Consti1 (Atty.
Gorospe)
Case Digest
G. Legislature
Case 1
City of Davao v. RTC
G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005
Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as
withdrawn
by
the
LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC
HELD:
o
o
tax exemption rules governing GSIS and
exceptions
the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited
by passage of un-repealable laws
FACTS:
GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public
Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for
non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting
to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was,
however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
extension
given
by
Davao
City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and
Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and
another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that
same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.
During pre-trial, the only
234 and 534 of the Local
withdrawn real property
withdrawn from the GSIS
payment
of
issue raised was whether sec.
Government Code, which have
tax from GOCCs, have also
its right to be exempted from
realty
tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE/S:
Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a
general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to
the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and
LGUs.
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of
real property taxes granted to natural or juridical
persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said
section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS
being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its
exemption
has
been
withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal
on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court found a
fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory
second
paragraph.
Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation
on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint
on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or
repeal
laws.
Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place
restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These
conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the
precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the
amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so,
they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
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G. Legislature
employed
legislators
conditions
the LGC
through legislative power to bind subsequent
to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two
under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether
removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.
Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC
states that any tax exemption, incentive or relief
granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this
Code shall be construed strictly against the person
claiming
it.
The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in
1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997,
sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years
1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC
provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the
City of Davao.
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
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G. Legislature
which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx
Case 3
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157870 (and other consolidated
petitions), November 3, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
VELASCO, J.:
I.
THE FACTS
These consolidated petitions challenge the
constitutionality
of
Sec.
36
of
R.A.
9165,
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar
as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates
for public office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary
schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutors
office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.
The challenged section reads:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the
quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test
xxx
xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.
Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x
x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices. Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected
to undergo a random drug test as contained in the
company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes
of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall
be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of
Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of
the Civil Service Law;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's
office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and
one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486.
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
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G. Legislature
II.
THE ISSUES
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a
law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No.
161658
and
declared Sec.
36(g)
of
RA
9165 and COMELEC
Resolution
No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It
alsoPARTIALLY
GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633
by
declaring Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL,
but
declaring
its Sec.
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently
enjoined
all
the
concerned
agencies
from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose
an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet
the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration,
(3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these
stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator
need not possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared
as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be
implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution,
effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate
of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper,
be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person
elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.
Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution,
at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would
be of little value if one cannot assume office for noncompliance with the drug-testing requirement.
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G. Legislature
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof
is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and
tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and
applied the following principles: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer
rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard
the health and well-being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to
discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided
by Vernonia,
supra, and Board
of
Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is
not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of
public and private offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution
is
couched
and
as
has
been
held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of
a government search or intrusion. And whether a search
at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged
by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion
on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion
of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drugtesting policy for employeesand students for that
matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift
and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it
may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of
the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In
this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop
for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office
is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work
policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any,
entered into by management and the bargaining unit,
and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine,
reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy
has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character
of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or
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G. Legislature
intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v.
Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly
drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative.
For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them
under a humiliating experience. While every officer and
employee in a private establishment is under the law
deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug
use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA
9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned
shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in
the companys work rules and regulations x x x for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As
to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the
screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the
results. But the more important consideration lies in the
fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored
by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the need to
know basis; that the drug test result and the records
shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted
practices to protect the confidentiality of the test
results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy,
under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met
by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the
law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the
random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the
Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable
at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the
prosecutors office with a crime with an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1
day
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
Case Digest
G. Legislature
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d)
of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In
the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to
the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their
persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In
the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless
drug
testing proceeds
from
the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case
of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In
the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never
be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness
and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of
being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let
alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug
testing in this case would violate a persons right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
are
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
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G. Legislature
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines
Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional
standards that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only
176,383.
ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
HELD:
Case 4
SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative
district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative
districts of the province. The said law originated from
House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
NO. The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the constitution states that: Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
There is a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a
province is entitled to at least a representative, there is
nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a
city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly entitled.
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
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G. Legislature
It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the
constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only
for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for
a province.
Case 4
Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010]
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Senator Benigno
Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716,
entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the
First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No.
4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on
31 October 2009 creating an additional legislative district
for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4)
legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines
Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to
form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced
by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for
the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis
for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. The
provision
reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic
Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed
first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province?
Held:
We deny the petition.
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
Case Digest
G. Legislature
Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes
a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative
district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate
the phrase each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand from the phrase or each
province point to no other conclusion than that the
250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province which, by
virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a
legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:
Requisites
for
Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000)
square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau;
or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative
addition to the indispensable income requirement.
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G. Legislature
Case 5
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan is
unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of
Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts.
Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162
(later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986,
Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as
requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of
Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the
population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the
year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional
for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A.
9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5
(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the
grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city
must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with
this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification
which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the
Certification based on the following statements
supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President
Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued
only if such are declared official by the Natl Statistics
Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated
whether the document have been declared official by the
NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which
case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.
Consti1 (Atty. Gorospe)
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G. Legislature
of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333
as of August 1, 2010.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the
year, which in this case, the Certification issued by
Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the
growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this
Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to
equalize the population and voting power among
districts.
