286 U.S.

352
52 S.Ct. 595
76 L.Ed. 1155

CONTINENTAL BAKING CO. et al.

v.
WOODRING, Governor of Kansas, et al.
No. 677.
Argued and Submitted April 25, 1932.
Decided May 23, 1932.

[Syllabus from pages 352-354 intentionally omitted]

Messrs. Charles R. Wilke, of Lincoln, Neb., and John C. Grover, of
Kansas City, Mo., for appellants.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 354-356 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Walter T. Griffin, of Topeka, Kan., for appellees.
Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a final decree of the District Court, composed of three
judges, as required by statute, which dismissed, on motion, the bill of complaint
in a suit brought to restrain the enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Act of
Kansas. Laws of 1931, c. 236; Continental Baking Company v. Woodring,
Governor (D. C.) 55 F.(2d) 347.

Plaintiffs are 'private motor carriers of property,' operating bakeries in Kansas

and other states and making deliveries to their customers by their own trucks.
They contend that the statute, by reason of the obligations it imposes, and of its
classifications, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the provision as to the privileges and immunities of
citizens (article 4, 2), and the commerce clause (article 1, 8, cl. 3), of the
Federal Constitution.

The statute relates to motor vehicles, comprehensively defined, when used upon

any public highway of the state for the purpose of transporting persons or
property. It applies to those who are engaged in such transportation as 'public
motor carriers' of property and passengers, 'contract motor carriers' of property
and passengers, and 'private motor carriers of property.' 'Public motor carrier'
means one transporting 'for hire as a common carrier having a fixed termini or
route.' 'Contract motor carrier' of property means one who is not a 'public motor
carrier' and is engaged in transportation 'for hire as a business.' 'Private motor
carrier of property' means one transporting 'property sold or to be sold by him
in furtherance of any private commercial enterprise.' Section 1.1 The act does
not apply to (1) motor carriers operating wholly within any city or village of the
state, (2) private motor carriers operating within a radius of twenty-five miles
beyond the corporate limits of such city or village, (3) the transportation of live
stock and farm products to market 'by the owner thereof or supplies for his own
use in his own motor vehicle,' and (4) the transportation of children to and from
school. Section 2.2 Public motor carriers are declared to be common carriers
within the meaning of the public utility laws of the state and subject to
regulation accordingly, including that of rates and charges. Section 3.3 Public
motor carriers, contract motor carriers, and private motor carriers of property
are forbidden to operate motor vehicles for compensation on any public
highway except in accordance with the provisions of the act. Section 4.4 The
public service commission is vested with supervision of these carriers in all
matters affecting their relationship 'with the traveling and shipping public' and,
specifically, to prescribe regulations in certain particulars hereinafter
mentioned. Section 5.5 All transportation charges made by public motor
carriers must be just and reasonable. Section 6. Public motor carriers in
intrastate commerce must obtain certificates of convenience and necessity.
Section 7. Contract motor carriers and private motor carriers of property, 'either
in intrastate commerce or in interstate commerce,' must obtain licenses.
Application therefor must give information as to ownership, financial condition
and equipment, and such further facts as the public service commission may
request. The commission is required, upon receipt of this information and on
compliance with the regulations and payment of fees, to issue a license. Section
8.6 In addition to license fees, public motor carriers, contract motor carriers, and
private motor carriers of property must pay a tax of 'five-tenths mill per gross
ton mile,' computed in the manner described, for the administration of the act
and for the maintenance and reconstruction of the public highways. Section
13.7 Every motor carrier covered by the act must keep daily records, upon
prescribed forms, of all vehicles used, and must certify under oath summaries
showing the ton miles traveled monthly and such other information as the
commission may require. Section 15.8 The commission is empowered to
enforce the provisions of the act and to inspect the books and documents of all
carriers to which the act applies. Section 16.9 Of the moneys received under the
provisions of the act, 20 per cent. is to be applied to administration and

enforcement, and the remainder is to be placed to the credit of the state's

highway fund. Section 18.10 No certificate or license is to be issued by the
commission to any of the described motor carriers until a liability insurance
policy approved by the commission has been filed 'in such reasonable sum as
the commission may deem necessary to adequately protect the interests of the
public with due regard to the number of persons and amount of property
involved, which liability insurance shall bind the obligors thereunder to pay
compensation for injuries to persons and loss of or damage to property resulting
from the negligent operation of such carrier.' No other or additional bonds or
licenses than those prescribed in the act are to be required by any city or town
or other agency of the state. Section 21.11 The commission may promulgate
rules relating to the maintenance of vehicle units in a safe and sanitary
condition, and making provision as to qualifications and hours of service of
operators and for the reporting of accidents. Section 22.12 Violation of the act
or of any order of the commission is made a misdemeanor. Section 23.13
4

