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Gendered Conflict
Mary Caprioli
Journal of Peace Research 2000 37: 51
DOI: 10.1177/0022343300037001003
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journal of

peace
R

E S E A R C H

2000 Journal of Peace Research,

vol. 37, no. 1, 2000, pp. 5368
Sage Publications (London, Thousand
Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
[0022-3433(200001)37:1; 5368; 011269]

Gendered Conflict*
MARY CAPRIOLI
Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth

This study quantitatively tests the relationship between state militarism and domestic gender equality.
International relations literature on the impact and potential impact of women on foreign policy suggests that women are more peaceful in that they are less likely than men to support the use of international violence. Other research indicates that a domestic environment of inequality results in state
militarism on the international level. Both lines of inquiry suggest that a domestic environment of
equality between women and men would lead toward greater state pacifism, and four hypotheses are
developed to test this relationship. The Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset is used with hostility level
as the dependent variable to measure the level of militarism employed by any given state to resolve
international conflicts. Independent variables for gender equality include percent women in parliament,
duration of female suffrage, percent women in the labor force, and fertility rate. Several control variables (alliances, contiguity, wealth, and democracy) are added to the multivariate logistic regressions,
and all four hypotheses are confirmed. This study substantiates the theory that domestic gender
equality has a pacifying effect on state behavior on the international level.

The debate rages within and beyond feminist theory1 as to the existence of a gender
gap between womens and mens support for
the use of violence to resolve international
disputes, and the impact or, in many cases,
the potential impact of domestic gender
equity on international behavior. Specifically, scholars have identified women, in
relation to men, as being less likely to
support the use of force (deBoer, 1985; Fite
et al., 1990; Frankovic, 1982; McGlen &
Sarkees, 1993; Mueller, 1973, 1994; Shapiro
& Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984; Togeby,
* The data used in this project can be found
at http://www.umassd.edu/1academic/CArtsandSciences/
polisci/Caprioli.html
1
There exists a wealth of feminist theory across disciplines. In this project, feminist theory is used as a general
term while recognizing the breath within feminist theory
and the dialogue between feminist theorists and disciplines.

1994). International relations scholars

studying the impact of women on foreign
policy suggest that increased gender equality,
resulting in womens equal political, economic, and social power, will result in more
pacific foreign policy behavior.2 The inclusion of women as equal members of society
will, therefore, result in fewer and less
violent militarized international disputes.
Ample work also exists within international relations literature linking domestic
factors and state bellicosity in that states
externalize domestic political culture to
international behavior (Doyle, 1986; Maoz
& Russett, 1992; Russett, 1990). Similarly,
feminists advocate the analysis of relationships between and within states to explain
2

The speculated change in policy outcome would not be

limited to foreign policy, which is the focus of this
research.

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54

journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H

international relations (Harrington, 1992).

Indeed, research suggests that domestic
social factors may have greater explanatory
potential in predicting state militarism than
do traditional measures (Brandes, 1994; Fite
et al., 1990; Forsythe, 1992; Iannello, 1992;
McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Peterson, 1992;
Tickner, 1992; Togeby, 1994). This
domesticinternational political link is based
on the premise that states duplicate patterns
of domestic politics in the international
arena and apply the same political norms in
both domestic and international politics.
States that typically exhibit discrimination
and violence in their domestic affairs will,
theoretically, rely on the same tools in the
international arena. We may, therefore,
expect the international behavior of states to
vary among states with more gender-neutral
value systems.
This analysis draws on both feminist
research and conflict studies in an attempt to
lend greater predictability and accuracy to
the study of peace. This research will analyze
the fundamental question as to whether
domestic gender equality correlates with
fewer and less violent military solutions to
resolve international disputes. After first
laying out the basic theoretical and conceptual material of relevance to this study, my
empirical analysis will examine the degree to
which domestic gender equality impacts
states international behavior. An analysis of
gender should begin with a common understanding of the term. Next, the assumption
that women differ from men in their support
for international violence necessitates identifying these value differences. Lastly, the
gender gap will be explored.

Gender
It is on the basis of gender that access and
power are limited and inequality is justified
and maintained. Gender issues determine
access to resources and control as a result

volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000

of gender-defined rights roles, power

relationships, responsibilities, and expectations (Sadik, 1997). Although the power and
role of women vary across cultures, women
are always unequal in both the economic
and political spheres (Scott, 1986: 1069),
thus making gender equality a useful crossnational variable.
Theorists seeking to understand womens
relative lack of power compared to that of
men subscribe to one of two general schools
of thought. Scholars explain the gendered
power deficit with two competing theories:
biological reductionism or biological determinism versus social constructivism.
According to both theoretical perspectives,
foreign policy would be altered with less
gender-based value systems, but for different
reasons.
Biological determinism posits physiological differences between men and women as
the basis of social roles. Scholars supporting
the concept of biological determinism argue
that women have an essential nature that is
based on their natural reproductive capacity
(Daly, 1984; Elshtain, 1986; Griffin, 1981;
Rich, 1976; Rossi, 1970; Ruddick, 1987).
According to this perspective, womens
behavior is instinctive and not learned. The
inclusion of women in foreign policy decisionmaking, therefore, would alter policy
output not womens nature, which is biologically determined.
On the other hand, social constructivists
argue that gender differences are socially
constructed and that gender is not synonymous with sex differences (Gailey, 1987;
MacCormack & Strathern, 1980; Ortner &
Whitehead, 1981; Stacey, 1986; Tickner,
1992). Gender is viewed as the product of
social relationships within society (Rosaldo,
1980; Rubin, 1975; Sadik, 1997).
According to the social constructivist perspective, there is no inherent difference
based on gender, as both males and females
are forced into stereotypical roles. The

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Mary Caprioli

inclusion of women in foreign policy, therefore, would not necessarily alter policy
output unless society were freed from gender
stereotypes. In which case, foreign policy
output might become less bellicose as both
genders become free to act on their beliefs
rather than being tied to roles that require
males to be aggressive and females passive.
Gender Values
Both perspectives social constructivist and
biological determinism lead to the conclusion that gender equality would affect
foreign policy decisionmaking and would
account for the existence of a gender gap. At
the most basic level, scholars have identified
distinct values for women and men. Some
studies, relying on assumptions about feminine and masculine qualities,3 suggest that
the inclusion of women in foreign policy
analyses will affect outcomes (Peterson,
1992; Tickner, 1992). Page & Shapiro
(1992: 295) declare that [I]n practically all
realms of foreign and domestic policy,
women are less belligerent than men.
Womens relative pacifism may be a
result of women seeing moral dilemmas in
terms of conflicting responsibilities rather
than competing rights, and of their valuing
community and connectedness over
autonomy and individuation (Flax, 1978;
Gilligan, 1982). Similarly, Ford & Lowery
(1986) argue that women prioritize care and
mutually acceptable solutions, whereas men
favor justice. In general, women are less
competitive and more focused on issues of
interdependence
and
egalitarianism
(Gidengil, 1995; Miller, 1988; Welch &
Hibbing, 1992). White (1988) corroborates
studies highlighting the egalitarian nature of
women with her research showing that males
engage in power struggles for personal gain,
whereas females attempt to minimize power
3

Combinations of masculine and feminine qualities exist

in all people. For the majority of women, the feminine
qualities are assumed to predominate.

GENDERED CONFLICT

differences, to share resources, and to treat

others equally. According to some feminist
literature, therefore, value differences4
between women and men result in a gender
gap in support for the international use of
violence. Domestic gender inequality, therefore, may yield increased state militarism on
the international level.
Feminists analyze power, defined as equal
access, and theorize that gender and power
hierarchies are inextricably intertwined
(Tickner, 1992: 19). Control is often used as
the rationale for female subjugation.
Feminists claim that power should be conceptualized as a divisible, infinite resource
and/or as the ability to reach goals (Iannello,
1992: 43). States that are not organized
according to strict hierarchical models based
on gender5 would be socialized to treat
others, regardless of differences, as equal and
due equal treatment. Feminism involves a
commitment to freedom, equality, and selfgovernment (Dietz, 1985) and rejects hierarchical domination, the use of military force,
and other forms of exploitation (BrockUtne, 1990).
Gender Gap
Thus far, scholars have concentrated on
measuring gender differences in public
opinion. Most of the research testing for the
existence of a gender gap focuses on the difference between the level of female and male
support for war and willingness to use force
(de Boer, 1985; Fite et al., 1990; Frankovic,
1982; McGlen & Sarkees, 1993; Shapiro &
Mahajan, 1986; Smith, 1984; Togeby,
1994). If women are less likely to support
the use of force, the inclusion of women as
equal members of society, with equal pol4

These value differences may be either the result of

biology or socialization. In either case, value differences
would exist.
5 This argument applies to any hierarchical organization
based on any number of factors including race, gender,
ethnicity, or caste. This project, however, is focused on
women.

