494 U.S.

56
110 S.Ct. 945
108 L.Ed.2d 47

Bob REVES, et al., Petitioners

v.
ERNST & YOUNG.
No. 88-1480.
Argued Nov. 27, 1989.
Decided Feb. 21, 1990.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1990.

See 494 U.S. 1092, 110 S.Ct. 1840.

Syllabus
In order to raise money to support its general business operations, the
Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma (Co-Op) sold
uncollateralized and uninsured promissory notes payable on demand by
the holder. Offered to both Co-Op members and nonmembers and
marketed as an "Investment Program," the notes paid a variable interest
rate higher than that of local financial institutions. After the Co-Op filed
for bankruptcy, petitioners, holders of the notes, filed suit in the District
Court against the Co-Op's auditor, respondent's predecessor, alleging,
inter alia, that it had violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934which regulates certain specified instruments,
including "any note[s]"and Arkansas' securities laws by intentionally
failing to follow generally accepted accounting principles that would have
made the Co-Op's insolvency apparent to potential note purchasers.
Petitioners prevailed at trial, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Applying
the test created in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90
L.Ed. 1244, to determine whether an instrument is an "investment
contract" to the determination whether the Co-Op's instruments were
"notes," the court held that the notes were not securities under the 1934
Act or Arkansas law, and that the statutes' antifraud provisions therefore
did not apply.
Held: The demand notes issued by the Co-Op fall under the "note"

category of instruments that are "securities." Pp. 60-76.

(a) Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate
investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they
are called. However, notes are used in a variety of settings, not all of
which involve investments. Thus, they are not securities per se, but must
be defined using the "family resemblance" test. Under that test, a note is
presumed to be a security unless it bears a strong resemblance, determined
by examining four specified factors, to one of a judicially crafted list of
categories of instrument that are not securities. If the instrument is not
sufficiently similar to a listed item, a court must decide whether another
category should be added by examining the same factors. The application
of the Howey test to notes is rejected, since to hold that a "note" is not a
"security" unless it meets a test designed for an entirely different variety
of instrument would make the 1933 Securities Act's and 1934 Act's
enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous and would be
inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting the laws. Pp. 60-67.
(b) Applying the family resemblance approach, the notes at issue are
"securities." They do not resemble any of the enumerated categories of
nonsecurities. Nor does an examination of the four relevant factors
suggest that they should be treated as nonsecurities: (1) the Co-Op sold
them to raise capital, and purchasers bought them to earn a profit in the
form of interest, so that they are most naturally conceived as investments
in a business enterprise; (2) there was "common trading" of the notes,
which were offered and sold to a broad segment of the public; (3) the
public reasonably perceived from advertisements for the notes that they
were investments, and there were no countervailing factors that would
have led a reasonable person to question this characterization; and (4)
there was no risk-reducing factor that would make the application of the
Securities Acts unnecessary, since the notes were uncollateralized and
uninsured and would escape federal regulation entirely if the Acts were
held not to apply. The lower court's argument that the demand nature of
the notes is very uncharacteristic of a security is unpersuasive, since an
instrument's liquidity does not eliminate the risk associated with securities.
Pp. 67-70.
(c) Respondent's contention that the notes fall within the statutory
exception for "any note . . . which has a maturity at the time of issuance of
not exceeding nine months" is rejected, since it rests entirely on the
premise that Arkansas' statute of limitations for suits to collect demand
noteswhich are due immediatelyis determinative of the notes'
"maturity," as that term is used in the federal Securities Acts. The

"maturity" of notes is a question of federal law, and Congress could not

have intended that the Acts be applied differently to the same transactions
depending on the accident of which State's law happens to apply. Pp. 7072.
(d) Since, as a matter of federal law, the words of the statutory exception
are far from plain with regard to demand notes, the exclusion must be
interpreted in accordance with the exception's purpose. Even assuming
that Congress intended to create a bright-line rule exempting from
coverage all notes of less than nine months' duration on the ground that
short-term notes are sufficiently safe that the Securities Acts need not
apply, that exemption would not cover the notes at issue here, which do
not necessarily have short terms, since demand could just as easily be
made years or decades into the future. Pp. 72-73.
856 F.2d 52 (CA8 1988), reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with
respect to Part II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III,
and IV, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and
KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p.
73. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, in which WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p.
76.
John R. McCambridge, Chicago, Ill., for petitioners.
Michael R. Lazerwitz, Washington, D.C. for Security Exchange Com'n, as
amicus curiae, in support of the petitioners, by special leave of Court.
John Matson for respondent.
Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether certain demand notes issued by the
Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma (Co-Op) are "securities"
within the meaning of 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. We
conclude that they are.

