BOOK TWO: HUMAN

RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
(APPRENTICES)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114337. September 29, 1995.]
NITTO ENTERPRISES, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, and ROBERTO
CAPILI, Respondents.
Sinfroso R. Pagunsan for Petitioner.
Ma. Elena Enly B. Nazareta for Private Respondent.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1 rendered by public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:

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Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili
sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship
agreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of
P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on,
accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was
not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process
injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private Respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letters 3 which reads:

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August 2, 1990
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa
pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang
sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minuto ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi
naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling
kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:

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Emergency and doctor fee P715.00

Medicines (sic) and others 317.04
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na
araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.

Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang confirmasyon
at pag-ayon na ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas ay totoo.
x

Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa
alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(Sgd.) Roberto Capili
Roberto Capili
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in
consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. 4
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch,
National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid
and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:
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WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims dismissed for lack of
merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial assistance.
SO ORDERED. 5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capili was valid. First,
private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross
negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had
shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without
authority any proper training. 6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
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WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant
to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to the time he is
actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear complainants money claims and to
dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED. 7
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus:

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As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship agreement filed with the
Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the
complainant was hired by respondent as a plain apprentice on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant
was respondent s regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28, 1990 who thus enjoyed
the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complaint being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 277(b)
and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon v. NLRC, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to prove that
the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was
illegally dismissed. 8
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondents representative
was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:

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NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondents] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby
commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. 1 74 Araneta
Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties are located and effect the
reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll
reinstatement.

You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the dispositive portion,
and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition-for certiorari.
The issues raised before us are the following:

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I
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition
Petitioner assails the NLRCs finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an
apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was
executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employerapprentice relationship.
Petitioners argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:

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Contents of apprenticeship agreement. Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of apprentices, shall
conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed
six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case
shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard
model programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May
28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder.." On the same date, an
apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.
However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by
the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the
apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a
condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary
step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of t he Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish national apprenticeship program through the
participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE
to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship
agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be
debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the
absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondents assertion that he was
hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserve credence. He should rightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
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ARTICLE 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 9
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private Respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and
procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means
that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of
his representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to
prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11
As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC : 12
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices
before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130, Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with
illegality. This procedure is mandatory; in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void and
inexistent (Tingson, Jr. v. NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122, Ruffy v.
NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 L [1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was
made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter and
quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not
have a choice. 13
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latters alleged
resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies any
spontaneity on private respondents part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission,
the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 152894 : August 17, 2007]
CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA C. PALAD,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision2 dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.
The Facts
On 15 July 1997, Century Canning Corporation (petitioner) hired Gloria C. Palad (Palad) as "fish cleaner" at
petitioner's tuna and sardines factory. Palad signed on 17 July 1997 an apprenticeship agreement3with petitioner.
Palad received an apprentice allowance of P138.75 daily. On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted its apprenticeship
program for approval to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). On 26 September 1997, the TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program.4
According to petitioner, a performance evaluation was conducted on 15 November 1997, where petitioner gave Palad
a rating of N.I. or "needs improvement" since she scored only 27.75% based on a 100% performance indicator.
Furthermore, according to the performance evaluation, Palad incurred numerous tardiness and absences. As a
consequence, petitioner issued a termination notice5 dated 22 November 1997 to Palad, informing her of her
termination effective at the close of business hours of 28 November 1997.
Palad then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, and non-payment of pro-rated 13th month
pay for the year 1997.
On 25 February 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but ordered petitioner to pay Palad
her last salary and her pro-rated 13th month pay. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the complaint for illegal dismissal
filed by the complainant against the respondents in the above-entitled case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. However, the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant the amount of ONE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS (P1,632.00), representing her last salary and the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (P7,228.00) PESOS representing her prorated 13th month pay.
All other issues are likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the Labor Arbiter's decision,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Arbiter dated 25 February 1999 is hereby MODIFIED in that,
in addition, respondents are ordered to pay complainant's backwages for two (2) months in the amount of P7,176.00
(P138.75 x 26 x 2 mos.). All other dispositions of the Arbiter as appearing in the dispositive portion of his decision
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.7

