Federation of Free Farmers vs.

Court of
Appeals

provided the ratio of division. Also, FFF

contended that even if planters and
millers had legal right to enter into
such agreement, still 60% of the
produce of milled sugarcane as well as
the derivatives obtained by the
planters have not been paid to the
laborers.CA ruled that the planters and
Victorias be jointly and severally
liable.FFF agreed with this decison.

FACTS:

There are 4 parties in this case: a. Federation

of Free Farmers (union representing the
farmers/laborers) b. Planters (the group
which harvests the lands where the farmers
work) c. Santos and Tikol (individual planters)
d. Central or Victorias milling corp, Inc.
(Planters bring their harvest here to be
milled).

(2)

Victorias
said
that
evidence
incontrovertibly shows that it has
already paid in full to the planters
their respective shares in proceeds
and derivatives from the moment it
was legally decided and agreed that it
should do so. Also, based from initial
petition, petitioner said that the
Federation admitted the laborers have
been given what is due them as far as
1952-53 to 1954-55 crops are
concerned. Victorias claimed that
planters and Victorias should not be
held jointly and severally liable. The
action filed was not founded on torts
but on either an obligation created by
a contract or by law, and even if on
torts, the action has prescribed. They
have paid the Planters so the Planters
should only be the one sued.

(3)

Planters association claim they have

freedom to stipulate ration as they
might agree. And that they have paid
the laborers.

(4)

Individual planters complain that the

decision of the Court of Appeals
ignored their plea of lack of jurisdiction
of the trial court over their persons in
spite of their proven claim that they
had not been properly served with
summons, and that the portion of said
decision holding them jointly and
severally liable with VICTORIAS and
the PLANTERS to the latter's laborers
for the amounts here in question has
no factual and legal basis, considering

Section 1 of RA 809 stipulates that in the

absence of written milling agreements
between the majority of planters and the
millers of sugarcane in any milling district in
the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced
in that district from the milling by the sugar
central of the sugarcane of any sugarcane
planter or plantation owner, as well as all byproducts and derivatives thereof, shall be
divided between them in the proportion
therein satisfied.

Section 9 stipulates that any increase in the

share of proceeds of milled sugarcane and
derivatives obtained by planters from the
Central, 60% of said increase should be paid
by planters to their respective laborers

*The following are the opposing contentions

of the petitioners:

(1)

FFF alleged that they have not been

paid from 1952-53 despite the 10%
increase and from 1953-1974 with the
4% increase. FFF claimed too that
Planters and Victorias entered into an
agreement when they have no legal
right because the law has already

they were not parties to the pertinent

questioned agreements.

In this connection, the question raised is:

Does Republic Act No. 809 apply even if the
majority of the sugarcane planters have
written milling agreement with the miller or
central stipulating a sharing proportion
different from that provided in Sec 1 of the
Act, such that any increase of participation
granted the planter under said milling
agreement will be divided between the
planter and his plantation laborer in the
proportion of 60% for the latter and 40%%
for the former? What is the legislative intent
which should be given effect.

Issue:
a. WON Planters and Victorias should be
severally liable
b. WON RA 809 is applicable regardless if
there exists a milling contract between
Central and Planters.

Held:

a. NO. Legal basis is that arising from law

which does not impose upon Centrals any
liability, whether expressly or impliedly, any
joint and several liability. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by
eliminating the joint and several liability of
VICTORIAS with the PLANTERS for the said
unpaid amounts, the said liability being
solely and exclusively of the PLANTERS No
contract bet sugar mill and the laborers.
Principal liability lies on Planters and
secondarily on Dept or Labor.

b. YES. The Act is thus operative irrespective

of whether there exists a milling agreement
between the central and the sugar planters.
To give literal import in interpreting the

two section will defeat the purpose of

the Act. It is undeniable that Section 9 of
Republic Act 809 uses the words "any
increase in participation granted the
planters under this Act". Read literally, there
could be a little shade of plausibility in the
posture of VICTORIAS and PLANTERS that
only any increase as a result of the
application of Section 1 of the Act is
contemplated in its Section 9, and not an
increase by virtue of a written milling
contract executed after the effectivity of the
Act. But if we look at the purpose why the
Act was enacted: 1.) continuous production
of sugar 2.) to grant the laborers a share in
the increased participation of planters in the
sugar produce. Therefore, any such increase
should be deemed as an "increase under
this Act", since it is a result of its operation.
The legislative intent is, thus to make the act
operative irrespective of whether there exists
a milling agreement between central and
sugar planters.

