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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JUL 24 2003
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GEORGE L. ARCHULETA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALEX C. McGUINNESS, JR., COLE
FINEGAN, GEORGE BRANTLEY,
CILE CHAVEZ, JAMES FLEMING,
DONA GOSS, IGNACIO MARTINEZ,
MARY ZIMMERER and SANDRA
HOWARD, in their official capacities as
members of the Board of Trustees of the
State Colleges of Colorado; TRUSTEES
OF THE STATE COLLEGES IN
COLORADO; METROPOLITAN
STATE COLLEGE; STEPHEN J.
LEONARD,
No. 02-1116
(D.C. No. 99-WM-1912)
(D. Colorado)
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and ARMIJO,
District Judge.**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
Honorable M. Christina Armijo, District Judge, United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation.
**
This is a case of alleged employment discrimination.
George L. Archuleta, (the plaintiff) is a sixty-two year old Hispanic. In August
1992, he was hired by Metropolitan State College (Metro State) to be a part-time
instructor in the history department, and he continued in that capacity until December
1998. During that time, he never taught less than two courses per semester. In January
1996, Metro State announced a vacancy for a full-time tenure track Assistant
Professorship in the history department. A search committee composed of eleven faculty
members was formed, and the committee reviewed approximately 133 applications for
that position, which included an application from the plaintiff. The plaintiff was initially
determined to meet the minimum qualifications for that position. However, during the
second phase of the review process, none of the search committee members chose
plaintiff as among the top 20 applicants, and he was eliminated from further
consideration. Upon the conclusion of the selection process, a Dr. Xiansheng Tian, an
Asian, was ultimately offered the position, which he accepted. Plaintiff, thereafter,
continued to teach at Metro State as a part-time instructor. On March 7, 1997, plaintiff
filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
alleging that he was being discriminated against regarding the terms and conditions of his
employment at Metro State because of his national origin and age, and further, that he
was being retaliated against for engaging in protected activities. In the fall of 1998,
Metro State decided to limit the plaintiff to teaching only one course in the spring of
1999. Plaintiff refused to accept this offer and decided to end his teaching at Metro State
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upon the completion of the fall semester of 1998, which he did.
On September 30, 1999, the plaintiff filed the present action in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging generally that he had been
discriminated against by the defendants regarding the terms and conditions of his
employment at Metro State because of his national origin and age. Named as defendants
were the Board of Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado and the individual members
thereof in their official capacity (the Trustees), Metro State, and Stephen J. Leonard,
the chairperson of the Department of History at Metro State, who also served as
chairperson of the search committee. The plaintiff set forth the background facts giving
rise to the present controversy in considerable detail, and then asserted three claims for
relief. In each claim, plaintiff simply alleged that because of the defendants actions, he
had been denied his right to equal employment opportunity, without further elaboration.
The first claim was based on 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, the second claim was based on
42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., and the third claim was based on 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq.
The defendants filed an answer and still later, after discovery, moved for
summary judgment, filing a voluminous brief with attachments in support thereof. The
plaintiff thereafter filed an equally voluminous brief in opposition to the defendants
motion for summary judgment. In that brief, the plaintiff conceded that his age
discrimination claim [his third claim] should be dismissed under the recent Supreme
Court ruling in Kimel v. Board of Regents, ___ U.S. ___ (2000). In that same brief,
plaintiff also agreed that his Title VII claim for intentional discrimination and retaliation
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(his second claim) was not brought against Leonard, individually, but was only brought
against his employers. Also, still in that same brief, plaintiff conceded that his 1981
and 1983 claims (his first claim) could be brought against only Leonard in his individual
capacity, and not against the other defendants.
On August 23, 2001, the district court granted the defendants motion for summary
judgment, in part, and denied it, in part. Specifically, the district court ruled as follows:
*****
2. The plaintiffs First Claim for Relief (pursuant to 1981
and 1983) shall be dismissed with prejudice against the
defendants with the exception of defendant Leonard in his
individual capacity. With respect to defendant Leonard, this
claim remains pending pursuant to 1983 on the issue of
whether defendant Leonard (in his individual capacity)
retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his free speech
rights.
3. The plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief (pursuant to Title
VII) shall be dismissed with prejudice against all defendants
except for the plaintiffs claim of illegal retaliation in
violation of Title VII against the defendant employer
(Trustees of the State Colleges of Colorado).
4. The plaintiffs Third Claim for relief (pursuant to 29
U.S.C. 621) shall be dismissed with prejudice in accordance
with the plaintiffs concession.
*****
On September 12, 2001, Leonard filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on
the plaintiffs claim that under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Leonard had retaliated against plaintiff
for exercising his right of free speech. On January 23, 2002, the district court granted that
motion and dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs free speech retaliation claim. In that
same order, the district court stated that the only remaining claim is plaintiffs Title VII
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retaliation claim against the Trustees of the Board of State Colleges of Colorado. On
February 4, 2002, the parties filed a joint stipulation that the only remaining claim, the
Title VII retaliation claim against the Trustees, be dismissed without prejudice, each party
to bear their own costs and attorneys fees. On February 6, 2002, the district court,
pursuant to the stipulation, dismissed without prejudice the only remaining claim. On
March 7, 2002, plaintiff, with new counsel, filed a notice of appeal from the order of
February 6, 2002.
