
policing and justice. Teams begin by formulating their own goals for justice and policing reform
and/or they may choose to work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, the facilitator
gives each stakeholder team or group of teams two-minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose
the plans of other groups.

Debrief in a large group with these questions:

 What are the biggest challenges facing those who advocate new approaches to justice and
policing?
 What common ground is there between all the stakeholder teams?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 163

CC/Flickr Photo: Africa Centre

Lesson 18
Approaches to Security Sector Reform

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Distinguish security sector reform from other types of security force assistance programmes
 Identify important elements of SSR
 Identify a key indicator of SSR success
 Define SSR’s relationship with related processes
 List civil society roles in SSR
 Identify characteristics of gender-sensitive SSR

This lesson provides civilians, military, and police with a common understanding of different
approaches to security sector reform and development. The lesson details the different roles and
responsibilities of the military, police, and civilians in government and civil society.

Lesson 18: Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR)

1. Definitions of Security Sector Reform (SSR)
The UN defines security sector reform (SSR) as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as
well as monitoring and evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities, and that has as its
goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without
discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law.”

The OECD defines security sector reform (SSR) as a process of “seeking to increase partner countries’
ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic
norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR/D includes, but extends
well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and
policing.”

164 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

2. SSR is Context-Specific
The security sector in every country is unique; shaped by the history, economic, political, social, religious
and other aspects of the local context. In every country, the security sector is constantly developing and
professionalising. SSR aims to improve the effectiveness and accountability of a security sector within a
unique, context-specific process.

3. SSR Terminology and Scope

SSR involves not only reforming and developing the military and police, but also addressing the wider
security sector or “system” including intelligence, justice, security policymakers, and non-state armed
groups. Some refer to SSR as justice and security sector reform (JSSR) or security sector development
(SSD). Regardless of the acronym, all of these efforts share common characteristics to support
accountability and effectiveness.

a. Accountability: SSR aims to improve democratic governance

SSR is a process that builds and improves checks and balances on the power of the security sector,
including civil oversight. Ideally, SSR includes participatory, multi-stakeholder processes that include
both civilian government oversight as well as oversight by civil society, especially women, minority
groups, and youth. Civilians can play significant roles in analysing security challenges, shaping security
policy and strategy, implementing security strategies, and monitoring and evaluating the performance of
the security sector. Democratising security forces also can mean that one political group does not control
and use the security sector against political rivals. SSR requires a transformation of a security system
from one that protects the safety, economic and political interests of an elite group to one that protects all
citizens, male and female including minority groups. SSR requires that the rule of law apply to all,
including the state security forces. SSR requires a political commitment to principles of fairness.

b. Effectiveness: SSR aims to professionalise the security sector

SSR is a process to build and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the security sector. Some SSR
experts assert the need for the state to hold a monopoly of force over other armed groups in society. SSR
requires attention both to accountability and effectiveness. Improvements in the weaponry or training for
security forces alone are not SSR.

4. Key Indicator of Successful SSR

Security sector reform aims to improve security – both national security and human security. The success
of SSR is measured, in large part, by the perceptions of civilians. Do civilians feel safer? Are they able to
work, travel, and live in their homes without fear of violence?

In too many countries, citizens run from the police and military, fearing repressive violence rather than
looking to security forces for protection. An indicator of successful SSR is that the public perceives
security forces as “protectors” and not “predators.” Figure 49 illustrates the transformation of public
perceptions through an SSR process.

Figure 50: Indicator of Security Sector Reform

5. SSR supports sustainable development, peace, and human security

SSR emerged from the recognition of the link between security and development. Violent conflict
frequently damages or reverses progress in economic, social and political development. On the other

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 165

hand, citizen-oriented states that provide public services and are accountable to citizens are critical to
security and stability.

Abuses by state-run security forces are often an important root cause of violent conflict such as
terrorism.82 Reformed, citizen-oriented security sectors correlate with states being more able prevent
and address violence and sustain a peace settlement to end war.83

Increasingly, donors in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recognise
SSR for its essential role in conflict prevention and supporting sustainable peace. 84 SSR is the single most
important factor in determining whether a peace settlement to end a war will last.85

SSR is important for achieving development goals in a variety of ways. SSR addresses the structural root
causes of insecurity, creating an enabling environment for development. SSR aims to reduce corruption,
abuses of power, and economic mismanagement, freeing resources to benefit development goals. SSR
may reduce spending on police and military, also freeing resources to benefit development goals.

6. Local Ownership and SSR

Most reviews of SSR programmes identify local ownership as the most pivotal element in success or
failure. UN Security Council resolution 2151 reiterated the centrality of national ownership for security
sector reform processes, encouraging states to define “an inclusive national vision” on security sector
reform, informed by the needs of their populations developed through broad national political processes
inclusive of all segments of society.86

Many experts critical of SSR argue that foreign donors and interveners have a tendency to ignore and
exclude local stakeholders from the process of analysing and designing improvements for the security
system. Donor approaches to SSR are fragmented, lack coordination, and lack mechanisms for listening to
local communities or communicating transparent goals or processes. Local ownership often refers to
superficial attempts to choose a few token civil society leaders, causing further conflict within civil
society. The term SSR implies an unequal power relationship between “reformed” external actors
reforming the unreformed.”87 This stands in contrast to internal stakeholders reforming their own
system. While outsiders often push SSR processes to speed up to meet the demands of fragile peace
agreements or security conditions, moving more slowly but including diverse local stakeholders can
actually be faster. Local ownership requires a move from external solutions and external regulation of
SSR toward internally generated solutions and local voices that monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of
SSR as measured by local perceptions and definitions of human security.

Donors attempting to foster local ownership and community engagement in security may not know
where to begin. At the same time, civil society groups wanting to push for reforms toward a human
security approach also do not know how to begin to reach out to the security sector. Lesson 10 in this
Handbook describes local ownership and community engagement in more depth.

7. Gender-sensitive SSR
Women are often left out of peace agreements and SSR programmes. Women and men experience
different types of violence. Both women and men need to be involved in peace negotiations and in
planning SSR programmes so that they reflect the needs and interests of all people. Planners tend to see
women as victims rather than actors. Planners often do not understand the operational benefits of
including women or recognise that the success of SSR often hinges of men and women working together.
SSR planners may also overlook the importance of recruiting and advancing women into prominent roles
in the security sector. Research studies illustrate that women in security forces, particularly police and
peacekeeping, are more likely to deescalate conflict with verbal communication skills and less likely to
use excessive force.88 They may emphasise brute strength rather than social skills, moral leadership, or
the necessity of having both women and men work together serve their communities.
a. Recruit and promote women into police and military leadership
b. Increase women’s participation in the design of SSR programmes
c. Ensure women’s equal access to justice and security, including their protection from
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

Security sector reform experts are producing new resources to provide guidance for gender-sensitive
SSR.89 Lesson 27 in this Handbook provides more information on gender mainstreaming in security.

166 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

8. Multi-Stakeholder Processes in SSR
Multi-stakeholder processes enable the transition
illustrated above. Multi-stakeholder processes can
earn public legitimacy and buy-in of all groups in
society. National and local multi-stakeholder
processes conduct joint assessments to identify
security challenges, jointly plan security strategies,
and jointly implement security programmes, and
jointly monitor and evaluate security sector. The
Coordination Wheel for Human Security illustrates the
different aspects of local ownership in SSR.

Local ownership, democratic governance and civilian

oversight are essential elements of the best practices
in security sector reform and development. Module 10
in this Handbook describes a joint process of assessing
security sector governance, accountability and
performance. This is especially relevant to local
ownership in SSR. Figure 51: Coordination Wheel for Human Security

9. SSR-Related Tasks
A variety of processes relate closely to the success or failure of SSR, including the following:
 Diplomacy to achieve a political peace agreement
 Demilitarisation, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR)
 Small arms and weapons disarmament
 Mine action
 Elections
 Justice sector reform
 Transitional justice

10. SSR and Justice Sector Reform

Many attempts at SSR emphasise technical reforms of the military and police but ignore or give less
emphasis to corresponding reforms and development of the justice sector. The justice sector includes
legal frameworks, the ministry of justice, the judiciary and court system, the prosecutors, and criminal
defence and legal aide.

The security sector and justice sector do not operate in isolation. If

the justice sector lacks the will to apply the rule of law fairly to all
people and groups or the capacity to gather evidence, prosecute and
apply the rule of law, then it will not matter if the police do their job
effectively. If the public does not trust the justice sector, this in turn
reduces the trust in the security sector.
Figure 52: Link between Justice and
Security Sectors
11. SSR, Human Rights, and Transitional Justice
SSR often takes place in countries where security forces and non-
state armed groups have all committed atrocities against the local population. Recognising the historic
legacy of violence against civilians and the lasting impacts of psychosocial trauma is essential. The ability
of victims to hold perpetrators accountable is also essential to justice. Without acknowledging the past, it
will be difficult for civilians to begin trusting security forces.

Transitional justice refers to society-wide efforts to address past human rights violations in order to do
the following:
 Acknowledge the past
 End impunity and hold perpetrators accountable
 Reaffirm the rule of law and provide justice services
 Help the country heal and achieve social reconciliation

Transitional justice includes formal criminal justice processes such as International Tribunals, such
Criminal Courts such as Sierra Leone’s Special Court. Transitional justice can also include non-judicial
processes such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). A communications strategy for

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 167

addressing the past and explaining the SSR process to the public is important. Local advisors from diverse
sectors of society can best design an effective public communication strategy. The Knowledge Hub on
Addressing Security and Human Rights Challenges in Complex Environments is an important resource for
addressing these issues.90

12. Amnesty versus Justice

Transitional justice processes sometimes offer amnesty in exchange for truth telling and accountability.
Some transitional justice processes are based on the concept of “restorative justice” that highlights the
victims and their needs. Restorative justice processes tend to rely less on punishment and more on other
gestures such as acknowledgements, apologies and restitution to victims.

Many transitional justice advocates are opposed to amnesty, noting that it undermines the rule of law.
This puts justice reform and transitional justice in conflict with SSR and DDR.

SSR and DDR (covered in the next lesson) both tend to offer amnesty to members of state and non-state
security forces to entice them to participate in reform efforts aimed to bring an end to violence. Amnesty
is important for two reasons:
 If combatants faced criminal charges, arrest and detainment in the DDR process, few would
participate.
 If information gathered from witnesses in the vetting process for SSR were to be shared with a
transitional justice programme, reprisal attacks on witnesses who spoke out against applicants
for security forces could take place.
Too much or too little amnesty can impact security and justice requirements for sustainable peace. For
these reasons, some experts suggest separating and carefully assessing the benefits and risks of amnesty
processes related to SSR and DDR from transitional justice efforts. 91

13. Non-state security stakeholders and SSR

SSR processes increasingly recognise the need to include non-state security and justice stakeholders. In
some countries, these non-state groups fulfil up to 80% of the security and justice roles in society. It
would not make sense to exclude these tribal, traditional, religious and other citizen-based groups. Local
ownership of SSR is essential, as local perceptions of security and justice may be very different than
foreigners’ own systems or their assumptions about how security and justice systems should work.

14. Opposition to Security Sector Development & Reform

There are many groups that may oppose SSR efforts. Political elites may oppose SSR so that they can
continue using security forces to protect political and economic interests. Business or corporate elites may
oppose SSR because of their interest in profit from security contracts tied to security strategies that rely
on weapons and arms sales, some profit from privatised prisons and criminal justice fees, or they oppose
SSR because they want to prevent the transparency and accountability that would reveal illegitimate
activities, such as forcibly remove civilians from areas where there are resources to extract resources for
profit.

15. “Train and Equip” Security Assistance

In practice, many Western donors under pressure to improve counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
efforts invest primarily in improving enemy-centric security strategies, with less emphasis on protection
of civilians and human security. This is more accurately called “security force assistance” as it does not
reflect all of the principles of SSR/D. Research on exclusive “train and equip” programmes in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Mali and elsewhere emphasise that they can do more harm than good. Often, they may lead to
situations where security forces simply use bigger weapons to repress local populations. They risk
further undermine human security when they trap populations between increased violence of abusive
security forces and the terror of non-state armed groups. The risk of security assistance to escalate
violence is especially prevalent in nondemocratic states, where security forces lack public legitimacy and
are thus at greater risk of engaging in abuses.92

Many donor countries take an approach to improving the performance of the security sector that
emphasises training and equipping security forces. These programmes primarily provide training in
weaponry, intelligence and enemy targeting, with comparatively small efforts to improve protection of
civilians and human rights. Some countries refer to this as “foreign security assistance” or “foreign
military financing.” Evaluations of these train and equip programmes demonstrate that they can help
democratic states achieve a monopoly of violence. But in nondemocratic states, train and equip
programmes can have a range of negative impacts of providing weapons and training to abusive security
forces that lack public legitimacy.93

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Most SSR programmes have element of both “train and equip” and “security sector governance” as they
are two ends of a spectrum of approaches for improving the security sector. While both aim to improve
the security sector, their analysis of the underlying problem and intervention goals are different. The
“security sector governance” approach emphasises the problem of a lack of state legitimacy. The solution
then is to improve civilian government and civil society oversight of the security sector which in turn
links to “a monopoly of legitimacy,” protection of civilians and improved public perceptions of security
forces. This approach to SSR attempts to address root causes of security threats stemming from the
security sector itself. On the other end of the spectrum, the “train and equip” security force assistance
programmes emphasise the central problem of the security forces lacking technical capacity to achieve a
“monopoly of force.” There is less emphasis on whether the public views security forces as legitimate or
whether security forces understand how to protect civilians.

Analysis Theory of Change

Security A lack of state legitimacy,  Build capacity of civilian government and civil society to
Sector Reform a failure to protect oversee the security sector
civilians, and negative  Reform the security sector to prioritise human security
public perceptions of  Training for security forces in protection of civilians and
security public engagement in national security dialogues for
Goal: a monopoly of improved security governance
legitimacy
Train & Equip Lack of state capacity to  Training and equipping state security forces to hold the
Security non-state armed groups; monopoly of force against non-state armed groups
Assistance Goal: a monopoly of
force
Figure 53: Comparison of SSR and Security Assistance

REVIEW
This lesson identified the purpose and scope of security sector reform to foster accountable and effective
security sector. This lesson described important elements and indicators of successful SSR, such as the
public’s perception of security forces as “protectors” and not “predators. This lesson also described the
relationship of SSR to other processes such as transitional justice, and distinguished SSR from other types
of security force assistance programmes that focus on simply training and equipping security forces
without improving governance and accountability.

Citations

82 Global Terrorism Index 2014, (New York, New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014).
83 Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2010).
84
Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor, “Promoting Conflict Prevention through Security Sector Reform,” (London:
Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2008).
85 Monica Duffy Toft, 2010.

86United Nations Security Council Resolution 2151. Adopted by the Security Council on April 2014.
87 Timothy Donais, editor, Local Ownership in SSR, (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of

Armed Forces, 2008), 5.

88 Monopoly of Force: the nexus of DDR and SSR, Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic editors, (Washington DC:

National Defense University, 2010), 92.

89 See for example:
 Gender and Security Programme at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
 Nordic Centre of Gender in Military Operations
 Institute for Inclusive Security (Megan Bastick and Tobie Whitman, A Woman’s Guide to Security Sector
Reform, (Washington, DC: Institute for Inclusive Security and Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, 2013).
90 See the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed forces and the International Committee of the Red
Cross web hub on Security and Human Rights Challenges in Complex Environments at
http://www.securityhumanrightshub.org accessed January 2016.
91 Sean McFate, “DDR-SSR and the Monopoly of Force,” in Monopoly of Force: the nexus of DDR and SSR, ed. Melanne A.

Civic and Michael Miklaucic. (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2010), 222.
92 Michael J. McNerney et al. Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool, (Washington DC: RAND Corporation

2014).
93 Michael J. McNerney et al., 2014.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 169

Lesson 18 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 If you could reform the security sector in your country, what is the first thing you would do?
 What is one real-life experience led you to choose this priority for reform?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to identify the components of security sector reform and democratisation
of the security sector. A peace agreement has just been signed in each of the scenarios. Security
Sector Reform is one of the conditions in the peace agreement. In each scenario stakeholder team,
discuss the following questions for fifteen minutes:
 What will your group do to support or undermine SSR?
 What are three priorities for reform? Which institutions or parts of the security sector would
you attempt to reform first?
 How will you anticipate and plan for the way other groups may attempt to undermine SSR?

In the large group, role-play an SSR meeting where representatives from each group are asked to
make opening statements. Allow each group two minutes to say what steps they think are needed in
order to “reform” the security sector. After each representative has given their opening statement,
ask the teams to step out of their roles and debrief the exercise.
 What are the obstacles to SSR?
 What steps could some stakeholders take to ensure there is greater local ownership and civil
society engagement in the SSR process?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

170 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

CC Flickr U.S. Air Force
photo: Staff Sergeant Marc I.
Lane

Lesson 19
Approaches to Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Define DDR
 Identify DDR’s contributions to human security
 Identify best practices of DDR
 Distinguish between different approaches to DDR
 Identify stakeholder roles in DDR
 Identify characteristics of gender-sensitive DDR

This lesson defines DDR and its relationship to security sector reform and human security. The lesson
describes characteristics of successful DDR.

Lesson 19: Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

1. UN Definition of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration

DDR’s primary goal is to improve human security. While increasingly mandated to support peace
operations during armed conflict, DDR is a process to address post-conflict security problem that arises
when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching
from conflict to peace, recovery and development. DDR helps build community resilience and national
capacity to assist in the reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants and to support communities
receiving ex-combatants and working for their peaceful and sustainable reintegration. DDR includes
political, social, psychosocial, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions.

 Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition,
explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 171

  Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and
groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants
for food, shelter, training, employment or tools.
 Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior to the
longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help
cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety
allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment
and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of
development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate
needs, and can last up to one year.
 Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable
employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time frame,
primarily taking place in communities at the local level. Often requiring long-term external
assistance, reintegration is a national responsibility.

2. DDR occurs in a variety of contexts.

Peace Process: DDR takes place in a post-war context when there is a peace process mandating a DDR
process to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate non-state armed groups alongside other recovery
programmes to address the root causes of violent conflict. In this context, a peace agreement serving as a
legal framework and basis is a precondition for effective DDR.

Downsizing state armed forces: DDR takes place when a government decides to shrink, or right size, the
number of people in state armed forces.

Law Enforcement: DDR takes place where there is new legislation controlling weapons ownership;
particularly in the midst of an ethnic conflict where loosely organised non-state armed groups are
fighting with each other.

Violent Extremism: DDR is mandated in active conflict settings typified by asymmetric conflict of violent
extremists groups, often characterised as “terrorists.” In these settings preconditions for DDR such as a
political agreement that would bring an end to hostilities may not be present. Termed “non-permissive”
environments, efforts at preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) may take place in tandem.

3. UN Integrated DDR Standards

Most wars end through peace processes that lay out political, economic, social, and security arrangements
for a country. The UN Integrated DDR Standards 94 (UN IDDRS) is the current global policy guidance on
DDR outlining best practices and lessons learned to support a war to peace transition so that combatants
become stakeholders in the peace process. The UN IDDRS Standards identify that DDR should do the
following:

 Plan and coordinate DDR within the framework of the peace process
 Link DDR to broader security issues, such as the reorganisation of the armed forces and other
security sector reform (SSR) issues
 Take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament, and weapons control and management
 Link DDR to the broader processes of national capacity building, reconstruction and development
in order to achieve the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants

DDR works best in the context of a peace process and a signed peace settlement between groups that
addresses root causes of violence.

The UN approach to DDR prioritises a peace process that uses negotiation, mediation or facilitation of
dialogue to address key issues driving armed opposition groups. Peacebuilding approaches to DDR
prioritise grievance resolution to address root causes of violence. Peacebuilding approaches to DDR require
work to address the fundamental relationship between armed opposition groups, community leaders and
local and/or national government representatives that makes them stakeholders in the peace process.
Peacebuilding approaches to DDR include a large role for civil society in developing sustainable platforms
and infrastructure for the social, economic and political reintegration of armed groups back into civilian
communities. Reintegration processes focus on supporting the entire community that is participating in
reintegration, and not just the individual ex-combatants.

172 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

DDR is unlikely to succeed without a political settlement to address the grievances of non-state armed
groups and views DDR within a broader approach to post war peacebuilding – and early conflict
prevention to ensure that fighting does not resume. DDR that takes place in the middle of
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency or war operations tends to lack the preconditions promoted in the
IDDRS. Under such conditions risks to DDR personnel, programmes and operations and violations of the
‘do no harm’ principle may be heightened.

The era of global violent extremism requires updating DDR approaches so that it becomes part of a wider
effort at disengaging, de-radicalising, countering, and preventing violent extremism by addressing
marginalization, political grievances and social cohesion. 95 The Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for
Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders 96 outlines recommendations to mitigate
violent extremist offenders and may be applicable for some DDR setting where this new generation of
DDR is occurring. These include ensuring that prisons are not “incubators” that increase violent
extremism and can be opportunities for reform or further de-radicalisation; promoting individually
tailored programmes to assess the motivations and perceptions of ex-combatants; and offering
opportunities for offenders to hear from victims about the impact on victim’s lives. 97

4. DDR is not a standardised, technical, linear programme.

DDR is a dynamic process that takes place in a complex environment. Since there are often different non-
state armed groups, some may begin the process before others. Some regions of the country might
undergo disarmament while other regions of the country are going through reinsertion. In some contexts,
non-state armed groups may first demobilise and reinsert into society, and then when they feel safe they
may later disarm.

DDR works best when it is country-specific, regional and dynamic. Each country is unique, with its own
complex and dynamic situation. DDR cannot be implemented in the same way in every country, or setting.
Where cross-border issues are a feature of DDR efforts, programmes works best if coordinated regionally,
to address the needs of combatants and armed groups that have been engaging in cross-border
operations. This may be an increasingly important aspect for DDR in conflict settings where a portion of
the caseload may include a new category of foreign terrorist fighter (FTF). Ideally, all relevant
peacekeeping missions and border controls should harmonise their DDR programmes in a conflict-
affected region while still taking into account the specific political, economic and social context of each
country.

5. DDR Sequencing
Traditionally, non-state armed groups first disarm, then demobilise, then reintegrate. In reality, this may
not always be optimal.

Armed groups that demobilise may be at risk from other armed groups, including state security forces. In
some cases, UN peacekeeping or state security forces prioritise the safety of disarmed groups. For
example, in Colombia state security forces that had order to protect demobilised guerrillas assassinated
up to 18% of the rebel group known as M19. 98 Where there are no safeguards for the security of non-
state armed groups, demobilisation or even simple reinsertion or reintegration efforts may come before
disarmament. In Northern Ireland, for example, “decommissioning” of weapons came only after they had
established a political power-sharing agreement.99

DDR sequencing also requires security guarantees as a precondition; ensuring that ex-combatants who go
through disarmament and demobilisation are then able to immediately enter reintegration programmes.
If disarmament and demobilisation processes thousands of people each week while reintegration
programmes can only absorb hundreds of people, there will likely be frustration and conflict from ex-
combatants with nowhere to go.

6. Short and Long-term Approaches to Disarmament

There are short and long-term approaches to disarmament. In the short term, community-based weapons
collection and control programmes; weapons destruction. In the mid to long-term, disarmament should
include the (re-) establishment of domestic legal systems to control weapons possession, regulate local
weapons production industries, and manage the supply and transportation of weapons by State and
corporate industries that profit from weapons’ sales; and securing weapons stockpiles to prevent
weapons leaking into society.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 173

The UN Integrated DDR Standards note the importance of not placing too much emphasis on short-term
weapons collections, such as counting the quantity of weapons collected or numbers of ex-combatants
demobilised. In past DDR processes, a gap between weapons collection and funding for reintegration
meant that ex-combatants became frustrated and in some cases renewed violence.

7. Spectrum of “R” in DDR

There are also short and long-term approaches to reintegration. Some experts argue that typical DDR
programmes include a “reinsertion” programme but not a “reintegration” programme. With little funding
for reintegration, experts argue that most DDR programmes stop at “reinsertion.” But often these short-
term reinsertion programmes are not enough to help combatants make the transition to civilian life. Some
return to join armed groups. DDR is defined as a short-term programme of no longer than 5 years. But
reintegration may take 5-10 years or even a generation. It cannot be easily measured in the short term.

“R” can also stand for repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation. The “R” has different meanings in
different DDR processes.

Reinsertion is a shorter-term goal that often is included in the “demobilisation” process. Reinsertion
includes time-specific, short-term programmes called “transitional support allowance” or TSA to give
immediate food, shelter and money to combatants so that they can survive in the short term.

Repatriation is also a more technical, time-specific effort to return ex-combatants to civilian citizenship
either in their countries of origin, or in their host countries, or in third countries.

Resettlement is a short-term effort to physically move ex-combatants into civilian communities, often
moving them out of the bush and into homes.

Rehabilitation refers to the physiological and mental health needs of ex-combatants who may be
traumatised from both fighting, and from abuses that may have occurred during their involvement in a
non-regulated non-state group. Female combatants and child soldiers are particularly likely to have
suffered abuse from other combatants.

Reintegration relates more closely to longer-term economic, social, and political development,
governance and peacebuilding programmes.

8. Political, Economic and Social Reintegration

There are four general types of reintegration: political, economic, psychosocial and social. Each can be
“restorative” or “transformative.” Restorative reintegration aims to restore the ex-combatant to his or her
former political, economic or social status. Transformative reintegration aims to change or improve the
political, economic, or social engagement of an ex-combatant.

 Political reintegration refers to ability for ex-combatants to consent to the rule of law and to
participate in governance and decision-making both locally and nationally both individually and
as a group of ex-combatants who may want to pursue their goals through political channels.

 Economic reintegration refers to the ability for ex-combatants to secure employment or livelihoods.
In doing so, ex-combatants secure, financial means for self-employment, employment
opportunities of the necessary means to have a livelihood to support their families.

 Psychological reintegration refers to addressing ex-combatant’s psychosocial trauma and stress to

help them adjust to civilian life.

 Social reintegration refers to the ability for ex-combatants to reconcile with and return to their
families and communities or to find a new community that will accept them. Social reintegration
relates to the concept of “social cohesion” which refers to the quality and quantity of
relationships within a community, particular across the lines of conflict. Social cohesion is
particularly important in processes to reintegrate former members of violent extremist groups.

9. DDR complements SSR

SSR reforms or transforms the security sector to achieve public legitimacy. DDR complements SSR by
disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating non-state armed groups into civil society. DDR and SSR

174 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

processes should be coordinated. Doing so requires coordination between civilian and military actors on
the ground. Neither effort may be effective if SSR happens without DDR, or DDR without SSR.

10. Civil-Military-Police Coordination is essential through all phases of DDR

DDR requires coordination between many stakeholders, including between the peacekeeping mission and
external partners, including UN funds, agencies and programmes, as well as national government, military
authorities, local police, and local civil society.

In general, military forces direct disarmament and demobilisation, prior to reinsertion, while civil society
and civilian government agencies direct the reinsertion phase nested within demobilisation and
reintegration. As such, civil society has important roles in advising and overseeing disarmament and
demobilisation, including reporting on weapons caches, advocating for the reduction of weapons
availability in society. In demobilization advising on the rate and flow for the controlled discharge of ex-
combatants during demobilization congruent with the community of return capacity to economically, and
socially absorb former fighters enhances reintegration. Likewise, peacekeeping forces, military forces and
local police can play an important role in ensuring the safety of ex-combatants who are reinserted into or
reintegrating with civil society.

DDR coordination can take place through various institutional mechanisms and arrangements such as
civil-military-police meetings, the establishment of military
liaison officers, and the integration of staff from Civil society peacebuilding organisations
organisations actively involved in DDR into a single DDR are designing DDR programmes that use
coordinating team. Civil–military cooperation should also mediation and grievance resolution
take place between the armed forces involved in DDR and processes to address conflicts and
civil society, including through town hall meetings or tensions that arise through the DDR
community forums that allow for open communication process.
between security forces and civil society.
*Read more about the role of civil society
There may be complementary roles for security forces and peacebuilding approaches to DDR in Local
civil society in each phase of disarmament, demobilisation Ownership in Security, the companion report to this
Handbook.
and reintegration. Illustrations such as these may be useful
visual aids for civil-military dialogue to jointly plan
complementary roles in each stage of DDR.

Civil Civil Security

Society Society Forces

Security Forces Security Forces Civil Society

Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration

Figure 54: Civil society and security force roles in DDR

11. Needs and Incentives for Diverse Beneficiaries of DDR

DDR processes need to respond to the different needs of different groups. Different stakeholders may
respond to different incentives.

Male and female adult combatants may have different needs and interests in participating in DDR. Senior
commanders and field-level soldiers may hold different motivations for continuing to fight or to go
through DDR. Commanders may want to hold political office or ask for other incentives that address their
political motivations. Field-level soldiers may also have grievances against corrupt political leaders or
local security forces. Members of global networks of violent extremists may have still other motivations
and interests. An assessment of the grievances and interests of diverse members and levels of non-state
armed groups may improve the design of DDR. As detailed later in this lesson, DDR should be gender-
sensitive to identify the different experiences and needs of male and female combatants.

Women Associated with Armed and Fighting Groups (WAAFG) may have joined voluntarily or they may
have been kidnapped and forced into a life involving both fighting and sexual slavery.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 175

Children associated with armed forces and groups may be victims, since the recruitment of children (child
soldiers) into armed forces and groups is a serious violation of human rights and is prohibited under
international law. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a “child” as a human being
younger than 18 years old. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces
or Armed Groups (“the Paris Principles”) provide detailed guidance for those who are implementing DDR
programmes. For example, it may be important to separate boys and girls from their former commanders
to protect them from coercion or abuse as they transition back into civilian life. Rapid education
programmes may help former child soldiers to catch up to their peer-aged classmates in regular schools.

Non-combatant roles that forcibly or voluntarily participated in armed groups may not be considered as
“civilians,” particularly in regards to including the in camps for refugees or displaced persons.

Elderly ex-combatants and ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses may have special needs.

Dependents are civilians who rely on a combatant for their livelihood. Dependants may participate in
making decisions alongside the combatant. Including women in making reintegration decisions, for
example, contributes to the successful transition to civilian life. Family tracing may also be necessary.

Communities are also key stakeholders and beneficiaries of DDR processes. Civilians who were not
involved in fighting may resent the special privileges and rewards given to combatants. Civilians that
suffered from violence should also benefit from DDR programmes through an inclusive, community-based
approach to DDR. In particular, communities can participate in designing and delivering reintegration
assistance (training, employment, health services, etc.) and these programmes can be made available to a
range of war- affected populations. Communities may receive direct recovery and development assistance
so that they may be better positioned to receive and support DDR processes.

