Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.

,
Facts:
The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines
and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties
of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before
one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message
which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting
or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also,
the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass
the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated
on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of
a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual
issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as
applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue:
Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it
causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held:
Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech,
of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of
constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic
polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,
nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of
such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order
or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for
lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither
the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of
the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the
rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps
for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the
establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and
municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to
the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to
peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that
has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive
response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance,
is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to
STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are
DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED
Toyota Workers Association vs Toyota Motor Phils.
Facts:
In May 2000, Mediator-Arbiter Ma. Zosima Lameyra issued an order certifying Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Workers Association as the exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota
rank-and-file employees. Toyota filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the said order.
Lameyra denied the motion and Toyota eventually appealed the order before the DOLE
Secretary.
Meanwhile, the Union submitted its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) proposals to
Toyota but the latter refused to bargain pending its appeal before the DOLE Secretary. The
Union then filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). The NCMB converted the notice of strike to a preventive mediation considering that
the DOLE Secretary was yet to decide on Toyotas appeal.
In relation to Toyotas appeal, the parties were invited to a hearing. Union members were not
allowed to attend the hearing as they were aptly represented by the Union. But despite this,
many Union members and officers failed to render overtime and work on the following day

which caused Toyota to lose P53,849,991.00. The union members went to the hearing and
assembled before the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Subsequently, Toyota terminated 227 employees. The terminated employees allegedly
abandoned their work.
This resulted to another rally within Toyotas premises as the strikers barricaded the
entrances of Toyota preventing non-strikers from going to work.
In April 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a
return-to-work order. The Union ended its strike in the same month. However, in May and
June 2001, union members still conducted rallies and pickets.
Issue:
Whether or not the strikes conducted by the Union on different occasions are illegal.
Held:
Yes. The strike conducted before the BLR as well as the strike conducted when the 227
employees were terminated is illegal because both did not go through the proper procedure
required by the Labor Code. It cannot be said that the strike conducted before the BLR is
beyond the ambit of the strikes contemplated in the Labor Code. The Union argues that the
strike is actually a protest directed against the government and is covered by their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. The SC disagreed with this argument because the Union failed to provide
evidence that the Mediator-Arbiter was biased against them. Further, if this were the kind of
protest they were claiming, they should have secured a rally permit. Further still, this case
involves a labor dispute. The employees may shroud their strike as mere demonstrations
covered by the constitution but in reality these are temporary work stoppages.
The strikes conducted after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute
are illegal for they violated the return-to-work order.
The Supreme Court also cited the 6 categories of illegal strikes which are:
1. When it is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees
performing governmental functions; or
2. When it violates a specific requirement of law, [such as Article 263 of the Labor Code
on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
3. When it is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to
commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
4. When it employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread
terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor
Code]; or
5. When it is declared in violation of an existing injunction, [such as injunction,
prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of
the Labor Code]; or

6. When it is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive

arbitration clause.
Primicias v. Fugoso
The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda for purposes of petitioning the government for redress to grievances.
However, the City Mayor, founding his actions on Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of
1927, did not issue the permit.
Facts:
The Coalesced Minority Party applied for a permit for the holding of a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda on a Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning
the government for redress to grievances.
However, the Mayor of the City of Manila (Valeriano Fugoso) did not issue the permit. For
this purpose, the campaign manager of the party (Cipriano Primicias) instituted this action for
mandamus.
Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 provides the power of the City Mayor of
Manila to grant or issue permits for the holding of assembly or meeting, parade or
procession. Moreover, he would be able to determine where to hold such activities.
Ruling:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But, it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not
absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power
to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign
police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
Under Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of the City of Manila, that the holding
of athletic games, sports or exercises during the celebration of national holidays in any
streets or public places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district may be
permitted provided that a permit be issued by the Mayor who shall determine the streets, or
public places or portions thereof where said activities may be held. From the Revised
Ordinance of the City, there is no express and separate provision regulating the holding of
public meeting or assembly at any street or public places.
As Section 1119 is susceptible to two constructions: one, that the Mayor of the City is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting in the streets and other public places of the City, and second, that the
applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the