The general situation to which the statute is addressed is thus described by the
District Court (55 F.(2d) at pages 350, 351): 'The state of Kansas has
constructed at great expense a system of improved highways. These have been
built in part by special benefit districts and in part by a tax on gasoline sold in
the state and by license fees exacted of all resident owners of automobiles.
These public highways have become the roadbeds of great transportation
companies, which are actively and seriously competing with railroads which
provide their own roadbeds; they are being used by concerns such as the
plaintiffs for the daily delivery of their products to every hamlet and village in
the state. The highways are being pounded to pieces by these great trucks
which, combining weight with speed, are making the problem of maintenance
well-nigh insoluble. The Legislature but voiced the sentiment of the entire state
in deciding that those who daily use the highways for commercial purposes
should pay an additional tax. Moreover, these powerful and speedy trucks are
the menace of the highways.'

It is apparent that Kansas, in framing its legislation to meet these conditions,

did not attempt to compel private carriers to become public carriers. The
Legislature did not purport to put both classes of carriers upon an identical
footing and subject them to the same obligations. See Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.
S. 553, 563, 51 S. Ct. 582, 75 L. Ed. 1264; Michigan Public Utilities
Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 576-578, 45 S. Ct. 191, 69 L. Ed. 445, 36
A. L. R. 1105; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S.
583, 592, 46 S. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 47 A. L. R. 457. It recognized and
applied distinctions. 'Public' or common carriers, and not private carriers, are
required to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity. The former,

and not the latter, are put under regulations as to fares and charges. While, with
respect to certain matters, both are placed under the general authority given to
the public service commission to prescribe regulations, it does not appear from
the bill of complaint that any regulation has been prescribed, or that the
commission has made any order, of which private carriers may properly
complain. The statute itself, however, does impose certain obligations upon
private motor carriers of property, and the first question is whether these
provisions violate the constitutional restrictions invoked.
6

First. 'Private motor carriers of property' must obtain a license, pay a tax, and
file a liability insurance policy. The public service commission has no authority
to refuse a license if the described information is given with the application, the
liability insurance policy is filed, and there is compliance with the regulations
and payment of the license fee. Section 8.14 It is not shown that either
regulations or license fees are unreasonable. The tax and the license fees, over
the expenses of administration, go to the highway fund of the state for the
maintenance and reconstruction of the highways the carrier is licensed to use.
The insurance policy is to protect the interests of the public by securing
compensation for injuries to persons and property from negligent operations of
the carriers. Section 21.15 The District Court approved an earlier decision, also
by a District Court of three judges, that this provision was not intended to
require 'security for passengers or cargoes carried, but only to protect third
persons from injuries to their persons or property.' 55 F.(2d) at page 357; Louis
v. Boynton (D. C.) 53 F. (2d) 471, 473. This is an admissible construction, and
no different application of the provision appears to have been made by either
the state court or the commission.

Requirements of this sort are clearly within the authority of the state which may
demand compensation for the special facilities it has provided and regulate the
use of its highways to promote the public safety. Reasonable regulations to that
end are valid as to intrastate traffic, and, where there is no discrimination
against the interstate commerce which may be affected, do not impose an
unconstitutional burden upon that commerce. Motor vehicles may properly be
treated as a special class, because their movement over the highways, as this
Court has said, 'is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is
also abnormally destructive to the ways themselves.' Hendrick v. Maryland,
235 U. S. 610, 622, 35 S. Ct. 140, 142, 59 L. Ed. 385; Kane v. New Jersey, 242
U. S. 160, 167, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222; Michigan Public Utilities
Commission v. Duke, supra; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.
S. 245, 250, 251, 48 S. Ct. 230, 72 L. Ed. 551; Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S.
163, 169, 170, 48 S. Ct. 502, 72 L. Ed. 833, 62 A. L. R. 45; Hodge Drive-ItYourself Company v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S. 335, 337, 52 S. Ct. 144, 76 L. Ed.