Noting that the district courts order of February 6, 2002, dismissing plaintiffs last
remaining claim, was without prejudice, we, on appeal, issued a show cause order to the
parties, advising them that because the dismissal order of February 6, 2002, was made
without prejudice, such rendered the judgment non-final and precluded an appeal of
the other orders of the district court, citing Heimann v. Snead, 133 F.3d 767, 769 (10th Cir.
1998) and Cook v. Rocky Mountain Bank Note Co., 974 F.2d 147, 148 (10th Cir. 1992).
Accordingly, we directed counsel to obtain a district court order either granting a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) certification or explicitly adjudicating the remaining claim. On May 30,
2002, the plaintiff, through his newly retained counsel, filed in the district court a motion
to dismiss his remaining claim with prejudice. On June 7, 2002, the district court
granted that motion and dismissed the remaining claim with prejudice. Under Lewis v.
B. F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988), it appears that plaintiffs
premature filing on March 7, 2002, of a notice of appeal was ripen[ed] and sav[ed] by
the district courts order of June 7, 2002, and that the appeal now meets the finality
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requirement of 28 U.S.C. 1291.
Plaintiffs third claim in his complaint was based on 29 U.S.C. 621, et seq., age
discrimination. As above stated, plaintiff thereafter conceded that his age discrimination
claim should be dismissed, and the district court did so in its order of August 23, 2001.
Accordingly, age discrimination is not involved in this appeal.
Further, as already stated, in his brief in opposition to defendants motion for
summary judgment, plaintiff agreed that his second claim based on 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et
seq., i.e., discrimination in not hiring him as a full-time assistant professor and in retaliating
against him because he thereafter filed a complaint with the EEOC based on that fact, was
not brought against Leonard, but only against his employer, i.e., the Trustees and Metro
State. By its order of August 23, 2001, the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants on plaintiffs Title VII claim of discrimination and retaliation
against all defendants, except for plaintiffs claim of retaliation against the Trustees of the
State Colleges of Colorado, which was reserved for trial. However, thereafter, in response
to our show cause order, the plaintiff asked the district court to dismiss his Title VII
retaliation claim against the Trustees with prejudice, and the court did so on June 7, 2002.
Hence, it now appears that the plaintiff having elected to have his Title VII retaliation claim
against the Trustees dismissed with prejudice by the district court, that particular claim is
not involved in the present appeal. At the request of the plaintiff, the district court
dismissed that claim with prejudice.
There remains that part of plaintiffs Title VII claim based on discrimination and
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retaliation on the part of Metro State. We agree with the district court that there was no
genuine issue of a material fact on that particular aspect of the case. Based on the record,
we agree with the district court that the plaintiff did not make a sufficient showing that out
of 133 applicants, he was best qualified, as he believed he was. Nor could the plaintiff
show that the defendants discriminated against him because of his race when they selected
someone else for the then vacant, full-time professorship, or that the search committees
belief there were others better qualified than the plaintiff was only a pretext or that Metro
State, as well, had somehow retaliated.
Accordingly, all that now remains for consideration is the plaintiffs first claim,
based on 42 U.S.C. 1983, wherein the plaintiff claimed that Leonard, individually,
violated his right of free speech, which claim was ultimately dismissed by the district
court in its order of January 23, 2002.1
In its order of January 23, 2002, wherein the district court granted Leonards
renewed motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs First Amendment claim, i.e., that
Leonard had retaliated against plaintiff for exercising his right of free speech, the district
court held that, assuming the other requirements were met, the plaintiff still had not shown
that his protected free speech was a substantial or motivating factor on any subsequent
Counsel in this court argues that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs
claim of constructive discharge. We do not believe that issue was presented to the
district court. The phrase constructive discharge does not appear in either the
complaint or pretrial order. However, the words discrimination and retaliation do
appear.
1
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detrimental employment decision. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1976) and Pickering v. Board of Education of Tp. High School
Dist. 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The plaintiff apparently relied
on two free speech violations: (1) a discussion between plaintiff and Leonard regarding
the changing of students grades, and (2) a dispute occurring in August, 1995, between
plaintiff and Leonard concerning the propriety of a speech made by the plaintiff at a City
Council meeting regarding the naming, or renaming, of a lake in City Park. Both incidents
apparently occurred before March 7, 1997, the date when plaintiff filed his complaint with
the EEOC, referred to above. As indicated, the district court concluded that there was an
insufficient showing that either matter was a cause for any reduction in course-load in the
spring of 1997, as claimed by the plaintiff. In this general regard, it would appear that
most, if not all, of the detrimental employment decisions relied on by the plaintiff were
not made by Leonard, acting individually, but rather were made by a faculty committee.
Without belaboring the matter, we agree with the district courts handling of this issue.
Judgment affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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