294 - Canque v. CA
294 - Canque v. CA
294 - Canque v. CA
CA
April 13, 1999 | Mendoza, J. | Presentation of Evidence Reference
to writing
Digester: Santos, Ihna
SUMMARY: Canque, a contractor doing business under the name
and style RDC Construction, had various contracts with the
government. In connection with these contracts, Canque entered
into 2 contracts with Socor Construction Corp. for delivery of
materials and rendering of services. When Socor sent Canque a
bill for the payment for said materials and services, Canque
refused to pay, hence, Socor brought a suit against Canque. By
analyzing the Book of Collectible Accounts of Socor Construction,
the trial court was convinced that the entries (both payments and
billings) recorded thereat are credible, hence, it ruled in favor of
Socor. CA affirmed the trial courts ruling. Canque is now arguing
that the CA erred in admitting in evidence as entries in the course
of business the entries in Socor Constructions Book of Collectible
Accounts, considering that the person who made said entries
actually testified in this case but unfortunately had no personal
knowledge of said entries. While SC agreed that the entries in the
Book of Collectible Accounts do constitute competent evidence to
show delivery of materials by Socor, as the business entries in
question do not meet the first and third requisites for the
admission in evidence of entries in corporate books, there were
other competent evidence presented by Socor supporting the
entries recorded under the Book of Collectible Accounts. Hence,
SC upheld the CAs ruling that Canque is liable to pay Socor the
amount demanded from her, plus interest.
DOCTRINE: The Book of Collectible Accounts is not really being
presented for another purpose. Socors counsel offered it for the
purpose of showing the amount of petitioners indebtedness. This
is also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a
memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores Aday as a witness.
In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is changed, not
the purpose for which it is offered.
Under Rule 132, Sec. 10, the memorandum used to refresh the
memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not
be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has
just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other
words, where the witness has testified independently of or after
his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events