12. Gender-sensitive DDR and involvement of non-combatants

DDR programmes should address the distinct needs and interests of women and girls, men and boys, and
people with same-sex sexuality, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer or other sexual
identities (LGBTQI). DDR planners tend to underestimate the number of female ex-combatants and
women associated with armed and fighting groups (WAAFGs). In Liberia, for example, planners expected
no more than 2,000 female ex-combatants, however; the UN DDR programme disarmed over 22,000 and
may have missed 14,000 others.100 Planning for gender-sensitive DDR programmes is essential to
success.101 The eligibility criterion for participation in DDR programmes needs to be fair to women and
girls, including those serving in non-combatant roles alongside men and boys. Non-state armed groups
require many non-combatant roles such as cooks, medics, porters, spies, translators, etc. They may also
include sex slaves. Some of these non-combatant roles would share a gun with a full time combatant,
while others may not have carried a gun at all, yet were integral to armed group strategies and tactics. In
Sierra Leone’s DDR programme required adult combatants to present their weapon and then disassemble
and reassemble them. Women were ordered to give their weapons to men or required them to apply for
DDR programmes as wives of male soldiers, leaving them ineligible for any of the DDR programmes on
their own.102

High levels of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are common within many armed groups,
particularly toward women, girls, boys and people who are LGBTQI. Approximately 75% of demobilised
girls in Liberia reported that they were victims of sexual abuse by other combatants. 103 Gender-sensitive
DDR programmes ensure that women have secure housing and are treated with respect as full human
beings to best ensure their safety.

Planners often underestimate the amount of women’s capacity to serve as spoilers to a fragile peace
process, or as agents for peace. Even though women often compose 10-30% of non-state armed groups,
their role in conflict and roles in shaping male combatant masculine identities are major considerations in
the design and implementation of DDR programmes. Recognising their own interests in DDR, women are
often active leaders of DDR efforts in their communities. Women’s inclusion in DDR can improve the
reintegration phase of DDR where women serve as moral leaders in education and healthcare, ultimately
improving the sustainability of DDR programmes.
a. Assess and plan with accurate estimates for women and girl’s participation in DDR
b. Use gender-inclusive eligibility criteria to treat male and female combatants and non-
combatants in non-state armed groups fairly
c. Enable men and women to register for DDR programmes separately

176 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 d. Create separate and secure housing and latrines for women and men
e. Prevent sexual and gender-based violence in all aspects of DDR demobilisation and
reintegration by identifying risks
f. Provide maternal healthcare for women and girls who may have already experienced
sexual violence
g. Plan for women’s full participation in DDR training and social reintegration

13. DDR’s Contributions

DDR processes cannot solve all problems in a society recovering from war. However, DDR can contribute
the following:
 Reduce violence and improve relationships between armed groups
 Provide support to combatants to transition to civilian life, including disarming and taking on a
new civilian identity
 Reduce the number of weapons in a society
 Create a ritualised and symbolic ending of a war

14. Unrealistic Expectations of DDR

DDR is a limited programme. It cannot do the following:
 Completely eliminate all weapons or disarm all armed individuals in society
 Solve all of a society’s economic problems through the financial incentives given to ex-combatants
 Bring an end to war or a return to violence without other complementary efforts to address root
causes and conflict drivers

REVIEW
DDR is a necessary component of a broader approach to human security. While DDR can occur in any
country going through a process of reducing the size of its armed forces, DDR is especially necessary
when dismantling non-state armed groups. While many DDR programmes focus on disarmament and
demobilising soldiers, this lesson emphasised the need for greater attention to reintegration to ensure
DDR is sustainable. Civil society has important roles to play in DDR, particularly in reintegration. Civil-
military-police coordination to support DDR can improve the longer-term goal of human security.

Citations

94 Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS). (New York:
UN DDR Resource Centre, 2014). Website accessed January 2016: http://www.unddr.org
95 Dean Piedmont. “The Role of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Countering Violent Extremism.”

SSR 2.0 Brief Series, (Kitchener, Ontario: Center for Security Governance (CSG), June 2015).
96 See Global Counterterrorism Forum, “Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration

of Violent Extremist Offenders”, accessed January 2016,

https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/159878/Rome+Memorandum-English.pdf
97 Special thanks to Dean Piedmont for review and contributions to this lesson.
98 Otty Patiño, Vera Grabe, and Mauricio Garcia, “The M19’s Reinsertion Process: Challenges and Lessons Learnt.

Patiño, Otty; Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts, Véronique
Dudouet, Hans J. Giessman and Katrin Planta editor, (London: Routledge, 2012).
99 Veronique Dudouet. “Nonstate Armed Groups and the Politics of Postwar Security Governance” ,” in Monopoly of

Force: the nexus of DDR and SSR, ed. Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic. (Washington DC: National Defense
University, 2010). P. 10.
100 Irma Specht. “Red Shoes: Experiences of Girl-combatants in Liberia.” Geneva: International Labour Organisations,

2006. P. 83 found in Jacqueline O'Neill and Jarad Vary. “Strengthening DDR and SSR through Women’s Inclusion” in
Monopoly of Force: the nexus of DDR and SSR, Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic editors,(Washington DC:
National Defense University, 2010), P. 79.
101 “How to Guide to Gender Sensitive Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration”, (Geneva: Inter-Agency

Working Group on DDR (IAWG), 2012).

102 Dyan Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson. “From Combat to Community: Women and Girls in Sierra Leone,”

(Washington DC: Women Waging Peace Policy Commission. Hunt Alternatives Fund, 2004). Found in O’Neill and
Vary. “Strengthening DDR and SSR through Women’s Inclusion,” in Monopoly of Force: the nexus of DDR and SSR, ed.
Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic. (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2010), P. 79-80.
103 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, UN Doc. A/59/695-S/2005/72, 9, (New York:

United Nations, 2005).

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 177

Lesson 19 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:

 What is one experience in your life that shapes your opinion on whether it is possible or
important to limit the number of weapons available to people in your country?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to identify the components of disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration (DDR) programs. The main militia group in each of the scenarios has agreed to disarm
in the peace agreement, but only if they are given amnesty. In the scenario stakeholder teams, each
group has thirty minutes to develop a response to this information that was not made public before
the peace agreement was finalised. Each team can negotiate with other stakeholders to design a
DDR programme that addresses your interests. Groups may continue to discuss internally their own
plan, or work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, each stakeholder team or group of
teams is allowed two minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose the plans of other groups.

After 20 minutes of team discussion, each team shares their strategy with the other teams. The
facilitator asks the entire group for their observations.
 Were there any creative solutions to address the interests of all stakeholder teams?
 What are the main trade-offs involved in DDR?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

178 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 CC/Flickr Photo: Westminster Creative Commons Climate
Protest

Module
6
Conflict Prevention &
Peacebuilding Skills
Module 6 Skills in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Lesson 20: Communication and Conflict Skills provides a foundation of skills in active
listening, diplomatic speaking and skills to defuse conflict and tense situations.

Lesson 21: Dialogue and Facilitation Skills identifies how to have productive conversations
the identify differences and build on common ground to enable coordination.

Lesson 22: Negotiation Skills identifies different approaches to negotiation and negotiation
skills useful to civil-military-police personnel working in complex environments.

Lesson 23: Mediation Skills describes the stages of mediation and it can be used to support
human security in complex environments.

Multi-stakeholder coordination requires advanced communication and conflict skills. These

skills are necessary for every level of interaction – but become even more important in a
complex environment. This Module provides civil society, military and police leaders with
practical skills in communication, dialogue, negotiation and mediation.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 179

CC Flickr Photo Credit:
UNMEER/Stefanie
Carmichael

Lesson 20
Communication and Conflict Skills

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
Identify nonverbal and verbal forms of communication necessary to defuse hostility and find solutions
to challenging conflicts
 Identify the characteristics of active listening
 Distinguish between paraphrasing versus defensive responses
 Identify the characteristics of diplomatic speaking skills
 Recognise how respectful behaviours defuse tense situations
 Identify the relevance of communication and conflict skills for leadership in complex
environments to achieve human security

This lesson provides an overview of terminology and a set of foundational communication and conflict
skills to enable civil society, military and police to communicate their interests and goals while actively
listening and understanding the interests and goals of other stakeholders living and working in the
same complex environment. The communication and conflict skills in this lesson can be used to
manage, resolve, transform or prevent conflict and to build peace between groups working in complex
environments.

Lesson 20: Communication and Conflict Skills

1. Communication and conflict are a natural parts of group interaction.

Communication and conflict are natural aspects of all relationships. Communication can promote
understanding but it can also prevent or undermine it. Conflict can be destructive. It can also be an
opportunity to address different points of view and find creative solutions that address the needs of all
the people who are interacting.

180 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Adaptive leaders in complex environments will communicate and may face conflict with other people in
their own organisations (within the military, police, governments, international organisations, or civil
society) every day. Adaptive leaders will also have to communicate and address conflict with people in
other organisations who may share some but not all of their goals, interests and assumptions.

Communication and conflict skills can help adaptive leaders learn how to more effectively listen to others
to improve understanding of other people’s points of view as well as how to communicate one’s own
goals and interests to others in a way that is more likely to help other people understand.

2. Social Science and Conflict Terminology

Security experts are beginning to link research from social science to security operations. 104 The field of
peace and conflict studies has already brought together interdisciplinary research on conflict to provide a
better understanding of conflict dynamics and skills to support coordination. Terminology in the social
sciences, and particularly in the field of peace and conflict studies, can be confusing. There are many
terms with similar meanings. The definitions below aim to clarify the differences in approaches.

Conflict management is a limited approach to reduce the negative effects of conflict by lessening its
negative impact.

Conflict resolution is an approach that resolves or settles the underlying issues that cause conflict.

Conflict transformation focuses on changing violent conflict into nonviolent conflict where individuals use
political and legal channels to address their interests.

Conflict prevention refers to efforts to prevent violent conflict. Conflict prevention efforts such as
diplomacy and negotiation attempt to stop violence from breaking out, since it is more difficult to stop
violence once it has started.

Peacebuilding is an umbrella term used to describe all efforts to transform conflict into nonviolent forms
of political negotiation and dialogue that can address the root causes of conflict.

Each of these approaches grows out of the communication and conflict skills outlined in this lesson and
also uses the dialogue, facilitation, negotiation and mediation skills detailed in the next three lessons.
Each approach attempts to move from violent conflict toward less violent conflict or complete resolution
of the issues causing conflict, as illustrated below. This Handbook uses the terms “conflict prevention” and
“peacebuilding” as an umbrella term for all efforts aiming to decrease violence and address root causes.

18. Using Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding to Support Security

The Coordination Wheel for Human Security in Module 3 described civil-military-police coordination to
conduct joint assessments, to plan jointly plan human security strategies, to jointly implement human
security programmes, and to jointly monitor and evaluate the security sector. Each of these activities
requires communication and conflict skills as well as peacebuilding processes such as dialogue,
negotiation and mediation.

A lack of contact and communication between civil society and security forces increases tensions and
decreases their ability to understand how to support human security. Peacebuilding skills and processes
help to support all the ideas discussed in this Handbook: legitimate state-society relations, human
security, security sector reform and development (SSR/D), local ownership and civil society oversight of
the security sector, and civil society-military-police coordination. The field of peace and conflict studies is
relevant to police and military personnel in many ways. 105 Conflict prevention and peacebuilding
communication skills and processes such as dialogue, negotiation, and mediation enable women and men
in civil society and the security sector to do the following:

 to communicate with each other,

 to defuse tense situations,
 to understand each other’s interest and
 to identify potential common ground enabling coordination to support human security.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 181

19. Humiliation and skills for defusing anger and hostility
Civilians, military, and police working in complex environments will encounter people who are angry and
hostile. Coordination forums often have at least one person who becomes hostile. The experience of being
humiliated or disrespected is the most likely reason people in any culture become angry and hostile.
Social science provides an analysis of key principles related to humiliation and an understanding for how
to defuse hostility.106

 Anger and aggression are often born out of frustration and a feeling of powerlessness.
 Recognise that the aggressor is often feeling threatened, anxious and fearful, and will respond even
more aggressively if he feels more threatened. Attempt to connect with the aggressor's humanity
and personal dignity. When confronted with an unacceptable demand, an appeal to the
aggressor's humanity has proven effective.
 Help the other person save face
-reassure him/her that their concerns are legitimate
-offer the option to pursue the issue/problem later if possible
-refrain from openly judging his/her behaviour.

20. Factors That Escalate Hostility and Aggression

Insecurity: We all experience insecurity whenever we are fearful or feel a loss of control and
predictability in our lives. When this basic degree of order and safety are threatened, people become
increasingly volatile and unpredictable.

Lack of choices: Just as a cornered rat fights the dirtiest, so too do humans. When there is dirty fighting,
someone is usually feeling powerless. This is hard to remember. Cornered people are often intimidating
and can inflict serious injury. Worse, they mask their powerlessness - from themselves as well as others.
Nothing suppresses a whimper better than a snarl! This hostility is most likely to be directed at you if
people feel that either you are responsible, directly or indirectly, for their predicament or that you have
options that they do not. In general, humans respond with hostility and aggression when they perceive
that their choices are limited. The sense of powerlessness that comes with feeling backed into a corner
often produces violent or hostile responses.

Asymmetrical power: When one person or group has or is perceived to have more power than another, the
less powerful person may feel threatened.

Ostentatious use of symbols of power: People can interpret showing off as an attempt to humiliate. Local
people may perceive outsiders are humiliating them by physical postures that project power, such as
sunglasses, hi-tech equipment, expensive vehicles, contextually extravagant lifestyles, uniforms, guns, or
other symbols of wealth and power. These may aggravate rather than defuse angry people.

Disrespectful behaviour: People feel disrespected when other groups that come into their community or
space do not show deference to local customs, leadership, and ethical/moral norms or do not
acknowledge or honour the equal humanity of all. Intercultural competence, discussed in Lesson 3, is
essential to helping all stakeholders identify how best to show respect to people in other cultures.

21. Defusing hostility by showing respect

Security forces and civil society can jointly advance human security when both groups respect each other
as human beings, even though they may distrust or disagree with each other on issues. Mutual respect is a
fundamental peacebuilding value. But it is also a skill. It is not easy to show respect to others in the midst
of a heated argument or when there is fundamental disagreement.

Building respectful relationships does not mean to accept or accommodate another person or groups
perspectives or interests. A peacebuilding approach does not back away from conflicts or tensions. It is
“hard on the problems, but soft on the people.” 107 This means that it encourages individuals to distinguish
between opinions and the persons who hold the opinion. It encourages them to criticise ideas or reject
types of behaviour, while maintaining an appreciation for the person behind it. Such an attitude is the
pre-requisite for building strong and sustainable relationships and trust.

182 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  Respect is a key principle in de-escalating and defusing anger and aggression.

 Focus on communicating respect with appropriate listening skills and non-aggressive, non-
challenging body language. The ability to show concern for the specific, personal needs of others
while maintaining a non-anxious demeanor in the midst of an angry interpersonal encounter,
may defuse the situation.

 Communication skills enable people to show respect while still maintaining their own interests
and needs.

 Verbal response to a hostile person may only escalate conflict. Nonverbal postures that reflect
your calm and confident ability to respond and interact with the aggressor are more likely to
deescalate a tense situation.

 Listening is an important skill in defusing anger. While it may seem easy, skillful listening and
careful paraphrasing to check for meaning and to show to others that you understand their point
of view – even if you do not agree with it - is quite difficult.

 Diplomatic speaking skills help to redirect and reframe anger and positional arguments into a
discussion that involves an analysis of the real interests involved

 More specifically, listening actively to others, in interpersonal exchanges, is a far more powerful
tool than speaking when trying to defuse hostility.

 To whatever extent you are able, show an interest in resolving the issue or meeting the other’s
needs and concerns:
-emphasise willingness to be cooperative and address the issue(s) being raised
-acknowledge the importance of whatever concern they are expressing

3. The Communication Process

Learning to defuse angry people or coordinate with diverse stakeholders both require communication
skills. Communication involves
sending and receiving messages. The
diagram below shows this process.
People send messages or “speak” both
verbally through the tone of our voice
and the words that we choose, and
nonverbally through the ways we
hold our bodies, the direction of our
eyes, the tone of our voice, and the
expressions on our face. People
receive messages or “listen” both Figure 55: Communication Process
verbally and nonverbally.

4. Nonverbal Communication Skills

According to communication experts, 60-80% of communication is nonverbal. That means each person
communicates to others primarily through our facial expressions, body posture, and eye movements.
Researchers have found that some people are much better than others in reading nonverbal cues.
“Emotional intelligence” is a term used to describe people who can accurately guess how someone else
might be feeling by “reading” their faces and bodies to understand what they are trying to communicate.
Adaptive leaders – those civilians, military and police who are able to make wise choices in a complex
environment – need emotional intelligence to help them communicate effectively with others. The ability
to interpret body language is especially important when communicating across cultures since postures
and physical expressions may have different meanings in different cultures.

Nonverbal communication can include the following:

 Eye Contact: In some cultures, direct eye contact is a sign of respect. In other cultures, direct eye
contact is a sign of challenging someone else. Cross-cultural communication can be difficult when

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 183

 one person is looking down to show respect to another while someone else is demanding to be
respected by having that person look at that person in the eyes.

 Facial Expressions: Some facial expressions are universal. Smiling and frowning communicate
pleasure or displeasure in every culture. But some facial expressions, like raising eyebrows or
pursing the lips, communicate different messages in different cultures.

 Body Movements: The diagram above illustrates nonverbal postures. What emotions do each of the
body postures above communicate? If the person on the left were a security officer at a checkpoint
and the person on the right were a civilian at the checkpoint, what would each person be
communicating to the other?

In some cultures, the postures of the person on both the left and the right would be interpreted as hostile
and threatening. Body postures differ significantly across cultures. In a cross-cultural context, we need to
know both what we ourselves are communicating and what other people in other cultures mean with our
body posture, eye contact, and facial expressions.

5. Verbal Communication Skills: Active Listening and Paraphrasing

Both listening and speaking require verbal communication skills, including active listening, paraphrasing
and diplomatic speaking. Active listening is an important skill because it is a way of helping people feel
their concerns are heard and acknowledged. When people feel heard, they are less likely to repeat
themselves, yell or shout, or be very angry. Active listening is an essential skill for defusing an angry or
violent confrontation.

6. How to listen effectively:

* Empathise - put yourself in the other person’s shoes and try to understand how s/he feels.

* Listen - for the feelings or emotions of the speaker, the meaning of their message, and the
specific content they are trying to communicate. Angry people often say aggressive,
inappropriate, offensive, unfair, unfounded things. Nevertheless, do not get “hooked” into
arguing. Do not give into the temptation to start interrupting, correcting, and arguing with the
angry person. When people are escalating, rational arguments have little to no effect except to
further provoke their hostility. Instead, focus on the deeper issues the person is so eager to
communicate. (See discussion below on Aikido listening, reframing positions to interests)

* Validate - let the other person know that her/his experience is valid. This does not mean that
you agree with them, only that you have listened to their experiences and can understand why
they might be feeling the way they do.

* Paraphrase - Paraphrasing is restating in your own words the core of what the other has
expressed in a message. A good paraphrase gets at content and emotions (see below)

* Clarify - ask questions to get more information about the problem (see below)

* Gather information - try to gain a better understanding about the situation without
antagonising

Affirming a person when you agree with what they are saying, as emphasising common ground is
important and can provide a basis of trust for exploring areas of difference or tension.

Demonstrating respect for a person’s humanity by asking people to say more about their experiences or
feelings can defuse tension. Showing people you care about their emotions and respect their point of view
can deescalate hostility or conflict and provide a foundation for communicating on more difficult issues.
Acknowledging feelings and experiences is not the same thing as agreeing with someone.
Acknowledgement of different experiences or beliefs can help to decrease tension.

7. Paraphrasing or summarising the emotion and content of the speaker’s message to you to
communicate understanding.
Paraphrasing is a way of acknowledging that you hear what someone said and checking to make sure you
and others understand the message by giving them a short summary of what they have said. When people
feel heard, they are less likely to feel angry. The opposite of paraphrasing is to reply defensively. When

184 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

people respond defensively, they do not summarise the other person’s point of view, but immediately
react to explain their own point of view. Defensive replies are often accompanied by strong emotions and
judgmental statements and thus tend to escalate tension.

Paraphrasing can be a difficult skill to learn. Some people may feel patronised or looked down upon if
their emotions are summarised or paraphrased by someone else. It takes skill and practice to learn how
to paraphrase strong emotions in a way that feels respectful to others. In some cultures, people do not
like to show or talk about their emotions. Paraphrase someone’s message by:

 Reflecting the emotion of their message and checking for understanding. “I sense that you are
feeling angry. Do I understand correctly?” This can allow the other person to correct the
perception and to keep their dignity if they have behaved in a certain way that was perceived as
angry.
 Reflecting the content of their message or their concerns. For example: “If I am hearing you
correctly, I sense you are upset that the community is not respecting your authority.”

A paraphrase contains no hint of judgment or evaluation. For example: "If I understand you correctly,
your perspective is that the military working in your community should never casually point their guns at
anyone.” Here are more examples of the difference between active listening responses using paraphrasing
to show understanding, and defensive listening replies that will likely escalate conflict.

Example A
There have been armed break-ins in a number of houses. A police officer knocks on the door of a
home to check on the safety of the family. A man answers the door and screams, “This is my
property! I have done nothing wrong! You may not search my house!”

Paraphrased Reply: “Sir, I respect your privacy. You have not done anything wrong. We will not
search your house. We are here to check on your safety.”

Defensive Reply: “Sir, you don’t have any rights. I can come into your house if I want to. If you would
respect my authority, I could tell you that I am only here to ask if you have had someone break into
your house!”

What is likely to happen if the police officer uses a paraphrased reply to affirm the emotions and
needs of the man at the door? What is likely to happen if the police officer uses a defensive reply?

Example B
A local religious leader is concerned about the way security forces are searching the homes of
families from a religious minority group. The religious leader approaches a checkpoint and asks to
speak to someone in authority at the military base. The military guard speaks forcefully “You can’t
just come here and get into the base! You have to have an appointment! You need to back away and
leave right now. You are a security threat! If you don’t back up, you will be arrested and detained!”

Paraphrased Reply: “Sir, I respect your difficult and dangerous job. Could you please let me know
how to make an appointment? I was not able to find a phone number to call and I have no way of
determining who I should call to make a meeting.”

Defensive Reply: “If you keep treating people here with this disrespect you will find people here
who will not bother to talk to you! You are in our country and should treat us with respect!”

What is likely to happen if the religious leader uses a paraphrased reply? What might happen if the
religious leader uses a defensive reply?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 185

 Example C
A military officer sees an NGO leader in the street. She invites him to the military base to discuss
coordinating on water management programmes in the local community. The NGO leader
becomes angry, raising his voice and saying, “I can’t come to your military base! Don’t you know
anything about International Humanitarian Law! The insurgents would be sure to see me walking
into the military base and would kill me as soon as I leave. Even talking to you right now here in
public is dangerous for me! Please just leave us alone so we can do our work and you should just
stick to keeping people safe!”

Paraphrased Reply: “Sir, I hear your concern for your safety. We want to make sure contact with
you does not endanger you or your organization. But we do need to coordinate our water efforts
with yours. Would it be possible to contact you on the phone or by email?”

Defensive Reply: “I’m so tired of hearing the NGOs complain about their safety. You only come to
us when you need our help!”

What is likely to happen if the military officer uses a paraphrased reply? What might happen if the
military officer uses a defensive reply?

8. Diplomatic Speaking
Like active listening and paraphrasing, diplomatic speaking is also a specialised skill. When people are
speaking, they tend to have a strong desire to have their own ideas or feelings recognised and
acknowledged by others. Diplomatic speakers take into consideration that when they talk about their
own needs, they also need to recognise and acknowledge the needs of others. Diplomatic speakers craft
messages that may be easier to hear or understand for the audience.

Diplomatic speaking is especially important when someone needs to communicate in a situation of

conflict or tension. Learning how to speak diplomatically helps people say things that others may not
agree with in a way that is more acceptable. When people need to communicate a message that might
antagonise others, they need skills to enable them to give this message in a way that will not make other
people close their ears or become defensive. Diplomatic speaking is a skill to communicate one’s own
needs without offending others. Diplomatic speaking includes three key skills: learning to use “I” or “We”
language, learning to share goals as preferences, and making assertive statements.

9. Use “I” or “We” language

Beginning sentences with “I” or “We” is a way of communicating one’s own needs and interests or goals
and of responding to someone else by communicating the impact of their behaviour or statements on you.
Beginning sentences with “You” can feel like it is pointing fingers or blaming others, creating or increasing
conflict. Sentences that begin with “I” or “We” and go on to share the impact of another person’s actions
on your own feelings and goals. It communicates one’s own needs and interests without accusing the
other person. The second one is likely to make someone defensive.

Example D

“I” language: “I feel upset when you are late for our meetings because it means that everyone else
has to wait for you.”

“You” language: “You are always late!”

“We” language: We feel humiliated when you refuse to meet with us because we believe our interests
deserve to be considered.

“You” language: You are disrespectful!

186 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Example E

Demand: “You must stop building schools in the region we are working.”

Preference: “We have an interest in making sure our projects complement yours so that our work
does not unintentionally undermine or conflict with your work.”

Demand: “Your community members must stop youth gangs in your community.”

Preference: “We are concerned about the high rates of crime in this community. Reducing crime
rates is our responsibility, so we want to work with the community to find ways to reduce crime
while respecting community and individual rights.”

10. Share your goals as preferences

It is important to be able to tell other people what you would like to do or what you would like them to
do. Stating goals in terms of preferences rather than demands allows a conversation and exchange to
occur.

11. Making Assertive Statements

There are times when civilian, military or police personnel are facing an angry person who does not pose
an immediate, lethal threat. In such situations it may be appropriate to respectfully but assertively
request a specific change in behaviour as a condition of continuing a discussion.

Preference Statements: Clearly communicate your preferences or desires rather than stating them as
demands or forcing others to guess what they are.
My preference is....
If it were up to us...
What I would like is...
From our perspective, it would be helpful if....

Interest Statements: Clearly state your wants, needs, fears, and concerns.
What concerns me is...
What we really need is... because...

Purpose Statements: Disclosing your intentions enables others to understand what motivates you and
minimises the opportunity for misunderstanding. It also reduces the chance for others to unknowingly
operate at cross-purposes.
What I’m trying to accomplish with this policy is...
We’re out here today because we were hoping to...
I am in the process of trying to locate...
Our intention with this group of people is to...

Naming Observations: Describe what you are currently observing between yourself and the other
person in a non-positional way. In an unhelpful conversation with a community elder, one might say:
“I’m noticing that we seem to be spinning our tires in this conversation. It seems like we’re all getting
a little tired and frustrated. I’m not sure why we are stuck nor how to move on. What do you think?”

Agreement Statements: Acknowledge where you agree with the other party in the midst of a
disagreement. This increases the amount of common ground and reduces the conflict field.
I agree with you that...
We definitely share your concern about...
Your interest in...... makes a lot of sense to me.
We share your hope that…

“Yes and...” NOT “Yes but…” The word but has been called the “verbal eraser.” Agreement statements

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 187

lose their effectiveness if they are followed by a disclaimer such as but. It is better to make your
agreement statement and then raise your other concerns.
I share your concern about.... and I am also concerned about...
I agree that we should.... and I also think that...

12. Defusing Conflict

Even when using active listening, paraphrasing and diplomatic speaking, conflict can still begin to
escalate. Two additional strategies can help defuse conflict.

Disagree with ideas, not with people. Be hard on the problem, soft on the people. Conflicts can become
destructive and even violent when people begin to accuse or blame each other. A focus on understanding
other people will often deescalate conflict. Once people feel respected and heard, they are then able to
work productively to address the issues.

Call for a time out. Sometimes arguments get so heated that people stop listening to each other. If conflict
is escalating or if you are at an impasse and cannot find a way to address the problem, ask if you can find a
quiet place and/or a separate time to work out the problem after each of the people involved has had time
to think.

LESSON REVIEW
Leaders in complex environments aiming to improve human security communicate every day with many
different individuals and groups. Conflict is a normal part of all relationships and leaders in complex
environments experience conflict within their own organisation, between organisations working on
similar goals, and with groups that are openly opposed to their goals. Conflict and communication skills
are relevant in all aspects of a leader’s life and work. Communication and conflict skills help culturally
diverse individuals, groups, and organisations learn how to communicate their goals and interests to
others. Wherever civilians and security forces relate to each other - at a checkpoint, in the streets, or in
meetings – these skills can help groups listen to each other, defuse tension, and communicate effectively
so that others can understand.

Citations

104 For example, see Social Sciences Support to Military Personnel Engaged in Counter Insurgency and Counter
Terrorism Operations HFM-172 (NATO, 2011) http://ftp.rta.nato.int/public//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-HFM-
172///$$MP-HFM-172-ALL.pdf accessed January 2016.
105 Thomas G. Matyó k and Cathryne L. Schmitz, “Is There Room for Peace Studies in a Future-Centered Warfighting

Curriculum?”, Military Review. (May-June 2014).

106 Donna Hicks. Dignity and its Essential Role in Solving Conflicts, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
2011).
107 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, (New York: Penguin, 1983).

188 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 20 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or
three people their response to this question:
 What is one experience where you have been able to defuse someone who is angry or
hostile?
 What techniques did you find effective in defusing anger?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using communication and conflict skills to defuse an angry
person or group. In each of the scenario groups, a town meeting is occurring in the village closest to
the IDP camp where civilians were killed in the raid. At the town meeting, one person in the
community becomes angry and begins yelling and threatening the others in the room. Ask for a
volunteer or group of volunteers from any of the stakeholder teams to role-play being angry and
escalating tension at this meeting. Set up the training room as if there is a town meeting. One of the
stakeholder groups representing the government (civilian, military or police) should open the
meeting and begin to discuss the recent raid in the IDP camp. The angry role players should then
disrupt and escalate tensions in the meeting. Any of the other stakeholder teams or players can then
attempt to diffuse the situation using verbal and nonverbal communication skills to defuse conflict.
Let this scenario play out, with the role-players from different stakeholder teams attempting to
practice skills. The angry role-players should attempt to be as realistic as possible.

After twenty minutes of role-playing, debrief the scenario.

 What did each stakeholder team do verbally or nonverbally that either escalated or
deescalated the situation?
 Did any of the role-players illustrate “active listening” or “paraphrasing” or “diplomatic
speaking”? Give specific examples.
 What worked best? What did not work?
 Debrief the role-players who were angry and escalating the tension. Did you feel heard and
understood by other stakeholders? What made you feel like escalating or deescalating the
anger you felt?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 189

 Flickr CC Photo by Juan
Manuel Herrera/OAS

Lesson 21
Dialogue & Facilitation Skills

Learning Objectives
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

 Distinguish between the characteristics of dialogue and debate

 Identify five characteristics of a good facilitator
 Identify the relevance of dialogue and facilitation skills for leadership in complex environments
to achieve human security

Multi-stakeholder dialogue is a fundamental part of multi-stakeholder coordination. Dialogue is a

process that creates a safe space for people with diverse experiences and points of view. Civilians,
military and police need to dialogue with each other on all aspects of the Coordination Wheel for
Human Security. This includes dialogue on conflict assessment, dialogue on joint planning, dialogue on
separate or joint programming such as civilian assistance and protection of civilians, and dialogue to
monitor and evaluate the security sector.