* The Co-Op is an agricultural cooperative that, at the time relevant here, had
approximately 23,000 members. In order to raise money to support its general
business operations, the Co-Op sold promissory notes payable on demand by

the holder. Although the notes were uncollateralized and uninsured, they paid a
variable rate of interest that was adjusted monthly to keep it higher than the rate
paid by local financial institutions. The Co-Op offered the notes to both
members and nonmembers, marketing the scheme as an "Investment Program."
Advertisements for the notes, which appeared in each Co-Op newsletter, read
in part: "YOUR CO-OP has more than $11,000,000 in assets to stand behind
your investments. The Investment is not Federal [sic ] insured but it is . . . Safe .
. . Secure . . . and available when you need it." App. 5 (ellipses in original).
Despite these assurances, the Co-Op filed for bankruptcy in 1984. At the time
of the filing, over 1,600 people held notes worth a total of $10 million.
3

After the Co-Op filed for bankruptcy, petitioners, a class of holders of the
notes, filed suit against Arthur Young & Co., the firm that had audited the CoOp's financial statements (and the predecessor to respondent Ernst & Young).
Petitioners alleged, inter alia, that Arthur Young had intentionally failed to
follow generally accepted accounting principles in its audit, specifically with
respect to the valuation of one of the Co-Op's major assets, a gasohol plant.
Petitioners claimed that Arthur Young violated these principles in an effort to
inflate the assets and net worth of the Co-Op. Petitioners maintained that, had
Arthur Young properly treated the plant in its audits, they would not have
purchased demand notes because the Co-Op's insolvency would have been
apparent. On the basis of these allegations, petitioners claimed that Arthur
Young had violated the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act as well as
Arkansas' securities laws.

Petitioners prevailed at trial on both their federal and state claims, receiving a
$6.1 million judgment. Arthur Young appealed, claiming that the demand notes
were not "securities" under either the 1934 Act or Arkansas law, and that the
statutes' antifraud provisions therefore did not apply. A panel of the Eighth
Circuit, agreeing with Arthur Young on both the state and federal issues,
reversed. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856 F.2d 52 (1988). We granted
certiorari to address the federal issue, 490 U.S. 1105, 109 S.Ct. 3154, 104
L.Ed.2d 1018 (1989), and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II
A.
5

This case requires us to decide whether the note issued by the Co-Op is a
"security" within the meaning of the 1934 Act. Section 3(a)(10) of that Act is
our starting point:

"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national
securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument
commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe
to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time
of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited." 48 Stat. 884, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10).

The fundamental purpose undergirding the Securities Acts is "to eliminate

serious abuses in a largely unregulated securities market." United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2059, 44
L.Ed.2d 621 (1975). In defining the scope of the market that it wished to
regulate, Congress painted with a broad brush. It recognized the virtually
limitless scope of human ingenuity, especially in the creation of "countless and
variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on
the promise of profits," SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299, 66 S.Ct.
1100, 1103, 90 L.Ed. 1244 (1946), and determined that the best way to achieve
its goal of protecting investors was "to define 'the term "security" in sufficiently
broad and general terms so as to include within that definition the many types
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of
a security.' " Forman, supra, 421 U.S., at 847-848, 95 S.Ct., at 2058-2059
(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933)). Congress therefore
did not attempt precisely to cabin the scope of the Securities Acts.1 Rather, it
enacted a definition of "security" sufficiently broad to encompass virtually any
instrument that might be sold as an investment.

Congress did not, however, "intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all
fraud." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556, 102 S.Ct. 1220, 1223, 71
L.Ed.2d 409 (1982). Accordingly, "[t]he task has fallen to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), the body charged with administering the
Securities Acts, and ultimately to the federal courts to decide which of the
myriad financial transactions in our society come within the coverage of these
statutes." Forman, supra, 421 U.S., at 848, 95 S.Ct., at 2059. In discharging our

duty, we are not bound by legal formalisms, but instead take account of the
economics of the transaction under investigation. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336, 88 S.Ct. 548, 553, 19 L.Ed.2d 564 (1967) (in
interpreting the term "security," "form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on economic reality"). Congress' purpose in enacting
the securities laws was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made
and by whatever name they are called.
9

A commitment to an examination of the economic realities of a transaction does

not necessarily entail a case-by-case analysis of every instrument, however.
Some instruments are obviously within the class Congress intended to regulate
because they are by their nature investments. In Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 105 S.Ct. 2297, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985), we held that
an instrument bearing the name "stock" that, among other things, is negotiable,
offers the possibility of capital appreciation, and carries the right to dividends
contingent on the profits of a business enterprise is plainly within the class of
instruments Congress intended the securities laws to cover. Landreth Timber
does not signify a lack of concern with economic reality; rather, it signals a
recognition that stock is, as a practical matter, always an investment if it has the
economic characteristics traditionally associated with stock. Even if sparse
exceptions to this generalization can be found, the public perception of common
stock as the paradigm of a security suggests that stock, in whatever context it is
sold, should be treated as within the ambit of the Acts. Id., at 687, 693, 105
S.Ct., at 2302, 2305.

10

We made clear in Landreth Timber that stock was a special case, explicitly
limiting our holding to that sort of instrument. Id., at 694, 105 S.Ct., at 2304.
Although we refused finally to rule out a similar per se rule for notes, we
intimated that such a rule would be unjustified. Unlike "stock," we said, " 'note'
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses instruments
with widely varying characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer
context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment context." Ibid.
(citing Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System, 468 U.S. 137, 149-153, 104 S.Ct. 2979, 2985-88, 82 L.Ed.2d 107
(1984)). While common stock is the quintessence of a security, Landreth
Timber, supra, 471 U.S., at 693, 105 S.Ct., at 2305, and investors therefore
justifiably assume that a sale of stock is covered by the Securities Acts, the
same simply cannot be said of notes, which are used in a variety of settings, not
all of which involve investments. Thus, the phrase "any note" should not be
interpreted to mean literally "any note," but must be understood against the
backdrop of what Congress was attempting to accomplish in enacting the
Securities Acts.2

11

Because the Landreth Timber formula cannot sensibly be applied to notes,

some other principle must be developed to define the term "note." A majority
of the Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue have adopted, in
varying forms, "investment versus commercial" approaches that distinguish, on
the basis of all of the circumstances surrounding the transactions, notes issued
in an investment context (which are "securities") from notes issued in a
commercial or consumer context (which are not). See, e.g., Futura
Development Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40-41 (CA1 1985); McClure
v. First Nat. Bank of Lubbock, Texas, 497 F.2d 490, 492-494 (CA5 1974);
Hunssinger v. Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484, 488 (CA7 1984);
Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772, 778-779 (CA10
1989), cert. pending No. 89-532.