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journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H

itical, social, and economic access, would

impact foreign policy. This implies that the
higher a states level of gender equality, the
more peaceful that state is likely to be.
In a public opinion study on support for
war in the USA, Mueller (1973: 146) concludes that [W]omen generally are less
favorable to escalation than men, but only
slightly more opposed to it; and women are
less opposed to withdrawal than men, but
only slightly more in favor of it. This observation held for World War II, the Korea
War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War.
Mueller (1973) cautions, however, that not
voicing support for a war is not the same as
opposing it. To extend the gender gap study
beyond the US experience, Welch &
Thomas (1988) studied the British experience. They found no gap in ideology or partisan affiliation between men and women,
yet discovered a substantial difference
toward the use of force but not in maintaining military power, nuclear determent,
or military spending.
In addition, Fite et al. (1990) found a difference in men and womens support for the
use of force, as did Wilcox et al. (1996) and
Gallagher (1993). In a study of the Gulf
War, Gallagher identified a large gap, with
women in support of attacking Iraqi forces
at 22% versus mens 48%, and with women
opposed to attacking Iraqi forces at 73%
versus mens 48%. Even though both mens
and womens identified goal was the same
(to get Iraqi troops out of Kuwait), there
existed a distinct difference in support for
attacking Iraqi forces. Similarly, Hart &
Teeter (1991) also found men to be more
likely to support war continuation.
Controversy does exist within international relations literature between those
who hold that women have similar values to
those of men and those who identify a
gender gap (Holsti & Rosenau, 1988;
Wittkopf & Maggiotto, 1983). In a study
conducted in the USA, McGlen & Sarkees

volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000

(1993) found varying degrees of a gender

gap amongst the masses but none with
women working within the State
Department or the Defense Department.
The absence of a gender gap within the State
and Defense Departments may be a result of
pressure to conform to traditional institutional perspectives or may be tied to socioeconomic status. Studies controlling for
socio-economic status, however, have failed
to alter the size of the resultant gender gap,6
thus suggesting a more robust relationship
than critics believe (Fite et al., 1990;
Gallagher, 1993; Tessler & Warriner, 1997;
Welch & Thomas, 1988).
The hypothesized reasons for the gender
gap, when found, are many. Conover (1988)
suggests that the gender gap is created only
by those women who identify with the
womens movement. Furthermore, Grant &
Newland (1991) argue that any current
gender gap associated with support for the
commitment of forces or for war would be
eradicated by the inclusion of more women
in active duty within the armed forces. The
inclusion of women in the armed forces, on
the other hand, might result in an alteration
of the armed forces, not of womens
opinion. And there is support for this supposition, as Carson (1993) offers evidence
that the police force has become less violent
with an increased number of female officers
integrated at all levels of the police force,
rather than having the female officers
become more violent.
Tessler & Warriner (1997) argue that
there is no evidence that women are less militaristic than men. They do, however, find
that individuals who are more supportive of
6

It is important to remember that these studies analyzed

the USA or Great Britain two countries in which all
receive public education and have a certain standard of
living that is not necessarily representative of other countries. Thus, the scope of the observation that a gender gap
exists on the use of military force regardless of socio-economic status cannot be considered valid in a cross-cultural
analysis.

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Mary Caprioli

equality between women and men are also

less supportive of violence to resolve conflict.
This suggests that the relationship between
more pacifist attitudes and international
conflict rests upon the degree of gender
equality that characterizes a society (Tessler
& Warriner, 1997). Those who express
greater concern for the status and role of
women, and particularly for equality
between women and men, are more likely
than other individuals to believe that the
international disputes in which their country
is involved should be resolved through
diplomacy and compromise (Tessler &
Warriner, 1997: 280; see also Boling, 1991;
Conover, 1988; Conover & Sapiro, 1993;
Cook & Wilcox, 1991; Dietz, 1985;
Gidengil, 1995; Ruddick, 1989). In other
words, societies that have internalized values
that are less gender-based and apply them to
their interstate and interpersonal relations
should exhibit less militaristic international
behavior.

Violence Begets Violence

Beyond the existence of a gender gap over
the use of force to warrant an analysis of
womens impact on state bellicosity lie theories linking domestic and international violence. Societies with high levels of family
violence are more likely to rely on violent
conflict resolution and are more likely to be
involved in wars compared to societies with
lower levels of family violence (Brumfield,
1994; Erchak & Rosenfeld, 1994; Levinson,
1989). Higher levels of societal violence may
be explained by Rummels (1997: 170) conclusion that when political power is centralized, nondemocratic, and highly dependent
upon ones social group membership, be it
race, religion, ethnicity, or some cultural
division [gender?], then collective violence is
also highly likely.
Indeed, Ember & Ember (1994) depict
the causal relationship between international

GENDERED CONFLICT

behavior and domestic behavior by arguing

that the nature of a states international
behavior both legitimates and is reflected in
its domestic behavior. There may, however,
be a mutually supportive relationship between international and domestic behavior,
not a simple unidirectional causation; e.g.
domestic behavior might legitimate and
be reflected in a states international
behavior.
Although the link between international
behavior and domestic behavior may be
driven by a myriad of inequalities and violence within society, scholars have found in
particular a correlation between a states
level of militarism and sexism, manifested by
womens inequality in relation to that of
men (Brownmiller, 1975; Elshtain, 1987;
Reardon, 1985; Ruddick, 1983). Other
scholars have linked masculinity with militarism (Cohn, 1989; Enloe, 1989). The
hypothesized link between masculinity and
militarism is maintained by mens higher
social status in relation to that of women.
Based on these theories, we would expect a
states level of militarism use of military
action to decrease in conjunction with
increased gender equality.