323.
8

Objection to the tax is made on the score of uncertainty, in view of the

exemptions of motor carriers operating wholly within a city or village, and of
private motor carriers operating 'within a radius of twenty five miles beyond the
corporate limits of such city, or any village.' Section 2.16 This objection is
distinct from that of unconstitutional discrimination, shortly to be considered.
We perceive no uncertainty by reason of the first exemption which definitely
applies to cases of operation exclusively within the limits of a city or village.
As to the second exemption, the state authorities assert, and it is not denied,
that, in the administration of the act, the public service commission has taken
the exemption to mean that 'so long as private carriers operate within a radius of
twenty-five miles of their home city or base they are not subject to the payment
of the fee. Even though they have made trips outside the twenty-five mile
radius, which subjects them to the law and to the payment of tax for such trips,
they are still not subject to the payment of a tax for trips made entirely within
the twenty-five mile zone.' The District Court expressed the opinion that the
provision 'can and should be construed as intending to exempt from the tax
those carriers who either have an established place of business or an established
delivery point, with trucks domiciled in any city, and that such trucks may
operate in that city and within a 25-mile radius free of any tax,' and the court
said that it agreed with the construction of the commission that, 'if such a truck
goes beyond the 25-mile limit,' 'only the excess is taxable.' 55 F.(2d) at page
356. On this construction, it cannot be said that there is a fatal defect in
definition. The tax itself is certain, as in the process of laying the tax it is
necessarily made certain before any penalty can be imposed for nonpayment.
The tax is to be assessed and collected on the basis of gross ton miles, and this
mileage is to be computed in a prescribed manner. When the tax is assessed,
the ordinary remedies will be available for contesting it, if the assessment is not
in accordance with the law. No impropriety in assessment or in collection as to
these appellants, or denial of remedy, is disclosed. Nor is the amount of the tax,
which the state could lay in its discretion for the lawful purposes declared,
shown to be unreasonable.

The objection to the authority given to the public service commission 'to
regulate and supervise the accounts, schedules, service and method of
operation,' 'to prescribe a uniform system and classification of accounts,' to
require the filing of reports and data, and generally to 'supervise and regulate'
all the carriers to which the act applies 'in all matters affecting the relationship'
between such carriers and 'the traveling and shipping public (section 5)17
similarly raises no question which can now be considered, as there has been no
action or threat of action, so far as appears, by the commission giving ground

for the contention that the constitutional rights of the appellants have been or
will be invaded. This is not a case like that of Smith v. Cahoon, supra, where
the requirements of the statute itself, as distinguished from action of the state
commission under it, had such an objectionable generality and vagueness as to
the obligations imposed upon private carriers that they provided no standard of
conduct that it was possible to know and exposed the persons concerned to
criminal prosecution before any suitably definite requirement had been
prescribed. In the instant case, the statute itself clearly distinguishes in
fundamental matters between the obligations of public and private carriers and
places upon the latter certain requirements which the state had power to impose.
Whatever uncertainty may exist with respect to possible regulations of the
commission will be resolved as regulations are promulgated. If any of these
transcend constitutional limits, appellants will have their appropriate remedy.
The provision as to keeping records and furnishing reports and information, and
as to maintaining uniform methods of accounting, may, in the case of private
carriers of property, be assumed, until the contrary appears, to have relation, as
the state authorities assert, to the determination of the amount of the tax to
which the private carriers are properly liable. The general grant of authority to
the public service commission over all the carriers described, including both
public and private carriers, in all matters affecting their relationship with the
traveling and shipping public, we think should be taken distributively in the
light of the context and of the manifest distinctions in the relation of different
sorts of carriers to the public. The distinction made by the statute between
public and private carriers with respect to the obtaining of certificates of public
convenience and necessity, and as to rates and charges, indicates the intention
to keep separate the special responsibilities of public carriers from the more
limited but still important duties which are owing as well by private carriers, in
protecting the public highways from misuse and in insuring safe traffic
conditions, and there is no reason to conclude that the authority given to the
commission will not be viewed and exercised accordingly. We agree with the
District Court that the last clause of section 5, providing that 'all laws relating to
the powers, duties, authority and jurisdiction of the public service commission
over common carriers are hereby made applicable to all such motor carriers
except as herein otherwise specifically provided,' applies to public and not to
private carriers.
10