12

The Second Circuit's "family resemblance" approach begins with a presumption

that any note with a term of more than nine months is a "security." See, e.g.,
Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137
(CA2 1976). Recognizing that not all notes are securities, however, the Second
Circuit has also devised a list of notes that it has decided are obviously not
securities. Accordingly, the "family resemblance" test permits an issuer to rebut
the presumption that a note is a security if it can show that the note in question
"bear[s] a strong family resemblance" to an item on the judicially crafted list of
exceptions, id., at 1137-1138, or convinces the court to add a new instrument to
the list, see, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939
(CA2 1984).

13

In contrast, the Eighth and District of Columbia Circuits apply the test we
created in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 1100, 90 L.Ed. 1244
(1946), to determine whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to the
determination whether an instrument is a "note." Under this test, a note is a
security only if it evidences "(1) an investment; (2) in a common enterprise; (3)
with a reasonable expectation of profits; (4) to be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." 856 F.2d, at 54 (case below).
Accord, Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 215 U.S.App.D.C. 384, 391-393, 669
F.2d 770, 777-779 (1981). See also Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1431
(CA9 1985) (setting forth what it terms a "risk capital" approach that is
virtually identical to the Howey test).

14

We reject the approaches of those courts that have applied the Howey test to
notes; Howey provides a mechanism for determining whether an instrument is
an "investment contract." The demand notes here may well not be "investment
contracts," but that does not mean they are not "notes." To hold that a "note" is
not a "security" unless it meets a test designed for an entirely different variety

of instrument "would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments

superfluous," Landreth Timber, 471 U.S., at 692, 105 S.Ct., at 2305, and would
be inconsistent with Congress' intent to regulate the entire body of instruments
sold as investments, see supra, at 60-62.
15

The other two contendersthe "family resemblance" and "investment versus

commercial" testsare really two ways of formulating the same general
approach. Because we think the "family resemblance" test provides a more
promising framework for analysis, however, we adopt it. The test begins with
the language of the statute; because the Securities Acts define "security" to
include "any note," we begin with a presumption that every note is a security.3
We nonetheless recognize that this presumption cannot be irrebuttable. As we
have said, supra, at 61, Congress was concerned with regulating the investment
market, not with creating a general federal cause of action for fraud. In an
attempt to give more content to that dividing line, the Second Circuit has
identified a list of instruments commonly denominated "notes" that nonetheless
fall without the "security" category. See Exchange Nat. Bank, supra, at 1138
(types of notes that are not "securities" include "the note delivered in consumer
financing, the note secured by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note
secured by a lien on a small business or some of its assets, the note evidencing
a 'character' loan to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment
of accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt
incurred in the ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the
customer of a broker, it is collateralized)"); Chemical Bank, supra, at 939
(adding to list "notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current
operations").

16

We agree that the items identified by the Second Circuit are not properly
viewed as "securities." More guidance, though, is needed. It is impossible to
make any meaningful inquiry into whether an instrument bears a "resemblance"
to one of the instruments identified by the Second Circuit without specifying
what it is about those instruments that makes them non-"securities." Moreover,
as the Second Circuit itself has noted, its list is "not graven in stone," 726 F.2d,
at 939, and is therefore capable of expansion. Thus, some standards must be
developed for determining when an item should be added to the list.

17

An examination of the list itself makes clear what those standards should be. In
creating its list, the Second Circuit was applying the same factors that this
Court has held apply in deciding whether a transaction involves a "security."
First, we examine the transaction to assess the motivations that would prompt a
reasonable seller and buyer to enter into it. If the seller's purpose is to raise
money for the general use of a business enterprise or to finance substantial

investments and the buyer is interested primarily in the profit the note is
expected to generate, the instrument is likely to be a "security." If the note is
exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor asset or consumer
good, to correct for the seller's cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other
commercial or consumer purpose, on the other hand, the note is less sensibly
described as a "security." See, e.g., Forman, 421 U.S., at 851, 95 S.Ct., at 2060
(share of "stock" carrying a right to subsidized housing not a security because
"the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized low-cost living
space; it was not to invest for profit"). Second, we examine the "plan of
distribution" of the instrument, SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.
344, 353, 64 S.Ct. 120, 124, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943), to determine whether it is an
instrument in which there is "common trading for speculation or investment,"
id., at 351, 64 S.Ct., at 123. Third, we examine the reasonable expectations of
the investing public: The Court will consider instruments to be "securities" on
the basis of such public expectations, even where an economic analysis of the
circumstances of the particular transaction might suggest that the instruments
are not "securities" as used in that transaction. Compare Landreth Timber, 471
U.S., at 687, 693, 105 S.Ct., at 2302, 2305 (relying on public expectations in
holding that common stock is always a security), with id., at 697-700, 105
S.Ct., at 2307-2308 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (arguing that sale of business to
single informed purchaser through stock is not within the purview of the Acts
under the economic reality test). See also Forman, supra, at 851, 95 S.Ct., at
2060. Finally, we examine whether some factor such as the existence of another
regulatory scheme significantly reduces the risk of the instrument, thereby
rendering application of the Securities Acts unnecessary. See, e.g., Marine
Bank, 455 U.S., at 557-559, and n. 7, 102 S.Ct., at 1224-1225, and n. 7.
18

