Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF/ Pork Barrel)

G.R. Nos. 2008566, 208493 and 209251

a Write-up

I.

A. Pork Barrel System, defined;

The collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government,
including its members. It involves two (2) kinds: Congressional, for legislators; and
Presidential, referred to as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
B. Brief history of Pork Barrel in the Philippines
Pork Barrel is referred to as lump-sum discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature, tracing itself back in 1922. Its earliest form was Act 3044 or the Public
Works Act of 1922 which provides that sums appropriated for certain public works shall
be distributed, subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the
House of Representatives.
During the Martial Law era, Congressional Pork Barrel was discontinued but the
BatasangPambansa introduced Support for Local Development Projects wherein each
assemblyman receives the amount of P500,000.00 involving public or non-public
projects. These assemblymen can communicate their project preferences to the Ministry
of Budget and Management for approval.
Post-Martial law, Congressional Pork Barrel was revived through the form of
Mindanao and Visayas Development Fund. A clamor was raised for a similar funding for
Luzon legislators, therefore leading to the creation of Countrywide Development Fund
(CDF)
During the Ramos administration, the Department of Budget and Management was
directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee
on Appropriations on the releases made from the fund. On 1998, however, a provision
was made that publication of the project list were no longer required, the list, being
merely sufficient for the release of the CDF Fund.
It was on 1999 during Estradas Administration that CDF was removed in the General
Appropriations Act and was replaced by three separate forms namely: Food Security
Program Fund, Lingap Para SaMahihirap Program Fund and Rural/Urban
Development Infrastracture Program Fund. These contained special provisions requiring
prior consultation with the members of the Congress for the release of the Funds.
It was also during Estradas Administration that the Priority Development Fund
appeared in the GAA, where funds were directly released to the implementing agency
and realignment of funds were allowed.

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos administration gave PDAF significant change. First, it was

silent on how much is the allocated fund for each legislator as well as participation in the
proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. Secondly, it was during this
time that provisions were made allowing formal participation of non-governmental
organizations (NGO) in the projects.
Present Administration- 2013 PDAF has allowed Local Government Units as
implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the projects.
C.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The Presidential Pork is associated with the Congressional Pork Barrel, which has been
expanded to include the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Both were
issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos which recognized the need for a special
fund to intensify and strengthen government efforts to give governmental assistance.

II.

Controversies
A. The pork funds has been subject to numerous controversies. The first was in 1996
when a former representative blew the lid on huge sums of government money that
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks. In 2004,
concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional, but
due to lack of evidentiary support, the petition was dismissed.
The latest controversy spawned in 2013 when whistle-blowers declared that a certain
corporation (JLN- Janet Lim Napoles), swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for ghost projects using dummy NGOs by using funds from the pork barrel funds of
lawmakers.
On September 2013, the Court issued a Resolution consolidating the cases of petitions
which seeks to declare the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional. The resolution has
also required public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions and issued a
TRO enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary or any of the
persons acting under their authority for releasing the remaining PDAF allocated to the
members of the Congress and the Malampaya Funds.
B. Petitions were taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System
a. Certiorari under rule 65 seeks to correct an act performed by a respondent
b. The acts sought to be controlled are discretionary acts, by which respondent is one
who exercises judicial functions and acted with grave abuse of discretion or with lack
or in excess of jurisdiction

III.

Issues (Constitutional Principles)

A. Procedural Issues

1. Whether or not the issues raised involve an actual and justiciable controversy
1.1Whether or not the issues related thereto are moot and academic
2. Whether or not the issues raised are matters of policy subject to judicial review
2.1 Whether or not the issues are matters of a Political Question
3. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to sue
4. Whether or not res judicata and stare decisis apply
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
1. Separation of Powers
2. Non-delegability of legislative power
3. Checks and balances
4. Accountability
5. Political Dynasties
6. Local Autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel
1.Undue delegation of power
2. Full Public Disclosure of transactions involving public interest
2.1Right of people to information on matters of public concern

A. Procedural Issues
1. Whether or not the issues raised involve an actual and justiciable controversy
With respect to Article VIII of the Constitution, it is stated that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry. These
requisites are as follows:
i. There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
ii. The person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act
iii. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lismotaof the case
(lismota- cause of the suit; motivation of a legal action)
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states that judicial power includes duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or
controversy is one where there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness,
whereby a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. This is a prerequisite that something
had been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury
to itself as a result of the challenged action.
Based on these principles, there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these
cases.