The duty laid upon the commission (section 22)18 to insist that motor vehicles
shall be maintained 'in a safe and sanitary condition,' to prescribe qualifications
of operators as to age and hours of service, and to require the reporting of
accidents, has manifest reference to considerations of safety. The terms of the
statute do not require action by the commission which does not have reasonable
relation to that purpose. In this respect, as well as in relation to the other matters

above-mentioned, appellants had no right to resort to equity merely because of

an anticipation of improper or invalid action in administration. Smith v.
Cahoon, supra, at page 562 of 283 U. S., 51 S. Ct. 582, 587; Dalton Adding
Machine Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 236 U. S. 699, 700, 701, 35 S.
Ct. 480, 59 L. Ed. 797; Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation
Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 52 S. Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. , decided May 16,
1932.
11

Second. The challenged exemptions are set forth in section 2.19 The first, which
excludes from the application of the act motor carriers who operate wholly
within a city or village of the state, has an obviously reasonable basis, as such
operations are subject to local regulations. In protecting its highway system, the
state was at liberty to leave its local communities unembarrassed, and was not
bound either to override their regulations or to impose burdensome additions.

12

The second exemption extends only to certain private motor carriers. Under the
construction above stated, the exemption provides immunity from the
provisions of the act for carriers of that class who have an established place of
business or base of operations within a city or village and operate within a
radius of twenty-five miles beyond the municipal limits. The first question is
whether the state, in legislation of this sort, may provide for such carriers an
exempt zone contiguous to its municipalities. We find no difficulty in
concluding that it may. As the District Court pointed out, there is 'a penumbra
of town' that is outside municipal limits, and delivery trucks, of those having
establishments within the municipalities, in their daily routine repeatedly cross
these limits 'in going back and forth into these outlying additions.' The court
found that trucks of that class 'use the state improved highways but slightly, for
the streets of these outlying additions are not generally a part of the state
system.' The District Court also directed attention to the fact that 'the practical
difficulty of keeping track of the mileage of such delivery trucks as they cross
back and forth is well-nigh insuperable' and that 'the revenue to be gained from
such use would be insignificant and the cost of collection large.' We think that
the Legislature could properly take these distinctions into account, and that
there was a reasonable basis for differentiation with respect to that class of
operations. In this view, the question is simply whether the fixing of the radius
at twenty-five miles is so entirely arbitrary as to be unconstitutional. It is
obvious that the Legislature in setting up such a zone would have to draw the
line somewhere, and unquestionably it had a broad discretion as to where the
line should be drawn. In exercising that discretion, the Legislature was not
bound to resort to close distinctions or to attempt to define the particular
differentiations as to traffic conditions in territory bordering on its various
municipalities. Ohio Oil Company v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 159, 50 S. Ct.

310, 74 L. Ed. 775. This Court has frequently held that the mere selection of a
mileage basis in the regulation of railroads cannot be considered a violation of
the Federal Constitution. The practical convenience of such a classification is
not to be disregarded in the interest of a purely theoretical or scientific
uniformity. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 283 U. S. 96, 101, 51 S.
Ct. 392, 75 L. Ed. 861; Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 680, 691, 8 S. Ct. 1028,
31 L. Ed. 841; New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.
S. 628, 633, 634, 17 S. Ct. 418, 41 L. Ed. 853; Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U. S. 453, 31 S. Ct. 275, 55 L. Ed. 290; Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co. v. Conley, 230 U. S. 513, 522, 33 S. Ct. 985, 57 L. Ed. 1597;
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 521,
36 S. Ct. 443, 60 L. Ed. 776; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 341, 354, 37 S. Ct.
298, 61 L. Ed. 755, L. R. A. 1917E, 938, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024; Clark v.
Maxwell, 282 U. S. 811, 51 S. Ct. 211, 75 L. Ed. 726; Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 80, 93, 52 S. Ct. 87, 76 L. Ed. 177.
No controlling considerations have been presented to overcome the
presumption attaching to the legislative action in this case in fixing the radius
of the zone for the purpose of establishing an exemption otherwise valid.
13