We conclude, then, that in determining whether an instrument denominated a

"note" is a "security," courts are to apply the version of the "family
resemblance" test that we have articulated here: A note is presumed to be a
"security," and that presumption may be rebutted only by a showing that the
note bears a strong resemblance (in terms of the four factors we have
identified) to one of the enumerated categories of instrument. If an instrument
is not sufficiently similar to an item on the list, the decision whether another
category should be added is to be made by examining the same factors.

B
19

Applying the family resemblance approach to this case, we have little difficulty
in concluding that the notes at issue here are "securities." Ernst & Young
admits that "a demand note does not closely resemble any of the Second
Circuit's family resemblance examples." Brief for Respondent 43. Nor does an

examination of the four factors we have identified as being relevant to our

inquiry suggest that the demand notes here are not "securities" despite their
lack of similarity to any of the enumerated categories. The Co-Op sold the
notes in an effort to raise capital for its general business operations, and
purchasers bought them in order to earn a profit in the form of interest.4 Indeed,
one of the primary inducements offered purchasers was an interest rate
constantly revised to keep it slightly above the rate paid by local banks and
savings and loans. From both sides, then, the transaction is most naturally
conceived as an investment in a business enterprise rather than as a purely
commercial or consumer transaction.
20

As to the plan of distribution, the Co-Op offered the notes over an extended
period to its 23,000 members, as well as to nonmembers, and more than 1,600
people held notes when the Co-Op filed for bankruptcy. To be sure, the notes
were not traded on an exchange. They were, however, offered and sold to a
broad segment of the public, and that is all we have held to be necessary to
establish the requisite "common trading" in an instrument. See, e.g., Landreth
Timber, supra (stock of closely held corporation not traded on any exchange
held to be a "security"); Tcherepnin, 389 U.S., at 337, 88 S.Ct., at 553
(nonnegotiable but transferable "withdrawable capital shares" in savings and
loan association held to be a "security"); Howey, 328 U.S., at 295, 66 S.Ct., at
1101 (units of citrus grove and maintenance contract "securities" although not
traded on exchange).

21

The third factorthe public's reasonable perceptionsalso supports a finding

that the notes in this case are "securities." We have consistently identified the
fundamental essence of a "security" to be its character as an "investment." See
supra, at 61, 65. The advertisements for the notes here characterized them as
"investments," see supra, at 59, and there were no countervailing factors that
would have led a reasonable person to question this characterization. In these
circumstances, it would be reasonable for a prospective purchaser to take the
Co-Op at its word.

22

Finally, we find no risk-reducing factor to suggest that these instruments are not
in fact securities. The notes are uncollateralized and uninsured. Moreover,
unlike the certificates of deposit in Marine Bank, supra, at 557-558, which were
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and subject to substantial
regulation under the federal banking laws, and unlike the pension plan in
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-570, 99 S.Ct. 790, 801-802, 58 L.Ed.2d
808 (1979), which was comprehensively regulated under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 829, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.
(1982 ed.), the notes here would escape federal regulation entirely if the Acts

were held not to apply.

23

The court below found that "[t]he demand nature of the notes is very
uncharacteristic of a security," 856 F.2d, at 54, on the theory that the virtually
instant liquidity associated with demand notes is inconsistent with the risk
ordinarily associated with "securities." This argument is unpersuasive. Common
stock traded on a national exchange is the paradigm of a security, and it is as
readily convertible into cash as is a demand note. The same is true of publicly
traded corporate bonds, debentures, and any number of other instruments that
are plainly within the purview of the Acts. The demand feature of a note does
permit a holder to eliminate risk quickly by making a demand, but just as with
publicly traded stock, the liquidity of the instrument does not eliminate risk
altogether. Indeed, publicly traded stock is even more readily liquid than are
demand notes, in that a demand only eliminates risk when, and if, payment is
made, whereas the sale of a share of stock through a national exchange and the
receipt of the proceeds usually occur simultaneously.

24

We therefore hold that the notes at issue here are within the term "note" in
3(a)(10).

III
25

Relying on the exception in the statute for "any note . . . which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months," 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10),
respondent contends that the notes here are not "securities," even if they would
otherwise qualify. Respondent cites Arkansas cases standing for the proposition
that, in the context of the state statute of limitations, "[a] note payable on
demand is due immediately." See, e.g., McMahon v. O'Keefe, 213 Ark. 105,
106, 209 S.W.2d 449, 450 (1948) (statute of limitations is triggered by the date
of issuance rather than by date of first demand). Respondent concludes from
this rule that the "maturity" of a demand note within the meaning of 3(a)(10)
is immediate, which is, of course, less than nine months. Respondent therefore
contends that the notes fall within the plain words of the exclusion and are thus
not "securities."

