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ADKINS V CHILDREN HOSPITAL

Brief Fact Summary. In 1918, the District of Columbia passed a statute that established
a minimum wage for women and children, the constitutionality of which was challenged
in this matter.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The freedom to contract may be restricted only when
exceptional circumstances exist as they relate to the police powers of a state.
Facts. The District of Columbia imposed a law upon all employers forcing them to pay
their women and child workers a predetermined minimum wage.
Issue. Is the fixing of a minimum wage for children and women constitutional?
Held. No. It is inappropriate to restrict a womans freedom to contract for her
labor service when such restriction is not equally applied to a man. The payment of a
minimum wage puts a burden on the employer that is completely unrelated to his
business.
Discussion. This case reflects the change in societys regard for the female worker. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) expressly recognizes that a
mature woman has the same contracting competence as a man. The Supreme Court
decides to side with the business owners and the economic consequence that a
minimum wage would have on them. Specifically, the closing of businesses is
mentioned as a detractor and weighed against the potential thriftiness or lack thereof of
women workers.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital ()

Syllabus
1. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, while constituted of two of the three
Justices of that court and one Justice of the Supreme Court of the District, affirmed
decrees of the latter court dismissing bills; thereafter, at the same term, (the Supreme
Court Justice having been replaced by the third Justice of the Court of Appeals) it
granted rehearings and reversed the decrees, and, thereafter, on second appeals, it
affirmed decrees entered pursuant to the reversals. Held that objections to the
jurisdiction to grant the rehearings did not go to the jurisdiction over the second
appeals, and need not be decided here upon review of the decrees of affirmance. P.
543.
2. Every possible presumption stands in favor of an act of Congress until overcome
beyond rational doubt. P. 544.

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3. But when, in the exercise of the judicial authority to ascertain and declare the law in
a given case, it is clear and indubitable that an act of Congress conflicts with the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Court so to declare, and to enforce the
Constitution. Id.
4. This is not to exercise a power to review and nullify an act of Congress, for no such
power exists; it is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of
a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be
brought the test and measure of the law. Id.
5. That the right to contract about one's affairs is part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the Fifth Amendment, is settled by repeated decisions of this Court. P.
545.
6. Within this liberty are contracts of employment of labor. In making these, generally
speaking, the parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they
can by private bargaining. Id. [p526]
7. Legislative abridgment of this freedom can only be justified by the existence of
exceptional circumstances. P. 546.
8. Review of former decisions concerning interferences with liberty of contract, by
(a) Statutes fixing the rates and charges of businesses affected by a public interest. P.
546.
(b) Statutes relating to the performance of contracts for public work. P. 547.
(c) Statutes prescribing the character, methods and time for payment of wages. Id.
(d) Statutes fixing hours of labor. Id.
9. Legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may properly take into account the
physical differences between men and women; but, in view of the equality of legal
status, now established in this country, the doctrine that women of mature age require,
or may be subjected to, restrictions upon their liberty of contract which could not
lawfully be imposed on men in similar circumstances, must be rejected. P. 552.
10. The limited legislative authority to regulate hours of labor in special occupations, on
the ground of health, affords no support to a wage-fixing law -- the two subjects are
essentially different. P. 553.
11. The Minimum Wage Act of Sept.19, 1918, c. 174, 40 Stat. 960, in assuming to
authorize the fixing of minimum wage standards for adult women, in any occupation in
the District of Columbia, such standards to be based wholly upon what a board and its
advisers may find to be an adequate wage to meet the necessary cost of living for
women workers in each particular calling and to maintain them in good health and

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protect their morals, is an unconstitutional interference with the liberty of contract. P.
554.
APPEALS from decrees of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, affirming two
decrees, entered, on mandate from that court, by the Supreme Court of the District,
permanently enjoining the appellants from enforcing orders fixing minimum wages
under the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act.

PEOPLE VS. POMAR

Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She
was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the
16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary
due her in violation of the provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint
based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory,
Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in the
complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the aforementioned
provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No. 3071 provides
that, Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of
labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as
laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty
days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer
without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent
to the total of two months counting from the day of her discharge. Section 15 of the
same Act provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted
by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with the purpose of
safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor
of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for
one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty pesos and
in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of
Police Power.
Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for
being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for
their affairs. It has been decided several times, that the right to contract about one's
affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law"
clause of the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any agreements,

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terms, and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals or public policy
The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power
may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the
preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster
than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of
the constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount
authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights
secured or guaranteed by the latter.