latters reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used
for the purpose, the Court believed that it must adopt the second construction. It means that
the ordinance does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but
only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places
where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting be held.
The other alternative when adopted because it would mean that the Mayor has the power to
grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit
the use of the streets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or
processions. Moreover, said construction would render the ordinance invalid and void as it
contravenes constitutional limitations.
The Mayor reasoned that, in granting the permit, the speeches delivered in the meeting
would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government and in the duly
constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order. In reiterating the pronouncements of the US Supreme Court in Whitney v.
California, [f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
Navarro v. Villegas
The City Mayor offered the Sunken Gardens, instead of Plaza Miranda, as venue for an
assembly.
Facts:
The Mayor of the City of Manila (Villegas) expressly stated his willingness to grant permits
for peaceful assemblies at Plaza Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when
they would not cause unnecessarily great disruption of the normal activities of the
community and has further offered Sunken Gardens as an alternative to Plaza Miranda as
the site of demonstration sought to be held that afternoon.
The Mayor believes that a public rally at Plaza Miranda, as to compared to one at the
Sunken Gardens as he suggested, poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public
disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies, and petitioner has manifested that it has no means of preventing such
disorders.
Ruling:
Every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a state of
fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed, storefronts boarded
up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the general detriment of the public.
Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of Mayor to grant
petitioners application for permit unconditionally. Thus, the Court denied the writ prayed for
by Navarro and dismissed their petition.

Reyes v. Bagatsing
The Anti-Bases Coalition planned to hold a peaceful march and rally. It would start in Luneta
Park and end at the gates of the US Embassy. After the march, a program would follow
whereby two brief speeches were to be delivered. However, the City Mayor did not act on
the request of organization for permit.
Facts:
Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in
the afternoon. The route is from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the US Embassy
which is two blocks away. The march would be attended by the local and foreign
participants of such conference.
A short program would be held after the march. During the program, there would be a
delivery of two brief speeches. After which, a petition based on the resolution adopted on
the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the
Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative
of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the
US Ambassador.
The Mayor of the City of Manila however intruded by not acting on the request of the
organization for permit. Rather, he suggested with the recommendation of the police
authorities that a permit may be issued for the rally if it would be held at the Rizal Coliseum.
As such, Reyes, on behalf of the organization, filed a suit for mandamus.
Ruling:
Reyes petition was granted.
The Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free speech and
peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite explicit that
[n]o law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Free
speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the State has a right to prevent. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.

Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a
necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free
speech.
Reiterating the ruling in Thomas v. Collins, the American Supreme Court held that it was not
by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of
the right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental
actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental
to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, of other legitimate
public interest.
What is guaranteed by the Constitution is peaceable assembly. One may not advocate
disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is
ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required.
As pointed out in US v. Apurado, [i]t is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will
mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions, feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater the grievances and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct,
injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to ones
destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate
occupied by intellectual liberty is our scheme of values.
It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is
freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit,
whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes
discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The principle under
American doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: The
question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as
to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations
of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of
speech which the Constitution protects.
There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by
turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties
should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is
not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. While
prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of
what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption
especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit
must he for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of
Justice Roberta, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place.

The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place,
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at
another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the
clear and present danger tests be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be
heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favourable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse
to the proper judicial authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom, are highly
ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the
judiciary even more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate
responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal
formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been felicitously
termed by Justice Holmes as the sovereign prerogative of judgment. Nonetheless, the
presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of suds rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
PBM Employment Association v. PBM
In airing their concerns regarding the excesses of the Pasig police, employees of the
Philippine Blooming Mills decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacaang. The
Company feared of losses to be incurred from 6 am to 2 pm.
Facts:
Petitioners decided to stage a mass demonstration at the Malacaang in protest of the
alleged abuses of the Pasig police.
Said demonstration would be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 am to 2
pm) as well as those in the regular second and third shift (from 7 am to 4 pm and from 8 am
to 5 pm, respectively), and that they informed the respondent company, Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc. of their proposed demonstration.
Ruling:
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security against
the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles. In the pithy language of Justice Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts. Ones rights to life, liberty and property to free speech, or free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. Laski proclaimed that the happiness of

the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to
be judged. Is interest, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise.
The freedoms of expressions and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of
Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish;
or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to
benefit the majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the
liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to mans enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms, the citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful
sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of
Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious
shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions. The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means
employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
The freedoms of speech and of the press, as declared in New York Times v. Sullivan, as well
as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed
against public officials or when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.
The demonstration held by petitioners before the Malacaang was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, not against their employer; said demonstration was purely and
completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right of
assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what
they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of PBM Co. to protect

petitioners from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of PBM to rally
to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees so that they can report to work
free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks, enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein the employer did not
even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly
and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers
of PBM were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of
the employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees
from 6 am to 2 pm, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is a potent means of
inhibiting speech and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence, its judgment is null and void and confers no rights.
Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment.
Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted
by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against
self-incrimination; or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a
deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, even after the accused has already
served sentence for 22 years.
Malabanan vs Ramento
Facts:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent University. They
sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8am to
12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated
in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At
such gathering, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the
proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely
critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was, as a
result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were asked to explain why they
should not be held liable for holding an assembly.
Issue:

Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
Decision:
Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving public
interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless there be a
showing of clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy or
disorder. If assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
IBP vs Atienza
Facts:
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit
with the office of Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at
the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only
allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled
rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit
because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola
Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for
allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place
different from what was indicated in the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within
his power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.
Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the
criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question
to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienzas power to modify the rally permit
without consulting with the IBP.
Held:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and
in this certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to

suspend the criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend
the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination of the pendency
of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action,
and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and
place different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at
the earliest opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant some time to determine
if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial
remedies) Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that
there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must
be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza
capriciously and whimsically changed the venue without any reason therefor. Such is
a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of expression.
F. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - public meeting at Plaza Miranda - (1) A statute requiring persons
using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from
the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or a
freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in them issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the
time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested
with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. (2) In the exercise of police power, the
council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner,
but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing
so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal
discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion to transcend it or to
confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant.
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda - The Mayor
cannot be compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be
designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil if no change was made.
JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - a peaceful march and rally from Luneta park to the
gates of the US Embassy. - (1) The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. (2) If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to
its legal possession is required. (3) Application for permit should be filed well ahead in time
to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to
the grant but at another place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of
the view that there is such imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants

must be heard on the matter. (4) Decision of the licensing authority must be transmitted to
the applicants at the earliest opportunity.
MIRIAM COLLEGE V. COURT OF APPEALS Article - (1) The right of the students to free
speech in school premises is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the court upheld
the right of the students to free expression in these cases, disciplinary action by the school
for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from
time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others were not ruled out. (2) The school cannot suspend
or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such
articles materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others.
JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS teachers and mass actions - mass actions then
staged. That given the return-to-work orders issued by the then DECS Secretary, they still
refused to return to work, they were then suspended and later on dismissed from service. Where public school teachers absent themselves without proper authority, from their schools
during regular school days, in order to participate in mass protest, their absence ineluctably
results in the non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for
which they are responsible, and they may be penalized not for their exercise of their right to
peaceably assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances but for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
NAACP vs Alabama, 357 US 449
Background
In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama brought a suit to the State Circuit Court
of Montgomery, Alabama, challenging the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) for violation of a state statute requiring foreign corporations to
qualify before doing business in the state. The NAACP, a nonprofit membership corporation
based in New York, had not complied with the statute, as it believed it was exempt. The state
suit sought both to prevent the Association from conducting further business within the state
and, indeed, to remove it from the state.
Referring to the Association's involvement with the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 and its
role in funding and providing legal assistance to black students' seeking admission to
the state university, the suit charged that the Association was ". . . causing irreparable injury
to the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which
criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afford no adequate relief . . . ." On the day this
suit was filed, the circuit court agreed to issue an ex parte order restraining the Association
from conducting business in the state or taking steps to qualify it to do so.
The Association, represented throughout by Robert L. Carter of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, responded by moving to dissolve the order on the grounds that its activities within the
state did not require its qualification under the statute and that the state's suit was intended
to violate its rights to freedom of speech and of assembly as guaranteed by the Constitution

of the United States. Before a hearing date was set, the state issued a subpoena for much of
the Association's records, including bank statements and leases, but most notably the
names and addresses of the "agents" or "members" of the Association in Alabama.
In its response to the lawsuit, the Association admitted that it was in breach of the statute
and offered to obtain qualification to continue business if that part of the ex parte order was
lifted. Because the Association did not comply with the order to produce its records, that
motion was denied and the Association was held in contempt and fined $10,000. The
contempt order allowed for the reduction or remission of the fine if the production order was
complied with within five days, after which the fine would be raised to $100,000.
Contending that the State could not constitutionally force disclosure of the records, the
Association moved to dismiss the contempt judgment once more. According to Alabama
case law, however, a petitioner could not seek a hearing or to dissolve an order until it
purged itself of contempt.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the first contempt judgment. The Alabama
Supreme Court then claimed the U.S. Supreme Court had relied on a "mistaken premise"
and reinstated the contempt judgment, which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed again. The
NAACP moved to try the case on the merits; this motion was denied and again appealed up
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case to Alabama, and ordered the Federal
district court to try the case on the merits if the Alabama court system continued to refuse to
do so.
The Alabama state circuit court finally heard the case on the merits, and decided the NAACP
had violated Alabama law and ordered it to stop doing business in the state; the Alabama
appeals courts upheld this judgment, refusing to hear the NAACP's appeals on
Constitutional grounds. Finally, the fourth time the case was heard by the U.S. Supreme
Court, it granted certiorari and decided the case, itself, on the merits rather than remand the
case to the balking Alabama court system, which had taken five years to get this far.
Decision
In an opinion delivered by Justice John Marshall Harlan II, the Supreme Court decided in
favor of the petitioners, holding that "Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership
lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private
interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment" and, further, that freedom to associate with
organizations dedicated to the "advancement of beliefs and ideas" is an inseparable part of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The action of the state's obtaining
the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of
its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the
constitutional rights of the petitioners.
Yates vs US, 354 US 298
Background