Equality
Both theories gender gap and the
domesticinternational violence link rely
on a concept of equality. Pateman (1970)
defines equality to mean that all people must
have equal political, economic, and social
access in order for each person to be able to
participate equally in society. Equal participation relies on equality of opportunity,
which means that no illegitimate criteria are
imposed and no indefensible and avoidable
background conditions are permitted that
impede, restrict, or deny a person a chance
to compete for or enjoy some good that is
available to others (Cauthen, 1987: 100).
All citizens should benefit from social,

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journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H

political, and economic equality. People

must have equal access and equal influence,
i.e. all people must be assumed equal. In
most societies, there exists a wide disparity in
political, social, and economic access. Those
states in which access is restricted by any
measure (wealth, lineage, race, and gender)
will necessarily violate the equality assumption.
Gender equality must be measured based
on social equality, which can be understood
as the relationship between and among individuals in which individuals do not constrain one another (Oppenheim, 1961). A
persons social position accords not only
status, but also access to political and economic systems (United Nations, 1984: 17).
Formal access to the political and economic
spheres translates into power and opportunities that enable a person to choose a way
of life and to experience equality of opportunity.
Social equality is, unfortunately, quite
difficult to measure in a cross-cultural study.
Even when not overtly subordinated,
women operate in a society that gives men
vast influence. No adequate measures exist
to gauge the social pressures that keep
women from certain employment or out of
the labor force entirely. Women, for
example, may earn high wages but may not
be allowed to control their wealth. Similarly,
it is difficult to determine if women choose
to become homemakers or if being a wife
and mother is their only alternative.
In theory, each measure of gender
equality captures a different aspect of
equality social, political, or economic. In
practice, however, the three measures are
highly correlated, for social, political, and
economic access are interdependent. If a
woman has low social standing, for example,
she is unlikely to gain political office. As a
result, each gender equality variable does not
represent a discrete measure of social, political, or economic equality but represents a

volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000

combination of all three, with each measure

having a different emphasis.

Research Design
This research is based on the theories that
women and mens values differ in that
women are less likely to advocate a military
response to resolve international disputes,
and that gender equality correlates with lower
levels of state militarism internationally. This
project tests whether higher levels of gender
equality yield lower levels of militarism,
measured by the use of military action as a
foreign policy tool from 1960 through 1992.
Data availability and reliability limit the
time-frame for this analysis, as statistics for
gender equality are neither widely available
nor reliable prior to 1960; and the 1992 end
year is a constraint of the dataset.
Multivariate logistic regression7 is performed to test the hypothesis using the
Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (MID)
(Bremer, 1996), which measures interstate
conflict. MID identifies 2187 incidences of
states involved in international disputes,
representing the total number of militarized,
international disputes by country during this
time-frame. There were a total of 159 states
involved in militarized international disputes; a dispute between two states counted
twice, once for each country involved.

Definitions and Measures of Variables

Independent Variables
Gender equality serves as the independent
variable, and militarism as the dependent
variable in this analysis. Militarism is measured by the level of military action
employed by a state for each militarized
international dispute in which it becomes
7

The SAS statistical package is used to run the analyses.

The parameter estimates given in the tables have been
multiplied by 1, to aid in interpreting the results and to
conform with other statistical packages.

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Mary Caprioli

involved. The unit of analysis is a state in a

particular militarized dispute matched, for
each dispute, with independent variables calculated for each calendar year. Thus, any
changes in the independent variables are
determined yearly. Several control variables
are used: contiguity, alliances, wealth, and
democracy. The independent variables do
not change significantly over the course of
each dispute and are coded for each country
for the start year of each dispute.
Measures of Gender Equity
The level of gender equality is determined by
evaluating womens social, political, and
economic equality in relation to that of men.
Social Equality
Fertility Rate This variable represents a
complex combination of interrelated social,
political, and economic aspects of womens
lives, and is available from the World Bank.
Womens lives are generally described in
terms of motherhood in societies in which
women have low social status. Fertility rate,
therefore, becomes an important measure of
womens social equality, of opportunities
beyond motherhood. Indeed, fertility rate
captures the interrelation among social,
economic, and political access: womens
access to reproductive health services is constrained by their broader social deprivation,
including the lack of resources for or priority
to their health, restrictions on social participation, and limited access to information
due to illiteracy (Sadik, 1997).
In addition, women who have no control
over their own fertility rate are less likely to
participate in the labor force than women
who exercise more control over their reproduction (Dixon-Mueller, 1993: chs 5 and
6). Fertility is related to womens status in
that high fertility rates result in poorer
health, and lower levels of education,
employment, and decisionmaking in both

GENDERED CONFLICT

the family and community (UN, 1995: 15).