Upon denial of Palad's motion for reconsideration, Palad filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. On 12 November 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned decision of the NLRC is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one
entered, to wit:
(a) finding the dismissal of petitioner to be illegal;
(b) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner her underpayment in wages;
(c) ordering private respondent to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and to
pay her full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld from her up to the time of her
reinstatement;
(d) ordering private respondent to pay petitioner attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) per cent of the monetary
award herein; and
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(e) ordering private respondent to pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the apprenticeship agreement which Palad signed was not valid and binding because
it was executed more than two months before the TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program. The Court of
Appeals cited Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,9 where it was held that prior approval by the
DOLE of the proposed apprenticeship program is a condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can
be validly entered into.
The Court of Appeals also held that petitioner illegally dismissed Palad. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner
failed to show that Palad was properly apprised of the required standard of performance. The Court of Appeals
likewise held that Palad was not afforded due process because petitioner did not comply with the twin requirements
of notice and hearing.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE; and
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2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT
ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.10
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit.
Registration and Approval by the TESDA of Apprenticeship Program Required Before Hiring of
Apprentices
The Labor Code defines an apprentice as a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an
employer.11 One of the objectives of Title II (Training and Employment of Special Workers) of the Labor Code is to
establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices.12In line with this objective, Articles 60 and 61 of
the Labor Code provide:
ART. 60. Employment of apprentices. - Only employers in the highly technical industries may employ
apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
(Emphasis supplied)
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ART. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. - Apprenticeship agreements, including the wage rates of
apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship
shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum
wage, which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered
into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. (Emphasis supplied)
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In Nitto Enterprises v. National Labor Relations Commission,13 the Court cited Article 61 of the Labor Code and held
that an apprenticeship program should first be approved by the DOLE before an apprentice may be hired, otherwise
the person hired will be considered a regular employee. The Court held:
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May
28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an
apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment.
However, the apprenticeship agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by
the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in
accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a
condition sine qua non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary
step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the
participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship
standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE
to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship
agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be
debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the
absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was
hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be
considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code x x x. (Emphasis
supplied)14
Republic Act No. 779615 (RA 7796), which created the TESDA, has transferred the authority over apprenticeship
programs from the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE to the TESDA.16 RA 7796 emphasizes TESDA's approval
of the apprenticeship program as a pre-requisite for the hiring of apprentices. Such intent is clear under Section 4 of
RA 7796:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
xxx
j) "Apprenticeship" training within employment with compulsory related theoretical instructions involving
a contract between an apprentice and an employer on an approved apprenticeable occupation;
k) "Apprentice" is a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable occupation during an
established period assured by an apprenticeship agreement;
l) "Apprentice Agreement" is a contract wherein a prospective employer binds himself to train the apprentice who
in turn accepts the terms of training for a recognized apprenticeable occupation emphasizing the rights,
duties and responsibilities of each party;
m) "Apprenticeable Occupation" is an occupation officially endorsed by a tripartite body and approved for
apprenticeship by the Authority [TESDA]; (Emphasis supplied)
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In this case, the apprenticeship agreement was entered into between the parties before petitioner filed its
apprenticeship program with the TESDA for approval. Petitioner and Palad executed the apprenticeship agreement on