Fourteen lower echelon officials of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA) were charged with
violating the Smith Act by being members of the CPUSA in California. The Smith Act made it
unlawful to advocate or organize the destruction or overthrow of any government in the
United States by force. The appellants claimed that the Communist Party was engaged in
passive political activities and that any violation of the Smith Act must involve active attempts
to overthrow the government.
Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled 61 to overturn the convictions. It construed
the Smith Act narrowly, stating that the term "organize" meant to form an organization, not to
take action on behalf of an organization. The Court drew a distinction between actual
advocacy to action and mere belief. The Court ruled that the Smith Act did not prohibit
"advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract doctrine." The Court
recognized that "advocacy to action" circumstances would be "few and far between."
Writing for the majority, Justice John Marshall Harlan introduced the notion of balancing
society's right of self-preservation against the right to free speech.[1] He wrote:[2]
We are thus faced with the question whether the Smith Act prohibits advocacy and teaching
of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to
that end, so long as such advocacy or teaching is engaged in with evil intent. We hold that it
does not.... In failing to distinguish between advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract
doctrine and advocacy of action to that end, the District Court appears to have been led
astray by the holding in Dennis that advocacy of violent action to be taken at some future
time was enough.
In a concurring opinion Justice Hugo Black wrote:
Doubtlessly, dictators have to stamp out causes and beliefs which they deem subversive to
their evil regimes. But governmental suppression of causes and beliefs seems to me to be
the very antithesis of what our Constitution stands for. The choice expressed in the First
Amendment in favor of free expression was made against a turbulent background by men
such as Jefferson, Madison, and Mason men who believed that loyalty to the provisions of
this Amendment was the best way to assure a long life for this new nation and its
Government.... The First Amendment provides the only kind of security system that can
preserve a free government one that leaves the way wide open for people to favor,
discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such
views may be to the rest of us.
With respect to evidence required to convict in the absence of an appropriate standard,
Black wrote:
The testimony of witnesses is comparatively insignificant. Guilt or innocence may turn on
what Marx or Engels or someone else wrote or advocated as much as a hundred years or
more ago.... When the propriety of obnoxious or unfamiliar views about government is in
reality made the crucial issue, prejudice makes conviction inevitable except in the rarest
circumstances.
Yates did not rule the Smith Act unconstitutional, but limited its application to such a degree
that it became nearly unenforceable. The Yates decision outraged some conservative

members of Congress, who introduced legislation to limit judicial review of certain sentences
related to sedition and treason, which did not pass.
The appellants' convictions were reversed and the case was remanded to District Court for a
retrial.
Reaction
The decision was announced on the same day as several other decisions in which
communists were on the winning side, including Watkins v. United States and Sweezy v.
New Hampshire (with the same majority and dissent). The day was called "Red Monday" by
some anti-communists who disagreed with the decision. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoovercalled
the decisions "the greatest victory the Communist Party in America ever received."
President Eisenhower evaded questions about the decisions at a press conference, but
wrote a letter to the Chief Justice after reports that he was "mad as hell" about them. The
day was viewed as an indication of the Court's assertiveness under its new Chief Justice,
with Time magazine headlining its coverage "U.S. Supreme Court: New Direction".
Journalist I.F. Stone said the day "will go down in the history books as the day on which the
Supreme Court irreparably crippled the witch hunt."
People vs Ferrer
Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of
thePhilippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult topublic officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others,
for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow
the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men,
Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of
the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any
forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by
being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.
The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP
and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined
the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of
the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the
CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the
Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for
penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for
acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership
to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute
and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:
1. Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.
2. Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.
Held:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The
statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and
their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership
was acquired with the intent to further the goals of theorganization by overt acts. This is the
element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof
of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid
and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful
acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed
after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of
this Act are given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance
with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary
changes having been made.
The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the
Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of
Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the
exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of
the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were
done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association
is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.
The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition
to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides
theorganization purpose is to

the
CPP, it
overthrow the

must
be
proven
that
present Government of

thePhilippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is

willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is
willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The
Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.