In general, lower fertility rates result in
womens empowerment in that they have
greater control over their own lives and more
free time (UNDP, 1995: 111).
Level of education is a potential measure
of womens social status; yet education, as a
whole, has increased worldwide, resulting in
little variation among states, and studies
conducted by the UN, UNFPA, and the
UNDP have linked womens education to
lower fertility. This relation between education and fertility holds regardless of
region, culture, or level of development and
is a result of five or six years of schooling
(Sadik 1997: ch. 2). A strong relationship
between control over fertility rate and economic standing also exists. Access to reproductive health services enhances womens
self-esteem, their confidence, their participation in political and community life, their
decision-making power and their position in
the family (Sadik, 1997: ch. 2).
Political Equality
Percent Women in Parliament The
percent women in parliament variable
reflects the percentage of women in the
upper house of parliament. The upper house
of parliament is used as it has a greater
impact on foreign policy than does the lower
house and is most comparable to those
states that are unicameral. The InterParliamentary Union compiles statistics on
women in parliament and provides dates for
the year suffrage was extended to women.
Suffrage The suffrage variable is derived
by subtracting the year women gained suffrage from the start year for the militarized
dispute. The resulting figure is the number
of years women have had political influence
via voting at the onset of the militarized
dispute. The longer women have had the
vote, the greater should be their influence.

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journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H

Formal political power best captures

womens political equality. Beyond influence gained through voting in democracies,
women obtain formal political power by
serving as members of government.
Theoretically, womens political power
would increase with their level of equality
within society. The second aspect of
womens political influence is suffrage. The
more politically powerful women are as a
group, the more influence they should have
on the decisions of leaders, at least in democratic states.
Female leaders were not used as an independent variable, for two important reasons.
First, few women have held the position of
president or prime minister, thus representing an inadequate sample. Perhaps more
important, women in positions of power are
compelled to use a style that conveys strength
in traditional male terms (Sykes, 1993). This
need to conform to traditional male styles
may explain McGlen & Sarkees (1993)
finding that no gender gap existed between
women and men working within the State
Department or the Defense Department as
noted earlier. Women such as Margaret
Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, and Golda Meir
who emulate men are often described as
acting as though they were men. They prove
more likely to succeed as national political
leaders and are more likely in male-dominated societies to gain political power (Astin
& Leland, 1991; Fukuyama, 1998; Sykes,
1993). These female leaders, therefore, do
not necessarily represent the female gender
or the possible effect of domestic gender
equality on foreign policy.
Economic Equality
Percent Women in the Labor Force In
this project, the World Banks statistics on
female percent share of the labor force are
used.
Recognizing that economic access is

volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000

largely determined by social access, economic access is measured by womens share of

the adult labor force. Women gain a sense of
empowerment through participation in
industry, which increases individual political
efficacy, thus fostering political participation. Active participants in society develop
a new sense of efficacy, which ensures their
continual and broadening participation in
multiple spheres of their lives. Often, participation in industry, within the workplace,
is the key to gaining a sense of efficacy that
will translate into participation in the political arena (Pateman, 1970).
No perfect measurement of womens
economic access exists cross-nationally.
Labor statistics are the most reliable and are
widely available, though these too offer no
indication as to whether women have
control of their wages. Labor statistics
measure the number of women working, not
the type of employment, average wage, or
unpaid labor, such as housework and child
rearing. However, the focus of this project is
on economic participation, not on income
or type of employment, as income was not
found important in explaining the hypothesized dovish nature of women (Fite et al.,
1990; Gallagher, 1993; Welch & Thomas,
1988).
Control Variables
Contiguity This variable is the total
number of neighbors that are contiguous by
land. The data come from the Correlates of
War (COW) contiguity dataset (Gochman,
1991).
States are more likely to become engaged
in an international dispute with a contiguous state (see Bremer, 1992; Diehl,
1991; Gleditsch, 1995; Goertz & Diehl,
1992; Maoz & Russett, 1992, 1993;
Rummel, 1994; Siverson & Starr, 1991).
The number of neighbors variable is used to
control for contiguity, as the probability of

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Mary Caprioli

GENDERED CONFLICT

conflict is dependent on the number of

neighbors (Gleditsch & Hegre, 1998).

tarism internationally rather than domestic

gender equality.

Number of Alliance Partners This variable represents the number of states sharing
membership in a defense pact or an entente.
These data are available from the COW
Alliance dataset (Singer & Small, 1993).
Some scholars have found alliance ties to
diminish the likelihood of war (Bremer,
1992; Maoz & Russett, 1992; Weede,
1983), while others (Rousseau et al., 1996)
report that alliance ties do not decrease the
likelihood of conflict. The number of
alliance partners may be sufficient to deter
attack, thereby reducing the number of
militarized disputes, or may increase
the number of militarized disputes as
alliance partners are drawn into an ongoing
dispute.