26

Petitioners counter that the "plain words" of the exclusion should not govern.
Petitioners cite the legislative history of a similar provision of the 1933 Act, 48
Stat. 76, 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(3), for the proposition that the purpose of the
exclusion is to except from the coverage of the Acts only commercial paper
short-term, high quality instruments issued to fund current operations and sold
only to highly sophisticated investors. See S.Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.,
3-4 (1933); H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1933). Petitioners also

emphasize that this Court has repeatedly held (see supra, at 60-63) that the
plain words of the definition of a "security" are not dispositive, and that we
consider the economic reality of the transaction to determine whether Congress
intended the Securities Acts to apply. Petitioners therefore argue, with some
force, that reading the exception for short-term notes to exclude from the Acts'
coverage investment notes of less than nine months' duration would be
inconsistent with Congress' evident desire to permit the SEC and the courts
flexibility to ensure that the Acts are not manipulated to investors' detriment. If
petitioners are correct that the exclusion is intended to cover only commercial
paper, these notes, which were sold in a large scale offering to unsophisticated
members of the public, plainly should not fall within the exclusion.
27

We need not decide, however, whether petitioners' interpretation of the

exception is correct, for we conclude that even if we give literal effect to the
exception, the notes do not fall within its terms.

28

Respondent's contention that the demand notes fall within the "plain words" of
the statute rests entirely upon the premise that Arkansas' statute of limitations
for suits to collect demand notes is determinative of the "maturity" of the notes,
as that term is used in the federal Securities Acts. The "maturity" of the notes,
however, is a question of federal law. To regard States' statutes of limitations
law as controlling the scope of the Securities Acts would be to hold that a
particular instrument is a "security" under the 1934 Act in some States, but that
the same instrument is not a "security" in others. Compare McMahon, supra, at
106, 209 S.W.2d 449 (statute runs from date of note), with 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.
5525(7) (1988) (statute runs "from the later of either demand or any payment of
principal of or interest on the instrument"). We are unpersuaded that Congress
intended the Securities Acts to apply differently to the same transactions
depending on the accident of which State's law happens to apply.

29

THE CHIEF JUSTICE's argument in partial dissent is but a more artful

statement of respondent's contention, and it suffers from the same defect. THE
CHIEF JUSTICE begins by defining "maturity" to mean the time when a note
becomes due. Post, at 77 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1170 (3d ed. 1933)).
Because a demand note is "immediately 'due' such that an action could be
brought at any time without any other demand than the suit," post, at 77, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE concludes that a demand note is due immediately for
purposes of the federal securities laws. Even if THE CHIEF JUSTICE is correct
that the "maturity" of a note corresponds to the time at which it "becomes due,"
the authority he cites for the proposition that, as a matter of federal law, a
demand note "becomes due" immediately (as opposed to when demand is made
or expected to be made) is no more dispositive than is Arkansas case law. THE

CHIEF JUSTICE's primary source of authority is a treatise regarding the state

law of negotiable instruments, particularly the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Law. See M. Bigelow, Law of Bills, Notes, and Checks v-vii (3d ed. W. Lile
rev. 1928). The quotation upon which THE CHIEF JUSTICE relies is
concerned with articulating the general state-law rule regarding when suit may
be filed. The only other authority THE CHIEF JUSTICE cites makes plain that
state-law rules governing when a demand note becomes due are significant
only in that they control the date on which statutes of limitation begins to run
and whether demand must precede suit. See 8 C.J. Bills and Notes 602, p. 406
(1916). Indeed, the treatise suggests that States were no more unanimous on
those questions in 1933 than they are now. Ibid. In short, the dissent adds
nothing to respondent's argument other than additional authority for what
"maturity" means in certain state-law contexts. The dissent provides no
argument for its implicit, but essential, premise that state rules concerning the
proper method of collecting a debt control the resolution of the federal question
before us.
30

IV

Neither the law of Arkansas nor that of any other State provides an answer to
the federal question, and as a matter of federal law, the words of the statute are
far from "plain" with regard to whether demand notes fall within the exclusion.
If it is plausible to regard a demand note as having an immediate maturity
because demand could be made immediately, it is also plausible to regard the
maturity of a demand note as being in excess of nine months because demand
could be made many years or decades into the future. Given this ambiguity, the
exclusion must be interpreted in accordance with its purpose. As we have said,
we will assume for argument's sake that petitioners are incorrect in their view
that the exclusion is intended to exempt only commercial paper. Respondent
presents no competing view to explain why Congress would have enacted
respondent's version of the exclusion, however, and the only theory that we can
imagine that would support respondent's interpretation is that Congress
intended to create a bright-line rule exempting from the 1934 Act's coverage all
notes of less than nine months' duration, because short-term notes are, as a
general rule, sufficiently safe that the Securities Acts need not apply. As we
have said, however, demand notes do not necessarily have short terms. In light
of Congress' broader purpose in the Acts of ensuring that investments of all
descriptions be regulated to prevent fraud and abuse, we interpret the exception
not to cover the demand notes at issue here. Although the result might be
different if the design of the transaction suggested that both parties
contemplated that demand would be made within the statutory period, that is
not the case before us.

31

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the demand notes at issue here fall
under the "note" category of instruments that are "securities" under the 1933
and 1934 Acts. We also conclude that, even under respondent's preferred
approach to 3(a)(10)'s exclusion for short-term notes, these demand notes do
not fall within the exclusion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

32

So ordered.

33

Justice STEVENS, concurring.

