UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4403
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE LAMAR WIGGINS, a/k/a T-Wig, a/k/a Barnwell,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District
Judge. (1:12-cr-00333-MBS-1)
Submitted:
June 30, 2014
Before WYNN and
Circuit Judge.
THACKER,
Decided:
Circuit
Judges,
and
July 15, 2014
DAVIS,
Senior
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, Darlington, South
Carolina, for Appellant.
Julius Ness Richardson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance
Lamar
Wiggins
was
convicted,
after
jury
trial, of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2012),
one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c) (2012),
and one count of felon in possession of firearms and ammunition,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (2012).
The district court
sentenced Wiggins to life imprisonment on the conspiracy count,
120
months
on
concurrently,
count.
On
the
and
felon
sixty
appeal,
in
possession
months
counsel
count,
consecutive
has
filed
to
on
brief
be
the
served
924(c)
pursuant
to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether
the
district
judgment
of
court
erred
acquittal
on
in
denying
Wigginss
the
924(c)
count.
motion
for
Wiggins
was
advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but
has not filed a brief.
The Government declined to file a brief.
This court reviews de novo the district courts denial
of a Rule 29 motion.
(4th Cir. 2011).
the
verdict,
inferences
United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93
If there is substantial evidence to support
after
therefrom
viewing
in
the
all
of
light
2
the
most
evidence
and
the
favorable
to
the
Government,
the
Penniegraft,
quotation
evidence
court
641
marks
which
F.3d
must
566,
affirm.
572
omitted).
a
reasonable
(4th
United
Cir.
Substantial
finder
of
States
2011)
(internal
evidence
fact
could
v.
is
that
accept
as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendants
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
719
F.3d
305,
311
(4th
Cir.
United States v. Al Sabahi,
2013)
(internal
quotation
omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 464 (2013).
marks
The court does
not review the credibility of the witnesses and assume[s] that
the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor
of the government.
United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245
(4th Cir. 2007).
In order to prove the 924(c) violation charged in
the indictment, the Government was required to establish that:
(1) Wiggins possessed a firearm, and (2) that the possession
. . . furthered, advanced, or helped forward a drug trafficking
crime.
2002).
to
United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir.
[T]here are many factors that might lead a fact finder
conclude
that
connection
existed
between
defendants
possession of a firearm and his drug trafficking activity.
Id.
These include the type of drug activity . . . being conducted,
accessibility of the firearm, the type of weapon, whether the
weapon is stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or
illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug
3
profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is
found.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of
the record leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the jurys verdict and the district court did not err
in denying Wigginss motion for judgment of acquittal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal.
We therefore affirm Wigginss convictions and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Wiggins, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review.
If Wiggins requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation.
Counsels motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Wiggins.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal
before
contentions
this
court
are
adequately
and
argument
presented
would
not
in
aid
the
the
materials
decisional
process.
AFFIRMED