WEST COAST HOTEL CO. V. PARRISH

Brief Fact Summary. Washington instituted a state wage minimum for women and
minors. The Appellant, West Coast Hotel (Appellant), paid the Appellee, Parrish
(Appellee), less than this minimum.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Wage and hour laws generally do not violate the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution).
Facts. The Appellee was a maid who worked for less than the state minimum of $14.50
per 48-hour week. She brought suit to recover the difference in pay from the Appellant.
Issue. Is the fixing of minimum wages for women and minors constitutional?
Held. Yes. This case overrules Adkins v. Childrens Hospital.
The exploitation of a class of workers who are at a disadvantaged bargaining position is
in the best interest of the health of the worker and economic health of the community.
Discussion. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) reverts to
reasoning that women are in an inferior position and need to be protected from those
who might try to take advantage of the situation. Furthermore, the state is justified in
adopting such legislation to protect the rest of the community from the burden of
supporting economically disadvantaged workers. It is important to note that the
Depression colored the Supreme Courts analysis.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish
Syllabus
1. Deprivation of liberty to contract is forbidden by the Constitution if without due
process of law, but restraint or regulation of this liberty, if reasonable in relation to its
subject and if adopted for the protection of the community against evils menacing the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the people, is due process. P. 391.
2. In dealing with the relation of employer and employed, the legislature has
necessarily a wide field of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of

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health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted through regulations
designed to insure wholesome conditions of work and freedom from oppression. P. 393.
3. The State has a special interest in protecting women against employment contracts
which through poor working conditions, long hours or scant wages may leave them
inadequately supported and undermine their health; because:
(1) The health of women is peculiarly related to the vigor of the race;
(2) Women are especially liable to be overreached and exploited by unscrupulous
employers; and
(3) This exploitation and denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to the health
and wellbeing of the women affected, but casts a direct burden for their support upon
the community. Pp. 394, 398, et seq.
4. Judicial notice is taken of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the
recent period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent despite the degree
of economic recovery which has been achieved. P. 399.
5. A state law for the setting of minimum wages for women is not an arbitrary
discrimination because it does not extend to men. P. 400.
6. A statute of the State of Washington (Laws, 1913, c. 174; Remington's Rev.Stats.,
1932, 7623 et seq.) providing for the establishment of minimum wages for women,
held valid. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, is overruled; Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, distinguished. P. 400.
[p380]
This was an appeal from a judgment for money directed by the Supreme Court of
Washington, reversing the trial court, in an action by a chambermaid against a hotel
company to recover the difference between the amount of wages paid or tendered to
her as per contract and a larger amount computed on the minimum wage fixed by a
state board or commission.

ACCFA v CUGCO

G.R. No. L-21484. November 29, 1969.

Facts:
(ACCFA) was a government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended.
Its administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural
Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844). On
the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA Workers'
Association (AWA), referred to as the Unions, are labor organizations composed of the
supervisors and the rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).
On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of
Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the
Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of

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unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order
to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to selforganization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and
refusal to bargain.
The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25,
1963 of the CIR en banc. Hence this appeal.
During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition for certification election with
the Court of Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the
ACA.Trial court agreed with this move.
However, the ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court granted.
Issue: WON the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for
certification election given that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in governmental
functions
Held: The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified
Ratio:
Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among
other governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture.
According to the Land Reform Code, the administrative machinery of the ACCFA shall be
reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the requirements and objective of this
Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit Administration. These include
powers non really accorded to non-government entities such as tax exemptions,
registration of deeds, notarial services, and prosecution of officials.
The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into
their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the
sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the
Congress may legally exercise.
Moreover, the ACA was delegated under the Land Reform Project Administration , a
government agency tasked t implement land reform.
Moreover, the appointing authority for officials was the President himself.
The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition of
collective bargaining powers in the respondent Unions within the context of Republic Act
No. 875, and hence against the grant of their basic petition for certification election as
proper bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in
governmental, not proprietary functions.
These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent"
(as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of
peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those
relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of

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citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this
traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as
attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and
prosperity of the people these letter functions being ministrant, he exercise of which
is optional on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The
areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the
government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better
equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of
individuals." continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet
the increasing social challenges of the times.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the
various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There
can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said
Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a
purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of
public schools and public hospitals.
Given these, the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought
in the Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf
of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the
right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in
1962 against the ACCFA.
This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which provides:
"SEC. 11.
Prohibition Against Strike in the Government. The terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this
Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing changes or
modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such employees may belong
to any labor organization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in
strike: Provided, However, that this section shall apply only to employees employed in
governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental
corporations."

CALALANG V WILLIAMS
Facts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public
Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and
Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against
respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and
regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of
social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people.

Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.
Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken
sympathy towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about
"the greatest good to the greatest number."

BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. v. NAFLU

FACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did
not report for work for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him
and nobody was there to look after his children. He was required to explain. Finding his
reasons to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him, since according to company
rules, absence for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.
ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?
HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations
to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be
fair, just and reasonable. No less than the Constitution looks with compassion on the
workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy
but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts
on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and
capital are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor
contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.

JAMER v. NLRC
FACTS: Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for
having accumulated shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor
arbiter ruled them having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.

