Remembering The

Ocean
Ranger

Accident Investigation and Lessons

Learned
Name: [CHRIS AMPIAH]
E-mail: [cyampiah@yahoo.com]

London South Bank University

Department of Applied Science
Faculty of Engineering, Science and the Built Environment
103 Borough Road, London, SE1 0AA
www.lsbu.ac.uk

ABSTRACT
The Ocean Ranger was the worlds largest mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU)
when it developed a severe list and sank off the coast of Newfoundland in
February 15, 1982 taking with it the lives of all 84 crew members aboard. This
loss of life and property was as a result of a combination of several preventable
incidents ultimately leading to a crescendo of fatalities. A timeline of how the
events unfolded has been constructed to set the pace for further understanding
of the mechanism behind this accident. It was established that, the series of
chain events was initiated by a vicious storm passing over the Newfoundland
area at that time. So severe was the storm that, this engineering marvel lost its
structural integrity, and coupled with a number of factors such as human error
and other engineering errors, the rig succumbed to the pressures of the storm
and sank. An event tree and fault tree constructed for the purposes of this study
provided further insight into the various paths available for the turn of events
and the probability of such events occurring. A further root cause analysis
confirmed that the loss of the Ocean Ranger was the result of not any one factor
alone but a dint of bad luck, several design flaws exacerbated by lack of training
and human errors. Following this epic accident that plagued the oil and gas
industry, a new paradigm of health and safety improvement regulations were
instituted particularly in the global offshore industry. In conclusion, the Ocean
Ranger disaster could have been prevented had there been a rigorous
emergency plan instituted in conjunction with proper training and drills for all
personnel on board, as well as the provision of life saving equipments.

INTRODUCTION
The Ocean Ranger was an engineering milestone achieved in the 1970s and
deemed the largest semi submersible Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU) in the
world at time of its completion in 1976. Owned by Ocean Drilling and Exploration
Company (ODECO), it was built by the Japanese firm Mitsubishi in Hiroshima,
Japan and was designed to operate in the harshest of environmental conditions,
or so it was claimed.
As the pride of the offshore industries breaking new frontiers, the Ocean Ranger
was thought to be unsinkable at that time. However, this self-propelled semisubmersible rig sank whiles drilling in the Hibernia oilfield in the Grand Banks
area 267 kilometres off St Johns, Newfoundland, Canada.
On Valentines Day the 14th of February, 1982, the submersible drilling rig, was
battered by a ferocious storm which broke a port light causing the ingress of
water and the subsequent short circuiting of control equipment panels. After
about a 16 hour struggle to regain control of the rig, it finally toppled forcing all
84 crew aboard to instinctively jump into the icy cold waters for a chance of
survival. Unfortunately, all of these bold crew men were never to be seen alive
again despite a concerted effort by nearby vessels to rescue them. This

seemingly unsinkable marvel of technology had been overpowered by the forces

of nature in the freezing North Atlantic Ocean,

History:
In the 1960s Canada embarked on a quest to prospect oil reserves off its eastern
sea boarders and this drive was well underway by the 1970s . In 1979, increased
exploration activities focusing on the Grand Banks discovered the Hibernia
Oilfield off the coast of Newfoundland. The Ocean Ranger drilling rig was thus,
contracted by Mobil Canada (MOCAN) to drill delineation wells to map out the
Hibernia Oilfield beginning in 1980 [3].

Fig.1 - Geographical location of the Hibernia oil field relative to St Johns,

Newfoundland [2]

Drilling Locations History

Because the Ocean Ranger was a drilling rig rather than a production rig, it was
normally deployed at drilling sites or in some cases at a standby location. Table 1
lists the period and geographic location where the Ocean Ranger was engaged in
offshore drilling operations [3].
Tab. 1 - Ocean ranger drilling location and days spent
Year
Geographical Location
Number of days
1980 - 1982
Grand Banks off Newfoundland
465
1980
Off coast of Ireland
126
1979/1980
Baltimore Canyon
166
1977
Lower Cook Inlet
111
1976/1977
Gulf of Alaska
232
1976
Bering Sea
99

Severe Weather History:

The US Coastguard Report (1983) laments that weather and sea data recorded
by the Ocean Ranger indicated the rig had experienced over 50 significant
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storms whilst drilling at the various locations indicated in Table 1. From the
records, it was also retrieved that the rig had experienced the most severe
weather from 16th to 20th January, 1982 while drilling in the Hibernia Oilfield. The
report further states that this storm had negligible effect on the Ocean Ranger
apart from altering its position over the well due to lose anchor tensions. During
the course of this 5 day severe weather period, the marine riser was
disconnected on two occasions due to heaving of the drilling rig caused by the
terrible weather, resuming drilling only when the weather and sea subsided [3].

