MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO- versus -ROGELIO I.

RAYALA
CASE DOCTRINE:
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good
behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause
as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.
FACTS:
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic
Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before
Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense charged. Secretary
Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP,
but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP issued AO 119, disagreeing with the recommendation that
respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
considering the circumstances of the case because of the nature of the position of
Reyala as occupying the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. Long digest
by Ernani Tadili. It was ordered that Rayala be dismissed from service for being found
guilty of grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty
of suspension of service for the maximum period of one (1) year.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review with this Court essentially arguing that he is
not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831 - Domingo Petition
1. The President has the power to remove presidential appointees; and
2. AO No. 250 does not cover presidential appointees.
G.R. No. 155840 - Rayala Petition
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
1. He's act does not constitute sexual harassment;
a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor;
b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, reemployment, or
continued employment; or
c. the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee.
2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and
3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual harassment in RA 7877 by
applying DOLE AO 250.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor,
demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for
her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or
ulterior motive. It was merely Domingo's perception of malice in his alleged acts - a
"product of her own imagination" - that led her to file the sexual harassment
complaint. Likewise, Rayala assails the OP's (office of the president) interpretation, as
upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence
of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense
against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Rayala next argues that AO
250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877.
In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. - Sexual harassment may be committed in any
of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on
dates, outings or the like for the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual
gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim.
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or
requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law. He
alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877
is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the
power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms of sexual
harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual harassment.
G.R. No. 158700 - Republic
The Republic raises this issue: Whether or not the President of the Philippines may
validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of
sexual harassment.
The Republic argues that Rayala's acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His
acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of
a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim. It also
contends that there is no legal basis for the CA's reduction of the penalty imposed by
the OP. Rayala's dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power
to remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the
requirements under the law and the due process clause. The Republic further claims
that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not prevent the
OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though
Rayala is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the
Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala,
constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service. The Republic
adds that Rayala's position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust;
thus, he should be dismissed from the service.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215 of the Labor
Code, which states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age
of 65 only during good behavior. Since Rayala's security of tenure is conditioned upon
his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to
live up to this standard.
RAYALA'S ARGUMENT
1. Rayala argues that AO 250 does not apply to him.
First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time of the
incident, was under the DOLE only for purposes of program and policy
coordination. Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the
NLRC, he is not within its coverage because he is a presidential appointee.
2. Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent
Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a
period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is
charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be
appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala
2. Whether or not Rayala should be dismissed from office
HELD:
1. As to the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala is of no real consequence.
The events of this case unmistakably show that the administrative charges against
Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction over
the administrative case; that the participation of the DOLE, through the Committee
created by the Secretary, was limited to initiating the investigation process, reception
of evidence of the parties, preparation of the investigation report, and recommending
the appropriate action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to
Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to
aid the Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
2. Rayala committed sexual harassment. In this case, it is the President of the
Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is
a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is
qualified by the phrase for cause as provided by law. Thus, when the President found
that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive
did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided
by law for such offense. The imposable penalty for the first offense of either the
administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error
for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the
service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high
government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, taking undue
advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance and
where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum

penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala
is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA
Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of
him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo, this Court, in upholding the liability of therein
respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one
of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being
the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to
carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis
over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them,
taking advantage of his superior position.