The third exemption applies to 'the transportation of livestock and farm

products to market by the owner thereof or supplies for his own use in his own
motor vehicle.' In Smith v. Cahoon, supra, the state statute, which applied to all
carriers for compensation over regular routes, including common carriers,
exempted from its provisions 'any transportation company engaged exclusively
in the transporting agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm products and
fresh and Salt Fish and Oysters and Shrimp from the point of production to the
assembling or shipping point enroute to primary market, or to motor vehicles
used exclusively in transporting or delivering dairy products.' The stated
distinction was thus established between carriers, and between private carriers,
notwithstanding the fact that they were 'alike engaged in transporting property
for compensation over public highways between fixed termini or over a regular
route.' The Court was unable to find any justification for this discrimination
between carriers in the same business, that is, 'between those who carry for hire
farm products, or milk or butter, or fish or oysters, and those who carry for hire
bread or sugar, or tea or coffee, or groceries in general, or other useful
commodities.'

14

The distinction in the instant case is of a different sort. The statute does not
attempt to impose an arbitrary discrimination between carriers who transport
property for hire, or compensation, with respect to the class of products they
carry. The exemption runs only to one who is carrying his own live stock and
farm products to market or supplies for his own use in his own motor vehicle.

In sustaining the exemption, the District Court referred to the factual basis for
the distinction. 'The Legislature knew,' said the court 'that as a matter of fact
farm products are transported to town by the farmer, or by a nonexempt
'contract carrier' employed by him. The Legislature knew that as a matter of
fact the use of the highways for the transportation of farm products by the
owner is casual and infrequent and incidental; farmers use the highways to
transport their products to market ordinarily but a few times a year. The
Legislature rightly concluded that the use of the highways for carrying home
his groceries in his own automobile is adequately compensated by the general
tax imposed on all motor vehicles.' 55 F.(2d) at page 352. And the court
properly excluded from consideration mere hypothetical and fanciful
illustrations of possible discriminations which had no basis in the actual
experience to which the statute was addressed. The court found a practical
difference between the case of the appellants 'who operate fleets of trucks in the
conduct of their business and who use the highways daily in the delivery of
their products to their customers,' and that of 'a farmer who hauls his wheat or
live stock to town once or twice a year.' The Legislature in making its
classification was entitled to consider frequency and character of use and to
adapt its regulations to the classes of operations, which by reason of their
habitual and constant use of the highways brought about the conditions making
regulation imperative and created the necessity for the imposition of a tax for
maintainance and reconstruction. As the Court said in Alward v. Johnson, 282
U. S. 509, 513, 514, 51 S. Ct. 273, 274, 75 L. Ed. 496, 75 A. L. R. 9: 'The
distinction between property employed in conducting a business which requires
constant and unusual use of the highways and property not so employed is plain
enough.' See, also, Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U. S. 80, 82, 50 S. Ct. 64,
74 L. Ed. 178; Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 73, 50 S. Ct. 204, 74
L. Ed. 704, 68 A. L. R. 194.
15

The fourth exemption is 'of transportation of children to and from school.' The
distinct public interest in this sort of transportation affords sufficient reason for
the classification. The state was not bound to seek revenue for its highways
from that source, and, without violating appellants' constitutional rights, could
avail itself of other means of assuring safety in that class of cases.

16

Appellants also refer to the provision of section 21, with respect to liability
insurance, that 'no other or additional bonds or licenses' shall be required 'by
any city or town or other agency of the state.' The propriety of this avoidance of
a duplication of security is apparent.

17

Decree affirmed.