Wealth The PENN World Table (Mark

5.6) (Summers & Heston, 1991) provides a
variable for real GDP per capita in constant
dollars using Chain index, 1985 international prices calculated yearly by state.
Wealth has been identified as an
important variable in predicting war both as
a direct factor (see Maoz & Russett, 1992)
and as a factor in classifying major powers.
Major powers are, in general, more likely to
become involved in wars (Bremer, 1992,
1980; Small & Singer, 1982). On the contrary, satisfied powers and developed states
have been found to be less bellicose
(Brawley, 1993; Kacowicz, 1995; Lemke &
Reed, 1996; Morgan & Campbell, 1991;
Rousseau et al., 1996), as wealthy states have
much to lose from violent conflict and little
marginal utility to gain (Maoz & Russett,
1993; Mueller, 1989).
Relative power also matters, with a preponderance of power generally accepted as
preventing war (see Sullivan, 1990).
Democratic states, however, when initiating
military violence, have done so against states
with inferior military, economic, and political capabilities (Forsythe, 1992; Gartzke,
1998; James & Mitchell, 1995). A relative
measure of power between states is not as
important as wealth in predicting war.
Indeed, the power capabilities variable has
little explanatory capability, for every state is
in a relative power position with regard to
other states, yet these power disparities do
not often result in war or militarized disputes (Gochman, 1998: 3). In addition, the
gender equity variables may be higher in
wealthier states, thus requiring a control
variable for wealth.

Democracy This variable is calculated

from Jaggers and Gurr Polity III dataset
(1996) and is a continuous term from 10
through 10, with 10 being the highest score
for democracy. The continuous score was
calculated by subtracting the autocracy score
from the democracy score ([democracy
score] minus [autocracy score]).
Although some research indicates the
democratic peace thesis to be dyadic
(Chan, 1984; Maoz & Russett, 1993;
Russett, 1990; Small & Singer, 1976;
Weede, 1984), other research (Benoit, 1996;
Bremer, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita &
Lalman, 1992; Gleditsch & Hegre, 1997;
Ray, 1995; Rummel, 1995) hints at a possible monadic relation between democracy
and militarism. A measure of democracy,
therefore, is included based on elements of
the democratic peace literature indicating
that democracies may be less bellicose. In
addition, many of the gender equity variables may be higher in democracies, thus
necessitating a control variable to test
whether democracy is affecting state mili-

China A dummy control variable is

included with fertility in the logistic
regression. This is necessary as China has an

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journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H

volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000

artificially low fertility rate that is not necessarily a product of female equality.

not be coded more than once for each state

involved.

Dependent Variable

Results

The level of military action employed by a

state creates a useful measure capturing a
states level of militarism through its reliance
on force as defined by various levels of, or
absence of, military action. A states level of
militarism is, perhaps, one of the better indicators of peace and is analogous to its
emphasis on force as a means of international conflict resolution (Latham, 1993).
Once again, women are less likely than men
are to support the use of militarized force as
a means of international conflict resolution,
and high levels of domestic gender equity
have been linked to lower levels of state militarism internationally. A states emphasis on
force, therefore, should be inversely related
to the level of gender equity the higher the
level of gender equity, the lower the level of
militarism.

Before analyzing the data, a few matters

should be discussed concerning the variables. This project tested the following operationalized hypotheses with regard to gender
equity all of which were confirmed:8

Militarism
Hostility Level The Militarized Interstate
Dispute data (Bremer, 1996), used in this
analysis, offer five different hostility levels
coded as follows: (1) no militarized action,
(2) threat to use force, (3) display of force,
(4) use of force, and (5) war.
A single dispute involving two states
would be coded twice because this analysis
focuses on the level of international militarism employed relative to the level of
domestic gender equality. For example, the
Falklands War involved both Argentina and
the UK. The militarized, international
dispute is listed twice, once for each country.
Because the Falklands War was a war
between two countries, each states level of
military force was coded 5 for war.
Although the Falklands War occurred only
during one year, a multiple-year war would

Political equality
Hypothesis 1: States with a higher percentage of women in parliament will
experience lower levels of international
violence.
Hypothesis 2: States with a longer duration of female suffrage will experience
lower levels of international violence.
Social equality
Hypothesis 3: States with lower fertility
rates will exhibit lower levels of international violence.
Economic equality
Hypothesis 4: States with higher female
participation in the labor force will
exhibit lower levels of international violence.
As outlined above, the independent variables
are fertility rate, female percent of the labor
force, female percent of parliament, duration
of female suffrage, contiguity, alliances,
wealth, and democracy. The four measures of
gender equality are correlated and introduce
multicollinearity in the regression.9 In order
to correct for the bias of multicollinearity,
8

These results were replicated with mulitvariate

regression (SPSS statistical package) using the COW data
set (Singer & Small, 1993) with identical independent
variables and with a dependent variable of fatality level.
The only notable difference was with economic
equality/labor force, which failed to show significance (p 
0.117). This may be attributed to a small N (49).
9 Each variable was systematically dropped from the equation and the coefficients and standard errors were affected,
thereby indicating that multicollinearity was biasing the
equation.