Facts: This is a petition for declaratory relief

filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in
the Court of First Instance Manila praying
that judgment be rendered against
respondents Games and Amusements Board
(GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato
de Leon.
Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended
by Republic Act No. 983, by express terms,
specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16
Saturdays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis
Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO,
and 12 Saturdays to the President for other
charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These
days can not be disposed of by the GAB
without authority of law.
Issue: W/N the placement of the six (6)
additional racing days given to the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of
Republic Act No. 1502, is proper

43 MANILA JOCKEY CLUB Inc. Vs GAMES

AND AMUSEMENT

Ratio:
- At the time of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956,
the long, continuous, and uniform
practice wasthat all sweepstakes
draws and races were held on Sundays
and during the whole day when
Congress chose not to specify in
express terms how the additional
sweepstakes draws and races would
beheld, it is safe to conclude that it did
not intend to disturb the then
prevailing situation and practice.
- Appellants have no vested right to the
unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24
Saturdays (except, perhaps, on
theholidays), because their holding of
races on these days is merely
permissive, subject to the licensing
and determinationby the GAB.
- Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted
increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes
draw and races, but without specifying
thedays for holding them
- GAB had no alternative except to
make room for the additional races,
from among the only available racing
daysunreserved by any law the
Sundays on which the private
individuals and entities have been
permitted to holdtheir races, subject

to licensing and determination by the

GAB.
In the interpretation of a legal
document, especially a statute (unlike
in the interpretation of an ordinary
writtendocument)
It is not enough to obtain information
to the intention or meaning of the
author or authorsbut also to see
whether the intention or meaning has
been expressed in such a way as to
give it legal effect andvalidity
The purpose of the inquiry, is not only
to know what the author meant by the
language he used, but also to see
thatthe language used sufficiently
expresses that meaning.
The legal act is made up of two
elements an (1) internal and an (2)
external one
o it originates in intention and is
perfected by expression
o failure of the latter may defeat
the former
Legislative debates are expressive of
the views and motives of individual
members and are not safe guides
It may not be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning and purpose
of the lawmaking body
It is impossible to determine with
certainty what construction was put
upon an act by the members of the
legislative body that passed the bill,
by resorting to the speeches of the
members thereof
Those who did not speak, may not
have agreed with those who did; and
those who spoke, might differ from
eachother

Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took
no part
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a
Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla
Compania de Seguros, through its authorized
agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12
months with the beneficiary designated as
Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence
during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna
participated actively with the
aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was
filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos
wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for
violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act
on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent
in the soliciting insurance without securing
the certificate of authority from the office of
the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad
contends that being the wife of true agent,
Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work,
as clerk, and that policy was merely a
renewal and was issued because Isidro had
called by telephone to renew, and at that
time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and
so she left a note on top of her husbands
desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial
court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced
here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August
1974, the trial courts decision was affirmed
by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR).
Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22
October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the
Office of the Solicitor General, representing
the Court of Appeals, submitted that
Aisporna may not be considered as having
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an

insurance agent within the scope or intent of
the Insurance Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a
whole. The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part of the statute must be considered
in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and
in order to produce harmonious whole. In
the present case, the first paragraph of
Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as
agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation
or procurement of applications for insurance
without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner; while the second paragraph
defines who is an insurance agent within the
intent of the section; while the third
paragraph prescribes the penalty to be
imposed for its violation. The appellate
courts ruling that the petitioner is
prosecuted not under the second paragraph
of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is
a reversible error, as the definition of
insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to
the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which
is any person who for compensation shall be
an insurance agent within the intent of this
section. Without proof of compensation,
directly or indirectly, received from the
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad
Aisporna may not be held to have violated
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
The Supreme Court reversed the appealed
judgment and acquitted the accused of the
crime charged, with costs de oficio.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation

136 SCRA 142
Facts:
Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one
of Philex Mining Corporations mine sites.
The heirs of the miners were able to recover
under the Workmans Compensation Act
(WCA).
Thereafter, a special committee report
indicated that the company failed to provide
the miners with adequate safety protection.
The heirs decided to file a complaint for
damages before the court of first instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Manila.
Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the action was based on an
industrial accident which is covered under
the WCA, and therefore, the CFI has no
jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that
work-connected injuries are compensable
exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the
WCA, which provides:
Section 5: Exclusive right to compensation.
The rights and remedies granted by this Act
to an employee by reason of a personal
injury entitling him to compensation shall

exclude all other rights and remedies

accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of
kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury x
x x.
Section 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmens
Compensation Commissioner shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
claims for compensation under the
Workmens Compensation Act, subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court, x x x.
Philex further contends that the WCA covers
work-connected accidents even if the
employer was negligent as the WCA under
Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional
compensation in the event that the employer
was negligent.
The heirs, however, content that the CFI has
jurisdiction as their complaint is not based on
the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on
damages arising out of negligence.
The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
The heirs questioned the dismissal before
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Does the CFI have jurisdiction over the
complaint?