Incident History:
On 6th February, 1982, the Ocean ranger underwent a rather uncharacteristic list
(tilt) to 6 degrees whiles receiving fuel and drilling fluid supplies. A general
evacuation announcement was made over the public address system for all
hands to don life jackets and report to the lifeboat stations. The evacuation was
eventually halted as the list was subsequently corrected to normal.

UNIT DESCRIPTION:
The Rig:
The Ocean Ranger was a semi submersible drilling rig capable of self propulsion
designed for deepwater operations in water depths up to 3000 feet [1]. Its design
and construction ensured it could withstand extremely harsh environmental
conditions including simultaneously occurring 100 knots winds, 3 knots surface
current and 110 feet tall waves. The length and width of the rig was 122 meters
(400ft) and 80 meters (262 ft) respectively. It stood at a height of 46 meters
(151ft) excluding the derrick. The blueprints of the rig consisted of a platform or
upper haul, mounted on top of eight vertical columns which were in turn
attached to a lower catamaran-type hull consisting of two oval pontoons parallel
to each other (Fig. 2 and 3). The upper haul served as a living and working
quarters for the crew whilst the two pontoons were used to achieve the right
level of structural flotation. Rig stability was achieved by the eight columns
capable of elevating the platform above the normal effects of the sea. The entire
rig weighed in at 14,913 tons gross whereas its net tonnage was 12,097 .
The platform was made up of the upper deck and the lower deck. The upper deck
consisted of the drilling floor and derrick, the cranes, the anchor windlasses, the
helicopter deck, storage racks for drilling pipes, casings and risers, the crews
upper living quarters, office space and work areas, and the lifeboat. The lower
deck housed the generator room, the cellar areas, the mud system, storage
areas and the lower two floors of the crews quarters.

Fig. 2 - Side elevation of the Ocean Ranger structure [3]

Fig. 3 - Front Elevation of the Ocean Ranger structure [3]

Pontoons
The two pontoons of the lower hull were ovular in cross-section with dimensions
122 meters long, 19 meters wide with a depth of 7 meters (400ft*62ft*24ft)
each. These pontoons carried on their topside, eight platform-supporting
columns, arranged in a rectangular fashion and were each referred to as the
starboard pontoon and the port pontoon respectively, each supporting four
vertical columns. Apart from providing flotation to the rig structure, the pontoons
also contained ballast water, fresh water, drill water and fuel oil tanks. In each
pontoon were 16 tanks and aft of these tanks was situated a pump room inside
each pontoon. Aft of each pump room was a propulsion room which contained
two 3500 Horse Power DC electric motors per pontoon. These electric motors
together provided 14000 total shaft Horse power drive to two steerable ducted
propellers for propulsion.
The Ballast Control Room located in one of the eight columns, controlled the rigs
ballast system. From this room, personnel could remotely open and close valves
and operate ballast pumps. By manipulating the ballast water, the control room
6

operator could increase or decrease the draft (sinkage) of the rig, induce or
remove trims and heels. Thus, the distance between the rigs waterline and the
lowest point on the pontoon was controlled by varying the amount of ballast
water in both port and starboard pontoons

Mooring system
A 12 point mooring system consisting of twelve 45,000 pound anchors was used
to maintain the Ocean Ranger in position at a drilling site as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Theses anchors were normally housed on the rig by tensioning them up against
the anchor bolster located at the base of the four corner columns. Anchor
handling boats would run the anchors out from the rig and position them on
location during deployment to a particular well site.

;
Fig. 4 - Top elevation of the Ocean Ranger Mooring system [3]

The ballast control room:

This room was located in column SC-3, the third column aft, starboard side of the
pontoon. The room deck was about 28 ft above the drilling draft water line. The
general plan of the ballast control room is depicted in Fig. 5. There were four
port lights (glass windows) built in the column, which allowed the operator in the
room to visually observe sea conditions and the vessel draft. Each port light was
permanently installed according to Japanese Standards Association and could not
be opened. However, interior metal closures called deadlights were provided,
which when shut, covered the port lights from within. The ballast control console
was also located across the forward section of the ballast control room, such that
the operator always faced forward when operating the console.

Fig. 5 - Top view of the Ballast control room layout [3]

Supply Ships
The Canadian government required each oil rig to have a dedicated standby
vessel stationed nearby in case of an emergency. These vessels also supplied
food, water, and fuel to their respective units. The Seaforth Highlander served
as the Ocean Rangers standby vessel and stood off approximately five miles
away from the Ocean Ranger in compliance with safety regulations.

