The court affirmed the district court's denial of Linda Wright's motion to set aside an alternative dispute resolution decision regarding her Dalkon Shield claim. Wright had claimed injuries from a device inserted in 1965, but the referee determined she did not prove it was a Dalkon Shield, which was not commercially available until 1969. The district court found the referee did not commit flagrant misconduct and Wright was simply dissatisfied with the decision, which is generally binding with no judicial review under the ADR agreement. The appellate court agreed there was no abuse of discretion.
The court affirmed the district court's denial of Linda Wright's motion to set aside an alternative dispute resolution decision regarding her Dalkon Shield claim. Wright had claimed injuries from a device inserted in 1965, but the referee determined she did not prove it was a Dalkon Shield, which was not commercially available until 1969. The district court found the referee did not commit flagrant misconduct and Wright was simply dissatisfied with the decision, which is generally binding with no judicial review under the ADR agreement. The appellate court agreed there was no abuse of discretion.
The court affirmed the district court's denial of Linda Wright's motion to set aside an alternative dispute resolution decision regarding her Dalkon Shield claim. Wright had claimed injuries from a device inserted in 1965, but the referee determined she did not prove it was a Dalkon Shield, which was not commercially available until 1969. The district court found the referee did not commit flagrant misconduct and Wright was simply dissatisfied with the decision, which is generally binding with no judicial review under the ADR agreement. The appellate court agreed there was no abuse of discretion.
The court affirmed the district court's denial of Linda Wright's motion to set aside an alternative dispute resolution decision regarding her Dalkon Shield claim. Wright had claimed injuries from a device inserted in 1965, but the referee determined she did not prove it was a Dalkon Shield, which was not commercially available until 1969. The district court found the referee did not commit flagrant misconduct and Wright was simply dissatisfied with the decision, which is generally binding with no judicial review under the ADR agreement. The appellate court agreed there was no abuse of discretion.
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT In Re: A. H. ROBINS COMPANY, INCORPORATED, Debtor. LINDA R. WRIGHT, Claimant-Appellant, v. DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST, Trust-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior District Judge; Blackwell N. Shelley, Bankruptcy Judge. (CA-85-1307-R) Submitted: September 15, 1998 Decided: October 16, 1998 Before WIDENER, HAMILTON, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. _________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. _________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL Linda R. Wright, Appellant Pro Se. Orran Lee Brown, Sr., DALKON SHIELD CLAIMANTS TRUST, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. _________________________________________________________________
No. 98-1713
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c). _________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: Linda Wright, a Dalkon Shield Claimant, appeals the district court's order denying her motion to set aside an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) decision. We affirm. Wright claimed that she was inserted with a Dalkon Shield in 1965. It was removed in 1974. She asserted that the device caused pelvic inflammatory disease, perforation, endometritis, uncontrolled bleeding, infertility, emotional injury, and pain and suffering. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust contended that the intrauterine device (IUD) Wright used was not a Dalkon Shield, because the device was not commercially available until November 1969, well after Wright's IUD was inserted. Wright elected to resolve her claim through ADR. The referee concluded that Wright had not met her burden of proving that the device she used was a Dalkon Shield. Therefore, she was not entitled to compensation for injuries caused by the Dalkon Shield. Wright moved to vacate the ADR decision. The district court denied the motion, finding that she was simply dissatisfied with the referee's decision and that the referee had not committed flagrant misconduct in reaching his decision. Therefore, judicial review was not appropriate. This appeal followed. The decision of an ADR referee is "binding and final," and a Dalkon Shield Claimant who proceeds to ADR generally relinquishes the right to judicial review. See In re A.H. Robins, Inc. (Bledsoe v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust), 112 F.3d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1997). The ADR Agreement that Wright signed and the ADR Rules provide no mechanism for judicial review of ADR decisions. Nonetheless, the district court may grant review from an ADR decision"`where the 2
moving party demonstrates flagrant referee misconduct by clear and
convincing evidence.'" Id. We review the district court's refusal to vacate an ADR decision for abuse of discretion. See id. Here, there was no abuse of discretion. The district court correctly found that the referee did not commit flagrant misconduct of the type envisioned by Bledsoe. Rather, the referee made a reasoned determination based on the evidence of record. We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3
W. Earl Duncan, James R. Duncan, Hoyt P. Piver, and Avery A. Piver v. Furrow Auction Company, Advancement, Inc., Glenn Penninger, and Small Business Administration, 564 F.2d 1107, 4th Cir. (1977)
In Re: Us Bancorp Litigation, Also Known as U.S. Bank National Association Litigation James D. Koenig, on Behalf of Himself, and the Class of Similarly Situated Consumers Phillippa Saunders, on Behalf of Herself and Others Similarly Situated Barbara A. Mans Michael J. Mans, Individually, and on Behalf of a Class of All Others Similarly Situated Chris Somers, Individually, and on Behalf of a Class of All Others Similarly Situated Anne Bergman Kathryn Rosebear, on Their Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated Jane Korn Robert Madoff, on Their Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated Brent Johnson Bill Rooney, Individually, and on Behalf of a Class of All Others Similarly Situated Daniel P. Mallove Timothy Gaillard Cynthia Gaillard Mary Scalise, - N. Peter Knoll, Intervenor Anne Knoll, Intervenor William J. Lorence, Intervenor v. U.S. Bank National Association, Nd, Formerly Known as First Bank of South Dakota, N.A. Us Bancorp Insurance Services, Inc. Us