SELECTIVE Atty. Bacungan believes that the

remedies are selective, i.e., the heirs had the
option of choosing between availing of the
compensation under the WCA or filing an
action for damages arising out of negligence
under the provisions of the Civil Code. If the
heirs had chosen one remedy and have
collected under that remedy, they can no
longer avail of the other remedy.
The allegations of the complaint indicate that
there was a breach of contract which may
justify an award for damages under the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. The
question now is whether or not the action for
damages will prosper, notwithstanding the
fact that the heirs had already received
compensation under the WCA.
The Court agreed with the position of Atty.
Bacungan that the two remedies are
selective. The WCA is based on a theory of
compensation distinct from existing theories
on damages. Recovery under the WCA is not
based on any theory on the part of the
employer.
Since the two remedies are distinct and the
heirs have the option of selecting which
remedy to avail of, are the heirs now
precluded from selecting the remedy under
the Civil Code, considering that they had
already availed of (and received
compensation) under the WCA?

Held:
Majority Opinion; Makasiar, J.
Several opinions [amicus curiae] were
advanced as to the nature of the remedies
provided for under the WCA, namely:
CUMULATIVE Justice Lazaro is of the opinion
that the heirs may file a complaint for
damages (which is different from
compensation under the WCA) with the
regular courts on the basis of the negligence
of an employer pursuant to the Civil code
provisions.
EXCLUSIVE Atty. (now Senator) Angara
believes that recovery under the WCA is
exclusive and therefore precludes an action
of damages under the Civil Code.

The heirs have a choice but they cannot

pursue both choices simultaneously.
The Court, however, noted that the heirs only
learned of the negligence report after they
had already availed and received
compensation under the WCA; they thus
could not make an intelligent and informed
choice at the time they opted for the WCA
remedy.
The heirs were thus allowed to pursue the
Civil Code remedy but they are not entitled
to recover under both remedies. Any
payment they received under the WCA shall
be deducted from the courts award of
damages, if any.

Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:
1.

Facts:
Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails
the constitutionality of RA 4790 and
petitioned
that
Comelec's
resolutions
implementing the same for electoral
purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12
barrios in two municipalities in the province
of Cotabato are transferred to the province of
Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change
in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the

municipality of Buldon in the Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,

Sarakan,
Kat-bo,
Digakapan,
Magabo,
Tabangao,
Tiongko,
Colodan
and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of
another
municipality,
the
municipality
of Parang,
also
in
the Province
of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
3. Apprised of this development, the Office of
the President, recommended to Comelec that
the operation of the statute be suspended
until "clarified by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the
statute should be implemented unless
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is
entitled
"An
Act
Creating
the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province
of Lanao del Sur", but which includes
barrios located in another province
Cotabato is
unconstitutional
for
embracing more than one subject in the
title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1. The constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,
under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof. Of relevance here is the second
directive. The subject of the statute must be
"expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the
spirit
of
command." Compliance
is
imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the
obligation to read during its deliberations the
entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of
House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790,
only its title was read from its introduction to
its final approval in the House where the bill,
being of local application, originated.
2. The Constitution does not require Congress
to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should
serve
the
purpose
of
the
constitutional demand that it inform the

legislators, the persons interested in the

subject of the bill, and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to
lead them to inquire into the body of the bill,
study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislators.
3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is
whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the
subject need not be stated in express terms
where it is clearly inferable from the details
set forth, a title which is so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or
put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act, is bad.
4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del
Sur" projects the impression that only the
province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent
province
of
Cotabato
are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town.
The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del
Sur," read without subtlety or contortion,
makes the title misleading, deceptive. For,
the known fact is that the legislation has a
two-pronged purpose combined in one
statute: (1) it creates the municipality of
Dianaton
purportedly
from
twenty-one
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan,
both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2)
it also dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del
Sur.
5. Finally, the title did not inform the members
of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it
did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their
towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it
kept the public in the dark as to what towns
and provinces were actually affected by the
bill.

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral

ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.

followed suit and changed their respective

charters.
The
controversial
difference
however is that all of its employees,
regardless of SG, are exempted from SSL.
This
prompted
the
Central
Bank
Employees Association to petition, after 8
years since its enactment, R.A. No. 7653.