'Section 1. (a) The term 'motor vehicle' when used in this act means any
automobile, automobile truck, trailer, motor bus, or any other self-propelled or
motor-driven vehicle used upon any public highway of this state for the
purpose of transporting persons or property. (b) The term 'public motor carrier
of property' when used in this act shall mean any person engaged in the
transportation by motor vehicle of property for hire as a common carrier having
a fixed termini or route. (c) The term 'contract motor carrier of property' when
used in this act shall be construed to mean any person not a public motor carrier
of property engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of property for hire
as a business. (d) The term 'private motor carrier of property' when used in this
act shall be construed to mean any person engaged in the transportation by
motor vehicle of property sold or to be sold by him in furtherance of any private
commercial enterprise. (e) The term 'public motor carrier of passengers' when
used in this act shall mean any person engaged in the transportation by motor
vehicle of passengers or express for hire as a common carrier having a fixed
termini or route. (f) The term 'contract motor carrier of passengers' when used
in this act shall be construed to mean any person not a public motor carrier of
passengers engaged in the transportation by motor vehicle of passengers or
express for hire. (g) The term 'public highway' when used in this act shall mean
every public street, road or highway or thoroughfare of any kind used by the
public.'

'Sec. 2. That this act shall not apply to motor carriers who shall operate wholly
within any city or village of this state, or private motor carriers who operate
within a radius of twenty five miles beyond the corporate limits of such city, or
any village, nor to the transportation of live stock and farm products to market
by the owner thereof or supplies for his own use in his own motor vehicle: or to
the transportation of children to and from school.'

'Sec. 3. All 'public motor carriers of property or passengers' as defined in this

act are hereby declared to be common carriers within the meaning of the public
utility laws of this state, and are hereby declared to be affected with a public
interest and subject to this act and to the laws of this state, including the
regulation of all rates and charges now in force or that hereafter may be
enacted, pertaining to public utilities and common carriers as far as applicable,
and not in conflict herewith.'

'Sec. 4. No public motor carrier of property or passengers, contract motor

carrier of property or passengers or private motor carrier of property shall
operate any motor vehicle for the transportation of either persons or property
for compensation on any public highway in this state except in accordance with
the provisions of this act.'

'Sec. 5. The public service commission is hereby vested with power and
authority and it shall be its duty to license, supervise and regulate every public
motor carrier of property or of passengers in this state and to fix and approve
reasonable maximum or minimum or maximum and minimum rates, fares,
charges, classifications and rules and regulations pertaining thereto. And the
public service commission is hereby vested with power and authority and it
shall be its duty to license, supervise and regulate every public motor carrier of
property or of passengers, contract motor carrier of property or of passengers
and private motor carrier of property in the state and to regulate and supervise
the accounts, schedules, service and method of operation of same; to prescribe a
uniform system and classification of accounts to be used; to require the filing of
annual and other reports and any other data; and to supervise and regulate
'public motor carriers of property or of passengers,' 'contract motor carriers of
property or of passengers' and 'private motor carriers of property,' in all matters
affecting the relationship between such 'public motor carriers of property or of
passengers,' 'contract motor carriers of property or of passengers' and 'private
motor carriers of property' and the traveling and shipping public. The public
service commission shall have power and authority by general order or
otherwise to prescribe reasonable and necessary rules and regulations governing
all such motor carriers. All laws relating to the powers, duties, authority and
jurisdiction of the public service commission over common carriers are hereby
made applicable to all such motor carriers except as herein otherwise
specifically provided.'

'Sec. 8. It shall be unlawful for any 'contract motor carrier of property or

passengers' or 'private motor carrier of property' to operate as a carrier of
property or passengers within this state either in intrastate commerce or in
interstate commerce without first having obtained from the public service
commission a license therefor. An application shall be made to the public
service commission in writing stating the ownership, financial condition,
equipment to be used and physical property of the applicant, and such other
information as the commission may request. Upon receipt of such information
and on compliance with the regulations and payment of fees, the public service
commission shall issue a license to such applicant.'