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ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?
HELD: Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities
constitute "fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly
authorized representative"--one of the just causes of valid termination of employment.
The employer cannot be compelled to retain employees who were guilty of malfeasance
as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law,
in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the employer.

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION VS. NLRC

Facts: On August 23, 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation (a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the business of mineral
prospecting, exploration and extraction) and private respondent NAMAWUMIF (a labor
federation duly organized and registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment, to which the Marcopper Employees Union is affiliated) entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from May 1, 1984 until April 30, 1987.
On July 25, 1986, prior to the expiration of the aforestated Agreement, the petitioner
and private respondent executed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein the terms of
the CBA, specifically on matters of wage increase and facilities allowance were modified.
On June 1, 1987, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the
integration of the cost of living allowance under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 into
the basic wage of workers, its effectivity retroactive to May 1, 1987. Consequently, the
basic wage rate of petitioner's laborers categorized as non-agricultural workers was
increased by P9.00 per day. Furthermore, the petitioner implemented the second five
percent (5%) wage increase due on the same date and thereafter added the integrated
COLA. However, the private respondent assailed the manner in which the second wage
increase was effected. It argued that the COLA should first be integrated into the basic
wage before the 5% wage increase is computed.
Issue: Whether or not the CBA should complied with.
Held: Yes. The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands
strong and true. However, the present controversy involves not merely an interpretation
of CBA provisions. More importantly, it requires a determination of the effect of an
executive order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA. This is, and should be, the
focus of the instant case.
It is unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they
allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the CBA and MOA were executed
because there is no question that as of May 1, 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the
basic wage of workers, or the statutory minimum wage, was increased with the
integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes the
COLA. This is what the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of
the parties must conform.

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Petitioner's arguments eventually lose steam in the light of the fact that compliance
with the law is mandatory and beyond contractual stipulation by and between the
parties; thus, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to include the COLA
becomes immaterial. There is evidently nothing to construe and to interpret because
the law is clear and unambiguous. Sadly for petitioner, said law, by some uncanny
coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the CBA increase became
effective. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that the computation of the CBA
increase on the basis of the "integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the
CBA. While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the parties,
it isnt an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary
contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is
not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, hence, it must yield
to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and
technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it,
giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is
intended to serve.

JMM V CA
Artist Record Book as a requirement for overseas employment contract)
Facts:The deployment of female entertainers to Japan was controlled by
thegovernment through Department Order No. 3, wherein said entertainers
wererequired an Artist Record Book as a precondition to the processing by the POEAof
any contract for overseas employment. Petitioners contends that overseasemployment
is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution and aversthat the alleged
deprivation thereof through the onerous requirement of an ARBviolates due process and
constitutes an invalid exercise of police power.
Issue:WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.
Held:Yes. The ARB requirement and the questioned Department order related to
itsissuance were issued pursuant to a valid exercise of police power whichconsiders the
welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women.
FACTS:
The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for
brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No.
3 which establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing
artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders,
1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for
employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of
law. FETMOP also averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was

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discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life liberty
and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against the orders.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc.
(Kary for brevity) filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by
the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court
issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and
dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision
but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said
issuance constituted a valid exercise of Police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.
RULING: Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its
issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police
Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the
state particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate
governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare
and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use
your property in such a fashion so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within
the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every
one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that
licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the
settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the
practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are required to
pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their
trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a
property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers
meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.

PASEI v. Drilon
FACTS: Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also
being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art
13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making

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processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police
power.
RULING: [Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female
contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the
sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.

PASEI VS. DRILON, 163 SCRA 386

Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short),
a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females," that
it 'does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills," and that it is violative of the right to travel. It was likewise held to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not
executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." In addition, it
was contended that Department Order No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior

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consultations. It was claimed to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause,
in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the
Order be further enforced.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor and Administrator
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
Issue: Whether or not deployment ban for female domestic helpers is valid under our
Constitution.

Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. The concept of police power is wellestablished in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an
absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." It is subject to the far
more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
PHILILIPPINES ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. DRILON
FACTS: PASEI recruits male and female for work abroad. They challenge the
constitutionality of DO no. 1 of DOLE guidelines governing the temporary suspension of
deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers for discrimination against
males or females and for not applying to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills.
HELD: Order is valid. It applies only to female contract workers but it does not import a
perfect identity if rights among all men and women. It is based on substantial
distinctions. Female domestic servants abroad are usually the victims of exploitive
working conditions. Distinctions are borne by evidence, there is no such evidence for

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male workers. It does not narrowly apply to existing conditions; they apply indefinitely
so long as those conditions exist. That it does not apply to all Filipina workers is not an
argument of unconstitutionality. Not all of them are similarly situated. What the
constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group within an existing
class to the prejudice of such a person or group resulting in an unfair advantage to
another person or group.