Stat-Con Principle: Relative

Constitutionality Principle
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in
every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the
statute may be constitutionally valid as
applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void
at
another
time
because
of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its
practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to
inquiry and investigation in the light
of changed conditions.
Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New
Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the
old Central Bank of the Philippines, and
created a new Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP).
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653
provides that those with Salary Grades (SG)
20 and above are exempted from the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL), meaning
their Money Board can make its own
compensation structure; while those with SG
19 and below are not exempted from
SSL, such that their salary structure are
bound to the provisions of SSL.
Following the enactment of RA No. 7653,
other Government Financial Institutions
(GFIs) like the GSIS, SSS, DBP and others,

The petitioners thrust for their challenge

is that RA 7653 denies them the equal
protection of the law as it makes an
unconstitutional cut between two classes:
1) officers and executives (SG 20 and above),
exempted from SSL; and 2) rank-in-file (SG
19 and below), not exempted from SSL.
This thus is a class legislation.
Further, one of their sub-sets of
arguments is that GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS
personnel are all exempted from the
coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of
rank-and-file
personnel
of
government
financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rankand-file are also discriminated upon.
Issue:
Whether the last paragraph of Section
15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of
the constitutional mandate that "No person
shall be. . . denied the equal protection of
the laws.
Ruling:
A) UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF
EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE
II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
It is settled in constitutional law that the
"equal protection" clause does not prevent
the Legislature from establishing classes
of individuals or objects upon which different
rules shall operate - so long as the
classification is not unreasonable.
That is, the standard for classification is
satisfied if it is based on reasonable
foundation and is not palpably arbitrary.

In the case at bar, exemption of SG 20 and

above from SSL was reasonable as it was
intended to address the BSPs lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was
not intended to discriminate the rank-in-file
employees. If the discrimination of the rankin-file employees was the end result, the
discrimination has a rational basis and
is not palpably arbitrary.
B)
THE
ENACTMENT,
HOWEVER,
OF
SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER
RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEESOF GFIs FROM
THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION
OF
THE
CHALLENGED
PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE. (this is where
concept of Relative Constitutionality comes
in)
A statute valid when enacted may
become invalid by change in the
conditions to which it is applied.
Although R.A. No. 7653 was held valid
under the present standards of equal
protection, the subsequent enactments of
the charters of the other GFIs which
unanimously
exempted
all
of
their
employees from the SSL, including those
occupying rank-in-file positions, where
now invidious to that of the rank-in-file
employees of the BSP, who are not exempted
from the SSL, considering that they all
belong to the same class of GFIs.
The rights for equal protection of
laws of the rank-in-file employees of the BSP
were now abridged.
Held:
The
continued
operation
and
implementation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No.
7653 is unconstitutional.

COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated August

16, 2007, resolving that all pending incidents
relating to her qualifications should now be
determined by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

G.R. No. 178831-32 (Promulgated April

1, 2009)
Jocelyn SyLimkaichong vs. COMELEC
Louis C. Biraogo vs. Hon. Prospero
Nograles, Jocelyn SyLimkaichong
Olivia P. Paras vs. House of
Representatives, Jocelyn SyLimkaichong
Renald F. Villando vs. COMELEC, Jocelyn
SyLimkaichong
At the core of these contentious
consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint
Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17,
2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. SyLimkaichong
(Limkaichong)
from
running
as
a
congressional candidate for the First District
of Negros Oriental; (2) the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated
June
29,
2007,
affirming her disqualification; and (3) the

Facts
- On March 26, 2007 LIMKAICHONG filed
a COC for House Rep.
- Two petitions for her disqualification:
April 4, 2007 and April 11, 2007
Napoleon Camero and Renald F.
Villando, respectively, filed separate
petitions on the grounds of her
lacking of citizenship which would
invalidate her candidacy.
- COMELEC
consolidated
such
complaints, the cases remained
pending on May 14, 2007 when the
elections were conducted.
- LIMKAICHONG EMERGED AS THE
VICTOR (65,708) on the margin of 7,
746 from opponent Olivia Paras
(57,962)
- On May 15, 2007 Olivia Paras filed to
COMELEC for the suspension of the
Proclaimation of Limkaichong as
winner
- In the COMELEC investigations, it was
found that LIMKAICHONGs father did
not fully acquire said naturalization
where the resolution disqualifies
LIMKAICHONG.
- On May 18, COMELEC En Banc issued
resolution 8062 not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates
with
pending
disqualification
cases which shall be without prejudice
to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases.
- LIMKAICHONG filed a motion for
reconsideration
and
to
lift
the
suspension (May 20, 22 2007) where
on May 25 the PBOC proclaimed her as
First District Representative.
- Numerous cases followed suit reaching
the Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari.