AVAILABLE EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

The primary lifesaving equipment on board the rig consisted of two 50-man
totally enclosed lifeboats, made of fibre glass reinforced plastics located on the
upper deck. The lifeboats were designed to be self-righting provided all
personnel were strapped in their seats with no significant accumulation of water
inside. Additionally, there were 10 Coast Guard approved 20-man inflatable life
rafts onboard with a total capacity of 200 persons all located on the upper deck;
four on the stern, two on the starboard side, two on the port side, and two on the
bow. In addition, the Seaforth Highlander was also at the beck and call of the
Ocean Ranger.

Fig. 6 The Ocean Ranger disaster timeline

Event 1:
Vicious
storm in
Hibernia
Field.

Event 3:
Large wave
hits rig and
breaks port
light. Sea
water floods
ballast
control
room.

14.0
16.42
0
Event 2:
Drilling
halted with
complicatio
ns.

19.45

Event 7:
Standby
vessel and
aerial
evacuation
requested.

Event 5:
Routine
checks
with
nearby
vessels.

21.30
Event 4: Loss
of control. Rig
begins to tilts
due to
uncontrolled
valve opening
and closure.

22.50

00.52
Event 6: Rig
tilts severely
to the
portside .All
counter
measure are
ineffective.
First mayday
call sent.

01.00

Event 9:
Standby
vessel
arrives.
Attempts
rescue.

01.30
Event 8: Last
radio
transmission.
Crew headed
for lifeboats.

01.50

Event 11:
Damaged
lifeboats
found
capsized by
rescue
vessels.
03.10

070
0

Event 10:
Ocean Ranger
sinks. Rescue
attempts fail.

MECHANISMS AND HYPOTHESES

Event recollection is solely being based on radio transmissions between the
Ocean Ranger, two other semi-submersibles drilling nearby, (Sedco 706 and
Zapata Ugland), Seaforth Highlander, and the MOCAN superintendent stationed
in St. Johns due to the loss of all 84 crew .Post accident investigation of the rig
by ROV and divers was used to recover key components of interest, as well as to
perform a comprehensive structural inspection [3].

Ballast control room port light failure

The initial event that led to the loss of the Ocean Ranger was the failure of the
port lights in the ballast control room. The exact cause of failure is unknown but
has been attributed to an impacting wave. It is of my opinion that the port light
had initially suffered some structural integrity issues, ultimately failing to
withstand the impact of the wave on that fateful night. Some argue that the
deadlight (metal safety shutters) could have been secured earlier at the onset of
the storm to prevent port light failure but realistically, the port lights were
needed open at all times so that the ballast room controller could observe
directly, the rigs position above the sea. Plus the rig crew had also been made to
believe that the rig was unsinkable and that nothing could go wrong.

Ballast control equipment failure

Following the port light shattering in the ballast control room, a substantial
amount of sea water immediately entered the room via avenues created by the
broken port light. Even though the crew then shut the deadlight window
immediately after sea water ingress, it was too late as the sea water was
sufficient enough to trigger a major electrical malfunction of the ballast control
console.

Forward list develops

As a direct result of this ballast room malfunction, several valves in the rigs
ballast system located in the pontoons begun to open and close uncontrollably.
This either allowed more sea water to enter into the rigs forward ballast tanks or
caused the onboard ballast water to drain towards the forward ballast tanks
causing the rig to develop an initially forward list. The degree of list and the
magnitude of draft increase were sufficient to allow for the ingress of flood water
into the rigs forward chain lockers through the pipe and wire trunk opening on
the top corner columns.

Crew begins evacuation

The exact reasons for this decision to abandon the rig is unknown since the rig
remained afloat for approximately 1.5 hours before sinking. That the crew may
have acted out of panic, desperation and the lack of in-depth knowledge
regarding emergency procedures. Hence their only instinctive act was to ice of
action. It is suspected that all crew members abandoned the rig by either

10

jumping into the freezing turbulent sea or via lifeboats with only so much on as
their regular clothes and life jackets.

List worsens until total submersion

The immediate cause of the loss of the Ocean Ranger was the progressive
downloading of the chain lockers in the forward columns and the subsequent
flooding of the rigs upper hull, resulting in the capsize of the rig by the bow. The
capsizing motion caused the rigs pontoons to make contact with the sea floor as
it turned over, damaging the forward ends of both pontoons.