Lesson 21: Dialogue & Facilitation Skills

This lesson draws from the Little Book of Dialogue on Difficult Subjects.108

1. Dialogue
Dialogue is a way of talking that encourages active listening and honest but respectful speaking. The goal
of dialogue is to improve understanding and relationships between people or groups that are in conflict.
Dialogue is less formal and structured than mediation. Unlike negotiation or mediation, dialogue is not

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aimed at reaching an immediate solution to a problem. Instead, dialogue is used when there are
misunderstandings between groups and different experiences. Dialogue simply creates the space to talk
about problems in a place where everyone is committed to listening to each other and trying to understand
different points of view.

Dialogue differs from another commonly used communication approach called debate. In a debate,
participants either consciously or unconsciously believe that there is only one right way to believe or act.
When people believe they alone hold the whole truth, there is no need to listen to others. For this reason,
some people following the debate approach discredit dialogue because it requires them to recognise that
they may be able to learn from people who believe differently. Dialogue requires participants to keep
their minds open to the process of learning and changing.

2. Comparing Dialogue with Debate

The chart below describes some of the differences between “dialogue” and “debate.” Politicians and the news
media often dramatise debates where each side of an argument tries to prove they are right and the other side is
wrong. Debate is unlikely to lead to real understanding or an appreciation of the differences that led to a given
conflict. Dialogue is more likely to lead to mutual understanding.

Figure 56: Comparison of Debate and Dialogue

DEBATE DIALOGUE
The goal is to “win” the argument by affirming The goal is to understand different perspectives and
one’s own views and discrediting other views. learn about other views.
People listen to the other to find flaws in their People listen to the other to understand how their
arguments. experiences shape their beliefs.
People critique the experiences of others as People accept the experiences of others as real and
distorted and invalid. valid.
People appear to be determined not to change People appear to be somewhat open to changing
their own views on the issue. their understanding of the issue.
People speak based on assumptions made about People speak only about their own understanding
the others’ positions and motivations. and experience.

People oppose each other and attempt to prove People work together toward common
each other wrong. understanding.
Strong emotions like anger are often used to Strong emotions like anger and sadness are
intimidate the other side. appropriate when they convey the intensity of an
experience or belief.

3. The Role of Dialogue in Complex Environments

In complex environments, diverse stakeholders need to understand each other’s experiences and
opinions. A formal and facilitated dialogue can enable civil society, governments, military, police and
international actors to improve their understanding of the context and their relationships with each
other. For example, in a complex environment, diverse groups may use formal dialogue on the following
topics:

Security dialogues to identify the threats facing different groups in society, especially those groups that
may be marginalised or lack political representation, such as women and minority groups

Assessment dialogues to discuss the root causes of insecurity and violent conflict and to identify local
resources for peace and human security

Dialogue skills are also useful in informal or unplanned occasions such as checkpoint or border crossings,
ad hoc meetings, or even sharing tea or drinks at a local restaurant.

4. Ground Rules or Guidelines

Ground rules – sometimes also called dialogue guidelines – are a set of behavioural standards and goals
that people in a formal dialogue agree to follow to create the best possible experience. Ground rules are
important for several reasons.

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First, setting ground rules serves to normalise a new process and strengthen ownership. In dialogue, the
group designs and agrees to its own set of norms and guidelines. Setting guidelines together helps
participants consciously choose to be in the process and decide what behaviours to honour and protect.

Secondly, setting guidelines together communicates that everyone in the group is essentially equal, at
least with respect to the group’s task. This is also somewhat rare because most settings where people
interact involve some degree of hierarchy where someone is in an authoritative role over others. If the
dialogue is based upon a collaborative search for truth among participants, it is vital that all of those
involved have equal opportunity to participate fully in the process and no one is seen as the authority.

Generally, there are two ways to set ground rules. In a setting with time constraints, one approach is to
list the ground rules and ask if people can comply with them. It is important that each person has a
chance to modify or raise concerns about the rules. Beware of prematurely assuming that people have
agreed to a set of ground rules when they have not. After ample opportunity to change the proposed
ground rules, the facilitator can invite public agreement that the group is willing to hold themselves and
others accountable to the ground rules.

Sample of Basic Ground Rules

1. Listen to understand the other’s point of view rather than to prepare a defense of your own view.
Try to listen more than you speak.
2. Respect others, and refuse to engage in name-calling.
3. Speak about personal experiences. Start your sentences with “I” rather than “you.” “I experienced....”
4. Minimise Interruptions and Distractions. In general people should be allowed to finish what they are
saying without being interrupted directly or with side-talk between other participants. Also people
should silence their cell phones.
5. Maintain confidentiality. Outside the group, discuss the content of what was said, not who said
what.
6. Ask questions. Ask honest, thought-provoking questions that give people the opportunity to explore
and explain their underlying assumptions.
7. Stay through the hard times. Make a commitment to stay in the dialogue despite the tensions.
8. Aim to understand. The goal of dialogue is to increase understanding between individuals. The goal
is not to solve the problem or agree on everything.
9. Recognise common ground. Every two people share something in common. Find it!
10. “Ouch,” then educate. If someone says something hurtful, don’t just disengage. Let the individual
and the group know why it was hurtful.

Another approach is to elicit the ground rules from the group. This approach offers much better buy-in
and adherence as people have invested more thought and energy in developing them. But the process can
be very time consuming. In sustained dialogue processes, some facilitators use the process of eliciting
ground rules as a way to learn the concerns, fears, and other tendencies in the group.

In some dialogues, participants may request that others “speak from the heart” meaning that they share
their emotions or the impact that an experience has had on their life. In some cultures, people participate
in dialogue without observable emotion and may even look down upon others or walk out of a dialogue
that includes too many emotional expressions. Facilitators will need to “read the room” or try to get a
sense of how to make a dialogue safe for some people to express their emotions without making the room
so emotional that it feels unsafe, awkward or uncomfortable for other participants.

One strategy to align the group around ground rules is to ask a question like this: “Before we go any
further, can we all agree to try to stay respectful and give everybody a chance to speak?” People will
rarely say no, and this question gives you and others the capacity to point out when people are being
disrespectful and are interrupting. Potentially the group agreement on this question can empower the
facilitator to point out when some people are dominating the conversation.

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5. The Role of a Dialogue Facilitator
Dialogue between groups can be done with or without a facilitator. A facilitator guides people through a
dialogue process. Facilitators are “process experts” rather than experts on a subject area. They keep a
dialogue focused, help participants consider a variety of views, and summarise group discussions. They
model active listening and respectful speaking.

Facilitators help the group explore similarities and differences of opinion. Facilitators do not promote or
share their own opinions. Facilitators make sure that all participants get a chance to contribute to the
dialogue. Facilitators bear primary responsibility for enforcing the ground rules, although the group also
shares this collective responsibility.

Effective dialogue between people of diverse experiences and beliefs usually requires the guidance of a
facilitator. The role of the facilitator in guiding the conversation makes dialogue different than other
communication forms. Facilitators help create a safe space by setting ground rules or guidelines to keep
dialogue participants focused on listening to and working with each other. Facilitators guide the dialogue
process without deciding who is right or wrong, or declaring a “winner” as a moderator does in a debate.

6. Facilitation Skills and Tasks

Facilitation is a learned skill. “Natural leaders” or people who play important leadership roles in other
activities may make excellent candidates for serving as facilitators, but not always. Facilitators are similar,
but also distinct from other types of effective leaders. The role of the facilitator may be the most
important element of a dialogue. Key competency skills of effective facilitators include the following:

Establish the purpose of the dialogue. Everyone in the room should clearly understand the purpose and
focus of the dialogue. Put this in writing and say it verbally. Check that participants understand and ask if
they have any questions.

Foster dialogue. Remind participants of the difference between dialogue and debate. Help them grasp the
importance of active listening and speaking respectfully and honestly, and how this differs from ways
they may be used to talking with others.

Manage the agenda and guide the process. Be as self-confident as possible to assure the participants you
know how to guide the process. Keep the discussion focused, and keep your focus on the process. Ask
open-ended questions that explore the complexities of the issues.

Develop ground rules. Either explain or ask the group to develop a list of ground rules. Ask participants if
they can agree to them, and invite them to monitor how they are following the ground rules. When the
ground rules are violated, give gentle but firm reminders.

Listen actively. Demonstrate verbal and nonverbal listening skills that show people you understand what
they are saying.

Monitor group dynamics. Pay attention to ensure that everyone has a chance to speak and that no one is
dominating the conversation. Check in with participants who seem quiet or withdrawn. Ask how they are
feeling. Remind participants to “share air time” so that everyone feels responsible for monitoring the
group’s dynamics.

Communicate interest in everyone’s perspective. Help to bring out views that aren’t represented.
Participants in a dialogue should feel that the facilitator is authentically interested in understanding their
experiences and ideas.

Help deal with difficult participants. Keep one-on-one arguments from taking over. Prepare for
participants who talk too much, refuse to participate, or disrupt the workshop. Respond to the situation
with confidence and grace.

Summarise and paraphrase. Help people feel that their unique experiences and ideas are heard and
understood by summarising and/or paraphrasing what is said. This skill can also help with long-winded
participants who have lost their own key message.

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Stay impartial. In order to maintain everyone’s trust, facilitators must refrain from sharing their
experiences or beliefs relevant to the issue. The facilitator’s role is to help participants wrestle with the
similarities and differences in the views they expressed.

Model the behaviour you expect from participants. Facilitators should model active listening, respectful
and honest speaking, and other ground rules at all times through their words and body language.

Close with a summary. Summarise the discussion and help focus the group on talking concretely about
next steps they want to take individually and collectively.

7. Advanced Skills and Tasks

Some facilitator characteristics – whether learned or natural – are important in leading highly effective
dialogues.

Facilitators inspire confidence in their leadership

Dialogue requires a facilitator to lead the dialogue and decide where to guide the conversation next. For
much if not most of the time, participants will be so engrossed in the exchanges that they will lose track of
the larger flow of the dialogue process. But sometimes, the group’s attention is drawn to the process itself,
and it is important that the facilitator not appear incapable of making a decision regarding the substance
of the dialogue. The group must feel that it can trust the facilitator’s judgment about which topics to
deepen and which to neglect, and that the facilitator trusts his or her own judgment.

Having enough natural charisma to inspire confidence in others is useful in the facilitator’s role as the
leader and will help create an atmosphere in which people feel safe and able to engage productively.

Facilitators are good multi-taskers

Facilitators need to keep track of many different and competing objectives at once. For example,
articulate but long-winded speakers often bring important content to a discussion. But in order for a
group to benefit from their contributions, a facilitator must keep track of the relative values of what they
are saying, people’s level of apparent boredom/interest in the ideas, how many people have yet to
address the topic, and how much time is left in the session.

Facilitators are flexible and not overly controlling

Since the facilitator’s job is to create a setting in which many people feel empowered to listen, talk, and
learn, the facilitator must be careful not to overly control the dialogue, because this will make people feel
boxed in and not truly included. Facilitators provide guidance but also listen to the group and observe
participant’s level of energy when deciding whether to be flexible or when to keep on schedule.

Facilitators see a situation from many points of view

Many facilitators engage in dialogue as part of their commitment to broader principles like justice, peace,
and democracy. In some cases, competent facilitators have an unconscious (or even conscious) bias
against participants that hold more political, economic, or social power. Facilitators need to do a great
deal of self-reflection to process their own biases before facilitating a dialogue in which their biases might
affect their ability to manage the process. Facilitators must be able to empathise with the experiences of
all the participants. The capacity to understand all points of view is essential.

Facilitators stay calm and engaged

One test of a facilitator’s skill level is his or her reaction to emotional intensity within a group. This may
take the form of anger, tears, rudeness, expressed frustration, or other intense emotion. In these
conditions, a facilitator’s primary task is to maintain the group’s focus of attention in spite of the charged
emotions. This can be very difficult, especially if the emotions are directed at the facilitator. Staying calm
in the midst of anxiety or tension takes a great deal of practice and inner strength. A wise facilitator stays
emotionally present and engaged while thinking about what is best for the group rather than formulating
a defence or attempting to stop emotional expression.

Facilitators pose provocative questions

When designing dialogues, facilitators come up with guiding questions, not with minute-by-minute
agendas in order to leave space for participants to contribute their own inputs and develop a common
understanding. A highly skilled facilitator is able to diverge from his guiding questions and come up
spontaneously with new questions that will move the dialogue forward and attain a deeper level of

194 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

honest analysis. The ability to improvise and generate questions that help the group see commonalities or
disagreements is an important skill.

Facilitators connect with people

A final important quality that separates first-rate facilitators from those with only a basic level of
competence concerns the ability to emotionally connect with participants and continually invite them to
stay engaged in the process. Highly skilled facilitators convey that they understand how participants see
the issue, and that everyone in the group can learn more from each other by staying with the process. The
challenge is to stay engaged in the process as participants learn and transform at their own rate without
seeming to be smarter or more evolved than the participants. The facilitator reminds participants that
they all are on a path toward a higher understanding, and that the facilitator is only a half-step ahead.

8. Differences between Facilitators and Other Leaders

Most natural leaders and facilitators share some of these important skills, but not all effective leaders
make good facilitators. Some leadership roles and skills undermine the capacity to be good facilitators.

Teachers and trainers may be tempted to see their role as fostering growth and development by
dispensing wisdom to the group. By contrast, effective facilitators recognise that the group must come to
its own conclusions based on participant’s exchanges.

Good meeting leaders stick to a defined agenda. However, effective facilitators sometimes keep their focus
on the overall goal of learning rather than accomplishing an agenda. Good public speakers may be
tempted to use their rhetorical skills to sway disparate people to their points of view. But rather than
convincing participants to accept one point of view, good facilitators help people understand several
points of view. They spend more time listening than talking.

REVIEW
This lesson provides an understanding of how dialogue and facilitation skills can enable civil society,
military and police to enhance their ability to understand complex environments through listening and
learning from other stakeholders and to improve their ability to coordinate with other stakeholders
working toward the shared goal of human security. This lesson contrasted dialogue and debate to
illustrate how debate-style conversations aim to convince others their opinions and experiences are
wrong while dialogue-style conversations aim to help people understand why other people’s experiences
have led them to hold different opinions. The lesson asserts that dialogue can be difficult, but that it has
the reward of greater understanding and improving relationships between people. The use of dialogue
guidelines and a skilled facilitator can make it easier for people to engage in dialogue. The lesson reviews
the key skills and characteristics of a professional facilitator.

Citations

108 David Campt and Lisa Schirch, The Little Book of Dialogue on Difficult Subjects. Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2004.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 195

Lesson 21 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question:

 What is an example of one experience where you had to facilitate a meeting in a diverse
group of people? What was effective in trying to facilitate this meeting? What was
challenging?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using dialogue and facilitation skills. Continuing from the
disruption in the exercise in Lesson 22, the town meeting to discuss what to do about the eighteen
civilians killed in the IDP camp continues but in small groups instead of one large group. Create small
groups of 5-6 people, one person from each stakeholder in the scenario you are using.

One person in each small group should take on the role of facilitator to practice the skills in this
lesson. The other participants can model either dialogue or debate. Some of the participants in each
of the groups should role-play an angry person who is escalating tension in the meeting. Allow the
dialogues to continue for twenty minutes. Then debrief the scenario with a discussion in each small
group:
 What did the facilitator do well verbally or nonverbally? What communication skills were
evident?
 How did the facilitator handle difficult or tense moments in the dialogue?
 Does each participant in the group feel like others understood their point of view?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

196 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

CC Flickr photo: OSCE
Parliament, Georgia

Lesson 22
Negotiation Skills

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

 Identify three different approaches to negotiation
 Identify the difference between conflict “positions” and conflict “interests”
 Identify at least three situations where negotiation would be useful for improving civil-military-
police coordination
 Identify the limits of interest-based negotiation
 Identify the relevance of negotiation skills for leadership in complex environments to achieve
human security

This lesson provides an introduction to the skills and process of negotiation. The lesson identifies the
type of situations where negotiation might be useful to support civil-military-police coordination.

Lesson 22: Negotiation Skills

1. Negotiation Defined
Negotiation is a process where two or more people or groups communicate with each other to address
competing interests that appear to be incompatible. In complex environments, civilian, military and police
leadership may need to use negotiation skills to address a wide variety of conflicts.

2. When is negotiation useful?

In complex environments, civilian, military and police leadership may use negotiation to address a wide
variety of conflicts.
 Intra-group conflicts within civil society, military or police about internal conflicts. For example,
some NGOs have been angry with other NGOs that work openly with the military. This is because

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 the safety, access, trust and legitimacy of all NGOs and their beneficiaries depend on the
perception of NGO independence from armed groups or political actors. Once any NGO begins to
work as a contractor for an armed group, it may damage the acceptance and security of all NGOs.
 Inter-group conflicts between civil-military-police groups about each group’s roles and
responsibilities in areas where they are each working and need to coordinate. For example, there
may be conflicts on SSR, DDR or civilian assistance efforts.
 Identity conflicts between clashing ethnic, religious, tribal or other identity groups.
 Ad hoc conflicts happen because diverse stakeholders are all operating, living and working in the
same complex environment. Negotiation can be used to improve day-to-day encounters or
meetings to simply sort out logistical coordination for sharing space. This can include using
negotiation at checkpoints or borders to defuse hostility and reduce the possibility of escalating
conflict.

3. From Win-Lose to Win-Win Solutions

Most people approach negotiations with a belief that in order for us to “win” or get what we want from
the negotiation, the other side needs to “lose.” This “win-lose” attitude makes people feel like they are
against the other person and their needs. The first principle of negotiation is that people need to work
together to solve their shared problem and if possible, create a “win-win” solution that satisfies
everyone’s basic needs. Negotiation and mediation are an opportunity to solve a shared problem.
Recognising that command and control attempts rarely work in complex environments, adaptive leaders
use negotiation and mediation skills and process to improve understanding and coordination between
diverse stakeholders living and working in the same complex environment.

4. Positions versus Interests and Needs

Negotiation helps people identify underlying needs and interests to develop creative solutions. Module 4
on Coordination on Conflict Assessment introduced the distinction between “positions” and “interests.”
People often engage in conflict to attempt to address their grievances. People may be willing to fight and
die to protect their basic human needs for dignity, respect, identity, and economic and physical safety. As
illustrated in the “onion” diagram in Module 4, needs and interests are often hidden underneath public
positions.

 Positions are what people say they want in public. These can be political demands or conditions under
which they will stop fighting.
 Interests are desires, concerns, and fears that drive people to develop a public position.
 Needs are the most basic material, social, and cultural requirements for life that drive people’s
behaviour and their positions and interests.

Many people believe that the best negotiation style is to decide what you want, take a “position,” and then
push and coerce other people to give you what you want. Interest-based negotiation is a process to go
beneath the public positions to discover each group’s deeper interests and needs. If people in a
negotiation discuss their positions rather than their interests or needs, it will be difficult for them to find
creative solutions that allow each of them to be satisfied.

Discussing basic needs and interests is a better negotiating strategy. Needs and interests can be satisfied
in many ways. Creative problem solving can be used to satisfy each person or group’s interests or needs
in a negotiation.

5. Three Approaches to Negotiation

Soft Negotiation: This type of negotiation style puts a large focus on maintaining relationships at the
expense of solving problems. Soft negotiation is “nice” and “soft” on people and relationships. But it does
not solve the problem, because people are afraid of confronting the real issues. This approach avoids the
real issues. People who are accommodating are often willing to give up their own interests and needs in
order to satisfy other people.

Hard or Positional Negotiation: In hard or positional negotiation, people see each other as the enemy.
They make no effort to understand or care about the interests and needs of other people. They may use
coercive negotiating tactics such as threats, abusive language, or power plays to show that they will not
accept anything other than their “position” in the negotiation.

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Interest-Based Negotiation: In interest or need-based negotiation, people see each other as partners in an
effort to solve a mutual problem. They share their own needs and interests while also listening to the
needs and concerns of others. They recognise that their needs and interests are interdependent and that
it will be difficult for them to meet their own needs and interests without examining the needs and
interests of others. People engage in creating problem solving to brainstorm how all human needs can be
satisfied. People build relationships with each other and seek to cooperate rather than compete with each
other. This type of negotiation searches for a “win-win” outcome acceptable to all the people in the
conflict. Interest-based negotiation is also referred to as “principled negotiation.”

The chart below illustrates these three different negotiation styles.

Soft Negotiation Positional Negotiation Interest-based Negotiation
Soft on the people and the Hard on the people and the Soft on the people and hard on
problem problem the problem
Seeks “I lose, you win” solutions Seeks “I win, you lose” solutions Seeks win-win solutions
Makes offers and yields to Makes threats and pressures Explores interests and focuses on
pressure others principles
Figure 57: Approaches to Negotiation -Adapted from Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton109

6. Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement or “BATNA”

Before beginning a negotiation, it is important to know the alternatives to addressing a conflict. If the
negotiation fails to address the problems, what will happen? What next steps will each group take?
Understanding the “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”, or “BATNA”, allows people to make
decisions about what they will accept during a negotiation. Without knowing the BATNA, negotiators will
have a difficult time assessing their options in the midst of a negotiation.

For example, a negotiation between police officers and community leaders over permission for civil
society to hold a protest march against government policies, both sides need to know their BATNA. Police
need to analyse what might happen if they reject the protest without negotiating with the civilian leaders.
If the media covers the decision, and it appears to be repressive, then police leaders may face
consequences for that decision. On the other hand the community leaders also need to assess their
BATNA. If the community decides to hold a protest without getting police permission through a
negotiation, they too may face negative consequences such as arrest or violent repression of the protest
march.

A group may decide to negotiate when they believe they have more to lose by not negotiating. People may
decide to negotiate for the following reasons:
 They have experienced great losses during prior violent exchanges
 Using the legal system would be slow and expensive
 Using violence has not been able to solve their problems
 They may realise that they can only solve the problem through negotiation because they recognise
the interdependence between groups and they believe they can get what they want and need by
negotiating with others.

7. Separate the people from the problem

Skilled negotiators address the issues and problems rather than blaming individuals or people.
Negotiations are more successful when people focus on the issues, not the qualities or characteristics of
groups of people. Civilians, military and police may all hold negative stereotypes about other groups.
Stereotypes are broad accusations against an entire group. In negotiation, the focus of communication is
to find solutions to problems, not to engage in criticisms against an individual or group based on
stereotypes. For example, if police and civilians in a community disagree about the use of force in a
particular situation, a negotiation would emphasise the issue of the use of force in an effort to understand
all points of view as well as the legal context. A constructive negotiation would not include civilians and
the police calling each other names or attacking each other’s character. When conflicts become
personalised and include name-calling and stereotypes, it becomes much more difficult to find solutions
to problems.

8. Use creativity and innovation to find a solution

Negotiation requires creativity. There may not seem to be solutions at the beginning of a negotiation but
the technique of brainstorming helps to generate options. Brainstorming is a process of thinking
creatively to develop a list of ways a problem may be solved. Brainstorming helps people to “think outside
of the box” that may limit their ability to see a solution. Skilled negotiators think creatively to develop the

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 199

widest range of possible options for resolving issues without immediately judging which are good and
which are not.

Sometimes a solution developed during a brainstorming session seems impossible at first, but can be
adapted and combined with other options to create a win-win solution. For example, the countries of
France and Spain were in conflict over a river on their borders. Rather than fight a war over the river, or
decide that one country owned it, they developed a win-win solution. They developed a creative idea of
alternating years that they could use the resources of the river.

9. Find objective ways of making decisions

Some negotiations can borrow solutions from others who have faced similar conflicts. Where there are
laws, rules, or standards, negotiators can use these as standards for deciding what is fair. For conflicts
facing civilians, military, and police, each country’s national constitution and laws, International Human
Rights Laws, the Law of Armed Conflict (International Humanitarian Law) and other related laws may be
helpful.

10. Every culture has their own way to negotiate

The interest-based negotiation skills described here can be helpful across diverse cultures. But it is not
enough to have these basic negotiation skills. Western negotiation experts designed interest-based
negotiation to be used in interpersonal or organisational conflicts or business negotiations to address
very specific problems. A military, police, or civil society leader may find interest-based negotiation very
useful for negotiating with their colleagues who are working within a shared cultural and organisational
framework. But it might not be as useful for negotiations that take place between local civilians and
foreign military forces. Every culture has its own style and rituals to support negotiation. Leaders who
want to use negotiation in complex environments to support human security will have to learn how
negotiation is carried out in the local culture. It might involve an exchange of gifts, the sacrifice of an
animal, eating or drinking tea together.

11. Negotiations in complex environments require advanced negotiation skills

In complex environments with civil, military, and police stakeholders, people and groups may not have
any pre-existing relationship with each other, or any interest in having a relationship in the future. There
may be little will to improve relationships or solve problems together through negotiation if groups do
not want to coexist in the same environment. There may be few incentives for reaching a negotiated
agreement and many rewards for continuing conflict.

The divisions within each side may also make reaching an agreement difficult. There may be internal
conflict over whether or not to negotiate with other groups. For example, some civil society organisations
and communities may want to negotiate on conflicts with military and police forces and others may not.
Similarly some military and police leaders may want to negotiate with local civilian leadership at the
community level and others may prefer to use force to intimidate or repress the civilian population.

If any of the armed groups walks away from negotiation deciding that violence is their BATNA, fighting
may resume, even though some groups may prefer to negotiate. This makes the failure of negotiations
very costly. While the negotiation skills identified so far in this lesson are valuable for solving technical
problems, they fall short in providing guidance for what have become known as “wicked problems”
occurring in many complex environments.

12. Wicked conflicts

Wicked problems, defined and described in lesson 1, include types of conflict that occur in complex
environments. Wicked conflicts may involve many stakeholders and different issues, including complex
religious, political, social and environmental issues. Wicked problems are particularly difficult to
negotiate. Wicked problems require advanced negotiation skills.

Any solution to the problem may create new problems. For example, an attempt to address religious
extremism can be perceived as attacking the religion itself, creating even more religious extremism. Or an
attempt to negotiate between tribal leaders may cause other leaders who do not want to negotiate to
assassinate those leaders in their own group that do want to negotiate. This may cause even more
violence between groups.

Wicked conflicts are each unique. It is often not possible to take a solution that worked to address one
wicked problem and use it to solve another. For example, a conflict between military leaders and tribal

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elders in one country may involve specific religious law, tribal rituals and customs, specific opposition to
government policies and a specific environmental context with other issues and factors driving conflict at
play. This makes it much more difficult for military leaders to take a negotiated solution that worked in
one region of a country and implement or impose the same solution on another region.

The complex environments in which wicked problems develop are themselves in flux. Social norms,
political agreements, cultural and religious values, and social identities may all be shifting. This means
groups are not able to calculate their alternatives or predict a BATNA to assess what might happen if they
negotiate or decide not to negotiate. Complex environments and the wicked problems that happen within
them are unpredictable, which make civil-military-police negotiations especially challenging.

13. Negotiation in Wicked Conflicts

In the midst of a crisis in a complex environment, some of the assumptions about negotiation change.
Listed below are some of the challenges military, police or civilian negotiators face when trying to solve
problems in complex environments when they face wicked conflicts.

 It may be difficult to define the problem that needs to be negotiated. Negotiating on a conflict related
to climate change shocks, religious extremism, and government corruption would require a complex
set of processes to address these three challenges. When negotiating in complex environments,
civilian and security sector leaders often have to take into account external factors that they cannot
immediately control or understand. Local community leaders may insist that their community
members are joining non-state armed groups in response to perceived humiliation from military and
police night raids on community homes. Military and police leaders may insist that local people are
joining an “insurgency” because of religious extremism and demand that religious actors be held
accountable. The conflict itself is not clear. There may be multiple factors driving conflict, making it
difficult for security sector leaders and community leaders to negotiate over goals, strategies or
tactics since they define the conflict in different ways.

 It may not be possible to include all the stakeholders in a negotiation due to political, geographical or
logistical concerns. Those who were excluded may contest or try to undermine an agreement reached
by the negotiating parties which means negotiations will have to restart again. In some security
forces, there is a frequent rotation of personnel. This creates a situation where rotating personnel
come and go, each not fully learning or understanding the complexity of issues and wicked conflicts.

 Stakeholders may have a difficult time determining their BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement) because there are so many different factors to take into consideration.

 The emotional stakes in negotiations in complex environments are very high. Negotiation partners
may fear for their personal security and may have been deeply traumatised because of the loss of
their colleagues. Such fear may lead them to harden their positions, adopt more extremist views, and
lose trust. It may also make it difficult to think rationally about costs and benefits or the “BATNA”. For
example, NGO representatives may be in outright refusal of any type of contact with military actors
after attacks on their offices occurred. A military officer may have no idea of the negative
consequences for choosing not to negotiate with a tribal elder. A police leader may not be able to
analyse any alternatives to a negotiated solution because there are so many diverse stakeholders and
factors at play that it is not able to predict what risks or benefits may be achieved through
negotiation. Furthermore, each side may be willing to fight and die for their cause. It may be difficult
to convince them to consider alternatives to their positions if they feel their very identity is at stake.

 In some cultures, to acknowledge wrongdoing requires carrying out revenge attacks. In some
contexts, any attempt at negotiating a problem that includes naming the history of wrongdoing risks
increasing the violence, as naming, blaming and shaming tactics (often used by civil society, especially
human rights groups) may humiliate stakeholders who may respond with cultural norms that call for
revenge or increasing violence. This may affect civil-military-police negotiations in complex
environments. Civil society may unknowingly set off new violence by publishing human rights
accounts that name perpetrators. Military and police leaders may unknowingly set off new violence
by negotiating with community leaders in a way that makes it impossible for community leaders to
save face, causing them humiliation and prompting them to take revenge. Negotiation in these
contexts requires extra attention to anticipate and mitigate these potential negative impacts.

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14. Adaptive Negotiation and Social Transformation
Wicked conflicts that take place in complex environments may not have a negotiated solution. Official
diplomacy between states, sometimes involving the UN is known as “Track I diplomacy.” Track I
diplomacy may take many years to address wicked conflicts by starting with “low hanging fruit” or
confidence-building mechanisms to solve small problems which then allows the stakeholders involved in
negotiation to sequence the issues they address. Ultimately, negotiation on wicked conflicts in complex
environments almost always involves “social transformation”; a fundamental shift in a country’s
economic, political and social systems.110

Unofficial diplomacy or “Track II diplomacy” involves civil society. Local conflict prevention and
peacebuilding use Track II diplomacy to bring together academics and mid-level leaders across the lines
of conflict in an attempt to analyse the conflict and begin brainstorming possible solutions that can then
support Track I diplomacy. Civil society has played significant roles in negotiating the end to civil wars in
South Africa, Mozambique, and dozens of other countries.