The Court granted it and dismissed all

petitions, including Biraogos petition,
and

reversed

the

ruling

of

the

COMELEC.
Petitioner also questioned on the 360degree turn of the decision by the
Court

dated

April

1,

2009

as

embodied in the Decision written by

Justice Ruben T. Reyes, which although
unpromulgated,

was

nonetheless

signed by 14 Associate Justices and

approved en banc on july 15, 2008.
Issue/s:
1. Was
the
proclamation
of
LIMCKAICHONG valid?
2. Upon proclamation, would it have
been the HRET, and not COMELEC
whom have had the jurisdiction
over the Disqualification cases?
3. Was COMELEC (Second Division
and
En
Banc)
correct
in
disqualifying LIMKAICHONG on the
grounds of her being not a
natural-born citizen?
4. Can the HoR be compelled to
prohibit
LIMKAICHONG
from
assuming
her
duties
as
representative?
5. WON the unpromulgated Decision
of the Court is final and executory

who garnered the highest number of

votes,
the
Division
Resolution
invalidating
his
certificate
of
candidacy was not yet final. As such,
his proclamation was valid or legal, as
he had at that point in time remained
qualified.
2. Yes it should be the HRETs
jurisdictionThe Court has invariably
held
that
once
a
winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a
Member
of
the
House
of
Representatives, the
COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's
own jurisdiction begins.
3. Since there was a flaw in the
naturalization

process

of

LIMKAICHONGs father, Julio OngSy,

which prevented him from gaining
finalty,

LIMKAICHONG

remains

Chinese national and was supposed

to be disqualified to run.However,
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473 clearly states that the cancellation
of the naturalization certificate can
only be made "upon motion made in
the proper proceedings by the Solicitor
General or his representatives, or by

Held/Decisions
1. Yes it was valid. On the grounds that
LIMKAICHONG
timely
filed
with
COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration and the lifting of the
incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. COMELEC resolution
8062 is valid exercise of COMELECs
constitutional power to promulgate its
own rules of conduct and procedure.
Planas vs. COMELEC the proclamation
of Defensor, the respondent therein

the proper provincial fiscal." In other

words, the initiative must come from
these

officers,

presumably

previous

investigation

particular

case.

through

its

Thus,

after

in

each

the

State,

representatives,

not

private persons, are the only ones who

may question the illegally or invalidly
procures certificate of naturalization.
4. No
(presumption
of
regularity)
[Norgales] went on to state that after

assumption by the Member-elect, or

having acquired a presumptively valid
title to the office, the House of
Representatives
cannot,
(motuproprio,
cancel,
revoke,
withdraw any recognition given to a
sitting Member or to remove his name
from its roll, as such would amount to
a removal of such Member from his
office without due process of law. The
unseating of a Member of the House of
Representatives should be exercised
with great caution and after the proper
proceedings for the ouster has been
validly completed. For to arbitrarily
unseat someone, who obtained the
highest number of votes in the
elections, and during the pendency of
the proceedings determining ones
qualification or disqualification, would
amount
to
disenfranchising
the
electorate
in
whom
sovereignty
resides.
5. NO. in Belacvs COMELEC, held that a
decision must not only be signed by
the Justices who took part in the
deliberation,

but

promulgated

to

must
be

also

be

considered

Decision, to wit:
[A] true decision of the Court is the
decision signed by the Justices and
duly

promulgated.

decision

is

so

Before

that

signed

and

promulgated, there is no decision of

the

Court

to

speak

of. before

decision is signed and promulgated, all

opinions and conclusions stated during
and after the deliberation of the Court,
remain in the breasts of the Justices,
binding upon no one, not even upon
the Justices themselves. Of course,
they may serve for determining what

the

opinion

of

the

majority

provisionally is and for designating a

member to prepare the decision of the
Court, but in no way is that decision
binding unless and until signed and
promulgated.
Thus an unpromulgated decision is no
decision at all.

Relation to said TOPIC (ANALYSIS)

Promulgation: Operative Fact for the
Effectivity of a Decision
It can be seen that in the case of
Limkaichong vs. COMELEC (wherein it
involves numerous cases under one
common theme) there is the idea of
the
usage
of
promulgation
of
resolutions as a means to effect
decision
to
the
parties.
The
importance of timing, as seen in the
facts of the case (see full text)
consummates the multiple angles
affected by said cases. The Supreme
Court taking cognizance of the matter
looked into the details of TIME as basis
for their decisions. Where on the
multiple cases that followed suit, the
idea of operative fact steps in on the
grounds of when the decisions were
made (on/against Limkaichong) and
the effect to which it constituted
(affecting the validity of Limkaichong
as not only a citizen but as a
proclaimed winner).
Reversal of Judicial Construction
The previous leaked unpromulgated
decision of the court is not yet final
and executory. Although it is already
signed, as long as it is not still
promulgated, it can still be change. An
unpromulgated decision is not a
decision since they are part of internal

deliberations of the Court which must

not be released to the public, since it
is still subject to change. This goes to
the reason of preserving ones
freedom of action, thus a member of
the court, although he already signed
can withdraw his vote as long as the
decision
has
not
yet
been
promulgated.
Source:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri200
9/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html