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Mary Caprioli

GENDERED CONFLICT

Table I. Military Disputes as a Function of Political Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth,
19601992
Independent variables

Parameter estimates
.0263
.0276
.0156
.0212
.29E4
.6395
.4427
2.7498

% women in parliament
Democracy score
Contiguity
# of alliance partners
Wealth
Intercept 1
Intercept 2
Intercept 3

Standard error
***.00769
**.0102
.00924
****.0047
.17E4
.1840
.1359
.1952

N  1098
Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  69.1107
Model significance  p  .0001
** p  .01; *** p  .001; **** p  .0001

Table II. Military Disputes as a Function of Political Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth,
19601992
Independent variables

Parameter estimates

Standard error

Suffrage
Democracy score
Contiguity
# of alliance partners
Wealth
Intercept 1
Intercept 2
Intercept 3

.0121
.0126
.0186
.0158
.02E3
3.7412
1.5477
2.6871

**.00376
.00928
*.00913
***.00421
.18E4
.1841
.1407
.1883

N  1316
Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  75.3090
Model significance  p  .0001
* p  .05; ** p  .01; *** p  .001

four separate logistic regressions are run with

each having the four control variables. An
additional dummy variable for China is
introduced into the social equality model
with fertility rate. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates first-order autocorrelation,
which was not significant in this analysis.
Political Equality
The results showed significance for the
length of female suffrage prior to the
dispute. Given two states, for example, the
state having twice the number of years of
female suffrage will be nearly five (4.94)
times as likely to resolve international disputes without military violence. The percent

women in parliament variable also showed

significance, with states having lower percentages of women in parliament being
more likely to use military violence to settle
disputes. As an illustration, a 5% decrease in
the proportion of women in parliament
renders a state nearly five (4.91) times as
likely to resolve international disputes using
military violence. This variable may become
even more important in the future, as states
currently have a relatively small percentage
of women in parliament. Only eight10 of
10

These states are the former Soviet Union, Romania,

Norway, Cuba, Sweden, Albania, the German Democratic
Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

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journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H

volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000

Table III. Military Disputes as a Function of Social Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth,
19601992
Independent variables

Parameter estimates

Standard error

Fertility rate
Democracy score
Contiguity
# of alliance partners
Wealth
China dummy variable
Intercept 1
Intercept 2
Intercept 3

.1435
.00320
.00879
.0165
.26E4
.1277
2.6744
.5087
3.7092

***.0408
.00948
.00954
****.00434
.02E3
.4092
.2829
.2603
.3053

N  1281
Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  75.9355
Model significance  p  .0001
*** p  .001; **** p  .0001

Table IV. Military Disputes as a Function of Economic Equality, Contiguity, Alliances, and Wealth,
19601992
Independent variables

Parameter estimates

Standard error

% women in labor force

Democracy score
Contiguity
# of alliance partners
Wealth
Intercept 1
Intercept 2
Intercept 3

.0104
.00698
.0140
.0130
.59E4
3.7294
1.5885
2.5808

*.00477
.00910
.00933
**.00423
***.17E4
.2073
.1717
.2105

N  1310
Log Likelihood Differential Test: 2  67.6217
Model significance  p  .0001
* p  .05; ** p  .01; *** p  .001

which exceed or meet the 30% threshold

established by the UN Commission on
Status of Women 1990 in order for women
to influence outcome to influence key
decisions and be taken seriously (UNDP,
1995: 108). Nevertheless, the percent
women in parliament shows statistical significance, thus indicating its importance.
Social Equality
As expected, those states with high fertility
rates, which represent a low social status for
women, were more likely to use force in
international disputes. For example,

decreasing the fertility rate by one-third

makes a state nearly five (4.67) times less
likely to use a military solution to settle
international disputes. As discussed above,
fertility rate encompasses a broad range of
concepts including level of education, available economic opportunities, political rights,
and overall social status. As such, fertility
rates best measure a womans overall status
by capturing not only an aspect of education, but also a measure of self-empowerment through control over her own life.
Expanding on Pateman (1970), a general
sense of efficacy political, economic, and