Recognising the important role of negotiation and diplomacy, some military academies now train “soldier
diplomats” who can participate in negotiation and reconciliation processes. Where civilian government,
security forces, and civil society are all participating in negotiation and diplomatic efforts, coordination is
essential. This type of coordination could significantly contribute to a systematic approach to wicked
conflicts. Without coordination, the potential for negotiation efforts to undermine each other is
significant. For example, civil society, military and police leaders may not themselves be able to assist in
negotiations of “wicked conflicts” that stem from a diverse set of factors fuelling the violence. Adaptive
leaders, as defined in Module 1, need to be able to determine when negotiation will be useful for civil-
military-police coordination on human security and when it is not possible or needs to be carried out by
other stakeholders, such as the UN or high-level diplomats.

Civil-military-police leaders can use “adaptive negotiation” to identify “sub-conflicts” or specific problems
that would benefit from negotiation between security forces and civil society. Adaptive negotiation will
also include an ability to think of negotiation as a broader process of social transformation, including
negotiation on government and security sector reforms, rule of law programmes, religious values,
economic development, and a wide range of other efforts may also be necessary.

LESSON REVIEW
This lesson reviewed three common approaches to negotiation: hard, soft, and interest-based. The lesson
described why interest-based negotiation is usually more effective in that it takes into consideration the
interests of all stakeholders involved in the negotiation, enabling all of them to create a solution that
satisfies their interests. The lesson ends by describing the difficulty of negotiating solutions to “wicked
problems” that frequently occur in complex environments where civil society, military and police may all
be working toward human security. Leaders may need to negotiate broader social processes, like
government reform initiatives, in addition to negotiating on specific issues such as how to manage water
or how to divide land.

Citations

109 Roger Fisher, William L. Ury and Bruce M. Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating without Giving In. (New York: Penguin
Books, 1983).
110 See also the following publications:

Calvin Chrustie, Jayne Seminare Docherty, Leonard Lira, Jamil Mahuad, Howard Gadlin & Christopher Honeyman,
“Negotiating Wicked Problems: Five Stories” in Venturing Beyond the Classroom, ed ‪Christopher Honeyman‪, James
Coben, Giuseppe De Palo‪. (Saint Paul, Minnesota: DRI Press, 2010).
Jayne Docherty and Leonard Lira, “Adapting to the adaptive: How can we teach negotiation for wicked problems?” in
Educating negotiators for a connected world: Volume 4 in the Rethinking Negotiation Teaching Series, ‪Christopher
Honeyman‪, James Coben, and A. Wei-Min Lee, (St. Paul, Minnesota: DRI Press, 2013).
Leonard Lira, “Design: The U.S. Army’s Approach to Negotiating Wicked Problems,” in Venturing Beyond the
Classroom, ed ‪Christopher Honeyman‪, James Coben, Giuseppe De Palo‪. (Saint Paul, Minnesota: DRI Press, 2010).

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Lesson 22 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question:
 What is one experience of a successful negotiation you have had in your life? What was
effective or ineffective in this negotiation?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using negotiation skills. Given the rising tensions following the
earthquake and the killing of eighteen civilians in the IDP camp, each of the stakeholders in this
scenario decides to renew efforts to negotiate an end to the crisis by building a common national
vision. Each stakeholder team has thirty minutes to formulate their negotiation plan based on the
lesson and then to seek out other stakeholder teams with whom they want to negotiate with to
achieve their goals.

 What approach to negotiation will each team take – soft, hard or interest-based?
 What is each team’s BATNA?
 Which issues might not be negotiable?
 What are the potential risks or benefits of negotiation?

Debrief the negotiation role-play by asking each team to reflect on the challenges and opportunities
to use negotiation to achieve their goals.

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

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 Flickr CC Photo Credit: Gemma
Fernandez und Maria Reig

Lesson 23
Mediation Skills

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Define mediation
 Identify the four steps involved in mediation processes
 Identify at least two situations where mediation would be useful for improving civil society-
military-police relations
 Identify the relevance of mediation skills for leadership in complex environments to achieve
human security

This lesson provides an understanding of how mediation skills can enable civil society, military and
police to identify the causes of conflicts between diverse stakeholders and develop mutually satisfying
solutions that address the interests of each group.

Lesson 23: Mediation Skills

1. Definition of mediation
Mediation is a process for handling conflict with the help of a third party or “mediator” who facilitates a
discussion between people in conflict with each other to identify the issues and develop options for
addressing the challenges.

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When a conflict is particularly difficult to resolve, a mediator helps people in conflict negotiate with each
other by facilitating the process of identifying the issues and by encouraging parties to find solutions. A
mediator plays a role that is more of a facilitator than a judge. Like facilitators, mediators guide people
through a process where they can express their needs, share their experiences, and listen to others.
However, mediators are not only interested in promoting exchange and understanding but also in coming
to an agreement that all parties can accept. Unlike a judge, mediators do not make a decision about how to
solve a conflict. Mediators need a wide variety of skills. These include the skills of good communication,
dialogue, and negotiation discussed in the last few lessons.

Mediation is not a new idea or process; it is very old way of handling conflict adapted from tribal cultures
around the world. In traditional societies, elders and chiefs play the roles of mediators. They help people
in conflict communicate and negotiate with each other to find a solution to their problems. Mediation is
growing in popularity. Many judges and courts around the world now refer cases to mediation. Diplomats
use mediation to solve global problems and to bring an end to wars. Schools use peer mediation so that
youth learn how to address problems with discussion rather than fighting.

2. When is mediation useful?

In complex environments, civilian, military and police leadership may use mediation to address a wide
variety of conflicts. Adaptive civil-military-police leaders may find that they can serve as a mediator
among their own staff, between other organisations who are in conflict, and between groups in the wider
society that are in conflict.

 Intra-group conflicts within civil society, military or police about internal conflicts. Mediation can
help address staff conflicts within an organisation.
 Inter-group conflicts between civil-military-police groups about each groups’ roles and
responsibilities in areas where they are each working and need to coordinate. Mediation can help
address conflicts between communities and the police or military working in the area. 111
Mediation can be useful for adaptive leaders attempting to build a wide coalition of coordinated
efforts aiming to achieve human security by improving relationships and the ability to coordinate
between groups
 Identity conflicts between clashing ethnic, religious, tribal or other identity groups. Mediation can
be used as part of a broader approach to reconciliation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding to
address deep-rooted conflicts and challenges. Mediation can be useful to decrease levels of social
division and violence between groups that are driving or contributing to conflict in a complex
environment. For example, police can serve as mediators between community members.112

3. The Mediation Process

The formal use of mediation draws on the best practices of people who have played a mediating role
between groups in conflict. The process of mediation is not an exact recipe to be followed. The mediation
process looks different in different contexts. The following four steps provide a general guide to the
mediation process.

Figure 58: The Mediation Process

Pre-Mediation
Mediators usually prepare for a mediation session by meeting separately with each stakeholder, the
individuals or groups involved in the conflict. In this preparatory meeting, a mediator will do the
following:

 Identify potential locations agreeable to each stakeholder

 Review the mediation process and clarify the role of the mediator to lead the process, not to decide
outcomes
 Listen to stakeholders identify key issues that they will bring to the mediation

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Mediation Introduction
Welcome and describe the process
 Make people feel comfortable according to local culture or custom. Greet people and help them find
an appropriate place to sit
 Give people a sense of how the process will proceed

Establish commitment to ground rules and the process

 Establish ground rules (see Lesson 11 or 21)

Opening Statement
Let each person describe the situation from his or her own perspective by making an “opening statement”

Identifying Issues and Options

Mediator summarises key issues and checks for accuracy
After the opening statements, mediators ask the different sides to paraphrase and summarise what they
heard the other individual or group say were their key interests. The mediator should assure all
stakeholders that understanding the other stakeholder’s point of view does not mean agreement with
their point of view. Paraphrasing is a way to check for understanding.

Summarise and reframe the key issues each stakeholder has identified to highlight the underlying
interests of each group. For example, stakeholders might share specific experiences, behaviours that are
offensive, or a disagreement about a specific decision or resource. Mediators reframe positions and
demands into statements that check for underlying interests, often having to do with a sense of respect,
dignity and an ability to participate in decisions that affect the stakeholder’s interests. Ask all groups
whether they feel their issues have been understood correctly.

Mediator sequences and groups issues together

 A mediator may call a break to consider how to best sequence a discussion of different issues
identified by the stakeholders
 Address each issue one by one, or group similar issues together
 Sequence issues from easy to difficult

Brainstorm options to address issues

 Ask people to think creatively to develop solutions to address everyone’s needs and interests
 Create a list of possible options for addressing

Making Agreements
 Jointly decide what options best address everyone’s interests
 Evaluate the different issues: ask participants which options will satisfy everyone’s interests
 Encourage and empower the people in conflict to choose which options are best for everyone
 Use this process to address each issue until they all have been addressed

Develop an agreement
 Make the final agreement as specific as possible: Who will do what? When will they do it?
 Make arrangements for what will happen if the agreement does not hold or if some other issue or
conflict arises. What will happen next?
 If apologies, acknowledgement of responsibility, or affirmation is part of the agreement, write
these down or make note of them in the final agreement

Closing Ceremony
 Find a way to close the mediation with sharing food over a reception or meal.

4. Mediation Skills: Paraphrasing, Summarising, and Reframing

Mediators draw on foundational communication and conflict skills to help the people in conflict communicate
more effectively and find solutions to their conflicts. Mediators should occasionally paraphrase people’s
thoughts and feelings to check-in with them to ensure that you have correctly understood what they said.
Paraphrasing is a way of acknowledging that you hear what someone said and checking to make sure you and
others understand the message by giving them a short summary of what they have said. Say: “So what you’re

206 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

saying is …” This is especially important if you are not sure you understand what they are trying to
communicate or if other participants look confused.

Mediators can also ask other groups in the mediation to paraphrase statements from an opposing group.
This is a very helpful technique to build trust between groups, as it helps them recognise that others have
understood them. Mediators help to summarise the discussions for the group by using paraphrasing skills

Example A:
Diplomatic: “I would prefer if we would agree to finish listening to the opening statements in the
mediation before we break for lunch. Could we all reaffirm our commitment to the ground rules of
the mediation?”

Accusatory: “I will not tolerate any more interruptions!”

Example B:
A villager is very upset with another group in the mediation, saying “You never tell the truth, I can never trust
you!”

Mediator paraphrased reply: “It sounds like you are really frustrated about what has happened in the past.
Can we agree that during the mediation process, we will all be honest with each other?”

Example C:
Someone in mediation might say: “I demand that you give me $1000 in compensation for destroying my
farmland with your military equipment!”

Mediator reframing: “If I am hearing you correctly, you have an interest in compensation for your losses
and want the military to acknowledge these losses.”

at the
end of each presentation or phase of the mediation.

“Reframing” is similar to paraphrasing. In reframing, a mediator will summarise what someone has said, but will
change the phrasing of the sentence to be more productive in transforming the conflict. A mediator can
“reframe” a statement about a groups’ position on how to solve the problem into a more general need that
expresses the interests underneath the position.

Speaking diplomatically is also a key skill for mediators. Learning how to speak diplomatically helps
mediators say difficult things in a way that others can hear them. When mediators need to communicate a
message about conflict or differences among people, they need skills to enable them to give this message
in a way that will not make other people close their ears or become defensive. When you are upset at
others, diplomatic speaking identifies your own needs without offending others.

5. Non-Verbal Mediation Skills

Mediators communicate nonverbally with their eyes, facial expressions and body posture Mediators can
set the tone for a productive problem-solving session through nonverbal cues.

 Relaxed and calm: The groups in the mediation will watch the nonverbal behaviour of the mediators.
If the mediator appears calm and relaxed, this helps the groups in the mediation stay calm. If the
mediator is anxious and nervous, this is contagious and will spread to participants in the mediation.
 Address the whole group: Look around the whole group as you speak. Try not to favour certain people
by looking directly at them most of the time.
 Confident and dignified: Mediators should think about their body posture to communicate that they
are confident and that they are overseeing a dignified process where each person is respected.

6. Managing Conflict
Remind everyone that conflict is normal. While conflict may be uncomfortable or tense, it is an
opportunity to solve problems and build better relationships.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 207

 Remain neutral as much as possible. If you don’t take sides, the group will have more confidence in
trusting you to help mediate and resolve the conflict.
 Go to the heart of the matter. Focus on the issues central to the conflict. This may seem to initially
make matters worse, but you have to do it to understand the disagreements.
 Stop one-on-one arguments from developing and threatening to take over the dialogue. Ask for quiet
time for a few minutes, or get everyone to stand up and stretch, encourage the people involved to talk
about it during the break, or suggest that people count to ten before answering back.

7. Emotional Outbursts
 Accept strong emotion as natural. Treat it as a chance to look closely at the issues involved and invite
the group to help resolve it. Strong emotions express bottled-up feelings due to past experiences
(anger, hatred, fear, hurt).
 Don’t stop a crying participant. Give the person time to do it. Allow the flow of emotions and energies
as well as the flow of ideas in the group, but don’t let them disrupt the interaction for too long. For
example, participants might burst into tears when sharing a painful experience.
 Allow the participants to express their emotions as well as the flow of ideas in the group, but don’t let
them disrupt the interaction for too long. Call a break and ask the person what she needs from the
group.
 Afterwards, lead the group into some moments of silence to process what happened or, if you know
you can, talk it through for them to help them learn from the situation.

8. Addressing participants who talk too much

Try to gain some agreement with the group at the beginning about the need to share speaking and
listening roles so that each has a chance to talk.

If some members of the group begin talking too much or too frequently, and you notice that others in the
group are not paying attention, ask them if you can interrupt briefly. Remind the whole group of the need
to listen to everyone’s experience and that the mediators’ job is to make sure everyone has time to speak.
Tell the group that you will raise your hand briefly when it is time for the person speaking to summarise
their main points and let someone else talk. Then go back to the person who was talking and ask them to
summarise their story and move onto another participant.

In some situations, you may want to talk to the person who has been talking too much at a break, so they
are not embarrassed in front of the group. Thank the person and tell them you observed that they had a
lot of important experiences to share, and then ask them to make sure to let other people have a chance to
talk. Be nice when you discourage talkative people who keep trying to take over the speaking time. Say:
“Thank you- but let’s hear from some others first.”

9. Dealing with Silence

Participants are silent for different reasons in workshops. They can be afraid, shy, untrusting, bored,
angry, and so on.

 Bring out quiet participants by gently including them in the dialogue. Say: “We haven’t had the chance
to hear your view yet. Would you like to share it with us?” or “We haven’t heard much about how
your group feels. What do you think?”
 Treat silence with respect, not fear. There are usually good reasons for it and finding out the reasons
will help you re-focus the group on the workshop goals. When silence is bothering the participants or
they seem unable to break it, confront it. Say something like: “We all seem to be unusually silent and
some of us are looking a bit uneasy. Can we talk about what’s happened to cause this? How do you
feel about the silence?” We often think that nothing can be happening unless people are talking or
that something must be wrong if people are not talking. But communication can still happen without
words: participants speak with their eyes, and with hand and body expressions (non-verbal
communication). Learn to look for non-verbal communication and to interpret it correctly for the
group. Also, participants may want to take some quiet time out, even in a discussion group, to sit and
think about what has been said.
 Bring hidden conflicts out in the open. If you see signs of unexpressed disagreement, ask those
participants what they are feeling. Say something like: “I sense that we’re not dealing with all the
issues here. What is going on here? Let’s talk about it together.” If the whole group is silent, they may
not understand the question you have asked to get the conversation going. Try to re-word the
question or ask two or three similar questions and then open the discussion up again. If the group is

208 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 only giving short and brief answers to your questions, ask more questions to help people say more
about their experiences or feelings.

10. Managing Spoilers

Adapted from “Managing a Mediation Process” US Institute of Peace113

“Spoilers” are people or groups who will try to interrupt or block a mediation. They may be inside or part
of the mediation, or outside of it. If they are in the mediation, they may just be there trying to interrupt
the process to make sure there is not an agreement. Other spoilers will block agreements if their own
interests are not met.

It may be difficult to know at the beginning who is a spoiler. It is important to have all the key groups in
the mediation, even those who may turn out to want to spoil or interrupt the process. But if some groups
are not included in the mediation, they may be making more trouble or interruption outside of the
mediation. So it is important to try to include them. Instead of excluding spoilers, mediators should find
ways to manage them in the process through these techniques:

11. Mediators can ask to meet with spoiler groups directly.

Include spoiler groups as observers of the process, but not direct parties to the mediation.

 Try to address the underlying grievances of the spoilers. Find out if they are looking for security, a
sense of fairness in distribution of resources, or some form of political recognition and legitimacy.
These issues can be made part of the mediation itself.
 Ask potential spoilers to help develop and then commit to a set of ground rules for the mediation that
will establish a set of norms for acceptable behaviours.
 Create a set of “carrots and sticks” so that groups that follow the guidelines gain the benefit of
mediation and those that do not follow the guidelines will suffer some consequence. The groups in
mediation can develop these carrots and sticks at the start of the process, so that they set up their
own rewards or punishments.
 As a last resort, spoilers can be told that the mediation process will go forward with or without the
spoiler, emphasising that the spoiler’s actions will have limited impact on the overall process. They
can either be part of the process or not included in the outcome.

12. Breaking Deadlocks

Adapted from Editors: Peter Harris and Ben Reilly Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for
Negotiators Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998.114

When the mediation cannot proceed because the groups are at an impasse or cannot work through or
agree on how to address an issue, there is a range of strategies to break this deadlock.

 Coalition building– Gain agreement from those groups in the mediation that want to continue talking
with each other to form a coalition.
 Unofficial channels– When official mediation or negotiation efforts break down, unofficial channels
for communicating can continue and meetings can take place in informal settings.
 Subgroups– Small groups of people can work on difficult issues that are blocking the progress of the
larger group. These subgroups can work to develop options for addressing the issue that can then be
brought back to the larger group.
 Shuttle mediation– A mediator can work with groups separately to try to make progress or gain
clarity on the underlying issues and needs blocking progress in mediation.
 Referendums, consultations and mandates– If the groups in a mediation are not able to identify a way
forward, these issues could be put to vote via a referendum or community council meeting.

13. Mediation Teams

A mediation team is a group of people, with different backgrounds or points of view who work together to
lead the mediation process. Mediation teams best include a combination of insiders/locals and
outsiders/internationals.
 A set of legitimate and respected insiders/locals that hold extensive social capital networks with
diverse stakeholders
 A set of credible and respected outsiders/internationals with comparative experience with peace
processes in other countries

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14. Key Roles of Mediation and Negotiation Support Teams
Experts: Bring technical experts in the specialised skills of negotiation and mediation along with knowing
the lessons learned from past peace processes
Trainers: Offer stakeholders training in negotiation, handling and speaking with news media, conflict
coaching and other skills necessary to a peace process
Analysis: Engage in on-going analysis and assessment of political, social, economic and security dynamics
impacting the peace process
Good Offices: Provide good offices or access to information related to the conflict needed by stakeholders
Envoys: Help identify, communicate with, transmit messages between, and convene diverse stakeholders
Planners: Ensure that all stakeholders accept the location of meetings, arrange for security at meetings,
detail protocols, level of confidentiality and other ground rules to foster respectful interactions
Mediators: Model respect for all stakeholders, ensure each stakeholder has adequate and roughly equal
time to share their perspectives, identify shared grievances, highlight common ground, develop creative
options, design next steps together
Reality Testers: Challenge stakeholders to identify their best alternatives to a negotiated agreement and
consensus on the way forward for the country. Identify the costs of not reaching an agreement
Catalysts: Act as catalysts for new forums, programmes, institutions to foster the peace process and on-
going peacebuilding.
Sustainers: Provide continuity and sustainability to a long-term, dynamic process

15. Personal attributes of Mediation Teams

In their book, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation, Lakhdar Brahimi and
Salem Ahmed outline the dangers of ignorance; arrogance; partiality; impotence; haste; inflexibility; and
false promises.” They say these are the fatal consequences for the peace process. Instead, members of a
mediation team should have at least the following basic skills and values supporting peace processes.

 Commit to using robust diplomatic skills in all situations and peaceful resolution of conflict and
demonstrate capability of building or repairing relationships
 Recognise local capacities for facilitation and mediation skills in community, district or national
processes or institutions
 Seek and promote inclusive, just and equitable solutions to political conflicts even if the insiders
may belong to one or more of the groups considered as key stakeholders

LESSON REVIEW
This lesson reviewed the mediation process for civilian, military, and police leaders working in complex
environments. Stakeholders may be able to use mediation to improve the ability of groups to work
together toward shared goals and/or to defuse tension, conflict or violence between groups in society
that are contributing to a crisis.

Citations

111 Lieutenant Matthew Ivey, “Using Mediation to Resolve Disputes between U.S. Military Bases and Foreign Hosts: A
Case Study in Japan,” in (Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 9 March, 2009). http://www.hnlr.org/2009/03/using-
mediation-to-resolve-disputes-between-us-military-bases-and-foreign-hosts-a-case-study-in-japan/ accessed
January 2016.
112 Samuel Walker, Carol Archbold, and Leigh Herbst, Mediating Citizen Complaints against Police Officers: A Guide for
Police and Community Leaders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services, 2002), http://restorativejustice.org/am-site/media/mediating-citizen-complaints-against-police-
officers.pdf (accessed January 2016).
113 Amy L. Smith and David R. Smock. Managing a Mediation Process, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2008).
114
Peter Harris and Ben Reilly. Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, (Stockholm, Sweden:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, (International IDEA), 1998).

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Lesson 23 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question:

 What is an example of a time in your life when someone else intervened in a conflict between
you and another person? What did that person do to help resolve the conflict?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to practice using mediation skills. A group of young armed men who had
been committing acts of violence against both local communities and the local police are going
through a process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). The young men have
given up their weapons and are beginning to return to their communities. Some members of the
community are unhappy about the return of these former members of the gangs and militias that
brought violence to their communities. They want to see the young men punished, not reintegrated
into their community. Other members of the community want an end to the cycle of violence and
want to welcome the young men back into the community. The community plans a mediation
process between the community members who oppose or favour reintegration.

Divide into four groups composed of mixed teams, some representing the security sector or
government and others representing civil society. Each group can assign two people to be
mediators. Mediators may assume a “pre-mediation” meeting has already taken place to identify the
time and place of the meeting. Mediators may begin by introducing and explaining the process.

After 20-30 minutes in the mediation, call time and begin to debrief the exercise. Let the small
groups debrief first:
 What did the mediator do well?
 What was challenging?
 What might have helped the process?

In the large group, ask small groups to share the challenges and to ask questions about the process.

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 211

 CC Flickr/ U.S. Coast
Guard photo: Petty
Officer 1st Class
Christopher Evanson

Module
7
Civilian Assistance

Module 7 Civilian Assistance

Lesson 24: Understanding Civilian Assistance defines different types of assistance and
emphasises the gap between good intentions and unintended impacts when carrying out
assistance.

Lesson 25: Coordinating Civilian Assistance identies international guidance for civilians and
military forces when working in the same complex environment.

This Module identifies helps civilians, military and police to understand different terminology,
potential dangers and international guidance for coordinating civilian assistance.

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CC Flickr Photo: Red Cross

Lesson 24
Understanding Civilian Assistance

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Define key terms related to civilian assistance
 Recognise the distinctions between different forms of assistance, such as the difference
between humanitarian assistance and development assistance
 Identify three ways that assistance impacts or relates to security
 Identify military and police roles in civilian-led humanitarian assistance
 Identify military and police reasons for engaging in civilian assistance
 Identify civilian concerns with military and police roles in civilian assistance
 Identify principles of effective development assistance
 Identify civil society principles for assistance
 Identify methods for reducing the negative impacts of assistance

This lesson defines and identifies the scope of civilian assistance. It explores some of the reasons why
civilian assistance is important to different stakeholders. It also identifies principles and best practices
for anticipating and avoiding unintended impacts. Good intentions behind civilian assistance do not
always lead to good impacts.

Lesson 24: Understanding Civilian Assistance

1. Terminology
Lesson 8 identified legal frameworks that guide assistance for people in need. Civilian and military
organisations use different terminology in reference to assistance given to local populations.
Civilian assistance or civil aid: This is a broad term used to describe all efforts to help civilians.
Disaster Assistance: Civilian assistance given during a natural disaster. Military and police may take on
civilian roles to assist with the crisis.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 213

Foreign Disaster Assistance: Some militaries use this term to describe a situation where a foreign military
assists civilians in another country during a crisis.

Humanitarian Assistance: By definition, the primary objective of humanitarian assistance or aid is to save
lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity through material or logistical assistance in response
to natural disasters and man-made disasters.

Development Assistance: Also referred to as international aid, overseas aid, official development
assistance (ODA), or foreign aid, supports the economic, environmental, social, and political development
of developing countries.

Governance Assistance: An specific type of development assistance related to how society makes
decisions and manages its resources. In most societies today, informal, non-state governance structures
complement or exist outside of formal state governance.

The distinction between humanitarian assistance and development assistance is important. Humanitarian
assistance requires strict operational requirements for neutrality, impartiality, independence and a sole
goal of relieving human suffering. While humanitarian assistance addresses specific crises, development
assistance provides longer-term efforts to transform the root causes of poverty, economic inequality, lack
of healthcare and education, and other social problems. For this Handbook, the term “civilian assistance”
is used to refer to both humanitarian and development assistance.

2. Relationship between Security and Assistance

There is a complex relationship between assistance and security. Scholars refer to a “security-
development nexus” revealing that assistance to people in need can improve security, or it can fuel
insecurity.115

a. Development can weaken local support for violence by spreading the economic benefits of
peace. Development can foster middle class and civil society actors that can put a brake on
political violence.
b. Development can discourage people who might use violence or join a violent group by
addressing their perceived grievances and offering better economic alternatives.
c. Development can empower local change agents who can make demands on their government
for transparency and accountability.

3. Assistance Can Contribute to Insecurity and Fuel Support for Violence

No type of assistance, regardless of intent, has a purely neutral affect. All assistance creates winners and
losers. Providing assistance is complex, and accompanying dangers can create harmful and
counterproductive second and third order effects. Development experts and NGOs with decades of
experience have recognised that despite their good intentions, they have often caused harm and increase
local conflict by their lack of understanding of local culture and contexts. Despite the best of intentions,
sometimes humanitarian and development assistance does more harm than good. International
assistance, be it private or governmental, can undermine local initiative, disrupt local economies, and
create a dependency trap.
a. Any transfer of assistance resources into a community can foster corruption and
unintentionally legitimate unpopular local leaders and armed groups.
b. If development resources are perceived to benefit some groups but not others, development
can exacerbate existing tensions between groups.
c. External development assistance can free up local resources for war, relieving leaders of their
responsibilities to provide basic services to citizens.
d. If assistance is suddenly withheld or repeatedly used as a “stick” to punish support for political
leaders, it can foster a backlash of support for groups that provide aid in the vacuum of
international support.
e. Inadequate development assistance funding relative to the population, geography and needs
may lead dependency and inflated expectations and public frustration.

4. Sequencing of Assistance and Security

Some argue that security should come first, and assistance should follow. In counterinsurgency, for
example, a “clear, hold, build” approach would see military efforts to clear and hold an area to come first,
before the “build” approach which would include development assistance and governance efforts. Others

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argue that security, development, and governance are interdependent. In most situations, civilian
assistance and security efforts should be simultaneous and not sequenced.

5. Military Assistance for Humanitarian Purposes

Military forces conduct a range of activities in civilian sectors. Military leaders articulate a range of
objectives for their involvement in civilian assistance. Some of these fit into the civilian definition of
humanitarian assistance, aimed purely at relieving human suffering. Many civilians recognise that in the
midst of a disaster or crisis, only the military has the logistical capacity to assist with infrastructure
support and transportation of large-scale humanitarian assistance efforts. Many civilians also recognise
that the military and police contribute to area security.

 Providing area security to help establish and maintain the basic conditions for the provision of
humanitarian assistance by civilian organisations
 Providing indirect assistance (transportation), logistical support or infrastructure support after
natural disaster or manmade crisis as a last resort through civilian-led effort (See MCDA
guidelines)

6. Military Civilian Assistance for Non-Humanitarian Purposes

Some civilian and military leaders ask military forces to take part in civilian assistance activities for non-
humanitarian purposes. This list below identifies some of these purposes.

 Preparing forces to work abroad through training and exercise

 Improving visibility, access, and influence in support of broader military and national interests
through security cooperation
 Providing capacity building and infrastructure support to help other countries prepare for crises
 Creating “peace dividends” to help publics see the impact of a peace process
 Building confidence in the good intentions of military forces; Generating collaborative
relationships with a host nation’s civil society as well as positive public relations and goodwill
 Addressing perceived drivers of instability and the root causes of ideological extremism
 Extending the state’s local legitimacy and authority by gaining support and winning the loyalty of
relevant communities or local elites
 Countering ideological support for terrorism
 Gaining access to and information about specific populations, including intelligence that can assist
in enemy targeting

For example, the UN’s Quick Impact Project (QIPs) provide peacekeeping forces with funding to do
civilian projects aimed at helping local communities and in turn, adding legitimacy to the presence of UN
forces.116 International forces in Afghanistan built schools and health clinics to win support of local
populations.

Some military personnel express concern that civilian tasks distract from military tasks. They would
prefer to “stay in their lane” with activities that are purely military. They question the rationale for
participating in civilian activities. In particular some see efforts to win the hearts and minds of local
populations as “soft” and ineffective.

7. Civilian Concerns with Military Civilian Assistance

Some civilians view the increase in military-based civilian assistance activities as “instrumentalising
assistance” for security purposes, thus distracting from civilian goals of poverty alleviation or relieving
human suffering. A number of researchers have already documented a range of unintended consequences
from complex peace operations and peacebuilding systems.117 These unintended effects include those that
obstruct the goals of international development and peacebuilding programmes, and those that adversely
impact local governments and populations. 118 Civilians assert that military involvement in civilian
activities has a variety of potential negative impacts, including the following:

 Decreases Trust and Access: Military involvement in civilian tasks or efforts to work with civilian
populations can blur the distinction between civilians and combatants mandated by the Geneva
Conventions. Such blurring can reduce the ability of civilian agencies to maintain trust with, and
access to, people in need of assistance.
 Decreases Safety: Lack of distinction between civilians and military forces can result in threats to
civilian beneficiaries and civilian staff.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 215

  Undermines or Duplicates Civilian Assistance: Military involvement in civilian tasks to achieve
short term political and security goals can also duplicate, undermine, or conflict with civilian
activities, making assistance efforts less effective in the long term.
 Fuels Corruption, Conflict, and Unintended Impacts: Military assistance provided without proper
oversight and accountability has the potential to fuel corruption or increase divisions, causing
unintended second order impacts. In many instances military involvement in civilian activities
have not taken adequate precautions to avoid negative impacts such as increased conflict and
corruption.
 Is not cost effective: Deploying military personnel to conduct civilian assistance is often far more
costly than civilian alternatives.

Civil-military guidance and coordination mechanisms are needed to address these potential negative
consequences of military involvement in civilian assistance, and to allow dialogue between civilians and
the military in those instances where civil-military cooperation and collaboration are appropriate and
necessary.

The next two lessons on civil-military-police coordination and lessons identify the following principles for
military support to civilian assistance that relate to these concerns.