Villanueva Y Paredes vs. Commission on

Elections (municipal board of canvassers of
dolores, quezon, vivencio g. lirio)
---------December , 1985
Doctrines
1. Laws and statute should be
construed in accordance with the
spirit of the law
2. Election laws should be reasonably
and liberally construed to achieve
their purposeto effectuate and
safeguard the will of the electorate
in the choice of their
representatives. The rules and
regulation for the conduct of
elections are mandatory before the
elections, but when it is sought to
enforce them after the elections,
they are held to be directory only.
Since if they are held mandatory,
innocent voters will be deprived of
their votes without any fault on
their part.
Facts
[Villanueva
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration of the decision (a decision
which dismissed his petition to set aside the
COMELEC resolutions on Feb. 21 and July 31
1980-denying his petition for annulment of
the proclamation of respondent Vivencio
Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores,
Quezon arguing that it should have been him

considering the majority of the votes casts)

on May 3, 1983.]
Narciso Mendoza had filed on Jan. 4,
1980 (the last day of filing for candidacy) a
sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office
of Vice-mayor in Dolores,Quezon. However
on that same day Mendoza filed an unsworn
letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his
said certificate of candidacy "for personal
reasons." On the next day, January 25, 1980,
petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning
of his companion Mendoza's withdrawal,.
filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy
in substitution" of Mendoza's for the said
office of vice mayor as a one-man
independent ticket. The results showed that
Villanueva won (3,112 votes over 2,660
votes of Lirio, his opponent).
But the Municipal board of Canvassers
didnt acknowledge the victory because for
them it was a stray vote because
Villanueva didnt appear in the COMELECs
certified
list
of
candidates
in
that
municipality, presuming that his candidacy
was not approved by the COMELEC. The
canvassers then proclaimed Vivencio G. Lirio
as the unopposed winner of the elections.
The Comelec argued:
Election Code provides:

The

1978

SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly

filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless
the candidate files with the office which
received the certificate ... or with the
Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal
...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing
certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a
certificate of candidacy duly filed should ...
withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office
may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office for which ... the candidate who has
withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before
midday of election ...

Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have

substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the
strength of Section 28 of the 1978 Election
Code which he invokes, For one thing,
Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not
under oath, as required under Section 27 of
the Code; hence it produces no legal effect.
For another, said withdrawal was made not
after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing
certificates of candidacy,
as contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code,
but on that very same day.
Issues:
1. Is the literal interpretation of the
Comelec on the Election code
(denying the proclamation of
Villanueva due to an unsworn
withdrawal
of
certificate
of
candidacy of Mendoza (sec. 27)
and because the withdrawal was
not done after the last day of
filing) in accordance with the spirit
of the law?
Held/Rationale

1. The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal

was not sworn is but a technicality
which should not be used to frustrate
the people's will in favor of petitioner
as the substitute candidate. Moreover,
Mendozas withdrawal was an actual
fact, so much that no votes were cast
for him at all. Although, his candidacy
was filed on the last day, his name
was not on the certified list of
candidates.
Thus,
his
unsworn
withdrawal was accepted by the
election registrar without protest or
objection. Also, since there was no
time to include the name of the
petitioner in the candidates list, he
circularized formal notices of his
candidacy to all chairmen and
members of the citizens election
committees in compliance with the

2.

3.

4.

suggestion of the Comelec Law

Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.
The
legal
requirement
that
a
withdrawal be under oath will be held
to be merely directory and Mendoza's
failure to observe the requirement
should be "considered a harmless
irregularity.
The Comelec's post-election act of
denying
petitioner's
substitute
candidacy certainly does not seem to
be in consonance with the substance
and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the
1978 Election Code provides for such
substitute candidates in case of death,
withdrawal or disqualification up to
mid-day of the very day of the
elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was
filed on the last hour of the last day for
regular filing of candidacies on January
4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that
same day. For all intents and purposes,
such withdrawal should therefore be
considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the
last day, even going by the literal
reading of the provision by the
Comelec.
It follows that the votes cast in his
favor must be counted. Such being the
case, there is more than sufficient
justification for his proclamation as
Vice Mayor

Manahan vs. ECC, 104 SCRA 198

Facts: Claimant was the widow of Nazario
Manahan, Jr., who died of Enteric Fever while
employed as a classroom teacher in the Las
Pias Municipal High School. Claimant filed
her claim with the GSIS for death benefits
under P.D. No. 626. GSIS denied the claim
finding that the ailment of the deceased is
not an occupational disease. Claimant filed a

Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the

deceased was in perfect health when
admitted to the service and that the ailment
of the deceased was attributable to his
employment, GSIS maintained its denial.
Claimant appealed to the Employees
Compensation Commission which affirmed
the GSIS denial.
Issue: WON claimant is entitled to the
benefits
Held:
Majority Opinion. The medical records of
the deceased showed that he had a history
of ulcer-like symptoms several months before
his death on May 2, 1975. He was even
treated
for
epigastric
pain
due
to
hyperacidity on Dec. 10,1974. Epigastric pain
is a symptom, and ulcer is a common
complication of typhoid fever. Hence, it is
clear that the illness which claimed his life
could have had its onset months before Dec.
10,1974. Such being the case, his cause of
action accrued before Dec. 10,1974.
In any case, the Court has always maintained
that in case of doubt, the same should be
resolved in favor of the workers. The
Workers Compensation Act and the Labor
Code should be liberally construed to attain
their laudable objective, that is, to give relief
to the workman and/or his dependents in the
event that the former should die or sustain
an injury. The presumption of compensability
subsists in favor of the claimant.
Concurring Opinion, Justice MelencioHerrera:
Although enteric fever is not an occupational
disease, considering the cause of such
illness, the risk of contracting it could have
been increased by the working conditions of
the deceased as a teacher, who used to eat
his meals at the school canteen and used the
comfort room and other facilities of the
school.

Villavert vs ECC, 110 SCRA 233

G.R. No. L-48605, December 14, 1981
FACTS:
This is a petition to review decision of the
Employees Compensation Commission
affirming decision of the Government Service
Insurance System denying the claim for death
benefits on the ground that acute hemmorhagic
pancreatitis is not an occupational disease, thus,
petitioner failed to show the causal connection
between the fatal ailment of Marcelino Villavert
and the nature of his employment. He was
employed at the Philippine Constabulary as code
verifier. However, due to shortage of qualified
civilian personnel to handle certain task, he was
assigned various tasks that would require him to
render overtime services especially in the
preparation of the checks for the salary of the
Philippine Constabulary and the National
Integrated Police personnel throughout the
country.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcelino Villavert thru
mother Domna Villavert is entitled to death
benefits?
HELD:
Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in favor of
the labor. Judgment rendered ordering
the Government Service Insurance System to
pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount
of Six Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00)

ISSUE:
Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises,
Inc. (Petitioner) vs.
NLRC, PaulinoMabuti, NapoleoBorata,
SilvinoTudio and Calinar Security
Agency (Respondents)

FACTS:

WON the NLRC erred in deciding that

the Petitioner and the Security Agency
are jointly and severally liable to pay
the Security Guards.
WON the NLRC erred in giving the
appeal due course despite the
Security Agencys failure to file the
appeal under oath and pay the appeal
fee on time.

RULING:

Del Rosario & Sons Logging

Enterprises, Inc. (Petitioner) entered
into a Contract of Services with Calinar
Security Agency for the supply of
security guards.
PaulinoMabuti, NapoleoBorata and
SilvinoTudio, three of the guards
deployed by the Security Agency with
the Petitioner, filed a Complaint
against the Security Agency and the
Petitioner for underpayment of salary
and the non-payment of living
allowance and 13th month pay.
The Security Agency denied liability
alleging that it cannot comply with the
payments required by law to the
Security Guards because of the
inadequate contract price paid by the
Petitioner.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
Complaint against the Petitioner
because of the non-existence of an
employer-employee relationship but
ordered the Security Agency to pay
the Security Guards the total amount
that they sought which was
P2,923.17.
Upon appeal by the Security Agency,
the NLRC decided to hold both the
Security Agency and the Petitioner
jointly and severally liable to pay the
Security Guards because the Petitioner
is considered an indirect employer of
the Security Guards.
The Security Agency, in its appeal to
the NLRC above, failed to file it under
oath and did not pay the required
appeal fee on time.

On Issue No. 1:
The SC affirms the decision of the NLRC
holding the Petitioner and the Security
Agency jointly and severally liable for the
underpayment of the salary and the nonpayment of the living allowance and 13th
month pay to the Security Guards. Under
Article 106 of the Labor Code, the Principal
(in this case, the Petitioner) should be held
jointly and severally liable with the
Contractor (in this case, the Security
Agency), in case the latter fails to pay the
wages of its employees. This is more so the
case with Petitioner considered as an indirect
employer under the definition stated in
Article 107 of the same Labor Code.
The joint and several liability imposed by the
Court is however without prejudice to the
Petitioners right to reimburse from the
Security Agency the amount it paid the
Security Guards.
The SC further ruled that the inadequate
contract price received by the Security
Agency from the Petitioner is irrelevant
because the Security Agency is expected to
have known the labor laws and the correct
compensation it should have demanded for
its services.
On Issue No. 2:

The SC rules that the NLRC has the right to

accept the appeal despite the lack of
verification and the delay in the payment of
the appeal fee. Article 221 of the Labor Code
provides that, unlike in the Courts of law
where the rules of evidence are controlling,
the primordial interest of the Labor Code and
the NLRC is to speedily and objectively
ascertain the facts of the case without regard
to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process. Anyway, the
deficiency in the verification in this case can
be cured in the actual oath-taking.