34

While I join the Court's opinion, an important additional consideration supports

my conclusion that these notes are securities notwithstanding the statute's
exclusion for currency and commercial paper that has a maturity of no more
than nine months. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10) ( 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). The Courts of Appeals have been unanimous in
rejecting a literal reading of that exclusion. They have instead concluded that
"when Congress spoke of notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months, it
meant commercial paper, not investment securities." Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009, 93 S.Ct. 443, 34
L.Ed.2d 302 (1972). This view was first set out in an opinion by Judge
Sprecher, and soon thereafter endorsed by Chief Judge Friendly. Zeller v.
Bogue Electric Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (CA2), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908, 94 S.Ct. 217, 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973). Others have adopted the same
position since. See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat. Bank of Lubbock, Texas, 497
F.2d 490, 494-495 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930, 95 S.Ct. 1132, 43
L.Ed.2d 402 (1975); Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 879 F.2d 772,
778 (CA10 1989); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 215 U.S. App.D.C. 384,
389-391, 669 F.2d 770, 775-777 (1981).

35

In my view such a settled construction of an important federal statute should not

be disturbed unless and until Congress so decides. "[A]fter a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other
federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if
the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 2359, 96 L.Ed.2d
185 (1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 51, 110 S.Ct. 381, 387,
107 L.Ed.2d 278 (1989) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). What I have
said before of taxation applies equally to securities regulation: "there is a strong

interest in enabling" those affected "to predict the legal consequences of their
proposed actions, and there is an even stronger general interest in ensuring that
the responsibility for making changes in settled law rests squarely on the
shoulders of Congress." Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 101, 107 S.Ct.
2729, 2736, 97 L.Ed.2d 74 (1987) (dissenting opinion). Past errors may in rare
cases be "sufficiently blatant" to overcome the " 'strong presumption of
continued validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute,' " but
this is not such a case. Id., at 103, 107 S.Ct., at 2737 (quoting Square D Co. v.
Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424, 106 S.Ct. 1922, 1930,
90 L.Ed.2d 413 (1986)).
36

Indeed, the agreement among the Courts of Appeals is made all the more
impressive in this case because it is buttressed by the views of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. See Securities Act Release No. 33-4412, 26
Fed.Reg. 9158 (1961) (construing 3(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933, the
1933 Act's counterpart to 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act). We have ourselves
referred to the exclusion for notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months as
an exclusion for "commercial paper." Securities Industry Assn. v. Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 137, 150-152, 104 S.Ct. 2979,
2986-87, 82 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984). Perhaps because the restriction of the
exclusion to commercial paper is so well established, respondents admit that
they did not even argue before the Court of Appeals that their notes were
covered by the exclusion. A departure from this reliable consensus would upset
the justified expectations of both the legal and investment communities.

37

Moreover, I am satisfied that the interpretation of the statute expounded by

Judge Sprecher and Judge Friendly was entirely correct. As Judge Friendly has
observed, the exclusion for short-term notes must be read in light of the
prefatory language in 2 of the 1933 Act and 3 of the 1934 Act. See
Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 11311132, and nn. 7-10 (CA2 1976). Pursuant to that language, definitions specified
by the Acts may not apply if the "context otherwise requires." Marine Bank v.
Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556, 102 S.Ct. 1220, 1223, 71 L.Ed.2d 409 (1982) (the
"broad statutory definition is preceded, however, by the statement that the
terms mentioned are not to be considered securities if 'the context otherwise
requires . . .' "); accord, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697698, 105 S.Ct. 2297, 2312-13, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985) (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting). The context clause thus permits a judicial construction of the
statute which harmonizes the facially rigid terms of the 9-month exclusion with
the evident intent of Congress. Exchange Nat. Bank, 544 F.2d, at 1132-1133.
The legislative history of 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act indicates that the exclusion
was intended to cover only commercial paper, and the SEC has so construed it.

Sanders, 463 F.2d, at 1079, and nn. 12-13; Zeller, 476 F.2d, at 799-800, and n.
6. As the Courts of Appeals have agreed, there is no apparent reason to
construe 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act differently. Sanders, 463 F.2d, at 10791080, and n. 15; Zeller, 476 F.2d, at 800. See also Comment, The Commercial
Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U.Chi.L.Rev. 362, 398 (1972).
38

For these reasons and those stated in the opinion of the Court, I conclude that
the notes issued by respondents are securities within the meaning of the 1934
Act.

39

Chief Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Justice WHITE, Justice O'CONNOR,

and Justice SCALIA join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

40

I join Part II of the Court's opinion, but dissent from Part III and the statements
of the Court's judgment in Parts I and IV. In Part III, the Court holds that these
notes were not covered by the statutory exemption for "any note . . . which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." Treating
demand notes as if they were a recent development in the law of negotiable
instruments, the Court says "if it is plausible to regard a demand note as having
an immediate maturity because demand could be made immediately, it is also
plausible to regard the maturity of a demand note as being in excess of nine
months because demand could be made many years or decades into the future.
Given this ambiguity, the exclusion must be interpreted in accordance with its
purpose." Ante, at 72-73.

41

But the terms "note" and "maturity" did not spring full blown from the head of
Congress in 1934. Neither are demand notes of recent vintage. "Note" and
"maturity" have been terms of art in the legal profession for centuries, and a
body of law concerning the characteristics of demand notes, including their
maturity, was in existence at the time Congress passed the 1934 Act.