8. Busan Principles for Effective Development Cooperation

The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation build off a series of international
conferences highlighting best practices of development assistance.
 Local ownership of development priorities by developing countries and supporting local capacity
 Focus on sustainable results of development assistance on eradicating poverty and reducing
inequality
 Inclusive development partnerships characterised by openness, trust, and mutual respect and
learning between the distinct and complementary roles of all assistance actors
 Transparency and accountability to each other and the intended beneficiaries of development
cooperation as well as to our respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders.

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding is another international process to identify
standards for assistance to address the root causes of security challenges.

9. NGO and CSO Assistance Standards

Umbrella networks for NGOs aim to identify best practices, standards and accountability mechanisms.
The Sphere Project is a global effort to establish minimum standards in humanitarian response.

In development assistance, NGOs insist HOW assistance is provided is more important than WHAT is
provided. Civil society emphasises empowerment and inclusion of local people in the planning, design &
delivery of efforts to minimise human suffering and maximise the quality of life. Civil society organisations
focus on human security goals related to the safety of individuals and communities.

Focus on Local Goals: The goal of any form of assistance is to improve the lives of local people and not to
achieve foreign political or economic goals. Assistance should build programmes from the community
level, focusing on local aspirations and needs.

Local Ownership and Genuine Partnership: Locally identified needs provide guidance for NGOs.
Assistance should be demand driven, not supply driven. Ideally, beneficiaries invite NGOs in. Principled
NGOs never impose their programmes upon communities. Assistance works best when national staff with
local knowledge hold key leadership positions within the NGO. While there is a clear trend towards
international NGOs hiring local people as staff members, few NGOs actually provide direct funding to
locally-led independent institutions. To the extent possible, assistance should ensure local people are in
charge of programme decisions that affect their communities.

Local Accountability and Sustainability: Assistance should be accountable to both donors and local
beneficiaries. The objectives and budgets of any assistance should be transparent so that they can be
understood and examined by local governments and communities. NGOs are accountable for the positive
and negative impacts of their assistance efforts. They are responsible for monitoring, evaluating
programmes and redesigning their plans if their assistance efforts cause harm. All programmes should be
for sustainable.

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CSOs met in Istanbul, Turkey in 2010 to outline “Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles.”
These principles guide the work and practices of civil society organisations in both peaceful and conflict
situations, in different areas of work from grassroots to policy advocacy, and in a continuum from
humanitarian emergencies to long-term development.

 Respect and promote human rights and social justice.

 Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girls’ rights.
 Focus on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation, with an emphasis on the
poor and marginalised.
 Promote environmental sustainability with specific attention to the socio-economic, cultural and
indigenous conditions for ecological integrity and justice.
 Practice transparency, accountability, and integrity in their internal operations.
 Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity with other CSOs and development actors, freely and as
equals, based on shared development goals and values, mutual respect, trust, organisational
autonomy, long-term accompaniment, solidarity and global citizenship.
 Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning, including the knowledge and wisdom of
local and indigenous communities.
 Commit to realising positive sustainable change, ensuring an enduring legacy for present and future
generations.

10. “Do No Harm” Approach

Assistance is never simple or inherently good. All assistance efforts change dynamics in the local context.
All forms of assistance have frequent unintended consequences, also known as second order effects.
There are no completely neutral assistance interventions. When assistance is given without a thorough
understanding of the local conflicts and divisions between groups, assistance can easily and frequently
create further conflict or do more harm than good. 119 Most civil society organizations, including NGOs,
have taken steps to anticipate and mitigate any negative impacts through specialised Do No Harm training
that enables them to provide conflict-sensitive assistance.

Conflict Sensitivity is an approach to programming and policymaking that recognises the potential
influence for any type of intervention to cause harm. It is also referred to as “Do No Harm.” Conflict-
sensitive policies, programmes and projects aim to minimise unintentional negative impacts that may
drive conflict and cause further social divisions while maximising positive impacts on the context that
mitigate conflict and bridge social divides. Conflict assessment and self-assessment research is central to
conflict sensitive policies, programmes and projects in human rights, humanitarian assistance,
development and related efforts.

Lesson 13 on Conflict Assessment Tools outlines how the Do No Harm method for assessment of context
works to reduce unintended consequences and improve the design of programmes to foster resilience. In
addition, when bringing aid resources into a complex operational environment, Do No Harm approaches
strive to be aware of the following five dangers:120

a. Theft: Armed groups may steal assistance to support their forces or to sell to raise money to
buy weapons.
b. Market Effects: Aid may undermine the local civilian economy by making it difficult for local
producers to find a market for their goods and reinforce the war economy where people
benefit from the continuation of violence.
c. Distributional effects: Assistance given to some groups and not to others can reinforce lines of
conflict and increase divisions between groups.
d. Substitution Effects: Foreign assistance can substitute for local resources held by the
government or armed opposition groups that would have been used to meet civilian needs,
thus freeing up resources needed to continue to wage war and making it possible for local
governments to not provide for its own citizens. Donor driven assistance can also discourage
local volunteerism and create a brain drain of staff toward international efforts rather than
local, national government and non-profit agencies.
e. Legitimisation Effects: Assistance can unintentionally provide legitimacy to armed groups on
all sides of a conflict who control territory where assistance is provided. When NGOS engage
with such groups to demand access to a given territory, they accept them as the “de-facto”
authorities, although the government or other actors may still be in control of the affected
area.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 217

For example, when security forces go into a community and build a school or hire a contractor to build a
school, a range of unintended impacts could occur.

 It could be a disincentive for participation in programmes that require volunteers.

 It could be inadvertently placed on land that privileges one group within the community.
 It could bring in resources to the community that are siphoned off by contractors, fuelling
corruption, or worse, end up in the hands of violent groups.

“Do no harm” is a commitment that all groups offering assistance can avoid harming others intentionally
or unintentionally by ensuring all programmes, particularly transfers of resources, are sensitive to
dynamics in local conflicts and divisions.

11. Conflict-Sensitive Assistance

A conflict sensitive approach to assistance examines whether there is an inclusive and transparent
process for designing the assistance programme, involving local leadership, if not input, into decision-
making at every possible step, from design of the project to who is involved to where and when it takes
place and how it is evaluated. Conflict sensitive assistance asks, “How will the assistance exhibit caution
in every step so that it does not inadvertently increase tensions or re-affirm existing power structures
and divisions between groups?” A conflict sensitive design of any type of assistance effort continually
questions the following:121

a. Where will the assistance take place? Will those who live further away resent the geographical
location of the project? Will there be a local office for the project? Will the location of this office
favour one side of the conflict? How will local people perceive the location of and standard of
living at the office in relation to the standard of living of local people?

b. Where will resources for the assistance come from? Will funds be used to buy local goods and
services? How will decisions be made about which local vendors are used? Will they come
from all sides of the conflict?

c. Who will benefit from the assistance? Will those left out of the project resent those who benefit
or those who helped them? Is there a way of structuring the project so that neighbouring
communities can also benefit at some point?

d. Who will staff the assistance? Do they represent people from all sides of the conflict? Will those
not represented resent those who are? Will all staff be evacuated if violence should take place?
If not, how will security decisions be made and prepared for ahead of time?

e. Why is the assistance being provided? Are the goals of the assistance transparent?

f. What will the assistance impact? How might the project be negatively impacted by the conflict-
affected context? How might the context be negatively affected by the peacebuilding effort?

g. How will resources be brought into the local context to support the assistance? What intended
or unintended impacts will these financial, material, or human resources have on the local
context?

h. When will the assistance take place? Will some people be left out because of the time of day or
year when it will happen?

SUMMARY
Civilian assistance will be an important set of activities in any complex environment. Many different
stakeholders will be providing civilian assistance. This lesson surveyed the different forms of civilian
assistance. It also outlined the tensions between civilian, military and police roles in civilian assistance.
For all stakeholders, there is often a gap between the good intentions and unintended impacts of civilian
assistance. This lesson described the standards and principles for civilian assistance that help to mitigate,
anticipate and prevent unintended impacts.

218 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Citations

115 See the following publications for a discussion on the relationship between civilian assistance and security:
Paul Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, (Washington DC: The World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 2355, 2002).
Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk. Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a
Resurgence of Terrorism, (Washington, DC: RAND, 2003).
Lael Brainard and Derek Chollet. Editors. Too Poor for Peace? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007).
Mark Halle. Sonia Peña Moreno. Sebastian Winkler. Editors. Trade, Aid, and Security, (London: Earthscan, 2007).
Coralie Bryant and Christina Kappaz. Reducing Poverty, Building Peace. (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press,
2005).
Lael Brainard, editor, Security By Other Means. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007).
116 “Quick Impact Projects – A tool for confidence-building” in Civil Affairs Handbook. United National Department of

Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, (New York: United Nations. 12 March 2012).
117 See Aoi, Chiyuki, Thakur, Ramesh Chandra, De Coning, Cedric. Eds. Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping

Operations, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007).

118 Hull, Cecilia, Mikael Eriksson, Justin MacDermott, Fanny Rudén and Annica Waleij, Managing Unintended

Consequences of Peace Support Operations, (Stockholm, Sweden: FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, December
2009).
119 Mary Anderson. Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace - or War, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

2010).
120 See CDA Collaborative Learning Projects for more information on this training programme on conflict sensitivity

and “Do No Harm,” http://www.cdacollaborative.org/programs/do-no-harm/, accessed October 2015.

121 Excerpted from Schirch, Lisa. Conflict Assessment and Peacebuilding Planning. Kumarian Press, 2013.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 219

Lesson 24 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with a series of questions:
 What is one experience you have had in your life where someone else offered you assistance
when you were in need?
 Based on your experiences, what do you think are the links between civilian assistance –
helping local populations – and security?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to understand the role of civilian assistance in a complex environment. An
earthquake occurs in each scenario. It is now eight months after the humanitarian crisis. The
government declares a shift from humanitarian assistance to development assistance. The military
had a significant role in humanitarian assistance. The Ministry of Interior announces that $300
million in remaining funds for assisting civilians in recovering from the earthquake will be channelled
through military forces to build positive relationships with citizens and counter violent extremism.

Each scenario stakeholder team should assess their reaction to this announcement. Each group has
thirty minutes to develop an initial response and to negotiate with other stakeholders to develop a
plan for how remaining civic assistance funds should be spent. Groups may continue to discuss
internally their own plan, or work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, each
stakeholder team or group of teams has two minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose the
plans of other groups.

Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-play.

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

 What will I take away from this lesson on civilian assistance that might impact the way I do my
work in the future?

220 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Flickr CC Photo: U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt.
Nestor Cruz

Lesson 25
Coordinating Civilian Assistance

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify the current international guidance for how civilians, military and police relate to each
other in complex environments
 Identify the most appropriate roles for military, police and other civil defence in civilian
assistance
 Identify the limits on the use of foreign military, police and other civil defence assets in
humanitarian assistance
 Identify the principles for the use of military escorts, police or civil defence forces by
humanitarian organisations and other civil society organisations

This lesson describes official global guidance on humanitarian assistance. Many of the principles in this
guidance are relevant to other, non-humanitarian forms of civil-military-police coordination in civilian
assistance. Civilian government and civil society organisations may need to coordinate with military
and police in a range of civilian assistance activities. This lesson identifies common principles and
practices for coordination on civilian assistance.

Lesson 25: Coordinating Civilian Assistance

1. Normative Principles from International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human
Rights Law (IHRL)
IHL and IHRL, described in Module 2/Lesson 8, provide a foundation for civil-military-police coordination
in complex environments. IHL principles are a foundation for all civil-military-police guidance and
coordination, in all regions where IHL is applicable.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 221

Distinguish between Civilian and Military/Police/Civilian Defence: The IHL principle of distinction refers to
armed forces making a distinction between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects (such
as hospitals) and military or police objects (such as military or police training centres). Recognise that
when military personnel engage in civilian activities this may blur the lines between civilians and military
targets and can place civilians at risk. Civilians should never be asked to wear military or police uniforms
and military and police personnel should refrain from presenting themselves as NGOs or humanitarians.
 Be aware that direct contact between military, police, and civilian personnel can cause suspicion
and may contribute to armed groups attacking civilians or civilian programmes.
 Military, police and civilian agencies should arrange all visits with each other by prior contact over
phone or email.
 Conduct a risk analysis to identify potential risk factors for participating in a coordination
mechanism and how this will impact local perceptions of civilian efforts.

Practice the principle of proportion: The IHL principle of proportion refers to armed forces ensuring that
any harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack on a military or police objective. The
benefit of a military or police programme in civilian assistance– such as gathering intelligence or building
confidence in the security mission - must be proportional to the potential harm to civilians. For example,
the benefits must be weighed against the potential for harm to civilian populations or civil society if
military-based assistance increases the chance that other armed groups may view civilian beneficiaries of
assistance as “soft targets.”

Practice the principle of precaution: The IHL principle of precaution refers to the duty of each party to the
conflict to take safety measures to protect civilians. Armed forces need to take into account the presence
of civilians prior to any attack or security operation. Military, police and civilians should take safety
measures for the protection of civilians in lethal and non-lethal military and police activities. Military and
police efforts in civilian assistance should anticipate potential lethal negative impacts on civilian
beneficiaries and civilian projects.

2. IASC Humanitarian Policy and Guidance

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is coordinates the development of guidelines on
humanitarian civil-military coordination.122 This global coordination body for humanitarian action,
mandated by the UN General Assembly, has established non-binding guidelines relating to the use of
military, police, and other civil defence assets and other aspects of civil-military relations. It aims to assist
humanitarian, military, police, and civil defence professionals to deal with civil-military-police
coordination on civilian assistance in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian
concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in accordance with international law, standards
and principles.

The IASC plays an important role to develop and promote policy and guidance on issues related to
humanitarian civil-military coordination.123 Some UN Member States contributed to the Guidelines on the
Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief” 124 (also known as the Oslo Guidelines or
MCDA), which now form a part of IASC guidance on civil-military relations. Individual countries have also
adopted their own humanitarian civil-military guidelines. IASC policy and guidance125 includes guidance
on a variety of topics, including:126
a. Operational Civil-Military Guidance
b. Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on the Use of Armed Escorts
c. The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Humanitarian Action (MCDA)

The IASC “Operational Civil-Military Guidance” and Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts apply to both
foreign and national military forces engaged in civilian assistance. Affected states have the responsibility
to respond to the humanitarian needs of their citizens with all civilian and military assets. National
military assets of the country experiencing a humanitarian crisis have an appropriate role in responding
to a crisis. They may be the first-responders. But even national military forces should consider the
potential negative impacts of their involvement in direct humanitarian assistance and instead consider
the most complementary roles of military support to humanitarian assistance.

3. Military, Police, and Civil Defence Roles in Humanitarian Assistance

The IASC Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Humanitarian Action
(MCDA), also known as the “Oslo Guidelines,” identify that military, police, and civil defence forces can

222 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

best contribute to humanitarian assistance through infrastructure support (building a bridge or a road)
or indirect assistance (transporting humanitarian assistance, providing water or clearing mines). Direct
assistance, such as handing out nutritional biscuits or providing emergency medical care, is best provided
by humanitarian agencies that practice humanitarian principles and already have trusting relationships
with local communities. Military and civil defence assets should be used for direct assistance only in
situations of last resort, determined on a case-by-case basis.

Direct Assistance is the face-to-face distribution of goods and services, such as handing out a nutritional
cookie.

Indirect Assistance is at least one step removed from the population and involves transporting relief goods
or relief personnel, for example, with military trucks.

Infrastructure Support involves providing general services such as construction, airspace management,
and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible to or solely for the benefit of the
affected population, such as building or repairing a road or bridge.

Figure 59: IASC

Guidelines on the
Use of Military and
Civil Defence

In some circumstances, NGOs may assess conditions to be appropriate for military forces to provide the
following kinds of complementary activities:
 Enhancing area security, for example through long- and short-range patrols, so that humanitarian
organisations can travel and work in safe environments.
 Providing security briefings to inform NGOs of potential threats such as land mines, or insecure
areas so that NGOs can make informed decisions about where they work and how they travel to
provide humanitarian assistance.
 Providing indirect assistance, such as providing transportation of humanitarian assistance to
warehouses where NGOs and other humanitarian organisations can then provide the direct
assistance. Military logistical skills are a complementary asset to NGO skills in direct assistance.
 Providing infrastructure support such as repairing bridges or roads that are necessary for
delivering humanitarian assistance, particularly access to remote locations or ports. Military
engineering skills are a complementary asset to NGO direct assistance skills.

Every form of military assistance to humanitarian activities should be assessed for potential unintended
impacts that might occur if civilians or civilian objects come to be seen as part of a military operation.
This may put them at risk of attack by armed opposition groups.

4. Use of Military Assets

The IASC guidelines also caution against any use of military and civil defence assets for direct
humanitarian assistance because this can bring unintended harmful consequences. There may be
increased security risks for those people directly receiving humanitarian aid from military forces and
there may be increased risks to aid workers for direct cooperation with military forces.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 223

International standards for humanitarian assistance from the IASC therefore recommend that military
forces should engage in humanitarian assistance when it is a demand-driven response to locally identified
humanitarian needs and not when it is supply-driven to achieve political or military goals established by
foreign forces.

Military forces should not provide direct humanitarian assistance unless it meets the criteria set out in
the IASC Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief, also referred to
as the Oslo Guidelines and the MCDA Guidelines for Complex Emergencies. The U.S. was part of the drafting
committee for these guidelines and approved them.

Humanitarian assistance should be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary. Any humanitarian
operation using military assets must retain its civilian nature and character, making a clear distinction
between military assets used for humanitarian purposes and those used for military purposes. The Oslo
Guidelines state that military forces should participate in humanitarian assistance only under the
following circumstances:
 Last resort: When the military has unique capability and no appropriate civilian resources exist;
 Timeliness: When the urgency of the task at hand demands immediate action;
 Civilian Control: When there is civilian control over the use of military assets;
 Time-Limited: When the use of military assets is limited in time and scale.

The principle of last resort has been further defined as including the following characteristics:
 A specific capability or asset requirement that cannot be met with available civilian assets has been
identified;
 Foreign military and civil defence assets would help meet the requirement and provide unique
advantages in terms of capability, availability, and timeliness;
 Foreign military and civil defence assets would complement civilian capabilities.

An example of last resort was when military forces coordinated the opening of the airport after the 2010
Haiti earthquake or provided sea transport and heavy lift to reach isolated areas after the 2013 hurricane
in the Philippines. In the midst of on-going hostilities, foreign military support for humanitarian
assistance inside an active military theatre should only be considered when there is a highly vulnerable
population that cannot be assisted or accessed by any other means. Preference should be given to military
assets of parties not engaged in combat operations.

Figure 60: Humanitarian Assistance Roles Over Time

The diagram above illustrates the short-term role of foreign military forces relative to international
civilian humanitarian assistance and the long-term local response from the affected nation. 127

5. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCOORD)

Humanitarian civil-military coordination is more established and institutionalised than any other form of
civil-military-police coordination. The UN defines humanitarian civil-military coordination as “the
essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies
necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and
when appropriate, pursue common goals.” UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCOORD)
establishes coordination centres to achieve strictly humanitarian goals.128

Recognising both threats and opportunities in humanitarian civil-military relationships, the UN created
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to strengthen coordination of humanitarian assistance in the

224 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

1990s. Humanitarian civil-military coordination holds lessons for civil-military coordination in other
sectors. Most international humanitarian organisations argue that civil-military coordination is essential
wherever there are civilian agencies and military forces operating in the same environment. The IASC
first developed guidance in regard to situations of natural disasters, and later in regard to complex
emergencies.129

UN OCHA sets up On-Site Operations Coordination Centres (OSOCC) to help local authorities in a disaster-
affected country to coordinate international relief. An OSOCC has three primary objectives:
 To be a link between international responders and the Government of the affected country.
 To provide a system for coordinating and facilitating the activities of international relief efforts at a
disaster site, where the coordination of many international USAR teams is critical to ensure
optimal rescue efforts.
 To provide a platform for cooperation, coordination and information management among
international humanitarian agencies.

6. Humanitarian Clusters
The IASC created the cluster system in 2005 (illustrated below) to improve coordination in specific
sectors of humanitarian response such as water and sanitation, health and protection of civilians. The
goal was to improve the predictability, timeliness and effectiveness of response, improve support for
national-led humanitarian response, and identify common standards and tools. A Cluster is a group
comprising humanitarian organisations (UN and non-UN), with one (and sometimes two) organisations
acting as a designated leader working in each of the main areas of humanitarian action (water, health,
education, etc.). The cluster leader is not in command, but rather facilitates cooperation and information
sharing. Some Clusters may be very informal. Clusters may conduct joint needs assessments, identify gaps
and requirements for meeting standards for each sector, and develop action plan to clarify roles and
determine “who is doing what where.” Clusters can also prepare for monitoring and evaluation, as well as
contingency planning.

There is currently no general policy on military participation in the UN cluster system. Clusters make
decisions about how to coordinate with military forces on a case-by-case basis. Certain clusters have been
working on how to engage with military forces based on their sectoral expertise. Currently, it is more or
less up to the cluster lead at the local level. That person will often bring the question to the cluster
members and seek consensus. Cross-sectoral civil-military guidance for the cluster system is currently
missing. OCHA remains in a position to help military forces identify relevant points of contact for
coordinating their civilian activities in relevant sectors and locations. In each context OCHA will be able to
point military representatives to the go-to person coordinating the specific sector.

Figure 61: UN Cluster System

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 225

7. De-conflicting Approaches to Civilian Assistance
There are steps to reduce these tensions and conflicts between government and CSO approaches to
development assistance. Military planners should work with the host-nation government and its National
Development Plan to ensure scarce assistance resources complement the contributions of other
interveners. Coordination can avoid assistance programmes that undermine the local economy and can
ensure military assistance programmes offer a comparative advantage, such as undertaking large
construction projects. CSOs do not, for example, tend to reopen factories or build roads or bridges but
they do build schools and health clinics. Avoiding competition or duplication means each organisation
recognises it contributes to a broader set of interventions in a complex environment.

For example, military forces constructing a road or opening a factory aimed to improve local perceptions
of military forces should ensure that their projects are coordinated with a country’s National
Development Plan. Conflict-sensitive programme design could, for example, use road-building assistance
as an opportunity for local employment generation to address an economic development goal. Creating
work teams of mixed ethnic or tribal groups to build roads together could also produce outcomes related
to social cohesion and reconciliation.

8. Role of Military Forces in Relation to the Security of CSOs

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the IASC define the
military’s role is to provide area security or a secure and safe area for civilians, and humanitarian
organisations in particular. The military is not obliged to provide direct protection for any type of civil
society organisation. CSOs have their own security strategies, as identified in Lesson 7, whereby they can
gain the consent of all armed groups to access people in need without being seen as a military target.

According to IHL/LOAC, military forces party to the conflict are obliged to facilitate and allow the passage
of impartial humanitarian assistance through territory under their control to reach civilian populations.
Humanitarian organisations liaise with all parties to conflict with the purpose of ensuring that their
humanitarian purpose and modalities of operation are understood, and to establish practical
arrangements that enable the safe and timely passage of relief supplies and personnel.

9. Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on the Use of Armed Escorts

There is no legal obligation for military forces to provide armed escorts to humanitarian organisations or
any type of civilian organisation. The 2013 IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for
Humanitarian Convoys outlines the circumstances of last resort detailing how and when escorts are
appropriate and alternatives to armed escorts.

Armed escorts are deemed acceptable based upon the following needs:
 Humanitarian Need: When a lack of humanitarian action would lead to unacceptable human
suffering;
 Permission from authorities: When responsible authorities are unable or unwilling to permit the
movement of humanitarian convoys without armed escort;
 Safety: When armed escort is a deterrent to enhance safety and does not impact the security of
humanitarian personnel or beneficiaries;
 Sustainability: When use of armed escort will not compromise future humanitarian programming.

Humanitarian convoys should always retain their civilian humanitarian identity with the use of logos and
symbols, so as to make clear the distinction between civilian and military targets. In practice,
humanitarian organisations face pragmatic choices and tradeoffs when using armed escorts or when
interacting directly with armed groups.130 The consequences of NGOs asking for or accepting an armed
escort could include the following potentially harmful impacts:

 Armed opposition groups would perceive NGOs as being agents of military forces and therefore
legitimate targets for attack. This may affect not only the specific humanitarian agency using an
armed escort, but also all other humanitarian agencies operating in the region.
 Armed escorts may themselves be a target of attack by other armed groups, especially if they do
not possess a deterrent capability, and thereby increase the chance of attack on a humanitarian
convoy.
 Use of armed escorts on one occasion may make it impossible for humanitarian agencies to travel
anywhere without armed protection, thereby making it impossible for them to operate.

226 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

10. Relevance of the IASC Five Commitments to Accountability to Affected Populations
In 2011, the IASC issued this guidance to improve leadership and accountability to affective populations
in complex humanitarian crises. Again, these principles are relevant outside of the humanitarian field and
could be considered for inclusion in new civil-military guidance.

Leadership/Governance: Demonstrate commitment to accountability to affected populations by ensuring

feedback and accountability mechanisms are integrated into country strategies, programme proposals,
monitoring and evaluations, recruitment, staff inductions, trainings and performance management,
partnership agreements, and highlighted in reporting.

Transparency: Provide accessible and timely information to affected populations on organisational

procedures, structures and processes that affect them to ensure that they can make informed decisions
and choices, and facilitate a dialogue between an organisation and its affected populations over
information provision.

Feedback and Complaints: Actively seek the views of affected populations to improve policy and practice
in programming, ensuring that feedback and complaints mechanisms are streamlined, appropriate and
robust enough to deal with (communicate, receive, process, respond to and learn from) complaints about
breaches in policy and stakeholder dissatisfaction. Specific issues raised by affected individuals regarding
violations and/or physical abuse that may have human rights and legal, psychological or other
implications should have the same entry point as programme-type complaints, but procedures for
handling these should be adapted accordingly.

Participation: Enable affected populations to play an active role in the decision-making processes that
affect them through the establishment of clear guidelines and practice s to engage them appropriately and
ensure that the most marginalised and affected are represented and have influence.

Design, Monitoring and Evaluation: Design, monitor and evaluate the goals and objectives of programmes
with the involvement of affected populations, feeding learning back into the organisation on an on-going
basis and reporting on the results of the process.

11. Integrity of Civilian Assistance

All forms of civilian assistance should aim to support local populations as the primary goal. Civilian
oversight should ensure that assistance is accountable to local people.

 Civilian actors should identify appropriate and complementary roles for the military in specific
sectors. Prepare military forces with guidance on how to communicate with civilian actors
without endangering their safety or access to beneficiaries and the need for talking to other
components of the mission or civilian actors outside the mission.

 Anticipate the lethal and non-lethal unintended impacts of using civilian activities to achieve a short
term political or security goal. Military involvement in these civilian activities may undermine
local ownership and sustainability in development and peacebuilding programmes.

 Follow the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality, so that recovery and peacebuilding
efforts relieve human suffering, regardless of the ethnic, religious, political or other affiliations of
the population. All forms of civilian assistance to local populations require some degree of
impartiality and neutrality.

 Assure access to vulnerable populations. Like humanitarians, civilians working on early recovery
and transition to development, governance and peacebuilding need to maintain and should be
allowed access to vulnerable populations, regardless of their ethnic, religious, or political identity
or affiliations. Civil-military coordination may be necessary to ensure that military activities
support civilian access rather than hinder it.

 Provide clear, transparent, civilian-led strategic direction: Civil-military coordination works best
where there is legal authorisation, transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. All
foreign assistance should be civilian-led.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 227

REVIEW
This lesson described identified the current international guidance for how civilians, military and police
relate to each other in complex environments. This guidance describes appropriate roles for military,
police and other civil defence in civilian assistance. It also discusses the principles for the use of military
escorts, police or civil defence forces by humanitarian organisations and other civil society organisations.

Citations
122 The IASC was established in 1992 in response to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 that called
for strengthened coordination of humanitarian assistance. In 1993, the General Assembly, through Resolution 48/57,
affirmed IASC’s role as the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. A broad
range of UN and non-UN humanitarian partners participate in this Standing Committee. The IASC includes the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the operational UN humanitarian organisations (such as
UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Food Program), the UN Development Program, the three international NGO consortia
(InterAction, the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), and International Council of Voluntary
Agencies (ICVA)), and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, is the inter-agency body responsible for international
policy on international humanitarian action. Under the leadership of the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, the IASC
develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian
assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian
principles. See UN and IASC Civil-Military Guidelines and Handbook for more information.
123 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in

Complex Emergencies. March 2003/revised January 2006.

124 https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20(November%202007).pdf
125 UN Civil Military Coordination (UN CMCOORD). See: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-

tools/UN-CMCoord/overview and http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/ accessed October 2015.

126 See the following Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidance (Geneva, Switzerland: Inter-Agency Standing
Committee) at http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications accessed
October 2015.
 Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies,
 Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief - Oslo Guidelines, OCHA-
November 2012,
 United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination - Concept Paper.
 Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys
127 Adapted by UN Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance OCHA from IASC Guidance
128 UN CMCOORD. See: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview
129http://ochaonline.un.org/OCHAHome/AboutUs/Coordination/HumanitarianCivilMilitaryCoordination/PolicyGuid

elinesRelatedDocuments/tabid/4938/language/en-US/Default.aspx
130 Edwina Thompson, Principled Pragmatism: NGO Engagement with Armed Actors (Monrovia, CA: WorldVision
International, 2008).

228 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 25 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with a series of questions:
 Based on your experience or your imagination, what is the most difficult part of coordinating
assistance to civilians after an earthquake, hurricane or in the midst of some other crisis?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to understand complementary roles, challenges and guidelines for
coordinating civilian assistance – especially between civil society and the security sector. In each of
the scenarios, it is now eight months after an earthquake. International and local aid groups
coordinate with military units through UN OCHA. After eight months, most of the international
humanitarian organisations leave along with OCHA. A new coordination mechanism is needed to
ensure all the different groups involved in assistance to civilians are not duplicating or undermining
each other’s work.

Each group has thirty minutes to develop an initial plan for a coordination mechanism and to
negotiate with other stakeholders to develop a coordination plan. Groups may continue to discuss
internally their own plan, or work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, each
stakeholder team or group of teams has two minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose the
plans of other groups. Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-
play.

Away 5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

What will I take away from this lesson on coordinating civilian assistance that might impact the way I
do my work in the future?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 229

 CC Flickr Photo/JC McIlwaine

Module
Protection of Civilians 8

Module 8 Protection of Civilians

Lesson 26: Mainstreaming Protection of Civilians identifies the roles and responsibilities of
different stakeholders in mainstreaming protection through all programs

Lesson 27: Gender Mainstreaming in Security identifies tools for mainstreaming a gender
lens in all aspects of peace and security.

Lesson 28: Mitigating Civilian Harm identifies a procedure for security forces and civil society
to coordinate efforts to prepare for and mitigate civilian harm that results from a security
operation.

This Module provides a foundation for military, police, and civilians on the core ideas, functions,
practices, and principles known as “protection of civilians” (PoC). Many stakeholders are
already training and building their capacity for protection of civilians. But often these efforts are
happening separate from each other. This Module aims to provide a common understanding in
each of three areas: general protection of civilians, gender mainstreaming in security, and
mitigating civilian harm.