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Mary Caprioli

social is gained from self-empowerment,

being able to choose the number of children
to have or deciding how far apart to space
births.
Economic Equality
The percent women in the labor force
showed statistical significance in explaining
state bellicosity. These results are in keeping
with literature identifying participation in
the labor force as an important factor in
explaining the hypothesized dovish nature of
women (Fite et al., 1990; Gallagher, 1993;
Welch & Thomas, 1988). The significance
of percent women in the labor force seems to
indicate that participation in the workforce
alone is sufficient to empower women.
Presumably, participation in the labor force
results in other types of participation,
including voting and other forms of political
activism. Increasing the proportion of
women in the labor force by 5%, for
example, renders a state nearly five (4.95)
times less likely to use military force to
resolve international conflict.
Control Variables
Number of Neighbors Contiguity shows
no statistical significance. In reference to the
contiguity variable, Gochman (1998: 3)
argues that a static condition cannot, by
itself be the cause of a nonstatic outcome.
Proximity in itself is not the cause of military
disputes or wars, because every state has
neighbors, yet states are not always in conflict with these neighbors. Furthermore,
contiguity is linked with economic interdependence (Russett, 1967), and recent
research argues that economic interdependence significantly counteracts the influences of contiguity on the likelihood of war
(Oneal et al., 1996: 23). Further analysis
would be necessary to draw any conclusions
regarding contiguity. Such an analysis is
beyond the scope of this project.

GENDERED CONFLICT

Number of Alliance Partners This variable showed statistical significance in all four
logistic regressions. The fewer the number of
alliance partners, the greater level of militarism exhibited.
Wealth Wealth showed significance in all
but one multivariate logistic regression,11
indicating that countries with higher levels
of wealth as measured by real GDP per
capita are less likely to rely on military solutions to international disputes. This
finding fits well with theories arguing that
satisfied powers and developed states are less
bellicose (Brawley, 1993; Kacowicz, 1995;
Lemke & Reed, 1996; Morgan & Campbell,
1991; Rousseau et al., 1996).

Conclusion
As evidenced by the statistical significance of
all three measures of gender equality political, social, and economic gender equality
is an important predictor of a states level of
international militarism. The conclusion,
therefore, is that higher levels of gender
equality correlate with lower levels of military action to settle international disputes.
When contiguity, alliances, wealth, and
democracy were controlled for, those states
with higher levels of gender equality were
less likely to rely on military force to settle
international disputes.
Even at the most basic level, womens
domestic equality impacts foreign policy.
This research confirms that the inclusion of
women as equal members of society will
effect foreign policy, in that their domestic
equality correlates with lower levels of international militarism. This analysis lends
credence to the domesticinternational
violence theory in that domestic inequality
11

This result is likely a function of multicollinearity

between fertility rate and the wealth variable. When run
separately, each shows statistical significance. The better
specified model, however, includes both variables.

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journal of P E A C E R E S E A RC H

represents a certain level of intolerance and a

hierarchical organization, both of which
translate into a world-view that necessarily
places some people or states as superior to
others. In addition, this evidence on the
impact of gender equality on foreign policy
does not necessarily contradict gender-gap
scholars, for the inclusion of women as equal
members of society seems to correlate with
lower levels of international militarism.
Whether this outcome is a function of a
gender gap or of having a more genderneutral value system, as Tessler & Warriner
(1997) suggest, remains unclear.
A world-view based on prejudice (against
women or other minorities) translates into a
level of global intolerance resulting in higher
levels of bellicosity against those states not
perceived as equal. Drawing from the democratic peace literature (Weart, 1994), states
do not go to war with other states that are
perceived as equal. Foreign policy goals to
ensure peace, therefore, should concentrate
more on supporting organizations aimed at
improving the status of women, including
those aimed at lowering fertility rates and
offering credit to women for business enterprises, especially in developing countries.
Future research should be directed at
better understanding the impact of all types
of domestic inequality on foreign policy
behavior. As evidenced by this research, feminist theory has the potential to add to our
understanding of international relations. We
must try to refine our measures for gender
equality, as they are rough and complex
measures. The significance of these measures,
despite their shortcomings, may indicate a
fundamental link between domestic gender
equality and international militarism. This
link surely goes beyond gender equality to
ethnic and racial disparities.
Indeed, Mueller (1973: 147148; 1994:
43) found that African-Americans were
more dovish in that as a group, they were
largely against escalation and for withdrawal

volume 37 / number 1 / january 2000

during World War II, the Korean War, the

Vietnam War, and the Gulf War. These
various types of domestic inequalities
should be analyzed in order to help scholars
better understand both the domesticinternational link in predicting states international behavior and conflict behavior in
general.
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MARY CAPRIOLI, b. 1968, PhD in Political

Science (University of Connecticut, 1999);
Assistant Professor, University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth (1999 ). Current
research interest: conflict and cooperation.

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