42

In construing any terms whose meanings are less than plain, we depend on the
common understanding of those terms at the time of the statute's creation. See
Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655, 82 S.Ct. 1399, 1402, 8 L.Ed.2d 750
(1962) ("[I]n the absence of anything to the contrary it is fair to assume that
Congress use[s a] word in [a] statute in its common-law sense"); Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 65 L.Ed.2d
488 (1980) (in construing a word in a statute, "we may look to the
contemporaneous understanding of the term"); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59, 31 S.Ct. 502, 516, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911)
(common-law meaning "presumed" to have been Congress' intent); see also

Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583, 98 S.Ct. 866, 871, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978);
United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341, 1344 (CA9 1988). Contemporaneous
editions of legal dictionaries defined "maturity" as "[t]he time when a . . . note
becomes due." Black's Law Dictionary 1170 (3d ed. 1933); Cyclopedic Law
Dictionary 649 (2d ed. 1922). Pursuant to the dominant consensus in the case
law, instruments payable on demand were considered immediately "due" such
that an action could be brought at any time without any other demand than the
suit. See, e.g., M. Bigelow, Law of Bills, Notes, and Checks 349, p. 265 (3d
ed. W. Lile rev. 1928); 8 C.J., Bills and Notes 602, p. 406, and n. 83 (1916).
According to Bigelow:
43

"So far as maker and acceptor are concerned, paper payable . . . 'on demand' is
due from the moment of its delivery, and payment may be required on any
business day, including the day of its issue, within the statute of limitations. In
other words, as to these parties the paper is at maturity all the time, and no
demand of payment isnec essary before suit thereon." Bigelow, supra, 349, at
265 (emphasis added; emphasis in original deleted; footnote omitted).

44

To be sure, demand instruments were considered to have "the peculiar quality

of having two maturity datesone for the purpose of holding to his obligation
the party primarily liable (e.g. maker), and the other for enforcing the contracts
of parties secondarily liable (e.g. drawer and indorsers)." Bigelow, supra,
350, at 266 (emphasis omitted). But only the rule of immediate maturity
respecting makers of demand notes has any bearing on our examination of the
exemption; the language in the Act makes clear that it is the "maturity at time
of issuance" with which we are concerned. 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(10).
Accordingly, in the absence of some compelling indication to the contrary, the
maturity date exemption must encompass demand notes because they possess
"maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months."*

45

Petitioners and the lower court decisions cited by Justice STEVENS rely,
virtually exclusively, on the legislative history of 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act for
the proposition that the term "any note" in the exemption in 3(a)(10) of the
1934 Act encompass only notes having the character of short-term "commercial
paper" exchanged among sophisticated traders. I am not altogether convinced
that the legislative history of 3(a)(3) supports that interpretation even with
respect to the term "any note" in the exemption in 3(a)(3), and to bodily
transpose that legislative history to another statute has little to commend it as a
method of statutory construction.

46

The legislative history of the 1934 Actunder which this case arisescontains
nothing which would support a restrictive reading of the exemption in question.

Nor does the legislative history of 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act support the
asserted limited construction of the exemption in 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.
Though the two most pertinent sources of congressional commentary on 3(a)
(3)H.R.Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1933) and S.Rep. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1933)do suggest an intent to limit 3(a)(3)'s
exemption to short-term commercial paper, the references in those Reports to
commercial paper simply did not survive in the language of the enactment.
Indeed, the Senate Report stated "[n]otes, drafts, bills of exchange, and bankers'
acceptances which are commercial paper and arise out of current commercial,
agricultural, or industrial transactions, and which are not intended to be
marketed to the public, are exempted. . . ." S.Rep. No. 47, supra, at 3-4
(emphasis added). Yet the provision enacted in 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act
exempts "[a]ny note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to
be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of
issuance of not exceeding nine months. . . ." 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(3) (emphasis
added).
47

Such broadening of the language in the enacted version of 3(a)(3), relative to

the prototype from which it sprang, cannot easily be dismissed in interpreting
3(a)(3). A fortiori, the legislative history's restrictive meaning cannot be
imputed to the facially broader language in a different provision of another Act.
Although I do not doubt that both the 1933 and 1934 Act exemptions
encompass short-term commercial paper, the expansive language in the
statutory provisions is strong evidence that, in the end, Congress meant for
commercial paper merely to be a subset of a larger class of exempted short-term
instruments.

48

The plausibility of imputing a restrictive reading to 3(a)(10) from the

legislative history of 3(a)(3) is further weakened by the imperfect analogy
between the two provisions in terms of both phraseology and nature. Section
3(a)(10) lacks the cryptic phrase in 3(a)(3) which qualifies the class of
instruments eligible for exemption as those arising "out of . . . current
transaction[s] or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current
transactions. . . ." While that passage somehow may strengthen an argument for
limiting the exemption in 3(a)(3) to commercial paper, its absence in 3(a)
(10) conversely militates against placing the same limitation thereon.

49

The exemption in 3(a)(3) excepts the short-term instruments it covers solely

from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. The same instruments are
not exempted from the 1933 Act's antifraud provisions. Compare 15 U.S.C.
77c(a)(3) with 15 U.S.C. 77l (2) and 77q(c); see also Securities Industry

Assn. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 468 U.S. 137, 151,
104 S.Ct. 2979, 2986-87, 82 L.Ed.2d 107 (1984). By contrast, the exemption in
3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act exempts instruments encompassed thereunder from
the entirety of the coverage of the 1934 Act including, conspicuously, the Act's
antifraud provisions.
50

Justice STEVENS argues that the suggested limited reading of the exemption
in 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act "harmonizes" the plain terms of that provision
with the legislative history of the 1933 Act. Ante, at 76. In his view, such
harmony is required by the "context clause" at the beginning of the 1934 Act's
general definition of "security." It seems to me, instead, that harmony is called
for primarily between 3(a)(10)'s general definition and its specific exemption.
The fairest reading of the exemption in light of the context clause is that the
situation described in the exemptionnotes with maturities at issue of less than
nine monthsis one contextual exception Congress especially wanted courts to
recognize. Such a reading does not render the context clause superfluous; it
merely leaves it to the judiciary to flesh out additional "context clause"
exceptions.