230 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

CC Flickr Photo: UNMISS/JC McIlwaine

Lesson 26
Mainstreaming Protection of Civilians

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Recognise the range of strategies necessary to mainstream the protection of civilians in all
programmes
 Compare roles for diverse actors in protection of civilians
 Identify potential coordination mechanisms for protection of civilians

Military, police, civilian government and civil society all have an interest in the protection of civilians.
This lesson provides a foundation for understanding the specific roles and responsibilities for the
protection of civilians by different stakeholders.

Lesson 26: Mainstreaming Protection of Civilian

1. Civilian threats and vulnerabilities
In the midst of natural disasters and violent conflict, male and female civilians are at risk.
 Criminal violence may occur at any time, and is especially prevalent in complex environments.
 Armed groups may intentionally attack civilians as a political statement, to help recruit new
members, or to initiate new recruits into an armed group.
 Mass atrocities are large-scale, deliberate attacks on civilians.
 Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is threat at all times, in all countries. Lesson 21
addresses gender mainstreaming in security to enhance protections against SGBV.
 Some armed groups will seek to avoid harm to civilians, but may unintentionally still cause harm.
This requires both improving protection of civilian harm mitigation, address in Lesson 22.

Civilians on the receiving end of violence may not make a distinction between intentional and
unintentional harm.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 231

 2. Protection of civilians is a moral, political, legal and strategic priority.
The UN and other international and regional organisations, as well as governments, military and police
forces, and civil society are striving to improve the protection of civilians for four interrelated reasons.

Moral The moral outrage and horror of the civilian casualties, especially mass atrocities such as the
Rwandan genocide, increased global commitments to improve protection of civilians.
Legal International humanitarian law as well as national legal frameworks, military and police
rules of engagement and/or status-of-forces agreements all detail the responsibilities of
different stakeholders to protect civilians from harm.
Political Harming civilians impacts the political legitimacy of the group committing harm, whether
intentional or not.
Strategic Protecting the population is key to winning the populations’ support. The population is the
“centre of gravity,” or the most important aspect of some security operations.

3. What are human rights?

Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. Universal human rights are
expressed and guaranteed by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general principles
and other sources of international law.

Human rights are interdependent and indivisible. Threats to some human rights can threaten all human
rights. For example, threats to the physical safety of a woman can make it impossible for her to go to
work, thus also threatening her economic rights. Threats to the social well-being and cultural survival of
an Indigenous tribe can also the tribes’ ability to provide governance to their communities.

Human rights entail both rights and obligations. Traditionally, states assume the legal duty to respect, to
protect and to fulfil the human rights of their citizens. The obligation to respect means that states must
refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect
requires states to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil
means that states must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. Non-state
actors such as individuals or corporations are entitled to having their human rights protected but were
traditionally not considered as having the obligation to respect the human rights of others. This view has
been changing and non-state entities can now increasingly be held accountable for violating the human
rights of others.

4. Protection of Civilians (PoC) defined in legal terms

Protection of civilians is a rapidly growing field, with constantly evolving guidelines and training. The
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines the concept of “protection of civilians” as “activities
aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of all individuals in accordance with international law –
international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law – regardless of their age, gender, social ethnic,
national, religious, or other background.”

From this legal point of view, two situations of protection are often distinguished:
 ‪Protection of civilians in armed conflict, whereby all parties to the conflict are responsible under
International humanitarian law for ensuring that the rights of civilians, i.e. those not directly
involved in hostilities, are respected and protected.‪‪
 Protection of civilians in contexts of natural disasters or civil unrest, where International
humanitarian law does not apply. In these situations, national authorities have the primary
responsibility to protect their citizens in accordance to human rights and refugee law.‪‪
In situations where states are not able to fulfil their obligation to guarantee these rights to civilians living on
their territory, other actors must come in and fulfil the protection responsibility of the state. This may include
humanitarian and human rights organisations, peacekeeping missions, electoral or ceasefire monitoring
missions and third government.

5. Protection of Civilians is a component of human security

The human security framework introduced in Lesson 15 provides a broad umbrella or strategic narrative
linking governance, development and security. As one of many approaches underneath a human security
umbrella, protection of civilians is distinct in two ways:

232 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  PoC is based on legal obligations of states and non-state
armed actors
 PoC is narrowly focused on reducing the risks of physical
violence, coercion and deprivation civilians face.

The desired end state of PoC is that risk to civilians be minimised

as far as possible. In order to reduce that risk, multiple types of
activities involving various approaches, sectors and disciplines
are needed, though all oriented towards a common protection
outcome.131

6. Protection of Civilians activities

There are various areas of PoC activities. PoC may include
monitoring of threats and vulnerabilities, actions to reduce
threats and vulnerabilities, and actions to improve the Figure 62: Relationship of Protection of Civilians
protective environment. to Human Security

a. Monitoring of civilian harm

Civil society, military, and police may all be involved in
identifying and documenting civilian threats and
vulnerabilities as well as human rights violations. POC monitoring includes research to do the following:
 Analyse threats to civilians
 Analyse civilian vulnerabilities
 Document harms to civilians

b. Reduce threats to civilians

Civil society, military, and police may all be involved in activities to reduce threats to civilians. This may
include removing or making it impossible for people perpetrating harm on civilians to have contact with
civilians. For example, “interpositioning” is a tactic to protect civilians. It involves an armed or unarmed
group of military, police, or civil society who place themselves between groups perpetrating violence and
civilians to reduce threats to civilians.

c. Reduce civilian vulnerabilities

Humanitarian organisations, including civil society, are responsible for reducing civilian vulnerabilities.
This may include ensuring that civilians have access to food, water, sanitation, and shelter in protected
areas. For example, water sources are often the site of attacks on civilians, particularly women. Provision
of water at protected locations can reduce civilian vulnerability to threats.

d. Improve the “protective environment”

Governments have primary responsibility to address all the elements of a protective environment.
Military, police, and civil society also can play supportive roles. These are outlined further in a section
below.

7. Civil-Military-Police roles and coordination in shaping protective environments

Coordination between civil society, civilian government, military and police on protection of civilians is
essential to ensure a “whole of system” approach. 132 This includes coordination on sharing Protection of
Civilian principles, and coordination on protection of civilian activities, including recognising distinct
Protection of Civilian roles and responsibilities.

Lesson 5 described five sectors of human security. Each dimension relates to human rights and protection
of civilians. Civil society, military and police should make protection of civilians central to all assistance
efforts. Each of the five sectors involves all stakeholders in society. But in each sector there may be a “lead
group” such as the military, police, civilian government, private business sector or civil society which may
play a significant role in addressing human rights in that sector. The table below illustrates, for example,
what protection of civilian roles and responsibilities might look like.

Lead group Sector

Military and police Safe and secure environment without direct threats of violence to
civilians in the home or in public
Police and civilian government Rule of law including protection of human rights and fair and just
application of the law.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 233

 Civilian government and civil Good governance including a government, private business sector
society and an empowered and independent civil society that play
complementary roles in governance
Civil society, especially educational Social well-being to ensure positive relationships between diverse
institutions, religious institutions groups in society through dialogue, mediation, negotiation,
and media reconciliation, etc.
Civilian government and private Sustainable economy to ensure people have food security and
business sector ability to make a living

8. UN Principles in protection mainstreaming

The United Nations is leading an effort to mainstream the protection of civilians to align all civilian and
military assistance with new UN guidance to ensure the primacy of UN mandates related to Protection of
Civilians in planning, policymaking, and implementation. All civilian, military and police initiatives,
including peacekeeping missions, should prioritise protection principles, in all sectors and programmes.
These principles, taken from the United Nations, 133 include the following:

Prioritise the safety and dignity of all people in every intervention: Every intervention, even those with
good intentions, can inadvertently harm people physically or psychologically. Direct physical threats from
people or environmental disasters can put the safety of people at risk. Physical and psychological threats
such as a lack of respect, humiliation, a lack of privacy and a lack of participation and consultation in
decisions that affect people’s lives undermine human dignity.

Ensure access to services in every intervention: People should have access to their basic needs (food,
shelter, clothing, etc.) without having to risk their safety, in a way that is physically and financially
possible, and that is culturally relevant and socially acceptable. Make sure an intervention does not block
people’s access to services. Arrange for people’s access to assistance and services - in proportion to need
and without any barriers (e.g. discrimination). Set-up appropriate mechanisms so that affected
populations can measure the adequacy of interventions, and address concerns and complaints.

Accountability: People who receive assistance and protection should have mechanisms to file concerns
and complaints with the people providing assistance and protection.

Participation and Empowerment: People in need of assistance and protection should participate in all
aspects of the decisions that go into the assistance. Empowerment is not something given to people.
Empowerment is a process by which people identify their own needs and interests, increase their
knowledge and resources to address their needs, claim their rights to have their needs met, and lead or
participate in the effort to improve their situation. Support the development of self-protection capacities
and assist people to claim their rights.

9. Protection of Civilians must include “meaningful assistance”

Implementation of Protection of Civilians mandates has been inadequate. Programmes to protect civilians
are often not operationally feasible. In order for access to be meaningful assistance and services must be:

 Available in sufficient quantity and quality

 Provided on the basis of need and without discrimination
 Within safe and easy reach
 Known by people potentially accessing services
 Physically and financially accessible
 Culturally relevant and socially acceptable134

10. The role of humanitarian assistance and civil society in protection of civilians
Humanitarian organisations, including those of the UN, the Red Cross Movement, and civil society
organisations participate in the following activities to support the protection of civilians:

 Responsive Action: Preventing, or ensuring protection from, abuse and alleviating its immediate
effects
 Remedial Action: Restoring dignity and ensuring well-being and recovery through assistance and
rehabilitation.
 Environment Building: Cultivating a social, cultural, institutional and legal environment conducive
to respect for rights.

234 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

The “how” or method of providing humanitarian assistance is just as important as “what” is provided.
Humanitarian assistance can offer protection to civilians by providing legal aid, providing family tracing
and reunification services, assisting demobilisation of child soldiers, facilitating refugee registration or
providing psycho-social support. Civil society can participate in early warning of violence and in using
dialogue, mediation and reconciliation among social groups to address drivers of violence.

Any type of assistance can unintentionally put people at risk. It is important, for example, to provide food,
shelter, water, and sanitation facilities in protected areas. Locating assistance in areas where there are
threats to women, men, girls or boys can put communities at risk of being attacked. Because outside
interveners may not be aware of potential risks, it is essential the local people and beneficiaries of
assistance be involved in assessing threats and vulnerabilities as well as designing solutions to mitigate
these risks.

11. The role of security forces in protection of civilians and human rights
UN and regional peacekeepers and state security forces are receiving new mandates that give them
explicit instructions to aid in the protection of civilians. These new mandates make protection of civilians
a more explicit focus of training, rules of engagement and lines of effort.

Military, police, and non-state armed groups hold specific responsibilities for the protection of civilians
both in peace support operations and in military operations during armed conflict. Civilian populations
expect state security forces to protect civilians. When security forces do not protect civilians, the security
forces lose credibility and legitimacy, which can undermine other security goals. 135

Security forces support PoC and human rights in two

ways: The Center for Civilians in Conflict
(CIVIC) works with military officials,
Planned Protection of Civilian Activities: Security forces policymakers, the UN and civilians to
may conduct offensive, defensive and stability operations improve protection of civilians and
that intend to prevent and mitigate harm to civilians as develop specific institutional
well as creating an environment conducive to the mechanisms for responding to civilian
protection of civilians. Community policing and gender- casualties.
sensitive policing are essential to protection of civilians.
Read more about their work in “Local Ownership of
Do No Harm: The UN has detailed human rights guidance Security” - the companion to this Handbook.
for counterterrorism legislation136, detention137, stopping
and searching people138 in the context of counterterrorism, as well as human rights guidance on security
infrastructure.139 Much of this guidance draws on security forces obligations and responsibilities outlined
in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) also known as International humanitarian law. This includes the key
principles of distinction, precaution, and proportion as outlined in Lesson 8 and 25.

12. Security Assistance, Protection of Civilians and the Primacy of Human Rights
In some countries, the security forces themselves either directly or indirectly put civilians at risk of
violence. Security assistance such as weapons sales and training for military and police in countries
lacking civilian oversight of the security sector or a justice system to uphold the rule of law and human
rights may enable abusive security forces to further harm civilians. In 2013, UN entities contemplating
support to non-United Nations security forces developed a human rights policy of due diligence 140,
including the following elements:

a. Before support is given, as assessment of the risks involved in providing or not providing such
support, in particular the risk of the recipient entity committing grave violations of international
humanitarian law, human rights law, or refugee law;

b. Transparency with receiving entities about the legal obligations for upholding human rights and the
core principles governing provision of support to security forces; and

c. An effective implementation framework, including:

a. Procedures for monitoring the recipient entity’s compliance with international
humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law;
b. Procedures for determining when and how to intercede with a view to putting an end to
grave violations of any of those bodies of law and for deciding, if need be, upon the
suspension or withdrawal of support;

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 235

 c. General operational guidance, as required, by the respective United Nations entities to
the country level on implementation of the policy.

13. Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine details each state’s responsibility to protect its population
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (mass atrocities). 141 R2P is
related, but distinct from the protection of civilians or human security agenda because it applies
exclusively to situations of mass atrocities. It appeals to the responsibility of other governments to stop
mass atrocities occurring in a third country. A traditional emphasis on state sovereignty limited
international action when a government used repression on its own people or was unable to protect its
citizens during civil violence. R2P links state sovereignty with responsibility for the protection of
civilians. Most violence today happens within states, not between states. If the state is unable to protect
its population, the international community has a responsibility to help build state capacity for early-
warning, mediating conflicts, security sector reform, and many other actions. If a state fails to protect its
citizens from mass atrocities or commits these acts against its own citizens, the international community
has the responsibility to intervene at first diplomatically using a wide array of peaceful measures, then
more coercively through various forms of sanctions, and using force as a last resort.

REVIEW
This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders an understanding of the activities required for
the protection of civilians and human rights. All stakeholders have a responsibility for prioritising civilian
safety during all aspects of working and living in complex environments. Greater coordination and
understanding of the shared principles and unique roles and responsibilities of civilian, military, and
police leaders will enable a more systematic approach to protection.

Citations

131 Interview with Jenny McAvoy, Director of Protection, InterAction. Washington, D.C., June 27, 2015.
132 Norah Niland, Riccardo Polastro, Antonio Donini, and Amra Lee. Independent Whole of System Review of Protection
in the Context of Humanitarian Action, (Norwegian Refugee Council on behalf of Inter-Agency Standing Committee
Protection Cluster, 2015).
133 See Global Protection Cluster website at http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/en/areas-of-

responsibility/protection-mainstreaming.html, accessed January 2016.

134 Protection Mainstreaming Training Package. (Geneva, Switzerland: Global Protection Cluster, 2014). Found at:

http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/aors/protection_mainstreaming/PM_training/1_GPC_Protecti
on_Mainstreaming_Training_Package_FULL_November_2014.pdf accessed 15 October 2015.
135 Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide. (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College Peacekeeping and

Stability Operations Institute, 2013).

136 Basic Human Rights Reference Guide: Conformity of National Counter-Terrorism Legislation with International

Human Rights Law

137 Basic Human Rights Reference Guide: Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism
138 Basic Human Rights Reference Guide: The Stopping and Searching of Persons in the Context of Countering

Terrorism
139 Basic Human Rights Reference Guide: Security Infrastructure
140 Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (document

A/67/775–S/2013/110)
141
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:
IDRC, 2001).

236 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 26 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question:
 How do people in your organisation protect the lives of civilians? Do you use this term
“protection of civilians?”

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to understand complementary roles and coordination for protection of
civilians. In each of the scenarios, Internally Displaced Persons whose homes and towns were
destroyed in the earthquake are now in the process of relocating. These IDPs are especially
vulnerable to kidnapping and recruitment into militia groups.

Each of the scenario stakeholder teams has thirty minutes to identify the Protection of Civilian
responsibilities and roles of different stakeholder groups and then to negotiate or advocate with
other groups to push for other stakeholder groups to take on Protection of Civilian responsibilities.
Then, each stakeholder team or group of teams is allowed two minutes to outline their plan and/or
to oppose the plans of other groups.

Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-play.
 What strategies to protect civilians seemed most successful or possible in their scenario?
 How well did each of these stakeholders coordinate with each other?
 What types of coordination mechanisms are needed?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 237

CC Flickr UNAMID Photo:
Albert Gonzá lez Farran

Lesson 27
Gender Mainstreaming in Security

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify three strategies for gender mainstreaming in security
 Define sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)
 Identify the link between masculinity and violence

This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders with tools for mainstreaming a gender lens in
all aspects of security, including gender sensitive analysis of threats, gender inclusion in the security
sector, and gender accountability in security sector oversight. The lesson identifies the problem of
sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and how it relates to complex environments. Armed groups
may use SGBV as a tactic of war to humiliate and punish women, their families and communities.
Preventing SGBV is a form of protection of civilians. Because SGBV is different from other types of
violence against civilians and undermines broader peacebuilding efforts, it requires special attention.
All human security efforts in complex environments must take into account the different needs,
perceptions, and experiences of women, men, girls, and boys.

Lesson 27: Gender Mainstreaming in Security

1. Definitions of Gender
Gender refers to social and cultural differences between males and females. Families, schools, religious
organisations, media programmes, and communities encourage boys and girls to take on specific gender
roles. Communities may punish boys who have “feminine” characteristics and girls who have “masculine”
characteristics. Feminine traits include caring for others and relational skills that support peace.
Masculine traits in many cultures include demonstrating aggression.

Gender discrimination is any pattern of preferential treatment of males over females. In complex environments,
men are more often chosen for leadership roles, and women are more often left out of political processes related

238 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

to violence and peace. Civilians, military, and police can address gender discrimination to ensure that all people
– men and women – are able to contribute to human security.

2. Definition of Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

SGBV includes psychological or emotional violence such as sexual harassment, rape and sexual abuse,
child sexual abuse, child marriage, female genital cutting, marital rape, dowry-related violence, female
infanticide, killing of females because they are females, forced prostitution, sex trafficking, and sexual
violence used during war. SGBV is directed against a person on the basis of their biological sex or their
social gender roles. Males commit most SGBV violence. Females experience high levels of SGBV. Males can
also experience SGBV. People with same sex sexuality, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer
or other sexual identities (LGBTQI) also experience high degrees of SGBV.

3. The “Women, Peace and Security” Agenda

Awareness of the impact of violence on women and women’s roles in peace and security has been
increasing at the global level with the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 2122
reaffirming women’s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of
conflicts, peace-building and peacekeeping. These resolutions call on member states to ensure women’s
equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and
security, and urge all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspective in
all areas of peace building.

4. Gender Mainstreaming in Human Security

Achieving gender equality in human security requires
“gender mainstreaming.” This includes the use of a gender
sensitive analysis of threats, gender inclusion, and gender
accountability.

Gender inclusion: The security sector should be gender

inclusive so that males and females have the same
opportunities to contribute to analysing security
threats, identifying security strategies and
participating in implementing the work of the security
sector, including security forces. Gender equity in the
security sector takes into consideration that women
have been historically disadvantaged and that they
may need special mandates and quotas to overcome
this discrimination so that they can contribute to
policing, for example. Figure 63: Gender Mainstreaming in Security

Gender sensitivity: Gender-sensitivity is process of raising awareness about and addressing the different
needs of males and females. All research in complex environments should disaggregate data to understand the
different experiences of males and females. Gender-sensitive assessments examine how policies and
projects affect males and females differently. Conflict assessment researchers should pay attention to the
possible gender gap between the way women and men experience violence and insecurity as well as their
involvement in supporting peace. Gender-sensitive human security requires paying attention to the
different experiences and capacities of males and females. This is especially important at checkpoints,
border crossings, home searches, in setting up camps with water, sanitation and housing, food and fuel
(access to firewood) for displaced people.

Gender accountability: All people need to have resources, access, skills, and self-esteem to participate fully
in the decisions that affect their lives, including in working for human security. Women and people of
diverse gender identities should also be included in mechanisms for oversight of the security, to ensure
security assessment and strategies offer protection

5. Impact of Sex and Gender on Protection of Civilians and Human Security

Gender influences human security in a variety of ways.
 Males, females and people of diverse gender identities experience different forms of violence
 Males and females may be taught different ways of managing conflict
 Females and people of diverse gender identities may be excluded from contributing to human
security

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 239

Men and women may have different ways of dealing Masculinity and Cattle-Rustling
with conflict based on ascribed societal roles. Women In some tribes, men steal cattle from other
may be discouraged from using violence if it is not seen ethnic groups or “cattle-rustle” as a way of
as feminine, while men may be encouraged to be proving their manhood. Cattle rustling
violent to prove their masculinity. Negotiation and often leads to tribal warfare or ethnic
dialogue may be seen as feminine, and most cultures clashes as men from one tribe may kill
value masculine traits more than feminine traits. those of another tribe in pursuit of justice
for stolen cattle. Mothers will tell their
Women may be able to play important roles in human sons that they will not find women to
security and peacebuilding, but gender roles may marry unless they prove themselves as
prohibit them from doing so. Men may be willing to “real men” who participate in cattle
negotiate and forgo violence, but gender roles may rustling. A man who has killed other men
push them toward violent solutions. The case study in battle is allowed to adorn himself with
here illustrates that both men and women participate special markings, bracelets or beads.
in the link between gender roles and violence. These marks are considered prestigious
and earn men both the affection of women
and leadership roles in their community.
6. Civilians, military and police each have a role in
preventing and responding to SGBV.
Just as all stakeholders have a role to play in protection of civilians, the security sector, including the
military and police, the justice system and other civilian government programmes, humanitarian
organisations and civil society also need to account for the specific needs, perceptions and experiences of
insecurity from sexual and gender-based violence threatening women, men, boys and girls. 142

For example, civil society can ensure that sexual and gender-based violence is a public issue discussed in
the media and in social forums to highlight the often-invisible forms of sexual and gender-based violence.
The police should have training and procedures to respond to the different forms of violence that men
and women typically encounter, and special procedures to respond to children. The military can ensure
that soldiers recognise their roles in preventing sexual and gender-based violence in any interaction with
civilians. As noted earlier, DDR programmes should include special provisions for the safety of female
soldiers. The different needs, perceptions, and experiences of each gender must likewise be taken into
account in SSR processes. Security sector institutions often exclude perspectives of local populations,
especially women.

7. Sexual and gender-based violence is a significant threat to human security.

In complex environments, women, men, girls, and boys experience different forms of violence because of
their sex and gender. Displaced populations are vulnerable to sexual exploitation, prostitution, and
trafficking because they may lack a home, a livelihood, and
they may have already suffered trauma, increasing their Power & Responsibility
risk to further exploitation. “The penalties for inequality between
women and men are very severe. And they
The legal frameworks and criminal justice systems may be are not borne by women alone. They are
inadequate, unwilling, or unable to protect women, borne by the whole world. Power,
children and vulnerable men from sexual exploitation and tempered by the wisdom and restraint of
abuse. Widespread corruption and impunity means responsibility, is the foundation of a just
perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence may not society. But with too little responsibility,
be held to account. power turns to tyranny. And with too little
power, responsibility becomes
All stakeholders operating in complex environments need exploitation. Yet in every country in the
procedures and accountability mechanisms for sexual and world, power and responsibility have
gender-based violence. In most NGOs, international become unbalanced and unhitched,
agencies, military and police forces’ policies, these distributed unequally between men and
mechanisms are still weak or missing. women… The penalties of women’s too-
great burden of responsibility and their
Security forces and humanitarians working in a complex too-small slice of power… are hardship,
environment, who are both under stress and have contact sickness, hunger, even famine....”
with vulnerable populations, have been known to
themselves engage in sexual and gender-based violence. Debbie Taylor, Women: A World Report. University of
Virginia 1985.
The people tasked with protection of civilians may
themselves be guilty of SGBV. Some military forces have

240 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

high internal rates of sexual violence. Males, females, and people of diverse gender identities report high
levels of sexual violence within some military groups. Violence against women living or working around
military bases is also well documented. Likewise, some police forces have a record of ignoring or avoiding
incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, or even intimidating women who report such violence.

8. Sexual and Gender-based Violence Against Females

The United Nations programme “UN Women” published the following facts: 143
 Violence against women occurs in all countries across social, economic, religious and cultural
groups. One of every three women experiences physical assault (raped or beaten) by her husband
or partner.
 It is estimated that of all women killed in 2012, intimate partners or family members killed almost
half.
 More often than not, cases of violence against women go unreported.
 Human trafficking impacts millions of women and girls and is the equivalent to modern-day
slavery. Women and girls represent 55 per cent of the estimated 20.9 million victims of forced
labour worldwide, and 98 per cent of the estimated 4.5 million forced into sexual exploitation.

The table below144 illustrates the types of sexual and gender-based violence women, men, girls and boys
experience before, during, and after war, even in times of peace. These include physical forms of violence
such as domestic violence and rape. Psychological forms of violence include harassment and humiliation.
Structural violence refers to the way many education systems giver preferential treatment to boys, or the
way women are left out of political decision making processes that impact their lives.

Forms of Violence Against Women

During “Normal” Life During War or Crisis Post-war
(No War)
Physical Forms –Domestic violence –Public violence –Increased domestic violence
of Violence –Rape correlates with an and rape
Against –Female genital mutilation increase in domestic -Rape victims experience
Women –Female infanticide (killing violence and rape beatings or death by family
girl babies) –Forced prostitution and members who want to return
–Trafficking of women as sexual slavery the family’s honour
sex slaves
Psychological –Sexual harassment in the –Portrayal of women as –War rape victims experience
Forms of workplace, religious victims degrades the social stigmatisation, physical
Violence institution, or family worth of women and mental trauma
Against –Sexist humour
Women –Shaming women for being
(Emotional raped
abuse, verbal –Cultural acceptance or
abuse) glorification of violence
against women
Structural –Giving boys more –As men leave to fight, –Few post-war reconstruction
Forms of education, food, and women are required to programmes address
Violence opportunities than girls provide for all family women’s physical and
–Giving girls more work needs during a time emotional needs resulting
than boys when food and from war
–Paying women less than resources are scarce –80% of the world’s refugees
men for the same work, due to war are women
resulting in the –Women are often left out of
feminisation of poverty –Women and women’s peace processes where
(most poor people are issues are often left out important decisions about
women) of peace settlements the future are made
–Placing limitations on –Truth and reconciliation
female leadership processes may not make a
–Excluding women from safe space for the private and
inheritance and property sexual nature of the war
rights crimes against women
Figure 64: Forms of Violence Against Women

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 241

9. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Males
There is growing recognition that men and boys also experience high levels of sexual and gender-based
violence. While data on SGBV against women has been well documented, males are often more reluctant
to identify SGBV against them, and organisations have not been gender sensitive in data collection to
ensure they identify strategies for collecting this information. SGBV against males is especially prevalent
within some cultures, within some military forces with a high tolerance for SGBV and in refugee or IDP
camps. In addition, armed groups may selectively kidnap and kill males.

The UN has guidelines on SGBV145 against males to encourage more organisations to recognise that males
are experiencing all types of SGBV, including rape. All males, just like all females, deserve human security
and protection from SGBV. Because of the stigma related to SGBV against males, gender sensitive
approaches are needed to address SGBV against males.

10. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual, Transgender and Intersex
(LGBTI) People
People with diverse gender identities often experience high levels of sexual and gender-based violence.
The UN guidance on SGBV gives special attention to the violence suffered by LGBTI people.

11. Understanding Psychological Responses to SGBV

Many women and men do not seek help or safety when they suffer from SGBV. In order to best prevent
and respond to SGBV in complex environments, civilian, military, and police leaders need to understand
the complex psychological reasons why women may not seek help when experiencing sexual and gender-
based violence. Responses to SGBV range from constructive to destructive responses.

Constructive responses to SGBV will lead women to seek safety and protection, whereas destructive
responses motivate women to remain in silence. Unlike other victims of abuse, victims of SGBV are
especially prone to responding destructively, which often further perpetuates violence against them. The
range of possible reasons why women and men may react destructively to SGBV includes:

Tendency to blame themselves rather than others

When a person is abused, many believe that they must have done something wrong to deserve the punishment.
Victims may blame themselves for causing the violence. Others may contribute to this by suggesting that SGBV is
the fault of the victim, who must have somehow “invited” the violence. In reality, there are no excuses for SGBV.
All issues or problems can and must be addressed without violence.

Confusion between Violence and Love

Some victims think that being battered is an expression of love or care for them and see the abuse as a form of
attention. Some research suggests being ignored or neglected is experienced as a severe form of
psychological violence. Rather than being ignored, some victims prefer to have men act jealous and
violent against them because they think it is symbol of love.

Family Pride and Honour

A victim may disgrace her family if she reports domestic violence. Acknowledging that there are problems
within a family is sometimes seen as bringing shame to the family. In order to protect the reputation of
the victim’s larger family network, she may choose to keep silent about domestic violence.

Socialisation
Many victims, especially females, are taught to be passive and nurturing. When women are in violent
relationships, they may feel that they have to be quiet in response to abuse and may feel responsible for taking
care of the family relationships.

Coping Mechanisms
Victims of SGBV develop coping mechanisms that help them to get on with their lives despite the abuse they
have suffered. Although expressing pain and suffering to others can be a way of coping with it, many victims of
SGBV tend to adopt coping mechanism that foster silence. Some of them try to forget about violence against
them because to identify it may cause too much stress or pain. Others may minimise the abuse and claim that it
isn’t affecting them emotionally or physically even if it is.

242 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Threat of Increased Violence
If a person reports on SGBV or seeks help from others, the perpetrator may seek revenge and threaten
her with even more violence. For example, a woman may keep quiet to protect herself and her children.

Society’s Lack of Resources and Responses

Many victims of SGBV are unable to seek protection because the society in which they live fails to provide
them resources. Social support centres, legal remedies, employment opportunities, child benefits or
childcare are institutional mechanisms that would make it easier for women to speak out and report
abuses. But in absence of these resources, women tend to resign themselves to the belief that seeking help
is futile since nothing will be done to address it.

Lack of Information about Options

Victims may also remain in silence because they are unaware of programmes such as domestic violence shelters
in their communities.

12. Understanding Male Violence

Males commit almost all SGBV violence. Men are not any
more “naturally violent” than women. Both women and men FEMLINKPacific works with military
have the potential for great violence and for contributing to officials and policymakers in Fiji and the
peace. But while most women are socialised to be peaceful, South Pacific to improve the
many boys are socialised to see aggression as proof of their implementation of the global Women,
masculinity or their maleness. Peace and Security Agenda.

Most cultures connect masculinity to concepts of courage, - Read more about their work in “Local Ownership of
Security” - the companion to this Handbook.
competition, assertiveness, and ambition that are expressed
through physical aggression and violence and repression of
other emotions. In many communities, men are asked to prove their masculinity through violence. Some fathers
tell their sons that war will “bring out the man in you.” Many boys learn that war is respectable and that heroes
are warriors, soldiers, and conquerors.