17 July 1997 wherein it was stated that the training would start on 17 July 1997 and would end approximately in
December 1997.17 On 25 July 1997, petitioner submitted for approval its apprenticeship program, which the TESDA
subsequently approved on 26 September 1997.18Clearly, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced even before the
TESDA approved petitioner's apprenticeship program. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement is void because it lacked
prior approval from the TESDA.
The TESDA's approval of the employer's apprenticeship program is required before the employer is allowed to hire
apprentices. Prior approval from the TESDA is necessary to ensure that only employers in the highly technical
industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations.19Thus, under RA 7796, employers can
only hire apprentices for apprenticeable occupations which must be officially endorsed by a tripartite body and
approved for apprenticeship by the TESDA.
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This is to ensure the protection of apprentices and to obviate possible abuses by prospective employers who may
want to take advantage of the lower wage rates for apprentices and circumvent the right of the employees to be
secure in their employment.
The requisite TESDA approval of the apprenticeship program prior to the hiring of apprentices was further
emphasized by the DOLE with the issuance of Department Order No. 68-04 on 18 August 2004. Department Order
No. 68-04, which provides the guidelines in the implementation of the Apprenticeship and Employment Program of
the government, specifically states that no enterprise shall be allowed to hire apprentices unless its
apprenticeship program is registered and approved by TESDA.20
Since Palad is not considered an apprentice because the apprenticeship agreement was enforced before the TESDA's
approval of petitioner's apprenticeship program, Palad is deemed a regular employee performing the job of a "fish
cleaner." Clearly, the job of a "fish cleaner" is necessary in petitioner's business as a tuna and sardines factory.
Under Article 28021 of the Labor Code, an employment is deemed regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
Illegal Termination of Palad
We shall now resolve whether petitioner illegally dismissed Palad.
Under Article 27922 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee for just causes23 or
for authorized causes.24 Furthermore, under Article 277(b)25 of the Labor Code, the employer must send the
employee who is about to be terminated, a written notice stating the causes for termination and must give the
employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Thus, to constitute valid dismissal from employment,
two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.26
In this case, the Labor Arbiter held that petitioner terminated Palad for habitual absenteeism and poor efficiency of
performance. Under Section 25, Rule VI, Book II of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, habitual absenteeism
and poor efficiency of performance are among the valid causes for which the employer may terminate the
apprenticeship agreement after the probationary period.
However, the NLRC reversed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on the issue of the legality of Palad's termination:
As to the validity of complainant's dismissal in her status as an apprentice, suffice to state that the findings of the
Arbiter that complainant was dismissed due to failure to meet the standards is nebulous. What clearly appears is that
complainant already passed the probationary status of the apprenticeship agreement of 200 hours at the time she
was terminated on 28 November 1997 which was already the fourth month of the apprenticeship period of 1000
hours. As such, under the Code, she can only be dismissed for cause, in this case, for poor efficiency of performance
on the job or in the classroom for a prolonged period despite warnings duly given to the apprentice.
We noted that no clear and sufficient evidence exist to warrant her dismissal as an apprentice during the
agreed period. Besides the absence of any written warnings given to complainant reminding her of "poor
performance," respondents' evidence in this respect consisted of an indecipherable or unauthenticated
xerox of the performance evaluation allegedly conducted on complainant. This is of doubtful authenticity
and/or credibility, being not only incomplete in the sense that appearing thereon is a signature (not that
of complainant) side by side with a date indicated as "1/16/98". From the looks of it, this signature is
close to and appertains to the typewritten position of "Division/Department Head", which is below the
signature of complainant's immediate superior who made the evaluation indicated as "11-15-97."
The only conclusion We can infer is that this evaluation was made belatedly, specifically, after the filing
of the case and during the progress thereof in the Arbitral level, as shown that nothing thereon indicate
that complainant was notified of the results. Its authenticity therefor, is a big question mark, and hence

lacks any credibility. Evidence, to be admissible in administrative proceedings, must at least have a
modicum of authenticity. This, respondents failed to comply with. As such, complainant is entitled to the payment
of her wages for the remaining two (2) months of her apprenticeship agreement.27 (Emphasis supplied)
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Indeed, it appears that the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that petitioner validly terminated Palad was based mainly on
the performance evaluation allegedly conducted by petitioner. However, Palad alleges that she had no knowledge of
the performance evaluation conducted and that she was not even informed of the result of the alleged performance
evaluation. Palad also claims she did not receive a notice of dismissal, nor was she given the chance to explain.
According to petitioner, Palad did not receive the termination notice because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for
work after being informed of the result of the evaluation.
Under Article 227 of the Labor Code, the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause.28 Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that Palad was terminated for valid reasons. In fact, the
NLRC found that petitioner failed to prove the authenticity of the performance evaluation which petitioner claims to
have conducted on Palad, where Palad received a performance rating of only 27.75%. Petitioner merely relies on the
performance evaluation to prove Palad's inefficiency. It was likewise not shown that petitioner ever apprised Palad of
the performance standards set by the company. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is
not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.29
Furthermore, Palad was not accorded due process. Even if petitioner did conduct a performance evaluation on Palad,
petitioner failed to warn Palad of her alleged poor performance. In fact, Palad denies any knowledge of the
performance evaluation conducted and of the result thereof. Petitioner likewise admits that Palad did not receive the
notice of termination30 because Palad allegedly stopped reporting for work. The records are bereft of evidence to
show that petitioner ever gave Palad the opportunity to explain and defend herself. Clearly, the two requisites for a
valid dismissal are lacking in this case.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 12 November 2001 and the Resolution dated 5 April 2002 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60379.
SO ORDERED.