51

Justice STEVENS also states that we have previously referred to the exemption
in 3(a)(10) as an exclusion for commercial paper. Ante, at 76 (citing
Securities Industry Assn., supra, 468 U.S., at 150-152, 104 S.Ct., at 2986-87).
In the Securities Industry Assn. dictum, however, we described the exemption
in 3(a)(10) merely as "encompass[ing]" commercial paper and in no way
concluded that the exemption was limited to commercial paper. See 468 U.S.,
at 150-151, 104 S.Ct., at 2986. Indeed, in Securities Industry Assn., our purpose
in referring to 3(a)(10) was to assist our determination whether commercial
paper was even included in the 73d Congress' use of the words "notes . . . or
other securities" in the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933.

52

In sum, there is no justification for looking beyond the plain terms of 3(a)
(10), save for ascertaining the meaning of "maturity" with respect to demand
notes. That inquiry reveals that the Co-Op's demand notes come within the
purview of the section's exemption for short-term securities. I would therefore
affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, though on different reasoning.

We have consistently held that "[t]he definition of a security in 3(a)(10) of the

1934 Act, . . . is virtually identical [to the definition in the Securities Act of
1933] and, for present purposes, the coverage of the two Acts may be
considered the same." United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.

837, 847, n. 12, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2058, n. 12, 44 L.Ed.2d 621 (1975) (citations
omitted). We reaffirm that principle here.
2

An approach founded on economic reality rather than on a set of per se rules is

subject to the criticism that whether a particular note is a "security" may not be
entirely clear at the time it is issued. Such an approach has the corresponding
advantage, though, of permitting the SEC and the courts sufficient flexibility to
ensure that those who market investments are not able to escape the coverage
of the Securities Acts by creating new instruments that would not be covered by
a more determinate definition. One could question whether, at the expense of
the goal of clarity, Congress overvalued the goal of avoiding manipulation by
the clever and dishonest. If Congress erred, however, it is for that body, and not
this Court, to correct its mistake.

The Second Circuit's version of the family resemblance test provided that only
notes with a term of more than nine months are presumed to be "securities." See
supra, at 63. No presumption of any kind attached to notes of less than nine
months' duration. The Second Circuit's refusal to extend the presumption to all
notes was apparently founded on its interpretation of the statutory exception for
notes with a maturity of nine months or less. Because we do not reach the
question of how to interpret that exception, see infra, at 71, we likewise express
no view on how that exception might affect the presumption that a note is a
"security."

We emphasize that by "profit" in the context of notes, we mean "a valuable

return on an investment," which undoubtedly includes interest. We have, of
course, defined "profit" more restrictively in applying the Howey test to what
are claimed to be "investment contracts." See, e.g., Forman, 421 U.S., at 852,
95 S.Ct., at 2060 ("[P]rofit" under the Howey test means either "capital
appreciation" or "a participation in earnings"). To apply this restrictive
definition to the determination whether an instrument is a "note" would be to
suggest that notes paying a rate of interest not keyed to the earning of the
enterprise are not "notes" within the meaning of the Securities Acts. Because
the Howey test is irrelevant to the issue before us today, see supra, at 64, we
decline to extend its definition of "profit" beyond the realm in which that
definition applies.

Reference to the state common law of negotiable instruments does not suggest
that "Congress intended the Securities Acts to apply differently to the same
transactions depending on the accident of which State's law happens to apply."
See ante, at 71. Rather, in the absence of a federal law of negotiable
instruments, cf. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580, 76 S.Ct. 974, 980,
100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956) ("[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations, which

is primarily a matter of state concern"), or other alternative sources for

discerning the applicability of the statutory term "maturity" to demand notes,
we are dependent on the state common law at the time of the Act's creation as a
basis for a nationally uniform answer to this "federal question." As we said in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 47, 109 S.Ct.
1597, 1608, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989):
"That we are dealing with a uniform federal rather than a state definition does
not, of course, prevent us from drawing on general state-law principles to
determine 'the ordinary meaning of the words used.' Well-settled state law can
inform our understanding of what Congress had in mind when it employed a
term it did not define."
See also 2A C. Sutherland on Statutory Construction 50.04, pp. 438-439 (4th
ed. 1984) (noting the "utility" found by various courts, including this Court, in
"examining a federal statute with reference to the common law of the various
states as it existed at the time the statute was enacted"). In 1934, when this
statute was enacted, as is true today, the American law of negotiable
instruments was found in the state-court reporters. Though the States were not
unanimous on the issue of the time of maturity of demand notes, virtually every
matter of state common law evokes a majority and minority position. The vast
number of courts that adopted the majority view of immediate maturity, see 8
C.J., Bills and Notes 602, p. 406, n. 83 (1916), compels the conclusion that
the immediate maturity rule constituted "well-settled state law" or a "general
state-law principle" at the time 3(a)(10) was enacted.