In most cultures, young boys are encouraged to repress empathy, to be tough, fearless, not to cry and to
value winning or dominating over others. Sometimes women pressure men to be violent to prove that
they are “real men.” Mothers may ask their sons to fight wars. Young girls may find aggressive young men
more attractive than men who do not fight.

Male violence against women in the form of domestic violence is also directly tied to masculinity. Some men
commit domestic violence against women as an expression of their frustration and shame at larger structures
that humiliate and shame them. When some men feel powerlessness in the face of unemployment or an inability
to earn social respect, they resort to violence against women to prove their manhood. Men may engage in SGBV
because of their own insecurities, mental illness resulting from childhood trauma or abuse, alcoholism or drug
addiction, feelings of humiliation from others that are transferred to weaker victims, or an inability to handle
angry feelings without violence.

The ideological language of war often encourages male aggression against women. Male combatants often
glorify their own image using masculine language, while referring to the enemy in feminine terms.
Metaphors like “penetrating the enemy” used in military strategies may incite men to engage in rape and
abuse. At the same time war rhetoric looks down on non-violent methods to resolve conflict. Male leaders
who favour negotiation or diplomacy rather than war are called “wimps” or “girls,” challenging their
manhood. Men may be socially sanctioned and criticised for working for peace.

13. Impact of Gender Discrimination on Women’s Contributions to Human Security

Civilian, military and police leaders have important roles to play in both preventing sexual and gender
based violence and in ensuring that women can participate in broader human security processes. It is
important to create special programmes to empower women to bring their experiences, ideas, and
concerns to the tasks of building peace. Women and men have different social networks in many societies.
Some women may have unique levels of access to places such as the market or religious networks. Some
women may be uniquely able to mobilise their community to accept a peace settlement or to engage in
dialogue through their extensive family and communal relationships.

Because women are half of every community and the tasks of peacebuilding are so great, women and men
must be partners in working toward human security. SGBV limits women’s ability to participate in

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 243

activities that support human security. Because women and men have different experiences of violence
and peace, women must be allowed and encouraged to bring their unique insights and gifts to the process
of peacebuilding. Women are excluded from public decision-making, leadership, and educational
opportunities in many communities around the world. Since women are the central caretakers of families
in many cultures, everyone suffers when women are oppressed, victimised, and excluded from
peacebuilding. Their centrality to communal life makes their inclusion in peacebuilding essential.

Because many women suffer from structural oppression and domestic violence, they are more likely to
understand that human security requires both the absence of war as well as safety within the home or
community. In peace negotiations and political arenas, women more often include concerns for structural
justice, human rights, and an end to domestic violence. 146

Women are not “naturally” peaceful. Women have played a variety of roles throughout history that
support war and other forms of violence, from warriors to supportive wives and mothers calling men to
the battlefield. Women have the capacity for both violence and peace. Like men, women must be
encouraged to use their gifts in building peace. Many girls are socialised not to express anger toward
others, as anger is not seen as “feminine” in many cultures. Many girls are encouraged to develop
relationships and relational skills, as these skills are useful for taking care of children and family
networks. Many girls are conditioned to believe they are “weaker” than boys and so develop nonviolent
forms of problem solving.

REVIEW
This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders an understanding of the activities required for
gender mainstreaming in security. All stakeholders have a responsibility for becoming gender sensitive,
gender inclusive, and gender accountable. This lesson described two global agendas: sexual and gender-
based violence and women (SGBV) and the women, peace and security agendas. Greater coordination
and understanding of these two agendas will enable a more systematic approach to gender
mainstreaming in security.

Citations
142
See the following Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidance (Geneva, Switzerland: Inter-Agency Standing
Committee) at http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/publications accessed
October 2015.
 Report on the IASC Task Force on the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises
 IASC Policy Statement on Protection from Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in Humanitarian Crises
 IASC Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings
 Focusing on Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence in Emergencies. September 2005
 GBV Area of Responsibility. 2010. Handbook for Coordinating Gender-based Violence Interventions in
Humanitarian Settings. At:
http://oneresponse.info/GlobalClusters/Protection/GBV/publicdocuments/GBV%20Handbook%20Long%
20Version%5b1%5d.pdf.
143 See more at: http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-

figures#sthash.lLs3cwfg.dpuf accessed October 2015.

144 Adapted from Lisa Schirch. “Frameworks for Understanding Women as Victims and Peacebuilders.” in Defying

Victimhood: Women and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding." Ed. Albrecht Schnabel and Anara Tabyshalieva, (Tokyo: UN
University Press, 2012).
145 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Working with Men and Boy Survivors of Sexual and Gender-based

Violence in Forced Displacement, July 2012, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5006aa262.html. accessed 6

November 2015.
146 Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner

Publishers, 2007).

244 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 27 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes
To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question:
“Do people in your organisation experience sexual and gender-based violence?”

Add 20 minutes
Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes
In scenario team groups, discuss how you would address the following challenges in your scenario:
Each scenario team receives a report outlining the following challenges. What do each of the
stakeholder groups do in response?
 In scenario A, a group of 300 girls are abducted from their school.
 In scenario B, a group of 20 female college students protesting against violence disappear. The
parents of the girls believe the police know what happened to their daughters and even
looked the other way as criminal gangs carried out the abduction.
 In scenario C, media report that two women, a mother and her daughter, are stoned to death.

Each stakeholder team has 10 minutes to discuss their response.

The facilitator should then open the scenario role play and allow 10-15 minutes for teams to meet
and discuss options.

The facilitator pauses the role play. Each team shares their strategy with the other teams. The
facilitator asks the entire group for their observations on what strategies to address SGBV seemed
most successful or possible in their scenario.

Away 5 minutes
To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 245

 CC Flickr Photo Credit: Nalin Hewapathirana

Lesson 28
Mitigating Civilian Harm

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
1. Identify at least three causes of civilian harm from security operations
2. Identify the ethical and strategic impacts of civilian harm
3. Identify at least five aspects of setting up a civilian harm incident management system

The first two lessons in this module focused on the responsibilities and roles that security forces and
civil society have in protecting civilians from harm. This lesson addresses a related problem of how to
respond to accusations of civilian harm. Security forces and civil society can coordinate efforts to
prepare for and mitigate civilian harm that results from a security operation. This lesson outlines the
steps for managing a civilian ham incident.

Lesson 28: Mitigating Civilian Harm

This lesson draws the specific methodology and guidance for mitigating civilian harm developed by the
Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). This text is copied and adapted from their written materials.

1. Causes of civilian harm

Military and police actions can unintentionally cause harm to civilians. In the past this was referred to as
“collateral damage.” Today security forces increasingly use the “civilian casualties.” Civilians may be harmed in a
variety of ways, including the following:

 Inaccurate gunfire or bomb attacks: Security forces cannot be assured that their weapons will hit their
targets. Some attacks are not accurate and harm civilians who happened to be near the attack.
 Raids: Civilian harm may result from military or police raids.

246 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  Mistaken identity: Civilians may be mistakenly targeted if intelligence wrongly identifies them as a
legitimate target
 Force protection: Civilians may be harmed as security forces attempt to protect their own
 Direct contacts: In some contexts, civilians may be seen as collaborators with security forces if there is
direct contact between civilians and military or police. Armed groups may view civilians who have had
direct contact as soft targets, easy to harm and punish for their collaboration.

2. Civilian casualties are an ethical and legal issue

Three principles relate to protection of civilians:

Principle of Distinction: Armed groups should distinguish at all times between civilians and civilian assets and
military and police and their vehicles, buildings, and other assets.

Principle of Proportionality: Armed groups are required to weigh the military benefit of an operation to harm it is
likely to inflict on civilians. Any harm to civilians requires legal and ethical decision-making to determine the
proportionality of benefit to harm.

Principle of Precaution: Armed groups should make every effort to prevent harm to civilians in their operations.

3. Civilian casualties are a strategic issue

Civilian harm impacts public perceptions about the legitimacy of security forces and the government for which
they work. The greater the levels of civilian harm, the more likely the public will question or turn against the
security forces and the government. Consider these two quotes from the former President of Afghanistan and
from a Taliban commander in the armed opposition to the government.

“Civilian casualties are undermining the support in the Afghan people for the war on terrorism. … How can you
expect the people who keep losing their children to remain friendly?”
[President Karzai, 2009]

“The people who are fighting with the Taliban are the brothers, uncles and relatives of those killed by the foreign
soldiers. They have joined the Taliban and are fighting the foreigners because they want to avenge their brothers,
fathers and cousins.”
[Taliban Commander in Uruzgan, 2008]

4. Civilian Harm Incident Management

All military and police operations need to have a standing policy and set of procedures for mitigating
civilian harm. For example, in Afghanistan, NATO nations agreed on the following set of non-binding
policy guidelines for how to respond to alleged cases of civilian combat-related harm—including death,
injury and property damage.
a. Promptly acknowledge combat-related cases of civilian casualties or damage to civilian property.
b. Continue to fully implement the ISAF standard operating procedures for investigating possible
cases of civilian casualties, or damage to civilian property, and endeavour to provide the
necessary information to the ISAF civilian casualties tracking cell.
c. Proactively offer assistance for civilian casualty cases or damages to civilian property, in order to
mitigate human suffering to the extent possible. Examples of assistance could include ex-gratia
payments or in-kind assistance, such as medical treatment, the replacement of animals or crops,
and the like.
d. Offers of such assistance, where appropriate, should be discussed with, and coordinated through,
village elders or alternative tribal structures, as well as district-level government authorities,
whenever possible. Assistance should also, where possible, be coordinated with other
responsible civilian actors on the ground.
e. Offering and providing such assistance should take into account the best way to limit any further
security risk to affected civilians and ISAF/PRT personnel.
f. Local customs and norms vary across Afghanistan and should be fully taken into account when
determining the appropriate response to a particular incident, including for potential ex-gratia
payments.
g. Personnel working to address cases of civilian casualties or damage to civilian property should
be accessible, particularly, subject to security considerations, in conflict-affected areas, and local
communities made fully aware of the investigation and payment process.
h. The system by which payments are determined and made should be as simple, prompt and
transparent as possible and involve the affected civilians at all points feasible.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 247

 i. Payments are made and in-kind assistance is provided without reference to the question of legal
liability.

5. CIVIC’s 7-Step Process

Civil society organisations such as the CIVIC also have a role in civilian harm mitigation. CIVIC began
working on behalf of civilians during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq when it became evident that the
international coalition of military forces did not have adequate procedures for or an understanding of the
necessity to and acknowledge and make amends for harm to civilians. Today they work in a variety of
conflicts from Syria to Somalia.

CIVIC has a method for helping security forces prepare for, investigate, and appropriately respond to
cases of civilian harm. While discussed in a generalised setting here this method can be adjusted and
applied to many different types of conflicts and to various armed actors. The method begins by identifying
the civilian harm mitigation practices that currently exist within a government and their military or other
armed actor. CIVIC consults with civilians themselves to assess protection challenges, to garner
information on whether current mechanisms are working, and if not, what local civil society leaders see
as necessary in order for civilian harm mitigation systems and programmes to work effectively. The
ultimate aim is to ascertain challenges in preventing and addressing civilian harms and recommend
specific policy and practice to address gaps.

The following 7‐step process describes how security officers can effectively manage allegations or
incidents of civilian harm. The process ensures respectful treatment of civilians and can decrease the
negative impacts of combat operations on the population. This in turn has a positive effect on the
perceived legitimacy of security forces. While the CIVIC’s method focuses on national level military
operation, the 7-step process is also relevant to police operations that may cause civilian harm.

Step 1: Be Prepared
Military and police operations pose a risk to civilians. Preparation before an operation begins and before
incidents of civilian harm occur is important, as it can be difficult to discern valid incidents from false allegations
of civilian harm, especially in the midst of a crisis in a complex environment. Put systems in place in advance to
take these preparatory steps:

a. Publicly acknowledge risk of civilian casualties & outline response measures including how civilians can
report alleged harm. Military and police should communicate with the public on the following issues:
 Describe the precautions being taken to prevent civilian harm
 Identify the reasons that security operations may endanger civilians and let the public know that
civilian casualties may still happen, despite precautions;
 State that allegations of civilian harm will be taken seriously but must be investigated;
 Identify the procedures for raising concerns, complaints or reports of civilian harm, including what
is expected of the public in filing such a claim of civilian harm

b. Draw up Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) including timelines for investigation & response

c. Identify and develop relationships with community leaders to assist in incident management as part of
regular community liaison work

d. Set up and maintain regular liaison structures with the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission (if
applicable) and the local human rights commission within the country.

e. Designate officers to be in charge of incident handling.

 Preferably senior level military and police leaders who are well trained on civilian harm mitigation
policy and practice and have access to relevant military and police personnel who were involved in
an incident or understand the broader context in which it happened
 Able to spend sufficient time addressing civilian harm, without too many other responsibilities
 If staff change, make sure there are institutionalised training and preparation for new staff to take
on the responsibilities of preparing for incidents of civilian harm

Step 2: Listen to the Initial Complaint/Allegation

Reports on civilian harms can come from a variety of sources.
 Military or police officers
 Local civilians

248 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  Civil society organisations
 News media

a. When local civilians or civil society organisations approach security forces to make a complaint, it is
important to make time to hear the allegation so the community sees that the security forces take the
complaint seriously. Ensure that the officer in charge of civilian harm incidents can be reached, listens
respectfully to document their account of the incident, and takes sufficient time to explain the process for
investigating the allegation.
 Ensure security procedures where civilians will report cases of civilian harm are reasonable and do not
unnecessarily frustrate or add to the anger over the situation. Ensure that the personnel at the entry
gate have direct contact with the responsible staff on civilian harm mitigation by mobile phone and are
instructed to contact the staff promptly if complainants arrive. Be prepared to go to the gate and
facilitate entry procedures to avoid unnecessary aggravation.
 With big groups ask for around 5 to 10 representatives to be identified so a meeting to hear the
concerns is manageable.
 Some allegations and rumours might sound completely ridiculous. The initial test for whether it is
worth researching an allegation is not whether a story appears credible to an officer, but whether local
people appear to give it any credit.

b. Be proactive if the security forces know of an incident, but no one from the community or civil society comes
to report the incident, forces should initiate a meeting with community leaders. Civilians may not report an
incident because of fear, anger or distrust. Reaching out to community leaders to communicate with them
about an incident can defuse tension and build trust.

c. Keep track of media reports, gossip in the marketplace, and enemy propaganda, which may build on a real
situation, but change key facts. Regularly crosscheck reports against internal military or police records of
casualties, weapon discharges or other significant events that indicate civilian harm. If a rumour/ story
appears sufficiently serious & damaging, raise it with the relevant community leaders directly to provide
information directly to them.

Step 3: Initial Response

If an allegation is clearly well documented, move immediately to stage 6 (making amends.)

 If an allegation requires investigation, explain the relevant procedures and clearly set out timeframes and
what kind of assistance is required.
 If an allegation is clearly incorrect, explain why the allegation is seen as false in as much detail as possible
(even if this entails “proving a negative”). The more evidence you can rely on the better – many locals can
be persuaded of your version of events but are unlikely to give you the benefit of the doubt.
 Be prepared to explain and justify why there are questions or doubts about an allegation, even if the points
seem obvious. No one’s credibility can be taken for granted. In a complex environment, diverse
stakeholders may have a history of distrust for others. If there is in any doubt, then opt for an investigation
of an allegation. Often the process itself will play a major part in addressing local anger and concerns. The
worst thing you can do is ignore a grievance.
 If confronted in the immediate aftermath of an incident, be especially sensitive to local anger and to any
cultural sensitivity (e.g. avoid touching dead bodies).
 When dealing with people who claim to have lost relatives or have been involved in an incident of civilian
harm, show empathy and respect even if you’re not yet sure whether and to what extent the claim is
genuine. Remember that people show grief in extremely different ways. Consider how you and your family
would want to be treated if the roles were reversed.
 Some complainants will be insulted if they are asked to provide evidence to back up allegations rather than
believed outright. The need for evidence can be justified in several ways, such as chain of command
requirements to produce backed-up reports / not release any compensation money without evidence, etc.
Often though, complainants will be happy to contribute to a serious investigation.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 249

Step 4: Investigation
There may be three separate investigations.

a. An initial local investigation uses a low standard of proof and

works on a short timeframe. The goal is simply to determine In the Philippines, civil society and the
if it likely that civilians were harmed. This type of government have set up local councils
investigation should occur in most cases after an allegation is called “Bantay Bayanihan” to provide
made. oversight on security. Security forces
report on civilian casualties directly to
b. An internal investigation has a higher standard of proof and a the community. Together they discuss
longer time frame. This investigation assesses who is at fault how best to respond.
and if there was misconduct.
Read more about their work in “Local Ownership in
c. An independent investigation by the UN or an independent Security” - the companion to this Handbook.
human rights commission may be useful, specifically if there
are serious allegations and potentially serious criminal consequences. Independent investigations are
valuable because they can have greater integrity and credibility than internal investigations. This can
counter false or misleading information and lead to both short-term and long-term steps to mitigate
further civilian harm.

Demonstrating to the community that a serious investigation is taking place is as important as the eventual
findings.
 Make effective use of internal military records and crosscheck claims against them but do not
automatically dismiss claims if no relevant internal records exist.
 Involve the community – gives an opportunity to tell their story/ air grievances & strengthens
credibility of findings.
 Interview eyewitnesses separately and check consistency with other accounts/ evidence.
 Locate and, if possible, speak to any injured.
 Take account of the impact of education, social & tribal/ ethnic/ political background, etc. in assessing
credibility
 Ask for evidence such pictures of dead/ wounded/ damage, destroyed items, names of victims, etc. In
most parts of the world, people have camera phones. Even if no immediate after-event footage is
available, disposable, cheap cameras & GPS can be lent to community leaders to take pictures of graves,
damage, etc. and coordinates. These can then be compared to internal footage of the relevant area, and
tested in individual interviews.

Investigations face a number of challenges.

 There may be false claims.
 Victims may not want to be named (see reasons for this in the last lesson). Some cultures will not allow
photographs of bodies or handling of the dead. Many cultural concerns are not absolute “deal-breakers”
but simply require sensitive handling – e.g. assurances how evidence will be treated; pictures of dead
females only to be shown to female officers, etc. Identify these cultural sensitivities, keep them
documented and ensure replacement staff receives them during rotations.
 Within a security organisation, there may be different goals, multiple chains of command, and a lack of
information sharing.
 The organisation may not have enough staff to carry out all the investigations that are needed.
 Witnesses may have a difficult time distinguishing between different types of uniforms. In a complex
environment with military forces from different countries, all foreign forces may be blamed for actions
carried out by any of them.

Step 5: Sharing Findings

The conclusions of an investigation should be shared with the affected community in a community meeting.
Investigators (local, internal to the organisation, and independent investigators) should present evidence.
 Take care to protect individual sources. Recognise that the top priority should be doing no further
harm. See the first lesson in this module for specific guidance on protection of civilians while
conducting an investigation on human rights abuses or civilian harms.

250 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  Any amends to be made can often be incorporated in the same forum.
 Findings that civilians were harmed need not entail findings of fault and need not be presented as such.
 It might be possible to “agree to disagree” with the findings of an investigation. Attempts should be
made to show respect and all a way for all involved to save face by protecting their dignity.
 Credibility will develop if security forces acknowledge real incidents and deny false allegations.

Step 6: Making Amends

Whenever it is likely that civilians were harmed, appropriate amends should be made, which may include:
 Apologies and explanations
 Monetary payments to victims and their families
 In-kind assistance
 Explaining any resulting changes, e.g. new guidelines, etc.

Communities will often be concerned with accountability – if the facts warrant it, it may help to explain that
more detailed investigations are on-going and how they tie into the military justice system.

Sharing the outcomes of any relevant courts martial, inquiries, etc. with the affected community often has
extremely positive impact.

It is essential that amends are seen to be made, i.e. monetary compensation offered to a family through a tribal
elder will often be accompanied with ceremony to show that the amends for losses has been accepted.

Amends may be directed at individual families, at the wider community or at both (e.g. compensation payments
for families who lost relatives and a new carpet for the village mosque in their memory). There is a wide range
of options at commanders’ disposal that should be fully utilised.

Internal systems of accountability and due process often may not be recognised or respected by local people,
who may have different ideas and expectations of accountability. It helps to explain why accountability
processes are inevitably slow. If outcomes from court inquiries are available, sharing these even months or
years after the relevant event may have a positive impact.

 Compensation must be clearly distinguished from humanitarian, development or other forms of civic
assistance.
 There may be multiple sources to consider for compensation:
– International Organisations (e.g. the World Bank, for example, set up and helped administer a
compensation fund for Nepal)
– National Government (e.g. programmes created by the government to help victims of
terrorism, crime, etc. These programmes should be extended to also help victims of military
operations)
– Military or police (military and policy may develop their own systems of making amends
including small sums of money to recognise losses).
 Facilitate claims and make procedures as un-bureaucratic as possible
 Importance of standardisation & avoiding double recovery: Consider maintaining a unified database of
all payments made in an area of operations.
 Compensation payments must avoid becoming an “opportunity” – principle of fairness. Should be equal
in amount and accessibility for all those harmed. A database as mentioned above can help ensure
fairness and combat corruption and opportunistic people. Bargaining can be avoided by reference to
standardised guidelines and by conducting credible investigations that share their findings with the
communities.
 Ensure you have a designated point person who has cultural sensitivity, has connections with the
community, understands the strategic imperatives of paying compensation and can work toward
mutual trust between the military, police, and the community.
 Consider linking amount & means of payment to local tradition.
 Know the sources of other help for victims, including programmes that may exist through international
organisations, the national government, or local groups.. Some of these programmes may be will to take
referrals from the military and police and and may help rebuild the lives of victims following harm with

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 251

 more than a cash pay-out. Victims should receive all help available, even if it comes from multiple
sources.

6. Local Media & Wider Community

Respond promptly to any allegations, even if only to announce an immediate investigation and give a clear
timeline for findings.

a. Never issue broad denials in the immediate aftermaths of an incident if you don’t have all the required
information. Issuing immediate & broad “knee jerk reaction” denials without having the information to
back them up may lead to repeated later changes and/ or retractions and is harmful both in regard of
wider public relations credibility and relations with specific victims.

b. Make findings of any investigations public within the promised timelines.

c. Cultivate a relationship with local journalists and “opinion leaders” & contact them regularly with
updates. Local media works very differently to international media. Professional standards, including
investigative skills and corroboration requirements, may differ from country to country.

d. Do not rely only on centrally issued press releases – at the very least press releases need to be translated
& shared effectively. Messages must be carefully tailored to local environments.

e. In case of major incidents consider holding a dedicated large public meeting or other public response.

f. At an initial announcement it is perfectly possible to deny elements that are clearly untrue/ acknowledge
true parts of a story and promise an investigation into the remaining aspects.

g. In some contexts, insurgents go to significant lengths to calibrate messages according to the intended
audience. They will often utilise local folklore, religious and historical allusions and language to great
effect. Messaging from military and police must attempt to compete with this in sophistication.
Similarly, insurgents carefully cultivate relations with local media and are extremely responsive to their
requests.

REVIEW
This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders an understanding of the activities required for
mitigating civilian harms. It is important military, police, and civilian agencies to have specific people
tasked with addressing civilian harm, and to detail the specific steps needed to respond to incidents of
civilian harm. This will enable a more systematic approach to mitigating civilian harms.

252 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 28 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question:
 What are the procedures for addressing civilian harms in your organisation, community or
region?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to understand a process for how to handle situations where security
forces harm civilians. In each of the scenario groups, the media announces that militia units are
hiding amidst IDPs in the camps set up after an earthquake in the country. The police raid the IDP
camp. Eighteen IDPs are killed in the gunfire between police and militias. Some stakeholder teams
question the legality of the raid.

Each of the scenario stakeholder teams has thirty minutes to propose and then to negotiate or
advocate with other groups for how they will investigate and respond to the civilian deaths. Then,
each stakeholder team or group of teams is allowed two minutes to outline their plan and/or to
oppose the plans of other groups. Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs
in this role-play.

 What strategies to address harm to civilians seemed most successful or possible in their
scenario?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 253

 Photo CC Flickr by Jane Fox

Module
9
Trauma Awareness,
Resilience & Managing Stress

Module 9 Trauma Awareness, Resilience and Managing Stress

Lesson 29: Trauma Awareness defines different types of stress and trauma and identifies the
impact on body, brain and behaviour.

Lesson 30: Resilience, Self-Care and Managing Stress identifies skills and principles for
stress management.

This module provides an introduction to the impact of trauma, stress, resilience and self-care
that face military, police, and civilians who work in stressful contexts. The lessons are adapted
and excerpted from a longer training provided by Eastern Mennonite University’s Strategies for
Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR).

The topics in this Module have the potential for triggering unexpected reactions from
participants. For this reason, facilitators using this material should receive special training in
dealing with trauma or have a background in counselling or social work. Facilitators should
have a plan for helping individual participants to process reactions to the material in this
Module. This might include having a counsellor on-call in case of a specific need.

254 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

 Photo CC Flickr by Trauma Resource Institute

Lesson 29
Trauma Awareness

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify at least three types and sources of trauma and the effects on individuals and groups
 Identify at least five impacts of trauma on the body, brain, beliefs and behaviour of individuals
and communities
 Identify the links between trauma and cycles of victimhood and violence – in families,
organizations, communities and nations

This lesson informs civilians, military and police working in complex environments of the shared
challenges of stress and trauma and the impact on civil-military-police relations. The lesson discusses
the different types of trauma and stress, as well as its impact on people’s bodies, brains, beliefs and
behaviours. The lesson illustrates and describes how trauma feed into a cycle of violence as
traumatised people make choices to seek revenge or harm others, leading to further trauma.

Lesson 29: Trauma Awareness

The material in this lesson draws from Eastern Mennonite University’s STAR programme – Strategies for
Trauma Awareness and Resilience.147

1. Stress and Trauma in Complex Environments

Civilians, military, police and anyone living and working in complex environments will experience stress
and trauma. Some may participate in harming others, experience harm themselves, witness harm done to
others, or a combination of all three. In the past, wars were fought on battlefields, where the trauma was

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 255

often separated from civilian population. Current armed conflicts result in far more direct harm to
civilians. Civilians, military and police may live with constant fear and a sense of threat and anxiety of
what will happen to them. They may be aggressive or impatient with each other, blame or seek revenge
on each other if they do not find appropriate ways of managing stress and trauma.

2. Definitions of Stress and Trauma

Stress occurs when our bodies, minds or emotions respond to an outside event. A natural part of life,
stress can have a positive or negative effect on the quality of life. Some types of stress motivate us toward
positive outcomes. Without any stress, productivity is low and we may feel unmotivated. But too much
stress results in distress and can lead to frustration, anxiety and disease. On-going stress may lead to
exhaustion, anxiety, depression and eventual burnout.

Traumatic stress refers to an emotional wound that results from experiencing or witnessing a traumatic
event or events: a highly stressful, horrifying event or series of events where one feels a lack of control,
powerlessness, and threat of injury or death. The word “trauma” comes from the Greek word for
“wound.” Not everyone who experiences a traumatic event or traumatic situations experiences traumatic
stress. Traumatic stress occurs when our ability to respond to threat is overwhelmed.

Traumatic events can be:

Single Event(s)
An intense one-time event, natural or human-caused, where there is serious threat of harm or death.

On-going or Repeated Events

Traumatic events or situations that are long term (on-going or repeated at intervals) often without
clear points at which it began or will end, and extreme in its social, economic, spiritual, emotional,
and political effects on individuals, families, communities, and societies.

Acute Stress Reaction (or disorder) is the diagnostic term for trauma reactions that last a minimum of two
days and go away in 30 days.

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is the diagnostic term used for reactions that do not go away
within 30 days. They cause significant distress and affect the individual’s ability to function socially,
occupationally and/or domestically. Trauma reactions do not always appear immediately. They can
remain dormant indefinitely and show up days, weeks, months or even years after the event, often in
response to a later traumatic event or trigger.

All types of trauma can impact individuals, groups or whole societies.

3. Definitions of Collective or Societal Trauma

There are different forms of trauma that affect whole communities or societies.
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, typhoons, tsunamis, earthquakes and volcanoes can cause
widespread stress and trauma. In general, the level of stress and trauma may correlate with whether
government services or civil society is resilient and able to respond to meet human needs.

Human failures such as buildings that collapse, levees breaking, plane crashes, nuclear accidents and
chemical contamination may also cause widespread trauma and tend to be more difficult than natural
disasters. People may blame a relatively small number of responsible individuals, or a corporation or a
government.

Deliberate harms such as structural violence including institutions and policies that harm certain groups,
or direct violent attacks, rape, domestic violence, massacres, torture, or war. Deliberate harms usually
result in a combination of shame, humiliation, helplessness, fear and/or anger. Deliberate harms also
include cultural attacks on the dignity and identity of a group. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is
deliberate psychological and physical harm against both males and females. (See Lesson 27)

4. Participation Induced Traumatic Stress (PITS)

Active participation in causing trauma (even in the line of duty) is a cause of post-traumatic stress
disorder. Researchers also refer to this as “Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress.”148 Sometimes this is
referred to as a “moral injury” because harming others may feel like it goes against our morality or sense

256 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

of ethics. Military and police personnel may experience the
psychological consequences of participation-induced
trauma syndrome (PITS).

5. Compassion Fatigue, Secondary Trauma, and

Burnout Hurt people hurt people.
Witnessing, viewing, or hearing about traumatic events in
real life or via media can lead to secondary trauma.
Researchers document that people who watch televised Pain that is not
images of traumatic events repeatedly have a higher rate
of symptoms of trauma than those who watch these events transformed is transferred.
only once.
-Adapted from Fr. Richard Rohr
Caring for traumatised people can bring satisfaction and
meaning to one’s life. Some caregivers may have been
taught to put the needs of others above their own. Because
they easily share another's emotions, they are vulnerable If we could read the secret
to internalising the pain and suffering of those they intend history of our enemies we
to help. They sometimes feel like they are losing their very
sense of self. Any unresolved personal trauma in their own
should find in each
life may be activated by reports of similar trauma in those person’s life sorrow and
they are helping. Eventually they may feel a debilitating suffering enough to disarm
weariness, a deep sense of physical, emotional and
spiritual exhaustion. all hostility.
When the burden for caring for others falls to an -Adapted from Henry Wadsworth
inadequate number of people who must work long hours Longfellow
without opportunity for recovery over an extended period
of time, debilitating symptoms of “compassion fatigue” are
a frequent sign of secondary trauma. Over-work without
adequate time for self-care such as relaxation, sleeping, entertainment and eating can also lead to
emotional, physical and mental burnout.