BOOK TWO: HUMAN

RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
(HANDICAPPED WORKERS)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999]
MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL
ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR.,
CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C.
DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE
CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q.
MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V.
GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION,
DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA
SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA,
ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, Petitioners v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that qualified disabled persons be granted the same terms and
conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees. Once they have attained the status of regular
workers, they should be accorded all the benefits granted by law, notwithstanding written or verbal contracts to the
contrary. This treatment is rooted not merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice for all.
The Case

Challenged in the Petition for Certiorari before us is the June 20, 1995 Decision of the National Labor Relations
3
Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the August, 22 1994 ruling of Labor Arbiter Cornelio L. Linsangan. The labor
4
arbiters Decision disposed as follows: crlwvirtualibrry
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-mentioned complaint for lack of merit.
5

Also assailed is the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts

The facts were summarized by the NLRC in this wise:

Complainants numbering 43 (p. 176, Records) are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to
1993 by respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. (pp. 68 & 69, Records) The full text of said
agreement is quoted below:
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR HANDICAPPED WORKERS
This Contract, entered into by and between:

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a universal banking corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with business address at FEBTC Building, Muralla, Intramuros,
Manila, represented herein by its Assistant Vice President, MR. FLORENDO G. MARANAN, (hereinafter referred
to as the BANK);
- and ________________, ________________ years old, of legal age, _____________, and residing at
__________________ (hereinafter referred to as the (EMPLOYEE).
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the BANK, cognizant of its social responsibility, realizes that there is a need to provide disabled and
handicapped persons gainful employment and opportunities to realize their potentials, uplift their socio-economic
well being and welfare and make them productive, self-reliant and useful citizens to enable them to fully integrate
in the mainstream of society;
WHEREAS, there are certain positions in the BANK which may be filled-up by disabled and handicapped persons,
particularly deaf-mutes, and the BANK ha[s] been approached by some civic-minded citizens and authorized
government agencies [regarding] the possibility of hiring handicapped workers for these positions;
WHEREAS, the EMPLOYEE is one of those handicapped workers who [were] recommended for possible
employment with the BANK;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and in compliance with Article 80 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, the BANK and the EMPLOYEE have entered into this Employment
Contract as follows:
1. The BANK agrees to employ and train the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE agrees to diligently and faithfully
work with the BANK, as Money Sorter and Counter.
2. The EMPLOYEE shall perform among others, the following duties and responsibilities:
i Sort out bills according to color;
ii. Count each denomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine;
iii. Wrap and label bills per hundred;
iv. Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and
v. Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.
3. The EMPLOYEE shall undergo a training period of one (1) month, after which the BANK shall determine
whether or not he/she should be allowed to finish the remaining term of this Contract.
4. The EMPLOYEE shall be entitled to an initial compensation of P118.00 per day, subject to adjustment in the
th
sole judgment of the BANK, payable every 15 and end of the month.
5. The regular work schedule of the EMPLOYEE shall be five (5) days per week, from Mondays thru Fridays, at
eight (8) hours a day. The EMPLOYEE may be required to perform overtime work as circumstance may warrant,
for which overtime work he/she [shall] be paid an additional compensation of 125% of his daily rate if performed
during ordinary days and 130% if performed during Saturday or [a] rest day.
6. The EMPLOYEE shall likewise be entitled to the following benefits:
th

i. Proportionate 13 month pay based on his basic daily wage.