'Sec. 13. In addition to the regular license fees or taxes imposed upon 'public
motor carriers of property or of passengers,' 'contract motor carriers of property
or of passengers,' and 'private motor carriers of property,' there shall be assessed
against and collected from every such carrier a tax of five-tenths mill per gross
ton mile for the administration of this act and for the maintenance, repair and
reconstruction of the public highways. The said gross ton mileage shall be
computed: (a) The maximum seating capacity of each passenger carrying
vehicle shall be estimated at 150 pounds per passenger seat; to this sum shall be

added the weight of the vehicle, the total shall then be multiplied by the
number of miles operated, and the amount thus obtained divided by 2,000; (b)
200 per cent of the rated capacity of each property carrying vehicle plus the
weight of the vehicle shall be multiplied by the number of miles the vehicle is
operated, and the amount thus obtained divided by 2,000.'
8

'Sec. 15. Every motor carrier to which this act applies shall keep daily records
upon forms prescribed by the commission of all vehicles used during the
current month. On or before the 25th day of the month following, they shall
certify under oath to the commission, upon forms prescribed therefor,
summaries of their daily records which shall show the ton miles traveled during
the preceding month, and such other information as the commission may
require. * * *'

'Sec. 16. The commission is hereby empowered to administer and enforce all
provisions of this act, to inspect the books and documents of all carriers to
which this act applies, and to expend such amount of the sum collected
hereunder as is necessary for such purposes upon requisition by the commission
to the state auditor: Provided, however, The total sum to be expended as
provided in this section shall not exceed during the calendar year twenty per
cent of the total gross sum collected under this act. * * *'

10

'Sec. 18. All moneys received under the provisions of this act shall be
distributed: (a) For administration and enforcement of the provisions of this act,
twenty per cent. shall be held by the state treasurer for the use of the public
service commission; (b) the balance the said treasurer shall place to the credit
of the highway fund of the state and it shall become a part thereof.'

11

'Sec. 21. No certificate or license shall be issued by the public service

commission to any 'public motor carrier of property,' 'public motor carrier of
passengers,' 'contract motor carrier of property or passengers' or 'private motor
carrier of property,' until and after such applicant shall have filed with, and the
same has been approved by, the public service commission, a liability insurance
policy in some insurance company or association authorized to transact
business in this state, in such reasonable sum as the commission may deem
necessary to adequately protect the interests of the public with due regard to the
number of persons and amount of property involved, which liability insurance
shall bind the obligors thereunder to pay compensation for injuries to persons
and loss of or damage to property resulting from the negligent operation of such
carrier. No other or additional bonds or licenses than those prescribed in this
act shall be required of any motor carrier by any city or town or other agency of
the state.'

12

'Sec. 22. The commission shall promulgate and publish in the official state
paper, and mail to each holder of a certificate or license hereunder, such
regulations as it may deem necessary to properly carry out the provisions and
purposes of this act. The commission may at any time, for good cause, suspend,
and, upon at least five days' notice to the grantee of any certificate and an
opportunity to be heard, revoke or amend any certificate. Upon the commission
finding that any public carrier does not give convenient, efficient and sufficient
service as ordered, such public carrier shall be given a reasonable time to
provide such service before any existing certificate is revoked or a new
certificate granted. Any rules promulgated by the commission shall include: (a)
Every vehicle unit shall be maintained in a safe and sanitary condition at all
times. (b) Every operator of a motor vehicle used as a public carrier shall be at
least twenty-one years of age; and every operator of other carriers to which this
act applies shall be at least sixteen years of age; and all such operators shall be
of good moral character and fully competent to operate the motor vehicle under
his charge. (c) Hours of service for operators of all motor carriers to which this
act applies shall be fixed by the commission. (d) Accidents arising from or in
connection with the operation of carriers shall be reported to the commission in
such detail and in such manner as the commission may require: Provided, That
the failure to report any such accident within five days after the happening
thereof shall be deemed willful refusal to obey and comply with a rule of the
commission. (e) The commission shall require and every carrier shall have
attached to each unit or vehicle such distinctive marking as shall be adopted by
the commission.'

13

'Sec. 23. Every carrier to which this act applies and every person who violates
or who procures, aids or abets in the violating of any provision of this act, or
who fails to obey any order, decision or regulation of the commission, or who
procures or aids or abets any person in his failure to obey such order, decision
or regulation, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding $500. * * *'

14

See note 6.

15

See note 11.

16

See note 2.

17

See note 5.

18

See note 12.

19

See note 2.