Those at high risk for secondary trauma, burnout or compassion fatigue include:
 Disaster and emergency care workers
 Medical staff
 Clergy, chaplains, and mental health professionals
 Family members, friends and associates of trauma survivors
 Lawyers, advocates, and human service workers
 Police and military personnel who attend to civilian needs
 Crisis phone-line attendants, and anyone who cares and listens to the stories of fear, pain and
suffering of others

6. Brain Structure and Trauma

The structure of the brain itself impacts the process of perception. Conflict, violence and trauma greatly
impact people’s ability to think and perceive accurately. In the midst of conflict, people respond to
traumatic or fear-producing situations via their brain stem. The reptilian brain or brain stem is the
unchanging base of the human nervous system that controls basic animal functions such as digestion,
perspiration and automatic reactions such as breathing. It is the place of “instinctual” responses to
conflict or threat such as the impulse to freeze, to fight, or to flee. The
limbic system is the emotional core of the brain where people feel
fear, anger, hatred, joy, etc. These two parts of the brain form the core
of the lower brain.

The cerebral cortex, illustrated in this diagram 149 in the front and
outside layer of the brain, controls rational thinking. This part of the
brain observes, anticipates, plans, responds and organises
information. It helps people make logical decisions, reflect, and create
ideas. Ideally, it controls the older two parts of the brain. Because this
part of the brain helps to integrate and regulate emotional impulses
Figure 65: Diagram
and control of the
impulses, Braincan learn to control their emotional reactions and even their physiological
people

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 257

responses to conflict such as tightened muscles, cold hands, and sweating resulting from fear or trauma.
The cerebral cortex or rational brain is the last part of the brain to engage in a situation of crisis.

In the midst of conflict, a threat, or some sort of traumatic experience, the rational brain is often
overwhelmed and the other two parts take over with emotional or instinctual reactions. Each individual
develops particular “buttons” that when “pushed” lead to reactions. The rush of adrenalin and chemicals
through the body can trigger a range of physical reactions. The “memory” of the trauma or crisis can stay
in the brain for years afterwards if the rational brain has not had the ability to identify and process the
crisis situation. The cortex helps people regulate their emotions such as fear, build relationships and feel
empathy for others, and process questions of morality and ethics.

7. Common Effects of Stress and Trauma

Stress and trauma can result in a wide range of emotional, cognitive, physical, and spiritual reactions. All
people respond to stress and trauma. It is a myth that “strong” people can handle stress. People of
different cultures and genders respond to trauma in different ways. In many cultures, gender socialisation
for males may encourage responding to stress and trauma with anger or even violence. Gender
socialisation for females may allow them to respond with sadness or grief and make it less acceptable for
them to express anger or rage. Some people manage stress and trauma in healthy ways, while others
become destructive to themselves or others.

Each individual responds to stress and trauma in distinct ways. Yet there are common patterns. In the
immediate aftermath of trauma, stress hormones typically flood the body and people feel shock and pain.
Then people often move to asking questions such as “Why me?” and may feel shame and humiliation
about their victimisation as well as survivor guilt. As time passes, people may become depressed, desire
revenge, or both, feeling that revenge will alleviate their depression. For some victims, the desire for
revenge leads them from a victim cycle to an aggressor cycle where they use violence on others and put
their own needs over others. Others may feel numb. Still others may find strength to look for ways out of
the crisis. The diagram below and the illustration on the next page help to identify these different
patterns.

Figure 66: Effects of Stress and Trauma

258 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

8. Examples of social problems in deeply traumatised societies
Individual responses to trauma impact the broader society with patterns of social behaviour. Families
may transmit trauma from one generation to another. When large number of individuals suffer trauma,
broad social patterns can occur.

Societies can become deeply divided on social, political and economic issues. People may come to see
conflict as “us” versus “them” or “good” vs. “evil” without a real understanding of the issues driving the
conflict. Communication between groups is difficult, making negotiated political processes difficult,
increasing the chance that individuals and groups will use violence to achieve their goals. Some may see
death or suicide as a better option than shame, humiliation, or loss of their group identity.

People may lose trust in public order, domestic violence, rape, kidnapping, youth gangs, organised crime,
and human destruction of the natural environment. Trauma can influence a society’s ability to address
current problems and conflicts.

Some groups may see death as better than losing their group identity or being shamed by others
Supporting human security in traumatised societies requires helping people to identify harms, assert
their needs, and move out of the cycle of violence.

9. Cycles of Violence
Responses to trauma frequently lead to a cycle of violence toward self and others illustrated in Figure 66
below. Some responses to stress and trauma are self-destructive. Experts call these “acting in” responses
part of the “victim cycle.” Other responses to stress and trauma harm others. Experts call these “acting
out” responses, or part of the “aggressor cycle.”

REVIEW
This lesson identified different types and sources of trauma and the effects of trauma and stress on
individuals and groups. Trauma and stress impact the body, brain, beliefs and behaviour of individuals
and communities. The lack of attention to stress and trauma can contribute to cycles of victimhood and
violence in families, organisations, communities and nations.

Citations

147 This lesson is adapted from the Trauma Awareness and Resilience Training Manual (available only through taking
the STAR training course found here: http://www.emu.edu/cjp/star/toolkit/) For a published form of some content
in this lesson, please see Carolyn Yoder, The Little Book of Trauma Healing (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2005).
148 Definition by Rachael M. MacNair, in Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress: The Psychological Consequences of

Killing, (New York: Praeger, 2005). STAR uses the word “Participation” rather than MacNair's term “Perpetration” to
convey the same phenomenon.
149 Drawn by Lee Eshleman for Carolyn Yoder, The Little Book of Trauma Healing. Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2005.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 259

Figure 67: Cycles of Violence

260 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Lesson 29 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question for self-reflection in
small groups of two or three people:

 How do stress and trauma affect your work in complex environments?

Add 20 minutes
Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to identify the impact of stress and trauma. In the scenario stakeholder
teams, discuss the likely symptoms of stress or trauma you may see in the following:

 Your organisation or unit within the scenario

 The local community where you work in the scenario
 The broader society where you work in the scenario

Debrief in a large group with these questions:

 How does stress and trauma affect each of the stakeholders in the scenario?
 What is the likely impact of stress and trauma on the society at large?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask the large group to identify in their notebooks or in pairs their
answer to these questions:

 If I could go back in time, what would I do differently in a past work experience given what this
lesson taught about stress and trauma?

 What will I do differently in the future given what we have learned in this lesson?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 261

Photo Credit: CC Flickr UN Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR)

Lesson 30
Resilience, Self-Care & Managing Stress

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify five factors that prevent people from managing stress or trauma
 Identify five strategies for managing stress, self-care and resilience to prevent personal and
professional burnout or compassion fatigue

This lesson informs civilian, military and police working in complex environments about how
individuals, organisations and communities can foster resilience and self-care to manage stress and
respond to trauma. It provides ideas for “emotional first aid” for people working in complex
environments who experience trauma and stress themselves and in the people with whom they work.

Lesson 30: Resilience, Self-Care and Managing Stress

The material in this lesson draws from Eastern Mennonite University’s STAR programme – Strategies for
Trauma Awareness and Resilience.150

1. Definitions of resilience, self-care and stress management?

Stress management and self-care refer to specific strategies people use to enable them to function in
stressful and traumatic situations. Stress management and self-care help people, communities and
societies to be “resilient.”
Resilience refers to the capacity to respond to, adapt to, absorb or survive a crisis or severe change.
Individuals, families and communities are resilient when they have an ability to anticipate and prepare
for crises so that they have a plan for how they will cope. In the environment, for example, some plants

262 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

are more “resilient” to drought or storms than others, allowing them to survive great hardships.
Institutions are resilient when they prepare for how their institution will continue their social functions
in the midst of a crisis. Social systems are most resilient when they combine strong, interdependent
elements that help communities provide for each other with flexible elements that allow people to
improvise or create new ways of responding in the midst of a crisis.
2. Factors that contribute to managing stress and resilience
Individuals, groups, organisations and societies can learn how to manage stress and become more
resilient to trauma. Civilians, military and police can learn to recognise the options for responding to
stress and trauma and make choices for themselves as individuals and organisations. Each of these
options requires an effort.
 Build social connections with others who recognise and support the need for stress management
 Improve self-esteem and confidence to improvise and respond to new challenges
 Develop insight into the impact of stress and trauma on oneself and others
 Foster a spiritual or philosophical outlook to understand tragedy as an opportunity for growth
 Recognise signs of stress in one’s body and know techniques for physically calming down
 Use a sense of humour to laugh at one’s own self and situation
 Consider the cost of anger and consider forgiving others as a way to care for oneself
 Advocate for justice and make an effort to repair harm
 Work to create an environment where basic needs are met
 Respond creatively to adversity and change and improvise in new and changing situations

3. Factors that prevent stress management and resilience

Insecurity: Fear of repeated traumatic events
Blaming: Either blaming oneself or blaming others
Identity: Being either a victim or an aggressor may be providing a source of identity, therefore healing or
peace that would change the status quo is seen as threatening
Unhealthy memorialising: Telling the story in ways that keep individuals/groups in the victim or offender
cycle
Fatalism: Passive attitudes and patterns of learned helplessness and hopelessness
Authoritarianism and corruption: Leadership that further inflames the conflict/ trauma; personal interests
of leaders override the public interest
Impunity: People who commit crime or harm others are not held accountable
Simplistic analysis of the situation: Believing that “we are all good and they are all bad” or “either we
retaliate or they re-victimise us” instead of seeing the ambiguity or range of other options
Social withdrawal: Social support is not adequate
Apathy: Inaction or inability to take steps to respond
Overwhelming emotions: Pain and anger overwhelm the rational brain and people respond instinctually

4. An Individual Path
Each individual or community will develop resilience and manage stress in their own way. People do not
all react the same to traumatic and stressful life events. An approach to building resilience that works for
one person might not work for another. People use varying strategies. A person's culture might have an
impact on how he or she communicates feelings and deals with adversity -- for example, whether and
how a person connects with significant others, including extended family members and community
resources. The good news about resilience is that it can be built using approaches that make sense within
each culture. Some or many of the ways to build resilience that follow may be appropriate to consider in
developing your personal strategy.

5. Places To Look For Help

Getting help when you need it is crucial in building your resilience. Beyond caring family members and
friends, people often find it helpful to turn to:

 Self-help and support groups: Support groups share information, ideas, and emotions, group
participants can assist one another and find comfort in knowing that they are not alone in
experiencing difficulty.
 Books and Online resources
 A licensed mental health professional such as a psychologist can assist people in developing an
appropriate strategy for moving forward. It is important to get professional help if you feel like
you are unable to function or perform basic activities of daily living as a result of the natural
disaster or other traumatic or stressful life experience.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 263

6. Strategies for Stress Management, Self-Care and Resilience
The same areas in which you experience the effects of trauma are also areas to focus efforts to help yourself cope.
The following are some ideas others have found useful. Add to this list additional strategies that you have found
helpful.

Figure 68: Strategies for Stress Management

7. Compassionate Listening
There are ways of listening to the stories of trauma victims that nudge them toward healing. Effective
listening can also be a powerful tool for reducing tensions and resolving conflicts, building bridges
between people and deepening our understanding of others. Hearing each other's stories allows for
mutual compassion and understanding. People can learn to listen in ways that heal and connect people is
called compassionate listening, active or reflective listening, or empathic listening.

8. What are underlying principles of listening that heal and connect people?
 Be present for the person who is sharing their story. As much as possible, leave your own
concerns behind. Try not to act hurried, distracted or restless.
 Listen empathically. Try to see the world through the eyes of the other person.
 Follow the basic "ground rules" of good listening. Don't interrupt, interrogate or give advice
unless asked.
 When listening to another, don't tell your own story or share personal problems except in rare
occasions.
 Communicate through words and nonverbal behaviours "I am interested in what you are saying,”
"I am trying to understand your emotions and feelings,” "I am not judging you."
 Be a sounding board; allow the speaker to explore a variety of options and ideas while you
remain non-judgmental.
 Be a mirror; reflect back to the person what you think they are saying and feeling.
 Be careful not to ask a lot of questions. Questions about “What happened to you…” can be re-
traumatising. If you do need to ask questions, ask open-ended questions (questions that can't be
answered with a mere "yes" or "no") to clarify and encourage the person to share in greater
depth.
 "What is helping you get through this now?”
 "What helped you survive this?”

264 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

  "How has this affected you?"
 “What signs of courage and kindness did you see?”
 "What other difficulties have you survived in the past and how did you do that?"
 "How can I help?"
 Listen for indications of strength, survivorship and resilience and gently reframe repetitive
stories of powerlessness and victimisation to help the person focus on possibilities for healing
and growth and their own sense of inner strength and direction.
 Focus on the one person or the group of people telling you their story. Don't be paralysed by the
enormity of the world's problems and needs.

9. What Victims Want to Say to Clergy151 or People who Care

Don’t explain and don’t take away my reality. I don’t want you to try to give me answers. What has
happened is absurd. It is surely not as life was intended to be. It doesn’t make sense. The pain is a sign to
me of how much I have loved and how much I have lost.
Stay close and remember me… for a long time. Understand my need to grieve, my need to withdraw, my
need to agonise, but remind me that you’re there to lean on when I want to share my pain. This loss will
always be a part of me. I’ll need to talk about it for years to come. Most people will be tired of hearing
about it after a period of time. Be the person who will invite me to share my feelings about this after
others have moved on to other concerns. If my loved one has died, mention his or her name from time to
time and let us remember together.
Don’t be frightened of my anger and be patient. Anger isn’t nice to be around. The one to worry about is the
one who has experienced violence but hasn’t become angry. My progress will not be steady. I’ll slip back
just when everyone thinks I’m doing so well. Be one to whom, on occasion, I can reveal my regression.
Remind me this isn’t all there is to life. My pain and my questions consume me. I can think and feel nothing
else. Remind me there is more to life than my understanding and my feelings.

10. When to refer for mental health services

Referrals to mental health and other health care professionals are made as workers encounter survivors
with severe disaster reactions or complicating conditions. The following reactions, behaviours, and
symptoms signal a need for further assistance.
 Disorientation- dazed, memory loss, inability to recall events in the last 24 hours
 Depression- pervasive feelings of hopelessness and despair, unshakable feelings of worthlessness
and inadequacy, withdrawal from others, inability to engage
 Anxiety- feeling on edge, restless, agitated, inability to sleep, frequent frightening nightmares,
flashbacks and intrusive thoughts, obsessive fears of another disaster
 Mental health challenges- hearing voices, seeing visions, delusional thinking, talking rapidly
 Inability to care for self - not eating, bathing or changing clothes, or daily activities
 Suicidal or homicidal thoughts or plans
 Problematic use of alcohol or drugs

REVIEW
This lesson defined the relevance of the ideas of resilience and self-care to military, police, and civilians
working in complex environments. The lesson described the factors and strategies useful for managing
stress and trauma. These strategies can help prevent personal and professional burnout or compassion
fatigue.

Citations

150 This lesson is adapted from the Trauma Awareness and Resilience Training Manual (available only through taking
the STAR training course found here: http://www.emu.edu/cjp/star/toolkit/) For a published form of some content
in this lesson, please see Carolyn Yoder, The Little Book of Trauma Healing (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2005).
151
Richard P. Lord “What Victims Want to Say to Clergy: A Collection of Feelings Expressed by Victims.” See
https://www.emu.edu/cjp/star/toolkit/survivors-clergy.pdf accessed January 2016.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 265

Lesson 30 Learning Exercises

Anchor 10 minutes
To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question for self-reflection:
 What do you do to help you cope with stress or trauma?

Add 20 minutes
Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes
1. Ask each participant to draw this
larger version of this diagram
on a sheet of paper.

2. Ask participants to place a dot

on each line to illustrate how
much time and emphasis they
put on each of the six parts of
life identified here. Place the
dot closer to the centre if you
are less satisfied and nearer the
outer edge if you are more
satisfied.

3. Then, connect all the dots. How

does the shape of your wheel
impact how you manage stress
or trauma? Where are things
off balance? How might you
make changes that will bring
your life’s wheel into better
balance?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.
CC Flickr Photo: Jesus Alfonso / WorldBank

Module
10
Security Governance,
Accountability & Performance

Module 10 Security Governance, Accountability and Performance

Security is a public good. Local ownership and oversight of the security sector is a public duty.
Modules 1 and 2 outlined all the potential stakeholders in the security sector. Module 3 outlined
the five elements of civil-military-police coordination, including joint capacity building,
assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Module 3 also
emphasised the benefits of local ownership and multi-stakeholder coordination. This module
concludes the Handbook with a lesson outlining how civilians, military and the police can work
together to monitor and evaluate security governance, accountability and performance.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 267

CC Flickr Photo Credit: Andre Mellagi

Lesson 31
Assessing Security Governance,
Accountability & Performance

Learning Objective:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
 Identify three principles of security sector assessment
 Identify three potential uses of the S-GAP tool to improve security
 Define characteristics of security governance, accountability and performance

This lesson introduces a security sector assessment and review framework. The Security —
Governance Accountability and Performance (S-GAP) Toolkit provides local and national civil society,
government leaders, and members of the security sector a foundation for security policy-making that
promotes a comprehensive planning strategy. The S-GAP provides a guide for research, dialogue, and
advocacy on security governance, accountability and performance designed by Partners Global
(formerly named Partners for Democratic Change). The tool also provides a framework for monitoring
implementation as reform initiatives evolve.

Lesson 31: Assessing Security Governance, Accountability & Performance

This lesson contains a summary of the S-GAP toolkit. The complete tool can be found on-line at:
http://securitygovernance.org.

1. Security Governance, Accountability and Performance (S-GAP)

Security is a public good. Local ownership and oversight of the security sector is a public duty for all
people in a society. Module 3 outlined the five elements of coordination, including joint capacity building,
assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Coordination mechanisms for
police, military, civilian government and civil society to provide such joint monitoring and evaluation
have been weak.

268 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Security reforms are frequently carried out in the frenzied days following conflict or political transition,
or in the midst of an on-going security threat. These high-intensity conditions mean that the process for
designing reform initiatives is often highly politicised and frequently focused primarily on addressing
immediate challenges. These initiatives are rarely comprehensive because they are so focused on
immediate political or security gains.

The S-GAP Framework is a tool for assessing the functioning of a security sector and broader security
system. There are myriad factors involved in supporting the proper functioning of a strong system for
ensuring security. There are many different ways of categorising a review of the security sector. The S-
GAP Framework is organised into three main categories - Governance, Accountability and Performance.

Governance Governance of the security sector is the process by which citizens and the state
define security, public safety, and justice needs, and establish and implement
laws and policies to address those needs. This process must include the proper
allocation of resources, promote the rule of law and human rights norms, and
result in professional, effective, legitimate and equitable institutions.

Accountability Accountability of the security sector is the compliance of state security, public
safety and justice actors with robust internal and external conduct review
mechanisms as well as with the laws and policies governing their institutional
missions; the transparency of these actors to the population they serve; and the
ability of non-state actors (media, civil society organisations, and citizens) to
publicise violations and seek redress in cases of alleged wrong doing by security,
public safety and justice actors.

Performance Performance of the security sector is the effective execution of the mandates of
the various security, public safety and justice institutions as defined by the
civilian leadership and accordance with domestic and international laws,
policies, and regulations, in order to meet the various security, public safety, and
justice needs of the population.

2. Multi-stakeholder Research, Dialogue and Reform

A key feature of S-GAP is its emphasis on an inclusive policymaking process. Institutional reforms too
often fail because they lack local support or buy-in or are otherwise unsuited to a given context. This is
particularly true in the case of improvements to security institutions, which are often developed in capital
cities through the participation of a relatively small number of experts. Partners believes that effective
reform initiatives must secure input from all the major stakeholder groups, including those from civil
society, the government, the security sector, and even the international community. In order to be
successful, those whom the reform is meant to serve must be involved.

Most existing security sector assessment tools are directed at international audiences as part of a larger
SSR or security assistance effort. While the S-GAP Toolkit can be useful for these international actors, it is
primarily intended for local and national actors from civil society, government, and the security sector. S-
GAP is designed to help local actors to assess the quality of their own security system and identify
windows of opportunity to improve its functioning.

The purpose of S-GAP is to guide assessment and planning around improvements to the security sector
and the broader security system. In the ideal scenario, S-GAP is used to guide a multi-stakeholder working
group composed of civil society, government, security sector, and, in some cases, international actors
through a comprehensive assessment process. It further provides a platform for planning reforms and for
conducting continuous monitoring and re-assessment.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 269

3. Principles for Security Assessments
Security system assessments should be:

Comprehensive, reviewing the security system as a whole for areas of potential weakness and strength to
build upon. This includes — but is not limited to — all defence, security, public safety, and justice
institutions of the state, as well as relevant non-state actors in justice and security.

Inclusive, integrating the experiences and perspectives of a wide range of stakeholders, including civil
society, government, security services, and others in order to ensure on-going support and promote
sustainability of reforms.

Transparent, so that the public understands any changes that might occur as a result, and are therefore
better able to support those changes.

Recurring, on an on-going basis so that the security system is able to respond effectively to ever–evolving
contexts. “Reform” should be thought of as simply “adaptation,” a natural process that the security
services are continually engaged in.

4. S-GAP Methods
The S-GAP frameworks and worksheets in the next lesson can be used in a variety of ways:

S-GAP can be used as a research tool, providing a particular sector an opportunity to analyse current and
potential security provision.

S-GAP can also be used as an educational tool, to enhance understanding of current and potential security
provision. This education could take place within a particular sector, for example security services, or
within a particular location, for example in a local community context with significant security needs.

S-GAP can be used in a multi-stakeholder process for security reform if a variety of factors are addressed
and coalesced for a “ripe moment,” but it can also be a multi–stakeholder process for dialogue across
sectors about security provision. S-GAP can also be used to support advocacy, whether by members of the
security services or civil society organisations. Ultimate application and use of S-GAP depends upon the
particular context and opportunities available.

To successfully transform a security system into one that is well governed, accountable and highly
performing requires a strong vision, a commitment over time, resources and the support of a range of
actors. No matter how reformers choose to make use of the S-GAP Framework they will be best served by
creating an inclusive and comprehensive process that draws on the capacities and expertise of all
stakeholders. Using the S-GAP Framework will help reformers identify the windows of opportunity for
reform and how it impacts the larger security governance, accountability and performance system.
Reformers can employ the Framework using a range of different strategies.

5. Guiding Questions and Framework Tools

The S-GAP Framework’s three main categories - Governance, Accountability and Performance - are
organised into three sub-categories and then a further three secondary components for a total of 27
elements. These are found in the chart on the next pages.

Each secondary component is accompanied by a set of guiding questions. The chart here only contains
one question, as an example of the type of questions asked.

After familiarising themselves with the guiding questions, participants will likely need to spend a
significant amount of time collecting relevant information in order to answer the questions. This may take
anywhere from several hours to several weeks, depending on the complexity of the issue being analysed
and the familiarity of the participants with that issue. Outside experts with specific expertise may need to
be engaged. Some guidance on where to find this information is included in the Framework itself, though
participants will likely have to gather information from additional sources including surveys, polling,
social media, and media analysis.

Upon gathering the information, participants will engage in facilitated discussion of the elements of the
Framework based on the guiding questions and will attempt to come to an agreement on detailed
answers to the questions. This is likely to be a time-consuming, complicated and contentious process. It is

270 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

to be expected that participants will have divergent opinions about the appropriate response to many of
the guiding questions, particularly as it relates to the quality of the laws, policies, procedures and
structures in place. This is particularly the case for stakeholders coming from different sectors. Many of
these opinions will be strongly held, and there is a danger that some groups could become defensive. It is
up to the facilitator to guide conversation around these questions and avoid allowing the conversation to
become stalled or derailed by vested interests or defensive attitudes. In many cases, the dialogue around
these disagreements will be as useful as the product of the S-GAP process itself.

The complete S-GAP tool contains worksheets useful for scoring group responses to the complete set of
research questions identified in each category. Scoring is not required nor prescribed by the answer to
any one question; instead it is the product of a negotiated agreement between participants in a reform
process that is informed by the guiding questions. Participants will work through the guiding questions
and begin taking note of responses and examples.

6. Developing Goals and Objectives

If reformers use the S-GAP Framework as part of an assessment and planning process a necessary step
would be to develop a plan for how to proactively improve their security system. Participants would
develop objectives or progress markers, as well as timelines for achieving them. The objectives or areas of
reform that participants develop can be informed by and reflect the guiding questions and assessments
for each sub-component. This process is almost certain to unfold as a negotiation between participants
with divergent interests and points of view. It will be up to the facilitator to help guide this discussion so
that concrete objectives are developed and a diversity of interests are represented.

Due to the likely contentious nature of developing objectives for reform, it may be tempting for
participants to focus on “low hanging fruit”—that is, reform initiatives that are relatively politically
palatable and agreeable among the diverse participants. This is again where a skilled facilitator is critical.
In some cases, focusing on “quick wins” in the short term may be required to develop momentum in
highly contentious environments, particularly in the early stages of reform. As the reform process
evolves, however, increasing focus should be placed on making substantive reforms and significant
strides toward the ideals accompanying each secondary component and the definitions provided for each
of the three main components.

REVIEW
This lesson introduced the Security-Governance Accountability and Performance (S-GAP) Toolkit. The S-
GAP provides a guide for research, dialogue, and advocacy on security governance, accountability and
performance. The complete S-GAP Toolkit, designed by Partners Global, can be found on-line at
http://securitygovernance.org.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 271

 GOVERNANCE
Institutional
Mandates
Guiding Principles for What are the policies and laws regarding the roles
Defence and Security, and responsibilities of the security sector?
Public Safety & Justice
Separation of Security Who has decision-making authority (formal or
Management informal) for security sector organisations?
Responsibilities
Guiding Principles for How is a state of emergency or declaration to use
Emergency Response force determined and put into action?
and Extraordinary
Circumstances
Policy
Environment
National Security How are priority security issues identified, and plans
Strategy for addressing them articulated? Is there a defined
national security strategy?
Budget Process How are defence, security, public safety and justice
sector budgets developed?
Civilian Engagement How are civilians engaged and participating in
and Participation security management? How do they collaborate with
the security sector?
Definition
Legal
Environment
Civil, Criminal and To which international human rights treaties is the
International Law country a signatory? Have these treaties been
domesticated in national (and sub-national, as
appropriate) law?
Courts Governing What policies are in place that prescribe how the
Security Sector Conduct military is to perform its operations and what
procedures are to be followed if those policies are
Definition broken (such as a military code of conduct and code
of justice)?
Governance of Non- What role do non-state and non-statutory security
state and Non-statutory and justice actors play in security in the country?
What security or justice needs do non-state actors
Security and Justice most often attempt to address? To what extent do
Actors their activities enhance security in the country?

ACCOUNTABILITY
Supervising and
Monitoring
Processes
State-based External What are the legislative oversight mechanisms (e.g.
Review and Oversight committees on armed services, intelligence, foreign
affairs, defence, etc.) that have authority to
Mechanisms supervise or monitor defence, security, justice, and
public safety organisations and their activities? How
often and in what ways do they exercise their
authority?
Internal Review What internal review and monitoring mechanisms
Mechanisms exist within security sector organisations?
Independent Review What security sector review mechanisms are
and Monitoring conducted outside of security sector organisations,
and outside of state or government-run monitoring
programmes?

272 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

Transparency
Availability of How does the public access information about the
Information security sector?
Right to Freedom of Is there a national (and sub-national, as appropriate)
Information Freedom of Information (or similar) law?
Clarity for Disclosure of How are intelligence priorities made known to the
Sensitive Intelligence public?
Information
Remedy
Courts and Tribunals If misconduct or wrongdoing occurs by or against the
security sector, how is it addressed?
Transitional Justice If there have been widespread human rights
Processes violations, how has the country acknowledged and
addressed the offenses?
Informal Justice How do informal or indigenous justice processes
Processes interact with formal or state processes?

PERFORMANCE
Police
Performance
Adequacy of Human What standards and policies exist for personnel
Resources (Police) composition in the police? How are these standards
and policies developed? How are they enforced?
Financial and Technical How are needs assessments conducted to ensure
Resources and that equipment and other resources available to the
police are sufficient for the police to effectively fulfill
Preparedness (Police) their mandate?
Police Effectiveness In what ways do police activities reduce levels of
violence and crime and promote rule of law?
Defence Sector
Performance
Adequacy of Human What standards and policies exist for personnel
Resources (Defence composition in the military and other defence
institutions?
Sector)

Financial and Technical How are needs assessments conducted to ensure

Resources and that equipment and other resources available to the
military and other defence institutions are sufficient
Operational for them to effectively fulfil their mandate?
Preparedness (Defence
Sector)
Defence Sector In what ways do military activities promote stability
Effectiveness and national security?
Justice Sector
Performance
Adequacy of Human Are there an adequate number of judges to ensure
Resources (Justice efficient processing of cases?
Sector)
Financial and Technical Is there a central ministry or other body for ensuring
Resources (Justice that courts perform adequately regardless of
location (urban or rural), and does this body have
Sector) adequate resources for performing this function?
Justice Sector To what extent are courts able to operate
Effectiveness independent of interference from political,
economic, social, criminal and transnational
pressures?

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 273

Lesson 31 Learning Exercises
Anchor 10 minutes

To begin the lesson, anchor the content in this lesson with an open question for discussion in small
groups of two or three people:

 Do you see security as a “public good” or service that the government provides to the
population?
 What in your experience is a way that the public tells the government if the security sector is
performing that public service appropriately?

Add 15 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 30 minutes

Each scenario stakeholder team is given an opportunity to submit a report on security governance,
accountability and performance. Based on the scenario lessons in other modules, each team can rate
the security sector in some or all of the categories listed in the table at the end of this lesson.

Each stakeholder team has 15 minutes to highlight the three areas of weakest and strongest areas in
each of the subcategories under governance, accountability and performance. Each team turns their
rating into the facilitator.

The facilitator tallies the score and shares the highest and lowest scoring categories with the whole
group.

Debrief this exercise in the large group.

 Is the final scoring accurate? Or do some groups disagree with it?
 Was every team’s voice heard?
 What are the benefits of a process to examine the security governance, accountability and
performance?

Away 5 minutes
To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants
can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

274 HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY

New generations of security sector leaders recognise that civil society is an important
stakeholder for sustainable security. At the same time, a rapidly growing number of civil society
organisations also recognise the need to engage with the security sector as key stakeholders for
sustainable peace. Human security depends on fruitful civil-military-police understanding and
coordination. No one group can achieve human security on their own without working with
others. Civil society, military and police all have roles to play in achieving human security.

This innovative, first-of-its-kind integrated civil-military-police training curriculum aims to

provide practical guidance and a shared understanding of terms and concepts to enable civil-
military-police coordination to support human security. The Handbook on Human Security was
designed for senior and mid-level leaders in national, regional and international organisations,
government, military, police and civil society. Ideally, training and education centres for
military, police, and civil society organisations including NGOs, universities, and religious
organisations will use the curriculum in integrated civil-military-police courses to enable joint
learning and relationship building.

This publication is a result of a consortium initiative led by the Alliance for Peacebuilding in collaboration
with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict and the Kroc Institute for International
Peace Studies. It is a collaborative product drawing on the expertise of people from forty countries and
over one hundred organisations consulted over a span of three years. The Handbook on Human Security
has a companion publication entitled Local Ownership in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding
Approaches that documents nearly 40 examples of civil society-military-police coordination.

The project was made possible with the generous support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The opinions
and views of the authors do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Fund.