ii. Five (5) days incentive leave.

iii. SSS premium payment.
7. The EMPLOYEE binds himself/herself to abide [by] and comply with all the BANK Rules and Regulations and
Policies, and to conduct himself/herself in a manner expected of all employees of the BANK.
8. The EMPLOYEE acknowledges the fact that he/she had been employed under a special employment program
of the BANK, for which reason the standard hiring requirements of the BANK were not applied in his/her case.
Consequently, the EMPLOYEE acknowledges and accepts the fact that the terms and conditions of the
employment generally observed by the BANK with respect to the BANKs regular employee are not applicable to
the EMPLOYEE, and that therefore, the terms and conditions of the EMPLOYEEs employment with the BANK
shall be governed solely and exclusively by this Contract and by the applicable rules and regulations that the
Department of Labor and Employment may issue in connection with the employment of disabled and handicapped
workers. More specifically, the EMPLOYEE hereby acknowledges that the provisions of Book Six of the Labor
Code of the Philippines as amended, particularly on regulation of employment and separation pay are not
applicable to him/her.
9. The Employment Contract shall be for a period of six (6) months or from ____ to ____ unless earlier terminated
by the BANK for any just or reasonable cause. Any continuation or extension of this Contract shall be in writing
and therefore this Contract will automatically expire at the end of its terms unless renewed in writing by the BANK.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties, have hereunto affixed their signature[s] this ____ day of
_________________, ____________ at Intramuros, Manila, Philippines.
In 1988, two (2) deaf-mutes were hired under this Agreement; in 1989 another two (2); in 1990, nineteen (19); in
1991 six (6); in 1992, six (6) and in 1993, twenty-one (21). Their employment[s] were renewed every six months
such that by the time this case arose, there were fifty-six (56) deaf-mutes who were employed by respondent
under the said employment agreement. The last one was Thelma Malindoy who was employed in 1992 and
whose contract expired on July 1993.
xxx
Disclaiming that complainants were regular employees, respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company
maintained that complainants who are a special class of workers the hearing impaired employees were hired
temporarily under [a] special employment arrangement which was a result of overtures made by some civic and
political personalities to the respondent Bank; that complainant[s] were hired due to pakiusap which must be
considered in the light of the context of the respondent Banks corporate philosophy as well as its career and
working environment which is to maintain and strengthen a corps of professionals trained and qualified officers
and regular employees who are baccalaureate degree holders from excellent schools which is an unbending
policy in the hiring of regular employees; that in addition to this, training continues so that the regular employee
grows in the corporate ladder; that the idea of hiring handicapped workers was acceptable to them only on a
special arrangement basis; that it adopted the special program to help tide over a group of handicapped workers
such as deaf-mutes like the complainants who could do manual work for the respondent Bank; that the task of
counting and sorting of bills which was being performed by tellers could be assigned to deaf-mutes; that the
counting and sorting of money are tellering works which were always logically and naturally part and parcel of the
tellers normal functions; that from the beginning there have been no separate items in the respondent Bank
plantilla for sorters or counters; that the tellers themselves already did the sorting and counting chore as a regular
feature and integral part of their duties (p. 97, Records); that through the pakiusap of Arturo Borjal, the tellers were
relieved of this task of counting and sorting bills in favor of deaf-mutes without creating new positions as there is
no position either in the respondent or in any other bank in the Philippines which deals with purely counting and
sorting of bills in banking operations.
7

Petitioners specified when each of them was hired and dismissed, viz: crlwvirtualibrry
NAME OF PETITIONER WORKPLACE Date Hired Date Dismissed
1. MARITES BERNARDO Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
2. ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE Intramuros 24 JAN 90 11 JAN 94