1.1 Whether or not the issues related thereto are moot and academic
The respondents has raised that the issues related had been moot and academic. A case
becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful
purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
However, jurisprudence has still given exceptions wherein the Courts shall still decide
cases even on the assumption of mootness. Exceptions are:
i. There is a grave violation of the Constitution
ii. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved
iii. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public
iv. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review
2. Whether or not the issues raised are matters of policy subject to judicial review
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution states that judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. In addition, the Constitution has not only
vested the Judiciary the right, but rather a duty to exercise such.
Therefore, it is no question that this case is subject to judicial review.
2.1 Whether or not the issues are a matter of Political Question
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. These
political questions are dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
The limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries
the assurance that courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.
The Court has denied the submission of respondents that issues are a matter of political
question. The issues do not pose political but rather legal questions which are within its
province to resolve.
3. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to sue
Even after an act of a governmental agency or after something has begun to take its toll
on the rights of individuals, the Court will not yet exercise judicial review unless the
constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.
The elements of standing are as follows:
i. The petitioner must have suffered injury in fact which can be legal, economic or
environmental
ii. The injury must be traceable to the governmental act challenged
iii. The injury must be redressable by the remedy being sought by petitioner

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers.
As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
Pork Barrel System under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be
utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the
Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
4. Whether or not res judicata and stare decisis apply
Res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the
parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court.
The Court found that res judicata and stare decisis do not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel
1. Separation of Powers
Article II Section 1 states that the Philippines is a democratic and Republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
However, the principle of separation of powers demarcates the three fundamental powers
of the government. The Constitution has allotted power to the executive, legislative and
judicial branches. In essence, the power to make laws is vested to the legislative, the
power to enforce laws belongs to the Executive (through the President), and the power to
interpret laws belongs to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of
the others, which purpose is to prevent concentration of authority in one department and
thereby avoiding tyranny.
The doctrine carries with itself that although the three branches are not subject to control
by either of the others and each is supreme within its own sphere, they are still equal and
coordinate. With this, it is said that there is violation of the separation of powers when
one branch unduly encroaches on the domain of the other. Broadly speaking, there is
violation when there is impermissible interference with and/or assumption of another
departments functions.
In the PDAF case, it was stated that enforcement of the National Budget was indisputably
a function of the Executive Department and it alone shall exercise all roles and
prerogatives to implement the national budget. The Legislative should not cross over the
field of implementing the National Budget since it was clearly the function of the
Executive.
Petitioners have raised that by allowing Legislators to interfere with the application of the
National Budget is an illustration of how absolute and definite the power of legislators
wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. And although respondents countered it by stating that the principle

has not been violated since the President maintains ultimate authority to control the
execution of the GAA and that he retains final discretion to reject the legislators
proposals, the Court has ruled in favour of the petitioners.
2. Non-delegability of legislative power
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, the legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same.
Article VI Section 1 states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Based on said provision, the Congress and the people may constitutionally wield
legislative power and no other. This embodies non-delegability of legislative power and
the only recognized exceptions would be
i. delegated legislative power to local governments which are allowed to legislate on
purely local matters
ii. constitutionally grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law,
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.
Since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power
of appropriation,which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The power of appropriation, involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from
the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able
to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation, and given that the2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly,said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
3. Checks and balances (Presidents power to veto)
Article VI Section 27 states that The President shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA
is passedand hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration.
It is stated that the 2013 PDAF Article is constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum
amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending. This setup connotes that theappropriation law leaves the actual

amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does
not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of
item veto.
4. Accountability
Petitioners related that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel operate defies public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking
itself or its members.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which
they themselves participate
Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: A Senator or Member of the
House of Representativesshall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account
of his office. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court agreed only in part. While the Court accounts for the possibility that the close
operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the
formers post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this
matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork
Barrel Systems intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.
5. Political Dynasties
It was also submitted by petitioners that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who
are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in
power, which contradicts Section 26 of Article II of the Constitutions.
Sec 26 The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
Political dynasty is a term coined where politics has been under the control of a few
notable families, where a politicians spouse, child or other kinsman run for the same or
other government office.
The Court found this petition to be only speculative and does not properly demonstrate
how the Pork Barrel System propagates political dynasties.
6. Local Autonomy
The Constitution provides of provisions that states local autonomy:
Article II Section 25 The State shall ensure the autonomy of localgovernments
Article X Section 2 The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy

Section 3 The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local governmentstructure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.
The Court had observed that the concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils which are
legally mandated to assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction. Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are
essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.
With PDAF, Congressmen can simply bypass the local development council and initiate
projects on its own, and even take credit for its execution. Insofar as individual legislators
are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert local autonomy,
the PDAF and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel

1.Undue Delegation
Regarding theMalampaya Fund, the phrase and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of Presidential Decree 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
The above phrase gives the President liberty to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to separately appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
2. Full Public Disclosure of transactions involving public interest
The petitioners of this case have also prayed before the court that they may be furnished
Lists and Detailed Reports from the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM and release it to
the Commission of Audit and to the public relating to schedule of legislators who have
availed of their PDAF from 2003 up to 2013 as well as the use of the Executives lumpsum, discretionary funds, including proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances
from PAGCOR specifying the project and the recipient.
Their basis to request for such document(s) lies on Article II Section 28 which states that
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Public interest are anything affecting the rights, health, or finances of the public at large.
It is a common concern among citizens in the management and affairs of local and
national government.
2.1 Right of people to information on matters of public concern
In par with Section 28 of Article II, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution states that:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation
by the government agency in custody, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern cannot be discretionary on the part of the agencies.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and are entitled to access official
records, the Constitution does not give them the right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstract, summaries or the likes in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.
With such reasons, the Court had denied the submissions. It has been instructed that the
proper remedy is to invoke the right is to file a petition for mandamus.