Rescue effort
Amidst the torrential storm, The Seaforth Highland vessel was able to manoeuvre
its way close to one life boat with several survivors on board. Efforts to safely
transfer the crew however, ended in a catastrophic capsize of the lifeboat as its
stability was compromised by the efforts of the crew to transfer safely to the
Seaforth Highlander. The lifeboat was designed to have inherent self-righting
stability only when the occupants were strapped into their seats. Thus as the
men frantically started to transfer, the boat lost stability plunging the crew into
the icy cold sea. Rescue crews noted that victims in the water were unable to
help themselves when life rings and other devices were thrown at them Out of
the 84 crew on board the rig, only 22 bodies were recovered by search teams
and all were found to have died from hypothermia according to autopsy reports.
Search teams were also able to recover 2 lifeboats and 6 life rafts, all in disarray,
over the course of the next four days. In hindsight, the missing 62 crew most
likely also died as a result of severe hypothermia.

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Fig. 7 - Event Tree Analysis

control
equipment disabled
Water IngressBallast
to control
room
measures
Riglockers
listing continues
until capsize
Forward
Chain
flood
Forward listIneffective
develops counter
Crew evacuation
under stormy weather conditions
Port light failure

0.7

0.1

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.9

0.1

0.3

0.9

0.9

Success
0.8
0.5
5x10-6

0.1
0.2

0.5

0.5

6
7
8
9

Failure

12

Event tree guide

Tab. 2 - Event tree Guide
Pathway Consequence
1
Port light fails, water enters ballast control room, equipments shortcircuits in the ballast control room, forward list develops, all counter
measures fail, forward chain lockers flood, rig list severely and the
crew successfully abandon the sinking rig. Crew ok. Rig is lost
2
Port light fails, water enters ballast control room, equipments disable
in the ballast control room, forward list develops, all counter
measure fail, forward chain lockers flood, rig list severely and the
crew fails to successfully abandon ship due to sever storm. Rig and
crew are lost.
3
Rig does not continue to list severely, giving the crew time to
evacuate successfully. Crew ok .Rig is somewhat ok.
4
Rig does not continue to list severely, but the crew are unable to
evacuate due to sever storm battering them. Crew lost. Rig is ok.
5
Forward chain lockers do not flood due to a safety cover that seals
them. Rig is ok. No need for evacuation
6
Counter measures to save the rig proves effective to competence
operators. The rig is saved from further listing and the crew remain
on board without evacuating. Crew and rig are ok.
7
Ballast control room equipment is water resistant and does not short
circuit. Rig control is not lost. Rig is ok. Crew is ok.
8
Sea water fails to enter the Ballast control room. Room is dry and all
equipments function fine. Rig is ok. Crew is ok.
9
Deadlight secures the opening and port light does not shatter Rig
stays afloat. Rig is ok. Crew is ok.

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ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS

The loss of the MODU OCEAN RANGER was not the result of any one action, but
rather a disastrous chain of events as discussed already. It was the culmination
of several minor design flaws and several human factors. It is quite probable
however, that this could have been prevented or damages minimised. The
contributing causes of capsize and the subsequent sinking of the Ocean Ranger
are listed below.

Human factors/errors:

Lack of understanding of ballast control system

Lack of understanding of rig stability concepts
Failure to properly address the listing incident of February 6, 1982

Operational issues:

production pressures forcing the crew to continue drilling into the

storm
Lack of detailed ballast control procedures in the operating manual
Lack of personnel training and certification

Engineering/design issues:

Poor ballast control design

Poor position of the ballast control room
Lack of watertight chain lockers
Absence of control instrumentation especially in the chain lockers
Inability to pump water out of chain lockers

Evacuation and Rescue issues:

Lack of insulated and waterproof suits to complement life jacket

Lifeboat design flaws
Lack of proper equipments to transfer victims from lifeboat to
standby vessel
Lack of equipment to recover unconscious victims from the stormy
sea such as drag nets and hook

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Fig.8 Fault
Tree

TOP EVENT

15

CONCLUSION
The capsize of the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU), the Ocean Ranger, was a
horrific disaster resulting in the loss of 84 lives. Initiated by a broken portlight,
the chain of events that followed could have been prevented through proper
personnel training, zero tolerance for production pressure at the expense of
health and safety, proper emergency planning, and integrity in our daily
engineering workings.

REFERENCES
1. Government of Canada. (1984) Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine
Disaster Volume 1 & 2. Ottawa, Ontario.
2. The Canadian Encyclopaedia, Ocean Ranger. [Online] Available at:
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/ocean-ranger.[Accessed:15, May,
2014]
3. U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation.(1983) MODU Ocean Ranger,
Capsizing and Sinking in the Atlantic Ocean on February 15, 1982 with Multiple Loss
of Life. United States Coast Guard. Washington D.C.

Cover image by:

Vingh,C. (2014) Sunken Ocean Ranger. [Online] Available at:
http://charlesvinh.daportfolio.com/gallery/227981. [Accessed: 22 August, 2014]

WaveStructural
impact failu

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