3. REBECCA E. DAVID Intramuros 16 APR 90 23 OCT 93

4. DAVID P. PASCUAL Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 21 NOV 94
5. RAQUEL ESTILLER Intramuros 2 JUL 92 4 JAN 94
6. ALBERT HALLARE West 4 JAN 91 9 JAN 94
7. EDMUND M. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 JAN 91 3 DEC 93
8. JOSELITO O. AGDON Intramuros 5 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
9. GEORGE P. LIGUTAN, JR. Intramuros 6 SEPT 89 19 JAN 94
10. CELSO M. YAZAR Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
11. ALEX G. CORPUZ Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
12. RONALD M. DELFIN Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
13. ROWENA M. TABAQUERO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
14. CORAZON C. DELOS REYES Intramuros 8 FEB 93 8 AUG 93
15. ROBERT G. NOORA Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
16. MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN Intramuros 1 FEB 93 1 AUG 93
17. ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI Intramuros 22 JAN 93 22 JUL 93
18. IKE CABANDUCOS Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
19. COCOY NOBELLO Intramuros 22 FEB 93 22 AUG 93
20. DORENDA CATIMBUHAN Intramuros 15 FEB 93 15 AUG 93
8

21. ROBERT MARCELO West 31 JUL 93 1 AUG 93

22. LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO West 15 JUN 90 21 NOV 93
23. JOSE E. SALES West 6 AUG 92 12 OCT 93
24. ISABEL MAMAUAG West 8 MAY 92 10 NOV 93
25. VIOLETA G. MONTES Intramuros 2 FEB 90 15 JAN 94
26. ALBINO TECSON Intramuros 7 NOV 91 10 NOV 93
27. MELODY V. GRUELA West 28 OCT 91 3 NOV 93
28. BERNADETH D. AGERO West 19 DEC 90 27 DEC 93
29. CYNTHIA DE VERA Bel-Air 26 JUN 90 3 DEC 93
30. LANI R. CORTEZ Bel-Air 15 OCT 88 10 DEC 93

31. MA. ISABEL B. CONCEPCION West 6 SEPT 90 6 FEB 94

32. DINDO VALERIO Intramuros 30 MAY 93 30 NOV 93
33. ZENAIDA MATA Intramuros 10 FEB 93 10 AUG 93
34. ARIEL DEL PILAR Intramuros 24 FEB 93 24 AUG 93
35. MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA Intramuros 27 JUL 90 4 FEB 94
36. THELMA SEBASTIAN Intramuros 12 NOV 90 17 NOV 93
37. MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES West 6 JUN 92 7 DEC 93
38. JEANNIE RAMIL Intramuros 23 APR 90 12 OCT 93
39. ROZAIDA PASCUAL Bel-Air 20 APR 89 29 OCT 93
40. PINKY BALOLOA West 3 JUN 91 2 DEC 93
41. ELIZABETH VENTURA West 12 MAR 90 FEB 94 [SIC]
42. GRACE S. PARDO West 4 APR 90 13 MAR 94
43. RICO TIMOSA Intramuros 28 APR 93 28 OCT 93
As earlier noted, the labor arbiter and, on appeal, the NLRC ruled against herein petitioners. Hence, this recourse
9
to this Court.
The Ruling of the NLRC

In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:
We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were
hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were
covered by xxx Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80.
Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the
10
parties.
The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, considering the
prevailing circumstances/milieu of the case.
Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners cite the following grounds in support of their cause:
I. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the petitioners - money sorters
and counters working in a bank - were not regular employees.
II. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the employment contracts
signed and renewed by the petitioners - which provide for a period of six (6) months - were valid.
III. The Honorable Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in not applying the provisions of the Magna
11
Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription against discrimination against disabled persons.
In the main, the Court will resolve whether petitioners have become regular employees.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whose
contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.
Preliminary Matter: Propriety of Certiorari

Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company argues that a review of the findings of facts of the NLRC is not
allowed in a petition for certiorari. Specifically, it maintains that the Court cannot pass upon the findings of public
respondents that petitioners were not regular employees.
True, the Court, as a rule, does not review the factual findings of public respondents in acertiorari proceeding. In
resolving whether the petitioners have become regular employees, we shall not change the facts found by the
public respondent. Our task is merely to determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying the law to the established facts, as above-quoted from the assailed Decision.
Main Issue: Are Petitioners Regular Employees?