People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no
part, 1 on leave
Facts: In an information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of that Province,
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a
violation of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. A preliminary investigation
conducted by said court resulted in the
finding of a probable cause that the crime
charged was committed by the defendant.
Thereafter, the trial started upon defendants
plea of not guilty, the defense moved to
dismiss the information on the ground that
as justice of the peace, the defendant is not
one of the officers enumerated in Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. The lower court
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a
justice of the peace is within the purview of
Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that
a justice of the peace is excluded from the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Acting on various motions and
pleadings, the lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by
the defense. Hence, the appeal by the
Solicitor General.

Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was

excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro
omisso habendus est, a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. The
maxim casus omisus can operate and
apply only if and when the omission has
been clearly established. The application of
the rule of casus omisus does not proceed
from the mere fact that a case is criminal in
nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. Substitution of terms is not
omission. For in its most extensive sense the
term judge includes all officers appointed
to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justice of the peace,
and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of
facts. The intention of the Legislature did not
exclude the justice of the peace from its
operation. In Section 54, there is no
necessity to include the justice of peace in
the enumeration, as previously made in
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as the legislature has availed itself of
the more generic and broader term judge,
including therein all kinds of judges, like
judges of the courts of First Instance, judges
of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of
the courts of Industrial Relations, and
justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal
order entered by the trial court and
remanded the case for trial on the merits.

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

Mario Centeno vs. Hon Victoria VillalonPornillos
236 SCRA 197
Topic: Penal Statutes: Strictly against the
State; liberally in favor of the accused
Facts:
Last quarter of 1985, the officers from
a group of elderly people of a civic
organization (Samahan ng Katandaan
ng Tikay, MalolosBulacan)esblished a
fund raising activity for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of their barrio.
Petitioner Martin Centeno, solicited
fromJudge Adoracion G. Angeles a
contribution of P1,500
Said solicitation was made without a
permit from the DSWD
As a consequence, an information was
filed against Martin Centeno for
violation of PD No. 1564 (Solicitation
Permit Law)

On December 29, 1992, the court

rendered judgment, sentencing the
accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.And required to pay only
P200.00 and recommended a
pardoned the accused for it is acted in
good faith.
Petitioner Centeno filed a motion to
nullify the information on the ground
that PD 1564 only covers solicitations
made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for
religious purposes such as
construction/renovation of a chapel
On May 21, 1993, Judge VillalonPornillos affirmed the decision of the
lower court but modified the penalty
because of perversity of the act
committed, increasing the penalty of
imprisonment to 6 yrs and the fine to
P1,000.
Issue:
Should the phrasecharitable
purposes be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include religious
purposes? NO.
Ruling:
PD 1564 merely stated charitable or
public welfare purposes, only goes to
show that the framers of the law never
intended solicitation for religious
purposes within its coverage.
It will be observed in Article VI Section
28 of 1987 Constitution, treat the
words charitable and religious
separately and independently to each
other. These two terms are likewise
dissociated and individually mention in
some statutes. Accordingly, the term
charitable should be strictly
construed so as to exclude
solicitations for religious purposes.
Thereby, we adhere to the
fundamental doctrine underlying
virtually all Penal Legislation that such
interpretation should be adopted as
would favor the accused.
Petitioner next avers that solicitations
for religious purposes cannot be
penalized under the law for, otherwise,
it will constitute an abridgment or
restriction on the free exercise clause
guaranteed under constitution. It may
be conceded that the construction of

church is social concern of the people

involve public welfare and that such
activity is within the cloak of free
exercise clause under the right to
freedom of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution.
To conclude, solicitations for religious
purposes may be subject to proper
regulation by the state in the exercise
of police power. However, the case at
bar, considering that solicitations
intended for a religious purpose are
not within the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. 1564..
WHEREFORE, decision appealed is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioner Martin Centeno is
ACQUITTED of the offense charged,
with costs de oficio.

In the interpretation of a penal statute,

the tendency is to subject it to careful

scrutiny and to construe it with such

strictness as to safeguard the rights of
the accused.
Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others.
The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a
statue had the intention been not to
restrict its meaning and to confine its
terms.
If the statute is ambiguous and admits
two reasonable but contradictory
constructions, that which operates in
favor of a party accused under its
provisions be preferred.
The purpose of strict construction is
not to enable a guilty person to
escape from punishment through a
technicality but to provide a definition
of forbidden acts.