1) Jose Go, the Director and CEO of Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, was charged with violating Section 83 of the General Banking Act for borrowing deposits/funds from the bank and facilitating loans to other parties without approval from the majority of the Board of Directors.
2) The RTC granted Go's motion to quash the information, but the CA reversed this and reinstated the case.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the information was not defective as it correctly charged Go with violating the law by becoming an obligor of bank funds without proper approval, regardless of the loan amounts or whether he acted as borrower or guarantor. Section 83 imposes separate approval, reporting, and limits on loans
1) Jose Go, the Director and CEO of Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, was charged with violating Section 83 of the General Banking Act for borrowing deposits/funds from the bank and facilitating loans to other parties without approval from the majority of the Board of Directors.
2) The RTC granted Go's motion to quash the information, but the CA reversed this and reinstated the case.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the information was not defective as it correctly charged Go with violating the law by becoming an obligor of bank funds without proper approval, regardless of the loan amounts or whether he acted as borrower or guarantor. Section 83 imposes separate approval, reporting, and limits on loans
1) Jose Go, the Director and CEO of Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, was charged with violating Section 83 of the General Banking Act for borrowing deposits/funds from the bank and facilitating loans to other parties without approval from the majority of the Board of Directors.
2) The RTC granted Go's motion to quash the information, but the CA reversed this and reinstated the case.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the information was not defective as it correctly charged Go with violating the law by becoming an obligor of bank funds without proper approval, regardless of the loan amounts or whether he acted as borrower or guarantor. Section 83 imposes separate approval, reporting, and limits on loans
1) Jose Go, the Director and CEO of Orient Commercial Banking Corporation, was charged with violating Section 83 of the General Banking Act for borrowing deposits/funds from the bank and facilitating loans to other parties without approval from the majority of the Board of Directors.
2) The RTC granted Go's motion to quash the information, but the CA reversed this and reinstated the case.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that the information was not defective as it correctly charged Go with violating the law by becoming an obligor of bank funds without proper approval, regardless of the loan amounts or whether he acted as borrower or guarantor. Section 83 imposes separate approval, reporting, and limits on loans
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JOSE C. GO, Petitioner, vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS,
Respondent. G.R. No. 178429 October 23, 2009 Facts: Jose Go, the Director and the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (Orient Bank) was charged before the RTC for violation of Section 83 of RA 337 or the General Banking Act. Go allegedly borrowed the deposits/funds of the Orient Bank and/or acting as guarantor, indorser of obligor for loans to other persons. He then used the borrowed deposits/funds in facilitating and granting and/or of credit lines/loans to the New Zealand Accounts loans in the total amount of PHP 2,754,905,857. He completed the alleged transaction without the written approval of the majority of the Board of Directors of said Orient Bank. Go then filed a motion to quash the Information. He averred that the use of the word "and/or" meant that he was charged for being either a borrower or a guarantor, or for being both. Thus the charge do not constitute an offense. That the Section 83 of RA 337 penalized only directors and officers xxx who acted either as borrower or as guarantor, but not as both. Also that the Information did not constitute an offense since the information failed to state the amount he purportedly borrowed. According to Go, the second paragraph of Section 83, serves as an exception to the first paragraph which allows the banks to extend credit accommodations to their directors, officers, and stockholders, provided it is "limited to an amount equivalent to the respective outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in capital contribution in the bank." The RTC granted Gos motion to quash the Information. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA granted the petition. It explained that the allegation that Go acted either as a borrower or a guarantor or both did not necessarily mean that Go acted both as borrower and guarantor for the same loan at the same time. It agreed with the prosecutions stand that the second paragraph of Section 83 of RA 337 is not an exception to the first paragraph. Hence, this petition. Issue: whether or not the allegation that Go acted as borrower or gurantor rendered the information defective? Whether or not the failure to state that Go borrowed beyond the limit of his outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in capital contribution in the bank rendered the Information defective? Ruling: No, the information was not defective. The following elements of violation of Section 83 of RA 337 which must be present to constitute a violation of its first paragraph: 1. the offender is a director or officer of any banking institution; 2. the offender, either directly or indirectly, for himself or as representative or agent of another, performs any of the following acts: a. he borrows any of the deposits or funds of such bank; or b. he becomes a guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or c. he becomes in any manner an obligor for money borrowed from bank or loaned by it; 3. the offender has performed any of such acts without the written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank, excluding the offender, as the director concerned. The language of the law is broad enough to encompass either act of borrowing or guaranteeing, or both. Banks were not created for the benefit of their directors and officers; they cannot use the assets of the bank for their own benefit, except as may be permitted by law. Congress has thus deemed it essential to impose restrictions on borrowings by bank directors and officers in order to protect the public, especially the depositors. Hence, when the law prohibits directors and officers of banking institutions from becoming in any manner an obligor of the bank (unless with the approval of the board), the terms of the prohibition shall be the standards to be applied to directors transactions such as those involved in the present case. Credit accommodation limit is not an exception nor is it an element of the offense as contrary to Gos claims.
Section 83 of RA 337 actually imposes three restrictions: approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements. The approval requirement (found in the first sentence of the first paragraph of the law) refers to the written approval of the majority of the banks board of directors required before bank directors and officers can in any manner be an obligor for money borrowed from or loaned by the bank. Failure to secure the approval renders the bank director or officer concerned liable for prosecution and, upon conviction, subjects him to the penalty provided in the third sentence of first paragraph of Section 83. The reportorial requirement, on the other hand, mandates that any such approval should be entered upon the records of the corporation, and a copy of the entry be transmitted to the appropriate supervising department. The reportorial requirement is addressed to the bank itself, which, upon its failure to do so, subjects it to quo warranto proceedings under Section 87 of RA 337. The ceiling requirement under the second paragraph of Section 83 regulates the amount of credit accommodations that banks may extend to their directors or officers by limiting these to an amount equivalent to the respective outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in capital contribution in the bank. Again, this is a requirement directed at the bank. In this light, a prosecution for violation of the first paragraph of Section 83, such as the one involved here, does not require an allegation that the loan exceeded the legal limit. Even if the loan involved is below the legal limit, a written approval by the majority of the banks directors is still required; otherwise, the bank director or officer who becomes an obligor of the bank is liable. Compliance with the ceiling requirement does not dispense with the approval requirement. Evidently, the failure to observe the three requirements under Section 83 paves the way for the prosecution of three different offenses, each with its own set of elements. A successful indictment for failing to comply with the approval requirement will not necessitate proof that the other two were likewise not observed.