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and
counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts
served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and should not
12
in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank. Rather, they were special workers
under Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners,
whose employment was merely an accommodation in response to the requests of government officials and civicminded citizens. They were told from the start, with the assistance of government representatives, that they could
not become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for money sorters, whose task used to
be performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need but merely for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent submits that as of the present, the special position that was created for the
petitioners no longer exist[s] in private respondent [bank], after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their
special employment contracts.
At the outset, let it be known that this Court appreciates the nobility of private respondents effort to provide
employment to physically impaired individuals and to make them more productive members of society. However,
we cannot allow it to elude the legal consequences of that effort, simply because it now deems their employment
irrelevant. The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably
show that the petitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have
acquired legal rights that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a
consequence of law and justice.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one
month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term
of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable
cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.
According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the
Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 80. Employment agreement. Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an
employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:
(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;
(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the
applicable legal minimum wage;
(c) The duration of employment period; and

(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.

The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives.
The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision. Succeeding events
13
and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), however, justify the application of
Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the
contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the
handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary
to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their
positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given
the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualifiedable-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta
provides:
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for
suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of
employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a
qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from
the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are
thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall
continue while such activity exists.
The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon v. NLRC,

14

in which this Court held:

The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of
the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one
year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing
need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the
business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such
activity exists.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent
bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months. Thus, the
following twenty-seven petitioners should be deemed regular employees: Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante,
Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller, Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon,
George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson,
Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret

Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa,
Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo.
As held by the Court, Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making
permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary
15
appointments, ad infinitum. The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during
which the bank determined the employees fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse
16
of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is
allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees.
As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be
17
terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause, these twentyseven petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without
18
loss of seniority rights and other privileges. Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money
sorting is no longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally
19
20
belonged, petitioners are hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. crlwvirtualibrry
Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not
entitled to the same benefits.
Applicability of the Brent Ruling

21

Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora in which the Court upheld the validity of an employment
contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing. It adds that the
petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary Mita Pardo de Tavera
and Representative Arturo Borjal.
We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled,
and that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the
Labor Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed byqualified ablebodied individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners arequalified for their positions. The
validation of the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of
the very mischief sought to be addressed by the new law.
22

Moreover, it must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. Provisions of
applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves
and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each
23
other. Clearly, the agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the
provisions of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified
able-bodied employees.
Respondents reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task could
24
not be done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night. We
find no basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike.
This excuse cannot justify the termination of their employment.
Other Grounds Cited by Respondent

Respondent argues that petitioners were merely accommodated employees. This fact does not change the nature
of their employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of
service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.
Equally unavailing are private respondents arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and
25
that its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T. Datu v. NLRC, the Court held that the determination of
whether employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure
of hiring x x x but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of
performance and its continued existence.

Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become regular
employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still, we are
not persuaded. The well-settled rule is that the character of employment is determined not by stipulations in the
26
contract, but by the nature of the work performed. Otherwise, no employee can become regular by the simple
expedient of incorporating this condition in the contract of employment.
27

In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC: crlwvirtualibrry

Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employees right to be secure in
his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the
concept of regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regular
employee and is entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of
employment.
xxx
At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent
cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in term
employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed
upon the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this Court went on
to say that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude
acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public
policy and morals.
In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but
also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment
of qualified persons, disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a
hindrance to their work. The eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment
contracts. Why then should they be dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes,
that, after showing their fitness for the work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights
like any other regular employees.
28

In this light, we note the Office of the Solicitor Generals prayer joining the petitioners cause. crlwvirtualibrry
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20, 1995 Decision and the
August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSEDand SETASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust
Company is hereby ORDEREDto pay back wages and separation pay to each of the following twenty-seven (27)
petitioners, namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel Estiller,
Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Lilibeth Q. Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales,
Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V. Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera,
Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion, Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Ma. Jeanette Cervantes,
Jeannie Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura and Grace S. Pardo. The NLRC is hereby
directed to compute the exact amount due each of said employees, pursuant to existing laws and regulations,
within fifteen days from the finality of this Decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.